G.R. No.

127578 February 15, 1999

MANUEL DE ASIS, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JAIME T. HAMOY, Branch 130, RTC, Kalookan City and GLEN CAMIL ANDRES DE ASIS represented
by her mother/guardian VIRCEL D. ANDRES, respondents.

PURISIMA, J.:

Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 oft he Revised Rules of Court seeking to nullify the decision of the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the trial court's Orders, dated November 25, 1993 and February 4, 1994, respectively, denying petitioner's Motion to
Dismiss the Complaint in Civil Case No. C-16107, entitled "Glen Camil Andres de Asis, etc. vs. Manuel de Asis", and the motion
for reconsideration.

The pertinent facts leading to the filing of the petition at bar are as follows:

On October 14, 1988, Vircel D. Andres, (the herein private respondent) in her capacity as the legal guardian of the minor, Glen
Camil Andres de Asis, brought an action for maintenance and support against Manuel de Asis, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-88-
935 before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 94, alleging that the defendant Manuel de Asis (the petitioner here)
is the father of subject minor Glen Camil Andres de Asis, and the former refused and/or failed to provide for the maintenance
of the latter, despite repeated demands.

In his Answer, petitioner denied his paternity of the said minor and theorized that he cannot therefore be required to provide
support for him.

On July 4, 1989, private respondent Vircel D. Andres, through counsel, sent in a manifestation the pertinent portion of which,
reads;

1. That this proposed Amended Answer, defendant (herein petitioner) has made a judicial
admission/declaration that "1). defendant denies that the said minor child (Glen Camil) is his child 2) he
(petitioner) has no obligation to the plaintiff Glen Camil . . .

2. That with the aforesaid judicial admission/declarations by the defendant, it seems futile and a useless
exercise to claim support from said defendant.

3. That under the foregoing circumstances it would be more practical that plaintiff withdraws the complains
against the defendant subject to the condition that the defendant should not pursue his counterclaim in the
above-entitled case, . . . 1

By virtue of the said manifestation, both the plaintiff and the defendant agreed to move for the dismissal of the case. Acting
thereupon, the Regional Trial Court a quo issued the following Order of August 8, 1989, dismissing Civil Case No. Q-88-935 with
prejudice, to wit:

Acting on the manifestation of Atty. Romualdo C. delos Santos, counsel for the defendant, that counsel for
the plaintiff Atty. Ismael J. Andres has no objection that this case be withdrawn provided that the defendant
will withdraw the counterclaim, as prayed for, let the case be dismissed with prejudice.

SO ORDERED.2

On September 7, 1995, another Complaint for maintenance and support was brought against Manuel A. de Asis, this time in the
name of Glen Camil Andres de Asis, represented by her legal guardian/mother, Vircel D. Andres. Docketed as Civil Case No. C-
16107 before Branch 130 of the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan, the said Complaint prayed, thus:
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendant:

1. To pay plaintiff the sum of not less than P2,000.00 per month for every month since June 1, 1987 as
support in arrears which defendant failed to provide plaintiff shortly after her birth in June 1987 up to
present;

2. To give plaintiff a monthly allowance of P5,000.00 to be paid in advance on or before the 5th of each and
every month.

3. To give plaintiff by way of support pendente lite a monthly allowance of P5,000.00 per month, the first
monthly allowance to start retroactively from the first day of this month and the subsequent ones to be
paid in advance on or before the 5th of each succeeding month.

4. To pay the costs of suit.

Plaintiff prays for such other relief just and equitable under the premises. 3

On October 8, 1993, petitioner moved to dismiss the Complaint on the ground of res judicata, alleging that Civil Case C-16107 is
barred by the prior judgment which dismissed with prejudice Civil Case Q -88-935.

In the Order dated November 25, 1993 denying subject motion to dismiss, the trial court ruled that res judicata is inapplicable
in an action for support for the reason that renunciation or waiver of future support is prohibited by law. Petitioner's motion
for reconsideration of the said Order met the same fate. It was likewise denied.

Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari. But on June 7, 1996, the Court of Appeals found that the said
Petition devoid of merit and dismissed the same.

Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this court via the present petition, posing the question whether or not the public
respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in upholding the denial of the
motion to dismiss by the trial court, and holding that an action for support cannot be barred by res judicata.

To buttress his submission, petitioner invokes the previous dismissal of the Complaint for maintenance and support, Civil Case
Q-88-935, filed by the mother and guardian of the minor, Glen Camil Andres de Asis, (the herein private respondent). In said
case, the complainant manifested that because of the defendant's judicial declaration denying that he is the father of subject
minor child, it was "futile and a useless exercise to claim support from defendant". Because of such manifestation, and
defendant's assurance that he would not pursue his counterclaim anymore, the parties mutually agreed to move for the
dismissal of the complaint. The motion was granted by the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, which then dismissed the case with
prejudice.

Petitioner contends that the aforecited manifestation, in effect admitted the lack of filiation between him and the minor child,
which admission binds the complainant, and since the obligation to give support is based on the existence of paternity and
filiation between the child and the putative parent, the lack thereof negates the right to claim for support. Thus, petitioner
maintains that the dismissal of the Complaint by the lower court on the basis of the said manifestation bars the present action
for support, especially so because the order of the trial court explicitly stated that the dismissal of the case was with prejudice.

The petition is not impressed with merit.

The right to receive support can neither be renounced nor transmitted to a third person. Article 301 of the Civil Code, the law in
point, reads:

Art. 301. The right to receive support cannot be renounced, nor can it be transmitted to a third person.
Neither can it be compensated with what the recipient owes the obligor. . . .

Furthermore, future support cannot be the subject of a compromise.

Art. 2035, ibid, provides, that:

No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:

(1) The civil status of persons;

(2) The validity of a marriage or legal separation;

(3) Any ground for legal separation

(4) Future support;

(5) The jurisdiction of courts;

(6) Future legitime.

The raison d' etre behind the proscription against renunciation, transmission and/or compromise of the right to support is
stated, thus:

The right to support being founded upon the need of the recipient to maintain his existence, he is not
entitled to renounce or transfer the right for this would mean sanctioning the voluntary giving up of life
itself. The right to life cannot be renounce; hence, support which is the means to attain the former, cannot
be renounced.

xxx xxx xxx

To allow renunciation or transmission or compensation of the family right of a person to support is virtually
to allow either suicide or the conversion of the recipient to a public burden. This is contrary to public
policy. 4

In the case at bar, respondent minor's mother, who was the plaintiff in the first case, manifested that she was withdrawing the
case as it seemed futile to claim support from petitioner who denied his paternity over the child. Since the right to claim for
support is predicated on the existence of filiation between the minor child and the putative parent, petitioner would like us to
believe that such manifestation admitting the futility of claiming support from him puts the issue to rest and bars any and all
future complaint for support.

The manifestation sent in by respondent's mother in the first case, which acknowledged that it would be useless to pursue its
complaint for support, amounted to renunciation as it severed the vinculum that gives the minor, Glen Camil, the right to claim
support from his putative parent, the petitioner. Furthermore, the agreement entered into between the petitioner and
respondent's mother for the dismissal of the complaint for maintenance and support conditioned upon the dismissal of the
counterclaim is in the nature of a compromise which cannot be countenanced. It violates the prohibition against any
compromise of the right to support.

Thus, the admission made by counsel for the wife of the facts alleged in a motion of the husband, in which
the latter prayed that his obligation to support be extinguished cannot be considered as an assent to the
prayer, and much less, as a waiver of the right to claim for support. 5

It is true that in order to claim support, filiation and/or paternity must first be shown between the claimant and the parent.
However, paternity and filiation or the lack of the same is a relationship that must be judicially established and it is for the court
to declare its existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties.

The civil status of a son having been denied, and this civil status, from which the right to support is derived
being in issue, it is apparent that no effect can be .given to such a claim until an authoritative declaration
has been made as to the existence of the cause. 6
Although in the case under scrutiny, the admission may be binding upon the respondent, such an admission is at most
evidentiary and does not conclusively establish the lack of filiation.

Neither are we persuaded by petitioner's theory that the dismissal with prejudice of Civil Case Q-88-935 has the effect of res
judicata on the subsequent case for support. The case of Advincula vs. Advincula 7 comes to the fore. In Advincula, the minor,
Manuela Advincula, instituted a case for acknowledgment and support against her putative father, Manuel Advincula. On
motion of both parties and for the reason that the "plaintiff has lost interest and is no longer interested in continuing the case
against the defendant and has no further evidence to introduce in support of the complaint", the case was dismissed.
Thereafter, a similar case was instituted by Manuela, which the defendant moved to dismiss, theorizing that the dismissal of
the first case precluded the filing of the second case.

In disposing such case, this Court ruled, thus:

The new Civil Code provides that the allowance for support is provisional because the amount may be
increased or decreased depending upon the means of the giver and the needs of the recipient (Art. 297);
and that the right to receive support cannot be renounced nor can it be transmitted to a third person
neither can it be compensated with what the recipient owes the obligator (Art .301). Furthermore, the right
to support can not be waived or transferred to third parties and future support cannot be the subject of
compromise (Art. 2035; Coral v. Gallego, 38 O.G. 3135, cited in IV Civil Code by Padilla, p. 648; 1956 Ed.).
This being true, it is indisputable that the present action for support can be brought, notwithstanding the
fact the previous case filed against the same defendant was dismissed. And it also appearing that the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 3553, was not an adjudication upon the merits, as heretofore shown, the right of
herein plaintiff-appellant to reiterate her suit for support and acknowledgment is available, as her needs
arise. Once the needs of plaintiff arise, she has the right to bring an action for support, for it is only then
that her cause for action is accrues.. . .

xxx xxx xxx

It appears that the former dismissal was predicated upon compromise. Acknowledgment, affecting as it
does the civil status of a persons and future support, cannot be the subject of compromise (pars. 1 & 4, Art.
2035, Civil Code). Hence, the first dismissal cannot have force and effect and can not bar the filing of
another action, asking for the same relief against the same defendant. (emphasis supplied).

Conformably, notwithstanding the dismissal of Civil Case Q-88-935 and the lower court's pronouncement that such dismissal
was with prejudice, the second action for support may still prosper.

WHEREFORE, the petition under consideration is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 145527 : May 28, 2002

AUGUSTUS CAEZAR R. GAN, Petitioner, v. HON. ANTONIO C. REYES, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC-Br. 61, Baguio City,
ALBERT G. TOLENTINO, in his capacity as RTC Sheriff of Baguio City, and FRANCHESKA JOY C. PONDEVIDA, assisted by
BERNADETTE C. PONDEVIDA, Respondents.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

Quite apprehensive that she would not be able to send to school her three (3)-year old daughter Francheska Joy S. Pondevida,
Bernadette S. Pondevida wrote petitioner Augustus Caezar R. Gan 1 demanding support for their "love child." Petitioner, in his
reply, denied paternity of the child. An exasperated Bernadette thereafter instituted in behalf of her daughter a complaint
against petitioner for support with prayer for support pendente lite.2cräläwvirtualibräry

Petitioner moved to dismiss on the ground that the complaint failed to state a cause of action. He argued that since
Francheska's certificate of birth indicated her father as "UNKNOWN," there was no legal or factual basis for the claim of
support.3 His motion, however, was denied by the trial court.4cräläwvirtualibräry

Despite denial of his motion, petitioner failed to file his answer within the reglementary period. Thus, on 19 January 2000
private respondent moved that petitioner be declared in default, which motion was granted. In its Order declaring petitioner in
default the trial court noted that petitioner's Motion to Admit Answer was filed more than ninety (90) days after the expiration
of the reglementary period, and only after private respondent moved that petitioner be declared in default. Petitioner's motion
for reconsideration was also denied. Hence, the court received the evidence of private respondent ex parte.

After finding that the claim of filiation and support was adequately proved, the trial court rendered its Decision on 12 May 2000
ordering petitioner to recognize private respondent Francheska Joy S. Pondevida as his illegitimate child and support her
with P20,000.00 every month to be paid on or before the 15th of each month starting 15 April 2000. Likewise petitioner was
ordered to pay Francheska Joy S. Pondevida the accumulated arrears of P20,000.00 per month from the day she was
born, P50,000.00 as attorney's fees and P25,000.00 for expenses of litigation, plus P20,000.00 on or before the 15th of every
month from 15 May 2000 as alimony pendente lite should he desire to pursue further remedies against private
respondent.5cräläwvirtualibräry

Forthwith, private respondent moved for execution of the judgment of support, which the trial court granted by issuing a writ
of execution, citing as reason therefor private respondent's immediate need for schooling.6 Pursuant to the writ, the sheriff
levied upon a motor vehicle, a Honda City, with Plate No. UMT 884, registered in the name of "A.B. Leasing & Fin. Corp., Leased
to: G & G Trading," and found within the premises of petitioner's warehouse in Caloocan City. 7cräläwvirtualibräry

Meanwhile, petitioner appealed the Judgment to the Court of Appeals.8cräläwvirtualibräry

On 9 June 2000 petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals imputing grave abuse of
discretion to the trial court for ordering the immediate execution of the judgment. Petitioner averred that the writ of execution
was issued despite the absence of a good reason for immediate enforcement. Petitioner insisted that as the judgment sought to
be executed did not yet attain finality there should be an exceptional reason to warrant its execution. He further alleged that
the writ proceeded from an order of default and a judgment rendered by the trial court in complete disregard of his "highly
meritorious defense." Finally, petitioner impugned the validity of the writ as he argued that it was issued without notice to him.
Petitioner stressed the fact that he received copy of the motion for immediate execution two (2) weeks after its scheduled
hearing.9cräläwvirtualibräry

On 31 August 2000 the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the ratiocination that under Sec. 4, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure judgments for support are immediately executory and cannot be stayed by an appeal. Thus, it did not help
petitioner any to argue that there were no good reasons to support its immediate execution. The second challenge hurled
against the validity of the writ concerning the lack of notice and hearing was likewise dismissed with the appeals court favoring
substantial justice over technicalities. Lastly, petitioner's justification for belatedly filing his answer, i.e., miscommunication with
his lawyer, was disregarded since it fell short of the statutory requirements of "fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence."10cräläwvirtualibräry

His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner came to us impugning the dismissal of his petition for certiorari.
Petitioner argues that under the rules a judgment for support which is subject of an appeal cannot be executed absent any
good reason for its immediate execution. Petitioner likewise attacks the validity of the writ asserting that it was issued in
violation of his right to notice and hearing. Petitioner also seeks the setting aside of the default order and the judgment
rendered thereafter for the reason that should he be allowed to prove his defense of adultery, the claim of support would be
most likely denied.11 Petitioner claims that in an action by a child against his putative father, adultery of the child's mother
would be a valid defense to show that the child is a fruit of adulterous relations for, in such case, it would not be the child of the
defendant and therefore not entitled to support. Parenthetically, how could he be allowed to prove the defense of adultery
when it was not even hinted that he was married to the mother of Francheska Joy. Petitioner consents to submit to
Dioxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Testing to resolve the issue of paternity, which test he claims has a reputation for
accuracy.12cräläwvirtualibräry

A careful review of the facts and circumstances of this case fails to persuade this Court to brand the issuance of the writ of
execution by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals with the vice of grave abuse of discretion. There is no
evidence indeed to justify the setting aside of the writ on the ground that it was issued beyond the legitimate bounds of judicial
discretion.

