The rapidly changing international political atmosphere of the late 1950s and 1960s, in which

many African colonies became independent and a civil rights movement emerged in the United
States, meant that apartheid South Africa became a pariah subject to gradually more restrictive
sanctions. The rise of the black consciousness movement that stimulated a black youth uprising
in the 1970sreinvigorated the antiapartheid struggle both inside and outside South Africa. In turn,
the government initiated cosmetic reforms, such as independence for the black home lands and a
new parliament for whites, Coloured, and Asians, which led to even more widespread urban
protest and a state of emergency during the 1980s.
Throughout the apartheid era the National Party regime became increasingly dependent on
military power while at the same time the antiapartheid organizations developed their own
insurgent military structures. During the 1980s Pretoria fashioned a ‘‘total strategy’’ that was
meant to mobilize the combined political, economic, and military resources of the state against
what it perceived as a Soviet-planned ‘‘total onslaught.’’ To weaken the ability of neighboring
black ruled countries to assist exiled antiapartheid groups, the South Africa military used
conventional and covert operations as well as support for armed dissidents .
P. W. Botha always insisted that the answer to the total onslaught, the concept of total strategy
was developed by a French general, Andre Beaufre, in a book, introduction to strategy, first
published in 1965. Beaufre's thesis written out of experiences of defeat in both conventional
(world War Two) and unconventional (Indo -China) was is sample .
Total strategy is a term with which most South Africans and Africans will be familiar. It comes
into common use during the era of P. W. Botha was portrayed by its authors as the apartheid
government’s response to the perceives threat of two total onslaught. The total onslaught, the
story went was the threat passes to South (and in deed to the western world).
What is a total strategy?
A total strategy or sometimes it’s called the total national strategy, a total strategy was the
strategy which meant to mobilize the combined political , economic and military resources of the
state against what it perceived as a soviet –planned “total onslaught”. To weaken the ability of
the neighboring black ruled countries to assist exiled anti-apartheid groups , the south African
military used conventional and covert operation as well as support for armed dissidents. After
becoming a prime minister in 1978, Botha introduced “total strategy” in 1970 as it seen in the
official texts.
Furthermore, there were revolutionary forces at work within South Africa, which were intent
upon supporting and fueling this threat .
This ingenious invention was intended to serve many purposes:

 to win the support of Western governments;

 to justify draconian repression of the black population or that part of it displaying
tendencies towards toppling white power;
  to brainwash the white population into closing ranks, particularly within the security
forces (defence and police) and within the judiciary, even to the extent of mentally
condoning torture and assassination of political activists;
 to justify destabilization of South Africa's neighbours, through cross-border raids,
through support for Renamo, Unita and other renegade forces and through military
invasion of Angola.

The irony of the doctrine of total strategy was that it was designed to portray the apartheid
government as this role bastion of western democracy on the continent of Africa where as the
real purpose of total strategy was to maintain apartheid power in this most undemocratic manner
imaginative serving the interest of 13% of the population at tile expense of 87% of the
population.
In Part A of this book, an attempt is made to reveal how multi-faceted and total the scope of total
strategy really was. A hint of this totality was given by no less an authority than General J.V. van
der Merwe, former Commissioner of the South African Police, in a submission to the
Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Justice during January 1995 on the desirability (or
otherwise) of establishing a Truth Commission. We quote verbatim from a memorandum
forming part of this submission:
As an example the so-called 'Simons town Deliberations' of 1979 gave specific orders with
regard to the gathering of information and cross border operations to the Security Forces. These
orders gave rise to the creation and implementation of a national intelligence gathering capability
directed at counter-revolutionary actions. This included the utilization of the South African
Police where the emphasis was placed on abnormal intelligence gathering methodology and not
according to international norms and practices.
The 'Simons town Deliberations' were followed over a number of years by decisions taken by the
government of the day in conjunction with the heads of the Security Forces, the Department of
National Intelligence and other security mechanisms in committees and structures like the State
Security Council and the Co-ordinating Intelligence Committee. These structures gave orders
concerning counter revolutionary actions on a continuous basis, whether by direct or implied
authority. By mutual agreement it was decided that the SA Defence Force was to be responsible
for the foreign dimension, the SAP for the internal dimension and the National Intelligence
Service and the Department of Foreign Affairs would support both dimensions with intelligence
back up. Practical examples of this co-operation include the 'Teenrewolusion?
Inligtingstaakspan' (Trewits), which was responsible for the identification of organizational
structures and individuals involved in the armed struggle of the liberation movements. Another
example was the Division for Strategic Communications, a sub-structure of the Secretariat of the
State Security Council of which the SADF was the primary functionary and the NIS provided the
administrative infrastructure. These structures were fully sanctioned by the Nationalist
government and senior members of the cabinet were briefed on a continuous and structured basis.
The system used members of the public, academics, senior personnel in the public service,
informers, agents and members of the security forces in a covert manner. Many of these people
at present hold senior positions in society. Some current members of parliament and provincial
legislatures have unwittingly provided the system with strategic information. In view of the fact
that terrorism is internationally accepted as a serious crime, the government had a close
relationship with various foreign intelligence agencies to provide information.
The above extract provides an interesting insight into how widely the net was cast in marshalling
various players in the total strategy and including not only the security forces, National
Intelligence Service and Department of Foreign Affairs as well as specially created co-ordinating
structures, but in addition members of the public in all spheres and even extending to foreign
intelligence agencies. Much attention will be given to this network under 'Covert operations'
(Chapter 6).

Total strategy has its origin in the cycles of repression and resistances dating back to 1948 (and
earlier many will argue) it was only subsequent to the Soweto uprising of 1976 that the need for
a total strategy was formally identified and the phrase come into common usage in 1977, P. W.
Botha as Minister of defence at the time introduced a white paper on defence, in which the
following occurs the process of ensuring and maintaining the sovereignty of state’s authority in a
conflict situation.
It was clear that Vorster’s deployment of the police couldn’t solve South Africa’s problems, and
in 1978 he was deposed by his defense Minister Pieter Willeum(P. W) Botha in a palace coup.
