FACILITATIVE RESPONSIVENESS:

Non-Directiveness from anthropological,

epistemological and ethical perspectives

PETER F. SCHMID

Abstract

To be non-directive does not only mean to do therapy without directing, guiding or

controlling the client. Rather, it is an expression of an image of the human being that
rests on a fundamental respect for the client’s autonomy and sovereignty on the one
hand, and on presence as a distinctive way of being in the therapeutic relationship on
the other. Both respect and presence spring from a basic trust in the client’s
personhood. Therefore, the essence of non-directiveness proves to be a genuine
consequence of person-centred anthropology and epistemology, and cannot be
removed from the person-centred approach to which it is essentially connected. Non-
directiveness is an expression of the ‘art of not knowing’. Regarding the human being
as a person, and thus understanding the person centred relationship as an encounter
person to person, requires acknowledging the other as truly an Other in the sense of
encounter (dialogical) philosophy. It requires facilitating client self-directedness by
existentially responding to the client’s opening up and call in the relationship.
Ultimately, as a response to being addressed by the client out of responsibility, the
essence of non-directiveness is an ethical issue with political consequences.

John Shlien (2003: 219), eloquent defender of a client-centred therapy according to

the principles elaborated by Carl Rogers, frankly stated that non-directivity is ‘certainly
an awkward term’ because of the image it creates as having no direction.

Historically, the concept of non-directivity was often misunderstood as describing a

passive (non-)behaviour or as lacking a sense of direction in the process of therapy. It
was confused with laissez-faire, and even lack of interest. Others interpreted it as a
method or technique in the sense of guidelines or rules for therapist behaviour, and
concluded ‘dos’ and ‘don’ts’ for therapist interventions. It was perverted into a
technique of mechanistic and wooden mirroring. It was mixed up with structuring, and
misinterpreted as ignorance of influence and expertise and as denial of power. It was
used by therapists preferring to remain in hiding, and as an excuse to deny the
therapist’s openness as a person in the encounter with the client. It was re-interpreted
over and over, and twisted in its meaning, until it was no longer recognizable. Many
abolished it completely. Few concepts were so profoundly misunderstood or so widely
used to make fun of and discredit the person-centred approach.

THE CONCEPT OF NON-DIRECTIVITY AS DISCUSSED IN THE PERSON-CENTRED

APPROACH

Quite early in the history of the person-centred approach, the concept of non-
directivity marked a crucial point in the understanding of its principles; it might even
be seen as the expression of the paradigmatic shift from problem-, solution- and
therapist-centred to client- and person-centred therapy. Even some 60 years later, it
only recently became the password for those who claim to adhere to truly ‘Rogerian’
therapy. In recent years theoreticians and practitioners who understand themselves as
‘non directive client-centred therapists’—thus making ‘non-directivity’ the shibboleth of
being genuine to Rogers’ intentions—claim that there is a fundamental distinction
between those who follow Rogers’ original approach and other orientations, developed
out of (and away from) Rogers’ concepts. Barbara T. Brodley (2002, 2003), for
example, enumerates Bozarth, Brodley, Brody, Patterson, Raskin, Shlien, Witty,
Zimring and others as being within the first category; and lists focusing-oriented
therapy (Gendlin, 1996; Hendricks, 2002), experiential therapy (Lietaer, 1998) and
process-experiential therapy (Elliott and Greenberg, 2002) among the other
approaches. As a matter of fact, in these experiential traditions, the concept of non-
directivity was widely given up and replaced by an experiencing-oriented and process-
focused stance, together with a distinction between contents and process. The debate
about the nature and importance of non-directivity, often fought in internet postings
(e.g. the CCT/PCA e-mail network, http: //texaslists.net/cctpca), came up anew and
very strongly after controversies at the Person-Centered and Experiential World
Conference 2003 in Egmond aan Zee in The Netherlands (PCEP, 2004).

Trying to understand carefully the original meaning of the concept as elaborated by

Carl Rogers, it can be found that non-directiveness is an expression of a basic
anthropological and epistemological stance; that is, a philosophical conviction, not a
matter of method or technique (if method and technique are understood in their usual
contemporary meaning, and not in their original sense, in which they mean ‘way’ and
‘art and science’ respectively).

In order to understand how the focus shifted in the comprehension of ‘being

nondirective’, from the early days to contemporary discussion, we need to take a look
into the history of the concept.

CARL ROGERS: ‘THE PERSON WHO SHOULD GUIDE IS THE CLIENT.’

In the beginning, Rogers’ emphasis on non-directivity was a counter-position to the

traditional medical model and the more directive forms of psychotherapy that were in
vogue at that time: classical psychiatry, psychoanalysis and behaviour therapy (see
Schmid 1996: 268–70, 1999, 2002b). In order to separate his way of approaching a
client from manipulative or guiding therapeutic behaviour he called it ‘non-directive,’
as opposed to the traditional ‘directive’ approach (Rogers, 1942; Raskin, 1947).
Although in the beginning the emphasis was on the way of proceeding and on the
counsellor skills (i.e., which intervention brings about which change?), the underlying
intention was clear: creating a non-judgemental atmosphere, a relationship free from
anxiety, and fostering verbalisation of the client’s emotions and experiencing, as well
as their self-exploration. Thus, from the very beginning of his ‘newer therapy’, at a
time when the main task for the therapist was to be an alter ego for the client, Rogers
opposed control over the client, or therapist-centred attitudes and behaviours, and
wanted to stress the responsibility of the client. Most important of all, he wanted to
emphasize trust in the client and his or her capabilities. He stated clearly: ‘Nondirective
counseling is based on the assumption that the client has the right to select his own
life goals, even though these may be at variance with the goals his counselor might
choose for him’ (Rogers, 1942: 126–7).
As early as 1942, Rogers wrote that the difference between a ‘directive versus
nondirective approach’ (pp. 108–28), is a difference in philosophy of counselling and
values. Therefore, the question for him was whether there is a right of the experienced
and more capable to guide the inexperienced and less capable or, conversely, a right
to independence for every person. This difference between problem-centred and client-
centred is, according to Rogers, an issue of social and political philosophy (see Schmid,
2004a: 37–8).

