Sibay, John Alfred B.

BSCRIM2 06/04/2021

Activity 1.1. Get a copy of the Catechism of the Catholic Church (CCC) or browse the internet and
search and enumerate the twelve (12) articles of faith of the Catholic Church which are the very
foundations of the Catholic teachings and dogmas.

1. I believe in God The Father almighty, creator of heaven and earth.

2. I belive in jesus Christ, his only son, our Lord

3. He was conceived by the power of the holy spirit and born of the virgin mary

4. Under Pontius Pilate, He was crucified, died and was buried.

5. He Decended to the dead. On the Third day he rose again.

6. He ascended into heaven and is seated at the right hand of the father. 7. He will come again to judge
the living and the Dead.

8. I believe in the Holy Spirit,

9. The holy catholic Church, the communion of saints,

10. the forgiveness of sins,

11. the resurrection of the body

12. and the life everlasting.

Activity 1.2. Aside from the biblical verses mentioned above, can you still cite at least five (5) bible
verses that support the divine motherhood of Mary?
1.Acts 1:14

14 They all joined together constantly in prayer, along with the women and Mary the mother of
Jesus, and with his brothers.

2. John 19:25

25 Near the cross of jesus stood his mother’s siste’s, Mary the wife of Clopas, and Mary
Magdalene

3. Luke 1:28
28 The angel went to her and said “Greetings, you who are highly favored! The lord is with
you.”

4. Luke 1:30

30 But the angel said to her, Do not be afraid, Mary ; you have found favor her with God.

5. Luke 1:31

31 You will conceive and give birth to a son, and you are to call him Jesus.

 Actvity 1.3. Write a short reflection on the following:

1. What for me is motherhood?

Answer:  Motherhood means family, happiness, love and contentment. ... It is unconditional

love and a protective force that you never knew you had. It means putting your children's needs
above your own

2. Do I consider the Blessed Mary as my true mother as well? Why?

Answer: Mary has been venerated since early Christianity, and is considered by millions to
be the most meritorious saint of the religion. ... The Catholic Church holds distinctive Marian
dogmas, namely her status as the Mother of God, her Immaculate Conception, her perpetual
virginity, and her Assumption into heaven

3. If Mary is also my mother, what are the things I do to show my love and respect toward her?

Answer: She sets the example of love and faithfulness to God. She intercedes for us in prayer
and she bestows graces on us from God that God allows Her to. Not only did she tell the
servers at the wedding feast to “Do what he tells you,” but she reminds us, too, to
follow her advice.

Activity 1.4. Worship. Pray the Holy Rosary meditating on the Joyful Mysteries and offer your
prayers for you biological mother and for all the mothers in the world.

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Activity 2.1. Picture Analysis

1.Dove-he Christian symbol of a dove with an olive branch in its beak pass at the end of forty days,
that Noah opened the window of the ark which he had made:...Also he sent forth a dove from him, to
see if the waters were abated from off the face of the ground; But the dove found no rest for the sole
of her foot, and she returned unto the ark. And he stayed yet other seven days; and again he sent
forth the dove out of the ark; And the dove came in to him in the evening; and, lo, in her mouth was
an olive leaf pluckt off: so Noah knew that the waters were abated from off the earth. And he stayed
yet other seven days; and sent forth the dove; which returned not again unto him any more

2. Halo of 12 stars:- The 12 stars represents God's 12 Greatest Seraphim Angels assigned to

protect the Blessed Virgin Mary as described by Saint Catherine Laboure in 1830 when she
was ordered by God to strike the Medal of the Immaculate Conception aka "The Miraculous
Medal

3. Blue Robe-her signature blue cloak with a red shirt underneath. Deeply rooted in Catholic
symbolism, the blue of her cloak has been interpreted to represent the Virgin's purity, symbolize
the skies, and label her as an empress, for blue was associated with Byzantine royalty

4. Cherub-A cherub is one of the unearthly beings who directly attend to God, according to
Abrahamic religions. The numerous depictions of cherubim assign to them many different roles,
such as protecting the entrance of the Garden of Eden

5. The Crescent Moon-The crescent moon is used in representations of Mary's miraculous

conception and birth (Joachim and Anna at the Golden Door, da Camerino, Tadino, ~1470).
The crescent appears under Mary's feet in paintings of the Assumption (Meister of the Luzien-
Legende, 1485) and signifies her glory and victory over time and space.

6. The snake-he Virgin Mary, in order to be pure enough to become the mother of Christ, was
conceived free from the burden of original sin. Her soul was created in the purest holiness and
innocence." He goes on to say: The term is often confused among non-Catholics with the Virgin
Birth

Activity 2.3. Objective Test

1. What is the meaning of Immaculate Conception? Answer: Immaculate Conception instead

refers to Mary's conception in the womb of her mother, St. Anne. The idea is that Mary
was conceived without the stain of original sin, or born free from original sin

2. Who officially proclaimed this dogma and when was it proclaimed? Answer: The two
Marian dogmas of Immaculate Conception and Assumption were established by popes in the
19th and 20th century. Pope Pius XII issued the Dogma of the Assumption and the Second
Vatican Council declared Mary to be the Mother of the Church.
3. In which Church document this dogma is formally written? Answer: A dogma of the Catholic
Church is defined as "a truth revealed by God, which the magisterium ... Truths formally and
explicitly revealed by God are dogmas in the strict sense when they are ... Nor must it be thought
that what is expounded in Encyclical Letters does not of itself demand consent, since
in writing such Letters 

4. Why was Mary conceived without original sin? Answer: The Catholic Church teaches that the
Blessed Virgin Mary was born without Original Sin because she, too, was conceived without
Original Sin. We call her preservation from Original Sin her
Immaculate Conception. ... Mary had free will; she could have said no, but God knew that she
would not.

5. What do we mean by preservative redemption? Answer: The following analysis of

Mary’s redemption attempts to clarify the Catholic understanding of how it can be
said that a person conceived without original sin can be said to be redeemed at all. The
importance of William Marshner’s technical treatment of this traditionally vexing
question, including his use of modal logic, will be apparent to those who regard it as a
chief function of theologians to defend and advance the Faith by precisely answering
as many potentially devastating questions as possible. Thus, Marshner proceeds to
eliminate false understanding of Mary’s redemption so that a proper understanding
might leave the central doctrines of the Church less open to attack.

Besides her total freedom from personal sin, the Church has also defined the Blessed
Virgin’s freedom from original sin. The Bull Ineffabilis Deus, in defining the
Immaculate Conception, says that she, in the first instant of her conception, was
“preserved immune” from that sin. [1]

At the same time, the Church teaches that the Blessed Virgin was redeemed. Pius XII, in
the encyclical Fulgens corona, declared that Mary’s privileges, far from removing her
from the redemptive work of Christ, or detracting from that work, represent the highest
possible intensity of it. She was redeemed “in a most perfect mode.” [2]

The conjunction of these two teachings compels theologians to posit the concept of a
“preservative redemption,” i.e. a redemption from sin which consists in being preserved
from ever having been in sin, original or actual. The question thereby arises: what
impact does such a unique case have on the meaning of the word `redemption’? Does it
render `redemption’ an equivocal term? (If it does, the teaching of Pius XII is empty
rhetoric.) Does it render `redemption’ an analogous term? If so, what kind of analogy is
involved? Proper proportionality? Improper? And what is the basis for the analogy?

It is important to know, because even an analogous term can only be stretched so far,
before it snaps into sheer metaphor or equivocation. And in order to know how, and
how far, `redemption’ can be stretched before it snaps, a theologian needs to know what
factors can vary and what factors must remain constant, in order for anyone to be truly
called “redeemed” without equivocation. In other words, the theologian needs a
complete set of the necessary conditions for the valid, though analogous, employment of
the term `redeemed.’

In fact, however, theological investigation of this topic has a peculiarly confused and
arid history-confused largely because it has been entangled in the hyper-confused issue
of the debitum peccati (Mary’s alleged obligation, necessity, or consignment to contract
original sin, as a daughter of Adam, even though in fact, by grace, she did not contract
it). Many theologians have held that, unless at least the debitum peccati can be affirmed
of Mary, it makes no sense to call her either “preserved” or “redeemed.” They accuse
those theologians who deny the debitum peccati of unwittingly, perhaps, making
`redemption’ equivocal.

The purpose of the following essay is to cut through this confused history, to start, so to
speak, “from scratch,” and to build from the ground up a solid account of what
“preservative redemption” must be. Twelve conclusions will be reached. The impact of
this account on the related issue of the debitum peccati will turn out to be both
surprising and radical.

