Philosophical Review

The Problem of Substance in Spinoza and Whitehead

Author(s): D. Bidney
Source: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 45, No. 6 (Nov., 1936), pp. 574-592
Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical Review
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 THE PROBLEM OF SUBSTANCE IN SPINOZA
AND WHITEHEAD'
I
In his Process and Realityand Science and theModern World
ProfessorWhiteheadexplicitlyacknowledgesthathis metaphysics
bears a close relationto that of Spinoza. Thus he writes:
The philosophyof organismis closelyallied to Spinoza's schemeof
thought.But it differsby the abandonmentof the subject-predicate
formsof thought,so faras concernsthepresuppositions thatthisform
is a directembodiment of the most ultimatecharacterizationof fact.
One resultis that the substance-qualityconceptis avoided and that
morphologicaldescriptionis replacedbydescription
of dynamicprocess.
(P.R. io.)
Similarlyin Science and theModern World (102-3) he says:
In the analogywithSpinozahis one substanceis forme the one under-
lying activityof realizationindividualizingitself in the interlocked
pluralityof modes.Thus concretefact is process.Its primaryanalysis
is into underlying
activityof prehensionand into realizedprehensive
events.
The passages just quoted bear ample evidenceof Whitehead'sre-
cognitionof the similaritybetweenhis systemof metaphysicsand
that of Spinoza. It shall be my purpose in what followsto make
explicitjust whereintherelationbetweentheirschemesof thought
lies and what constitutestheirfundamentaldifferences. The main
thesis I shall tryto maintainis that there is a conflictof philo-
sophicaltraditionsat the basis of the metaphysicsof Spinoza and
Whitehead,and that all the problemsof Spinoza's metaphysics
recurin Whitehead'sworksin a moreacute form.With thisobject
in mind I thinkit best to select for discussionthose conceptsof
Spinoza's thoughtto whichWhiteheadhas drawn attention.
The substanceof Spinoza is also God or the mostperfectbeing.
The infinitesubstanceor God is allowed a final'eminent'reality
beyondthat of the finitemodes or accidents.The principleupon
whichthisreasoningis based is thatof theinseparability of perfec-
tion and reality-a doctrinewhich identifiesSpinoza with all
the otherphilosophersof the Great Tradition. I suggestthat all
' This paperwas read in its presentformat a sessionof the Philosophical
Conference heldat theUniversity of Torontoin thefallof 1935. The section
on Spinoza is based on a largerstudyto be entitledThe Conflictof Tradi-
tionsin the Philosophyof Spinoza.
574

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 SPINOZA AND WHITEHEAD 575
of Spinoza's proofsof the existenceof God can be expressedin
two brief theses: First, existenceis an attributeof the essence
of a mostperfectbeing-which is his definition of 'causa sui' and
a doctrinehe held in commonwithSt. Anselm.Second,perfection
determinesexistence,or more elaborately,perfectionis prior in
realityto being and is thatwhich determinesthe actual existence
of being. Hence if anythingexists,the most perfector infinitely
perfectbeing exists. The point I would make here is that both
theses of Spinoza may be reduced to the single propositionthat
perfection(or value) and existence (reality) are inseparable.2
There is one very importantimplicationof Spinoza's doctrine
of perfection.If we say that quantityof perfectiondetermines
existence,it followsat once thatan infinitely perfectbeingis most
real. Anotherway of arrivingat the same conclusionis by begin-
ning with the notionthat the attributesof a substanceconstitute
its essence. From this it followsthat the more attributesa sub-
stance has, the greateris its reality,and that hence a substance
constitutedby infiniteattributesis most real. The commonthesis
of bothargumentsis thatonlyan infinite substanceor beingis most
real. The finitethingby the very fact of its finitudelacks being.
This thought,I take it,is at the basis of Spinoza's dictumOmnis
determinatio negatioest (i-8, schol. i )-a phrasewhichis usually
misinterpreted by commentators who begin the studyof Spinoza
witha Hegelian bias. It is not thatany formor categoryof being
involvesits negate as Hegel would urge, but that a determinate
formof being is by its very nature a limitationor negationof
infinitelyperfectbeing. In brief,the Spinozisticthesisis that the
infiniteis priorin natureto the finite.3
I have taken the space-timeto elaborate this point because I
regard it as constituting one of the fundamentaldifferencesbe-
tween Spinoza and Whitehead,as indeed betweenall philosophia
perennisand modern relationisticphilosophies.4One direct im-
plicationof Whitehead's principleof the primacyof process is
that value or perfectionis not intrinsicallybound up with the
2 See mypaper"Value and Realityin the Metaphysics of Spinoza" in this
Review XLV 229.
3 ProfessorHallettin his Aeternitas
has previouslydrawnattention to this
point.
4 I am indebtedto ProfessorSheldonof Yale fortheuse of thisterm.