Non-directivity was the term for the shift of the focus of attention of both, therapist
and client, from therapist interpretation and guidance, to client awareness of and
attentiveness to his or her inner world of experiencing. The term ‘client-centred’
(Rogers, 1951) expressed in a positive way, what the term ‘non-directive’ conveyed in
an exclusionary one. From the very beginning, non-directiveness must be seen in the
context of the philosophy of experience-centredness, and of the therapist’s
unconditional positive regard for and empathic listening to the client (see Barrett-
Lennard 1998: 59–60; Schmid, 1996: 268–70, 1999).

Further developments in Rogers’ experience, understanding and theory of therapy,

stressing the encounter quality of the person-to-person relationship of psychotherapy
(Rogers, 1962), did not abolish the concept of non-directivity. Seen from the
relational, inter-subjective perspective non-directivity still was seen as a core aspect of
the expression of trust in the client’s self-healing capacities—that is, their actualizing
tendency. But it got an additional importance as an expression of the ‘way of being
with’ the client (see below).

Rogers (1975: 26), interviewed by Evans, responded to the question of whether he

would say that he had qualified somewhat the notion of being non-directive during the
later periods of his work:

No. I think perhaps I enriched it, but not really qualified it. I still feel that
the person who should guide the client’s life is the client. My whole
philosophy and whole approach is to try to strengthen him in that way of
being, that he’s in charge of his own life and nothing I say is intended to
take that capacity or that opportunity away from him.

RECENT AND CURRENT DEBATE: NON-DIRECTIVITY AS REALIZATION OF THE

CORE CONDITIONS …

In the last two decades the controversial issue of non-directivity has usually been
discussed in combination with the understanding of the core conditions and their
sufficiency; that is, in terms of attitudes (see Schmid, 1996: 268–70; 2001b: 66–8).

Keith Tudor and Tony Merry (Tudor and Merry, 2002: 89; Tudor et al., 2004), among
others, state that non-directivity is a matter of attitude not of behaviour. Merry (1999:
75) points to the non-authoritarian nature of person-centred therapy: ‘The counsellor
does not choose the ‘agenda’ for the client or attempt to control or determine the
processes that occur within the client.’

Jerold Bozarth (1998: 51, 86, 2002) regards non-directivity as a practice application of
the therapist’s unconditional positive regard, and as an essential component of
Rogerian empathy. For him the non-directive attitude generally is a logical deduction
from the central theoretical hypothesis. ‘There is, in essence, no room for directivity in
Rogers’ conceptions of therapy and the therapist’s role’ (1998: 56).

Barbara Temaner Brodley (1999a: 79) asserts that ‘the concept of non-directivity
comes into existence within the meaning of these therapeutic attitudes’, namely the
core conditions. According to Brodley (1997, 1999b, 2003; Merry and Brodley, 2002)
the non-directive attitude is inherent in the term ‘client-centred’ and inherent in the
therapeutic attitudes. She argues that it is a part of their essential meaning, because it
guarantees the protection of the client’s autonomy. Thus, living the basic attitudes is
inherently non-directive and respectful of the client’s self-determination. She maintains
that the attitudes are expressed by empathic following responses, a willingness to
answer questions and accommodate requests from clients and unsystematic responses
from the therapist’s frame of reference—behaviours that do not violate the client’s
fundamental right to self-determination. Brodley (1990, 1999a) further emphasises
that ‘client-centred’ and ‘experiential’ are two different therapies that turn on the issue
of directivity and influence. Garry Prouty (1999) argues similarly.

Lisbeth Sommerbeck (2004) views the non-directive attitude of the client-centred

therapist as a logical consequence of the uniqueness of each individual client and the
unconditional positive regard towards him and of the assumption that the human
organism’s continuous interaction with its environment is a non-linear dynamic system.
Therefore, the client-centred therapist not only should not be an expert, but cannot be
an expert on what is best for the client.

Expertism is also an issue for Cecil H. Patterson (2000: 181–4). He claims that the
matter of being non-directive is to free a process of self-discovery and self-
actualization, to foster autonomy, responsibility and self-determination. Patterson
argues against the idea it could make sense that within a ‘principled non-directivity’
(see below) the therapist may offer activities, exercises, techniques, directions, advice,
interpretations, etc. in order to please the client and his or her wishes. He underlines
that it is naïve to believe that clients are really completely free to reject such offerings
from one who is perceived, to some extent at least, as an expert. ‘Moreover, these
offerings are inconsistent with respect and with the end of client-centered therapy—a
responsible, independent, self-actualizing client’ (ibid.: 182). He also remarks that the
definition of ‘placebo’ is ‘to please the client’.

Paul Wilkins’ (2003: 85–98) asserts that it is the therapist’s intention that matters. He
reinforces that Rogers’ point was to contrast his approach to approaches with a
‘knowing better’ stance of therapists, to place emphasis on the client’s right to select
the goals in therapy. So he sees non-directivity as a relative concept, contrasting with
the idea that therapists, not clients, are the experts. Though non-directive therapists
do influence their clients (by their own experiences, cultural biases, their way of
behaving and talking, their office, dressing, etc.), their basic intention communicates
the message that the client is capable of deciding on his or her own about the process
and contents of therapy. In opposition to the criticism that therapists should not deny
but should deliberately use their expertism (i.e., the therapist must not be non-
directive), Wilkins argues that no such stance is needed. He points to the theory that
different psychopathologies do not require different treatments (opposing what
experiential therapists argue—that it is important to bring about specific processes in
order to more efficiently support change). As Rogers (1957) put it—therapist expertise
is only a need of insecure therapists (see Schmid 2004a, 2005a, 2005b).
Dave Mearns and Brian Thorne (2000: 191) shift the focus of interest in the debate
about non-directivity from the therapist’s behaviour to the client’s experience. They
assert: ‘The importance of directivity is not in what the counsellor does but in what the
client experiences. […] The question which should be asked is not ‘is the therapist
behaving directively?’ but ‘is the client being directed?’ In doing so, they decisively
stress the importance of the relationship for the understanding of the importance of
non-directiveness.