I shall try first to establish a general sense of `redemption,’ open to (but not restricted
to) the theological interpretation. Then I shall establish a similarly general sense of
`preservation.’ Third, giving both terms a theological interpretation, I shall see what
possibilities there are for a preservative redemption.

It may be objected that the establishment of a general sense for such terms, prior to
considering their theological sense, is an inversion of proper theological procedure,
which ought to begin with explication of the revealed datum. I reply that the revealed
datum already includes the fact that, under inspiration, the mystery of what Christ did
for us has been described by a term derived from human experience, namely,
`redemption.’ Without a prior understanding of that term, one cannot explicate the
revealed datum. Of course, one must avoid the pitfall of assigning to `redemption’ a
natural sense which precludes or arbitrarily restricts its application to the supernatural
mystery; I have already acknowledged a need to avoid that danger by proposing to
establish a general sense which is open to the theological interpretation. The same
remarks apply, mutatis mutandis, to `preservation.’

THE MEANING OF REDEMPTION

I think it is clear that someone is said to be redeemed if and only if he stands in some
rather complicated relations to at least two other people, one of whom is the redeemer,
and the other of whom is the creditor/captor (or whatever) who accepts the work of the
redeemer which was done on behalf of the one redeemed. My first conclusion, therefore,
is that redemption is a relation involving at least three persons. Of course, the
redeemed may be indefinitely many in number, the creditors/captors may be many, and
the work of redeeming may be a cooperative effort of many. But the total number
involved cannot be less than three.

We shall save many words if we give these three some letter-labels as stand-ins for
proper names. Let us call the one who accepts the redemptive work as satisfactory `a‘,
the one who does the redemptive work `b,’ and the one who is redeemed by that work
`c.’

However, redemption is not simply a relation of three persons. Other items must be
taken into account. For example, what a accepts is not directly the person of the
redeemer but his action. Differently said, a accepts a complex whole which we may
call the state of affairs that b acts in some appropriate way. Likewise, the work of b, the
redeemer, does not affect directly the person of c but rather the obligation,
indebtedness, or captivity in which c stands vis-a-vis a. Hence, again, the work of the
redeemer affects a whole situation which we may call the state of affairs that c is in a
certain predicament. My second conclusion, then, is that redemption is a relation
involving certain states of affairs.

Again, it will save many words if we give schematic “names” to the states of affairs. Let
us take the state of affairs that b acts in some appropriate way on behalf of c and name it
‘Red(b,c).’ And the state of affairs that c is in a certain predicament vis-a-vis a, we shall
call ‘Pred(c,a).’

Now, in order to determine whether there are also other facts or states of affairs which
are directly and immediately involved in the idea of redemption, one must try to sort out
what the idea contains from what the idea presupposes. Part of the complexity of the
idea resides in the fact that it seems to presuppose a great deal, in fact, a whole history
of previous dealings.

It may be asked, for example, whether redemption in facto esse presupposes a previous

agreement between a and b as to what work, action, or price would be satisfactory – an
agreement antecedent to the actual accomplishment or payment of that satisfaction.
Here I think the answer is negative. I think that redemption per se neither requires nor
excludes an understanding between a and b, antecedent to the actual performance
of b’s action, as to what kind of action will be satisfactory. Often, there is no need for
such an agreement, because redemption occurs within a cultural, juridical, or economic
context in which it is already fixed, and a matter of common knowledge, what kind of act
or price redeems what kind of fault or default. In the revealed mystery, of course, one
has to do with a redemptive act which is not merely conventionally but intrinsically
acceptable, and recognized as such by God the Father from all eternity. (That is why, in
theology, we think of the redemption as achieved in fact as soon as the passion of Christ
is finished, without waiting for an acceptance of that passion by God the Father, since
the latter is already, indeed eternally, assured.) In any case, even where there is no prior
understanding of any kind, either culturally given or directly contracted between the
parties, and even where b simply surprises a with a work done or a price offered, it
seems impossible to deny that redemption in fact occurs provided only that a does
accept what is offered. Hence my third conclusion is that redemption neither includes
nor presupposes as a requirement an antecedent agreement between a and b.

