G.R. No.

L-10134             June 29, 1957

SABINA EXCONDE, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
DELFIN CAPUNO and DANTE CAPUNO, defendants-appellees.

Dante Capuno, son of Delfin Capuno, was accused of double homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of Isidoro Caperina
and Amado Ticzon on March 31, 1949 in the Court of First Instance of Laguna (Criminal Case No. 15001). During the trial, Sabina
Exconde, as mother of the deceased Isidoro Caperina, reserved her right to bring a separate civil action for damages against the
accused. After trial, Dante Capuno was found guilty of the crime charged and, on appeal, the Court Appeals affirmed the decision.
Dante Capuno was only (15) years old when he committed the crime.

In line with her reservation, Sabina Exconde filed the present action against Delfin Capuno and his son Dante Capuno asking for
damages in the aggregate amount of P2,959.00 for the death of her son Isidoro Caperiña. Defendants set up the defense that if any
one should be held liable for the death of Isidoro Caperina, he is Dante Capuno and not his father Delfin because at the time of the
accident, the former was not under the control, supervision and custody, of the latter. This defense was sustained by the lower court
and, as a consequence it only convicted Dante Capuno to pay the damages claimed in the complaint. From decision, plaintiff
appealed to the Court of Appeals but the case was certified to us on the ground that the appeal only involves questions of law.

It appears that Dante Capuno was a member of the Boy Scouts Organization and a student of the Bilintawak Elementary School
situated in a barrio in the City of San Pablo and on March 31, 1949 he attended a parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal in said city upon
instruction of the city school's supervisor. From the school Dante, with other students, boarded a jeep and when the same started to
run, he took hold of the wheel and drove it while the driver sat on his left side. They have not gone far when the jeep turned turtle
and two of its passengers, Amado Ticzon and Isidore Caperiña, died as a consequence. It further appears that Delfin Capuno, father
of Dante, was not with his son at the time of the accident, nor did he know that his son was going to attend a parade. He only came
to know it when his son told him after the accident that he attended the parade upon instruction of his teacher.

The only issue involved in this appeal is whether defendant Delfin Capuno can be held civilly liable, jointly and severally with his son
Dante, for damages resulting from the death of Isidoro Caperiña caused by the negligent act of minor Dante Capuno.

The case comes under Article 1903 of the Spanish Civil Code, paragraph 1 and 5, which provides:

ART. 1903. The obligation impossed by the next preceding articles is enforceable not only for personal acts and omissions,
but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible.

The father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any damages caused by the minor children who
live with them.

xxx     xxx     xxx

Finally, teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they
are under their custody.

Plaintiff contends that defendant Delfin Capuno is liable for the damages in question jointly and severally with his son Dante because
at the time the latter committed the negligent act which resulted in the death of the victim, he was a minor and was then living with
his father, and inasmuch as these facts are not disputed, the civil liability of the father is evident. And so, plaintiff contends, the
lower court erred in relieving the father from liability.

We find merit in this claim. It is true that under the law above quoted, "teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any
damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody", but this provision only applies to an institution of
arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution (Padilla, Civil Law, 1953, Ed., Vol. IV, p. 841; See 12 Manresa, 4th Ed.,
p. 557). Here Dante capuno was then a student of the Balintawak Elementary School and as part of his extra-curricular activity, he
attended the parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal upon instruction of the city school's supervisor. And it was in connection with that
parade that Dante boarded a jeep with some companions and while driving it, the accident occurred. In the circumstances, it is clear
that neither the head of that school, nor the city school's supervisor, could be held liable for the negligent act of Dante because he
was not then a student of an institute of arts and trades as provided by law.

The civil liability which the law impose upon the father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that
may be caused by the minor children who live with them, is obvious. This is necessary consequence of the parental authority they
exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the "duty of supporting them, keeping them in their company, educating them
and instructing them in proportion to their means", while, on the other hand, gives them the "right to correct and punish them in
moderation" (Articles 154 and 155, Spanish Civil Code). The only way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they
prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage(Article 1903, last paragraph, Spanish
Civil Code). This defendant failed to prove.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is modified in the sense that defendants Delfin Capuno and Dante Capuno shall pay to
plaintiff, jointly and severally, the sum of P2,959.00 as damages, and the costs of action.
Separate Opinions

REYES, J.B.L., J.,  dissenting:

After mature consideration I believe we should affirm the judgement relieving the father of liability. I can see no sound reason for
limiting Art. 1903 of the old Civil Code to teachers of arts and trades and not to academic ones. What substantial difference is there
between them in so far as, concerns the proper supervision and vigilance over their pupils? It cannot be seriously contended that an
academic teacher is exempt from the duty of watching do not commit a tort to the detriment of third persons, so long as they are in
a position to exercise authority and supervision over the pupil. In my opinion, in the phrase "teachers or heads of establishments of
arts and trades" used in Art. 1903 of the old Civil Code, the words "arts and trades" does not qualify "teachers" but only "heads of
establishments". The phrase is only an updated version of the equivalent terms "preceptors y artesanos" used in the Italian and
French Civil Codes.

If, as conceded by all commentators, the basis of the presumption of negligence of Art. 1903 in some culpa in vigilando that the
parents, teachers, etc. are supposed to have incurred in the exercise of their authority, it would seem clear that where the parent
places the child under the effective authority of the teacher, the latter, and not the parent, should be the one answerable for the
torts committed while under his custody, for the very reason that the parent is not supposed to interfere with the discipline of the
school nor with the authority and supervision of the teacher while the child is under instruction. And if there is no authority, there
can be no responsibility.

In the case before us, there is no question that the pupil, Dante Capuno, was instructed by the City School Supervisor to attend the
Rizal parade. His father could not properly refuse to allow the child to attend, in defiance of the school authorities. The father had
every reason to assume that in ordering a minor to attend a parade with other children, the school authorities would provide
adequate supervision over them. If a teacher or scout master was present, then he should be the one responsible for allowing the
minor to drive the jeep without being qualified to do so. On the other hand, if no teacher or master was at hand to watch over the
pupils, the school authorities are the ones answerable for that negligence, and not the father.

At any rate, I submit that the father should not be held liable for a tort that he was in no way able to prevent, and which he had
every right to assume the school authorities would avoid. Having proved that he trusted his child to the custody of school authorities
that were competent to exercise vigilance over him, the father has rebutted the presumption of Art. 1903 and the burden of proof
shifted to the claimant to show actual negligence on the part of the parent in order to render him liable.
G.R. No. L-14414 April 27, 1960

SEVERINO SALEN and ELENA SALBANERA, plaintiffs and appellants,

v. JOSE BALCE, defendant and appellee.

Marciano C. Dating, Jr. for Appellants.