… OR AS AN OUTDATED CONCEPT TO BE REINTERPRETED OR REPLACED

Others think that certain kinds of directivity are not incompatible or irreconcilable with
a person-centred stance: David Cain (1989, 1990) does not regard non-directivity as a
basic characteristic of the person-centred approach. He thinks that to impose
nondirectivity on the client may hinder or restrict him or her. Of course, an imposition
of non-directivity would be entirely inconsistent with the intention that comes from
holding a non-directive attitude. In Cain’s eyes the task is to learn with the client how
he or she is learning best; otherwise the therapist would hinder themselves in offering
their personal and professional resources and will not be able to adjust to the
individuality of each client.

Barry Grant (1990, 2004) positions himself against Cain who, in his view, seems to
have an ‘in order to’ attitude and an orientation towards effectiveness. Coming from an
ethical point of view, Grant considers non-directiveness to be ‘the hallmark of client
centered therapy, the characteristic that distinguishes it from all other therapies’
(2004: 158). He also states that ‘Non-directiveness, the absence of intention to cause
specific effects or bring about specific changes in clients, is consistent with respecting
the right to self-determination’ (ibid.). He goes on to make a distinction—on the basis
of the image of the human being and the motive of acting that the therapist holds—
between instrumental ‘non-directiveness’ as a means for growth and ‘principled non-
directiveness’. According to Grant, the latter is to be understood as a fundamental
expression of respect, regarding the other as a mystery. Principled non-directiveness is
an absence of the intention to make anything in particular happen. It is an expression
of an attitude towards the world of facing it as a miracle, as an object of love, not will.

David Coghlan and Edward McIlduff (1990), not unlike gestalt therapists, discriminate
between process and contents. They discriminate between giving a structure
concerning the means of processing and being directive concerning the contents.

Germain Lietaer (1992; 1998), an influential advocate of the experiential wing in

humanistic therapies, favours the shift from non-directivity to experience-orientation.
He distinguishes between directivity and manipulation and believes that directivity ‘in
its positive aspects refers to the therapist’s task-oriented responses and interventions’
(1998: 63). In his opinion to be non-directive simply means that there is no therapy
plan. He emphasizes that directivity has nothing to do with manipulation, control or
pressure and warns of a ‘directivity phobia’ (Lietaer 1992b: 11–12, 16, Lietaer and
Dierick 1996: 15).

The advocates of focusing-oriented (Gendlin, 1996), process-experiential or process-

guiding (Elliott and Greenberg 2002), emotion-focused (Greenberg, 2002) and goal or
clarification-oriented therapy (Sachse, 2003, 2004) distinguish between directivity
regarding the contents of the client’s communications and directivity regarding the
therapeutic process. Experiential and process-directive writers assert that their
directive intentions are focused on clients’ process, not their content (e.g. Greenberg,
Rice and Elliott, 1993; Gendlin, 1974). They do not intend to direct clients’ contents in
the sense of directing the client to talk about certain topics. But they see it as the
therapist’s task to steer the client’s process according to their knowledge about the
importance and nature of it. In return, Brodley (2003) and others criticise that they
overlook the fact that any process-directive procedure changes the content of their
client’s thoughts, feelings and communications and that process-directive therapists
ignore that their directive procedures require the client to surrender to the therapist’s
expertise.

Finally, there are authors who simply view ‘non-directiveness’ as a ‘myth’ (Bowen,
1996) and try to use transcripts of Rogers’ therapy or demonstration sessions to prove
their assertion. In doing so they provide a classic example of understanding and
discussing the concept of non-directivity on the level of intervention techniques.

SOME MISUNDERSTANDINGS: WHAT NON-DIRECTIVITY IS NOT

Following from this short survey, some classic misunderstandings of the concept of
non-directivity can be cleared up easily (see Schmid 1996: 268–270).

Non-directivity is not inactive

Non-directivity has nothing do with passivity or inactivity, nor is it something like

abstinence. It has nothing to do with non-involvement. Also, the caricature of a wishy-
washy behaviour (‘non-direct’), never taking a stand, squirming with embarrassment,
always hesitating to ask questions (see Pörtner 1994: 74), has nothing at all to do with
person-centredness. The same goes for simple restatements or a wooden technique of
reflecting of feelings (Rogers, 1986a). The peak of misinterpretation was definitely
reached when non-directivity was contorted Into the technique of simply mirroring the
client’s words. Non-directivity is in actuality an active and pro-active way of interaction
in the encounter process of therapist and client, as will be shown below.

Non-directivity is not (necessarily) unstructured

Structure refers to a specific order. A group or a dialogue can be structured or

unstructured in terms of the various issues of setting in therapy; including its time
frame, the order of speakers in a group and other elements of structure.
Brainstorming, to examine another example, is structured if there is the rule that all
ideas are collected without comment or assessment. Directivity refers to the intention
as to why such an order is set or denied. It has to do with the way somebody tries to
reach his goals (see Schmid, 1996: 175–6; Coghlan and McIlduff, 1990). This leads to
the question of influence.