Section 4, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court clearly states that, unless ordered by the trial court, judgments in actions for support
are immediately executory and cannot be stayed by an appeal. This is an exception to the general rule which provides that the
taking of an appeal stays the execution of the judgment and that advance executions will only be allowed if there are urgent
reasons therefor. The aforesaid provision peremptorily calls for immediate execution of all judgments for support and makes no
distinction between those which are the subject of an appeal and those which are not. To consider then petitioner's argument
that there should be good reasons for the advance execution of a judgment would violate the clear and explicit language of the
rule mandating immediate execution.

Petitioner is reminded that to the plain words of a legal provision we should make no further explanation. Absoluta sententia
expositore non indiget. Indeed, the interpretation which petitioner attempts to foist upon us would only lead to absurdity, its
acceptance negating the plain meaning of the provision subject of the petition.

Petitioner would also have us annul the writ of execution on the ground that he was not notified of its issuance. We are unable
to accept such a plea for enough has been done by petitioner to delay the execution of the writ. As the records show, in partial
fulfillment of the writ of execution petitioner surrendered a sedan which apparently was not his as it was later ordered released
to a third party who laid claim over the levied vehicle.13 Also, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a Motion for Leave to
Deposit in Court Support Pendente Lite promising to deposit the amount due as support every 15th of the month, but to date
has not deposited any amount in complete disavowal of his undertaking.14 He was not even deterred from appealing before us
and needlessly taking up our time and energy by posing legal questions that can be characterized, at best, as flimsy and trivial.
We are thus not prepared to abrogate the writ of execution issued in favor of private respondent for substantial justice would
be better served if petitioner be precluded from interposing another barrier to the immediate execution of the support
judgment.

We are not intimating that in every case the right to notice of hearing can be disregarded. That is not so. It appears in this case
that there has been too much temporizing in the execution of the writ which must not be allowed to thwart the constitutional
mandate for speedy disposition of cases. As has been said, a technicality should be an aid to justice and not its great hindrance
and chief enemy.15 Truly, if the writ of execution would be voided on this ground alone, then procedural rules which were
primarily drafted to protect parties in the realm of constitutional guarantees would acquire a new sanctity at the expense of
equity and justice.

Lastly, we note that no useful purpose would be served if we dwell on petitioner's arguments concerning the validity of the
judgment by default and his insistence that he be subjected, together with private respondent Bernadette C. Pondevida to DNA
testing to settle the issue of paternity. The futility of his arguments is very apparent. It is not for us at this instance to review or
revise the Decision rendered by the trial court for to do so would pre-empt the decision which may be rendered by the Court of
Appeals in the main case for support.
In all cases involving a child, his interest and welfare are always the paramount concerns. There may be instances where, in
view of the poverty of the child, it would be a travesty of justice to refuse him support until the decision of the trial court
attains finality while time continues to slip away. An excerpt from the early case of De Leon v. Soriano16 is relevant, thus:

The money and property adjudged for support and education should and must be given presently and without delay because if
it had to wait the final judgment, the children may in the meantime have suffered because of lack of food or have missed and
lost years in school because of lack of funds. One cannot delay the payment of such funds for support and education for the
reason that if paid long afterwards, however much the accumulated amount, its payment cannot cure the evil and repair the
damage caused. The children with such belated payment for support and education cannot act as gluttons and eat voraciously
and unwisely, afterwards, to make up for the years of hunger and starvation. Neither may they enrol in several classes and
schools and take up numerous subjects all at once to make up for the years they missed in school, due to non-payment of the
funds when needed.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the Decision sought to be reviewed, the instant petition is DENIED. The 31 August
2000 Decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the Petition for Certiorari instituted by petitioner Augustus Caezar C. Gan and
upholding the validity of the 2 June 2000 Writ of Execution issued by the Regional Trial Court Br. 61, Baguio City, in Civil Case
No. 4234-R, is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 125041 June 30, 2006

MA. BELEN B. MANGONON, for and in behalf of her minor children REBECCA ANGELA DELGADO and REGINA ISABEL
DELGADO. Petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA, Presiding Judge, RTC-Makati, Branch 149, FEDERICO
C. DELGADO and FRANCISCO C. DELGADO, Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 20 March 1996, affirming
the Order, dated 12 September 19952 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 149, Makati, granting support pendente lite to
Rebecca Angela (Rica) and Regina Isabel (Rina), both surnamed Delgado.

The generative facts leading to the filing of the present petition are as follows:

On 17 March 1994, petitioner Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, in behalf of her then minor children Rica and Rina, a Petition for
Declaration of Legitimacy and Support, with application for support pendente lite with the RTC Makati. 3 In said petition, it was
alleged that on 16 February 1975, petitioner and respondent Federico Delgado were civilly married by then City Court Judge
Eleuterio Agudo in Legaspi City, Albay. At that time, petitioner was only 21 years old while respondent Federico was only 19
years old. As the marriage was solemnized without the required consent per Article 85 of the New Civil Code, 4 it was annulled
on 11 August 1975 by the Quezon City Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. 5

On 25 March 1976, or within seven months after the annulment of their marriage, petitioner gave birth to twins Rica and Rina.
According to petitioner, she, with the assistance of her second husband Danny Mangonon, raised her twin daughters as private
respondents had totally abandoned them. At the time of the institution of the petition, Rica and Rina were about to enter
college in the United States of America (USA) where petitioner, together with her daughters and second husband, had moved
to and finally settled in. Rica was admitted to the University of Massachusetts (Amherst) while Rina was accepted by the Long
Island University and Western New England College. Despite their admissions to said universities, Rica and Rina were, however,
financially incapable of pursuing collegiate education because of the following:

i) The average annual cost for college education in the US is about US$22,000/year, broken down as follows:

Tuition Fees US$13,000.00

Room & Board 5,000.00

Books 1,000.00

Yearly Transportation &

Meal Allowance 3,000.00

Total US$ 22,000.00

or a total of US$44,000.00, more or less, for both Rica and Rina

ii) Additionally, Rica and Rina need general maintenance support each in the amount of US$3,000.00 per year or a
total of US$6,000 per year.

iii) Unfortunately, petitioner’s monthly income from her 2 jobs is merely US$1,200 after taxes which she can hardly
give general support to Rica and Rina, much less their required college educational support.
 iv) Neither can petitioner’s present husband be compelled to share in the general support and college education of
Rica and Rina since he has his own son with petitioner and own daughter (also in college) to attend to.

v) Worse, Rica and Rina’s petitions for Federal Student Aid have been rejected by the U.S. Department of Education. 6

Petitioner likewise averred that demands7 were made upon Federico and the latter’s father, Francisco, 8 for general support and
for the payment of the required college education of Rica and Rina. The twin sisters even exerted efforts to work out a
settlement concerning these matters with respondent Federico and respondent Francisco, the latter being generally known to
be financially well-off.9 These demands, however, remained unheeded. Considering the impending deadline for admission to
college and the opening of classes, petitioner and her then minor children had no choice but to file the petition before the trial
court.

Petitioner also alleged that Rica and Rina are her legitimate daughters by respondent Federico since the twin sisters were born
within seven months from the date of the annulment of her marriage to respondent Federico. However, as respondent
Federico failed to sign the birth certificates of Rica and Rina, it was imperative that their status as legitimate children of
respondent Federico, and as granddaughters of respondent Francisco, be judicially declared pursuant to Article 173 of the
Family Code.10

As legitimate children and grandchildren, Rica and Rina are entitled to general and educational support under Articles 174 11 and
195(b)12 in relation to Articles 194(1 and 2)13 and 199(c)14 of the Family Code. Petitioner alleged that under these provisions, in
case of default on the part of the parents, the obligation to provide support falls upon the grandparents of the children; thus,
respondent Federico, or in his default, respondent Francisco should be ordered to provide general and educational support for
Rica and Rina in the amount of US$50,000.00, more or less, per year.

Petitioner also claimed that she was constrained to seek support pendente lite from private respondents - who are millionaires
with extensive assets both here and abroad - in view of the imminent opening of classes, the possibility of a protracted
litigation, and Rica and Rina’s lack of financial means to pursue their college education in the USA.

In his Answer,15 respondent Francisco stated that as the birth certificates of Rica and Rina do not bear the signature of
respondent Federico, it is essential that their legitimacy be first established as "there is no basis to claim support until a final
and executory judicial declaration has been made as to the civil status of the children."16 Whatever good deeds he may have
done to Rica and Rina, according to respondent Francisco, was founded on pure acts of Christian charity. He, likewise, averred
that the order of liability for support under Article 199 of the Family Code is not concurrent such that the obligation must be
borne by those more closely related to the recipient. In this case, he maintained that responsibility should rest on the shoulders
of petitioner and her second husband, the latter having voluntarily assumed the duties and responsibilities of a natural father.
Even assuming that he is responsible for support, respondent Francisco contends that he could not be made to answer beyond
what petitioner and the father could afford.

On 24 May 1994, petitioner filed a Motion to Declare Defendant (respondent herein) Federico in Default. 17 This was favorably
acted upon by the trial court in the Order dated 16 June 1994.18

On 5 August 1994, respondent Federico filed a Motion to Lift Order of Default alleging that the summons and a copy of the
petition were not served in his correct address. 19 Attached thereto was his Answer20 where he claimed that petitioner had no
cause of action against him. According to him, he left for abroad and stayed there for a long time "[w]ithin the first one
hundred twenty (120) days of the three hundred days immediately preceding March 25, 1976" and that he only came to know
about the birth of Rica and Rina when the twins introduced themselves to him seventeen years later. In order not to antagonize
the two, respondent Federico claimed he did not tell them that he could not be their father. Even assuming that Rica and Rina
are, indeed, his daughters, he alleged that he could not give them the support they were demanding as he was only
making P40,000.00 a month.

Finding sufficient ground in the motion filed by respondent Federico, the trial court lifted its Order dated 16 June 1994 and
admitted his Answer.21

In the meantime, on 25 April 1994, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Set Application for Support Pendente Lite for Hearing
because Rica and Rina both badly needed immediate financial resources for their education. 22 This Motion was opposed by
respondent Francisco.23 After both parties submitted supplemental pleadings to bolster their respective positions, the trial
court resolved the motion in an Order dated 12 September 1995 in this wise:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, respondents are hereby directed to provide a monthly support
(pendente lite) of P5,000.00 each or a total of P10,000.00 for the education of Rebecca Angela and Regina Isabel Delgado to be
delivered within the first five days of each month without need of demand. 24

Unsatisfied with the Order of the trial court, petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals via Petition for Certiorari. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the holding of the trial court and disposed the petition in the following manner:

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED and the Order of the lower court dated September 12, 1995 is
hereby AFFIRMED.25

Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied through the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 16 May 1996. 26

Petitioner is now before this Court claiming that the Decision of the Court of Appeals was tainted with the following errors:

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT RESPONDENT JUDGE DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN FIXING THE AMOUNT OF MONTHLY SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE GRANTED TO PETITIONER’S CHILDREN AT A
MEASLEY P5,000.00 PER CHILD.

I.

RESPONDENT COURT IGNORED EVIDENCE ON RECORD OF THE FINANCIAL INCAPACITY OF RICA AND RINA’S PARENTS IN
DEFAULT OF WHOM THE OBLIGATION TO GIVE SUPPORT DEVOLVES ON THE GRANDFATHER.

II.

IT BEING ESTABLISHED THAT THE PERSON OBLIGED TO GIVE SUPPORT – GRANDFATHER DON PACO – IS UNDOUBTEDLY
CAPABLE OF GIVING THE AMOUNT DEMANDED, RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT JUDGE
ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN FIXING AN AMOUNT OF SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE THAT IS OBVIOUSLY
INADEQUATE TO SUPPORT THE EDUCATIONAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE RECIPIENTS. 27

At the time of the filing of the present Petition, it is alleged that Rica had already entered Rutgers University in New Jersey with
a budget of US$12,500.00 for academic year 1994-1995. She was able to obtain a tuition fee grant of US$1,190.00 and a Federal
Stafford loan from the US government in the amount of US$2,615.00. 28 In order to defray the remaining balance of Rica’s
education for said school year, petitioner claims that she had to secure a loan under the Federal Direct Student Loan Program.

Meanwhile, Rina entered CW Post, Long Island University, where she was expected to spend US$20,000.00 for the school year
1994-1995. She was given a financial grant of US$6,000.00, federal work study assistance of US$2,000.00, and a Federal
Stafford loan of US$2,625.00.29 Again, petitioner obtained a loan to cover the remainder of Rina’s school budget for the year.

Petitioner concedes that under the law, the obligation to furnish support to Rica and Rina should be first imposed upon their
parents. She contends, however, that the records of this case demonstrate her as well as respondent Federico’s inability to give
the support needed for Rica and Rina’s college education. Consequently, the obligation to provide support devolves upon
respondent Francisco being the grandfather of Rica and Rina.

Petitioner also maintains that as respondent Francisco has the financial resources to help defray the cost of Rica and Rina’s
schooling, the Court of Appeals then erred in sustaining the trial court’s Order directing respondent Federico to pay Rica and
Rina the amount of award P5,000.00 each as monthly support pendente lite.