Under Vorster’s premiership ,Bothahad turned the South African defence Force into the most
awesome military machine on African continent and of become central to his strategy for
maintaining white power. Botha realized that the days of old styled apartheid were over and he
adopted a two -handed strategy of reform accompanied by unprecedented repression. Believing
there was a total onslaught on South Africa from both outside and the inside the country he
devised his so called “total strategy”
In 1977, P.W. Botha as minister of defence at the time introduced a White Paper on Defence, in
which the following occurs:
“The process of ensuring and maintaining the sovereignty of a state's authority in a
conflict. situation has, through the evolution of warfare, shifted from the purely
military to an integrated national action ... The resolution of conflict in the times in which
we now live demands interdependent and coordinated action in all fields - military,
psychological, economic, political, sociological, technological, diplomatic, ideological,
cultural, etc. We are today involved in war whether we like it or not. It is therefore
essential that a total strategy [be] formulated at the highest level.”
And so was born total strategy and the National Security Management System as its vehicle of
implementation and coordination. The Simons town Deliberations of 1979 referred to by General
van der Merwe above must have been one of the first gatherings of the designers of formal total
strategy to take stock of the means available to them and determine how to put them to best use.
In Part A, both the overt and covert components of this repressive armoury come under scrutiny.
The total strategy involved a detention and executions of political activists found within and
outside south Africa. “the state’s response was to mobilize all possible sources in line with total
strategy . In June 1985 ecytern cape UDF leaders Mathew Goniwe Fort Calata, and two others
were abducted and killed in a targeted assassination .
Total strategy was also characterized with the use of military and economic superiority against
the neighbouring countries which aided Black south Africans against apartheid policies
“the botha’s government used south Africa’s economic superiority to dominate the neighbouring
Countries and prevent them from providing sanctuary for militant refugees………………South
Africa also used its military superiority to restrain neighbouring governments from pursuing
antiapartheid policies , between 1981 and 1983, south African commandos raided or carried out
undercover operations against every one of its neighbors. In addition , the south African armed
forces continued to occupy Namibia and south Africa intervened substantially in both of the
former portuguse territories”
At the same time he poured ever-increasing numbers of troops into African townships to stop
unrest while using economic incentives to attempt to draw neighboring countries into a
“constillatiom of South African states “ under south Africa’s leadership. Between 1981 and 1983
, the army was used to enforce compliance on every one of the country’s neighbours. An
undeclared war against Angola reduced a potentially oil rich country to war -revaged ruins, while
a South African sponsored conflict in Mozambique to nought a poverty stricken country to it’s
knees Now was both averse to sending commando units across the borders into Botswana,
Zimbabwe, Swaziland and Lesotho to attack and bomb South African refuges.

In 1983 he concoted what Botha believed was a master plan for a so called New constitution on
which coloured and Indians would be granted to vote. But before anyone get too excited he
qualified this with the relevation that each group would be represented on a separate chambers,
which would have no executive power, meanwhile for Africans apartheid would continue as
usual
In the face of intensifying protest the government looked for ways to respond, and between
March and December it afford to release Mandela no fewer than five times, provided he agreed
to banishment to the Trans Laci Bantu stem. Five times he refused and this cat and mouse game
continued right through the 1980’s as the pressure mounded and South Africa’s townships
become ungovernable.

Although of relatively recent origin, the concept of a total national strategy (for the sake of
convenience, here abbreviated as TNS)has become firmly established in South Africa's political
vocabulary. This is largely due to Mr P W Botha who has, since becoming Prime Minister in
1978, given the concept both a prominence and content previously lacking. When it first
appeared in official texts in the early 1970s, TNS - or "total strategy", as it was then styled – was
used primarily in a military/security context. Since then, TNS has acquired a much wider
meaning and it now in fact embraces also the realms of domestic political/constitutional
development, economics, state administration and foreign relations. The purpose of this study is
to try and assess the foreign policy implications of TNS. Local discussion of TNS has largely
focused on its domestic ramifications, thus tending to overlook its relevance for South Africans
foreign relations. Although TNS contains specific foreign policy objectives, the strategy's
implications for the Republic's foreign relations cannot realistically be determined by
considering only these aspects. The internal components of TNS are also of fundamental
importance because, to restate a truism, South Africa's foreign relations are crucially affected by
its domestic policies. Put in simple terms, the central question which the present study seeks to
answer, is how will TNS affect South Africa's present international standing Opening of joint
defence college in Voortre kherhoogte in 1973.Mr Botha retreated that in the struggle for
existence, a nation should employ not only its military power, but "all the means at its disposal"
He continued "sound planning is based on a thorough knowledge of all aspects of strategy and
co-ordination and co-operation between all departments and agencies who could make a
contribution to the Security of the state
During the time of total strategy in South Africa, military especially the police, defence and
security was much used to implement the total strategy, without that power May be there was no
total strategy in South Africa . As the key control and link to the total strategy, the security and
defence of South Africa during 1948-1989 did various projects, duties, as the implementation to
the total strategy in South Africa during the time of apartheid in South Africa. Some of them
were;
During the late 1940s and 1950s the National Party administration, through Minister of Defence
F. C. Erasmus, embarked on a campaign to Republicanize and Afrikanerize the Union Defence
Force. The Defence Act was amended so that from November 1949 all correspondence would be
inboth official languages: English and Afrikaans. As a result, unilingualEnglish-speakers,
including the many migrating to South Africa in the1950s because of economic problems in
Britain, werediscouraged fromenlistment. At the same time, existing English-speaking personnel
were pressured to take early retirement and many resigned during the early 1950s. Thenumber of
South African service personnel sent to Britain for training wasreduced and a local military
academy was established to train future officers.Although Afrikaners had made up the majority
of the security forces beforethe Second World War, the eventual result of these policies was that
by theearly1970s Afrikaans-speakersconstituted 85 percent of the army, 75 percentof the air
force, and 50 percent of the navy. Those who had been promotedby Smuts’s United Party
government were moved out of key positions, andNational Party supporters came to dominate
the security forces. GeneralPoole, an English-speaking veteran of the Second World War, had
beenscheduled to take over as chief of general staff in 1949 but Erasmus connivedto block him

In late 1949 Erasmus ordered the removal of the red tab displayed on military uniforms to
indicate Second World War service, whichhad been a politically divisive issue in South Africa.