Non-directivity is not non-influential

The notion of ‘directive versus non-directive’ has nothing to do with whether therapy is
an influencing process. Of course, there is therapist intent to influence the client.
Otherwise, why would therapists do therapy with clients? In relationships there is no
way not to influence; one cannot not influence. The relevant issue is the nature of the
influence (see also Patterson, 2000: 182). It is the nature of therapist influence that
should be questioned when the issue of ‘directive versus non-directive’ is examined. In
being empathic, the person-centred therapist and facilitator avoids directivity in terms
of selecting the topics, interpreting the meaning of the client’s feelings and cognitions
and steering the process of therapy. Non-directive empathic understanding is an
influencing attitude and behaviour. It most likely influences clients to treat themselves
and their processes in a similar way. Active listening of this type influences.

The misunderstanding of non-directivity as non-influencing highlights an often

neglected difference: what a therapist does (or fails to do) always has an effect or
impact, but this must not be confused with an intention to have a certain effect.
Therapists are always paying more attention to certain things and less to others—
intention makes the difference as to what impact or influence this has on the client.
Concerning his work in groups, Rogers stated (1971: 276), ‘(T)here is no doubt that I
am selective in my listening and hence “directive”, if people wish to accuse me of this.’
He stresses that he is unquestionably much more interested in the meaning the
experiences have for a client in the moment and the feelings which they arouse in the
client, than the stories they tell.

‘It is these meanings and the feelings to which I try to respond’ (ibid.). Thus, even
active listening may be seen as directive in terms of influencing. But the crucial point is
how it is done, and whether one aims at a specific goal.

Non-directivity is not a denial of power

As there is influence, there is power. The claim for non-directivity is not a denial of
power, as is often insinuated. On the contrary, the non-directive therapist is very
aware of his power and therefore uses it particularly carefully; that is, in a way that
brings about empowerment of clients by trust in their resources. In other words: the
goal of person-centred influence is to foster the process of actualization. The ‘means’
to do so is by being present—a way of being and behaving that is explicated in the
description of the core conditions (see below). Everything else, including any kind of
directivity, is incompatible with these ‘means’ (see Patterson, 2000).

Non-directivity is not a technique

It is definitely inadequate to deal with all of these questions in a discussion on the level
of techniques. Non-directivity is nothing that is used ‘in order to’; it is not an
instrument. It is true that non-directive therapists do not direct, control, guide, steer,
put something into somebody’s mind or manipulate. It is true that they do not give
advice, interpret, diagnose, question, interrogate, instruct, rate, evaluate, judge. And
it is also true that these ‘don’ts’ are consequences of a fundamental non-directive
attitude.

But there is much more. It is important to emphasize that discussing non-directivity

on the level of behaviour is wrong. It is necessary to view non-directivity in the context
of the attitude(s). But even this does not necessarily hit at its core (as the ongoing
discussion proves). Non-directivity is a matter of the underlying image of the human
being, a matter of the theory of knowledge that is held and a matter of the respective
ethical stance.
Non-directivity is thus a matter of basic beliefs. People who think that directivity is
necessary in therapy and counselling have a different image of the human being, a
different concept of how to deal with knowledge and a different ethical stance from
those who work with their clients on the basis of non-directiveness. Since it is of no
use to argue over beliefs (they precede acting, thinking and science), there is no way
to say who, ultimately, is right. There is no way to convince each other (Schmid, 1999:
178– 9). Different convictions lead to different consequences. The only thing one really
can record is that there is a difference; and to have an honest look at the
consequences.

THE NATURE OF THE THERAPEUTIC RELATIONSHIP ACCORDING TO A

PERSON-CENTRED IMAGE OF THE HUMAN BEING PERSON-CENTRED
ANTHROPOLOGY: THERAPY AS PERSONALISATION AND AS ENCOUNTER
PERSON TO PERSON

The name of the person-centred approach was not chosen by coincidence. Whatever
else the reasons were to coin the term ‘person-centred,’ it was also meant from the
very beginning to express a certain anthropological stance, based on a specific image
of the human being, developed in the occidental philosophical tradition. Rogers’
thinking was deeply rooted in this tradition. As the name suggests, the underlying key
concept of person centred therapy is the understanding of the human being as a
person, and the understanding of the therapeutic relationship as an encounter (or
meeting) person to person.

What it means to be a person, and the consequences that follow for a person entred
approach to psychotherapy, has been described previously in detail (Schmid,
1991, 1994, 1998a, 1998c, 2002c: 58–65, 2004b, 2005c). What follows is only a brief
summary.

The person-centred image of the human being is based on the view of men and women
as persons. According to two different yet dialectically linked traditional strands of
meaning in the history of theology, philosophy and psychology, the human being is
characterized as a person if he or she is denoted in his or her unique individuality,
worth and dignity, as well as in his or her interconnectedness. Both the substantial
notion of being a person (i.e., being from oneself) and the relational conception of
becoming a person (i.e., being from and towards others), belong to the meaning of
this person centred image of the human being. They are dialectically and inseparably
connected. To be a person describes autonomy and interconnectedness, individuality
and solidarity, sovereignty and commitment. Carl Rogers combined both views in a
unique way for psychotherapy when he built his theory and practice upon the
actualizing tendency as the motivational force constructively working on behalf of the
client (substantial dimension), which is maximized in a facilitative relationship of a
certain kind (relational dimension). This facilitative relationship is an encounter
provided by a person who is really present; that is, living the core conditions described
by Rogers (1957) as fully as possible in this relationship (see below).

Person-centred personality and relationship theory understands personalisation as a

process of becoming independent and of developing authentic relationships. Therefore,
the respective theory of therapy understands therapy as both personality development
and encounter person to person. At the same time it is important to be aware that
both client and therapist are understood as persons. Both therapist and client develop
together in this relationship. Thus, both notions of being a person are also important
for the therapist: unconditional acknowledgment and empathic positive regard as a
way of being ‘with’ the client, together with a position ‘counter’ to the client; that is, a
committed ‘en-counter’.