On the other hand, respondent Francisco argues that the trial court correctly declared that petitioner and respondent Federico
should be the ones to provide the support needed by their twin daughters pursuant to Article 199 of the Family Code. He also
maintains that aside from the financial package availed of by Rica and Rina in the form of state tuition aid grant, work study
program and federal student loan program, petitioner herself was eligible for, and had availed herself of, the federal parent
loan program based on her income and properties in the USA. He, likewise, insists that assuming he could be held liable for
support, he has the option to fulfill the obligation either by paying the support or receiving and maintaining in the dwelling here
in the Philippines the person claiming support.30 As an additional point to be considered by this Court, he posits the argument
that because petitioner and her twin daughters are now US citizens, they cannot invoke the Family Code provisions on support
as "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens
of the Philippines, even though living abroad."31

Respondent Federico, for his part, continues to deny having sired Rica and Rina by reiterating the grounds he had previously
raised before the trial court. Like his father, respondent Federico argues that assuming he is indeed the father of the twin
sisters, he has the option under the law as to how he would provide support. Lastly, he assents with the declaration of the trial
court and the Court of Appeals that the parents of a child should primarily bear the burden of providing support to their
offspring.

The petition is meritorious.

As a preliminary matter, we deem it necessary to briefly discuss the essence of support pendente lite. The pertinent portion of
the Rules of Court on the matter provides:

Rule 61
SUPPORT ‘PENDENTE LITE’

SECTION 1. Application.- At the commencement of the proper action or proceeding, or at any time prior to the judgment or
final order, a verified application for support pendente lite may be filed by any party stating the grounds for the claim and the
financial conditions of both parties, and accompanied by affidavits, depositions or other authentic documents in support
thereof.

xxxx

SEC. 4. Order.- The court shall determine provisionally the pertinent facts, and shall render such orders as justice and equity
may require, having due regard to the probable outcome of the case and such other circumstances as may aid in the proper
resolution of the question involved. If the application is granted, the court shall fix the amount of money to be provisionally
paid or such other forms of support as should be provided, taking into account the necessities of the applicant and the
resources or means of the adverse party, and the terms of payment or mode for providing the support. If the application is
denied, the principal case shall be tried and decided as early as possible.

Under this provision, a court may temporarily grant support pendente lite prior to the rendition of judgment or final order.
Because of its provisional nature, a court does not need to delve fully into the merits of the case before it can settle an
application for this relief. All that a court is tasked to do is determine the kind and amount of evidence which may suffice to
enable it to justly resolve the application. It is enough that the facts be established by affidavits or other documentary evidence
appearing in the record.32lavvphi1.net

After the hearings conducted on this matter as well as the evidence presented, we find that petitioner was able to establish, by
prima facie proof, the filiation of her twin daughters to private respondents and the twins’ entitlement to support pendente
lite. In the words of the trial court –

By and large, the status of the twins as children of Federico cannot be denied. They had maintained constant communication
with their grandfather Francisco. As a matter of fact, respondent Francisco admitted having wrote several letters to Rica and
Rina (Exhs. A, B, C, D, E, F, G, G-1 to G-30). In the said letters, particularly at the bottom thereof, respondent Francisco wrote
the names of Rica and Rina Delgado. He therefore was very well aware that they bear the surname Delgado. Likewise, he
referred to himself in his letters as either "Lolo Paco" or "Daddy Paco." In his letter of October 13, 1989 (Exh. G-21), he said "as
the grandfather, am extending a financial help of US$1,000.00." On top of this, respondent Federico even gave the twins a treat
to Hongkong during their visit to the Philippines. Indeed, respondents, by their actuations, have shown beyond doubt that the
twins are the children of Federico.33
Having addressed the issue of the propriety of the trial court’s grant of support pendente lite in favor of Rica and Rina, the next
question is who should be made liable for said award.

The pertinent provision of the Family Code on this subject states:

ART. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the following persons in
the order herein provided:

(1) The spouse;

(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;

(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and

(4) The brothers and sisters.

An eminent author on the subject explains that the obligation to give support rests principally on those more closely related to
the recipient. However, the more remote relatives may be held to shoulder the responsibility should the claimant prove that
those who are called upon to provide support do not have the means to do so. 34

In this case, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals held respondent Federico liable to provide monthly support pendente
lite in the total amount of P10,000.00 by taking into consideration his supposed income of P30,000.00 to P40,000.00 per
month. We are, however, unconvinced as to the veracity of this ground relied upon by the trial court and the Court of Appeals.

It is a basic procedural edict that questions of fact cannot be the proper subject of a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule finds a more stringent application where the Court of Appeals upholds the findings of
fact of the trial court; in such a situation, this Court, as the final arbiter, is generally bound to adopt the facts as determined by
the appellate and the lower courts. This rule, however, is not ironclad as it admits of the following recognized exceptions: "(1)
when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals
went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7)
when the findings are contrary to that of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs
are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion." 35 The case at bar falls within the
seventh and eleventh exceptions.

The trial court gave full credence to respondent Federico’s allegation in his Answer 36 and his testimony37 as to the amount of
his income. We have, however, reviewed the records of this case and found them bereft of evidence to support his assertions
regarding his employment and his earning. Notably, he was even required by petitioner’s counsel to present to the court his
income tax return and yet the records of this case do not bear a copy of said document. 38 This, to our mind, severely
undermines the truthfulness of respondent Federico’s assertion with respect to his financial status and capacity to provide
support to Rica and Rina.

In addition, respondent Francisco himself stated in the witness stand that as far as he knew, his son, respondent Federico did
not own anything –

"Atty. Lopez:

I have here another letter under the letter head of Mr. & Mrs. Dany Mangonon, dated October 19, 1991 addressed to Mr.
Francisco Delgado signed by "sincerely, Danny Mangonon, can you remember."

xxxx
WITNESS:

A: I do remember this letter because it really irritated me so much that I threw it away in a waste basket. It is a very demanding
letter, that is what I do not like at all.

ATTY. LOPEZ:

Q: It is stated in this letter that "I am making this request to you and not to your son, Rico, for reasons we both are aware of."
Do you know what reason that is?

A: Yes. The reason is that my son do not have fix employment and do not have fix salary and income and they want to depend
on the lolo.

x x x xlavvphi1.net

Q: Would you have any knowledge if Federico owns a house and lot?

A: Not that I know. I do not think he has anything.

Q: How about a car?

A: Well, his car is owned by my company.39

Respondent Federico himself admitted in court that he had no property of his own, thus:

Q: You also mentioned that you are staying at Mayflower Building and you further earlier testified that this building belongs to
Citadel Corporation. Do you confirm that?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What car are you driving, Mr. Witness?

A: I am driving a lancer, sir.

Q: What car, that registered in the name of the corporation?

A: In the corporation, sir.

Q: What corporation is that?

A: Citadel Commercial, Inc., sir.

Q: What properties, if any, are registered in your name, do you have any properties, Mr. Witness?

A: None, sir."40 (Emphasis supplied.)

Meanwhile, respondent Francisco asserts that petitioner possessed the capacity to give support to her twin daughters as she
has gainful employment in the USA. He even went as far as to state that petitioner’s income abroad, when converted to
Philippine peso, was much higher than that received by a trial court judge here in the Philippines. In addition, he claims that as
she qualified for the federal parent loan program, she could very well support the college studies of her daughters.
We are unconvinced. Respondent Francisco’s assertion that petitioner had the means to support her daughters’ education is
belied by the fact that petitioner was even forced by her financial status in the USA to secure the loan from the federal
government. If petitioner were really making enough money abroad, she certainly would not have felt the need to apply for
said loan. The fact that petitioner was compelled to take out a loan is enough indication that she did not have enough money to
enable her to send her daughters to college by herself. Moreover, even Rica and Rina themselves were forced by the
circumstances they found themselves in to secure loans under their names so as not to delay their entrance to college.

There being prima facie evidence showing that petitioner and respondent Federico are the parents of Rica and Rina, petitioner
and respondent Federico are primarily charged to support their children’s college education. In view however of their
incapacities, the obligation to furnish said support should be borne by respondent Francisco. Under Article 199 of the Family
Code, respondent Francisco, as the next immediate relative of Rica and Rina, is tasked to give support to his granddaughters in
default of their parents. It bears stressing that respondent Francisco is the majority stockholder and Chairman of the Board of
Directors of Citadel Commercial, Incorporated, which owns and manages twelve gasoline stations, substantial real estate, and is
engaged in shipping, brokerage and freight forwarding. He is also the majority stockholder and Chairman of the Board of
Directors of Citadel Shipping which does business with Hyundai of Korea. Apart from these, he also owns the Citadel
Corporation which, in turn, owns real properties in different parts of the country. He is likewise the Chairman of the Board of
Directors of Isla Communication Co. and he owns shares of stocks of Citadel Holdings. In addition, he owns real properties here
and abroad.41 It having been established that respondent Francisco has the financial means to support his granddaughters’
education, he, in lieu of petitioner and respondent Federico, should be held liable for support pendente lite.

Anent respondent Francisco and Federico’s claim that they have the option under the law as to how they could perform their
obligation to support Rica and Rina, respondent Francisco insists that Rica and Rina should move here to the Philippines to
study in any of the local universities. After all, the quality of education here, according to him, is at par with that offered in the
USA. The applicable provision of the Family Code on this subject provides:

Art. 204. The person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill the obligation either by paying the allowance fixed,
or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has a right to receive support. The latter alternative
cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto.

Under the abovecited provision, the obligor is given the choice as to how he could dispense his obligation to give support. Thus,
he may give the determined amount of support to the claimant or he may allow the latter to stay in the family dwelling. The
second option cannot be availed of in case there are circumstances, legal or moral, which should be considered.

In this case, this Court believes that respondent Francisco could not avail himself of the second option. From the records, we
gleaned that prior to the commencement of this action, the relationship between respondent Francisco, on one hand, and
petitioner and her twin daughters, on the other, was indeed quite pleasant. The correspondences exchanged among them
expressed profound feelings of thoughtfulness and concern for one another’s well-being. The photographs presented by
petitioner as part of her exhibits presented a seemingly typical family celebrating kinship. All of these, however, are now things
of the past. With the filing of this case, and the allegations hurled at one another by the parties, the relationships among the
parties had certainly been affected. Particularly difficult for Rica and Rina must be the fact that those who they had considered
and claimed as family denied having any familial relationship with them. Given all these, we could not see Rica and Rina moving
back here in the Philippines in the company of those who have disowned them.

Finally, as to the amount of support pendente lite, we take our bearings from the provision of the law mandating the amount of
support to be proportionate to the resources or means of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient. 42 Guided by this
principle, we hold respondent Francisco liable for half of the amount of school expenses incurred by Rica and Rina as support
pendente lite. As established by petitioner, respondent Francisco has the financial resources to pay this amount given his
various business endeavors.

Considering, however, that the twin sisters may have already been done with their education by the time of the promulgation
of this decision, we deem it proper to award support pendente lite in arrears43 to be computed from the time they entered
college until they had finished their respective studies.

The issue of the applicability of Article 15 of the Civil Code on petitioner and her twin daughters raised by respondent Francisco
is best left for the resolution of the trial court. After all, in case it would be resolved that Rica and Rina are not entitled to
support pendente lite, the court shall then order the return of the amounts already paid with legal interest from the dates of
actual payment.44

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 20 March
1996 and Resolution dated 16 May 1996 affirming the Order dated 12 September 1995 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 149,
Makati, fixing the amount of support pendente lite to P5,000.00 for Rebecca Angela and Regina Isabel, are hereby MODIFIED in
that respondent Francisco Delgado is hereby held liable for support pendente lite in the amount to be determined by the trial
court pursuant to this Decision. Let the records of this case be remanded to the trial court for the determination of the proper
amount of support pendente lite for Rebecca Angela and Regina Isabel as well as the arrearages due them in accordance with
this Decision within ten (10) days from receipt hereof. Concomitantly, the trial court is directed to proceed with the trial of the
main case and the immediate resolution of the same with deliberate dispatch. The RTC Judge, Branch 149, Makati, is further
directed to submit a report of his compliance with the directive regarding the support pendente lite within ten (10) days from
compliance thereof.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 163209 October 30, 2009

SPOUSES PRUDENCIO and FILOMENA LIM, Petitioners,

vs.
MA. CHERYL S. LIM, for herself and on behalf of her minor children LESTER EDWARD S. LIM, CANDICE GRACE S. LIM, and
MARIANO S. LIM, III, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

For review1 is the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals, dated 28 April 2003, ordering petitioners Prudencio and Filomena Lim
(petitioners) to provide legal support to respondents Cheryl, Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III, all surnamed Lim
(respondents).

The Facts

In 1979, respondent Cheryl S. Lim (Cheryl) married Edward Lim (Edward), son of petitioners. Cheryl bore Edward three children,
respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III. Cheryl, Edward and their children resided at the house of
petitioners in Forbes Park, Makati City, together with Edward’s ailing grandmother, Chua Giak and her husband Mariano Lim
(Mariano). Edward’s family business, which provided him with a monthly salary of ₱6,000, shouldered the family expenses.
Cheryl had no steady source of income.

On 14 October 1990, Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park residence, bringing the children with her (then all minors), after a
violent confrontation with Edward whom she caught with the in-house midwife of Chua Giak in what the trial court described
"a very compromising situation."3

Cheryl, for herself and her children, sued petitioners, Edward, Chua Giak and Mariano (defendants) in the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City, Branch 140 (trial court) for support. The trial court ordered Edward to provide monthly support of ₱6,000
pendente lite.4

The Ruling of the Trial Court

On 31 January 1996, the trial court rendered judgment ordering Edward and petitioners to "jointly" provide ₱40,000 monthly
support to respondents, with Edward shouldering ₱6,000 and petitioners the balance of ₱34,000 subject to Chua Giak’s
subsidiary liability.5

The defendants sought reconsideration, questioning their liability. The trial court, while denying reconsideration, clarified that
petitioners and Chua Giak were held jointly liable with Edward because of the latter’s "inability x x x to give sufficient support x
x x."6

Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals assailing, among others, their liability to support respondents. Petitioners argued
that while Edward’s income is insufficient, the law itself sanctions its effects by providing that legal support should be "in
keeping with the financial capacity of the family" under Article 194 of the Civil Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 209
(The Family Code of the Philippines).7

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its Decision dated 28 April 2003, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. On the issue material to this appeal, that is,
whether there is basis to hold petitioners, as Edward’s parents, liable with him to support respondents, the Court of Appeals
held:
The law on support under Article 195 of the Family Code is clear on this matter. Parents and their legitimate children are
obliged to mutually support one another and this obligation extends down to the legitimate grandchildren and great
grandchildren.

In connection with this provision, Article 200 paragraph (3) of the Family Code clearly provides that should the person obliged
to give support does not have sufficient means to satisfy all claims, the other persons enumerated in Article 199 in its order
shall provide the necessary support. This is because the closer the relationship of the relatives, the stronger the tie that binds
them. Thus, the obligation to support is imposed first upon the shoulders of the closer relatives and only in their default is the
obligation moved to the next nearer relatives and so on.8

Petitioners sought reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied their motion in the Resolution dated 12 April 2004.