This was resented bythe predominantly English-speaking Active Citizen Force members
whoignored the instruction until the early 1950s. By 1952, new flags, rank insignia, and
decorations were introduced, the British disciplinary code wasrewritten, the rank of lieutenant-
colonial was renamed commandant, and anew military magazine called Kommando was
launched. Erasmus himselfseized the files of Military Intelligence from Defence Headquarters
inPretoria. The office of Military Intelligence in Cape Town was closed withoutconsultation with
the Royal Navy that was based there at the time and SouthAfrica stopped sharing information
with Britain. Even before its 1948 election, the National Party had declared opposition to African
militaryservice that had been expanded during the Second World War. In April 1949Erasmus
disbanded the black Native Military Corps and the long-established Coloured South African
Cape Corps. While the 1957 Defence Act retained the state’s right to enlist nonwhite volunteers
in the Defence Force, National Party policy maintained that they would be employed on a very
limited basis in logistical roles such as cooks and drivers, and that they would never bearmed.
Predicting the declaration of a republic in 1961, the 1957 Act also renamed the Union Defence
Force as the South African Defence Force(SADF), the title royal was dropped from Citizen
Force regiments, and the designation of naval vessels was changed from Her Majesty’s South
African Ship (HMSAS) to South African Ship (SAS).
The National Party’s commitment to the Western side of the Cold War was demonstrated
through the service of SAAF pilots in the Berlin Airlift (1948–49)and the Korean War (1950–
53). As a founding member of the United Nations, South Africa sent a fighter squadron to Korea
that operated under American command and flew 12,067 sorties, mostly ground attack missions,
with a loss of 34 pilots. Unlike other parts of the world there was no Western-sponsored regional
defence organization through which South Africa could develop its armed forces. In 1950 South
Africa committed itself to assist Britain in the event of war in the Middle East, and as a result it
was allowed to purchase£30 million worth of military equipment. Eventually, Britain
delivered200 Centurian tanks, 20 Comet tanks, several hundred Feret and Saracen armoured
cars, artillery, and 9 Canberra bombers. Pretoria also received40 Vampire and 30 Sabre jets from
Canada, and 56 Alouette helicopters from France. At the same time the British were investing in
the Central African Federation, Southern and Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland, to create an
economic and military foil to Nationalist-ruled South Africa. In the June 1955 Simons town
Agreement, Britain turned over its Cape naval facility and command of the South African navy
to Pretoria. South Africa agreed to let Royal Navy vessels use the port, and Britain agreed to sell
South Africa £18 million worth of naval resources over an eight-year period. This amounted to
two destroyers, four frigates, some minesweepers, and seven coastal defence aircraft. For the
British the aim of the agreement was to secure the Capesea-route to the Middle East, and for
South Africa it enhanced sovereignty and naval capability. The acquisition of American-made C-
130 transport air.
During the 1960s and 1970s, with the rise of the antiapartheid armed struggle, South African
military authorities began to rethink the policy all-white SADF. On visits to France and the
United States, South African officers were exposed to counterinsurgency theories inspired by the
warsin Algeria and Vietnam. In the early 1960s SADF officer Magnus Malanattended a
command and staff course at Fort Leavenworth in the United Stateswhere he learned these
concepts and implemented them as head of the army from 1973 to 1976 and head of the SADF
from 1976 to 1980. This new approach held that well-motivated insurgents could defeat a strong
conventional military. While a military campaign could delay an insurgency, it could be defeated
only by non military measures designed to win the ‘‘hearts and mind’’ of the population. Within
this context, indigenous soldiers with intimate knowledge of local language and culture were
valued. The establishment of South Africa’s own military academy allowed these counter
insurgency theories to circulate among the emerging officer corps of the 1960s and 1970s.
In addition, manpower shortages caused by maintaining an all-white Defence Force in a country
where whites constituted a minority and the prospect of conventional warfare with African-ruled
states made recruitment of black soldiers attractive. The experience of Portuguese and Rhodesian
counterinsurgency in neighboring territories, both of which employed armed black troops, was
also influential. Since the Cape Coloured community had a long and well-known history of
military service prior to 1950, the SADF created the South African Coloured Corps in 1963 as its
first extension of military service beyond whites though at the time this unit was assigned a
noncombat role. In 1972 it was renamed the South African Cape Corps (SACC) and became part
of the permanent force with improved salaries. Within the SACC, strength was increased to 2000
men, a training center opened and an infantry battalion established.
Officially designated as a combat unit in January 1975, the Cape Corps sent its first detachment
of 190 men on counterinsurgency operations in South West Africa in November of that year
followed by another larger force in August 1976. From that point on, South African Coloured
soldiers became aregular feature of combat operations in South West Africa. Building on the
success of the Coloured experiment, the South African navy established the Indian Service
Battalion in January 1975 and its members were given the same training—including firearms
instruction—as white sailors. During the1970s the navy deployed Coloured sailors on many
operational vessels, and in1977 separate sleeping and dining facilities were removed from all
ships.
In November 1973 General Malan, chief of the army, authorized the creation of the South
African Army Bantu Training Centre located at a prison guard school to conceal the fact that
black South Africans were undergoing conventional military instruction. In December 1975 the
center was transformed into 21 Battalion, a multiethnic unit of black South African
soldiersarmed and paid the same as white troops. In mid-1977, 21 Battalion began training an
infantry company for operations, and in March 1978 it was sent to South West Africa and thrust
into combat just three days after arrival.
With the successful performance of this company, other black units were sent to the operational
area regularly. During the late 1970s instructors from the SACC and 21 Battalion trained black
infantry battalions for the defense forces of the Transkei, Bophuthatswana, and Venda
homelands From 1977into the early 1980s a series of ethnically and regionally oriented black
infantry battalions were created that could theoretically become part of homeland armies but in
practice most remained integral parts of the SADF.