According to dialogic (or encounter) philosophy the relationship to somebody as a

person is called an encounter. To encounter means to meet the unexpected. Between
persons, it means to meet face to face. One of the consequences of viewing the human
being as a person is the realization that accepting another person means truly
acknowledging him or her as an Other in the sense of dialogical thinking. He or she is
no alter ego, no close friend a priori, no identifiable person. He or she is an entirely
different person. Etymologically, the word ‘encounter’ comes from the Latin ‘contra’,
which means ‘against’, To en-counter another person, first of all, means recognizing
that the Other really ‘stands counter’, because he or she is essentially different from
me. Therefore encounter is an amazing meeting with the reality of the Other. It means
that one is touched by the essence of the opposite (Guardini, 1955). In order for this
to happen, there must be a non-purpose-oriented openness and a distance which leads
to amazement. ‘Being counter’, according to Martin Buber (1923), is the foundation for
meeting face to face, an event in which one becomes present to the Other.

This ‘position’ appreciates the Other as somebody independent, as an autonomous

individual, different and separated from me, worthy of being dealt with. In being
counter the otherness of the Other is appreciated. To stand counter also means to give
room to each other and to express respect. In facing the Other I can see him or her
and acknowledge the Other’s uniqueness and qualities. (More on encounter as a basic
category for the person-centred approach: Schmid, 1991, 1994, 1998b, 2002a, 2002c,
2002f.)

Moreover, if a person is constituted through their relationship to another person, to be

a person means to be a response. The movement always originates from the Thou: it
is the call, the addressing of another human being, which evokes a response—a
response from which I cannot escape, because nobody can respond in my place. We
are obliged and responsible to the Other and owe him or her an answer—making the
‘priority’ of the Other. This is particularly important for the understanding of the nature
of a therapeutic relationship: the client is the call, the therapist as a person is the
response to this call, whence, out of his response-ability, his responsibility derives (see
below). What happens in psychotherapy, if it is understood as an encounter
relationship, is that the client is opening up and revealing him- or herself and the
therapist is responding as a person.

PERSON-CENTRED EPISTEMOLOGY: THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL PARADIGM

SHIFT FROM I–THOU TO THOU–I

In facing Others I do not think what I could know about them, but I am ready to
accept what they are going to disclose. The challenge of encounter is ‘to be kept awake
by an enigma’ (Levinas, 1983: 120). The Other is different. Thus, in order to do justice
to him, he must not be seen from my perspective. He or she is the one coming
towards me, approaching me. The movement goes from the Thou to the I, not the
other way round— an epistemological paradigm shift of tremendous importance and
consequence.

It follows that the person-centred approach is a phenomenological approach. The word

‘phenomenon’ comes from a verb in the Greek language, which in its active form
(fainein) means ‘show, bring to light, make appear, announce’; in passive voice
(fainesqai) it means ‘be shown, come to light, appear, come into being’. A therapeutic
approach is phenomenological if the direction, the movement, goes from the client to
the therapist: the client ‘shows and announces’. The therapist tries to ‘perceive and
understand’. This denotes a Thou-I relationship, as opposed to the ‘egology’—as
Emmanuel Levinas (1983: 189) called the traditional occidental thinking—of the
conventional humanistic approaches. Therefore, the person-centred approach goes
radically beyond these ‘humanistic’ approaches.

Person-centred therapy turns the established understanding of psychotherapy

completely on its head. The conventional model rests on the idea that it is the
therapist who has to gain knowledge about the client in order to treat them, paralleling
the traditional medical model Carl Rogers so strongly opposed. In the traditional
(objectifying) approach the questions are: What do I (the therapist) see? What can I
observe? What is over there? What can I do? How can I help? Rogers’ approach
proceeds just the other way round: what does the client show, disclose, reveal; what
does he or she want to be understood? The task of the therapist then is not to try to
get knowledge about the client but to ac-knowledge the person who is showing him- or
herself (Schmid, 2002c).

From the understanding of ‘person’, it follows that being a person means: to disclose,
to reveal oneself to oneself and to the Other. This is the special notion of ‘person’
inherent to the Person-Centred Approach. It is far different from what many people,
including therapists of various orientations, mean when they say ‘I see you as a
person.’ The word may be the same; the meaning is not. The meaning definitely goes
beyond what is considered to be the common ground of all humanistic approaches in
psychology, namely that the human being comes into the view as a human (hence the
name), and not only according to the criteria of natural science—a development
undoubtedly important in overcoming an objectifying understanding of therapy
(Schmid, 2003). Many still refer to this conception, if they regard the human being as
a person, including authors from within the ‘Rogerian family of therapies’ (see Lietaer,
2002).

However, as just mentioned above, the notion of being a person, as it is the underlying
ground of the person-centred approach, is much more specific and radical. He or she is
the expert on his or her life, not the therapist. This epistemological paradigm change
also implies that the expert in the therapeutic endeavour, in any respect, is the client.
The therapist’s task is to be present and ask the question: ‘What is the client’s call?’
Thus, the respective task is to keep one’s ability to be surprised and touched.

There are three possible positions on expertism in psychotherapy. The first claims that
the therapist is the expert for the contents and the process (the methods, the means,
the procedure, the skills). This is a principle held, for example, in cognitive behaviour
therapy. A second position sees the client as the expert on the contents and the
therapist (at least partially) as the expert on the process—the expert on the way
therapy proceeds.