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576 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. XLV.
natureof reality.Values, as exemplifiedin various temporal,finite
formsof being,may emergeor evolvein time,but processas such,
unlikeSpinoza's substance,is not essentiallyconstitutedby value-
attributes.In his Adventuresof Ideas Whitehead has some ex-
plicitstatementsto this effect.He writes: "All realizationis finite
and thereis no perfectionwhich is the realizationof all perfec-
tions" (330). And again (357):
Every occasionis in its ownnaturefinite.There is no totalitywhichis
theharmonyof all perfections. Whateveris realizedin anyone occasion
of experiencenecessarilyexcludes the unboundedwelterof contrary
possibilities.There are always otherswhichmighthave been and are
not.This finitenessis nottheresultof evil or of imperfection.
It results
fromthe factthatthereare possibilitiesof harmonywhicheitherpro-
duce evil in pointof realizationor are incapableof such conjunction.
Here we see that Whitehead followsthe Greek ratherthan the
Hebrew-Christiantradition.For him,as for Plato and Aristotle,
an actual eventis thatwhichhas some definiteform.The infinite
is the formless,thatwhichlacks all determination and thereforeall
actuality.Hence according to Whitehead there can be no infi-
nitelyperfectbeing who is the realizationof all perfections.Per-
fectionis somethingwhich can be attributedonly to some finite
formof being.
The reason forthis fundamentaldifference betweenthe Greeks
and Whiteheadon theone hand, and Spinoza and the Scholastics
on the other,is theirdifferentconceptionof the nature of ulti-
mate reality.For Spinoza the essenceof substanceconsistsnot in
a particularformbut in its attributes.Hence the more attributes
any substancehas expressingits power and reality,the more per-
fectis thatsubstance.Thereforethemostperfectbeingor God is a
being constitutedby all or infiniteattributes(i -9; i-II). Infinity
of beingdoes not mean indeterminateness or lack of definitechar-
means absolutefulnessof being.In thisrespect
acteristics.Infinity
the infiniteof the Hebrew-Christiantraditiondiffersfromthe in-
finiteof the Greeks,the TO APEIRON or boundless of Plato,
which is merelythe indeterminatereceptacleof formsof being
but in itselflacks all causal efficacyor actuality.Whitehead,like
Plato, conceivesall being as dependentupon some finiteform.It
is theformswhichlimittheboundlessand producedeterminate be-
ing and orderand harmony.

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No. 6.] SPINOZA AND WHITEHEAD 577

II
Before analysingfurthertheidea of God in Spinoza and White-
head, it may be best to make a few historicalremarksabout the
natureof substance,in order to see our problemsin theirproper
perspective.
The early Ionian philosophersasked themselvesthe question,
what is nature made of? They gave various answers, each one
choosing some substance from sense-experiencewhich he ima-
ginedcould be the sourceof all things,such as water,air, etc.The
point I wish to note here is that,once we begin with the notion
of substanceas thatwhichis the permanentsubstratumof all par-
ticular formsof being,we must conceiveall particularthingsas
in some way modes or modifications of thatcontinuoussubstance
and as havingno independentexistenceapart fromthatsubstance.
Plato and Aristotle,as I interpret
them,differedfromtheIonian
philosophersin that theywere metaphysicaldualists.They made
a definiteseparationbetween the formaland the materialprin-
ciples of nature, and then were forced to make desperate,
thoughunsuccessful,effortsto bringthemtogetheragain as they
appeared in nature.Plato conceivedthe realmof Forms or Ideas
as somehowparticipatingin the world of change or flux.If we
followthe accountof the Timeus, therewere the formsor limits
somehowlimitingtheboundlessor unlimited.Aristotletoo,in spite
of his criticismof Plato for separatingthe formsfromparticular
things,could not avoid this metaphysicalbifurcation.Ultimately,
for him,the highestformof being is God or Pure Form; lowest
in the scale of being is Prime Matter (Hyle) whichhas a mini-
mum of form.5Matter is that which has the potentialityfor be-
comingall things; formis that which constitutesthe essence or
being of things.It is truethat as regardsparticularthingsAris-
totleinsistedupon an inseparableunion of formand matterand
was opposed to the Platonic doctrineof universal forms.The
pointI wish to suggesthere is thatin the end Aristotlealso, since
he worked with the two ultimateprinciplesof matterand form,
could not overcomethis fatal dualism.
The thoughtI wish to emphasizehere is that the reason why
bothPlato and Aristotleinsisteduponthe distinctionbetweenmat-
5 See Metaphysica 1072a, b.

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578 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. XLV.

terand formis thattheyadoptedthethesisof Parmenides,namely,

that being must be unchangingand eternal. That which is ever
in a state of becomingcannot be said to be. Hence they were
opposed to the Heraclitean doctrinethat all is flux. This also
is whytheyrejectedthe traditionof the Ionian philosopherswho
maintainedthatthereis one substanceor stuffwhichservesas the
substratumof all things. If in the observable world there is
change and motion,substancealso must be undergoingchange;
otherwiseone is forced to say with Parmenides and Zeno that
change or motion is an illusion of the senses. By maintaining
the permanenceof formas over against the passage of nature,
Plato and Aristotleattempted,thoughunsuccessfully,to do jus-
tice to the demandsof reasonand experience.

III
This lesson, it appears, was not taken to heartby Spinoza and
Whitehead; and this accountsfor the essentialambiguityof their
thought.Spinoza, as is well known,triedto overcomethe dualism
of Descartes by positingone substanceconstitutedby the known
attributesof extensionand thought.From this it followed,as
Spinoza himselfrealized, that all finite,perceptiblethingsmust
be regarded ontologicallyas modes or modificationsof that one
infinitesubstance. But the perfectionof an absolutely perfect
substancedemanded that it be actually and fullyrealized in all
respects and not subject to temporalchange and process; and
this could not be the case if the infinitesubstancewas the imme-
diate groundor sourceof the modes. This I take to be the signifi-
cance of those propositionsof Spinoza's Ethics (Prop. 2I-28,
Bk. i) wherehe demonstratesthat"all thingswhich followfrom
theabsolutenatureof any attributeof God mustforeverexistand
must be infinite" (i-2i); and concludes (I-28) that "an individual
thingor a thingwhich is finiteand has a determinateexistence
cannotexist nor be determinedto action unless it be determined
to existenceand actionbyanothercause whichis also finiteand has
a determinateexistence".
Spinoza resortsto various expedi-
To overcomethis difficulty,
ents. He summonsthe Neo-Platonistsand the Cabbalists to his
aid; and theyinformhim thatif only he introducea doctrineof