Hence, this petition.

The Issue

The issue is whether petitioners are concurrently liable with Edward to provide support to respondents.

The Ruling of the Court

We rule in the affirmative. However, we modify the appealed judgment by limiting petitioners’ liability to the amount of
monthly support needed by respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III only.

Petitioners Liable to Provide Support but only to their Grandchildren

By statutory9 and jurisprudential mandate,10 the liability of ascendants to provide legal support to their descendants is beyond
cavil. Petitioners themselves admit as much – they limit their petition to the narrow question of when their liability is triggered,
not if they are liable. Relying on provisions11 found in Title IX of the Civil Code, as amended, on Parental Authority, petitioners
theorize that their liability is activated only upon default of parental authority, conceivably either by its termination12 or
suspension13 during the children’s minority. Because at the time respondents sued for support, Cheryl and Edward exercised
parental authority over their children,14 petitioners submit that the obligation to support the latter’s offspring ends with them.

Neither the text of the law nor the teaching of jurisprudence supports this severe constriction of the scope of familial obligation
to give support. In the first place, the governing text are the relevant provisions in Title VIII of the Civil Code, as amended, on
Support, not the provisions in Title IX on Parental Authority. While both areas share a common ground in that parental
authority encompasses the obligation to provide legal support,15 they differ in other concerns including the duration of the
obligation and its concurrence among relatives of differing degrees.16 Thus, although the obligation to provide support arising
from parental authority ends upon the emancipation of the child,17 the same obligation arising from spousal and general
familial ties ideally lasts during the obligee's lifetime.. Also, while parental authority under Title IX (and the correlative parental
rights) pertains to parents, passing to ascendants only upon its termination or suspension, the obligation to provide legal
support passes on to ascendants not only upon default of the parents but also for the latter’s inability to provide sufficient
support. As we observed in another case raising the ancillary issue of an ascendant’s obligation to give support in light of the
father’s sufficient means:

Professor Pineda is of the view that grandchildren cannot demand support directly from their grandparents if they have parents
(ascendants of nearest degree) who are capable of supporting them. This is so because we have to follow the order of support
under Art. 199. We agree with this view.

xxxx

There is no showing that private respondent is without means to support his son; neither is there any evidence to prove that
petitioner, as the paternal grandmother, was willing to voluntarily provide for her grandson's legal support. x x x 18 (Emphasis
supplied; internal citations omitted)
Here, there is no question that Cheryl is unable to discharge her obligation to provide sufficient legal support to her children,
then all school-bound. It is also undisputed that the amount of support Edward is able to give to respondents, ₱6,000 a month,
is insufficient to meet respondents’ basic needs. This inability of Edward and Cheryl to sufficiently provide for their children
shifts a portion of their obligation to the ascendants in the nearest degree, both in the paternal (petitioners) and
maternal19 lines, following the ordering in Article 199. To hold otherwise, and thus subscribe to petitioners’ theory, is to
sanction the anomalous scenario of tolerating extreme material deprivation of children because of parental inability to give
adequate support even if ascendants one degree removed are more than able to fill the void.1avvphi1

However, petitioners’ partial concurrent obligation extends only to their descendants as this word is commonly understood to
refer to relatives, by blood of lower degree. As petitioners’ grandchildren by blood, only respondents Lester Edward, Candice
Grace and Mariano III belong to this category. Indeed, Cheryl’s right to receive support from the Lim family extends only to her
husband Edward, arising from their marital bond.20 Unfortunately, Cheryl’s share from the amount of monthly support the trial
court awarded cannot be determined from the records. Thus, we are constrained to remand the case to the trial court for this
limited purpose.21

Petitioners Precluded from Availing of the Alternative Option Under

Article 204 of the Civil Code, as Amended

As an alternative proposition, petitioners wish to avail of the option in Article 204 of the Civil Code, as amended, and pray that
they be allowed to fulfill their obligation by maintaining respondents at petitioners’ Makati residence. The option is unavailable
to petitioners.

The application of Article 204 which provides that —

The person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill the obligation either by paying the allowance fixed, or by
receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has a right to receive support. The latter alternative cannot be
availed of in case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto. (Emphasis supplied)

is subject to its exception clause. Here, the persons entitled to receive support are petitioners’ grandchildren and daughter-in-
law. Granting petitioners the option in Article 204 will secure to the grandchildren a well-provided future; however, it will also
force Cheryl to return to the house which, for her, is the scene of her husband’s infidelity. While not rising to the level of
a legal obstacle, as indeed, Cheryl’s charge against Edward for concubinage did not prosper for insufficient evidence, her
steadfast insistence on its occurrence amounts to a moral impediment bringing the case within the ambit of the exception
clause of Article 204, precluding its application.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 28 April 2003, and its Resolution
dated 12 April 2004 with the MODIFICATION that petitioners Prudencio and Filomena Lim are liable to provide support only to
respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III, all surnamed Lim. We REMAND the case to the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City, Branch 140, for further proceedings consistent with this ruling.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 182367 December 15, 2010

CHERRYL B. DOLINA, Petitioner,

vs.
GLENN D. VALLECERA, Respondent.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case is about a mother’s claim for temporary support of an unacknowledged child, which she sought in an action for the
issuance of a temporary protection order that she brought against the supposed father.

The Facts and the Case

In February 2008 petitioner Cherryl B. Dolina filed a petition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary protection order
against respondent Glenn D. Vallecera before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City in P.O. 2008-02-07 1 for alleged
woman and child abuse under Republic Act (R.A.) 9262.2 In filling out the blanks in the pro-forma complaint, Dolina added
a handwritten prayer for financial support3 from Vallecera for their supposed child. She based her prayer on the latter’s
Certificate of Live Birth which listed Vallecera as the child’s father. The petition also asked the RTC to order Philippine Airlines,
Vallecera’s employer, to withhold from his pay such amount of support as the RTC may deem appropriate.

Vallecera opposed the petition. He claimed that Dolina’s petition was essentially one for financial support rather than for
protection against woman and child abuses; that he was not the child’s father; that the signature appearing on the child’s
Certificate of Live Birth is not his; that the petition is a harassment suit intended to force him to acknowledge the child as his
and give it financial support; and that Vallecera has never lived nor has been living with Dolina, rendering unnecessary the
issuance of a protection order against him.

On March 13, 20084 the RTC dismissed the petition after hearing since no prior judgment exists establishing the filiation of
Dolina’s son and granting him the right to support as basis for an order to compel the giving of such support. Dolina filed a
motion for reconsideration but the RTC denied it in its April 4, 2008 Order, 5 with an admonition that she first file a petition for
compulsory recognition of her child as a prerequisite for support. Unsatisfied, Dolina filed the present petition for review
directly with this Court.

The Issue Presented

The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the RTC correctly dismissed Dolina’s action for temporary protection and
denied her application for temporary support for her child.

The Court’s Ruling

Dolina evidently filed the wrong action to obtain support for her child. The object of R.A. 9262 under which she filed the case is
the protection and safety of women and children who are victims of abuse or violence. 6 Although the issuance of a protection
order against the respondent in the case can include the grant of legal support for the wife and the child, this assumes that
both are entitled to a protection order and to legal support.

Dolina of course alleged that Vallecera had been abusing her and her child.1avvphil But it became apparent to the RTC upon
hearing that this was not the case since, contrary to her claim, neither she nor her child ever lived with Vallecera. As it turned
out, the true object of her action was to get financial support from Vallecera for her child, her claim being that he is the father.
He of course vigorously denied this.

To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper action, first establish the filiation of the child, if the same is not
admitted or acknowledged. Since Dolina’s demand for support for her son is based on her claim that he is Vallecera’s
illegitimate child, the latter is not entitled to such support if he had not acknowledged him, until Dolina shall have proved his
relation to him.7 The child’s remedy is to file through her mother a judicial action against Vallecera for compulsory
recognition.8 If filiation is beyond question, support follows as matter of obligation. 9 In short, illegitimate children are entitled
to support and successional rights but their filiation must be duly proved.10

Dolina’s remedy is to file for the benefit of her child an action against Vallecera for compulsory recognition in order to establish
filiation and then demand support. Alternatively, she may directly file an action for support, where the issue of compulsory
recognition may be integrated and resolved.11

It must be observed, however, that the RTC should not have dismissed the entire case based solely on the lack of any judicial
declaration of filiation between Vallecera and Dolina’s child since the main issue remains to be the alleged violence committed
by Vallecera against Dolina and her child and whether they are entitled to protection. But of course, this matter is already water
under the bridge since Dolina failed to raise this error on review. This omission lends credence to the conclusion of the RTC that
the real purpose of the petition is to obtain support from Vallecera.

While the Court is mindful of the best interests of the child in cases involving paternity and filiation, it is just as aware of the
disturbance that unfounded paternity suits cause to the privacy and peace of the putative father’s legitimate family. 12 Vallecera
disowns Dolina’s child and denies having a hand in the preparation and signing of its certificate of birth. This issue has to be
resolved in an appropriate case.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City’s Order dated March 13,
2008 that dismissed petitioner Cherryl B. Dolina’s action in P.O. 2008-02-07, and Order dated April 4, 2008, denying her motion
for reconsideration dated March 28, 2008.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 175279-80 June 5, 2013

SUSAN LIM-LUA, Petitioner,

vs.
DANILO Y. LUA, Respondent.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, petitioner seeks to set aside the Decision1 dated April 20, 2006 and
Resolution2 dated October 26, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissing her petition for contempt (CA-G.R. SP No. 01154)
and granting respondent's petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 01315).

The factual background is as follows:

On September 3, 2003,3 petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with respondent
Danilo Y. Lua, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-29346 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 14.

In her prayer for support pendente lite for herself and her two children, petitioner sought the amount of ₱500,000.00 as
monthly support, citing respondent’s huge earnings from salaries and dividends in several companies and businesses here and
abroad.4

After due hearing, Judge Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr. issued an Order5 dated March 31, 2004 granting support pendente lite, as
follows:

From the evidence already adduced by the parties, the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (₱250,000.00) Thousand Pesos would be
sufficient to take care of the needs of the plaintiff. This amount excludes the One hundred thirty-five (₱135,000.00) Thousand
Pesos for medical attendance expenses needed by plaintiff for the operation of both her eyes which is demandable upon the
conduct of such operation. The amounts already extended to the two (2) children, being a commendable act of defendant,
should be continued by him considering the vast financial resources at his disposal.

According to Art. 203 of the Family Code, support is demandable from the time plaintiff needed the said support but is payable
only from the date of judicial demand. Since the instant complaint was filed on 03 September 2003, the amount of Two
Hundred Fifty (₱250,000.00) Thousand should be paid by defendant to plaintiff retroactively to such date until the hearing of
the support pendente lite. ₱250,000.00 x 7 corresponding to the seven (7) months that lapsed from September, 2003 to March
2004 would tantamount to a total of One Million Seven Hundred Fifty (₱1,750,000.00) Thousand Pesos. Thereafter, starting the
month of April 2004, until otherwise ordered by this Court, defendant is ordered to pay a monthly support of Two Hundred
Fifty Thousand (₱250,000.00) Pesos payable within the first five (5) days of each corresponding month pursuant to the third
paragraph of Art. 203 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The monthly support of ₱250,000.00 is without prejudice to any
increase or decrease thereof that this Court may grant plaintiff as the circumstances may warrant i.e. depending on the proof
submitted by the parties during the proceedings for the main action for support. 6

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration,7 asserting that petitioner is not entitled to spousal support considering that she
does not maintain for herself a separate dwelling from their children and respondent has continued to support the family for
their sustenance and well-being in accordance with family’s social and financial standing. As to the ₱250,000.00 granted by the
trial court as monthly support pendente lite, as well as the ₱1,750,000.00 retroactive support, respondent found it
unconscionable and beyond the intendment of the law for not having considered the needs of the respondent.

In its May 13, 2004 Order, the trial court stated that the March 31, 2004 Order had become final and executory since
respondent’s motion for reconsideration is treated as a mere scrap of paper for violation of the threeday notice period under
Section 4, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, and therefore did not interrupt the running of the period
to appeal. Respondent was given ten (10) days to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of the court for
disregarding the March 31, 2004 order granting support pendente lite.8
His second motion for reconsideration having been denied, respondent filed a petition for certiorari in the CA.

On April 12, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision,9 finding merit in respondent’s contention that the trial court gravely abused its
discretion in granting ₱250,000.00 monthly support to petitioner without evidence to prove his actual income. The said court
thus decreed:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, this petition is given due course. The assailed Orders dated March 31, 2004, May
13, 2004, June 4, 2004 and June 18, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cebu City issued in Civil Case No. CEB No.
29346 entitled "Susan Lim Lua versus Danilo Y. Lua" are hereby nullified and set aside and instead a new one is entered
ordering herein petitioner:

a) to pay private respondent a monthly support pendente lite of ₱115,000.00 beginning the month of April 2005 and
every month thereafter within the first five (5) days thereof;

b) to pay the private respondent the amount of ₱115,000.00 a month multiplied by the number of months starting
from September 2003 until March 2005 less than the amount supposedly given by petitioner to the private
respondent as her and their two (2) children monthly support; and

c) to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.10

Neither of the parties appealed this decision of the CA. In a Compliance11 dated June 28, 2005, respondent attached a copy of a
check he issued in the amount of ₱162,651.90 payable to petitioner. Respondent explained that, as decreed in the CA decision,
he deducted from the amount of support in arrears (September 3, 2003 to March 2005) ordered by the CA -- ₱2,185,000.00 --
plus ₱460,000.00 (April, May, June and July 2005), totaling ₱2,645,000.00, the advances given by him to his children and
petitioner in the sum of ₱2,482,348.16 (with attached photocopies of receipts/billings).

In her Comment to Compliance with Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution, 12 petitioner asserted that none of the expenses
deducted by respondent may be chargeable as part of the monthly support contemplated by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740.

On September 27, 2005, the trial court issued an Order13 granting petitioner’s motion for issuance of a writ of execution as it
rejected respondent’s interpretation of the CA decision. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and subsequently also
filed a motion for inhibition of Judge Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr. On November 25, 2005, Judge Yrastorza, Sr. issued an
Order14 denying both motions.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, both motions are DENIED. Since a second motion for reconsideration is
prohibited under the Rules, this denial has attained finality; let, therefore, a writ of execution be issued in favor of plaintiff as
against defendant for the accumulated support in arrears pendente lite.