Severino Balce for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

CIVIL LIABILITY; PARENTS SUBSIDIARILY LIABLE FOR CRIMINAL ACT OF MINOR OVER 15 YEARS; ARTICLE 2180 OF NEW CIVIL CODE
APPLICABLE. — Under Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, a father is civilly liable for the acts committed by his son only if the
latter is an imbecile, an insane, under 9 years of age, who acts without discernment, unless it appears that there is no fault or
negligence on his part. This is because a son who commits the act under any of those conditions is by law exempt from criminal
liability (Article 12, subdivisions 1, 2 and 3, Revised Penal Code). The idea is not to leave the act entirely unpunished but to attach
certain civil liability to the person who has the delinquent minor under his legal authority and control. But a minor over 15 years who
acts with discernment is not exempt from criminal liability, for which reason the Code is silent as to the subsidiary liability of his
parents should he stand convicted. In that case resort should be had to the general law, the Civil Code, which, under Article 2180,
provides that "The father and, in case of his death, or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for damages caused by the minor
children who lived in their company." This provision covers not only obligations which arise from quasi-delicts but also those which
arise from criminal offenses. To hold otherwise would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence intervenes
the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if the damage is
caused with criminal intent.

DECISION

On February 5, 1957, plaintiffs brought this action against defendant before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte to
recover the sum of P2,000.00, with legal interest thereon from July 18, 1952, plus attorney’s fees and other incidental expenses.

Defendant, in his answer, set up the defense that the law upon which plaintiffs predicate their right to recover does not here apply
for the reason that that law refers to quasi-delicts and not to criminal cases.

After trial, the court sustained the theory of defendant and dismissed the complaint with costs. Hence the present appeal.

Plaintiffs are the legitimate parents of Carlos Salen who died single from wounds caused by Gumersindo Balce, a legitimate son of
defendant. At the time, Gumersindo Balce was also single, a minor below 18 years of age, and was living with defendant. As a result
of Carlos Salen’s death, Gumersindo Balce was accused and convicted of homicide and was sentenced to imprisonment and to pay
the heirs of the deceased an indemnity in the amount of P2,000.00. Upon petition of plaintiffs, the only heirs of the deceased, a writ
of execution was issued for the payment of the indemnity but it was returned unsatisfied because Gumersindo Balce was insolvent
and had no property in his name. Thereupon, plaintiffs demanded upon defendant, father of Gumersindo, the payment of the
indemnity the latter has failed to pay, but defendant refused, thus causing plaintiffs to institute the present action.

The question for determination is whether appellee can be held subsidiary liable to pay the indemnity of P2,000.00 which his son
was sentenced to pay in the criminal case filed against him.

In holding that the civil liability of the son of appellee arises from his criminal liability and, therefore, the subsidiary liability of
appellee must be determined under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, and not under Article 2180 of the new Civil Code
which only applies to obligations which arise from quasi-delicts, the trial court made the following
observation:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The law provides that a person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable (Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code). But there is no
law which holds the father either primarily or subsidiarily liable for the civil liability incurred by the son who is a minor of 18 years.
Under Art. 101 of the Penal Code, the father is civilly liable for the acts committed by his son if the latter is an imbecile, or insane, or
under 9 years of age or over 9 but under 15, who has acted without discernment. Under Art. 102, only inkeepers and tavern-keepers
are held subsidiarily liable and under Art. 103 of the same Penal Code, the subsidiary liability established in Art. 102 shall apply only
to ‘employers, teachers, persons and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils,
workmen, apprentices or employees in the discharge of their duties.’ By the principle of exclusio unus exclusio ulterius, the
defendant in this case cannot he held subsidiary liable for the civil liability of Gumersindo Balce who has been convicted of homicide
for the killing of the plaintiff’s son Carlos Salen.

"ART. 2180 of the Civil Code, relied upon by the plaintiffs, is not applicable to the case at bar. It applies to obligations which arise
from quasi-delicts and not to obligations which arise from criminal offenses. Civil liability arising from criminal negligence or offenses
is governed by the provisions of the Penal Code and civil liability arising from civil negligence is governed by the provision of the Civil
Code. The obligation imposed by Art. 2176 of the New Civil Code expressly refers to obligations which arise from quasi- delicts. And
obligations arising from criminal offenses are never obligations arising from quasi-delicts (Commissioner’s note). And according to
Art. 2177, the ‘responsibility for fault of negligence under Art. 2176 is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising
from negligence under the Penal Code. . . .’"
While we agree with the theory that, as a rule, the civil liability arising from a crime shall be governed by the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, we disagree with the contention that the subsidiary liability of persons for acts of those who are under their
custody should likewise be governed by the same Code even in the absence of any provision governing the case, for that would
leave the transgression of certain rights without any punishment or sanction in the law. Such would be the case if we would uphold
the theory of appellee as sustained by the trial court.

It is true that under Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, a father is made civilly liable for the acts committed by his son only if the
latter is an imbecile, an insane, under 9 years of age, or over 9 but under 15 years of age, who acts without discernment, unless it
appears that there is no fault or negligence on his part. This is because a son who commits the act under any of those conditions is
by law exempt from criminal liability (Article 12, subdivisions 1, 2 and 3, Revised Penal Code). The idea is not to leave the act entirely
unpunished but to attach certain civil liability to the person who has the delinquent minor under his legal authority or control. But a
minor over 15 who acts with discernment is not exempt from criminal liability, for which reason the Code is silent as to the
subsidiary liability of his parents should he stand convicted. In that case, resort should be had to the general law which is our Civil
Code.

The particular law that governs this case is Article 2180, the pertinent portion of which provides: "The father and, in case of his death
or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for damages caused by the minor children who lived in their company." To hold that this
provision does not apply to the instant case because it only covers obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and not obligations
which arise from criminal offenses, would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father
or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if the damage is caused
with criminal intent. Verily, the void that apparently exists in the Revised Penal Code is subserved by this particular provision of our
Civil Code, as may be gleaned from some recent decisions of this Court which cover equal or identical cases.