Next, it may be asked whether redemption presupposes an agreement

between c and b – that is, whether c must have agreed to accept b as his or her
redeemer, before `is redeemed’ can be predicated of c. If one answers this question in
the affirmative, the notion of a purely “objective” redemption (in which the knowledge,
consent, or dispositions of the intended beneficiary, c, are neither here nor there) will
make no sense. If one answers the question in the negative, the general sense of
`redemption’ which we are seeking to establish will neither require nor exclude the prior
consent of c, and hence it will be possible for that sense to capture what theologians
have long called the “objective redemption.”

The negative answer is justified not only by thological convenience but also by the facts
of the case in the purely human situation. Suppose that the would-be redeemer, b, has
offered to a an equivalent of what c owed to a, and suppose that a has accepted this
gesture as closing all accounts between himself and c, and suppose lastly that all of this
has occurred entirely unbeknownst to c; in such a situation it is quite undeniable that,
no matter how c himself reacts to the news, something has already been altered.
Something has happened which changes the status of c in the eyes of a. For the first time
since his default, c has been placed in a situation which objectively gives him an option;
the initiative has become his.

Now, given exactly this objective alteration of the situation and nothing more, a large
number of denouements are possible. Perhaps c has a personal hatred of b which
prevents him from accepting a benefit from b‘s hands. Or perhaps c has a stubborn
streak which disinclines him to accept favors from anyone. Or perhaps c has reasons of
his own for preferring his present predicament to freedom. It is quite possible, then,
that c simply refuses to accept what has been done for him. And in response to such a
refusal, there are two basic options for a and b.

On the one hand, they may consider that the deal has “fallen through,” so that,
after b’s contribution has been refunded (if possible or necessary), the moral or juridical
situation of c is exactly as it was before. On this assumption, the idea of objective
redemption reduces to the idea of attempted redemption, and the only permanent
alteration which objective redemption makes to the situation of a recusant c is an
alteration of the historical record: henceforth c is one for whom a redemption was
attempted but failed because rejected by c himself.

On the other hand, a and b may take the line that what they have done cannot be
undone, so that, whether c likes it or not, his debt has been cancelled; if c chooses not to
think so, that is henceforth a matter of his own distorted thinking; if c is in prison and
chooses to remain there, that is henceforth purely a matter between him and the jail
administration. On this assumption, the objective redemption remains a true
redemption, since the alteration which it makes in the situation is a permanent
alteration of c‘s position precisely in its moral or juridical dimensions.

Therefore, under either assumption, the purely objective redemption makes some
permanent change in the situation, whether juridical or merely historical. Hence on
both assumptions there is good reason to establish a purely objective sense of
`redemption’ which can be verified prior to, and independently of, the response by c.

Moreover, it is not only in the case of refusal that one has grounds for distinguishing an
objective sense of `redemption’ from a more inclusive, subjective one. For suppose the
denouement is that c accepts as his own redemption the work of b, already accepted
by a. Still, in different situations, this “acceptance” by c will consist of different things. It
might consist simply of walking out the jail door; it might involve signing a document; it
might involve making a gesture of reconciliation with a, etc. In other words, depending
on the nature of c‘s predicament vis-a-vis a, the act which constitutes c‘s acceptance of
the already objectively changed situation may vary greatly both in its overt form and in
its subjective pre-conditions. (In the theological interpretation, of course, c‘s acceptance
of his redemption will be a very complex affair, involving the openness to and receipt of
actual grace, an act of infused faith, etc.) Hence it is appropriate to treat that acceptance
as falling outside of redemption in one sense (the objective) and to treat the larger
situation which includes that process of acceptance as verifying a larger and hence
second sense of `redemption’ (the subjective).

My fourth conclusion, therefore, is that a distinction between objective and subjective

redemptions is justified, and that the general sense of `redemption’ we are seeking here
ought to be first and foremost an account of objective redemption (it can always be
expanded later), and that in this objective sense, an agreement or acceptance on the part
of c is neither presupposed nor included nor excluded. The symbol ‘Red(b,c)’ will be
used henceforth in the objective fashion.