Notify both parties of this Order.

SO ORDERED.15

Since respondent still failed and refused to pay the support in arrears pendente lite, petitioner filed in the CA a Petition for
Contempt of Court with Damages, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 01154 ("Susan Lim Lua versus Danilo Y. Lua"). Respondent, on
the other hand, filed CA-G.R. SP No. 01315, a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court ("Danilo Y. Lua versus
Hon. Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr., in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 14, and Susan Lim Lua").
The two cases were consolidated.

By Decision dated April 20, 2006, the CA set aside the assailed orders of the trial court, as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

 a) DISMISSING, for lack of merit, the case of Petition for Contempt of Court with Damages filed by Susan Lim Lua
against Danilo Y. Lua with docket no. SP. CA-GR No. 01154;

b) GRANTING Danilo Y. Lua’s Petition for Certiorari docketed as SP. CA-GR No. 01315. Consequently, the assailed
Orders dated 27 September 2005 and 25 November 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cebu City issued in
Civil Case No. CEB-29346 entitled "Susan Lim Lua versus Danilo Y. Lua, are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE, and
instead a new one is entered:

i. ORDERING the deduction of the amount of Ph₱2,482,348.16 plus 946,465.64, or a total of

PhP3,428,813.80 from the current total support in arrears of Danilo Y. Lua to his wife, Susan Lim Lua and
their two (2) children;

ii. ORDERING Danilo Y. Lua to resume payment of his monthly support of Ph₱115,000.00 pesos starting from
the time payment of this amount was deferred by him subject to the deductions aforementioned.

iii. DIRECTING the issuance of a permanent writ of preliminary injunction.

SO ORDERED.16

The appellate court said that the trial court should not have completely disregarded the expenses incurred by respondent
consisting of the purchase and maintenance of the two cars, payment of tuition fees, travel expenses, and the credit card
purchases involving groceries, dry goods and books, which certainly inured to the benefit not only of the two children, but their
mother (petitioner) as well. It held that respondent’s act of deferring the monthly support adjudged in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740
was not contumacious as it was anchored on valid and justifiable reasons. Respondent said he just wanted the issue of whether
to deduct his advances be settled first in view of the different interpretation by the trial court of the appellate court’s decision
in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740. It also noted the lack of contribution from the petitioner in the joint obligation of spouses to support
their children.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA.

Hence, this petition raising the following errors allegedly committed by the CA:

I.

THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING RESPONDENT GUILTY OF INDIRECT CONTEMPT.

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE DEDUCTION OF THE AMOUNT OF PH₱2,482,348.16 PLUS
946,465.64, OR A TOTAL OF PH₱3,428,813.80 FROM THE CURRENT TOTAL SUPPORT IN ARREARS OF THE
RESPONDENT TO THE PETITIONER AND THEIR CHILDREN.17

The main issue is whether certain expenses already incurred by the respondent may be deducted from the total support in
arrears owing to petitioner and her children pursuant to the Decision dated April 12, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740.

The pertinent provision of the Family Code of the Philippines provides:

Article 194. Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and
transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.

The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the preceding paragraph shall include his schooling or
training for some profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority. Transportation shall include expenses in going
to and from school, or to and from place of work. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner argues that it was patently erroneous for the CA to have allowed the deduction of the value of the two cars and their
maintenance costs from the support in arrears, as these items are not indispensable to the sustenance of the family or in
keeping them alive. She points out that in the Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740, the CA already considered the said items which
it deemed chargeable to respondent, while the monthly support pendente lite (₱115,000.00) was fixed on the basis of the
documentary evidence of respondent’s alleged income from various businesses and petitioner’s testimony that she needed
₱113,000.00 for the maintenance of the household and other miscellaneous expenses excluding the ₱135,000.00 medical
attendance expenses of petitioner.

Respondent, on the other hand, contends that disallowing the subject deductions would result in unjust enrichment, thus
making him pay for the same obligation twice. Since petitioner and the children resided in one residence, the groceries and dry
goods purchased by the children using respondent’s credit card, totalling ₱594,151.58 for the period September 2003 to June
2005 were not consumed by the children alone but shared with their mother. As to the Volkswagen Beetle and BMW 316i
respondent bought for his daughter Angelli Suzanne Lua and Daniel Ryan Lua, respectively, these, too, are to be considered
advances for support, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. Respondent stressed that being children of parents
belonging to the upper-class society, Angelli and Daniel Ryan had never in their entire life commuted from one place to
another, nor do they eat their meals at "carinderias". Hence, the cars and their maintenance are indispensable to the children’s
day-to-day living, the value of which were properly deducted from the arrearages in support pendente lite ordered by the trial
and appellate courts.

As a matter of law, the amount of support which those related by marriage and family relationship is generally obliged to give
each other shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the needs of the recipient. 18 Such support
comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in
keeping with the financial capacity of the family.

Upon receipt of a verified petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage or for annulment of voidable marriage, or
for legal separation, and at any time during the proceeding, the court, motu proprio or upon verified application of any of the
parties, guardian or designated custodian, may temporarily grant support pendente lite prior to the rendition of judgment or
final order.19 Because of its provisional nature, a court does not need to delve fully into the merits of the case before it can
settle an application for this relief. All that a court is tasked to do is determine the kind and amount of evidence which may
suffice to enable it to justly resolve the application. It is enough that the facts be established by affidavits or other documentary
evidence appearing in the record.20

In this case, the amount of monthly support pendente lite for petitioner and her two children was determined after due hearing
and submission of documentary evidence by the parties. Although the amount fixed by the trial court was reduced on appeal, it
is clear that the monthly support pendente lite of ₱115,000.00 ordered by the CA was intended primarily for the sustenance of
petitioner and her children, e.g., food, clothing, salaries of drivers and house helpers, and other household expenses.
Petitioner’s testimony also mentioned the cost of regular therapy for her scoliosis and vitamins/medicines.

ATTY. ZOSA:

xxxx

Q How much do you spend for your food and your two (2) children every month?

A Presently, Sir?

ATTY. ZOSA:

Yes.

A For the food alone, I spend not over ₱40,000.00 to ₱50,000.00 a month for the food alone.

xxxx

ATTY. ZOSA:
Q What other expenses do you incur in living in that place?

A The normal household and the normal expenses for a family to have a decent living, Sir.

Q How much other expenses do you incur?

WITNESS:

A For other expenses, is around over a ₱100,000.00, Sir.

Q Why do you incur that much amount?

A For the clothing for the three (3) of us, for the vitamins and medicines. And also I am having a special therapy to straighten
my back because I am scoliotic. I am advised by the Doctor to hire a driver, but I cannot still afford it now. Because my eyesight
is not reliable for driving. And I still need another househelp to accompany me whenever I go marketing because for my age, I
cannot carry anymore heavy loads.

xxxx

ATTY. FLORES:

xxxx

Q On the issue of the food for you and the two (2) children, you mentioned ₱40,000.00 to ₱50,000.00?

A Yes, for the food alone.

Q Okay, what other possible expenses that you would like to include in those two (2) items? You mentioned of a driver, am I
correct?

A Yes, I might need two (2) drivers, Sir for me and my children.

Q Okay. How much would you like possibly to pay for those two (2) drivers?

A I think ₱10,000.00 a month for one (1) driver. So I need two (2) drivers. And I need another househelp.

Q You need another househelp. The househelp nowadays would charge you something between ₱3,000.00 to ₱4,000.00. That’s
quite…

A Right now, my househelp is receiving ₱8,000.00. I need another which I will give a compensation of ₱5,000.00.

Q Other than that, do you still have other expenses?

A My clothing.

COURT:

How about the schooling for your children?

WITNESS:

A The schooling is shouldered by my husband, Your Honor.

COURT:

Everything?

A Yes, Your Honor.

xxxx

ATTY. FLORES:

Q Madam witness, let us talk of the present needs. x x x. What else, what specific need that you would like to add so I can tell
my client, the defendant.

WITNESS:

A I need to have an operation both of my eyes. I also need a special therapy for my back because I am scoliotic, three (3) times
a week.

Q That is very reasonable. [W]ould you care to please repeat that?

A Therapy for my scoliotic back and then also for the operation both of my eyes. And I am also taking some vitamins from excel
that will cost ₱20,000.00 a month.

Q Okay. Let’s have piece by piece. Have you asked the Doctor how much would it cost you for the operation of that scoliotic?

A Yes before because I was already due last year. Before, this eye will cost ₱60,000.00 and the other eyes ₱75,000.00.

Q So for both eyes, you are talking of ₱60,000.00 plus ₱75,000.00 is ₱135,000.00?

A Yes.

xxxx

Q You talk of therapy?

A Yes.

Q So how much is that?

A Around ₱5,000.00 a week.21

As to the financial capacity of the respondent, it is beyond doubt that he can solely provide for the subsistence, education,
transportation, health/medical needs and recreational activities of his children, as well as those of petitioner who was then
unemployed and a full-time housewife. Despite this, respondent’s counsel manifested during the same hearing that respondent
was willing to grant the amount of only ₱75,000.00 as monthly support pendente lite both for the children and petitioner as
spousal support. Though the receipts of expenses submitted in court unmistakably show how much respondent lavished on his
children, it appears that the matter of spousal support was a different matter altogether. Rejecting petitioner’s prayer for
₱500,000.00 monthly support and finding the ₱75,000.00 monthly support offered by respondent as insufficient, the trial court
fixed the monthly support pendente lite at ₱250,000.00. However, since the supposed income in millions of respondent was
based merely on the allegations of petitioner in her complaint and registration documents of various corporations which
respondent insisted are owned not by him but his parents and siblings, the CA reduced the amount of support pendente lite to
₱115,000.00, which ruling was no longer questioned by both parties.
Controversy between the parties resurfaced when respondent’s compliance with the final CA decision indicated that he
deducted from the total amount in arrears (₱2,645,000.00) the sum of ₱2,482,348.16, representing the value of the two cars
for the children, their cost of maintenance and advances given to petitioner and his children. Respondent explained that the
deductions were made consistent with the fallo of the CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740 ordering him to pay support
pendente lite in arrears less the amount supposedly given by him to petitioner as her and their two children’s monthly support.

The following is a summary of the subject deductions under Compliance dated June 28, 2005, duly supported by receipts 22:

Car purchases for Angelli Suzanne - Php1,350,000.00

and Daniel Ryan - 613,472.86

Car Maintenance fees of Angelli - 51,232.50

Suzanne

Credit card statements of Daniel Ryan - 348,682.28

Car Maintenance fees of Daniel Ryan - 118,960.52

Php2,482,348.16

After the trial court disallowed the foregoing deductions, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration further asserting that
the following amounts, likewise with supporting receipts, be considered as additional advances given to petitioner and the
children23:

Medical expenses of Susan Lim-Lua Php 42,450.71

Dental Expenses of Daniel Ryan 11,500.00

Travel expenses of Susan Lim-Lua 14,611.15

Credit card purchases of Angelli 408,891.08

Suzanne

Salon and travel expenses of Angelli 87,112.70

Suzanne

School expenses of Daniel Ryan Lua 260,900.00

Cash given to Daniel and Angelli 121,000.00

TOTAL - Php 946,465.64

GRAND TOTAL - Php 3,428,813.80

The CA, in ruling for the respondent said that all the foregoing expenses already incurred by the respondent should, in equity,
be considered advances which may be properly deducted from the support in arrears due to the petitioner and the two
children. Said court also noted the absence of petitioner’s contribution to the joint obligation of support for their children.

We reverse in part the decision of the CA.

Judicial determination of support pendente lite in cases of legal separation and petitions for declaration of nullity or annulment
of marriage are guided by the following provisions of the Rule on Provisional Orders 24
Sec. 2. Spousal Support.–In determining support for the spouses, the court may be guided by the following rules:

(a) In the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement between the spouses, the spouses may be
supported from the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership.

(b) The court may award support to either spouse in such amount and for such period of time as the court may deem
just and reasonable based on their standard of living during the marriage.

(c) The court may likewise consider the following factors: (1) whether the spouse seeking support is the custodian of a
child whose circumstances make it appropriate for that spouse not to seek outside employment; (2) the time
necessary to acquire sufficient education and training to enable the spouse seeking support to find appropriate
employment, and that spouse’s future earning capacity; (3) the duration of the marriage; (4) the comparative
financial resources of the spouses, including their comparative earning abilities in the labor market; (5) the needs and
obligations of each spouse; (6) the contribution of each spouse to the marriage, including services rendered in home-
making, child care, education, and career building of the other spouse; (7) the age and health of the spouses; (8) the
physical and emotional conditions of the spouses; (9) the ability of the supporting spouse to give support, taking into
account that spouse’s earning capacity, earned and unearned income, assets, and standard of living; and (10) any
other factor the court may deem just and equitable.

(d) The Family Court may direct the deduction of the provisional support from the salary of the spouse.

Sec. 3. Child Support.–The common children of the spouses shall be supported from the properties of the absolute community
or the conjugal partnership.

Subject to the sound discretion of the court, either parent or both may be ordered to give an amount necessary for the support,
maintenance, and education of the child. It shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the necessities
of the recipient.

In determining the amount of provisional support, the court may likewise consider the following factors: (1) the financial
resources of the custodial and non-custodial parent and those of the child; (2) the physical and emotional health of the child
and his or her special needs and aptitudes; (3) the standard of living the child has been accustomed to; (4) the non-monetary
contributions that the parents will make toward the care and well-being of the child.

The Family Court may direct the deduction of the provisional support from the salary of the parent.

Since the amount of monthly support pendente lite as fixed by the CA was not appealed by either party, there is no controversy
as to its sufficiency and reasonableness. The dispute concerns the deductions made by respondent in settling the support in
arrears.

On the issue of crediting of money payments or expenses against accrued support, we find as relevant the following rulings by
US courts.

In Bradford v. Futrell,25 appellant sought review of the decision of the Circuit Court which found him in arrears with his child
support payments and entered a decree in favor of appellee wife. He complained that in determining the arrearage figure, he
should have been allowed full credit for all money and items of personal property given by him to the children themselves,
even though he referred to them as gifts. The Court of Appeals of Maryland ruled that in the suit to determine amount of
arrears due the divorced wife under decree for support of minor children, the husband (appellant) was not entitled to credit for
checks which he had clearly designated as gifts, nor was he entitled to credit for an automobile given to the oldest son or a
television set given to the children. Thus, if the children remain in the custody of the mother, the father is not entitled to credit
for money paid directly to the children if such was paid without any relation to the decree.