This position can be found in gestalt and experiential therapies. The third possibility
asserts that the client is expert for both problems and methods, contents and process,
and the therapist is a facilitator—a stance only to be found in genuine person-centred
therapy: According to its personal anthropology it is the client who is the expert on his
or her life, because he or she is the experienced; he or she is the one opening up and
directing the way of the process. In the view of a genuinely personal anthropology it is
of no use to separate the process from the person, and it is impossible to separate
contents and process—in a very significant sense the process is the contents is the
meaning. Therefore, it also seems to be artificial to separate between relationship-,
contents- and process-experts. As a matter of fact, from a person-centred perspective,
both are experts, yet in a different sense. One might say: the therapist is the expert
on not being an expert of the life of another person (Schmid, 2001c, 2003, 2004a).

PERSON-CENTRED THEORY OF THERAPY: THE THERAPIST’S PRESENCE AS THE

RESPONSE TO THE CALL OF THE CLIENT

The existential response, the respective stance to enable a person to open up, is
presence. ‘Presence’ derives from the Latin words ‘esse’, which means ‘to be’, and
‘prae’ (‘in front of’) which is an intensifier. Thus, ‘prae-esse’ is not just ‘being’, but
‘really being’. Presence means to be authentic as a person; fully myself and fully open;
whole; fully living the individual ‘I am’; fully living the relationships ‘I am’. The
challenge is, at one and the same time, to be oneself and in relationship. Being able to
be touched, impressed, surprised, changed, altered, growing and also being able to
stick to one’s own experiences and symbolizations (instead of taking the experiences,
interpretations and stances of the others), to value from within (without judging the
person of the other), to have one’s own point of view.

What Rogers described as core conditions corresponds with presence, as understood

on a deeper, dialogical-personal level. Presence, in the sense of encounter philosophy,
is the existential core of these attitudes. It is further explained by the description of
the conditions, which Rogers always understood holistically as interrelated; intrinsically
connected, a ‘triad variable’. That is, each one of the conditions makes no therapeutic
sense without the others. Rogers’ (1986b) description of the therapeutic relationship
as being present to the Other seems to be, more than he himself noticed, a basic and
comprehensive depiction of a therapeutic encounter relationship. Together,
congruence, unconditional positive regard and empathy constitute one human attitude,
one fundamental way of being, relating and acting, truly characterized as
psychophysical presence, a way of being, a way of ‘being with’, a way of ‘being in
encounter’. The necessary and sufficient conditions for therapeutic change, in their
intrinsic connectedness, constitute a way of being with the client that is crucial for the
therapeutic endeavour. They are not three separate qualities. They are one
fundamental way of understanding oneself and the Other as a person (see Schmid
2001a, 2001b, 2001c, 2002a). Hence, presence is an expression of authenticity, as it
is related to the immediately present flow of experiencing. It reflects congruence, as
well as the difference between a person’s experiencing and symbolization, and
between his or her symbolization and communication. Presence is an expression of
empathy, because, in existential wonderment, it is related to what the Other is
experiencing. And presence is an expression of positive regard without conditions, as
acceptance of myself and personal acknowledgement of the Other, of whatever
immediately present feelings he or she is experiencing.

When the therapist is present to the client, there is no hidden therapeutic agenda.
Presence in this meaning is always im-media-te; that is, without media, without
preconceived means. The therapist accepts the client in his or her moment-by-moment
process—including what brought him or her to this moment and the possibilities of
further development in the future. This excludes diagnosing and pathologising the
client and precludes the therapist having any pre-determined method. Such lack of
categorisation invites the therapist to experience the client as a unique individual,
embracing their entire personhood without favour or discrimination. (For more on the
notion of presence, see Schmid, 1994, 1996, 2002a, 2003; see the interesting piece of
research by Geller and Greenberg, 2002.)

NON-DIRECTIVENESS AS REALISATION OF AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL,

EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND ETHICAL CONVICTION NON-DIRECTIVENESS IS AN
EXPRESSION OF PERSON-CENTREDNESS

From the discussion above, it is clear that approaching a human being as a person is
necessarily a non-directive enterprise; that is, a way of becoming aware of and relating
to the other person that does not follow any preconceived direction, because the
direction originates from the other person. If one fails to become aware of and relate
to the Other in this way, the Other is immediately changed from a person to be
encountered to an object to be treated. So, if one wants to adhere to an image of the
human being as a person, and approach Others in a person-centred way, non-
directivity is unavoidable as the only way to become aware of the other as a person.
Otherwise, he or she will be dealt with necessarily in an objectifying manner.

It is as simple as this: non-directiveness means that the client is seen as a person who
is able to find his own answer, and therefore it is not the therapist’s task to direct the
client towards a specific answer, or even towards an answer at all. Non-directiveness
means that the therapist enters into an encounter relationship in which both client and
therapist do not know where the relationship will lead.

Being non-directive, responding in a facilitative way, unfolds the notion of ‘person’ as a

response to another person’s call. Non-directiveness must be understood as a
consequence of the personhood of the client (and also of the therapist). Like ‘person’,
non-directivity has both a substantial and a relational dimension, and must be seen as
a realization of the Other’s autonomy. It must be comprehended through the person-to
person relationship. As to the substantial notion of ‘person’, non-directiveness radically
stresses the uniqueness, dignity and freedom of the person. It is an expression of the
substantiality of the other person; that is, of the right of self-determination and
responsibility, and the capacity of the self-healing potential. It is an expression of the
conviction that the process of change is unpredictable in its specificity, because it is
idiosyncratic for each client (Merry and Brodley, 2002). This stance is characterised by
the fundamental and unequivocal respect held by the therapist. A fundamental and
principled non-directiveness is the logical consequence of an image of the human being
which favours the uniqueness of the Other over standardising diagnosis, and prioritises
acknowledgement to knowledge. Consequently, directive means are inconsistent with
the goal of autonomy, responsibility and self-determination, and they are incompatible
with unconditional positive regard and acknowledgment.