These included the Swazi 111 Battalion established in 1977 and based in the eastern Transvaal,
the Zulu 121 Battalion formed in 1978 and based in northern Natal, the Shangaan 113 Battalion
formed in 1979 and located in the northern Transvaal, and the northern Sotho 116 Battalion
created in1984 and also based in the northern Transvaal. In South West Africa, in1976, 31
Battalion was organized for Bushmen and 32 Battalion for black Angolans. The military
employment of Coloured, Indian, and black personnel was so successful that in 1980 their period
of voluntary national servicewas extended from 12 to 24 months. While whites amounted to
almost100 percent of the permanent force and voluntary national service personnelin the early
1970s, by the second half of the 1980s whites made up around60 percent and blacks just under
40 percent. South African defense authorities were quick to realize that the combat deployment
of nonwhite personnel meant the inevitability of them advancing in rank including
commissioning as officers. The third operational company of 21 Battalion sent to South West
Africa in the late 1970s had black platoon sergeants. That black combat soldiers would perform
more effectively under their own officers was well known. After one month at the Military
Academy and twenty-one months training with the SACC, the first seven Coloured officers were
commissioned in May 1975. In 1978 the navy commissioned its first Indian officers and the
number of Coloured and Indian naval officers increased during the 1980s. Very few black
officers were commissioned in the SADF between 1984 and 1990. One problem was that the
many black officers in homeland armies, because of their foreign status, were not subject to
racial discrimination when undergoing training with the SADF but South African black officers
had to live, sleep, and eat in separate.
In the late 1960s, as African nationalist insurgency spread across the region,SADF authorities
began to see a need for a special forces element that could undertake sensitive and covert
missions often in other countries. In 1968 volunteers from Citizen Force units around
Johannesburg formed the Hunter Group that was initially an unofficial elite counterinsurgency
force. Beginning in 1970Commandant Jan Breytenbach, just returned from leading a small South
African military assistance mission to Biafran forces during the Nigerian civil war, was ordered
to begin the formation of an embryonic special forces unitthat was trained at Oudtshoorn in the
Cape with help from the Rhodesian Special Air Service (SAS). In 1972 the new unit, trained in
both airborne andseaborne operations, was renamed Reconnaissance Commando (or
Recess).Eventually five such units were established each with specific expertise. 1 Raceways
based in Durban focusing on advanced parachuting techniques, 2 Raceways located in Pretoria
and became a Citizen Force unit originating partly from the old Hunter Group, and 4 Recce was
stationed at Saldanha specializing in amphibious operations and underwater diving. Sited at
Phalaborwa in the eastern Transvaal, 5 Recce performed ‘‘pseudo-terrorist’’ operations using
former insurgents who had changed sides to infiltrate guerrilla groups. What had once been 3
Recce was, by the mid-1980s, turned into Project Barnacleor the Civil Cooperation Bureau
(CCB) a highly secretive unit, technically made up of civilians, which collected intelligence and
carried out assassinations of opposition leaders and sympathizers both inside and outside South
Africa.
During the 1970s South African Recces participated in Rhodesian counterinsurgency operations,
particularly with the SAS and Selous Scouts, and after the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980,
many Rhodesian soldiers moved south to join the SADF. In 1981 the Recce units and other
Special Forces elements were removed from army control and were reorganized as an
independent structure reporting directly to SADF command.4Insurgent campaigns by
antiapartheid organizations and the independence of neighboring African countries led to South
African military expansion during the 1960s. In the 1950s white compulsory military service was
conducted through a ballot system where a limited number of young men were selected for an
initial training period of three months followed by three21-day training camps. By the early
1960s almost all those with ballots were selected for nine months of training and five camps.
From 1968 all 18-yearold white males were required to complete one year of national service
The SADF Permanent Force was increased from 9,000 in 1960 to 15,000 in1964 and at the same
time the number of national servicemen trained annually grew from 2,000 to 20,000.
Simultaneously, South Africa spent more than$800 million on major armaments purchases,
including frigates from the United Kingdom, three submarines from France, and reconnaissance
aircraft. Creating a quick reaction air mobile capacity, the SADF, in 1961, established a
Parachute Battalion made up mostly of white national servicemen with second and third
battalions, Citizen Force units, formed in the early and mid1970s. In 1968 the SADF held its first
large-scale exercise, Operation Sibasa,which tested its reaction to insurgent intrusion from
Mozambique. Involvement in regional conflicts—discussed later—led to further expansion of
the SADF in the 1970s and 1980s. The number of personnel on active duty increased from50,000
in 1970 to 150,000 in 1980 and 200,000 in 1985. In 1978 the period of compulsory national
service for white males was extended from 12 to24 months with a subsequent annual call-up of
potentially three months.
In addition to economic stress, this led to the 1983 formation of the End Conscription Campaign
by white conscientious objectors allied to the antiapartheid
United Democratic Front. Military expenditure rose from R257 million in1970–71 to R2.4
billion in 1980–81 to R4.8 billion in 1985–86. At least half the annual defense budget was spent
on manufacturing weapons and equipment or on foreign purchase of sophisticated aircraft that
could not be produced locally.
In 1968 the South African government established the Armaments Development and Production
Corporation (Armscor) to facilitate local manufacture of weapons, military equipment, and
munitions that were becoming difficult to obtain externally because of the country’s increasing
international isolation. Through the 1970s and 1980s South Africa produced foreign designed
weapon systems under license such as Belgian and Israeli small arms, French armored cars and
missiles, and Italian trainer jets. French Mirage fighter jets were assembled from imported parts
in South Africa. Armscorstepped up its efforts in the late 1970s because of a compulsory UN
arms embargo and the beginning of conventional warfare in Angola. An Israelikit was used to
upgrade the British-supplied Centurian tanks then renamedOlifant and a Belgian design became
the basis for a new South African armored infantry fighting vehicle called Ratel. Collaboration
with an American-Canadian firm resulted in the production of the long-range G-5155-mm
howitzer, and a copy of a Taiwanese multiple rocket launcher system was manufactured as the
South African Valkiri. With its counter in surgencyoperations of the 1970s and 1980s, South
Africa became a leading designer and producer of mine-protected vehicles. In 1977 South Africa
conducted a nuclear test in the south Atlantic and during the 1980s produced six or seven small
nuclear bombs. Meant as a deterrent to foreign invasion and as a diplomatic bargaining chip,
South African nuclear weapons were dismantled in the early 1990s as a negotiated end of
apartheid became a reality Responding to a perceived threat from Soviet-supplied chemical
weapons in Angola and the need for riot control within South Africa, the government authorized
the military, in 1981, to develop a chemical and biological weapons program known as
‘‘Operation Coast.’’ By 1990 this project had produced irritant gases for crowd control, poisons
and biological agents for assassinations, and addictive drugs. There have been allegations that
the SADF used chemical and biological weapons during operations in South west Africa,
Angola, and Mozambique and that these were tested on insurgent prisoners. As with nuclear
weapons, South African chemical and biological agents were destroyed in the transition of the
early 1990s .