In the absence of some finding of consent by the mother, most courts refuse to allow a husband to dictate how he will meet the
requirements for support payments when the mode of payment is fixed by a decree of court. Thus he will not be credited for
payments made when he unnecessarily interposed himself as a volunteer and made payments direct to the children of his own
accord. Wills v. Baker, 214 S. W. 2d 748 (Mo. 1948); Openshaw v. Openshaw, 42 P. 2d 191 (Utah 1935). In the latter case the
court said in part: "The payments to the children themselves do not appear to have been made as payments upon alimony, but
were rather the result of his fatherly interest in the welfare of those children. We do not believe he should be permitted to
charge them to plaintiff. By so doing he would be determining for Mrs. Openshaw the manner in which she should expend her
allowances. It is a very easy thing for children to say their mother will not give them money, especially as they may realize that
such a plea is effective in attaining their ends. If she is not treating them right the courts are open to the father for redress." 26

In Martin, Jr. v. Martin,27 the Supreme Court of Washington held that a father, who is required by a divorce decree to make
child support payments directly to the mother, cannot claim credit for payments voluntarily made directly to the children.
However, special considerations of an equitable nature may justify a court in crediting such payments on his indebtedness to
the mother, when such can be done without injustice to her.

The general rule is to the effect that when a father is required by a divorce decree to pay to the mother money for the support
of their dependent children and the unpaid and accrued installments become judgments in her favor, he cannot, as a matter of
law, claim credit on account of payments voluntarily made directly to the children. Koon v. Koon, supra; Briggs v. Briggs, supra.
However, special considerations of an equitable nature may justify a court in crediting such payments on his indebtedness to
the mother, when that can be done without injustice to her. Briggs v. Briggs, supra. The courts are justifiably reluctant to lay
down any general rules as to when such credits may be allowed.28 (Emphasis supplied.)

Here, the CA should not have allowed all the expenses incurred by respondent to be credited against the accrued support
pendente lite. As earlier mentioned, the monthly support pendente lite granted by the trial court was intended primarily for
food, household expenses such as salaries of drivers and house helpers, and also petitioner’s scoliosis therapy sessions. Hence,
the value of two expensive cars bought by respondent for his children plus their maintenance cost, travel expenses of petitioner
and Angelli, purchases through credit card of items other than groceries and dry goods (clothing) should have been disallowed,
as these bear no relation to the judgment awarding support pendente lite. While it is true that the dispositive portion of the
executory decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740 ordered herein respondent to pay the support in arrears "less than the amount
supposedly given by petitioner to the private respondent as her and their two (2) children monthly support," the deductions
should be limited to those basic needs and expenses considered by the trial and appellate courts. The assailed ruling of the CA
allowing huge deductions from the accrued monthly support of petitioner and her children, while correct insofar as it
commends the generosity of the respondent to his children, is clearly inconsistent with the executory decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
84740. More important, it completely ignores the unfair consequences to petitioner whose sustenance and well-being, was
given due regard by the trial and appellate courts. This is evident from the March 31, 2004 Order granting support pendente lite
to petitioner and her children, when the trial court observed:

While there is evidence to the effect that defendant is giving some forms of financial assistance to his two (2) children via their
credit cards and paying for their school expenses, the same is, however, devoid of any form of spousal support to the plaintiff,
for, at this point in time, while the action for nullity of marriage is still to be heard, it is incumbent upon the defendant,
considering the physical and financial condition of the plaintiff and the overwhelming capacity of defendant, to extend support
unto the latter. x x x29

On appeal, while the Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740 reduced the amount of monthly support fixed by the trial court, it
nevertheless held that considering respondent’s financial resources, it is but fair and just that he give a monthly support for the
sustenance and basic necessities of petitioner and his children. This would imply that any amount respondent seeks to be
credited as monthly support should only cover those incurred for sustenance and household expenses.1avvphi1

In the case at bar, records clearly show and in fact has been admitted by petitioner that aside from paying the expenses of their
two (2) children’s schooling, he gave his two (2) children two (2) cars and credit cards of which the expenses for various items
namely: clothes, grocery items and repairs of their cars were chargeable to him which totaled an amount of more than One
Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00) for each of them and considering that as testified by the private respondent that she needs
the total amount of ₱113,000.00 for the maintenance of the household and other miscellaneous expenses and considering
further that petitioner can afford to buy cars for his two (2) children, and to pay the expenses incurred by them which are
chargeable to him through the credit cards he provided them in the amount of ₱100,000.00 each, it is but fair and just that the
monthly support pendente lite for his wife, herein private respondent, be fixed as of the present in the amount of ₱115,000.00
which would be sufficient enough to take care of the household and other needs. This monthly support pendente lite to private
respondent in the amount of ₱115,000.00 excludes the amount of One Hundred ThirtyFive (₱135,000.00) Thousand Pesos for
medical attendance expenses needed by private respondent for the operation of both her eyes which is demandable upon the
conduct of such operation. Likewise, this monthly support of ₱115,000.00 is without prejudice to any increase or decrease
thereof that the trial court may grant private respondent as the circumstances may warrant i.e. depending on the proof
submitted by the parties during the proceedings for the main action for support.

The amounts already extended to the two (2) children, being a commendable act of petitioner, should be continued by him
considering the vast financial resources at his disposal.30 (Emphasis supplied.)

Accordingly, only the following expenses of respondent may be allowed as deductions from the accrued support pendente lite
for petitioner and her children:

1âwphi1
Medical expenses of Susan Lim-Lua Php 42,450.71

Dental Expenses of Daniel Ryan 11,500.00

Credit card purchases of Angelli 365,282.20

(Groceries and Dry Goods) 228,869.38

Credit Card purchases of Daniel Ryan

TOTAL Php 648,102.29

As to the contempt charge, we sustain the CA in holding that respondent is not guilty of indirect contempt.

Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice, and dignity. It
signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the court’s order, but such conduct which tends to bring the authority of
the court and the administration of law into disrepute or, in some manner, to impede the due administration of justice. 31 To
constitute contempt, the act must be done willfully and for an illegitimate or improper purpose. 32 The good faith, or lack of it,
of the alleged contemnor should be considered.33

Respondent admittedly ceased or suspended the giving of monthly support pendente lite granted by the trial court, which is
immediately executory. However, we agree with the CA that respondent’s act was not contumacious considering that he had
not been remiss in actually providing for the needs of his children. It is a matter of record that respondent continued
shouldering the full cost of their education and even beyond their basic necessities in keeping with the family’s social status.
Moreover, respondent believed in good faith that the trial and appellate courts, upon equitable grounds, would allow him to
offset the substantial amounts he had spent or paid directly to his children.

Respondent complains that petitioner is very much capacitated to generate income on her own because she presently
maintains a boutique at the Ayala Center Mall in Cebu City and at the same time engages in the business of lending money. He
also claims that the two children have finished their education and are now employed in the family business earning their own
salaries.

Suffice it to state that the matter of increase or reduction of support should be submitted to the trial court in which the action
for declaration for nullity of marriage was filed, as this Court is not a trier of facts. The amount of support may be reduced or
increased proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means
of the person obliged to support. 34 As we held in Advincula v. Advincula35

…Judgment for support does not become final. The right to support is of such nature that its allowance is essentially
provisional; for during the entire period that a needy party is entitled to support, his or her alimony may be modified or altered,
in accordance with his increased or decreased needs, and with the means of the giver. It cannot be regarded as subject to final
determination.36

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated April 20, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos.
01154 and 01315 is hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

 a) DISMISSING, for lack of merit, the case of Petition for Contempt of Court with Damages filed by Susan Lim Lua
against Danilo Y. Lua with docket no. SP. CA-G.R. No. 01154;

b) GRANTING IN PART Danilo Y. Lua's Petition for Certiorari docketed as SP. CA-G.R. No. 01315. Consequently, the
assailed Orders dated 27 September 2005 and 25 November 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cebu City
issued in Civil Case No. CEB-29346 entitled "Susan Lim Lua versus Danilo Y. Lua, are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE,
and instead a new one is entered:

i. ORDERING the deduction of the amount of Php 648,102.29 from the support pendente lite in arrears of
Danilo Y. Lua to his wife, Susan Lim Lua and their two (2) children;

ii. ORDERING Danilo Y. Lua to resume payment of his monthly support of Ph₱115,000.00 pesos starting from
the time payment of this amount was deferred by him subject to the deduction aforementioned.

iii. DIRECTING the immediate execution of this judgment.

SO ORDERED."

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 193225, February 09, 2015

BBB,*Petitioner, v. AAA,*Respondent.

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

Petitioner BBB is now before this Court with a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to
assail the Decision2 dated November 6, 2009 and Resolution3 dated August 3, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 89581, which affirmed with modification the issuance against him on August 14, 2007 of a Permanent Protection Order
(PPO)4 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 162, in favor of his wife, herein respondent AAA.

Antecedent Facts

The CA aptly summarized as follows the facts of the case until the RTC’s issuance of the PPO against
BBB:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Both [BBB] and [AAA] allege that they first met in 1991 but started to date seriously only in 1996. [AAA] was then a medical
student and was raising her first child borne from a previous relationship, a boy named [CCC], with the help of her parents.

During the relationship with [BBB], [AAA] bore two more children namely, [DDD] (born on December 11, 1997) and [EEE] (born
on October 19, 2000).

To legalize their relationship, [BBB] and [AAA] married in civil rights on October 10, 2002 and thereafter, the birth certificates of
the children, including [CCC’s], was amended to change their civil status to legitimated by virtue of the said marriage.

The relationship, both admit, was far from ideal and has had its share of happy moments and heated arguments. The two
however have contradicting statements as to the cause of their present situation.

[BBB] alleges that [AAA’s] irrational jealousy has caused their frequent arguments. According to [BBB], [AAA] has been
suspicious of [BBB] and his relationship with his female co-workers, which [BBB] alleges, contrary to [AAA’s] suspicion, are
purely professional. According to [BBB], because of their repeated fights, he was forced to leave the family home to prevent the
brewing animosity between him and his wife. Soon after [BBB] left, [AAA] herself decided to leave the family home and brought
the children with her, which made it difficult for [BBB] to see their kids regularly. This has also caused the family expense to
double, making it even more difficult for [BBB] to fulfill his financial obligations.

[AAA], on the other hand, alleges that their heated arguments were often due to [BBB’s] incessant womanizing. When
confronted about it, [BBB], instead of denying the same, would even curse [AAA].

The breaking point for [AAA] came when, [BBB’s] alleged mistress, a woman by the name of [FFF], insulted and humiliated
[AAA] in public, in the presence of [BBB] himself, who, according to [AAA], did nothing to stop the same. Extremely hurt, [AAA]
decided to leave the conjugal home with the children and lived temporarily at a friend’s house. She however went back to the
conjugal home with [DDD] and [EEE] after some time, leaving her son [CCC] at her friend’s house.

What made matters worse, according to [AAA], was the apparent biases of [BBB] in favor of [DDD] and [EEE]. That despite his
promise to treat [CCC] as his own, [BBB] would still treat the latter differently from the two kids, putting [CCC] at a
disadvantage. [AAA], cites as example the instances when, [BBB] would buy food and toys for [DDD] and [EEE] only, buying
nothing for [CCC].

While living separately from [BBB], [AAA] discovered that [BBB] was not paying the rentals due on the condominium unit they
were occupying, forcing [AAA] to move out. [AAA] was likewise compelled to find work to support the family, after [BBB] has
started to be remiss in his financial obligations to the family. According to [AAA], the amounts given by [BBB] were not
sufficient to cover the family expenses, forcing her to request for loans from friends.

[AAA] likewise feels threatened after discovering [that BBB] was stalking her and/or their children. [AAA] alleges that she found
out that [BBB] has sought the help of one [GGG], a friend of [BBB] who lives within the same compound where [AAA] lives, to
go through the guard’s logbook to monitor their every move, i.e., who visits them, what time [AAA] leaves and returns back
home, etc.

Citing the foregoing as constituting economic and psychological abuse, [AAA] filed an application for the issuance of a
Temporary Protection Order with a request to make the same permanent after due hearing, before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City.

Finding good ground in [AAA’s] application, the court a quo issued a Temporary Protection Order (TPO). The TPO was
thereafter, made permanent by virtue of a Decision of the RTC dated August [14, 2007], the dispositive portion of which orders:

“x x x x
Prohibiting [BBB], directly and indirectly, from stalking, harassing, annoying, or otherwise verbally abusing [AAA], directly or
indirectly, to refrain from insulting her, cursing her and shouting invectives at her;

Prohibiting [BBB] from committing or threatening to commit any act that may cause mental and emotional anguish to [AAA],
i.e. publicly displaying her extramarital relations with his mistress [FFF] and anyone else for that matter;

Prohibiting [BBB] from exposing the minor children to immoral and illicit environment, specifically prohibiting him to allow her
(sic) mistress [FFF] and anyone else to be with them in instances where he would be allowed by this Court to see their children;

Allowing [BBB] ALONE to see and visit his children once a month (for a total of 12 visits per year) at the latter’s residence for a
maximum period of 2 years [sic] each visit, subject to further orders from this Court. For this purpose, [BBB’s every visit] shall be
accompanied by the Court Sheriff, who shall coordinate with [AAA] as to the availability of time and date of children for such
visit, at the expense of [BBB]. For every visit, the Court Sheriff is directed to submit his report within 5 days from the date [BBB]
visited the children;

Directing [BBB] to allow [AAA] to continue to have lawful use and possession of the motor vehicle more particularly described as
follows:

One (1) Hyundai Starex Van

1997 Model
Plate Number: WJP 902
Chassis Number:
Serial Number KMJWH7HPXU158443

Granting [AAA] permanent sole custody over their common children until further orders from this Court;

Ordering [BBB] to provide support in the amount of Php 62,918.97 per month (not Php 81,650.00 being prayed by [AAA]) to
[AAA] as monthly support, inclusive of educational expenses, groceries, medicines, medical bills, and insurance premiums,
starting from the month of January 2007 to be given within the first five (5) days of the month through the Court Sheriff, who
shall coordinate with [AAA] in receiving such support;

Requiring [BBB] to stay away from the offended party and any designated family or household member at a distance of 100
meters;

Requiring [BBB] to stay away from the residence, school, place of employment or any specified place frequented regularly by the
offended party and children and any designated family or household member;

Ordering [BBB] to post bond of Php 300,000.00 to keep peace pursuant to Section 23 of RA 9262 with the undertaking that [BBB]
will not commit the violence sought to be prevented and that in case such violence is committed[,] he will pay the amount
determined by the Court in its judgment;

Ordering [BBB] to pay the sum of Php 100,000.00 (not Php 200,000.00 being prayed by [AAA]) representing both reasonable
attorney’s fees and cost of litigation, including cost of suit.

x x x x.”5

Ruling of the CA
BBB filed before the CA an appeal6 to challenge the RTC Decision dated August 14, 2007. BBB alleged that the RTC’s (a) issuance
of the PPO against him, (b) award to AAA of the sole custody over their children, (c) directives for him to pay attorney’s fees
and costs of litigation and to post an excessive amount of bond, and (d) declaration that he had an abusive character lack
factual bases.