As to the relational notion, and from an encounter perspective—becoming aware of the

Other as a mystery and an enigma—there is no doubt that realizing the ‘way of being
with’ others called ‘presence’ is non-directive in principle. Non-directiveness denotes
the ability to be surprised by the Other and to be open to what the Other is willing to
reveal as a person. To be present principally implies not to make something happen,
but to be open to a unique process between two (or more) persons. If the therapist
does not see himself in the position of the expert for the other person’s life, but as a
person meeting another person, then guiding, steering or directing would be
completely incompatible with this self-understanding. Directive means are inconsistent
with impartial and unbiased listening, and inconsistent with being empathic.
Both notions of person, the substantial and the relational, belong together and cannot
be separated.

Non-directiveness is an expression of the therapist’s authenticity. Authenticity means

that authors encounter authors and not copies. Authenticity is non-directive, because
inherent in it is the notion that only the author of a life can change it. Thus authenticity
strictly opposes any expert behaviour, be it in terms of contents and decisions, in
terms of how to get there; that is, means, methods and techniques. If authenticity is
what therapy is about, the only legitimate ‘techné’ (the original Greek word which
means ‘art’) is im-media-cy, or im-media-te presence (presence without media), in
other words, the encounter person to person. To be precise, non-directive therapy is a
process to overcome preconceived techniques and methods (which always come in
between humans) by making them superfluous.

Therapies, theories and practices that concentrate on the experience (therefore calling
themselves ‘experiential’), reduce the person as a whole to the experience as a part.
Thus they are no longer person-centred, but focus instead on only one aspect of the
person (‘focusing-oriented therapy’ or ‘focusing therapy’). They not only pay less
attention to the relationship in a dialogical way, and thus miss the essence of an
encounter relationship, but also re-introduce the therapist as an expert in terms of
directing the process (‘process-directional’ or ‘process-guiding’). They do so even if
they limit themselves to process-guiding activities and do not intend to influence the
contents (see Prouty, 1999; Schmid, 2002d). Consequently, they no longer need the
concept of nondirectiveness.

Non-directivity cannot be split in terms of being non-directive on one level and

directive on another at the same time. Therefore, non-directivity can mean only that
there is no goal set by the therapist regarding the contents and no method regarding
the process; no intention to aim at something specific. Non-directiveness means that
the respect for, and thus the trust in, the person is the overall principle, as is openness
in the process of the relationship. Consequently, non-directivity is an expression of not
using preconceived means to influence the therapeutic process in a way chosen by the
therapist.

In other words: presence, as the way of being with a person, is non-directive per se.

NON-DIRECTIVENESS IS AN EXPRESSION OF THE ‘ART OF NOT-KNOWING’

Non-directiveness is a fundamental consequence of the epistemological insight that the

movement in therapy, its direction, comes from the client. If it is the client who ‘knows
best’, the therapist’s task is to be present and follow. The therapist does not see any
need to control the direction the client takes. As already mentioned, Merry (1999: 44
and 75;) emphasizes that non-directivity is ‘a general non-authoritarian attitude
maintained by a counsellor whose intention is empathically to understand a client’s
subjective experience.’ Merry also writes that ‘the particular characteristic of the
actualizing tendency, whilst its direction is regarded as constructive and creative,
cannot be predicted and should not be controlled or directed’ (ibid. 76). Taking this
one step further, I rather like to think this is because of creativity and spontaneity
evolving in a person who is neither directed nor controlled.
Non-directiveness is a non-purpose-oriented openness towards the Other. It is the only
way to genuinely encounter a client as a person, and as a consequence it is the
therapist’s contribution to an encounter relationship. Thus, first of all, the task is to let
go of one’s ideas of the client, even if these ideas are well-intentioned. Sidney Jourard
(1968) points out that disregarding one’s prejudices is an invitation to the Other to
also let go—let go of yesterday’s ideas, interests and goals and explore new ones. Both
therapist and client transcend their ideas about the client and provide the chance for
new, creative possibilities.

So, non-directiveness is ultimately an expression of the ‘art of not-knowing’ (Schmid,

2001b; 2002c); the art of being curious, open to being surprised. It is a kind of
sophisticated naivety (see Husserl, 1950) towards the client, where the challenging
part is the unknown and not-yet-understood. It is an openness to wonderment,
surprise and what the client has to disclose. The underlying phenomenological idea is
that ‘each experience, which deserves this name, thwarts an expectation’. (Gadamer,
1999: 362).

Following a term by Wittgenstein (1969) this might also be called ‘creative ignorance’.

NON-DIRECTIVENESS IS THE RECOGNITION OF THE CLIENT’S SELF-

DIRECTIVENESS

As early as 1942 Rogers (p. 87) writes that what is non-directive for the therapist is
selfdirected for the client (centred on the directions of the client) and thus, ‘client-
centred’.

‘Self-directivity’ of the client is the goal of person-centred therapy and counselling.

This stresses the understanding of Mearns and Thorne (see above) that the important
thing about non-directivity is what it means for the client. Person-centred therapy is
not about the therapist being non-directive; it is about the client being self-directive.

Art Bohart (2004) further develops the concept of self-directedness. He emphasizes

that it is the client, as an active, intelligent and thinking being and agent, who makes
empathy and the core conditions work. The client is an active self-healer. Bohart’s
central observation and theory is most profound, and has far-reaching consequences.
Building upon it, it follows that the concept of non-directiveness means that the
process is clientcentred: not only in the traditional meaning that the attention is
centred in the client, but also that it is the client who—as an active self-healer—directs
the process. Therefore, it might make sense to think of the process in terms of ‘client-
directiveness’; which might not only be an adequate term, but also one less open to
potential misunderstanding than non-directiveness.