By those actions ,reformations, amendments that were done by the security and defence of South
Africa lead to the implementations of total strategy in South Africa. Also in addition to this were
other resemble elements that traced during the time of Minister honorable Botha in South Africa
that shows the existence and implementation of total strategy as the way to maintain the
apartheid government in South Africa.

Apartheid state in crisis

Apartheid literally “apartness” or separateness in the Afrikaans and Dutch languages , is the
name that was given to a policy of separating people by race, with regard to where they lived ,
where they went to school , where they worked , and were they lived , where they died. It was
introduced in south Africa in 1948,by the national party government and it remained official
practice until the fall from power of that part in19994. Racial discrimination in south Africa did
not start in 1948, but traced back during the Dutch colonization of the cape of good hope in 1652
and the establishment thereafter of an economy based on the uses of slaves imported from East
Africa and southeast Asia. Even at the end of the slavery in 1830’s, racial segregations
continued in many forms as European settlements expanded , the British government conquered
African societies, and imperialism select alike spoke of the ‘civilising mission’ of white rule and
favoured , almost without exception , the segregation of black from white.
During the first half of twentieh century , before the second world war
APARTHEID UNDER PRESSURE
A current analysis of repression, apartheid law and structures, and prospects for a negotiated settlement HRC,
May 1990
Three questions are uppermost in the minds of those concerned with the situation in South Africa today. Is
repression finally on the way out? Is apartheid really being dismantled? And what are the prospects for a
peaceful resolution of the conflict? They are questions which are closely interrelated and which require an
integrated answer. The central issue in addressing these questions is the demise of apartheid (not its reform)
and its replacement with a new democratic order. Let us look at each question in turn.
1. The current level of repression
Detention without trial for interrogation or 'preventive' purposes, barring access to the courts, lawyers, family
or friends has been practised on a wide scale for 30 years. Over 75 000 victims have experienced the detention
cells in that time, some for as long as 3 years. Over 50 000 of that number have been detained during the last 5
years, attesting to the extreme level of repression exercised during the State of Emergency. Today, detention
without trial continues on a daily basis, it is happening as we speak. The numbers are in the hundreds rather
than the thousands of the recent past and the current detainee population stands at between 400 and 500,
including children under the age of 18. The long history of torture in detention has not ended as reports
continue to come in.
Banning and restriction of persons (house arrest in its extreme form) is, since F.W. de Klerk's address to
parliament on 2 February 1990, something of the past. However, the powers under the legislation are still
intact and could be invoked at any time.
Political trials and imprisonment are at a level, which can only be described, as frenzied. During 1989, a record
number of 395 known political trials were completed involving over 3000 accused, with 42 death sentences
and 237 prison sentences of between 5 and 20 years. The year 1990 started off with over 250 political trials
under way and looks set to exceed last year's record. The current political prisoner population is estimated at
around 3000, of whom about 12% are 'security law' prisoners and the balances are 'unrest' prisoners convicted
of such offences as public violence.
The government denies it conducts political trials or holds political prisoners but nevertheless announced
through F.W. de Klerk's address of 2 February that those serving sentences simply for membership of
previously banned organisations would be considered for release. Since that announcement there have been
about 80 releases (including that of Nelson Mandela) only some of which complied with the stated condition
and in many cases release was imminent anyway. This out-flow has also been partly nullified by the inflow
from ongoing trials.
Political executions have since 2 February been suspended along with all other executions, pending a judicial
reassessment of capital punishment legislation. The outcome of this reassessment is presently emerging but
still leaves about 80 political prisoners on death row, uncertain of their fate.
Other repressive acts against persons have included denial or withdrawal of passports, banishment to remote
areas and withdrawal of citizenship followed by deportation to a homeland. Most prevalent at the present time
however is the 'listing' of persons under the ISA making it an offence, punishable by up to 3 years
imprisonment, to quote any utterance, past or present, of any person on the list. There are over 300 persons
currently gagged in this way, some deceased, some in exile, and some in prison.
Organisations are no longer banned or restricted since the address of 2 February. The unbanning of the ANC,
PAC and SACP was certainly the most dramatic aspect of that address. However, the powers to ban or restrict
organisations are still intact and could be brought into play at any time. Furthermore the United Democratic
Front and the National Union of South African Students are prohibited in terms of proclamations issued under
the Affected Organisations Act from receiving any foreign funding.
Freedom of assembly continues to be severely restricted, constituting a major source of conflict at the present
time. On 1 April, the annual blanket ban on all outdoor political, gatherings without permission was renewed
for the fifteenth consecutive year under the '. ISA. During late 1989 permission for protest marches, rallies,
etc., began to be granted fairly readily and police seemed to be acting with restraint at such gatherings.
However, attitudes seem to have hardened again, permission for gatherings is frequently refused and in some
areas the security forces have returned to their former use of extreme force in breaking up peaceful marches
and demonstrations, resulting at times in heavy and unnecessary loss of life. A recent estimate is that 139
people have been killed and 1429 injured directly or indirectly by police action since the De Klerk address of 2
February. Such heavy-handed and irresponsible action carries the danger that; communities (and particularly
the youth) struggling to articulate their grievances and aspirations will conclude that peaceful methods lead
nowhere.
Media restrictions, reminiscent of  wartime conditions, which were imposed under the SOE over the last few
years, were relaxed to some extent on February 2. No longer is it forbidden to report on unrest situations or
actions of the security forces by way of the printed or spoken word, but visual reporting is still prohibited.
Furthermore, in practice, journalists are frequently ordered or removed from the scene of unrest under SOE
regulations. No newspapers are currently banned or under the threat of suspension but the powers to act under
the ISA are nevertheless still in place.
Political activity has escalated considerably since the highly successful detainee hunger strike and defiance
campaign of 1989. Laws and regulations, which ban or restrict political campaigns, boycotts, stayaways and
'alternative' structures, have been largely disregarded. Security force response, as mentioned previously, has
blown hot and cold but for some time now has returned decisively to its former brutality.