On November 6, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed decision affirming the factual findings and dispositions of the RTC, but
ordering the remand of the case for the latter to determine in the proper proceedings who shall be awarded custody of the
children. Like the RTC, the CA found that under the provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, 7 BBB had subjected AAA and
their children to psychological, emotional and economic abuses. BBB displayed acts of marital infidelity which exposed AAA to
public ridicule causing her emotional and psychological distress. While BBB alleged that FFF was only a professional colleague,
he continued to have public appearances with her which did not help to dispel AAA’s accusation that the two had an extra-
marital relation. Further, BBB verbally abused AAA either in person or through text messages. The CA likewise did not favorably
consider BBB’s claim that he cannot provide financial support to AAA and the children in the amount required by the RTC as his
income merely depended on contractual hosting and events management assignments. The CA emphasized that AAA was in the
position to know the sources of BBB’s income. Citing Section 288 of R.A. No. 9262 and Article 2139 of the Family Code, the CA,
however, ordered the RTC to determine who shall be entitled to exercise custody over the children, who at that time were
already older than seven years of age.

The CA denied BBB’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration10 by way of the Resolution11 dated August 3, 2010 which is likewise
assailed in the instant petition.

Issues

Undaunted, BBB now comes before this Court raising the following issues:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHETHER OR NOT THE [CA] COMMITTED ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE RTC’S DECISION TO MAKE THE [TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER (TPO)] PERMANENT.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE [CA] COMMITTED ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE RTC’S AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COST OF
LITIGATION IN FAVOR OF [AAA].

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE [CA] COMMITTED ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE RTC’S ORDER REQUIRING [BBB] TO POST AN EXCESSIVE
AMOUNT OF BOND TO KEEP THE PEACE.12cralawlawlibrary

IV

WHETHER OR NOT THE CA AND THE RTC CORRECTLY ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE THE UNAUTHENTICATED TEXT MESSAGES
ADDUCED BY AAA.13cralawlawlibrary

WHETHER OR NOT THE AWARD OF SUPPORT SHOULD BE DELETED AS THE SPOUSES’ COMMON BIOLOGICAL CHILDREN, DDD
AND EEE, ARE ALREADY UNDER BBB’S ACTUAL CARE AND CUSTODY SINCE AUGUST 2010 WHEN AAA LEFT TO WORK AS A
NURSE IN THE UNITED STATES.14
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In support of the instant petition, BBB merely reiterates his factual claims in the proceedings below relative to his financial
position and AAA’s supposedly baseless accusations and demands from him. In addition, he posits that the text messages
offered by AAA as evidence were unauthenticated; hence, doubt exists as to their admissibility. Further, he points out that due
to the current whereabouts and circumstances of the parties, the PPO issued against him is rendered moot. He now has actual
care and custody of DDD and EEE, while CCC, who is not his biological son, resides in a college dormitory. BBB and AAA barely
get in touch with each other except when the latter initiates the same.

In her Comment15 to the petition, AAA counters that BBB erroneously raises factual issues which are subjects beyond the
contemplation of a petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Further, BBB continuously violates the PPO,
which under the provisions of R.A. No. 9262, is supposed to be immediately executory upon its issuance by the RTC. AAA claims
that BBB still verbally abuses her. BBB has not posted the P300,000.00 bond required from him. He likewise has not paid the
attorney’s fees and costs of litigation awarded to AAA. He does not provide support for CCC, who, in the eyes of the law, is also
among his legitimated children. AAA further alleges that in 2010, she left DDD and EEE under the care of BBB only because the
circumstances then obtaining forced her to do so. Three years had then lapsed from the time she filed an application for a
protection order and still, no execution of the PPO ensued. She could not depend for financial support from BBB. She was thus
left with no choice but to yield custody over DDD and EEE even if the set-up exposed the children to BBB’s illicit affairs. AAA
points out that since their children are all older than seven years of age, they are already capable of choosing for themselves
whom they want to exercise custody over them.

Pending the Court’s deliberation of the instant case, BBB filed a Manifestation and Motion to Render Judgment Based on a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA).16 BBB alleges that on July 29, 2013, he and AAA had entered into a compromise anent the
custody, exercise of parental authority over, and support of DDD and EEE. 17cralawlawlibrary

AAA’s counsel, Atty. Shielah Elbinias-Uyboco (Atty. Uyboco), filed a Comment to the MOA18 pointing out that AAA signed the
MOA while emotionally distressed and sans the former’s advice and guidance. Atty. Uyboco likewise emphasizes that BBB’s
illicit relationship with FFF continues in violation of the PPO issued by the RTC.

In BBB’s Reply,19 he counters that AAA should be presumed to have acted with due care and full knowledge of the contents of
the MOA which she signed. Further, BBB’s alleged involvement with FFF is an issue which need not be resolved in a judgment
based on compromise.

Disquisition of the Court

The instant petition is not a proper

subject of a compromise agreement.

The Court cannot take the simplest course of finally writing finis to the instant petition by rendering a judgment merely based
on compromise as prayed for by BBB due to reasons discussed below.

Alleging psychological violence and economic abuse, AAA anchored her application for the issuance of a TPO and a PPO on the
basis of the provisions of R.A. No. 9262. In the instant petition, what is essentially being assailed is the PPO issued by the RTC
and which was affirmed by the CA. The rules, however, intend that cases filed under the provisions of R.A. No. 9262 be not
subjects of compromise agreements.

It bears stressing that Section 23(d) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC 20 explicitly prohibits compromise on any act constituting the crime
of violence against women. Thus, in Garcia v. Drilon,21 the Court declared that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Violence, however, is not a subject for compromise. A process which involves parties mediating the issue of violence implies
that the victim is somehow at fault. x x x.22 (Emphasis deleted)

AM No. 10-4-16-SC,23 on the other hand, directs the referral to mediation of all issues under the Family Code and other laws in
relation to support, custody, visitation, property relations and guardianship of minor children, excepting therefrom those
covered by R.A. No. 9262.

While AAA filed her application for a TPO and a PPO as an independent action and not as an incidental relief prayed for in a
criminal suit, the instant petition cannot be taken outside the ambit of cases falling under the provisions of R.A. No. 9262.
Perforce, the prohibition against subjecting the instant petition to compromise applies.

The courts a quo committed no

error in issuing a PPO against BBB.

Anent the main issues raised in the instant petition, the Court finds no error in the CA’s ruling that the RTC properly issued a
PPO against BBB and that a remanding of the case to the trial court is necessary to determine who shall exercise custody over
CCC, DDD and EEE. However, the choices of the children as with whom they would prefer to stay would alter the effects of the
PPO. Hence, this Court affirms the herein assailed PPO except items (d), (f), (g), (h) and (i)24 thereof relative to who shall be
granted custody over the three children, how the spouses shall exercise visitation rights, and the amount and manner of
providing financial support, which are matters the RTC is now directed to determine with dispatch.

The Court notes BBB’s manifestation that he and AAA had arrived at an amicable settlement as regards the issues of custody,
exercise of parental authority over, and support of DDD and EEE. While these matters can be lawful subjects of compromise,
AAA’s vacillation, as expressed by her counsel, compels the Court to exercise prudence by directing the RTC to resolve with
finality the aforesaid issues. The parties are, however, not precluded from entering into a compromise as regards the aforesaid
issues, but the Court now requires the RTC’s direct supervision lest the parties muddle the issues anew and fail to put an end to
their bickering.

No grounds exist which compel this

Court to resolve the first three issues
raised by BBB since they are merely
factual in character.

In Padalhin v. Laviña,25 the Court declared that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Primarily, Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court categorically states that the petition filed shall raise only questions of law,
which must be distinctly set forth. A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts,
while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of
law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of
them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear
that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact.cralawred

x x x [T]he substantive issue of whether or not the petitioners are entitled to moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s
fees is a factual issue which is beyond the province of a petition for review on certiorari. x x x
In the case at bar, the petitioner spouses present to us issues with an intent to subject to review the uniform factual findings
of the RTC and the CA. Specifically, the instant petition challenges the existence of clear and substantial evidence warranting
the award of damages and attorney’s fees in Laviña’s favor. Further, the instant petition prays for the grant of the Spouses
Padalhin’s counterclaims on the supposed showing that the complaint filed by Laviña before the RTC was groundless. It bears
stressing that we are not a trier of facts. Undoubtedly, the questions now raised before us are factual and not legal in
character, hence, beyond the contemplation of a petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. 26 (Italics in the
original and emphasis ours)

In BBB’s case, he avers that the RTC and the CA’s (a) issuance of the PPO, (b) award of attorney’s fees and costs of litigation in
AAA’s favor, and (c) directive for him to post a bond in the amount of P300,000.00 all lack factual bases. The first three issues
presented unmistakably call for a re-calibration of evidence. While the general rule that only legal issues can be resolved in a
petition filed under Rule 45 recognizes exceptions,27 BBB’s case does not fall in the latter category. The RTC and the CA are in
accord with each other as to their factual findings, which are supported by substantial evidence, thus, binding upon this Court.

The doubt raised by BBB anent the

admissibility of the text messages as
evidence is not genuinely a legal issue.

In the case of Justice Vidallon-Magtolis v. Salud,28 it is stated that any question as to the admissibility of text messages as
evidence is rendered moot and academic if the party raising such issue admits authorship of the subject
messages.29cralawlawlibrary

BBB argues that the RTC and the CA erred in admitting as evidence the text messages which were sent by him and FFF to AAA
since they were unauthenticated. However, BBB himself effectively admitted in the pleadings filed with this Court and the CA
that he indeed sent the text messages attributed to him by AAA. The Appellant’s Brief 30 filed before the CA stated in part
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

[AAA] conveniently chose to leave out the initiatory messages to which [BBB] replied to. It is totally obvious that the alleged
messages from [BBB] are only messages that are in response to an ongoing verbal or virtual tussle and the adamant refusal of
[AAA] to bring the children home despite the entreaties of [BBB]. Be it noted that [BBB], for the past several months leading up
to their separation, and up to the time that the instant case has been filed, continuously endured the extreme mood swings,
malicious accusations, haranguing, curses, insults, and even violence from [AAA]. 31 (Emphasis and underscoring in the original
and italics ours)

Further, in the instant petition, BBB repleads that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

[I]t is utterly apparent that the alleged messages from [BBB] are only messages that are in response to an ongoing verbal or
virtual tussle between the parties.32
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In the above-quoted portions of the pleadings, BBB attempted to justify why he sent the messages to AAA. However, in doing
so, he, in effect, admitted authorship of the messages which AAA adduced as evidence. It is likewise noted that BBB did not
deny ownership of the cellphone number from which the text messages were sent.

Hence, while at first glance, it would seem that the issue of admissibility of the text messages requires an interpretation of the
rules of evidence, this Court does not find the same to be necessary. While BBB had admitted authorship of the text messages,
he pleads for this Court to consider those messages as inadmissible for allegedly being unauthenticated. BBB’s arguments are
unbearably self-contradictory and he cannot be allowed to take refuge under technical rules of procedure to assail what is
already apparent.

The deletion from the PPO of the

directive of the RTC and the CA relative
to the award of support is not warranted.
While CCC is not BBB’s biological son,
he was legitimated under the latter’s name.
Like DDD and EEE, CCC is entitled to
receive support from BBB.

BBB claims that DDD and EEE are now under his sole care and custody, which allegedly renders moot the provision in the PPO
relative to support. BBB points out that CCC is not his biological son. Impliedly then, BBB justifies why CCC is not entitled to
receive support from him.

This Court is not persuaded.

Article 177 of the Family Code provides that “[o]nly children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time
of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other may be legitimated.” Article 178
states that “[l]egitimation shall take place by a subsequent valid marriage between parents.”

In the case at bar, the parties do not dispute the fact that BBB is not CCC’s biological father. Such being the case, it was
improper to have CCC legitimated after the celebration of BBB and AAA’s marriage. Clearly then, the legal process of
legitimation was trifled with. BBB voluntarily but falsely acknowledged CCC as his son. Article 1431 of the New Civil Code
pertinently provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Art. 1431. Through estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be
denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.

At least for the purpose of resolving the instant petition, the principle of estoppel finds application and it now bars BBB from
making an assertion contrary to his previous representations. He should not be allowed to evade a responsibility arising from
his own misrepresentations. He is bound by the effects of the legitimation process. CCC remains to be BBB’s son, and pursuant
to Article 179 of the Family Code, the former is entitled to the same rights as those of a legitimate child, including the receipt of
his father’s support.

Notwithstanding the above, there is no absolute preclusion for BBB from raising before the proper court the issue of CCC’s
status and filiation. However, BBB cannot do the same in the instant petition before this Court now. In Tison v. CA,33 the Court
held that “the civil status [of a child] cannot be attacked collaterally.” The child’s legitimacy “cannot be contested by way of
defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a different purpose.”34 The instant petition sprang out of AAA’s application
for a PPO before the RTC. Hence, BBB’s claim that CCC is not his biological son is a collateral issue, which this Court has no
authority to resolve now.

All told, the Court finds no merit in BBB’s petition, but there exists a necessity to remand the case for the RTC to resolve matters
relative to who shall be granted custody over the three children, how the spouses shall exercise visitation rights, and the amount
and manner of providing financial support.

The RTC and the CA found substantial evidence and did not commit reversible errors when they issued the PPO against BBB.
Events, which took place after the issuance of the PPO, do not erase the fact that psychological, emotional and economic
abuses were committed by BBB against AAA. Hence, BBB’s claim that he now has actual sole care of DDD and EEE does not
necessarily call for this Court’s revocation of the PPO and the award to him of custody over the children.