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No. 6.] SPINOZA AND WHITEHEAD 579
degrees of emanation all his difficultieswill be solved. Hence
appears the famous distinction between attributes, immediate in-
finitemodes, mediate infinitemodes, and finitemodes (Letter 64
to Schuller: Sh. Tr. i, ch. 9). The immediate modes which follow
directly from the attributes are eternal, but those which are more
remote from the divine source of perfection lack the potency or
power of the divine substance and hence are subject to mutability.
This argument failed to satisfy some of Spinoza's correspondents,
and in modern times no commentator lets the opportunity go by
without drawing the reader's attention to its shortcomings. The
doctrine of emanation, which in Neo-Platonic literature usually
goes along with degrees of being, is one which Spinoza cannot
consistently adopt if he is to retain an essential monism in which
all finitethings are modes or modifications of the divine substance.
Spinoza, however, had a very resourceful mind and besides was
learned in the philosophical traditions. Hence he reintroduced the
Aristotelian distinction between form and matter-but, of course,
like a discreet man, without using these precise terms. He pre-
ferred instead to employ the terminologyof Francis Bacon and dis-
tinguished between Natura Naturans and Natura Naturata (Sh.
Tr. 2, ch. 9; Ethics I-29, schol.). For Bacon, Natura Naturans,
the nature engendering nature, is the formal principle in things
(Aphorisms II, I, 2). Natura Naturans is the formal, universal
law or structure immanent in things which determines their op-
erations and properties. The particular thing, as we observe it in
its relations to other things, is nothing but the effect,the natura
naturata, or produced nature, which follows from the active uni-
versal principle within it. The formal principle immanent in things
is eternal and immutable; but the particular things which are the
effects of the latent form are subject to change in time. In Spi-
noza's treatise On the Improvement of the Understanding there
occurs this passage (Wild Edition 39-40):
The essencesof particularmutablethingsare not to be gatheredfrom
theirseriesor orderof existencewhichwould furnishus withnothing
beyondtheirextrinsicdenominations, theirrelations,or at most,their
circumstances,all of whichare verydifferentfromtheirinmostessence.
This inmostessencemustbe soughtsolelyfromfixedand eternalthings,
and fromthelaws inscribed(so to speak) in thosethingsas in theirtrue
codes, accordingto whichall particularthingstake place and are ar-

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58o THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. XLV.
ranged.Nay, thesemutableparticularthingsdependso intimately and
essentiallyupon the fixed things,that they cannot eitherbe or be
conceivedwithoutthem.Whencethesefixedand eternalthings,though
theyare themselvesparticular,will nevertheless,owing to theirpres-
ence and powereverywhere, be to us as universalsor generaof defini-
tionsof particularmutablethings,and as the proximatecauses of all
things.
Now althoughtherehave not been wantingcommentators who,
when they read this passage, pointed out its similarityto the
thoughtof Bacon, very few have tried to show the connection
betweenthis doctrineof formsand Spinoza's theoryof naturans
and naturata. Instead, learned but futile researcheshave been
undertakento trace the historyof the term in Scholasticphilo-
sophy,which all end by showingthat, althoughSpinoza uses a
termoccasionally foundin Scholasticliterature,he employsit in
a different sense. Althoughthe Scholasticsat timesspoke of God
as Natura Naturans,theystillregardedHim as a beingwho trans-
cended nature, as the Creator of nature,whereas for Spinoza
Natura Naturans is a principleimmanentin nature. My thesis
is that Spinoza simplyadoptedthe Baconian use of the terms,but,
unlike Bacon, he made of them metaphysicalprinciples.God as
Natura Naturans is simplythe formalprincipleimmanentin na-
ture as a whole; Natura Naturata, the world of thingswhich de-
pend on God, does not differsubstantiallyfrom Him. Within
substance itself one is neverthelessforcedto introducethe dis-
tinctionbetweenactive and passive nature,so as to allow for a
formal principlewhich is constantand is the source of order
in the sense-objectswhichare always comingintobeingand ceas-
ing to exist.
It should be rememberedin this connectionthat the primacy
of Natura Naturans impliesthatGod or natureis to be conceived
as a concrete,individualbeing of a definite,determinatenature.
This means that God must ultimatelybe conceivedas finitebe-
cause, as we have shown,the formaland the finiteare identical.
An infiniteform,as Plato and Aristotletrulysaw, is a contradic-
tion. Spinoza attemptedto pass lightlyover this difficulty
by iden-
tifyingGod as constitutedby His eternal,infiniteattributeswith
Natura Naturans and the world of finitemodes with Natura
Naturata. Thus he writes (Ethics I-29, schol.): "By Natura

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No. 6.] SPINOZA AND WHITEHEAD 58i