A case in point is Exconde v. Capuno, 101 Phil., 843 the facts of which are as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Dante Capuno, a minor of 15 years of age, lives in the company of his father, Delfin Capuno. He is a student of the Balintawak
Elementary School in the City of San Pablo and a member of the Boy Scout Organization of his school. On March 31, 1949, on the
occasion of a certain parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal in the City of San Pablo, Dante Capuno was one of those instructed by the City
School Supervisor to join the parade. From the school, Dante Capuno, together with other students, boarded a jeep. When the jeep
started to run, Dante Capuno took hold of the wheel and drove it while the driver sat on his left side. They have not gone far when
the jeep turned turtle and two of its passengers, Amado Ticzon and Isidro Caperiña died as a consequence. The corresponding
criminal action for double homicide through reckless imprudence was instituted against Dante Capuno. During the trial, Sabina
Exconde, as mother of the deceased Isidro Caperiña, reserved her right to bring a separate civil action for damages against the
accused. Dante Capuno was found guilty of the criminal offense charged against him. In line with said reservation of Sabina Exconde,
the corresponding civil action for damages was filed against Delfin Capuno, Dante Capuno and others."cralaw virtua1aw library

In holding Delfin Capuno jointly and severally liable with his minor son Dante Capuno arising from the criminal act committed by the
latter, this Court made the following ruling:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that
may be caused by the minor children who live with them, is obvious. This is a necessary consequence of the parental authority they
exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the ‘duty of supporting them, keeping them in their company, educating them
in proportion to their means’, while, on the other hand, gives them the ‘[right to correct and punish them in moderation’ (Arts. 134
and 135, Spanish Civil Code). The only way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage (Art. 1903, last paragraph, Spanish Civil Code.) This defendants
failed to prove."cralaw virtua1aw library

Another case in point is Araneta v. Arreglado 104 Phil., 524; 55 Off. Gaz. [9] 1961. The facts of this case are as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"On March 7, 1951, while plaintiff Benjamin Araneta was talking with the other students of the Ateneo de Manila while seated atop
a low ruined wall bordering the Ateneo grounds along Dakota Street, in the City of Manila, Dario Arreglado, a former student of the
Ateneo, chanced to pass by. Those on the wall called Dario and conversed with him, and in the course of their talk, twitted him on
his leaving the Ateneo and enrolling in the De La Salle College. Apparently, Arreglado resented the banter and suddenly pulling from
his pocket a Japanese Luger pistol (licensed in the name of his father Juan Arreglado), fired the same at Araneta, hitting him in the
lower jaw, causing him to drop backward, bleeding profusely. Helped by his friends, the injured lad was taken first to the school
infirmary and later to the Singian Hospital, where he lay hovering between life and death for three days. The vigor of youth came to
his rescue; he rallied and after some time finally recovered, the gunshot wound left him with a degenerative injury to the jawbone
(mandible) and a scar in the lower portion of the face, where the bullet had plowed through. The behavior of Benjamin was likewise
affected, he becoming inhibited and morose after leaving the hospital."cralaw virtua1aw library

Dario Arreglado was indicted for frustrated homicide and pleaded guilty, but in view of his youth, he being only 14 years of age, the
court suspended the proceedings as prescribed by Article 80 of the Revised Penal Code. Thereafter, an action was instituted by
Araneta and his father against Juan Arreglado, his wife, and their son Dario, to recover material, moral and exemplary damages. The
court of first instance, after trial, sentenced the Arreglados to pay P3,943.00 as damages and attorney’s fees. From this decision, the
Aranetas appealed in view of the meager amount of indemnity awarded. This Court affirmed the decision but increased the
indemnity to P18,000.00. This is a typical case of parental subsidiary liability arising from the criminal act of a minor son.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed. Judgment is hereby rendered ordering appellee to pay appellants the sum of
P2,000.00, with legal interest thereon from the filing of the complaint, and the costs.
G.R. No. 174156               June 20, 2012

FILCAR TRANSPORT SERVICES, Petitioner,

We resolve the present petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Filcar Transport Services (Filcar), challenging the
decision2 and the resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 86603.

The facts of the case, gathered from the records, are briefly summarized below.

On November 22, 1998, at around 6:30 p.m., respondent Jose A. Espinas was driving his car along Leon Guinto Street in Manila.
Upon reaching the intersection of Leon Guinto and President Quirino Streets, Espinas stopped his car. When the signal light turned
green, he proceeded to cross the intersection. He was already in the middle of the intersection when another car, traversing
President Quirino Street and going to Roxas Boulevard, suddenly hit and bumped his car. As a result of the impact, Espinas’ car
turned clockwise. The other car escaped from the scene of the incident, but Espinas was able to get its plate number.

After verifying with the Land Transportation Office, Espinas learned that the owner of the other car, with plate number UCF-545, is
Filcar.

Espinas sent several letters to Filcar and to its President and General Manager Carmen Flor, demanding payment for the damages
sustained by his car. On May 31, 2001, Espinas filed a complaint for damages against Filcar and Carmen Flor before the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila, and the case was raffled to Branch 13. In the complaint, Espinas demanded that Filcar and Carmen Flor
pay the amount of ₱97,910.00, representing actual damages sustained by his car.

Filcar argued that while it is the registered owner of the car that hit and bumped Espinas’ car, the car was assigned to its Corporate
Secretary Atty. Candido Flor, the husband of Carmen Flor. Filcar further stated that when the incident happened, the car was being
driven by Atty. Flor’s personal driver, Timoteo Floresca.

Atty. Flor, for his part, alleged that when the incident occurred, he was attending a birthday celebration at a nearby hotel, and it was
only later that night when he noticed a small dent on and the cracked signal light of the car. On seeing the dent and the crack, Atty.
Flor allegedly asked Floresca what happened, and the driver replied that it was a result of a "hit and run" while the car was parked in
front of Bogota on Pedro Gil Avenue, Manila.

Filcar denied any liability to Espinas and claimed that the incident was not due to its fault or negligence since Floresca was not its
employee but that of Atty. Flor. Filcar and Carmen Flor both said that they always exercised the due diligence required of a good
father of a family in leasing or assigning their vehicles to third parties.

The MeTC Decision

The MeTC, in its decision dated January 20, 2004,4 ruled in favor of Espinas, and ordered Filcar and Carmen Flor, jointly and severally,
to pay Espinas ₱97,910.00 as actual damages, representing the cost of repair, with interest at 6% per annum from the date the
complaint was filed; ₱50,000.00 as moral damages; ₱20,000.00 as exemplary damages; and ₱20,000.00 as attorney’s fees. The MeTC
ruled that Filcar, as the registered owner of the vehicle, is primarily responsible for damages resulting from the vehicle’s operation.

The RTC Decision

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 20, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, affirmed the MeTC decision.5 The RTC
ruled that Filcar failed to prove that Floresca was not its employee as no proof was adduced that Floresca was personally hired by
Atty. Flor. The RTC agreed with the MeTC that the registered owner of a vehicle is directly and primarily liable for the damages
sustained by third persons as a consequence of the negligent or careless operation of a vehicle registered in its name. The RTC added
that the victim of recklessness on the public highways is without means to discover or identify the person actually causing the injury
or damage. Thus, the only recourse is to determine the owner, through the vehicle’s registration, and to hold him responsible for the
damages.

The CA Decision

On appeal, the CA partly granted the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 86603; it modified the RTC decision by ruling that Carmen Flor,
President and General Manager of Filcar, is not personally liable to Espinas. The appellate court pointed out that, subject to
recognized exceptions, the liability of a corporation is not the liability of its corporate officers because a corporate entity – subject to
well-recognized exceptions – has a separate and distinct personality from its officers and shareholders. Since the circumstances in
the case at bar do not fall under the exceptions recognized by law, the CA concluded that the liability for damages cannot attach to
Carmen Flor.