Thus, non-directiveness is neither a principle as such, nor a statement about every

single behaviour or action of the therapist. It is not a set of behaviours or a technique.
It is an active expression of being impressed by the Other (and not by one’s own
ideas, combinations and solution proposals) and being interested in him or her. To be
nondirective is a ‘way of being with’, and a consequence of the trust in the client’s
actualizing tendency. To be non-directive means valuing the otherness and uniqueness
of the Other.

It is a precondition for encounter as well as the basic realization of a genuine

encounter relationship. Non-directiveness is an epistemological issue. In non-
directiveness, the values of the therapist are expressed not to gain external control
over the client, but to respect his or her organismic self-directedness and personal
autonomy. Non-directiveness denotes the ability to be surprised by the Other and to
be open to what the Other is willing to reveal as a person. The therapists’ task is to
respond to the innate capabilities to lead his or her own life; to do everything that is
facilitative to this end. The most facilitative thing one can do is to respect and
acknowledge the client as a person, with all their abilities mentioned. Presence is the
incarnation of such facilitative responsiveness.

To summarise: non-directiveness is a dimension of presence, an expression of

presence. Presence means that the therapist is responding existentially; that is, as a
person, to the call of the client. Thus, non-directiveness is a way of facilitative
responsiveness. The client, as his or her own expert in terms of the contents (the client
is the one who ‘knows’ what it is all about) and in terms of the process (i.e., the way of
communication, the ‘languages’, the means of therapy) directs the process of therapy
and the process of his or her life.

NON-DIRECTIVENESS IS AN EXPRESSION OF PERSON-CENTRED ETHICS

By doing psychotherapy, a decision is made to respond to the misery, to the grief, to

the life of another person; to share his or her joys and sorrows. As stated above, it
derives from being addressed by the Other, from being touched, being asked, called;
from being appealed to. In every personal encounter there lies the response to a call.
And the response grows out of responsibility, that is, out of ‘response ability’, the
ability to respond.

The Other is an appeal and a provocation; the person in need represents a demand.
This means that the need of the Other is there first and that psychotherapy is
responding, answering to a demand. In short: psychotherapy from a person-centred
perspective has its origin in the Other.

The epistemological paradigm change for psychotherapy achieved by Carl Rogers, from
knowledge to ac-knowledge-ment on part of the therapist, leads us to understand the
therapist as somebody who is called to respond. This makes psychotherapy an ethical
challenge. Starting especially from a phenomenological consideration, as Rogers did,
psychotherapy must be regarded as an ethical phenomenon. If the personal perception
of the Other is the basis of the relationship, an ethical relation is created. Whatever
else psychotherapy might be (art, science, practical philosophy of life, spiritual
discipline, etc.), it is an ethical enterprise, as described earlier (Schmid 2002d, 2002e,
2003).

The Other is never an object to perceive or to know about. The Other cannot be
understood by a refinement of the methods of perception. The Other must be
understood by increasing empathic sensitivity and by increasing openness to being
touched by clients through their opening-up—by what they show and disclose. It is this
reverse of the usual order of communication which makes the person-centred way of
communicating unique among the therapeutic orientations and justifies the designation
‘non-directive’.

In the process of therapy the client’s response-ability grows and the therapist’s
‘responses’ more and more become co-responses of the client and the therapist to the
experiences in the relationship (see Schmid, 2003).
Taking a closer look at the core of person-centred theory, as expressed in Rogers’
1957 statement, we find that its ethical foundation is already included: Psychotherapy
means responding to the client’s incongruence, responding to a vulnerable or anxious
person (the second, and often ignored, necessary condition!) Even more: if the six
conditions (Rogers, 1957) are necessary and sufficient for a constructive development
of the person by means of psychotherapy, then it is the therapist’s obligation to take
them into account (contact, client incongruence, communication of therapist’s
attitudes) or to offer them respectively (congruence, unconditional positive regard,
empathy).

After all, it is a matter of the image of the human being that is held. Thus, non-
directiveness also ‘is a principle and ethical stance’ (Merry, 2004: 42), ‘an essentially
ethical commitment’ (Worsley, 2004: 130; see also Grant, 1990). As such, it comes
‘before’ theory and practice, which are influenced by it. The art of not knowing is a
consequence of this ethical stance. It is a way of relating towards each other in which
we are obliged to provide for each other as persons, and to provide for ourselves.

It is a humble attitude towards the unknown (Grant, 1990), a humble attitude at the
sight of the uniqueness of the Other. In the interpersonal encounter which we call
therapy, we are addressed and asked to respond, thus assuming a deep responsibility;
an obligation in which our fellow human expects us to render the service we owe to
each other. In the end, what we owe each other is nothing else but love. Non-
directiveness is an expression of this ethical stance. Non-directiveness is an expression
of love.

NON-DIRECTIVENESS IS A POLITICAL ISSUE: THE EXPRESSION OF A BASIC

COMMITMENT TO EMANCIPATION

Finally, it becomes clear that non-directiveness is the expression of a basic belief in the
self-directive capacities of the person—it is a philosophy, a commitment to
emancipation.

The ‘facilitative responsiveness’ of the non-directive therapist, in the language of

dialogic or encounter philosophy, carries these meanings. It is the self-understanding
of the therapist as a person who is present to respond as a person to a person in need.
Thus non-directivity is much more than an attitude or a posture, let alone a rule or a
technique.

When taken simply as a rule or technique, non-directivity becomes perverted to the

opposite of what it is meant to be. Today, non-directivity might not be an up-to-date
term that unambiguously expresses what the matter is about. The term itself states
only what person-centred therapy is not about. But the issue at stake—emancipatory
psychotherapy versus alienating control—is perfectly up to date, perhaps more than
ever.

What John Shlien (2000) said regarding person-centred therapy, is true for
nondirectiveness: ‘It is not good manners. It is in the character.’

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