Naturans we are to understandthatwhichis in itselfand is con-

ceived throughitself or those attributesof substancewhich ex-
press eternaland infiniteessence". Now my contentionis thatthe
principleof Natura Naturans cannotbe applied consistently to a
substancewhose essence is constitutedby attributes.Two entirely
contrarymetaphysicaltheoriesas to the natureof substanceare
involved. Substance as constitutedby attributesmay be infinite
and perfect,preciselybecause it lacks a formal,determining prin-
ciple. Spinoza is forcedto readoptthe substance-attribute meta-
physics because he wishes to retain his metaphysicalmonism.
Logically,by introducing the conceptof Natura Naturans,he has
introduceda formal,relationalprinciplewhich,consideredby it-
self,apart fromnaturanaturata,can no longerbe spokenof as an
actual substancequalifiedby attributes.
Furthermore, to add to the difficulties
of the situation,Spinoza
did not realize thathis metaphysicswas not at all consistentwith
his physics.He took over the mechanistic,Democriteanphysicsof
Galileo and Descartes. On this basis, the union of bodies is ex-
plained to be the result of the combinationof atomic particles.
Form becomes secondary; formis the resultof the union of the
physical particles,but in no way determinestheir formation.
AlthoughDescartes conceivednature as a continuumof exten-
sion,he continuedto speak of particlesand primaryand secondary
qualities as if the atomicphysicsstillheld. Since he held further
that thoughtconstituteda distinctsubstance,he conceivedman
as composed of a substantialsoul and a mechanisticbody and
then was faced with the problemof the interactionof body and
mind.
As regardsSpinoza, the situationis morecomplex.In so far as
he held to the doctrinethatnaturewas one infinitesubstance,his
individuals,as modes of that substance,had to be internallyre-
lated to thatsubstance,whichdeterminedtheiressence and exist-
ence. This step Spinoza refused to take. Instead he proceeded
to separate the world of modes fromthe infinitesubstance.The
perceptibleworldhe, like Descartes,conceivedas actingaccording
to mechanisticlaws. Furthermore,on the basis of his Baconian
theoryof forms,Natura Naturans should have been the formal,
determining principleof natureas a whole. Instead we findthatthe

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582 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. XLV.
formof nature is somethingsecondaryand derivativedepending
upon the combinationof individualthings.Spinoza's doctrineof
the world conceived fromthe standpointof physicsis best illus-
tratedby the followingpassage (2-lemma 7 precedingprop. 14)
If we nowconsider an individual
of anotherkindcomposed of many
individuals
of diversenatureswe shalldiscoverthatitmaybe affected
in manyotherways,itsnaturenevertheless beingpreserved.For since
eachof itspartsis composedof a number of bodies,eachpartwithout
anychangeof its naturecan movemoreslowlyor morequicklyand
consequentlycancommunicate itsmotion morequickly or moreslowly
to therest.If we nowimagine a thirdkindof individualcomposed of
theseof thesecondkind,we shalldiscover thatit canbe affectedin
manyotherwayswithout anychangeof form.Thusif we advancead
infinitumwe mayeasilyconceive thewholeof natureto be one indi-
vidual,whoseparts,thatis to say,all bodies,differin infinite
ways
withoutanychangeof thewholeindividual.
Here we see that nature,conceivedas an individual,is such as a
resultof thecommunication of partsin motionin a definiteratioof
motionand rest. The parts are not conceivedas internallyor ne-
cessarilyrelatedto one another,and the formof the whole in no
way determinestheactionof theparts.I submitthatsuch a physi-
cal theoryis not consistentwith a metaphysicswhich gives the
primacyto the formalprinciple,nor is it consistentwitha monis-
tic theoryin which all nature is a continuumof changelesssub-
stance.
IV
We turnnow to a similaranalysisof Whitehead'smetaphysics.
The generalthesisI shall tryto maintainis thatall the difficulties
of Spinoza's metaphysicsrecur in Whitehead's works in a more
aggravated form.Let us consider:
Throughoutall his work Whitehead repeats and repeats the
lesson that as a result of modern physics we must no longer
conceiveof natureas constitutedby inert,staticsubstances.The
electricaltheoryof matteris thatmatteris essentiallyan activity,
quanta of energy.The notionof an inertsubstancequalifiedby
attributesmustbe abandoned and in its place we must substitute
process or series of occasions and events. Whitehead expresses
thisdoctrineclearlyand brieflyin his pamphlet,Nature and Life,
wherehe says: "Matterhas been identifiedwithenergyand energy
is activity; the passive substratumcomposed of self-identical

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No. 6.] SPINOZA AND WHITEHEAD 583
enduringbits of matterhas been abandoned". He is careful to
pointout thatwe mustnot committhe fallacyof 'simplelocation'
by regardingany bit of energyin isolationfromits environment.
To quote again: "In the modernconceptthe group of agitations
which we termmatteris fused into its environment. There is no
possibility of a detached, self-containedlocal existence. The
environmententersinto the nature of each thing."
The question now occurs, What is the relation between the
individualformsof energyand the cosmic activitywhichconsti-
tutes theirenvironment?Is Process in any way to be conceived
as a unity?Is it priorto theevents?It seemsto me thatWhitehead,
like Bergson,in spite of his repeated criticismsof the category
of substanceis forcedto reintroduceit underanothername. For
himtheultimatesubstrateof thingsis energyof some sort.Process
or energyis thatwhose natureit is to act-just as Descartes con-
ceived the soul as that whose nature it is to thinkand therefore
held that the soul thinksalways. In his Science and the Modern
World (I02-3) Whitehead states his position clearly: "In the
analogywithSpinoza his one substanceis forme the one underly-
ing activityof realizationindividualizingitselfin an interlocked
pluralityof modes.-Each event is an individualmatterof fact
issuing froman individualizingof the substrateactivity."Here
we see clearlythatWhitehead,like Spinoza, postulatesone funda-
mentalsubstrateof which all thingsare modes, but he identifies
this substratewith activity.
The main reasons for Whitehead's rejection of the category
of substanceare two:
First,thereis the argumentfromLogic and Mathematicswhich
he holds in commonwith BertrandRussell. Throughoutall his
works Whiteheadmakes it very obvious that he is opposed to a
substance-attribute metaphysicsand to a subject-predicatelogic.
Instead he urgesthatphilosophyshouldbe based on a logic which
gives the primacyto relationsor structureand not to the terms
or subjects. Similarlyin metaphysicsthe ultimateprinciplemust
be a relationalactivityand not some underlyingstaticsubstance.
He believesthatsome such entityas process,change,or becoming,
is theultimaterealitywhichservesas thebondof relationbetween
the various events or occasions which emerge in time fromthe
cosmic process. Just as in logic it is the relationalformof the