Next, it may be asked whether redemption presupposes a certain relation or kinship

between b and c. Must c be redeemed by a member of his own family, clan, species? Or
may c be redeemed by anybody or anything? Here I think that anthropology and
philosophy conspire to require the former alternative. Philosophically, one can say that,
because the redeemer must render to a an equivalent of what c owed to a, there must be
at least enough similarity between b and c to make such an equivalent performance
possible. Anthropologically, a kinship between b and c seems to be well nigh universal
as a requirement. My fifth conclusion, then, is that redemption presupposes, by way of a
necessary condition, some degree of kinship between the redeemer and the one-to-be-
redeemed.
Next, it is necessary to probe the nature of the “predicament” in which c stands. Two
points are obvious at once. First, it is presupposed that c has been under an obligation
to a. Secondly, it is presupposed that c has run afoul of a in failing to meet this
obligation. But is it also presupposed that c cannot meet the obligation, given this initial
slip and his present circumstances? Surely, the answer is affirmative for the senses of
`redemption’ in which we shall be interested. Granted, there are other senses. A singer,
for example, after a poor performance, convinced that he can do better, may plead for a
“chance to redeem himself.” Whatever one ought to make of this idiom, it clearly
bespeaks a different situation from the sort we wish to study. We are interested in the
sense of `redemption’ in which self-redemption is impossible. For our purposes,
thereforeand this is my sixth conclusion-it is presupposed that c cannot extricate
himself from his predicament vis-a-vis a.

But what exactly is that predicament? Is it simply and identically the indebtedness
to a? Or is it some further discomfiture consequent upon the indebtedness, such as
imprisonment? Or malediction? Depending on which way one answers this question,
one commits oneself to a different account of how redemptive work, or the acceptance of
redemptive work, alters the predicament of the one–to-be-redeemed. For, so long as one
takes the redemptive work itself as b‘s rendering to a a satisfactory equivalent of
what c owed to a, it is clear that if Pred(c,a) is identically c‘s indebtedness to a, then
Red(b,c) simply, directly, and per se cancels that predicament. In other words,
what a does in accepting the redemptive work of b is simply to make that work stand
for, or replace, c‘s own rendering of what he owes. Therefore, if c‘s failure to render what
he owes is the whole of his predicament vis-a-vis a, that predicament simply ceases to
exist as soon as a accepts the redemptive work of b. On the other hand, if c‘s
predicament is or includes the fact that a has already taken punitive action of some kind
against c, so that the predicament is no longer the simple indebtedness but the
consignment of c to captivity or malediction by a, then the redemptive work of b has a
quite different impact on that predicament. For this time, if we assume as we did before
that Red(b,c) consists of b‘s rendering to a a satisfactory equivalent of what c owed to a,
then when a accepts Red(b,c) it is not the case that Pred(c,a) is simply cancelled; rather
it is the case that Pred(c,a) ceases to be appropriate, just, or necessary. In other words,
on this assumption, once the redemptive work is done and accepted, there is no longer
any need for c to languish in captivity or under malediction; if a is just, he will now offer
to withdraw his punitive action or terminate it; but the redemptive work
itself, qua satisfactory and even qua accepted, will have as its immediate and per
se effect not this very termination itself (hence not the annihilation of Pred(c,a) itself)
but only the rendering appropriate in justice of the termination. At least, such is the
inference unless we expand the notion of redemptive work, e.g., by making it include not
only the rendering of what c owed but also the liberation of c. But let us hold this latter
possibility in suspension for a moment. Let us try to resolve one issue at a time.

The issue now before us is whether, in the sense of `redemption’ which we wish to
establish, the predicament from which c is redeemed is simply and identically his
indebtedness to a (which he himself cannot overcome), or whether that predicament is a
captivity or malediction imposed upon c by a as a punishment for c‘s default on his
indebtedness. I think it is more faithful both to ancient practice and to classical theology
to take the latter of these alternatives. We shall assume – this is my seventh conclusion
– that the predicament of c vis-a-vis a is a punitive sanction under which c languishes as
a result of his default. We must therefore distinguish Pred(c,a) from the different and
logically prior state of affairs that c is hopelessly in debt to a, and we shall give this prior
state of affairs its own label, namely, ‘Deb(c,a).’ We may add that Deb(c,a) is the
provocation for the fact that a has punished c, of which Pred(c,a) is the concrete and
achieved effect, that is, the state of captivity or malediction taken passively as a property
of c.

Now, if we keep our narrow sense of redemptive action, according to which Red(b,c)
consists wholly in the fact that b renders an equivalent of what c owed to a, it will be
clear that what is immediately and per se achieved by redemption (that is, achieved by
Red(b,c) as accepted by a is simultaneously the cancellation of Deb(c,a) and the
rendering unnecessary in justice of Pred(c,a). If the predicament is captivity, one will be
able to say that, redemptione peracta, the jail door may stand open. The state of affairs
Pred(c,a) no longer ought to obtain. That it actually and de facto ceases (that the jail
door actually stands open) is directly and immediately the effect of liberation, not of
redemption, although, of course, the open door is mediately the effect of redemption.