This Court, thus, affirms the CA’s order to remand the case for the RTC to resolve the question of custody. Since the children are
now all older than seven years of age, they can choose for themselves whom they want to stay with. If all the three children
would manifest to the RTC their choice to stay with AAA, then the PPO issued by RTC shall continue to be executed in its
entirety. However, if any of the three children would choose to be under BBB’s care, necessarily, the PPO issued against BBB
relative to them is to be modified. The PPO, in its entirety, would remain effective only as to AAA and any of the children who
opt to stay with her. Consequently, the RTC may accordingly alter the manner and amount of financial support BBB should give
depending on who shall finally be awarded custody over the children. Pursuant to Articles 201 and 202 of the Family Code,
BBB’s resources and means and the necessities of AAA and the children are the essential factors in determining the amount of
support, and the same can be reduced or increased proportionately. The RTC is reminded to be circumspect in resolving the
matter of support, which is a mutual responsibility of the spouses. The parties do not dispute that AAA is now employed as well,
thus, the RTC should consider the same with the end in mind of promoting the best interests of the children.

A final note on the effectivity and

violation of a PPO

The Court reminds the parties that the application for the issuance of a PPO is not a process to be trifled with. It is only granted
after notice and hearing. Once issued, violation of its provisions shall be punishable with a fine ranging from Five Thousand
Pesos (P5,000.00) to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) and/or imprisonment of six (6) months. 35cralawlawlibrary

Section 16 of R.A. No. 9262, on the other hand, provides that “[a] PPO shall be effective until revoked by a court upon
application of the person in whose favor the order was issued.”

Pending the resolution of the instant petition, BBB claims that he and AAA had executed a MOA, upon which basis a judgment
by compromise is sought to be rendered. Atty. Uyboco, on her part, pointed out AAA’s vacillation anent the MOA’s execution.
With the foregoing circumstances, the parties, wittingly or unwittingly, have imposed upon this Court the undue burden of
speculating whether or not AAA’s half-hearted acquiescence to the MOA is tantamount to an application for the revocation of
the PPO. The Court, however, refuses to indulge the whims of either parties. The questions raised in the instant petition for the
Court to dispose of revolve around the propriety of the PPO’s issuance. The Court resolves that principal query in the
affirmative. The PPO thus stands unless AAA, categorically and without any equivocation, files an application for its revocation.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 6, 2009 and Resolution dated August 3,
2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89581 are AFFIRMED. The Permanent Protection Order, dated August 14, 2007,
issued against BBB by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 162 STANDS except items (d), (f), (g), (h) and (i)36 thereof.
The case is hereby remanded to the trial court for it to accordingly modify the aforecited items after determining with dispatch
the following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(1) who between BBB and AAA shall exercise custody over the three children;
(2) how the parties shall exercise their respective visitation rights; and
(3) the amount and manner of providing financial support.

The Reply and Manifestation dated November 10, 2014 and December 4, 2014, respectively, are NOTED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 201292, August 01, 2018

PENSION AND GRATUITY MANAGEMENT CENTER (PGMC), GHQ, AFP, CAMP AGUINALDO, QUEZON CITY, REPRESENTED BY
ITS CURRENT CHIEF, Petitioner, v. AAA (CA-G.R. SP NO. 04359-MIN),*** Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 are the August 16, 2011 Resolution2 and March 9, 2012 Resolution3 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) which dismissed the Petition for Certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 04359-MIN and denied herein petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration,4 respectively.

Factual Antecedents

Respondent AAA filed an action for support against her husband, BBB - a retired military person, before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Isabela, Basilan. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 921-259 and assigned to RTC Branch 1.

On February 12, 2010, the trial court issued its Judgment,5 the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner and against the respondent by way of the following:

1) Ordering the issuance of a Permanent Protection Order decreeing the respondent to support the petitioner and the minor
child CCC consisting of 50% of his monthly pension to be withheld regularly by the Pension Gratuity Management Center of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, General Headquarters, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, to be remitted by the latter by check
directly to the petitioner;

2) Ordering the respondent to pay the petitioner support in arrears in the amount of P130,000.00, representing monthly
support of P5,000.00 commencing from January, 2008.

SO ORDERED.6
On February 12, 2010, the trial court issued a Permanent Protection Order 7 reiterating what was decreed in its Judgment and
ordering the automatic withholding of BBB's monthly pension by petitioner Pension Gratuity Management Center of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (PGMC) and its direct remittance to respondent.

Petitioner filed a Manifestation (with Motion)8 questioning the trial court's directive for it to withhold half of BBB's pension for
direct remittance to respondent, arguing that it may not legally release any portion of BBB's monthly pension to any other
individual as it was not impleaded as a party defendant to Civil Case No. 921-259; that it is prohibited by law from releasing and
distributing monthly pensions of retired military personnel to individuals other than the retirees themselves; and that pensions
are public funds and may not be appropriated for a purpose not intended by law. To this motion, respondent filed her
Comment,9 to which petitioner filed a Reply.10

In an April 23, 2011 Order,11 the trial court denied petitioner's Manifestation (withMotion) for lack of merit.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Petitioner filed an original Petition for Certiorari12 with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 04359-MIN. In a August 16, 2011
Resolution, however, the CA dismissed the petition for being tardy and for failing to strictly comply with Rules 43 and 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (1997 Rules), particularly for failure to make a valid tender of payment for the docket and other
fees, for having remitted postal money orders that bear an invalid date, and for failure to state the material dates of receipt of
the assailed judgment and order of the trial court and the date of filing of its motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner moved to reconsider, but the CA held its ground, insisting on a strict application of the 1997 Rules relative to the
filing of petitions for certiorari.

Issues
In a February 10, 2016 Resolution,13 this Court resolved to give due course to the Petition, which contains the following
assignment of errors:
I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DISMISSED OUTRIGHT THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65
ON THE GROUND THAT ONLY THE MATERIAL DATE OF RECEIPT OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE RTC DENYING THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION FILED BY THE PETITIONER WITH THE RTC WAS INDICATED.

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT STRICTLY APPLIED THE RULE ON PAYMENT OF DOCKET FEES
AND OTHER LAWFUL FEES BY ORDERING THE DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ON THE GROUND THAT THERE WAS
NO VALID TENDER OF PAYMENT OF DOCKET AND OTHER LAWFUL FEES DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE POSTAL MONEY ORDERS
REMITTED BORE AN INVALID DATE OF JULY 61, 2011.

III.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT REFUSED TO RULE ON SUBSTANTIVE MERITS OF THE PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI.14
Petitioner's Arguments

In praying that the assailed CA dispositions be set aside and that, instead, the case be remanded to the CA for resolution
thereof on the merits, petitioner pleads in its Petition and Reply15 substantial compliance with the 1997 Rules; that rules of
procedure must give way to substantial justice; that the procedural lapses it committed are not fatal to its cause; and that the
substantial issues and merit of its case outweigh the procedural lapses it committed.

Respondent's Arguments

Respondent, on the other hand, simply counters in her Comment 16 that the CA was correct in dismissing the petition
for certiorari for petitioner's failure to properly observe the procedural requirements.

Our Ruling

The Court denies the Petition.

The lone substantive issue for resolution in this suit - which would settle the case once and for all - is whether petitioner may be
validly ordered by the court to withhold half of BBB's pension for direct remittance to respondent. The Court declares that it
can; the issue has already been settled in a previous case - one involving the very same petitioner in this case.

Thus, in Republic v. Yahon,17 the Court held that PGMC may be ordered to automatically deduct a portion from the retirement
benefits of its member-recipients for direct remittance to the latter's legal spouse as and by way of support in compliance with
a protection order issued by the trial court, pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 9262 (RA 9262) or the Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004. The Court declared therein that RA 9262 - which is a special law; a later
enactment; a support enforcement legislation; and one that addresses one form of violence, which is economic abuse against
women and children - should be construed as laying down an exception to the general rule that retirement benefits are exempt
from execution. The Court therein noted that RA 9262 itself explicitly authorizes the courts to order the withholding of a
percentage of the income or salary of the defendant or respondent by the employer, which shall be remitted directly to the
plaintiff or complainant - other laws to the contrary notwithstanding. Thus, the Court declared:
In this petition, the question of law presented is whether petitioner military institution may be ordered to automatically deduct
a percentage from the retirement benefits of its enlisted personnel, and to give the same directly to the latter's lawful wife as
spousal support in compliance with a protection order issued by the RTC pursuant to R.A. No. 9262.

A protection order is an order issued by the court to prevent further acts of violence against women and their children, their
family or household members, and to grant other necessary relief Its purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further
harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life. The
protection orders issued by the court may be a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) or a Permanent Protection Order (PPO),
while a protection order that may be issued by the barangay shall be known as a Barangay Protection Order (BPO).
Section 8 of R.A. No. 9262 enumerates the reliefs that may be included in the TPO, PPO or BPO, to wit:
xxxx

(g) Directing the respondent to provide support to the woman and/or her child if entitled to legal support. Notwithstanding
other laws to the contrary, the court shall order an appropriate percentage of the income or salary of the respondent to be
withheld regularly by the respondent's employer for the same to be automatically remitted directly to the woman. Failure to
remit and/or withhold or any delay in the remittance of support to the woman and/or her child without justifiable cause
shall render the respondent or his employer liable for indirect contempt of court;

xxxx
Petitioner argues that it cannot comply with the RTC's directive for the automatic deduction of 50% from S/Sgt. Yahon's
retirement benefits and pension to be given directly to respondent, as it contravenes an explicit mandate under the law
governing the retirement and separation of military personnel.

The assailed provision is found in Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1638, which states:
Section 31. The benefits authorized under this Decree, except as provided herein, shall not be subject to attachment,
garnishment, levy, execution or any tax whatsoever; neither shall they be assigned, ceded, or conveyed to any third person:
Provided, That if a retired or separated officer or enlisted man who is entitled to any benefit under this Decree has unsettled
money and/or property accountabilities incurred while in the active service, not more than fifty per centum of the pension
gratuity or other payment due such officer or enlisted man or his survivors under this Decree may be withheld and be applied
to settle such accountabilities.
A similar provision is found in R.A. No. 8291, otherwise known as the "Government Service Insurance System Act of 1997,"
which reads:
SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien - x x x

xxxx

The funds and/or the properties referred to herein as well as the benefits, sums or monies corresponding to the benefits under
this Act shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, execution, levy or other processes issued by the courts, quasijudicial
agencies or administrative bodies including Commission on Audit (COA) disallowances and from all financial obligations of the
members, including his pecuniary accountability arising from or caused or occasioned by his exercise or performance of his
official functions or duties, or incurred relative to or in connection with his position or work except when his monetary liability,
contractual or otherwise, is in favor of the GSIS.
In Sarmiento v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we held that a court order directing the Philippine National Bank to refrain from
releasing to petitioner all his retirement benefits and to deliver one-half of such monetary benefits to plaintiff as the latter's
conjugal share is illegal and improper, as it violates Section 26 of CA 186 (old GSIS Law) which exempts retirement benefits from
execution.

The foregoing exemptions have been incorporated in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which governs execution
of judgments and court orders. Section 13 of Rule 39 enumerates those properties which are exempt from execution:
SEC. 13. Property exempt from execution. Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the following property, and no other,
shall be exempt from execution:

xxxx

(1) The right to receive legal support, or money or property obtained as such support, or any pension or gratuity from the
Government;
It is basic in statutory construction that in case of irreconcilable conflict between two laws, the later enactment must prevail,
being the more recent expression of legislative will. Statutes must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to
form a uniform system of jurisprudence. However, if several laws cannot be harmonized, the earlier statute must yield to the
later enactment. The later law is the latest expression of the legislative will.

We hold that Section 8(g) of R.A No. 9262, being a later enactment, should be construed as laying down an exception to the
general rule above-stated that retirement benefits are exempt from execution. The law itself declares that the court shall order
the withholding of a percentage of the income or salary of the respondent by the employer, which shall be automatically
remitted directly to the woman "[n]otwithstanding other laws to the contrary."
Petitioner further contends that the directive under the TPO to segregate a portion of S/Sgt. Yahon's retirement benefits was
illegal because said [monies] remain as public funds, x x x

xxxx

We disagree.

Section 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262 used the general term "employer," which includes in its coverage the military institution, S/Sgt.
Yahon's employer. Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Thus, Section 8(g) applies
to all employers, whether private or government.

It bears stressing that Section 8(g) providing for spousal and child support, is a support enforcement legislation. In the United
States, provisions of the Child Support Enforcement Act allow garnishment of certain federal funds where the intended
recipient has failed to satisfy a legal obligation of child support. As these provisions were designed 'to avoid sovereign immunity
problems' and provide that 'moneys payable by the Government to any individual are subject to child support enforcement
proceedings,' the law is clearly intended to 'create a limited waiver of sovereign immunity so that state courts could issue valid
orders directed against Government agencies attaching funds in their possession.'

This Court has already ruled that R.A. No. 9262 is constitutional and does not violate the equal protection clause. In Garcia v.
Drilon the issue of constitutionality was raised by a husband after the latter failed to obtain an injunction from the CA to enjoin
the implementation of a protection order issued against him by the RTC. We ruled that R.A. No. 9262 rests on real substantial
distinctions which justify the classification under the law: the unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact
that women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread bias and prejudice against women.

We further held in Garcia that the classification is germane to the purpose of the law, viz:
The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address violence committed
against women and children, spelled out in its Declaration of Policy, as follows:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women and children and guarantees full
respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect the family and its members particularly women and
children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.

xxxx
Under R.A. No. 9262, the provision of spousal and child support specifically addresses one form of violence committed against
women: economic abuse.
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent which includes, but is not
limited to the following:

1. Withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or
activity, except in cases wherein the other spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as defined in Article 73
of the Family Code;

2. Deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use and enjoyment of the conjugal, community
or property owned in common;

3. Destroying household property;

4. Controlling the victims' own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal money or properties.
The relief provided in Section 8(g) thus fulfills the objective of restoring the dignity of women who are victims of domestic
violence and provide them continued protection against threats to their personal safety and security. 18 (Emphasis and italics in
the original; citations omitted)
Having disposed of the case in the foregoing manner, the other issues raised by petitioner are deemed irrelevant and need not
be passed upon by the Court. Quite the contrary, the resolution of the Court on the substantive issue involved should be
enforced with dispatch, this case being one for support.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The August 16, 2011 and March 9, 2012 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 04359-MIN, as well as the February 12, 2010 Judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Isabela, Basilan, Branch 1, in Civil Case
No. 921-259 are AFFIRMED in toto.

The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for execution, and if necessary, evaluation and determination of what is correctly
due to respondent AAA by way of support in arrears and interest, if any, considering the period of time that elapsed since the
case was decided by the trial court.

SO ORDERED.