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584 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. XLV.

propositionwhich determinesthe truth-function of the variable

term,so in metaphysics,process or creativityis the relational
principlewhichconstitutesrealityas one continuum.
Secondly,thereis the BergsonianargumentfromIntuitionand
the Theory of CreativeEvolution.Bergson in his Introductionto
Metaphysicsand Creative Evolution reveals to us most clearly
the fundamentalpresuppositionof modern relationisticphiloso-
phy. Becoming,he argues, is more intelligiblethan being. This,
he claims,can be shown if we bear in mind the phenomenonof
motion.Movementis not the series of staticpositionsof things.
It is essentiallya certaindurationof flux.This durationcan be
analysedforthe purposesof actionintoa seriesof stages or posi-
tions, but motion cannot be reconstructedthrougha series of
staticpositions.When one attemptsto do so he becomesinvolved
in all theparadoxes of Zeno. SimilarlyfromBecomingor Process
we can by abstractionderive various static formsof being. But
fromthenotionof beingone cannotderivethenotionof becoming.
In this respect,Bergsonand Whiteheadmaintain,all philosophies
of the past have been misledby theAristoteliansubject-predicate
logic and by the consequentsubstance-attribute metaphysics.
As said, the doctrineof the primacyof becomingover being
depends upon the assumptionthat becomingis more intelligible
thanbeing.This, I wish to urge,is a fallaciousassumption.There
is more,I should say, to active beingthan to staticbeing,thereis
moreto a body in motionthanto a body in a series of staticposi-
tions; but process or activityapart froma being or substanceto
which it may be attributedis essentiallyunintelligible.It seems
to me thatWhitehead'sremarkin his Nature and Life that "It is
always possibleto workone's self intoa stateof completecontent-
mentwithan ultimateirrationality"is well illustratedin the case
of Relationisticphilosophers.
The compatibility of thecategoryof substancewiththecategory
of activityis best demonstratedby the philosophyof Leibniz,
whose influenceWhitehead acknowledges. Leibniz, it will be
recalled,was opposed to the Cartesian-Spinozistic conceptionof a
continuousextendedsubstance.Extensionby naturewas divisible
and hence,he claimed,substanceas extendedwas not reallyone.
Instead he conceiveda theoryof monads or individualsubstances
whichwere centresof activity.The activityof the monad or unit

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No. 6.] SPINOZA AND WHITEHEAD 585
consistedin its perceptionor representation of the universeof
othermonads. Monads differfromone anotherin the qualitiesof
theirperceptions.There are degreesof activity.Perceptionis the
lowest form of activityand does not involve consciousness.It
correspondsto one's state when he is in a swoon or deep sleep.
Apperceptioninvolves consciousnessor reflectiveknowledgeof
these inner states and is characteristicof souls. Brieflyput, the
followingpointsare importantin this connection.First, the ulti-
mate constituentsof reality are individual substances whose
essence consistsin the characterof theirexperience.Second, one
monad has nothingin commonwith another and cannot affect
thatother.This is what Leibniz means by sayingthatall monads
are windowless.Third, each monad experiencesor representsthe
rest of the universe as a result of the preestablishedharmony
arrangedby God. Fourth,space or extensionis not a substantial
or real attributeof a monad; it is only a phenomenalrelation
betweensubstances.Fifth,all natureis essentiallyalive thoughin
varyingdegrees.Sixth,each monad is internallydetermined.
If now we examine the writingsof Whiteheadwe findcertain
marked similarities.In his Concept of Nature he agrees with
Leibniz thatspace is not an attributeof reality,but onlya relation
betweenevents. Secondly,he agrees that the ultimatesubjective
or formalnatureof each eventconsistsin the enjoymentof some
experience,thoughhe definesexperiencedifferently. Of course,
there are some importantdifferencesbetweenthem. Whitehead
is opposed to a theoryof pluralisticsubstancessuch as Leibniz
maintains;he conceivestheLeibnizianmonads as eventsor modes
of a more ultimate Spinozistic substance. Furthermore,he is
opposed to the substance-attribute view implied in Leibniz's
doctrinethat the monads are substances to which discernible
differencesof activityor qualityare attributed.He is opposed to a
'windowless'theoryof substancesuch thatthereis no interaction
between things.Whitehead's variationsseem to consist,first,in
postulatinginternalrelationsbetweenvariousactual eventsinstead
of internalrelationsbetweenthevariousexperiencesof one entity.
Thus he avoids the doctrineof a preestablishedharmonyand at
the same timeagrees withLeibniz thateach event,on account of
its internal relations, mirrors the whole universe. Secondly,
accordingto Whitehead,the actual occasions have no substantial

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586 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. XLV.