Having surveyed the scene of formal repression, we need to spend a short time looking at its ever present and
more sinister accomplice, informal repression - the extension of repression into the realms of the semi-legal
and the non-legal. Informal repression in the South African context is not new but received a tremendous boost
during the P.W. Botha era of 'total strategy' devised to combat what was perceived as the 'total onslaught'
against the bastions of apartheid. Army generals and police chiefs of the security establishment developed the
National Security Management System, with the National Security Council at its head. In security matters the
Council became more powerful than the cabinet itself. Its tentacles reached every level of society through Joint
Management Centres by co-opting local councils, local industry, local business, etc. In this way anti-apartheid
activists and organisations were identified, monitored, harassed and neutralised in various ways. Since the
departure from the political arena of P.W. Botha, the role of the National Security Council has been
downgraded and subordinated to the cabinet but the essential components of the National Security
Management System are nevertheless still intact, even if in modified form.
Vigilante groups have their origins in the support systems, which have been built up around the unpopular
apartheid-created structures of homeland authorities and of black local authorities. Their growth has been
actively encouraged or tacitly condoned through thinly disguised support of the security forces and local
police. The impression of so-called 'black-on-black' violence is easily created by such means. There is
currently a high level of rejection amongst the black community of homelands and black municipal councils,
which is generating a flurry of disruptive activity on the part of vigilante groups. The violent situation in Natal
must be seen in this context.
Hit squads have now clearly emerged as an essential component of the 'total strategy'. There can be few who
still doubt the existence of hit squads within the structures of the South African Police and of the South African
Defence Force and that these squads have perpetrated a full spectrum of atrocities in the name of defending
apartheid. If anything is still in doubt, it is the question of how high up the line command originates. Evidence
emerging from the Harms Commission of Inquiry suggests the involvement of cabinet ministers, so that it will
not come as a surprise to find that the State Security Council has guided and promoted this form of
unconventional warfare. In the meantime, in spite of commissions of inquiry, hit squads continue their
activities.
In summary, it must be said that all the powers of repression available to the apartheid regime are still intact
and most of them continue to be exercised. The lifting of the State of Emergency alone will not signal the end
of repression since virtually all of its awesome powers are available through the permanent legislation of the
Internal Security Act.
2. The current status of apartheid laws and structures
Let us now turn to the question of whether apartheid is really being dismantled. We need to examine which
racially discriminatory laws are still on the statute books and which administrative structures still exist to
implement those laws.
The law basic to the entire system of apartheid, and from which all other laws derive, i-the Population
Registration Act of 1950. This act presumes to identify and classify from birth each and every person as
belonging to one of 4 distinct races. Racial classification then determines each individual's destiny from the
cradle to the grave in terms of franchise, mobility, residential rights and social benefits and services provided
by the state. It is a law built into the constitution and today stands firm as the foundation stone of the system of
government.
The first consequence of racial classification is the specific exclusion of the black racial group from the vote
for central government as provided for in the Republic of South Africa Constitution Act of 1983, in the latest
form. To reinforce this exclusion, the Homeland Citizenship Act was introduced in 1970 to create so-called
independent homelands, whereby many millions of blacks were declared citizens of these homelands and
simultaneously deprived of their South African citizenship, such as it was. The absence of franchise for South
Africa's 27 million blacks is still very much the situation today and is of course the most fundamental issue of
all to be addressed if lasting peace is to become a reality.
The Native Land Act of 1913 and the Development Trust and Land Act of 1936 strictly limit access to land by
the black population group. This legislation allocates 13.6% of the country's land area for 75% of the
population and denies them ownership of land outside these allocated territories. During recent years these
statutes have been frayed at the edges due to the refusal of millions of blacks to be herded into overcrowded |
homelands and due to their settling into urban areas against all odds.
In recognition of the permanence of this urban black population, limited freehold housing rights have been
permitted. Nevertheless the laws governing land ownership rights are intact to this day. Similarly, regarding
rights of ownership, the rights of residential occupation within any area is strictly controlled by the notorious
Group Areas ' Act of 1966 (first promulgated in 1950) and reinforced by the Prevention of Illegal Squatting
Act of 1989 (first promulgated in 1951). This legislation is designed to effect a total social and residential
separation of the 4 classified race groups. It, too, is suffering a measure of disarray as a result of the huge
pressure of overcrowded urban populations spilling over into areas designated exclusively for white
occupation. In an effort to manipulate legislation to accord with the realities of the situation, the South African
government has been dabbling with such concepts as free settlement areas, which raise more problems and
contradictions than they solve. In spite of this fancy footwork, the Group Areas Act reigns supreme and
prosecutions for its infringement continue apace.
The quality of services and social benefits provided by the state is determined according to racial group by a
complex web of legislation at first and second tier level. In the areas of education, health care and social
welfare, facilities are segregated and grossly unequal, services are administered through separate state
departments, and budgetary allocations are highly discriminatory. As a result, there is a chronic state of crisis
in all of these areas, never worse than at the present time.
The Reservation of Separate Amenities Act of 1953 is a law, which has come under considerable pressure and
defiance in many of its aspects and seems due for repealing in the near future. It provides for the racial
segregation of such public amenities as public transport, parks, beaches, swimming baths, resorts, caravan
parks, hospitals, clinics, railway stations, post offices, banks and virtually any public area except a public road
or street. Many of the provisions have fallen into disuse by default or executive decree within the main centres
but many smaller towns continue to enforce them rigorously, protected and encouraged by the knowledge that
the Act is still on the statute books. As the custodian of petty apartheid, the Separate Amenities Act represents
the softest target for the proponents of reform strategy. Nevertheless, when state president De Klerk announced
in late 1989 that the government had decided to repeal the Act at some time in the future, he qualified this
announcement by saying that 'there are a few sensitive areas where the institution of fitting measures will be
necessary when the Act is repealed'. Apartheid does not give up easily.
Having briefly outlined the racial laws still in place on the statute books, we can look at the government
structures, which make and implement these laws and judge whether such structures are serving to perpetuate
the apartheid system.
Central power is vested in the tricameral parliament; a structure that gives token representation to those
classified as 'coloured' and 'Indian' but retains effective control in the hands of the white group. The population
group classified as 'black' is totally excluded. This structure, which came into existence in 1984 amidst
widespread protest leading to a State of Emergency, is essentially apartheid in concept in several senses.
Firstly, it excludes three quarters of the population on racial grounds; secondly it is composed of 3 separate
houses, each a different race group; and thirdly, effective control lies in the hands of the white minority
representing less than 15% of the total population. One can say therefore that its legitimacy rating is 15% at
best.