The CA, however, affirmed the liability of Filcar to pay Espinas damages. According to the CA, even assuming that there had been no
employer-employee relationship between Filcar and the driver of the vehicle, Floresca, the former can be held liable under the
registered owner rule.
The CA relied on the rule that the registered owner of a vehicle is directly and primarily responsible to the public and to third
persons while the vehicle is being operated. Citing Erezo, et al. v. Jepte,6 the CA said that the rationale behind the rule is to avoid
circumstances where vehicles running on public highways cause accidents or injuries to pedestrians or other vehicles without
positive identification of the owner or drivers, or with very scant means of identification. In Erezo, the Court said that the main aim
of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner, so that if a vehicle causes damage or injury to pedestrians or other vehicles,
responsibility can be traced to a definite individual and that individual is the registered owner of the vehicle.7

The CA did not accept Filcar’s argument that it cannot be held liable for damages because the driver of the vehicle was not its
employee. In so ruling, the CA cited the case of Villanueva v. Domingo8 where the Court said that the question of whether the driver
was authorized by the actual owner is irrelevant in determining the primary and direct responsibility of the registered owner of a
vehicle for accidents, injuries and deaths caused by the operation of his vehicle.

Filcar filed a motion for reconsideration which the CA denied in its Resolution dated July 6, 2006.

Hence, the present petition.

The Issue

Simply stated, the issue for the consideration of this Court is: whether Filcar, as registered owner of the motor vehicle which figured
in an accident, may be held liable for the damages caused to Espinas.

Our Ruling

The petition is without merit.

Filcar, as registered owner, is deemed the employer of the driver, Floresca, and is thus vicariously liable under Article 2176 in
relation with Article 2180 of the Civil Code

It is undisputed that Filcar is the registered owner of the motor vehicle which hit and caused damage to Espinas’ car; and it is on the
basis of this fact that we hold Filcar primarily and directly liable to Espinas for damages.

As a general rule, one is only responsible for his own act or omission.9 Thus, a person will generally be held liable only for the torts
committed by himself and not by another. This general rule is laid down in Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which provides to wit:

Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

Based on the above-cited article, the obligation to indemnify another for damage caused by one’s act or omission is imposed upon
the tortfeasor himself, i.e., the person who committed the negligent act or omission. The law, however, provides for exceptions
when it makes certain persons liable for the act or omission of another.

One exception is an employer who is made vicariously liable for the tort committed by his employee. Article 2180 of the Civil Code
states:

Article 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible.

xxxx

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

xxxx

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

Under Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the Civil Code, an action predicated on an employee’s act or omission may be
instituted against the employer who is held liable for the negligent act or omission committed by his employee.

Although the employer is not the actual tortfeasor, the law makes him vicariously liable on the basis of the civil law principle of pater
familias for failure to exercise due care and vigilance over the acts of one’s subordinates to prevent damage to another.10 In the last
paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the employer may invoke the defense that he observed all the diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent damage.
As its core defense, Filcar contends that Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the Civil Code is inapplicable because it
presupposes the existence of an employer-employee relationship. According to Filcar, it cannot be held liable under the subject
provisions because the driver of its vehicle at the time of the accident, Floresca, is not its employee but that of its Corporate
Secretary, Atty. Flor.

We cannot agree. It is well settled that in case of motor vehicle mishaps, the registered owner of the motor vehicle is considered as
the employer of the tortfeasor-driver, and is made primarily liable for the tort committed by the latter under Article 2176, in relation
with Article 2180, of the Civil Code.

In Equitable Leasing Corporation v. Suyom,11 we ruled that in so far as third persons are concerned, the registered owner of the
motor vehicle is the employer of the negligent driver, and the actual employer is considered merely as an agent of such owner.

In that case, a tractor registered in the name of Equitable Leasing Corporation (Equitable) figured in an accident, killing and seriously
injuring several persons. As part of its defense, Equitable claimed that the tractor was initially leased to Mr. Edwin Lim under a Lease
Agreement, which agreement has been overtaken by a Deed of Sale entered into by Equitable and Ecatine Corporation (Ecatine).
Equitable argued that it cannot be held liable for damages because the tractor had already been sold to Ecatine at the time of the
accident and the negligent driver was not its employee but of Ecatine.

In upholding the liability of Equitable, as registered owner of the tractor, this Court said that "regardless of sales made of a motor
vehicle, the registered owner is the lawful operator insofar as the public and third persons are concerned; consequently, it is directly
and primarily responsible for the consequences of its operation."12 The Court further stated that "[i]n contemplation of law, the
owner/operator of record is the employer of the driver, the actual operator and employer being considered as merely its
agent."13 Thus, Equitable, as the registered owner of the tractor, was considered under the law on quasi delict to be the employer of
the driver, Raul Tutor; Ecatine, Tutor’s actual employer, was deemed merely as an agent of Equitable.

Thus, it is clear that for the purpose of holding the registered owner of the motor vehicle primarily and directly liable for damages
under Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the Civil Code, the existence of an employer-employee relationship, as it is
understood in labor relations law, is not required. It is sufficient to establish that Filcar is the registered owner of the motor vehicle
causing damage in order that it may be held vicariously liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

Rationale for holding the registered owner vicariously liable

The rationale for the rule that a registered owner is vicariously liable for damages caused by the operation of his motor vehicle is
explained by the principle behind motor vehicle registration, which has been discussed by this Court in Erezo, and cited by the CA in
its decision:

The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident happens, or that any damage or injury is
caused by the vehicle on the public highways, responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner.
Instances are numerous where vehicles running on public highways caused accidents or injuries to pedestrians or other vehicles
without positive identification of the owner or drivers, or with very scant means of identification. It is to forestall these
circumstances, so inconvenient or prejudicial to the public, that the motor vehicle registration is primarily ordained, in the interest of
the determination of persons responsible for damages or injuries caused on public highways. [emphasis ours]

Thus, whether there is an employer-employee relationship between the registered owner and the driver is irrelevant in determining
the liability of the registered owner who the law holds primarily and directly responsible for any accident, injury or death caused by
the operation of the vehicle in the streets and highways.

As explained by this Court in Erezo, the general public policy involved in motor vehicle registration is the protection of innocent third
persons who may have no means of identifying public road malefactors and, therefore, would find it difficult – if not impossible – to
seek redress for damages they may sustain in accidents resulting in deaths, injuries and other damages; by fixing the person held
primarily and directly liable for the damages sustained by victims of road mishaps, the law ensures that relief will always be available
to them.