existence of their own; they are modes or effectsof cosmic

process or creativity.In this mannerhe is interpreting the Leib-
nizian monads in a Spinozisticfashion; he retainsthe doctrineof
Leibniz that the nature of things consists in their activityor
experience,but like Spinoza he refusesto give individualthingsa
substantialexistenceof theirown. Whiteheadhimselfsummarizes
his positionclearlyin Process and Reality (pt. 2, ch. 2, P. I24):
This is a theoryof monads,but it differsfromLeibniz's in that his
monadschange.In theorganictheorytheymerelybecome.Each monadic
creatureis a modeof the processof 'feeling'theworld,of housingthe
worldin one unitof complexfeelingin everyway determinate. Such a
unit is an actual occasion-it is the ultimatecreaturederivativefrom
thecreativeprocess.
I suggestedin the precedingparagraphthatWhiteheadis inter-
pretingthe Leibnizian monads in Spinozistic fashion.The same
point can be made by saying that Whitehead's systemapproxi-
mates a formof the Indian Upanishidicphilosophy.He himself
makes this suggestionin his Process and Reality (ii) where he
says:
In monisticphilosophiesSpinoza's or absoluteidealism,this ultimate
termed'The Absolute'.In suchmonistic
is God,who is also equivalently
schemesthe ultimateis illegitimatelyallowed a final'eminent'reality
beyondthatascribedto anyof its accidents.In thisgeneralpositionthe
philosophyof organismseemsto approximatemoreto some strainsof
Indianor Chinesethoughtthanto WesternAsiaticor Europeanthought.
One side makes processultimate;the otherside makes fact ultimate.
The connectionbetween the Indian conceptionof the ultimate
natureof process and Whitehead'stheoryis very close. In both
thereis the doctrinethatthe ultimatesubstrateof thingsis inde-
terminateactivityor process, from which the world of finite,
temporalformsemerges.For boththis ultimateprocess is essen-
tiallyqualitativeexperientialfeelingor subjectiveenjoymentwith-
out representation or consciousness;experienceis said to be prior
to consciousness.One mightalso say that the theoryof cosmic,
indeterminateexperience is akin to one of Leibniz's lowgrade
monadsbut conceivedas a boundless,infinitecontinuumafterthe
fashionof the Platonic space of the Timeus.6 Whitehead,how-
ever, differsfromthe Indian sages in insistingwith the Greeks
6 In his Science and First PrinciplesProfessorNorthrophas developed
the theorythatthe Platonicspace of the Timaus is identicalwiththeinde-
terminate boundlessof Orientalphilosophy.This pointof view enablesone
to gain insightinto Whitehead'sdoctrine.

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No. 6.] SPINOZA AND WHITEHEAD 587

that loss of finite,actual individualityis a real loss, not a gain;

that the individualattainshis perfectionby achievingsome har-
monious formof beingand therebyextricatinghimselffromthe
indeterminacy of pure experience.

V
At this point the problemwhich the Ionian philosophersand
Spinoza faced recurs. If we begin with infinite,indeterminate
experience,how shall we account for the origin of change and
differentiationinto finitemodes? In Whitehead'ssystemthe pro-
blem is more acute than in Spinoza's because the latter at least
startedwithan actual determinate substancewithpowerof activity
to modifyitselfinto various finitemodes. But Whitehead'sulti-
mate substrateis indeterminate potentialityor feeling,lackingany
actual powers and characteristics. How is one to derive actuality
frompotentiality?Aristotlepostulateda pure formor actuality,
which he also designatesas Prime Mover, because he was con-
vinced thatpotentiality was intelligibleonlyin relationto a prior
actuality.7This too is the commonassumptionof Maimonides,St.
Thomas, and Spinoza. The reason why Spinoza takes such pains
to prove the existenceof an absolutelyinfinite, perfectsubstance
is because he assumes thatall becomingor process,all modes that
become in time,can be renderedintelligibleonly by conceiving
some infinitely perfectbeing of which they are the effects.In
brief,the less real or perfectis to be explained by the more real
or perfect.Whitehead,however,in commonwithBergson and S.
Alexander,has to explainthe originof the actual fromthe poten-
tial. I suggest here that he can do so only by endowing the
potentialwithattributeswhichcan consistently be attributedonly
to somethingactual. This is shown by the fact that Whitehead
endowsProcess or Creativitywithan urgeor Eros to realizeitself.
He thusintroducesintothe cosmicprocessthe principleof appeti-
tionor endeavorwhichcharacterizedLeibniz's monads.A typical
passage illustratingthis thoughtoccurs in Adventuresof Ideas
(357): "We must conceive the divine Eros as the active enter-
tainmentof all ideas withthe urge to theirfiniterealizationeach
in its due season. Thus a processmustbe inherentin God's nature
wherebyhis infinity is acquiringrealization."I concludefromthe
7 See Metaphysica I049b.

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588 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. XLV.
above quotationthat Whitehead endeavors to derive the actual
fromthe potentialby attributingto process an eros or urge to
realize all possibilities.This, it seems to me, is to endow process
withattributeswhichit cannothave in so faras it is mereindeter-
minatepotentiality. To say as Miss Emmetdoes in herbook White-
head's Philosophy of Organism (248) that "in the last resort
action can do anythingthat it must do in order for thereto be
anythingat all", is to give up any claim to rationalinterpretation
and explanationof the nature of reality.
Whiteheadhimselfis implicitlyaware of the unsatisfactoriness
of his position. Nature exhibitsnot only process but also con-
stancy.Accordingto the Concept of Nature, thereare universal
formsof being which appear or are situated in the ephemeral
events; e.g., Cambridgeblue may be situatedin manyevents,but
the blue does not changewiththe events.These universalsWhite-
head latercalls "eternalobjects". The pointhere is thathe realizes
thatone cannotderivethese eternalobjects fromthe merenotion
of creativityor process.
Thus Whiteheadlike Spinoza is forcedby the problemof the
relationof permanenceand changeto revise his conceptionof the
natureof God. Like Spinoza he comes to maintainthat God must
be conceivedas a purelyformalprinciple,ratherthan as a sub-
strateof events.God is then conceivedby him as the "Principle
of Concretion",as that in virtueof which the eternalobjects or
pure possibilitiesare broughtinto relationwith actual events so
that theybecome relevantto one another.God so conceivedis a
purelyformal,relatingprinciplewhichmakes the eternalobjects
and eventsgrow together(concrescence). He does not create or
produce eternalobjects and events.He also serves as a limiting
principle,limitingthenumberof possiblesfromamongthe infinite
manywhichcan be actuallyrealized.By thislimitationGod intro-
duces values intothe world.The pointshere indicatedare clearly
stated by Whitehead in the followingpassages. In Science and
theModern World (257) he writes: "God is the ultimatelimita-
tionand His existenceis the ultimateirrationality. For no reason
can be given for just thatlimitationwhich standsin his nature
it
to impose."And again (258) : "If He be conceivedas the supreme
ground for limitation,it stands in his very nature to divide the
good fromthe evil". So in Process and Reality (522) : "By reason