Black local authorities were introduced about the same time as the tricameral parliament and were intended to
serve as a sop to the urban black population for their exclusion from central government by offering some form
of representation at local government level. Elections to black councils have been virtually totally boycotted
and those who accepted office regarded as sell-outs and collaborators, bent on lining their own pockets. The
imposition of black councils without consulting the communities they purported to serve was the major factor,
alongside the introduction of the tricameral parliament, in triggering off mass protest throughout South Africa,
starting in 1984 and continuing to this day. Great pressure has been placed upon black councillors to resign and
for the councils to be dismantled. In spite of councils being propped up by official security forces and
unofficial vigilante groups, wholesale resignations and collapse of councils have taken place. At the present
there is a strong resurgence of popular feeling against what are perceived as puppet structures and resignations
are again on the increase.
The homelands are monuments to apartheid political and social engineering. The rationale for their creation
was to provide the black population group with a means of expressing their political aspirations since this was
forever to be denied them within 'white' South Africa at central government level. In fact, the homelands
concept, besides attempting to address the issue of black political representation, also is intended to perpetuate
the existence of docile labour reservoirs, control the flow of labour to the mines, industry and farms, and limit
access of the black population to urban areas. Much has been written about the destruction of home life, the
uprooting of whole communities, the impoverishment and overcrowding and many other consequences of this
experiment in social engineering in which some 13 million people have been compressed into the patchwork of
land pieces which make up the 10 homelands - 6 of them 'self-governing' and 4 of them 'independent'. Much
has also been written about the way in which forced removals of the earlier years of some 3.5 million people,
has given way more recently to forced incorporation by redrawing boundaries and also of the loss of South
African citizenship by 8 million homeland citizens. Suffice it to say at this point that the homeland system is in
a state of disintegration in the face of mass rejection by the inhabitants of the homelands themselves who have
wearied of the corrupt, inefficient and repressive administrations of these puppet structures. There is now a
widespread call for the reincorporation of these territories into a unitary South Africa, with some of the
homeland leaders now even supporting this call, while others continue to resist it.
Returning to the original question of whether apartheid is really being dismantled, it is dear that the laws that
underpin apartheid remain on the statute book and are still being implemented. That they are under
considerable attack is apparent and if any dismantling is taking place it is as a result of the struggles and
resistance by the victims themselves making both the laws and structures of apartheid unworkable.
It should, however, be borne in mind that apartheid must not be examined simply in terms of its statutory
provisions. Apartheid has infected the very heart of our country through a complex web of institutions and
structures. It is going to take a major effort by the people of South Africa, supported by the international
community, to reverse this.
3. Prospects for a negotiated settlement
In spite of the stubborn persistence of repression and of apartheid laws and structures, there can be no doubt
that a spirit of change is in the air and that very real possibilities exist for a negotiating process to get under
way. Why, after so many years of turning a deaf ear to the voice of black demands, is there now an apparent
willingness on the part of the white minority regime to come to the negotiating table? Does that willingness
stem from a change of heart? Or does it come from pressures, which the regime is unable to resist? Two
sources of intense pressure are easily discernible and undoubtedly account for the shift away from the deeply
repressive 'total strategy' era dominated by the 'securocrats' towards an era of outreach determined by the
politicians.
The first, and more fundamental source of pressure, is the mass resistance of the majority population to
apartheid, resistance which reached boiling point at the imposition of the tricameral parliament and black local
authorities, resistance which has survived the intensely repressive years of State of Emergency, resistance
which expressed itself through the mass hunger strike of detainees and the defiance campaign of 1989,
resistance which simply won't take no for an answer.
The second source, which arose out of the first, is the isolation, which descended upon the apartheid regime
from the international community and in particular the deep economic crisis, which resulted from that
isolation. It is that economic crisis which needs to be understood if the new strategy of outreach which slowly
began to emerge 2 years ago with the withdrawal from Angola, is to be seen in its proper context.
The declaration of the first State of Emergency on 21 July 1985 precipitated a crisis of confidence on the part
of foreign investors and particularly foreign bankers who were exposed to the tune of 24 billion US dollars,
most of it short term loans. Their anxiety turned to panic when the South African government unilaterally
declared a moratorium or 'standstill' on foreign debt repayment shortly thereafter in an attempt to stem the
flood of capital pouring out of the country. In spite of negotiating a series of 3 favourable foreign debt
repayment agreements with creditor banks since 1986 (the most recent in October 1989), the South African
government has had to watch the huge capital sum of 12 billion US dollars flow out of the country during the
past 5 years, and faces the prospect of a similar net outflow of capital during the next 4 to 5 years as the
world's bankers demand repayment of their existing loans and decline to consider making any new loans until
they perceive political and economic stability in the country. In addition to repayment of foreign loans, a
considerable proportion of the capital outflow to date has been due to a flight of capital on the part not only of
foreign investors but also and more especially on the part of South African businessmen who have devised
ways, both legal and illegal, of transferring their assets abroad.
Can the apartheid economy survive such a huge capital haemorrhage? Clearly it cannot. The foreign exchange,
which the capital outflow draws upon, can only come from 2 sources, namely balance of payments surpluses or
from foreign reserves. South Africa has since 1985 been forced to run its economy on the basis of a surplus on
its balance of payments which means driving up exports (not an easy task in the face of trade sanctions) and
driving down imports which, in turn, has a depressing effect on an economy highly dependant upon imported
technology and capital equipment. Surpluses over the last 5 years totalled a little over 10 billion US dollars,
somewhat short of the outflow of 12 billion dollars. The shortfall obviously had to come out of foreign
reserves held by the South African Reserve Bank in the form of gold and foreign currency (some foreign
currency is also held by commercial banks). Figures released by the South African Reserve Bank reflect a drop
in the value of foreign reserves over the last 2 to 3 years from about $3 billion to around $2 billion. This latter
figure represents about 6 weeks import cover, regarded as a dangerously low level. But the official figures
mask the full story. It is known that the South African Reserve Bank has access to short term bridging loans,
probably against the security of pledging future gold production, which if deducted from the declared reserves,
would show the nett foreign reserves to be negative for much of the time. In international terms the South
African economy is in fact bankrupt and living from hand to mouth.