To identify the person primarily and directly responsible for the damages would also prevent a situation where a registered owner of
a motor vehicle can easily escape liability by passing on the blame to another who may have no means to answer for the damages
caused, thereby defeating the claims of victims of road accidents. We take note that some motor vehicles running on our roads are
driven not by their registered owners, but by employed drivers who, in most instances, do not have the financial means to pay for
the damages caused in case of accidents.

These same principles apply by analogy to the case at bar. Filcar should not be permitted to evade its liability for damages by
conveniently passing on the blame to another party; in this case, its Corporate Secretary, Atty. Flor and his alleged driver, Floresca.
Following our reasoning in Equitable, the agreement between Filcar and Atty. Flor to assign the motor vehicle to the latter does not
bind Espinas who was not a party to and has no knowledge of the agreement, and whose only recourse is to the motor vehicle
registration.

Neither can Filcar use the defenses available under Article 2180 of the Civil Code - that the employee acts beyond the scope of his
assigned task or that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage - because the motor vehicle
registration law, to a certain extent, modified Article 2180 of the Civil Code by making these defenses unavailable to the registered
owner of the motor vehicle.1awp++i1 Thus, for as long as Filcar is the registered owner of the car involved in the vehicular accident,
it could not escape primary liability for the damages caused to Espinas.

The public interest involved in this case must not be underestimated. Road safety is one of the most common problems that must be
addressed in this country. We are not unaware of news of road accidents involving reckless drivers victimizing our citizens. Just
recently, such pervasive recklessness among most drivers took the life of a professor of our state university.14 What is most
disturbing is that our existing laws do not seem to deter these road malefactors from committing acts of recklessness.

We understand that the solution to the problem does not stop with legislation. An effective administration and enforcement of the
laws must be ensured to reinforce discipline among drivers and to remind owners of motor vehicles to exercise due diligence and
vigilance over the acts of their drivers to prevent damage to others.

Thus, whether the driver of the motor vehicle, Floresca, is an employee of Filcar is irrelevant in arriving at the conclusion that Filcar
is primarily and directly liable for the damages sustained by Espinas. While Republic Act No. 4136 or the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code does not contain any provision on the liability of registered owners in case of motor vehicle mishaps, Article 2176, in
relation with Article 2180, of the Civil Code imposes an obligation upon Filcar, as registered owner, to answer for the damages
caused to Espinas’ car. This interpretation is consistent with the strong public policy of maintaining road safety, thereby reinforcing
the aim of the State to promote the responsible operation of motor vehicles by its citizens.

This does not mean, however, that Filcar is left without any recourse against the actual employer of the driver and the driver
himself. Under the civil law principle of unjust enrichment, the registered owner of the motor vehicle has a right to be indemnified
by the actual employer of the driver of the amount that he may be required to pay as damages for the injury caused to another.

The set-up may be inconvenient for the registered owner of the motor vehicle, but the inconvenience cannot outweigh the more
important public policy being advanced by the law in this case which is the protection of innocent persons who may be victims of
reckless drivers and irresponsible motor vehicle owners.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision dated February 16, 2006 and the resolution dated July 6, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner Filcar Transport Services.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 75112 August 17, 1992

FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE, petitioner,

Bedona & Bedona Law Office for petitioner.

Rhodora G. Kapunan for private respondents.

The private respondents, heirs of the late Potenciano Kapunan, seek reconsideration of the decision rendered by this Court on
October 16, 1990 (Filamer Christian Institute v. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 477) reviewing the appellate court's conclusion that
there exists an employer-employee relationship between the petitioner and its co-defendant Funtecha. The Court ruled that the
petitioner is not liable for the injuries caused by Funtecha on the grounds that the latter was not an authorized driver for whose acts
the petitioner shall be directly and primarily answerable, and that Funtecha was merely a working scholar who, under Section 14,
Rule X, Book III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code is not considered an employee of the petitioner.

The private respondents assert that the circumstances obtaining in the present case call for the application of Article 2180 of the
Civil Code since Funtecha is no doubt an employee of the petitioner. The private respondents maintain that under Article 2180 an
injured party shall have recourse against the servant as well as the petitioner for whom, at the time of the incident, the servant was
performing an act in furtherance of the interest and for the benefit of the petitioner. Funtecha allegedly did not steal the school jeep
nor use it for a joy ride without the knowledge of the school authorities.

After a re-examination of the laws relevant to the facts found by the trial court and the appellate court, the Court reconsiders its
decision. We reinstate the Court of Appeals' decision penned by the late Justice Desiderio Jurado and concurred in by Justices Jose C.
Campos, Jr. and Serafin E. Camilon. Applying Civil Code provisions, the appellate court affirmed the trial court decision which
ordered the payment of the P20,000.00 liability in the Zenith Insurance Corporation policy, P10,000.00 moral damages, P4,000.00
litigation and actual expenses, and P3,000.00 attorney's fees.

It is undisputed that Funtecha was a working student, being a part-time janitor and a scholar of petitioner Filamer. He was, in
relation to the school, an employee even if he was assigned to clean the school premises for only two (2) hours in the morning of
each school day.

Having a student driver's license, Funtecha requested the driver, Allan Masa, and was allowed, to take over the vehicle while the
latter was on his way home one late afternoon. It is significant to note that the place where Allan lives is also the house of his father,
the school president, Agustin Masa. Moreover, it is also the house where Funtecha was allowed free board while he was a student of
Filamer Christian Institute.

Allan Masa turned over the vehicle to Funtecha only after driving down a road, negotiating a sharp dangerous curb, and viewing that
the road was clear. (TSN, April 4, 1983, pp. 78-79) According to Allan's testimony, a fast moving truck with glaring lights nearly hit
them so that they had to swerve to the right to avoid a collision. Upon swerving, they heard a sound as if something had bumped
against the vehicle, but they did not stop to check. Actually, the Pinoy jeep swerved towards the pedestrian, Potenciano Kapunan
who was walking in his lane in the direction against vehicular traffic, and hit him. Allan affirmed that Funtecha followed his advise to
swerve to the right. (Ibid., p. 79) At the time of the incident (6:30 P.M.) in Roxas City, the jeep had only one functioning headlight.

Allan testified that he was the driver and at the same time a security guard of the petitioner-school. He further said that there was
no specific time for him to be off-duty and that after driving the students home at 5:00 in the afternoon, he still had to go back to
school and then drive home using the same vehicle.

Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school president where both Allan and Funtecha reside is an act in furtherance of
the interest of the petitioner-school. Allan's job demands that he drive home the school jeep so he can use it to fetch students in the
morning of the next school day.

It is indubitable under the circumstances that the school president had knowledge that the jeep was routinely driven home for the
said purpose. Moreover, it is not improbable that the school president also had knowledge of Funtecha's possession of a student
driver's license and his desire to undergo driving lessons during the time that he was not in his classrooms.