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No. 6.] SPINOZA AND WHITEHEAD 589
of thisprimordialactuality[of God] thereis an orderin the rele-
vance of eternalobjects to the process of creation".
In so far as God is the principleof concretion,He is, like the
Natura Naturans of Spinoza, a purelyformalprincipleand not
at all a substanceor substrateunderlyingits modes. It seems to
me that Whitehead commitsthe same error as Spinoza in con-
tinuingto attributeto God, consideredpurelyas a formalprinciple,
attributeswhichcould onlypertainto Him if He were a substance.
This explains why Whitehead proceeds to speak of God himself
as an accidentor emergentof thegeneralactivity.Thus in Process
and Reality ( i i ) we findthe arrestingstatement:"In thephiloso-
phyof organism,this ultimateis termedcreativityand God is its
primordialnon-temporalaccident".And again (P.R. I35): "This
is the conceptionof God accordingto which He is consideredas
the outcomeof creativity,as the foundationof order and as the
goal towards novelty". These passages may serve as sufficient
indicationthat Whitehead is attemptingto combine the notion
of God as a principleof orderor concretion,with God as in some
sense identicalwith ultimatecreativityor substantialactivity.To
solve this difficultyhe conceivesof God as an emergentor mode
of creativity,Who thenproceedsto act as principleof concretion.
The difficulties of Spinoza's theoryare slightas compared to
thoseof Whitehead.Spinoza, at least,was always dealingwiththe
actual. God, whether as consistingof infiniteattributesor as
Nature Naturans, was always actual. Whitehead, however,has
two realms,the potentialand the actual, and is faced with the
problemof derivingthe one fromthe other.On the level of the
potentialhe endows process or creativitywith the conative urge
to realize itself.Then, as this is not sufficient
to account for the
facts,he adds a principleof concretionto synthesizeand limitthe
eternal objects and the actual events,if and when the latter do
emerge.Whiteheadis consistentenoughto realize thatGod identi-
fiedwithprocess or creativity, and God as principleof concretion,
are stillmerelypotentialand not anythingactual. Hence he pro-
ceeds to evolvean actual God Who will be notmerely"primordial"
but also "consequent".Let us see how he attemptsto accomplish
this feat.
As said, Whitehead does not wish to confuse the actual with
the potential.God, as primordial,shares the natureof the poten-

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590 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. XLV.

tial,in that,thoughactual,He is not fullyactual; He is "deficiently

actual". He has only conceptual "luring" feelings,not physical
feelings (P.R. 522). In the fulness of time God too becomes
actual, but He is dependentupon the activityof the actual occa-
sions. When eternalobjects become realized in actual eventsas a
result of the cooperationof God considered in His primordial
nature,then they also exist as ideas in the mind of God. As a
consequence of the realization of the eternal possibilities,the
potentialnatureof God becomes realized too. This can be under-
stood in two ways: First,the Divine Being acquires a consequent
nature because the indeterminate, boundless activitytakes on a
definite,determinatecharacteras a resultof the self-creativefunc-
tion of the interrelatedevents. Secondly,fromthe pointof view
of God as the principleof concretion,we can say that God is
conscious of the actual interrelationbetweenthe various objects
of natureconsideredas a unity.He is, so to speak,theactual order
of nature,whereas in His primordialnature He was simplythe
necessary condition or source of order. Furthermore,in the
passage of nature,eventsendure for a limitedtime or epoch and
thencease to be. But in perishingeach eventenjoys an "objective
immortality"' because it constitutesa part of the eternalnature
of the consequentcharacterof God. In thissense God is the home
of values. Typical passages illustratingWhitehead's conception
of the dual nature of God are the followingfromProcess and
Reality.
Thus analogouslyto all actual entities,the natureof God is dipolar.
He has a primordialnatureand a consequentnature.The consequent
natureof God is conscious,and it is the realizationof the actual world
in theunityof His nature,and throughthe transformation of His wis-
dom.The primordialnatureis conceptual,the consequentnatureis the
weavingof God's physicalfeelingsupon His primordialconcepts(524).
Thus byreasonof therelativity of all things,thereis a reactionof the
worldon God. The completionof God's natureintoa fulnessof physical
feelingsis derivedfromthe objectification of the world in God. He
shares witheverynew creatureits actual world; and the concrescent
creatureis objectified
in God as a novelelementin God's objectification
of that actual world (523).