Nor are future prospects any brighter. In spite of the massive foreign capital bleeding that has taken place over
the last 5 years, there has only been an effective reduction in the foreign debt of about 4 billion dollars. The
total debt still stands at 20 billion dollars, o£ which 8 to 9 billion fall due during the 4 year period of 1990 to
1993, in of the apparently easy terms of the Third Interim Debt Arrangement of October last. The major hump
occurs in this year, 1990, with as much as 2.5 billion dollars falling due in the months of May and June alone.
Add to this daunting prospect the fact that flight of capital (other than debt repayments) still continues,
although at a lower level than the avalanche of 1985/6.
The looming economic crisis must long have dawned upon the apartheid government as incapable of solution
by any means other than a political one. That realisation led them out of Angola, out of Namibia and in the
direction of negotiations with those whom they had subjugated or persecuted for so many years. In shifting
direction, the politicians within the government must have prevailed over the securocrats and convinced them
of the absolute necessity, in the interests of their own survival, of abandoning the doctrine of 'total strategy' and
of seeking political solutions. Whether the securocrats remain convinced and will stick to the agreement is now
in some doubt with the security forces again reverting to type and acting with great force against peaceful
protest marches and demonstrations. This ideological tussle has still to run its course. In the meantime, as
crunch point approaches, desperate efforts are being made by the government to gain international acceptance
and in particular access to the international financial system.
As negotiation with the black majority becomes an imperative for the apartheid regime,' what will the
substance of the negotiations likely to be and, in particular, how is the regime likely to respond to the demands
which are being made? Both the demands and a process are set out in the Harare Declaration drawn up and
adopted by the OAU ad-hoc Committee on 21 August 1989 and widely endorsed both nationally and
internationally. Strong support for the Harare Declaration was effectively given by the United Nations General
Assembly, which at a Special Session on 14 December 1989, adopted by consensus a resolution entitled
'Declaration on apartheid and its destructive consequences in Southern Africa'.
The Harare Declaration, after enunciating some of the principles on which a democratic order in South Africa
could be based, proposes a process for a political settlement, which involves 4 distinct stages.
1. Creating a climate in which negotiations can take place. This involves the halting of repression and clearly
the responsibility for this step lies with the government. The requirements are inseparable since it makes no
sense to release political prisoners while continuing to hold political trials and generate new political prisoners.
Nor can political trials be stopped without repealing the laws and measures, which give rise to such trials.
2. Ceasefire talks between the 2 conflicting sides to achieve a suspension of hostilities.
3. Actual negotiations could now commence and these would address the principles and mechanisms for
dismantling apartheid and for creating a new, democratic order.
4. The transition process to be put into effect under the supervision of an interim administration and involving
the holding of elections.
Only after the adoption of the new constitution does the Harare Declaration call for the lifting of sanctions by
the international community. It says, in effect, that the pressures, which were responsible for making
negotiations a possibility, should not be relaxed until their objective has been attained.
What of the apartheid government's responses to the demands for the lifting of political repression and the
dismantling of apartheid? While there is undoubtedly a genuine commitment to change on the part of state
president F.W. de Klerk and at least some of his government, is that change the same as the change demanded
by the opponents of apartheid everywhere? So far, it seems that it is something substantially less which gives
the uncomfortable feeling that a game is being played - a game to see how little can be given up while still
securing a relaxation of pressure, both internal and international.
Only after the adoption of the new constitution does the Harare Declaration call for the lifting of sanctions by
the international community. It says, in effect, that the pressures, which were responsible for making
negotiations a possibility, should not be relaxed until their objective has been attained.
What of the apartheid government's responses to the demands for the lifting of political repression and the
dismantling of apartheid? While there is undoubtedly a genuine commitment to change on the part of state
president F.W. de Klerk and at least some of his government, is that change the same as the change demanded
by the opponents of apartheid everywhere? So far, it seems that it is something substantially less which gives
the uncomfortable feeling that a game is being played - a game to see how little can be given up while still
securing a relaxation of pressure, both internal and international.
In the area of repression, the apartheid regime has very little room in which to manoeuvre, since without
meeting very specific demands, negotiations will not even begin. The February 2 address to Parliament met the
demands for the unbanning of organisations and people, temporarily suspended political executions and
released a very limited number of political prisoners, but left all the other demands virtually untouched.
However the Groote Schuur meeting between the government and the ANC on 2-4 May produced an
agreement to address all of the remaining issues as a matter of urgency. So in the area of repression the signs
are promising, but we must wait and see. Certainly, however, this is where the pressures are producing results.
In the area of apartheid laws and structures the situation is not so encouraging. The foundation stone of
apartheid, the Population Registration Act, is in no immediate danger of being repealed, the argument being
that it is central to the present constitution and can only disappear with the arrival of a new constitution. On the
issue of the franchise, president De Klerk has very recently categorically rejected majority rule as an option,
and his ministers still grope for phrases such as 'minority protection' to cover the entrenchment of group rights.
Votes of equal value are talked about, but 2 parliamentary chambers are hinted at, with the upper chamber
consisting of ethnic groups with power of veto. It is clear that any insistence by the regime on the question of
group rights will bedevil the prospects for successful negotiations.
No direct response is forthcoming on the issue of the Land Act or the redistribution of land but on the issue of
the Group Areas Act, president De Klerk stated on 19 April 1990 that it will be replaced 'possibly next year
[by] something ... generally acceptable' to the 3 houses of parliament (which excludes the opinion of the black
majority). The provision of state services and public amenities on racially discriminatory lines continues to
crack under pressure such as authorising white hospitals to accept black patients because there is an over
capacity of 11 000 beds in white hospitals and a shortage 7 000 beds in black hospitals. Henceforth,
superintendents of these hospitals will decide whether or not to admit black patients to white hospitals. In this
way the government is attempting to shift its responsibility. Insofar as government structures are concerned,
the tricameral parliament, the black councils and the homelands administration are all being maintained in the
face of fierce rejection but because of their unpopularity they are no longer being promoted with any
enthusiasm. For example, the so-called self-governing homelands are no longer to be urged to take their
'independence'.
All in all, one is left with the impression that the apartheid government is moving forward under pressure but
constantly looking for ways to maintain apartheid power under some new guise. Any let-up in pressure at this
time would encourage that tendency.