Activity 3.2. Objective Test

1. What do we mean by the doctrine of Mary’s Perpetual Virginity? Answer: The perpetual
virginity of Mary is the doctrine that Mary, the mother of Jesus Christ, was
a virgin ante partum, in partu, et post partum—before, during and after the birth of
Christ.

2. Why was it appropriate that Mary should remain virginal after the birth of Our Lord? Answer: It is
the official position of the Roman Catholic Church that Jesus' mother Mary remained a
virgin for her entire life. ... The Roman Catholic Church views Mary as “the Mother of
God” and “Queen of Heaven.” Catholics believe Mary to have an exalted place in
Heaven, with the closest access to Jesus and God the Father.

3. What is the principal objection to Mary’s Perpetual Virginity and how are we going to contradict
that objection? Answer: The perpetual virginity of Mary is the doctrine that Mary, the
mother of Jesus Christ, was a virgin ante partum, in partu, et post partum—before,
during and after the birth of Christ.

Activity 4.2. Reflection writing. Why do you think the people of Maasin have a great devotion to the
Mahal nga Patrona?
Answer: Maasin City is one of the oldest communities in Southern Leyte,
although it used to be called Nipa. It supposedly got its current name back
during the Spanish occupation of the Philippines, as when Spaniards went by
the Canturing River, they asked the natives in Spanish what it was called. Not
understanding the question, they responded “Maasin" (salty), thinking that
they were being asked how the water tasted. The name stuck, and it became
known as Maasin from then on. As a people, the residents of Maasin City are
known for their devout faith, which is why this place is one of the known
pilgrimage places in the Eastern Visayas. Beyond the religious sites, the city
also holds several gems for those who are looking for adventure.

Spend some time in contemplation at the Maasin Cathedral Maasin Cathedral Source: Wikipedia
The Cathedral of Nuestra Señora De Asunsion, otherwise known as Maasin Cathedral, was built
in the 17th-century, making it the oldest as well as the biggest church in the city. Various
religious orders have served in the church, including the Jesuits, the Augustinians, and the
Franciscans. The church was destroyed thrice in its history. The present church was completed in
1968, the same year that it was declared the seat of the Diocese of Maasin. As such, don’t be
surprised to find a more modern interior in the cathedral, versus its antique façade. However,
some of the statues of saints still harken back to the Spanish era. Note that the church is only
open if there is mass. However, there is mass every day at 11 am, so visitors who want to visit
can schedule their trip to arrive at or near that time. As a side note, history buffs may also want
to explore St. Joseph College, right beside Maasin Cathedral, which was constructed in 1928.
The city itself has several colonial-era houses dotting the streets.
Maasin Cathedral
Address: National Road, Maasin City, Southern Leyte See our full list of recommended hotels in
Maasin City and also compare the prices with airbnbs in Maasin City

Activity 4.3. Reasoning. After knowing and understanding the four Marian dogmas, kindly describe
and explain the relationship of these doctrines (Divine Motherhood, Immaculate Conception,
Perpetual Virginity, and Assumption) to one another.
Answer: The four dogmas of Mother of God, Immaculate Conception, perpetual virginity, and
Assumption form the basis of Mariology. However, a number of other Catholic doctrines about
the Virgin Mary have been developed by reference to sacred scripture, theological reasoning
and Church tradition. What are the four Marian dogmas solemnly defined by the Church?
Divine motherhood, Mary's Perpetual Virginity, Mary's Immaculate Conception, and Mary's
Bodily Assumption into Heaven. Roman Catholic Church The doctrine that the
Virgin Mary was conceived free from all stain of original sin. The feast of the Immaculate
Conception is celebrated on December 8. They are baptism, confirmation, the Eucharist,
reconciliation (penance), anointing of the sick, marriage, and holy orders. This number was
confirmed by the Council of Trent against the Protestant reformers, who maintained that there
were only two sacraments (baptism and the Eucharist). The spiritual motherhood of Mary is
patterned after her divine motherhood. ... She became the Mother of the Head as well as the
Mother of all the members; physically, the Mother of Christ, and spiritually the Mother of men.
Her divine motherhood was the cause as well as the measure of her spiritual motherhood.