By a long and devious route Whitehead has finallyarrivedat

the stage where Spinoza and the classical philosophersbegan; but,
so far as I can see, his actual or consequentGod has no causal
efficacy.He serves as a sort of reservoir of values and past

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No. 6.] SPINOZA AND WHITEHEAD 59I

objectives,and is a symbolof humanaspirations.In his eagerness

to preservethe autonomyand freedomof the individual,White-
head has relegatedhis God to a secondaryposition.8What is done
on earthis registeredin heaven,but earthis primary.Whitehead's
attitudeis clearlyshownin Process and Reality.
The sheerforceof thingslies in the intermediatephysicalprocess; this
is the energyof physicalproduction.God's role is not the combatof
productiveforce with productiveforce,of destructiveforcewith de-
structiveforce; it lies in the patientoperationof the over-powering
rationality
of His conceptualharmonization.He does notcreatetheworld,
He saves it; or, more accurately,He is the poet of the world,with
tenderpatienceleading it by his vision of truth,beautyand goodness
(525-526).

In orderto guaranteethe freedomof the individual,Whitehead

conceives of God as acting simply by persuasion and as exerting
no force. As primordial,God is simply an unconscious urge
imparted to the occasions; as consequent, He is the conscious
object of desire. Thus we receive back again the Unmoved Mover
of Aristotle's psychology, though the Unmoved Mover of the
Aristotelian physics and biology is rejected.
Briefly put, the reasons for the inadequacy of Whitehead's
system are two. First, he attempts to derive the actual from the
potential. This I regard as intrinsically impossible and unintel-
ligible. Secondly,he is tryingto combinea monisticmetaphysics
witha pluralistictheoryof physicsand biology-a fallacysimilar
to that of Spinoza. Instead of offering us any solution of the
perennial problem of the one and the many, he merely restates the
difficultiesin a more ambiguous and aggravated form. He wishes
to retain a monistic substrate and also to keep the independence
of the individual events and their self-creativeness. At one time
he gives the primacy to God and calls the individuals modes of
'It is instructiveto note in thisconnectionthat Spinoza is more oriental
in his conceptionof freedomthanis Whitehead.Spinoza takes determinism
seriously;the law of cause and effect,the law of Karma, holds with in-
exorable necessityamong the modes; and thereis also a necessarycon-
nectionin the dependenceof the modes uponultimatesubstance.Freedom,
in the last analysis,consistsin identifyingoneselfwiththe eternalsource
of all value and being (4-28). Spinoza,however,differsfromthe orientals
in thatthis identificationis the resultof an intellectuallove of God, and
does not involvean ecstaticstate of spiritualintoxicationwhereinthereis
loss of self-consciousness.
Whitehead,on the otherhand,is anxiousto pre-
serve the freedomof the individualapart fromany referenceto the ulti-
mate substrate.Every occasion gives birthto some novelty;there is an
indeterminism about each actual occasion and about God. No groundor
reasoncan be givenforthe creativeactivityof God or the events.

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592 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW
His activity; at other times he gives the primacyto the nexus
of events and conceivesof God as an accident derived fromthe
process.9It seems to me thathe actuallyhas a vicious bifurcation
between his fundamentalprinciples,though he tries vainly to
reassure us that he does not mean to introduceany real dualism
or bifurcation.
The positivethesesto be derivedfromthispaper are two. First,
an ultimatelyintelligibletheoryof metaphysicsmust begin with
theprimacyof theactual,as Aristotle,the Scholasticsand Spinoza
insisted.'0Secondly, a metaphysicswhich is to do justice to the
problems of the one and the many, permanence and change,
eternityand time, must in the last analysis be some form of
dualism. There must be some eternal principleof being over
against the world of events.This was the great insightof Plato
and Aristotleand the failureto appreciate that insightaccounts
for the mutual difficultiesof Spinoza and Whitehead. Just pre-
ciselyhow thesetwo metaphysicalprinciplesare to be harmonized
is stillthetask of futurephilosophy.
D. BIDNEY
YESHIVA COLLEGE

9AlthoughWhiteheadinhisScienceand theModernWorldemphasizesthe
organiccharacterof his philosophyand its close relationto the monismof
Spinoza, yet in his Process and Reality he has a tendencyto go to the
opposite extreme.It is surprisingto findhim saying (114): "Thus the
philosophyof organismis pluralisticin contrastwith Spinoza's monism".
In his anxietyto guaranteethe autonomyand independenceof the events,
Whiteheadtendsto conceivethemsomewhatas temporalmonadseach of
whichis a 'causa sui' (135). It is hard to see how thispluralismin therealm
of physicsand biologyis consistentwithhis previouslyacknowledgedmeta-
physicalmonism(Sc. Mod. World99). Instead of havingGod, the ultimate
metaphysicalreality,explain the originof events,he attemptsto have the
temporaleventsaccountfor the originof this eternalprinciple.This pro-
cedure rendershis whole philosophyintrinsically unintelligible and goes
contraryto all philosophyof the past.Whitehead'stheoryis simplya com-
plex illustrationof the problemsof the one and the many,permanenceand
change,but in the last analysissolves none of them.
10I am muchindebtedto ProfessorUrban'sThe Nature of theIntelligible
World foran appreciation of thenotionof intrinsic Professor
intelligibility.
Urbanhas developedthisthesisfroman axiologicalpointof viewwhichpre-
supposesNeo-Kantiancategories.My thesis,however,is in agreementwith
common-sense Aristotelianand Scholasticdoctrine.The main insightto be
derivedfroma studyof modernRelationisticphilosophiesand 'Philosophia
Perennis'is thatrevolutions in philosophy accomplishas littleas in therealm
of politics.In the realmof the intellectas in the Commonwealth therere-
sults nothingbut chaos and the destructionof sacred values and institu-
tions. When in the process of time a less hystericalmood prevails,one
comes to realize that certaincategoriesof thought,certainprinciplesof
metaphysics, cannot be violated if we are to continueto live and think
rationally.

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