In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allan's house, Funtecha definitely was not having a joy ride.
Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a "frolic of his own" but ultimately, for the service for which the
jeep was intended by the petitioner school. (See L. Battistoni v. Thomas, Can SC 144, 1 D.L.R. 577, 80 ALR 722 [1932]; See also
Association of Baptists for World Evangelism, Inc. v. Fieldmen's Insurance Co., Inc. 124 SCRA 618 [1983]). Therefore, the Court is
constrained to conclude that the act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of his employer
for which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial
duties. The clause "within the scope of their assigned tasks" for purposes of raising the presumption of liability of an employer,
includes any act done by an employee, in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time
of the infliction of the injury or damage. (Manuel Casada, 190 Va 906, 59 SE 2d 47 [1950]) Even if somehow, the employee driving
the vehicle derived some benefit from the act, the existence of a presumptive liability of the employer is determined by answering
the question of whether or not the servant was at the time of the accident performing any act in furtherance of his master's
business. (Kohlman v. Hyland, 210 NW 643, 50 ALR 1437 [1926]; Jameson v. Gavett, 71 P 2d 937 [1937])

Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules implementing the Labor Code, on which the petitioner anchors its defense, was promulgated
by the Secretary of Labor and Employment only for the purpose of administering and enforcing the provisions of the Labor Code on
conditions of employment. Particularly, Rule X of Book III provides guidelines on the manner by which the powers of the Labor
Secretary shall be exercised; on what records should be kept; maintained and preserved; on payroll; and on the exclusion of working
scholars from, and inclusion of resident physicians in the employment coverage as far as compliance with the substantive labor
provisions on working conditions, rest periods, and wages, is concerned.

In other words, Rule X is merely a guide to the enforcement of the substantive law on labor. The Court, thus, makes the distinction
and so holds that Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules is not the decisive law in a civil suit for damages instituted by an injured
person during a vehicular accident against a working student of a school and against the school itself.

The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of employment between an alleged employee and an alleged
employer. It invokes a claim brought by one for damages for injury caused by the patently negligent acts of a person, against both
doer-employee and his employer. Hence, the reliance on the implementing rule on labor to disregard the primary liability of an
employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is misplaced. An implementing rule on labor cannot be used by an employer as a shield
to avoid liability under the substantive provisions of the Civil Code.

There is evidence to show that there exists in the present case an extra-contractual obligation arising from the negligence or reckless
imprudence of a person "whose acts or omissions are imputable, by a legal fiction, to other(s) who are in a position to exercise an
absolute or limited control over (him)." (Bahia v. Litonjua and Leynes, 30 Phil. 624 [1915])

Funtecha is an employee of petitioner Filamer. He need not have an official appointment for a driver's position in order that the
petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act, it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident
was for the benefit of the petitioner. Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting within the scope of
his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the presumption  juris tantum that there was
negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee, or in the supervision over him. The petitioner has failed to
show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha and Allan.

The Court reiterates that supervision includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of its employees and
the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom the employer has relations
through his employees. (Bahia v. Litonjua and Leynes, supra,  at p. 628; Phoenix Construction, v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148
SCRA 353 [1987])

An employer is expected to impose upon its employees the necessary discipline called for in the performance of any act
indispensable to the business and beneficial to their employer.

In the present case, the petitioner has not shown that it has set forth such rules and guidelines as would prohibit any one of its
employees from taking control over its vehicles if one is not the official driver or prohibiting the driver and son of the Filamer
president from authorizing another employee to drive the school vehicle. Furthermore, the petitioner has failed to prove that it had
imposed sanctions or warned its employees against the use of its vehicles by persons other than the driver.

The petitioner, thus, has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising from the unskilled manner by which Funtecha drove the
vehicle. (Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co., 38 Phil. 768, 772 [1918]). In the absence of evidence that the petitioner had exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employees, the law imposes upon it the vicarious liability for acts or
omissions of its employees. (Umali v. Bacani, 69 SCRA 263 [1976]; Poblete v. Fabros, 93 SCRA 200 [1979]; Kapalaran Bus Liner v.
Coronado, 176 SCRA 792 [1989]; Franco v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 178 SCRA 331 [1989]; Pantranco North Express, Inc. v.
Baesa, 179 SCRA 384 [1989]) The liability of the employer is, under Article 2180, primary and solidary. However, the employer shall
have recourse against the negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the plaintiff.

It is an admitted fact that the actual driver of the school jeep, Allan Masa, was not made a party defendant in the civil case for
damages. This is quite understandable considering that as far as the injured pedestrian, plaintiff Potenciano Kapunan, was
concerned, it was Funtecha who was the one driving the vehicle and presumably was one authorized by the school to drive. The
plaintiff and his heirs should not now be left to suffer without simultaneous recourse against the petitioner for the consequent injury
caused by a janitor doing a driving chore for the petitioner even for a short while. For the purpose of recovering damages under the
prevailing circumstances, it is enough that the plaintiff and the private respondent heirs were able to establish the existence of
employer-employee relationship between Funtecha and petitioner Filamer and the fact that Funtecha was engaged in an act not for
an independent purpose of his own but in furtherance of the business of his employer. A position of responsibility on the part of the
petitioner has thus been satisfactorily demonstrated.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of the decision dated October 16, 1990 is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the
respondent appellate court affirming the trial court decision is REINSTATED.
G.R. No. 132266 December 21, 1999

CASTILEX INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, Petitioner,

v. VICENTE VASQUEZ, JR. and LUISA SO VASQUEZ, and CEBU DOCTORS’ HOSPITAL, INC., Respondents.

The pivotal issue in this petition is whether an employer may be held vicariously liable for the death resulting from the negligent
operation by a managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle.

The antecedents, as succinctly summarized by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

On 28 August 1988, at around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning, Romeo So Vasquez, was driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente
Osmeña Rotunda. He was traveling counter-clockwise, (the normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) but without any protective helmet or
goggles. He was also only carrying a Student’s Permit to Drive at the time. Upon the other hand, Benjamin Abad [was a] manager of
Appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation, registered owner [of] a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no. GBW-794. On the same date
and time, Abad drove the said company car out of a parking lot but instead of going around the Osmeña rotunda he made a short
cut against [the] flow of the traffic in proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St. or to Belvic St.

In the process, the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided with each other causing severe injuries to the former.
Abad stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands Hospital and later to the Cebu Doctor’s Hospital.

On September 5, 1988, Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctor’s Hospital. It was there that Abad signed an acknowledgment of
Responsible Party (Exhibit K) wherein he agreed to pay whatever hospital bills, professional fees and other incidental charges
Vasquez may incur.

After the police authorities had conducted the investigation of the accident, a Criminal Case was filed against Abad but which was
subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute. So, the present action for damages was commenced by Vicente Vasquez, Jr. and
Luisa So Vasquez, parents of the deceased Romeo So Vasquez, against Jose Benjamin Abad and Castilex Industrial Corporation. In the
same action, Cebu Doctor’s Hospital intervened to collect unpaid balance for the medical expense given to Romeo So Vasquez. 1

The trial court ruled in favor of private respondents Vicente and Luisa Vasquez and ordered Jose Benjamin Abad (hereafter ABAD)
and petitioner Castilex Industrial Corporation (hereafter CASTILEX) to pay jointly and solidarily (1) Spouses Vasquez, the amounts of
P8,000.00 for burial expenses; P50,000.00 as moral damages; P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and P778,752.00 for loss of earning
capacity; and (2) Cebu Doctor’s Hospital, the sum of P50,927.83 for unpaid medical and hospital bills at 3% monthly interest from 27
July 1989 until fully paid, plus the costs of litigation. 2

CASTILEX and ABAD separately appealed the decision.

In its decision 3 of 21 May 1997, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court holding ABAD and CASTILEX liable but held
that the liability of the latter is "only vicarious and not solidary" with the former. It reduced the award of damages representing loss
of earning capacity from P778,752.00 to P214,156.80; and the interest on the hospital and medical bills, from 3% per month to 12%
per annum from 5 September 1988 until fully paid.

Upon CASTILEX’s motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals modified its decision by (1) reducing the award of moral damages
from P50,000 to P30,000 in view of the deceased’s contributory negligence; (b) deleting the award of attorney’s fees for lack of
evidence; and (c) reducing the interest on hospital and medical bills to 6% per annum from 5 September 1988 until fully paid. 4

Hence, CASTILEX filed the instant petition contending that the Court of Appeals erred in (1) applying to the case the fifth paragraph
of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, instead of the fourth paragraph thereof; (2) that as a managerial employee, ABAD was deemed to
have been always acting within the scope of his assigned task even outside office hours because he was using a vehicle issued to him
by petitioner; and (3) ruling that petitioner had the burden to prove that the employee was not acting within the scope of his
assigned task.chanrobles law library

Jose Benjamin ABAD merely adopted the statement of facts of petitioner which holds fast on the theory of negligence on the part of
the deceased.

On the other hand, respondents Spouses Vasquez argue that their son’s death was caused by the negligence of petitioner’s
employee who was driving a vehicle issued by petitioner and who was on his way home from overtime work for petitioner; and that
petitioner is thus liable for the resulting injury and subsequent death of their son on the basis of the fifth paragraph of Article 2180.
Even if the fourth paragraph of Article 2180 were applied, petitioner cannot escape liability therefor. They moreover argue that the
Court of Appeals erred in reducing the amount of compensatory damages when the award made by the trial court was borne both
by evidence adduced during the trial regarding deceased’s wages and by jurisprudence on life expectancy. Moreover, they point out
that the petition is procedurally not acceptable on the following grounds: (1) lack of an explanation for serving the petition upon the
Court of Appeals by registered mail, as required under Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) lack of a statement
of the dates of the expiration of the original reglementary period and of the filing of the motion for extension of time to file a
petition for review.

For its part, respondent Cebu Doctor’s Hospital maintains that petitioner CASTILEX is indeed vicariously liable for the injuries and
subsequent death of Romeo Vasquez caused by ABAD, who was on his way home from taking snacks after doing overtime work for
petitioner. Although the incident occurred when ABAD was not working anymore "the inescapable fact remains that said employee
would not have been situated at such time and place had he not been required by petitioner to do overtime work." Moreover, since
petitioner adopted the evidence adduced by ABAD, it cannot, as the latter’s employer, inveigle itself from the ambit of liability, and
is thus estopped by the records of the case, which it failed to refute.

We shall first address the issue raised by the private respondents regarding some alleged procedural lapses in the petition.

Private respondent’s contention of petitioner’s violation of Section 11 of Rule 13 and Section 4 of Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure holds no water.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Section 11 of Rule 13 provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

SECTION 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing. — Whenever practicable, the service and filing of pleadings and other papers
shall be done personally. Except with respect to papers emanating from the court, a resort to other modes must be accompanied by
a written explanation why the service or filing was not done personally. A violation of this Rule may be cause to consider the paper
as not filed.

The explanation why service of a copy of the petition upon the Court of Appeals was done by registered mail is found on Page 28 of
the petition. Thus, there has been compliance with the aforequoted provision.

As regards the allegation of violation of the material data rule under Section 4 of Rule 45, the same is unfounded. The material dates
required to be stated in the petition are the following: (1) the date of receipt of the judgment or final order or resolution subject of
the petition; (2) the date of filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if any; and (3) the date of receipt of the notice of the
denial of the motion. Contrary to private respondent’s claim, the petition need not indicate the dates of the expiration of the original
reglementary period and the filing of a motion for extension of time to file the petition. At any rate, aside from the material dates
required under Section 4 of Rule 45, petitioner CASTILEX also stated in the first page of the petition the date it filed the motion for
extension of time to file the petition.

Now on the merits of the case.

The negligence of ABAD is not an issue at this instance. Petitioner CASTILEX presumes said negligence but claims that it is not
vicariously liable for the injuries and subsequent death caused by ABAD.

Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code should only apply to instances where the employer is
not engaged in business or industry. Since it is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling furniture it is therefore not
covered by said provision. Instead, the fourth paragraph should apply.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Petitioner’s interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate. The phrase "even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry" found in the fifth paragraph should be interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the employer to be
engaged in any business or industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee who is acting within the scope of his assigned
task. 5

A distinction must be made between the two provisions to determine what is applicable. Both provisions apply to employers: the
fourth paragraph, to owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise; and the fifth paragraph, to employers in general,
whether or not engaged in any business or industry. The fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of employees committed either in
the service of the branches or on the occasion of their functions, while the fifth paragraph encompasses negligent acts of employees
acting within the scope of their assigned task. The latter is an expansion of the former in both employer coverage and acts included.
Negligent acts of employees, whether or not the employer is engaged in a business or industry, are covered so long as they were
acting within the scope of their assigned task, even though committed neither in the service of the branches nor on the occasion of
their functions. For, admittedly, employees oftentimes wear different hats. They perform functions which are beyond their office,
title or designation but which, nevertheless, are still within the call of duty.

This court has applied the fifth paragraph to cases where the employer was engaged in a business or industry such as truck operators
6 and banks. 7 The Court of Appeals cannot, therefore, be faulted in applying the said paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code to
this case.

Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, whether or not engaged in any business or industry, an employer is liable for the torts
committed by employees within the scope of his assigned tasks. But it is necessary to establish the employer-employee relationship;
once this is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable, that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned
task when the tort complained of was committed. It is only then that the employer may find it necessary to interpose the defense of
due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee. 8

It is undisputed that ABAD was a Production Manager of petitioner CASTILEX at the time of the tort occurrence. As to whether he
was acting within the scope of his assigned task is a question of fact, which the court a quo and the Court of Appeals resolved in the
affirmative.

Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are entitled to great respect, and
even finality at times. This rule is, however, subject to exceptions such as when the conclusion is grounded on speculations,
surmises, or conjectures. 9 Such exception obtain in the present case to warrant review by this Court of the finding of the Court of
Appeals that since ABAD was driving petitioner’s vehicle he was acting within the scope of his duties as a manager.
Before we pass upon the issue of whether ABAD was performing acts within the range of his employment, we shall first take up the
other reason invoked by the Court of Appeals in holding petitioner CASTILEX vicariously liable for ABAD’s negligence, i.e., that the
petitioner did not present evidence that ABAD was not acting within the scope of his assigned tasks at the time of the motor vehicle
mishap. Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, it was not incumbent upon the petitioner to prove the same. It was enough
for petitioner CASTILEX to deny that ABAD was acting within the scope of his duties; petitioner was not under obligation to prove
this negative averment. Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (He who asserts, not he who denies, must prove). The Court has
consistently applied the ancient rule that if the plaintiff, upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action, fails to show in a
satisfactory manner facts which he bases his claim, the defendant is under no obligation to prove his exception or defense. 10

Now on the issue of whether the private respondents have sufficiently established that ABAD was acting within the scope of his
assigned tasks.

ABAD, who was presented as a hostile witness, testified that at the time of the incident, he was driving a company-issued vehicle,
registered under the name of petitioner. He was then leaving the restaurant where he had some snacks and had a chat with his
friends after having done overtime work for the petitioner.

No absolutely hard and fast rule can be stated which will furnish the complete answer to the problem of whether at a given
moment, an employee is engaged in his employer’s business in the operation of a motor vehicle, so as to fix liability upon the
employer because of the employee’s action or inaction; but rather, the result varies with each state of facts. 11

In Filamer Christian Institute v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 12 this Court had the occasion to hold that acts done within the scope
of the employee’s assigned tasks includes "any act done by an employee in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the
account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damages."cralaw virtua1aw library

The court a quo and the Court of Appeals were one in holding that the driving by a manager of a company-issued vehicle is within
the scope of his assigned tasks regardless of the time and circumstances.

We do not agree. The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to
charge petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within
the course or scope of his employment.

The following are principles in American Jurisprudence on the employer’s liability for the injuries inflicted by the negligence of an
employee in the use of an employer’s motor vehicle:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I. Operation of Employer’s Motor Vehicle in Going to or from Meals

It has been held that an employee who uses his employer’s vehicle in going from his work to a place where he intends to eat or in
returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his employment in the absence of evidence of some special
business benefit to the employer. Evidence that by using the employer’s vehicle to go to and from meals, an employee is enabled to
reduce his time-off and so devote more time to the performance of his duties supports the findings that an employee is acting within
the scope of his employment while so driving the vehicle. 13

II. Operation of Employer’s Vehicle in Going to or from Work

In the same vein, traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or concern of the employee, and not a part
of his services to his employer. Hence, in the absence of some special benefit to the employer other than the mere performance of
the services available at the place where he is needed, the employee is not acting within the scope of his employment even though
he uses his employer’s motor vehicle. 14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary:red

The employer may, however, be liable where he derives some special benefit from having the employee drive home in the
employer’s vehicle as when the employer benefits from having the employee at work earlier and, presumably, spending more time
at his actual duties. Where the employee’s duties require him to circulate in a general area with no fixed place or hours of work, or
to go to and from his home to various outside places of work, and his employer furnishes him with a vehicle to use in his work, the
courts have frequently applied what has been called the "special errand" or "roving commission" rule, under which it can be found
that the employee continues in the service of his employer until he actually reaches home. However, even if the employee be
deemed to be acting within the scope of his employment in going to or from work in his employer’s vehicle, the employer is not
liable for his negligence where at the time of the accident, the employee has left the direct route to his work or back home and is
pursuing a personal errand of his own.

III. Use of Employer’s Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours

An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latter’s personal use outside of regular working hours is generally
not liable for the employee’s negligent operation of the vehicle during the period of permissive use, even where the employer
contemplates that a regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for personal as well as business purposes and
there is some incidental benefit to the employer. Even where the employee’s personal purpose in using the vehicle has been
accomplished and he has started the return trip to his house where the vehicle is normally kept, it has been held that he has not
resumed his employment, and the employer is not liable for the employee’s negligent operation of the vehicle during the return trip.
15

The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are applicable in our jurisdiction albeit based on the doctrine of respondeat superior, not
on the principle of bonus pater familias as in ours. Whether the fault or negligence of the employee is conclusive on his employer as
in American law or jurisprudence, or merely gives rise to the presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the employer as
in ours, it is indispensable that the employee was acting in his employer’s business or within the scope of his assigned task. 16

In the case at bar, it is undisputed that ABAD did some overtime work at the petitioner’s office, which was located in Cabangcalan,
Mandaue City. Thereafter, he went to Goldie’s Restaurant in Fuente Osmeña, Cebu City, which is about seven kilometers away from
petitioner’s place of business. 17 A witness for the private respondents, a sidewalk vendor, testified that Fuente Osmeña is a "lively
place" even at dawn because Goldie’s Restaurant and Back Street were still open and people were drinking thereat. Moreover,
prostitutes, pimps, and drug addicts littered the place. 18

At the Goldie’s Restaurant, ABAD took some snacks and had a chat with friends. It was when ABAD was leaving the restaurant that
the incident in question occurred. That same witness for the private respondents testified that at the time of the vehicular accident,
ABAD was with a woman in his car, who then shouted: "Daddy, Daddy!" 19 This woman could not have been ABAD’s daughter, for
ABAD was only 29 years old at the time.

To the mind of this Court, ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties
at the time he figured in a vehicular accident. It was then about 2:00 a.m. of 28 August 1988, way beyond the normal working hours.
ABAD’s working day had ended; his overtime work had already been completed. His being at a place which, as petitioner put it, was
known as a "haven for prostitutes, pimps, and drug pushers and addicts," had no connection to petitioner’s business; neither had it
any relation to his duties as a manager. Rather, using his service vehicle even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or
one of the perks attached to his position.

Since there is paucity of evidence that ABAD was acting within the scope of the functions entrusted to him, petitioner CASTILEX had
no duty to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in providing ABAD with a service vehicle. Thus, justice and
equity require that petitioner be relieved of vicarious liability for the consequences of the negligence of ABAD in driving its vehicle.
20

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the appealed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the
modification that petitioner Castilex Industrial Corporation be absolved of any liability for the damages caused by its employee, Jose
Benjamin Abad.

SO ORDERED.