Vestil vs. IAC
Vestil vs. IAC
Vestil vs. IAC
IAC
179 SCRA 48
Facts:
Respondent-spouses’ child Theness, 3 years old, was bitten by a dog while playing with the child
of petitioners in the house of petitioner Purita’s late father.
She suffered multiple lacerated wounds in the forehead and was administered anti-rabies
vaccine. She was discharged but readmitted one week later due to vomiting of saliva. The child
died and cause of death was certified as broncho-pneumonia.
Respondents Uys sued petitioners for damages as possessors of the dog that bit and killed their
daughter.
Petitioners contended that:
they’re not the owners of the dog nor the house where the dog was but the late
Vicente Miranda whose estate has yet to be partitioned with other heirs to the
property;
the dog was tame;
no one saw the dog bit the child.
CFI ruled in favor of petitioners.
IAC reversed, held that:
Under 2183 of the Civil Code, petitioners should be held liable as possessor of the
house and dog for the injuries caused by the dog;
The child had died as a result of the dog bites and not for causes independent thereof
Issue:
WON petitioners were possessors of the dog, therefore liable for damages.
Held:
Yes. While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house, which was still part of Vicente
Miranda's estate, there is no doubt that she and her husband were its possessors at the time of the
incident in question. She was the only heir residing in Cebu City and the most logical person to take care
of the property, which was only six kilometers from her own house. Moreover, there is evidence
showing that she and her family regularly went to the house, once or twice weekly, according to at least
one witness, 14 and used it virtually as a second house. Interestingly, her own daughter was playing in
the house with Theness when the little girl was bitten by the dog. The dog itself remained in the house
even after the death of Vicente Miranda in 1973 and until 1975, when the incident in question occurred.
It is also noteworthy that the petitioners offered to assist the Uys with their hospitalization expenses
although Purita said she knew them only casually.
Petitioners’ contention that there was no showing that the child died as a result of the bite was contrary
to what the evidence established. Based on the testimony of Dr. Tautjo, the Court finds that the link
between the dog bites and the certified cause of death has beep satisfactorily established. We also
reiterate our ruling in Sison v. Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, that the death certificate is not
conclusive proof of the cause of death but only of the fact of death. Indeed, the evidence of the child's
hydrophobia is sufficient to convince us that she died because she was bitten by the dog even if the
death certificate stated a different cause of death. The petitioner's contention that they could not be
expected to exercise remote control of the dog is not acceptable. In fact, Article 2183 of the Civil Code
holds the possessor liable even if the animal should "escape or be lost" and so be removed from his
control. And it does not matter either that, as the petitioners also contend, the dog was tame and was
merely provoked by the child into biting her. The law does not speak only of vicious animals but covers
even tame ones as long as they cause injury. As for the alleged provocation, the petitioners forget that
Theness was only three years old at the time she was attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever
she might have done to the animal.
It is worth observing that the above defenses of the petitioners are an implied rejection of their original
posture that there was no proof that it was the dog in their father's house that bit Theness.
According to Manresa the obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the
negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the
damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses.