G.R. No.

198627 In support of its recollection of the events of February 28, 2002, PGIC relied on a Traffic
Accident Investigation Report (Report) prepared by PO2 Cecilio Grospe Tomas (PO2 Tomas)
DST MOVERS CORPORATION, Petitioner, of the Muntinlupa City Traffic Enforcement Unit of the Philippine National Police. This was
vs. attached as Annex "E"9 of PGIC’s Complaint and also as Annex "E"10 of its Position Paper. It
PEOPLE'S GENERAL INSURANCE CORPORATION, Respondent. stated:

DECISION TRAFFIC ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

(Entry No. 805-285-0202)
LEONEN, J.:
Time and date : At about 10:30 p.m. February 28, 2002
A determination of where the preponderance of evidence lies is a factual issue which, as a Place : along SLEX, Bilibid N/B, Muntinlupa City
rule, cannot be entertained in a Rule 45 petition. When, however, the sole basis of the trial Weather con : Fair
court for ruling on this issue is evidence that should not have been admitted for being Nature : RIR/DTP/PI (hit and run)
hearsay, this court will embark on its own factual analysis and will, if necessary, reverse the Inv vehicle (3)
rulings of the lower courts. A traffic accident investigation report prepared by a police officer Vehicle-1 : Honda civic
relying solely on the account of a supposed eyewitness and not on his or her personal Plate no. : URZ-976
knowledge is not evidence that is admissible as an exception to the Hearsay Rule.
Driver : MA. ADELINE YUBOCO Y DELA CRUZ
(injured)
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure praying that the assailed May 11, 2011 Decision2 and September 8, 2011 Lic. no. : N03-96-213671
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals Former Twelfth Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 109163 be Address : 24 Hernandez st., BF Homes Paranaque City
reversed and set aside, and that a new one be entered dismissing respondent People’s Reg. Owner : Fidel Yuboco
General Insurance Corporation’s (PGIC) Complaint for Sum of Money.4 Address : same as driver
Damage : rear & front portion, whole right side portion
In its assailed May 11, 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the Vehicle-2 : Mits. Lancer
ruling of Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 07-118093 which, Plate no. : CMM-373
in turn, affirmed in toto the ruling of Branch 22 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila in Civil Driver : HARRISON TUQUERO Y VALDEZ
Case No. 181900. In its assailed September 8, 2011 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied Lic. no. : 014-02-032855
petitioner DST Movers Corporation’s (DST Movers) Motion for Reconsideration.5
Address : 13-16 Carolina st., Villasol Subd., Angeles City
Reg. Owner : Edgardo Tuquero
The Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila found DST Movers liable to pay PGIC the amount of
P90,000.00 by way of actual damages plus interest as well as P10,000.00 for attorney’s fees Address : 518 Obio st., Villasol Subd., Angeles City
and costs of suit.6 The Court of Appeals ordered DST Movers to pay PGIC the amount of Damage : left side rear portion
P25,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of the original award of P90,000.00 as actual Vehicle-3 : Truck
damages.7 Plate no. : UAL-295
Driver : Unidentified
In a Complaint for Sum of Money filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, PGIC Damage : Undetermine [sic]
alleged that at about 10:30 p.m. on February 28, 2002, along the South Luzon Expressway Reportee : G. Simbahon of PNCC/SLEX
and in the area of Bilibid, Muntinlupa City, a Honda Civic sedan with plate number URZ-976
(sedan) was hit on the rear by an Isuzu Elf truck with plate number UAL-295 (truck). PGIC F A C T S:
underscored that the sedan was on a stop position when it was hit. The sedan was then
allegedly pushed forward, thereby hitting a Mitsubishi Lancer. The driver of the truck then
allegedly escaped.8 It appears that while V1 was on stop position facing north at the aforesaid place of
occurrence when the rear portion of the same was allegedly hit/bumped by V3 which was
moving same direction on the same place due to strong impact V1 pushed forward and hit the
left side rear portion of V2 causing damages and injuries thereon. After the impact, V3 On appeal, the ruling of the Metropolitan Trial Court was affirmed in toto by Branch 47 of the
escaped towards undisclosed direction and left V1 & V2 at the place of accident. During Regional Trial Court of Manila.23
investigation V1 & V2 driver gave voluntary handwritten statement and they were advised to
submit medical certificate, estimate/photos of damages as annexes. DST Movers then filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Status of the case: For follow-up. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
In its assailed May 11, 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the rulings of the
(sgd.) Regional Trial Court and the Metropolitan Trial Court. However, it noted that PGIC failed to
PO2 Cecilio Grospe Tomas PNP prove actual loss with reasonable certainty. As such, the Court of Appeals deleted the award
- on case -11 of P90,000.00 in actual damages and replaced it with an award of P25,000.00 in temperate
damages.
The truck was supposedly subsequently discovered to be owned by DST Movers.12 The
sedan was covered by PGIC’s insurance under Policy No. HAL-PC-1314.13 As a result of the In its assailed September 8, 2011 Resolution,24 the Court of Appeals denied DST Movers’
February 28, 2002 incident, the sedan’s owner, Fidel Yuboco, filed a total loss claim with Motion for Reconsideration.
PGIC in the amount of P320,000.00. PGIC paid Fidel Yuboco the entire amount of
P320,000.00.14 Hence, DST Movers filed the present Petition insisting that its liability was not established by
a preponderance of evidence. Specifically, it faults the Metropolitan Trial Court for ruling in
Asserting that it was subrogated to Fidel Yuboco’s rights and that the proximate cause of the favor of PGIC despite how its version of events was supported by nothing more the Traffic
mishap was the negligence of the driver of the truck, PGIC, through counsel, sent DST Accident Investigation Report. It asserts that reliance on this Report was misplaced as it was
Movers demand letters. PGIC demanded from DST Movers the amount of P90,000.00, which supposedly "improperly identified [and] uncorroborated."25
represented the difference between the P320,000.00 paid by PGIC to Yuboco and the
salvage price of P230,000.00, at which PGIC was supposedly able to sell what remained of For resolution is the issue of whether petitioner DST Movers Corporation’s liability was
the sedan.15 established by a preponderance of evidence. Subsumed in this is whether it was an error for
the Metropolitan Trial Court to admit and lend evidentiary weight to the piece of evidence
Its demands not having been satisfied, PGIC proceeded to file its Complaint 16 for Sum of chiefly relied upon by respondent People’s General Insurance Corporation: the Traffic
Money before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. This case was docketed as Civil Case Accident Investigation Report prepared by PO2 Tomas.
No. 181900.17
I
In its Answer,18 DST Movers acknowledged that it was the owner of the truck. However, it
claimed that the truck did not make any trips on February 28, 2002 as it was undergoing Petitioner comes to this court through a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
repairs and maintenance.19 In support of this affirmative defense, DST Movers attached as 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It invites this court to reconsider the consistent rulings of the
Annexes "1" to "1-F"20 copies of invoices, receipts, and cash vouchers relating to repairs and Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Court, and the Metropolitan Trial Court that petitioner’s
maintenance procedures that were undertaken on the truck on specific dates, which included liability arising from the February 28, 2002 incident was established by a preponderance of
February 28, 2002. evidence.

Following the submission of the parties’ position papers, Branch 22 of the Metropolitan Trial A Rule 45 petition pertains to questions of law and not to factual issues. Rule 45, Section 1 of
Court Manila rendered its Decision21 favoring PGIC’s version of events and finding DST the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is unequivocal:
Movers liable. The dispositive portion of this Decision reads:
SECTION 1. Filing of Petition with Supreme Court. — A party desiring to appeal by certiorari
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the
ordering to pay the latter to pay the [sic] of Php90,000.00 as actual damages plus interest of Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme
12% per annum from the date of filing of the complaint and the sum of Php10,000.00 as and Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of
for attorney’s fees and the costs of suit. law  which must be distinctly set forth.

SO ORDERED.22
This court’s Decision in Cheesman v. Intermediate Appellate Court 26 distinguished questions the damage suffered by the private complainant or whether or not the act from which civil
of law from questions of fact: liability might arise exists are questions of fact.31

As distinguished from a question of law — which exists "when the doubt or difference arises Equally on point, this court has explained in many instances that a determination of the
as to what the law is on a certain state of facts" — "there is a question of fact when the doubt causes of and circumstances relating to vehicular accidents is a factual matter that this court
or difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts;" or when the "query may not revisit when the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are completely in
necessarily invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of accord.
witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to
each other and to the whole and the probabilities of the situation."27 (Citations omitted) In Industrial Insurance Co. v. Bondad:32

Seeking recourse from this court through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 Questions regarding the cause of the accident and the persons responsible for it are factual
bears significantly on the manner by which this court shall treat findings of fact and issues which we cannot pass upon. It is jurisprudentially settled that, as a rule, the jurisdiction
evidentiary matters. As a general rule, it becomes improper for this court to consider factual of this Court is limited to a review of errors of law allegedly committed by the appellate court.
issues: the findings of fact of the trial court, as affirmed on appeal by the Court of Appeals, It is not bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the
are conclusive on this court. "The reason behind the rule is that [this] Court is not a trier of proceedings below.33
facts and it is not its duty to review, evaluate, and weigh the probative value of the evidence
adduced before the lower courts."28 Likewise, in Viron Transportation v. Delos Santos:34

A determination of whether a matter has been established by a preponderance of evidence The rule is settled that the findings of the trial court especially when affirmed by the Court of
is, by definition, a question of fact. It entails an appreciation of the relative weight of the Appeals, are conclusive on this Court when supported by the evidence on record. The
competing parties’ evidence. Rule 133, Section 1 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides Supreme Court will not assess and evaluate all over again the evidence, testimonial and
a guide on what courts may consider in determining where the preponderance of evidence documentary adduced by the parties to an appeal particularly where, such as here, the
lies: findings of both the trial court and the appellate court on the maker coincide. 35 (Citation
omitted)
SECTION 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. — In civil cases, the party having
the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining However, there are exceptions that leave room for this court to make a factual determination
where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court for itself and, ultimately, to overturn the factual findings with which it is confronted:
may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses' manner of testifying,
their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are
testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their (1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and
testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the conjectures;
same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of
witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number. (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;

Consistent with Cheesman, such determination is a "query [that] necessarily invites (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of witnesses, existence
and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other and to the (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
whole and the probabilities of the situation."29
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;
On point as regards civil liability for damages, this court in Caina v. People of the
Philippines30 explained: (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the
case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
Questions on whether or not there was a preponderance of evidence to justify the award of
damages or whether or not there was a causal connection between the given set of facts and (7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
 (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on from the basic rationale of fairness, as the party against whom it is presented is unable to
which they are based; cross-examine the person making the statement:40

(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and reply SECTION 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. — A
briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is,
which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.36 The Hearsay Rule, however, is not absolute. Sections 37 to 47 of Rule 130 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence enumerate the exceptions to the Hearsay Rule. Of these, Section 44—
In Dela Llana v. Biong,37 this court conducted its own (re-) examination of the evidence as the regarding entries in official records—is particularly relevant to this case:
findings of the Regional Trial Court conflicted with those of the Court of Appeals. The
Regional Trial Court held that the proximate cause of the injuries suffered by the petitioner SECTION 44. Entries in official records. — Entries in official records made in the performance
was the supposed reckless driving of the respondent’s employee; the Court of Appeals held of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty
otherwise. On review, this court sustained the findings of the Court of Appeals. specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

In Standard Insurance v. Cuaresma,38 the ruling of the Metropolitan Trial Court was reversed Precisely as an exception to the Hearsay Rule, Rule 130, Section 44 does away with the
by the Regional Trial Court. The latter was then sustained by the Court of Appeals. On need for presenting as witness the public officer or person performing a duty specially
review, this court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. This court noted that the enjoined by law who made the entry. This, however, is only true, for as long the following
Metropolitan Trial Court erroneously gave weight to the traffic accident investigation report requisites have been satisfied:
presented by the petitioner as proof of the proximate cause of the damage sustained by a
motor vehicle. (a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person specially
enjoined by law to do so;
II
(b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such
Here, petitioner insists that the Traffic Accident Investigation Report prepared by PO2 Tomas other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and
should not have been admitted and accorded weight by the Metropolitan Trial Court as it was
"improperly identified [and] uncorroborated."39 Petitioner, in effect, asserts that the non- (c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him
presentation in court of PO2 Tomas, the officer who prepared the report, was fatal to stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official
respondent’s cause. information.41

WON the report should have been admitted as evidence. NO Respondent, the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, and the Court of Appeals
are all of the position that the Report prepared by PO2 Tomas satisfies these
Unlike in Dela Llana and Standard Insurance, the findings of the Metropolitan Trial Court, the requisites.1âwphi1 Thus, they maintain that it is admissible as prima facie evidence of the
Regional Trial Court, and the Court of Appeals in this case are all in accord. They consistently facts it states. This despite the admitted fact that neither PO2 Tomas, nor the person who
ruled that the proximate cause of the damage sustained by the sedan was the negligent supposedly reported the events of February 28, 2002 to PO2 Tomas – the person identified
driving of a vehicle owned by petitioner. As with Standard Insurance, however, this as "G. Simbahon of PNCC/SLEX"42 – gave a testimony in support of the Report.
conclusion is founded on the misplaced probative value accorded to a traffic accident
investigation report. In the first place, this Report should not have been admitted as evidence They are in serious error.
for violating the Hearsay Rule. Bereft of evidentiary basis, the conclusion of the lower courts
cannot stand as it has been reduced to conjecture. Thus, we reverse this conclusion. The statements made by this court in Standard Insurance are on point:

Rule 130, Section 36 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides for the Hearsay Rule. It [F]or the Traffic Accident Investigation Report to be admissible as prima facie evidence of the
renders inadmissible as evidence out-of-court statements made by persons who are not facts therein stated, the following requisites must be present:
presented as witnesses but are offered as proof of the matters stated. This rule proceeds
. . . (a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person specially enjoined by There was, thus, no opportunity to present witnesses during an actual trial. However, Section
law to do so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by 9 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure calls for the submission of witnesses’ affidavits
such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the together with a party’s position paper and after the conduct of a preliminary conference:
public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must
have been acquired by him personally or through official information. SECTION 9. Submission of Affidavits and Position Papers. — Within ten (10) days from
receipt of the order mentioned in the next preceding section, 49 the parties shall submit the
Regrettably, in this case, petitioner failed to prove the third requisite cited above. As correctly affidavits of their witnesses and other evidence on the factual issues defined in the order,
noted by the courts below, while the Traffic Accident Investigation Report was exhibited as together with their position papers setting forth the law and the facts relied upon by them.
evidence, the investigating officer who prepared the same was not presented in court to
testify that he had sufficient knowledge of the facts therein stated, and that he acquired them These affidavits take the place of actual testimony in court and serve to expedite the
personally or through official information. Neither was there any explanation as to why such resolution of cases covered by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Thus, it was still
officer was not presented. We cannot simply assume, in the absence of proof, that the insufficient for respondent to have merely annexed the Report to its Position Paper. By its
account of the incident stated in the report was based on the personal knowledge of the lonesome, and unsupported by an affidavit executed by PO2 Tomas, the Report was hearsay
investigating officer who prepared it. and, thus, inadmissible.

Thus, while petitioner presented its assured to testify on the events that transpired during the As the sole evidence relied upon by respondent as to the identity of the responsible motor
vehicular collision, his lone testimony, unsupported by other preponderant evidence, fails to vehicle or person has been rendered unworthy of even the slightest judicial consideration,
sufficiently establish petitioner's claim that respondents' negligence was, indeed, the there is no basis for holding-as the Metropolitan Trial Court did-that the motor vehicle
proximate cause of the damage sustained by Cham's vehicle.43 [Emphasis supplied] responsible for the damage sustained by the sedan was owned by petitioner. Not only this,
petitioner has even adduced proof that on February 28, 2002, its Isuzu Elf truck with plate
Respondent presented proof of the occurrence of an accident that damaged Fidel Yuboco’s number UAL-295 was undergoing repairs and maintenance and, thus, could not have been at
Honda Civic sedan,44 that the sedan was insured by respondent,45 and that respondent paid the South Luzon Expressway. The weight of evidence is clearly in petitioner's favor.
Fidel Yuboco’s insurance claims.46 As to the identity, however, of the vehicle or of the person
responsible for the damage sustained by the sedan, all that respondent relies on is the WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed May 11,
Report prepared by PO2 Tomas. 2011 Decision and September 8, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals Former Twelfth
Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 109163 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent People's
It is plain to see that the matters indicated in the Report are not matters that were personally General Insurance Corporation's Complaint is DISMISSED.
known to PO2 Tomas. The Report is candid in admitting that the matters it states were
merely reported to PO2 Tomas by "G. Simbahon of PNCC/SLEX."47 It was this "G. No pronouncement as to costs.
Simbahon," not PO2 Tomas, who had personal knowledge of the facts stated in the Report.
Thus, even as the Report embodies entries made by a public officer in the performance of his SO ORDERED.
duties, it fails to satisfy the third requisite for admissibility for entries in official records as an
exception to the Hearsay Rule.
G.R. No. 209040, December 09, 2015
To be admitted as evidence, it was thus imperative for the person who prepared the Report—
PO2 Tomas—to have himself presented as a witness and then testify on his Report. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RODOLFO PATEÑO
However, even as the Report would have been admitted as evidence, PO2 Tomas’ testimony DAYAPDAPAN, Accused-Appellant.
would not have sufficed in establishing the identity of the motor vehicle and/or the person
responsible for the damage sustained by the sedan. For this purpose, the testimony of G. RESOLUTION
Simbahon was necessary.
PEREZ, J.:
Of course, we are aware that this case was decided by the Metropolitan Trial Court pursuant
to the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure (considering that petitioner’s total claims The subject of this review is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC
amounted to less than P200,000.0048). Accordingly, no trial was conducted as, after the No. 0G788 dated 23 May 2013 which affirmed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court
conduct of a preliminary conference, the parties were made to submit their position papers. (RTC) of Bais City, Branch 45, in Criminal Case Nos. F-03-12-A, F-03-13-A, F-03-14-A, F-03-
15-A, and F-03-16-A finding accused-appellant Rodolfo Pateño y Dayapdapan guilty beyond     - With old hymenal tear at 3 & 9 o'clock positions
reasonable doubt of five (5) counts of rape.
    - Negative for discharges
Except for the dates, the five (5) Informations identically charge accused-appellant of rape
committed as follow:     - Admits 2 fingers with ease9ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
A pastor of the United Church of Christ of the Philippines (UCCP) testified on the contents of
That on or about March 25, 2002 at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening at x x x, Negros the Membership Record Book which show that AAA was born on 10 September 1987 and
Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, was baptized on 5 June 1988. Said document also listed accused-appellant as AAA's father.
who is the father of 14-year old [AAA],3 did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
by force, threat or intimidation, insert his penis into the vagina of his said daughter and had Accused-appellant confirmed that AAA started staying with him in March 2002 but added that
carnal knowledge of her against her will and consent.4ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary there were five of them living in the house of his nephew, Rene Pateño (Rene). He denied
On arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. During pre-trial, both parties made the raping AAA and claimed that AAA is taking revenge because during a beauty contest in April
following factual stipulations: of that year, he pinched AAA in front of her fellow contestants
and barangay councilors.10 Accused-appellant's nephew, Rene testified that accused-
appellant lived with him but AAA was living with his sister.11 Rene's sister Arly corroborated
1. That the accused admits his identity in the five (5) cases that whenever his
Rene's statement that AAA was living with her on the dates of the alleged rape
name is mentioned in the proceedings he is the same accused in this case;
incidents.12 Both witnesses speculated that AAA wrongfully accused her father of rape
because she harbored a grudge towards accused-appellant who would always scold her.13
2. That accused admits that he is the father of the victim [AAA];
On 27 April 2007, accused-appellant was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of five (5)
3. That accused admits that he is living at [x x x],5 Negros Oriental; and
counts of rape. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this [c]ourt finds accused RODOLFO PATEÑO y
4. That private complainant admits that she was a contestant in a beauty DAYAPDAPAN, guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of rape for five (5)
pageant involving money contribution wherein the winner is determined with counts as provided under the provisions of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, and
the amount of money raised on occasion of the barangay fiesta of [x x x] on 5 pursuant to the provisions of par. (1) of Article 266-B, he may be meted the extreme penalty
April 2002.6 of death. But, with the passage of Republic Act No. 8353, he is thereby meted the penalty
of FIVE (5) RECLUSION PERPETUAS, and with all the accessory penalties.
AAA related that she was only four years old when her parents left her to the care of her aunt,
BBB. AAA started living with accused-appellant only in 2000 in a two-bedroom house. On 25 He is thereby ordered to pay the victim, [AAA], the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND
March 2002 at around 10:00 p.m., AAA, then 14 years old, was awakened by accused- (P50,000.00) PESOS for actual damages and another FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00)
appellant who removed her short pants and underwear. Accused-appellant likewise took off PESOS for moral damages, and to pay costs.14ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
his clothes. He threatened AAA with a scythe and ordered her to stay quiet. He then mounted
her and made pumping motions. After satisfying his lust, accused-appellant left without On 23 May 2013, the CA rendered the assailed judgment affirming with modification the trial
saying a word. He proceeded to perform this bestial act on AAA for the four (4) succeeding court's decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
nights.7 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is DENIED. The Joint Decision dated April
27, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court RTC), Branch 45, Bais City in Criminal Case Nos. F-03-
When AAA could no longer bear it, she left the house and stayed in the house of her teacher 12-A, F-03-13-A, F-03-14-A, F-03-15-A, [and] F-03-16-A convicting Rodolfo Pateño y
from 30 March to 1 April 2002 where she intimated to the latter her harrowing experience in Dayapdapan of five (5) counts of rape and meting him the penalty of imprisonment
the hands of accused-appellant.8 of reclusion perpetua for each count, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS as to
damages.
On 5 April 2002, AAA underwent a medical examination, the findings and results of which are
as follow: Accused-appellant Rodolfo Pateño y Dayapdapan is ordered to pay the victim AAA Seventy
- Contusion upper border iliac region, right Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as civil indemnity, Seventy Five Thousand Pesos
(P75,000.00) as moral damages and Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as exemplary
    - Pelvic exam:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary damages, for each count of rape, all with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date
of finality of this judgment. No costs.15ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Accused-appellant filed the instant appeal. In a Resolution16 dated 18 November 2013,
accused-appellant and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) were required to file their We also cannot give credence to accused-appellant's claim that AAA was taking revenge
respective supplemental briefs if they so desired. Both parties manifested that they were when she filed the rape charges against accused-appellant for allegedly castigating her. No
adopting their respective briefs filed before the appellate court.17 woman in her right mind, especially a young girl, would fabricate charges of this nature and
severity.22
In his Brief,18 accused-appellant argues that AAA's testimony regarding the time and manner
of the purported five (5) rape incidents is incredulous. Accused-appellant insists that AAA did The RTC and the CA correctly appreciated the twin qualifying circumstances of minority and
not feel any fatherly love towards him and she had the motive to falsely accuse him of rape. relationship. Accused-appellant admitted during the pre-trial conference that AAA was his
Accused-appellant claimed that AAA had been reprimanded numerous times by him because daughter. Thus, relationship between accused-appellant and AAA is established. Anent the
of her unacceptable behavior. Finally, accused-appellant contends that the prosecution failed element of minority, the prosecution presented a certification23 from the UCCP Office in
to prove AAA's age at the time of the commission of the alleged crime. Ayungon, Negros Occidental stating that AAA was baptized according to the rites and
ceremonies of the UCCP. The certification shows that AAA was born on 10 September 1987
WON the certification from UCCP office is admissible in evidence. YES to accused-appellant and a certain Nely Fabel. A page of the UCCP Membership Book was
submitted bearing the same information. It was held that a birth certificate, baptismal
The appeal is without merit. certificate, school records or documents of similar nature can be presented to prove the age
of a victim.24 In this case, the Membership Book, which is considered an entry in official
Accused-appellant insists that AAA's claim of sequent rape identically done is highly records under Section 44,25 Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, is admissible as prima facie of
improbable and contrary to human experience. their contents and corroborative of AAA's testimony as to her age. Moreover, entries in public
or official books or records may be proved by the production of the books or records
In People v. Solomon,19 we held that the victim's uniform testimony regarding the manner by themselves or by a copy certified by the legal keeper thereof. 26
which she was raped does not diminish her credibility. We explained, thus:
Men are creatures of habit and are bound to adopt a course of action that has proven to be Considering that accused-appellant committed rape qualified by the twin circumstances of
successful. As appellant was able to fulfill his lustful designs upon complainant the first time, minority and relationship, the proper penalty to be imposed is death. Since the imposition of
it comes as no surprise that he would repeat the horrific acts when the circumstances the death penalty has been prohibited by Republic Act No. 9346, the lower courts properly
obtaining in the first rape again presented themselves.20ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary imposed the penalty oireclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole for each count of rape.
As in the aforestated case, AAA did not immediately report the incident to her teacher and As to the award of damages, we deem it proper to further modify the CA's award. Pursuant to
instead, she suffered for four more similar incidents before she broke her silence. our ruling in People v. Gambao,27 AAA is thus entitled to P100,000.00 as civil indemnity,
PI00,000.00 as moral damages and P 100,000.00 as exemplary damages. Finally, all
There is a plausible explanation for the conduct of the victim. The Court explained damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this
in Solomon, viz.: judgment until fully paid.28
Complainant's youth partly accounts for her failure to escape appellant's lust. A young girl like
complainant cannot be expected to have the intelligence to defy what she may have WHEREFORE, accused-appellant Rodolfo Pateño y Dayapdapan is found GUILTY for each
perceived as the substitute parental authority that appellant wielded over her. That count of the crime of rape, qualified by minority and relationship, charged under Criminal
complainant had to bear more sexual assaults from appellant before she mustered enough Case Nos. F-03-12-A, F-03-13-A, F-03-14-A, F-03-15-A, and F-03-16-A and is hereby
courage to escape his bestiality does not imply that she willingly submitted to his desires. sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole, in lieu of
Neither was she expected to follow the ordinary course that other women in the same death. He is also ORDERED to pay AAA the amounts of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity,
situation would have taken. There is no standard form of behavior when one is confronted by P100,000.00 as moral damages, and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each count of
a shocking incident. Verily, under emotional stress, the human mind is not expected to follow rape, plus legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the finality of this Resolution until
a predictable path.21ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary the amounts due are fully paid.
AAA was only able to report the incident when she was away from the custody of accused-
appellant and when she felt safe. SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

AAA's credibility was upheld by the trial court, which is in a position to observe the candor, G.R. No. 127598           February 22, 2000
behavior and demeanor of the witness. Findings of the lower courts with respect to credibility
of the rape victim are conclusive.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, Contracting out - no need to consult union consult first
vs.
Hon. SECRETARY OF LABOR LEONARDO QUISUMBING and MERALCO EMPLOYEES All benefits - existing terms and conditions all terms
and WORKERS ASSOCIATION (MEWA), respondent.
Retroactivity - Dec. 28, 1996-Dec. 27, 199(9) from Dec. 1, 1995
RESOLUTION
Dissatisfied with the Decision, some alleged members of private respondent union (Union for
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: brevity) filed a motion for intervention and a motion for reconsideration of the said Decision. A
separate intervention was likewise made by the supervisor's union (FLAMES2) of petitioner
corporation alleging that it has bona fide legal interest in the outcome of the case.3 The Court
In the Decision promulgated on January 27, 1999, the Court disposed of the case as follows:
required the "proper parties" to file a comment to the three motions for reconsideration but the
Solicitor-General asked that he be excused from filing the comment because the "petition
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the orders of public respondent Secretary filed in the instant case was granted" by the Court.4 Consequently, petitioner filed its own
of Labor dated August 19, 1996 and December 28, 1996 are set aside to the extent consolidated comment. An "Appeal Seeking Immediate Reconsideration" was also filed by
set forth above. The parties are directed to execute a Collective Bargaining the alleged newly elected president of the Union.5 Other subsequent pleadings were filed by
Agreement incorporating the terms and conditions contained in the unaffected the parties and intervenors.
portions of the Secretary of Labor's orders of August 19, 1996 and December 28,
1996, and the modifications set forth above. The retirement fund issue is remanded
The issues raised in the motions for reconsideration had already been passed upon by the
to the Secretary of Labor for reception of evidence and determination of the legal
Court in the January 27, 1999 decision. No new arguments were presented for consideration
personality of the MERALCO retirement fund.1
of the Court. Nonetheless, certain matters will be considered herein, particularly those
involving the amount of wages and the retroactivity of the Collective Bargaining Agreement
The modifications of the public respondent's resolutions include the following: (CBA) arbitral awards.

January 27, 1999 decision Secretary's resolution Petitioner warns that if the wage increase of P2,200.00 per month as ordered by the
Secretary is allowed, it would simply pass the cost covering such increase to the consumers
Wages - P1,900.00 for 1995-96 P2,200.00 through an increase in the rate of electricity. This is a non sequitur. The Court cannot be
X'mas bonus - modified to one month 2 months threatened with such a misleading argument. An increase in the prices of electric current
needs the approval of the appropriate regulatory government agency and does not
Retirees - remanded to the Secretary granted automatically result from a mere increase in the wages of petitioner's employees. Besides,
this argument presupposes that petitioner is capable of meeting a wage increase. The All
Loan to coops - denied granted Asia Capital report upon which the Union relies to support its position regarding the wage
GHSIP, HMP and issue cannot be an accurate basis and conclusive determinant of the rate of wage increase.
Housing loans - granted up to P60,000.00 granted Section 45 of Rule 130 Rules of Evidence provides:

Signing bonus - denied granted WON the All Asia Capital report is admissible in evidence. NO
Union leave - 40 days (typo error) 30 days
Commercial lists and the like. — Evidence of statements of matters of interest to
High voltage/pole - not apply to those who are members of a team persons engaged in an occupation contained in a list, register, periodical, or other
not exposed to the risk published compilation is admissible as tending to prove the truth of any relevant
matter so stated if that compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that
Collectors - no need for cash bond, no
occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them therein.
need to reduce quota and MAPL
CBU - exclude confidential employees include Under the afore-quoted rule, statement of matters contained in a periodical, may be admitted
only "if that compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is
Union security - maintenance of membership closed shop
generally used and relied upon by them therein." As correctly held in our Decision dated
January 27, 1999, the cited report is a mere newspaper account and not even a commercial The assailed resolution which incorporated the CBA to be signed by the parties was
list. At most, it is but an analysis or opinion which carries no persuasive weight for purposes promulgated on June 5, 1989, the expiry date of the past CBA. Based on the
of this case as no sufficient figures to support it were presented. Neither did anybody testify to provision of Section 253-A, its retroactivity should be agreed upon by the parties. But
its accuracy. It cannot be said that businessmen generally rely on news items such as this in since no agreement to that effect was made, public respondent did not abuse its
their occupation. Besides, no evidence was presented that the publication was regularly discretion in giving the said CBA a prospective effect. The action of the public
prepared by a person in touch with the market and that it is generally regarded as trustworthy respondent is within the ambit of its authority vested by existing law.
and reliable. Absent extrinsic proof of their accuracy, these reports are not admissible.6 In the
same manner, newspapers containing stock quotations are not admissible in evidence when On the other hand, the Union argues that the award should retroact to such time granted by
the source of the reports is available.7 With more reason, mere analyses or projections of the Secretary, citing the 1993 decision of St. Luke's.16
such reports cannot be admitted. In particular, the source of the report in this case can be
easily made available considering that the same is necessary for compliance with certain Finally, the effectivity of the Order of January 28, 1991, must retroact to the date of
governmental requirements. the expiration of the previous CBA, contrary to the position of petitioner. Under the
circumstances of the case, Article 253-A cannot be properly applied to herein case.
Nonetheless, by petitioner's own allegations, its actual total net income for 1996 was P5.1 As correctly stated by public respondent in his assailed Order of April 12, 1991
billion.8 An estimate by the All Asia financial analyst stated that petitioner's net operating dismissing petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration —
income for the same year was about P5.7 billion, a figure which the Union relies on to support
its claim. Assuming without admitting the truth thereof, the figure is higher than the P4.171 Anent the alleged lack of basis for the retroactivity provisions awarded; we
billion allegedly suggested by petitioner as its projected net operating income. The P5.7 would stress that the provision of law invoked by the Hospital, Article 253-A
billion which was the Secretary's basis for granting the P2,200.00 is higher than the actual net of the Labor Code, speaks of agreements by and between the parties, and
income of P5.1 billion admitted by petitioner. It would be proper then to increase this Court's not arbitral awards . . .
award of P1,900.00 to P2,000.00 for the two years of the CBA award. For 1992, the agreed
CBA wage increase for rank-and-file was P1,400.00 and was reduced to P1,350.00; for 1993;
further reduced to P1,150.00 for 1994. For supervisory employees, the agreed wage increase Therefore, in the absence of a specific provision of law prohibiting retroactivity of the
for the years 1992-1994 are P1,742.50, P1,682.50 and P1,442.50, respectively. Based on the effectivity of arbitral awards issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to Article
foregoing figures, the P2,000.00 increase for the two-year period awarded to the rank-and-file 263(g) of the Labor Code, such as herein involved, public respondent is deemed
is much higher than the highest increase granted to supervisory employees.9 As mentioned in vested with plenary and discretionary powers to determine the effectivity thereof.
the January 27, 1999 Decision, the Court does "not seek to enumerate in this decision the
factors that should affect wage determination" because collective bargaining disputes In the 1997 case of Mindanao Terminal,17 the Court applied the St. Luke's doctrine and ruled
particularly those affecting the national interest and public service "requires due consideration that:
and proper balancing of the interests of the parties to the dispute and of those who might be
affected by the dispute."10 The Court takes judicial notice that the new amounts granted In St.  Luke's Medical Center v.  Torres, a deadlock also developed during the CBA
herein are significantly higher than the weighted average salary currently enjoyed by other negotiations between management and the union. The Secretary of Labor assumed
rank-and-file employees within the community. It should be noted that the relations between jurisdiction and ordered the retroaction of the CBA to the date of expiration of the
labor and capital is impressed with public interest which must yield to the common previous CBA. As in this case, it was alleged that the Secretary of Labor gravely
good.11 Neither party should act oppressively against the other or impair the interest or abused its discretion in making his award retroactive. In dismissing this contention
convenience of the public.12 Besides, matters of salary increases are part of management this Court held:
prerogative.13
Therefore, in the absence of a specific provision of law prohibiting retroactive
On the retroactivity of the CBA arbitral award, it is well to recall that this petition had its origin of the effectivity of arbitral awards issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant
in the renegotiation of the parties' 1992-1997 CBA insofar as the last two-year period thereof to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, such as herein involved, public
is concerned. When the Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction and granted the arbitral respondent is deemed vested with plenary and discretionary powers to
awards, there was no question that these arbitral awards were to be given retroactive effect. determine the effectivity thereof.
However, the parties dispute the reckoning period when retroaction shall commence.
Petitioner claims that the award should retroact only from such time that the Secretary of The Court in the January 27, 1999 Decision, stated that the CBA shall be "effective for a
Labor rendered the award, invoking the 1995 decision in Pier 8 case14 where the Court, period of 2 years counted from December 28, 1996 up to December 27, 1999."
citing Union of Filipino Employees v. NLRC,15 said: Parenthetically, this actually covers a three-year period. Labor laws are silent as to when an
arbitral award in a labor dispute where the Secretary had assumed jurisdiction by virtue of assistance to cooperatives and the Cooperative Code does not make it an obligation of the
Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code shall retroact. In general, a CBA negotiated within six employer or any private individual.22
months after the expiration of the existing CBA retroacts to the day immediately following
such date and if agreed thereafter, the effectivity depends on the agreement of the Anent the 40-day union leave, the Court finds that the same is a typographical error. In order
parties.18 On the other hand, the law is silent as to the retroactivity of a CBA arbitral award or to avoid any confusion, it is herein declared that the union leave is only thirty (30) days as
that granted not by virtue of the mutual agreement of the parties but by intervention of the granted by the Secretary of Labor and affirmed in the Decision of this Court.
government. Despite the silence of the law, the Court rules herein that CBA arbitral awards
granted after six months from the expiration of the last CBA shall retroact to such time agreed The added requirement of consultation imposed by the Secretary in cases of contracting out
upon by both employer and the employees or their union. Absent such an agreement as to for six (6) months or more has been rejected by the Court. Suffice it to say that the employer
retroactivity, the award shall retroact to the first day after the six-month period following the is allowed to contract out services for six months or more. However, a line must be drawn
expiration of the last day of the CBA should there be one. In the absence of a CBA, the between management prerogatives regarding business operations per se and those which
Secretary's determination of the date of retroactivity as part of his discretionary powers over affect the rights of employees, and in treating the latter, the employer should see to it that its
arbitral awards shall control. employees are at least properly informed of its decision or modes of action in order to attain a
harmonious labor-management relationship and enlighten the workers concerning their
It is true that an arbitral award cannot  per se be categorized as an agreement voluntarily rights.23 Hiring of workers is within the employer's inherent freedom to regulate and is a valid
entered into by the parties because it requires the interference and imposing power of the exercise of its management prerogative subject only to special laws and agreements on the
State thru the Secretary of Labor when he assumes jurisdiction. However, the arbitral award matter and the fair standards of justice.24 The management cannot be denied the faculty of
can be considered as an approximation of a collective bargaining agreement which would promoting efficiency and attaining economy by a study of what units are essential for its
otherwise have been entered into by the parties.19 The terms or periods set forth in Article operation. It has the ultimate determination of whether services should be performed by its
253-A pertains explicitly to a CBA. But there is nothing that would prevent its application by personnel or contracted to outside agencies. While there should be mutual consultation,
analogy to an arbitral award by the Secretary considering the absence of an applicable law. eventually deference is to be paid to what management decides. 25 Contracting out of services
Under Article 253-A: "(I)f any such agreement is entered into beyond six months, the parties is an exercise of business judgment or management prerogative.26 Absent proof that
shall agree on the duration of retroactivity thereof." In other words, the law contemplates management acted in a malicious or arbitrary manner, the Court will not interfere with the
retroactivity whether the agreement be entered into before or after the said six-month period. exercise of judgment by an employer.27 As mentioned in the January 27, 1999 Decision, the
The agreement of the parties need not be categorically stated for their acts may be law already sufficiently regulates this matter.28 Jurisprudence also provides adequate
considered in determining the duration of retroactivity. In this connection, the Court considers limitations, such that the employer must be motivated by good faith and the contracting out
the letter of petitioner's Chairman of the Board and its President addressed to their should not be resorted to circumvent the law or must not have been the result of malicious or
stockholders, which states that the CBA "for the rank-and-file employees covering the period arbitrary actions.29 These are matters that may be categorically determined only when an
December 1, 1995 to November 30, 1997 is still with the Supreme Court," 20 as indicative of actual suit on the matter arises.
petitioner's recognition that the CBA award covers the said period. Earlier, petitioner's
negotiating panel transmitted to the Union a copy of its proposed CBA covering the same WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED and the assailed
period inclusive.21 In addition, petitioner does not dispute the allegation that in the past CBA Decision is MODIFIED as follows: (1) the arbitral award shall retroact from December 1, 1995
arbitral awards, the Secretary granted retroactivity commencing from the period immediately to November 30, 1997; and (2) the award of wage is increased from the original amount of
following the last day of the expired CBA. Thus, by petitioner's own actions, the Court sees no One Thousand Nine Hundred Pesos (P1,900.00) to Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) for the
reason to retroact the subject CBA awards to a different date. The period is herein set at two years 1995 and 1996. This Resolution is subject to the monetary advances granted by
(2) years from December 1, 1995 to November 30, 1997. petitioner to its rank-and-file employees during the pendency of this case assuming such
advances had actually been distributed to them. The assailed Decision is AFFIRMED in all
On the allegation concerning the grant of loan to a cooperative, there is no merit in the other respects.1âwphi1.nêt
union's claim that it is no different from housing loans granted by the employer. The award of
loans for housing is justified because it pertains to a basic necessity of life. It is part of a SO ORDERED.
privilege recognized by the employer and allowed by law. In contrast, providing seed money
for the establishment of the employee's cooperative is a matter in which the employer has no
business interest or legal obligation. Courts should not be utilized as a tool to compel any G.R. No. 107518 October 8, 1998
person to grant loans to another nor to force parties to undertake an obligation without
justification. On the contrary, it is the government that has the obligation to render financial PNOC SHIPPING AND TRANSPORT CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA EFIGENIA FISHING Subsequently, the complaint was further amended to include petitioner as a
CORPORATION, respondents. defendant 12 which the lower court granted in its order of September 16,
1985. 13 After petitioner had filed its answer to the second amended complaint, on February 5,
1987, the lower court issued a pre-trial order 14 containing, among other things, a stipulations
of facts, to wit:
ROMERO, J.:
1. On 21 September 1977, while the fishing boat "M/V MARIA EFIGENIA"
owned by plaintiff was navigating in the vicinity of Fortune Island in Nasugbu,
A party is entitled to adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss actually suffered
Batangas, on its way to Navotas, Metro Manila, said fishing boat was hit by
and duly proved.1 Indeed, basic is the rule that to recover actual damages, the amount of loss
the LSCO tanker "Petroparcel" causing the former to sink.
must not only be capable of proof but must actually be proven with a reasonable degree of
certainty, premised upon competent proof or best evidence obtainable of the actual amount
thereof.2 The claimant is duty-bound to point out specific facts that afford a basis for 2. The Board of Marine Inquiry conducted an investigation of this marine
measuring whatever compensatory damages are borne.3 A court cannot merely rely on accident and on 21 November 1978, the Commandant of the Philippine
speculations, conjectures, or guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages 4 as well as Coast Guard, the Honorable Simeon N. Alejandro, rendered a decision
hearsay5 or uncorroborated testimony whose truth is suspect.6 Such are the jurisprudential finding the cause of the accident to be the reckless and imprudent manner in
precepts that the Court now applies in resolving the instant petition. which Edgardo Doruelo navigated the LSCO "Petroparcel" and declared the
latter vessel at fault.
The records disclose that in the early morning of September 21, 1977, the M/V Maria
Efigenia XV, owned by private respondent Maria Efigenia Fishing Corporation, was 3. On 2 April 1978, defendant Luzon Stevedoring Corporation
navigating the waters near Fortune Island in Nasugbu, Batangas on its way to Navotas, Metro (LUSTEVECO), executed in favor of PNOC Shipping and Transport
Manila when it collided with the vessel Petroparcel which at the time was owned by the Luzon Corporation a Deed of Transfer involving several tankers, tugboats, barges
Stevedoring Corporation (LSC). and pumping stations, among which was the LSCO Petroparcel.

After investigation was conducted by the Board of Marine Inquiry, Philippine Coast Guard 4. On the same date on 2 April 1979 (sic), defendant PNOC STC again
Commandant Simeon N. Alejandro rendered a decision finding the Petroparcel at fault. entered into an Agreement of Transfer with co-defendant Lusteveco whereby
Based on this finding by the Board and after unsuccessful demands on petitioner, 7 private all the business properties and other assets appertaining to the tanker and
respondent sued the LSC and the Petroparcel captain, Edgardo Doruelo, before the then bulk oil departments including the motor tanker LSCO Petroparcel of
Court of First Instance of Caloocan City, paying thereto the docket fee of one thousand two defendant Lusteveco were sold to PNOC STC.
hundred fifty-two pesos (P1,252.00) and the legal research fee of two pesos (P2.00). 8 In
particular, private respondent prayed for an award of P692,680.00, allegedly representing the 5. The aforesaid agreement stipulates, among others, that PNOC-STC
value of the fishing nets, boat equipment and cargoes of M/V Maria Efigenia XV, with interest assumes, without qualifications, all obligations arising from and by virtue of
at the legal rate plus 25% thereof as attorney's fees. Meanwhile, during the pendency of the all rights it obtained over the LSCO "Petroparcel".
case, petitioner PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation sought to be substituted in place
of LSC as it had already acquired ownership of the Petroparcel. 9 6. On 6 July 1979, another agreement between defendant LUSTEVECO and
PNOC-STC was executed wherein Board of Marine Inquiry Case No. 332
For its part, private respondent later sought the amendment of its complaint on the ground (involving the sea accident of 21 September 1977) was specifically identified
that the original complaint failed to plead for the recovery of the lost value of the hull of M/V and assumed by the latter.
Maria Efigenia XV.  10 Accordingly, in the amended complaint, private respondent averred
that M/V Maria Efigenia XV  had an actual value of P800,000.00 and that, after deducting the 7. On 23 June 1979, the decision of Board of Marine Inquiry was affirmed by
insurance payment of P200,000.00, the amount of P600,000.00 should likewise be claimed. the Ministry of National Defense, in its decision dismissing the appeal of
The amended complaint also alleged that inflation resulting from the devaluation of the Capt. Edgardo Doruelo and Chief mate Anthony Estenzo of LSCO
Philippine peso had affected the replacement value of the hull of the vessel, its equipment "Petroparcel".
and its lost cargoes, such that there should be a reasonable determination thereof.
Furthermore, on account of the sinking of the vessel, private respondent supposedly incurred 8. LSCO "Petroparcel" is presently owned and operated by PNOC-STC and
unrealized profits and lost business opportunities that would thereafter be proven. 11 likewise Capt. Edgardo Doruelo is still in their employ.
 9. As a result of the sinking of M/V Maria Efigenia caused by the reckless and (a) Exhibit A — certified xerox copy of the certificate of
imprudent manner in which LSCO Petroparcel was navigated by defendant ownership of M/V Maria Efigenia XV;
Doruelo, plaintiff suffered actual damages by the loss of its fishing nets, boat
equipments (sic) and cargoes, which went down with the ship when it sank (b) Exhibit B — a document titled "Marine Protest" executed
the replacement value of which should be left to the sound discretion of this by Delfin Villarosa, Jr. on September 22, 1977 stating that as
Honorable Court. a result of the collision, the M/V Maria Efigenia XV sustained
a hole at its left side that caused it to sink with its cargo of
After trial, the lower court 15 rendered on November 18, 1989 its decision disposing of Civil 1,050  bañeras valued at P170,000.00;
Case No. C-9457 as follows:
(c) Exhibit C — a quotation for the construction of a 95-footer
WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in trawler issued by Isidoro A. Magalong of I. A. Magalong
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant PNOC Shipping & Transport Engineering and Construction on January 26, 1987 to Del
Corporation, to pay the plaintiff: Rosario showing that construction of such trawler would cost
P2,250,000.00;
a. The sum of P6,438,048.00 representing the value of the
fishing boat with interest from the date of the filing of the (d) Exhibit D — pro forma invoice No. PSPI-05/87-NAV
complaint at the rate of 6% per annum; issued by E.D. Daclan of Power Systems, Incorporated on
January 20, 1987 to Del Rosario showing that two (2) units
b. The sum of P50,000.00 as and for attorney's fees; and of CUMMINS Marine Engine model N855-M, 195 bhp. at
1800 rpm. would cost P1,160,000.00;
c. The costs of suit.
(e) Exhibit E — quotation of prices issued by Scan Marine
Inc. on January 20, 1987 to Del Rosario showing that a unit
The counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Likewise, the case
of Furuno Compact Daylight Radar, Model FR-604D, would
against defendant Edgardo Doruelo is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of
cost P100,000.00 while a unit of Furuno Color Video
jurisdiction.
Sounder, Model FCV-501 would cost P45,000.00 so that the
two units would cost P145,000.00;
SO ORDERED.
(f) Exhibit F — quotation of prices issued by Seafgear Sales,
In arriving at the above disposition, the lower court cited the evidence presented by private Inc. on January 21, 1987 to Del Rosario showing that two (2)
respondent consisting of the testimony of its general manager and sole witness, Edilberto del rolls of nylon rope (5" cir. X 300fl.) would cost P140,000.00;
Rosario. Private respondent's witness testified that M/V Maria Efigenia XV  was owned by two (2) rolls of nylon rope (3" cir. X 240fl.), P42,750.00; one
private respondent per Exhibit A, a certificate of ownership issued by the Philippine Coast (1) binocular (7 x 50), P1,400.00, one (1) compass (6"),
Guard showing that  M/V Maria Efigenia XV was a wooden motor boat constructed in 1965 P4,000.00 and 50 pcs. of floats, P9,000.00 or a total of
with 128.23 gross tonnage. According to him, at the time the vessel sank, it was then carrying P197,150.00;
1,060 tubs (bañeras) of assorted fish the value of which was never recovered. Also lost with
the vessel were two cummins engines (250 horsepower), radar, pathometer and compass.
(g) Exhibit G — retainer agreement between Del Rosario
He further added that with the loss of his flagship vessel in his fishing fleet of fourteen (14)
and F. Sumulong Associates Law Offices stipulating an
vessels, he was constrained to hire the services of counsel whom he paid P10,000 to handle
acceptance fee of P5,000.00, per appearance fee of
the case at the Board of Marine Inquiry and P50,000.00 for commencing suit for damages in
P400.00, monthly retainer of P500.00, contingent fee of 20%
the lower court.
of the total amount recovered and that attorney's fee to be
awarded by the court should be given to Del Rosario; and
As to the award of P6,438,048.00 in actual damages, the lower court took into account the
following pieces of documentary evidence that private respondent proffered during trial:
(h) Exhibit H — price quotation issued by Seafgear Sales,
Inc. dated April 10, 1987 to Del Rosario showing the cost of
 poly nettings as: 50 rolls of 400/18 3kts. 100md x 100mtrs., that by the issuance of the order of January 25, 1990, said motion had become moot and
P70,000.00; 50 rolls of 400/18 5kts. 100md x 100mtrs., academic. 20
P81,500.00; 50 rolls of 400/18 8kts. 100md x 100mtrs.,
P116,000.00, and 50 rolls of 400/18 10kts. 100md x Unsatisfied with the lower court's decision, petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of
100mtrs., P146,500 and bañera (tub) at P65.00 per piece or Appeals which, however, affirmed the same in toto on October 14, 1992. 21 On petitioner's
a total of P414,065.00. assertion that the award of P6,438,048.00 was not convincingly proved by competent and
admissible evidence, the Court of Appeals ruled that it was not necessary to qualify Del
The lower court held that the prevailing replacement value of P6,438,048.00 of the fishing Rosario as an expert witness because as the owner of the lost vessel, "it was well within his
boat and all its equipment would regularly increase at 30% every year from the date the knowledge and competency to identify and determine the equipment installed and the
quotations were given. cargoes loaded" on the vessel. Considering the documentary evidence presented as in the
nature of market reports or quotations, trade journals, trade circulars and price lists, the Court
On the other hand, the lower court noted that petitioner only presented Lorenzo Lazaro, of Appeals held, thus:
senior estimator at PNOC Dockyard & Engineering Corporation, as sole witness and it did not
bother at all to offer any documentary evidence to support its position. Lazaro testified that Consequently, until such time as the Supreme Court categorically rules on
the price quotations submitted by private respondent were "excessive" and that as an expert the admissibility or inadmissibility of this class of evidence, the reception of
witness, he used the quotations of his suppliers in making his estimates. However, he failed these documentary exhibits (price quotations) as evidence rests on the
to present such quotations of prices from his suppliers, saying that he could not produce a sound discretion of the trial court. In fact, where the lower court is confronted
breakdown of the costs of his estimates as it was "a sort of secret scheme." For this reason, with evidence which appears to be of doubtful admissibility, the judge should
the lower court concluded: declare in favor of admissibility rather than of non-admissibility (The Collector
of Palakadhari, 124 [1899], p. 13, cited in Francisco, Revised Rules of Court,
Evidently, the quotation of prices submitted by the plaintiff relative to the Evidence, Volume VII, Part I, 1990 Edition, p. 18). Trial courts are enjoined to
replacement value of the fishing boat and its equipments in the tune of observe the strict enforcement of the rules of evidence which crystallized
P6,438,048.00 which were lost due to the recklessness and imprudence of through constant use and practice and are very useful and effective aids in
the herein defendants were not rebutted by the latter with sufficient evidence. the search for truth and for the effective administration of justice. But in
The defendants through their sole witness Lorenzo Lazaro relied heavily on connection with evidence which may appear to be of doubtful relevancy or
said witness' bare claim that the amount afore-said is excessive or bloated, incompetency or admissibility, it is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting
but they did not bother at all to present any documentary evidence to them on doubtful or technical grounds, but admitting them unless plainly
substantiate such claim. Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that their rejection
the mouth of the credible witness, but it must be credible in itself. (Vda. de places them beyond the consideration of the court. If they are thereafter
Bonifacio vs. B. L. T. Bus Co., Inc. L-26810, August 31, 1970). found relevant or competent, can easily be remedied by completely
discarding or ignoring them. (Banaria vs. Banaria, et al., C.A. No. 4142, May
31, 1950; cited in Francisco, Supra). [Emphasis supplied].
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the lower court's decision
contending that: (1) the lower court erred in holding it liable for damages; that the lower court
did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by paying only P1,252.00 as docket fee; (2) Stressing that the alleged inadmissible documentary exhibits were never satisfactorily
assuming that plaintiff was entitled to damages, the lower court erred in awarding an amount rebutted by appellant's own sole witness in the person of Lorenzo Lazaro, the appellate court
greater than that prayed for in the second amended complaint; and (3) the lower court erred found that petitioner ironically situated itself in an "inconsistent posture by the fact that its own
when it failed to resolve the issues it had raised in its memorandum. 16 Petitioner likewise filed witness, admittedly an expert one, heavily relies on the very same pieces of evidence (price
a supplemental motion for reconsideration expounding on whether the lower court acquired quotations) appellant has so vigorously objected to as inadmissible evidence." Hence, it
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case despite therein plaintiff's failure to pay the concluded:
prescribed docket fee. 17
. . . The amount of P6,438,048.00 was duly established at the trial on the
18
On January 25, 1990, the lower court declined reconsideration for lack of merit.   Apparently basis of appellee's documentary exhibits (price quotations) which stood
not having received the order denying its motion for reconsideration, petitioner still filed a uncontroverted, and which already included the amount by way of adjustment
motion for leave to file a reply to private respondent's opposition to said motion. 19 Hence, on as prayed for in the amended complaint. There was therefore no need for
February 12, 1990, the lower court denied said motion for leave to file a reply on the ground appellee to amend the second amended complaint in so far as to the claim
for damages is concerned to conform with the evidence presented at the trial.
 The amount of P6,438,048.00 awarded is clearly within the relief prayed for assessed the anticipated profit on a charter or other engagement which it
in appellee's second amended complaint. was unable to fulfill. What the court has to ascertain in each case is the
"capitalised value of the vessel as a profit-earning machine not in the
On the issue of lack of jurisdiction, the respondent court held that following the ruling in  Sun abstract but in view of the actual circumstances," without, of course, taking
Insurance Ltd. v. Asuncion, 22 the additional docket fee that may later on be declared as still into account considerations which were too remote at the time of the
owing the court may be enforced as a lien on the judgment. loss. 27 [Emphasis supplied].

Hence, the instant recourse. As stated at the outset, to enable an injured party to recover actual or compensatory
damages, he is required to prove the actual amount of loss with reasonable degree of
certainty premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence available. 28 The burden
In assailing the Court of Appeals' decision, petitioner posits the view that the award of
of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence would be presented on either
P6,438,048 as actual damages should have been in light of these considerations, namely: (1)
side. He must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence which means that the
the trial court did not base such award on the actual value of the vessel and its equipment at
evidence, as a whole, adduced by one side is superior to that of the other. 29 In other words,
the time of loss in 1977; (2) there was no evidence on extraordinary inflation that would
damages cannot be presumed and courts, in making an award must point out specific facts
warrant an adjustment of the replacement cost of the lost vessel, equipment and cargo; (3)
that could afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages are
the value of the lost cargo and the prices quoted in respondent's documentary evidence only
borne. 30
amount to P4,336,215.00; (4) private respondent's failure to adduce evidence to support its
claim for unrealized profit and business opportunities; and (5) private respondent's failure to
prove the extent and actual value of damages sustained as a result of the 1977 collision of In this case, actual damages were proven through the sole testimony of private respondent's
the vessels. 23 general manager and certain pieces of documentary evidence. Except for Exhibit B where the
value of the 1,050 bañeras of fish were pegged at their September 1977 value when the
collision happened, the pieces of documentary evidence proffered by private respondent with
Under Article 2199 of the Civil Code, actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in
respect to items and equipment lost show similar items and equipment with corresponding
satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained. They proceed from a sense of
prices in early 1987 or approximately ten (10) years after the collision. Noticeably, petitioner
natural justice and are designed to repair the wrong that has been done, to compensate for
did not object to the exhibits in terms of the time index for valuation of the lost goods and
the injury inflicted and not to impose a penalty. 24 In actions based on torts or quasi-delicts,
equipment. In objecting to the same pieces of evidence, petitioner commented that these
actual damages include all the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission
were not duly authenticated and that the witness (Del Rosario) did not have personal
complained of. 25 There are two kinds of actual or compensatory damages: one is the loss of
knowledge on the contents of the writings and neither was he an expert on the subjects
what a person already possesses (daño emergente), and the other is the failure to receive as
thereof. 31 Clearly ignoring petitioner's objections to the exhibits, the lower court admitted
a benefit that which would have pertained to him (lucro cesante). 26 Thus:
these pieces of evidence and gave them due weight to arrive at the award of P6,438,048.00
as actual damages.
Where goods are destroyed by the wrongful act of the defendant the plaintiff
is entitled to their value at the time of destruction, that is, normally, the sum of
WON the exhibits fall under the hearsay exception rule. NO
money which he would have to pay in the market for identical or essentially
similar goods, plus in a proper case damages for the loss of use during the
period before replacement. In other words, in the case of profit-earning The exhibits were presented ostensibly in the course of Del Rosario's testimony. Private
chattels, what has to be assessed is the value of the chattel to its owner as a respondent did not present any other witnesses especially those whose signatures appear in
going concern at the time and place of the loss, and this means, at least in the price quotations that became the bases of the award. We hold, however, that the price
the case of ships, that regard must be had to existing and pending quotations are ordinary private writings which under the Revised Rules of Court should have
engagements, . . . been proffered along with the testimony of the authors thereof. Del Rosario could not have
testified on the veracity of the contents of the writings even though he was the seasoned
owner of a fishing fleet because he was not the one who issued the price quotations. Section
. . . . If the market value of the ship reflects the fact that it is in any case
36, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that a witness can testify only to those
virtually certain of profitable employment, then nothing can be added to that
facts that he knows of his personal knowledge.
value in respect of charters actually lost, for to do so would be pro tanto to
compensate the plaintiff twice over. On the other hand, if the ship is valued
without reference to its actual future engagements and only in the light of its For this reason, Del Rosario's claim that private respondent incurred losses in the total
profit-earning potentiality, then it may be necessary to add to the value thus amount of P6,438,048.00 should be admitted with extreme caution considering that, because
it was a bare assertion, it should be supported by independent evidence. Moreover, because general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and
he was the owner of private respondent corporation 32 whatever testimony he would give with specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to
regard to the value of the lost vessel, its equipment and cargoes should be viewed in the light be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically
of his self-interest therein. We agree with the Court of Appeals that his testimony as to the mentioned." 40 The exhibits mentioned are mere price quotations issued personally to Del
equipment installed and the cargoes loaded on the vessel should be given Rosario who requested for them from dealers of equipment similar to the ones lost at the
credence 33 considering his familiarity thereto. However, we do not subscribe to the collision of the two vessels. These are not published in any list, register, periodical or other
conclusion that his valuation of such equipment, cargo and the vessel itself should be compilation on the relevant subject matter. Neither are these "market reports or quotations"
accepted as gospel truth. 34 We must, therefore, examine the documentary evidence within the purview of "commercial lists" as these are not "standard handbooks or periodicals,
presented to support Del Rosario's claim as regards the amount of losses. containing data of everyday professional need and relied upon in the work of the
occupation." 41 These are simply letters responding to the queries of Del Rosario. Thus, take
The price quotations presented as exhibits partake of the nature of hearsay evidence for example Exhibit D which reads:
considering that the persons who issued them were not presented as witnesses. 35 Any
evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the January 20, 1987
personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of another person who is not on the
witness stand. Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative value unless PROFORMA INVOICE NO. PSPI-05/87-NAV
the proponent can show that the evidence falls within the exceptions to the hearsay evidence
rule. 36 On this point, we believe that the exhibits do not fall under any of the exceptions MARIA EFIGINIA FISHING CORPORATION
provided under Sections 37 to 47 of Rule 130. 37
Navotas, Metro Manila
It is true that one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule pertains to "commercial lists and the
like" under Section 45, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. In this respect, the Court
of Appeals considered private respondent's exhibits as "commercial lists." It added, however, Attention: MR. EDDIE DEL ROSARIO
that these exhibits should be admitted in evidence "until such time as the Supreme Court
categorically rules on the admissibility or inadmissibility of this class of evidence" because Gentlemen:
"the reception of these documentary exhibits (price quotations) as evidence rests on the
sound discretion of the trial court." 38 Reference to Section 45, Rule 130, however, would In accordance to your request, we are pleated to quote our Cummins Marine
show that the conclusion of the Court of Appeals on the matter was arbitrarily arrived at. This Engine, to wit.
rule states:
Two (2) units CUMMINS Marine Engine
Commercial lists and the like. — Evidence of statements of matters of model N855-M, 195 bhp. at 1800 rpm., 6-
interest to persons engaged in an occupation contained in a list, register, cylinder in-line, 4-stroke cycle, natural
periodical, or other published compilation is admissible as tending to prove aspirated, 5 1/2 in. x 6 in. bore and stroke,
the truth of any relevant matter so stated if that compilation is published for 855 cu. In. displacement, keel-cooled,
use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used and relied electric starting coupled with Twin-Disc
upon by them there. Marine gearbox model MG-509, 4.5:1
reduction ratio, includes oil cooler,
Under Section 45 of the aforesaid Rule, a document is a commercial list if: (1) it is a companion flange, manual and standard
statement of matters of interest to persons engaged in an occupation; (2) such statement is accessories as per attached sheet.
contained in a list, register, periodical or other published compilation; (3) said compilation is
published for the use of persons engaged in that occupation, and (4) it is generally used and Price FOB Manila P580,000.00/unit
relied upon by persons in the same occupation.
Total FOB Manila P1,160,000.00
Based on the above requisites, it is our considered view that Exhibits B, C, D, E, F and
H 39 are not "commercial lists" for these do not belong to the category of "other published TERMS : CASH
compilations" under Section 45 aforequoted. Under the principle of  ejusdem generis, "(w)here
 DELIVERY : 60-90 days from date of order. testimony. Others maintain that it is entitled to no more consideration than if it
had been excluded.
VALIDITY : Subject to our final confirmation.
The rule prevailing in this jurisdiction is the latter one. Our Supreme Court
WARRANTY : One (1) full year against factory defect. held that although the question of admissibility of evidence can not be raised
for the first time on appeal, yet if the evidence is hearsay it has no probative
value and should be disregarded whether objected to or not. "If no objection
Very truly
is made" — quoting Jones on Evidence — "it (hearsay) becomes evidence
yours,
by reason of the want of such objection even though its admission does not
confer upon it any new attribute in point of weight. Its nature and quality
POWER remain the same, so far as its intrinsic weakness and incompetency to satisfy
SYSTEMS, the mind are concerned, and as opposed to direct primary evidence, the
INC. latter always prevails.

(Sgd.) The failure of the defense counsel to object to the presentation of

incompetent evidence, like hearsay evidence or evidence that violates the
E. D. rules of res inter alios acta, or his failure to ask for the striking out of the
Daclan same does not give such evidence any probative value. But admissibility of
evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence
To be sure, letters and telegrams are admissible in evidence but these are, however, subject whether objected to or not has no probative value. 47
to the general principles of evidence and to various rules relating to documentary
evidence. 42 Hence, in one case, it was held that a letter from an automobile dealer offering Accordingly, as stated at the outset, damages may not be awarded on the basis of hearsay
an allowance for an automobile upon purchase of a new automobile after repairs had been evidence. 48
completed, was not a "price current" or "commercial list" within the statute which made such
items presumptive evidence of the value of the article specified therein. The letter was not Nonetheless, the non-admissibility of said exhibits does not mean that it totally deprives
admissible in evidence as a "commercial list" even though the clerk of the dealer testified that private respondent of any redress for the loss of its vessel. This is because in  Lufthansa
he had written the letter in due course of business upon instructions of the dealer. 43 German Airlines v. Court of Appeals, 49 the Court said:

But even on the theory that the Court of Appeals correctly ruled on the admissibility of those In the absence of competent proof on the actual damage suffered, private
letters or communications when it held that unless "plainly irrelevant, immaterial or respondent is "entitled to nominal damages which, as the law says, is
incompetent," evidence should better be admitted rather than rejected on "doubtful or adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or
technical grounds," 44 the same pieces of evidence, however, should not have been given invaded by defendant, may be vindicated and recognized, and not for the
probative weight. This is a distinction we wish to point out. Admissibility of evidence refers to purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered." [Emphasis
the question of whether or not the circumstance (or evidence) is to considered at all. 45 On the supplied].
other hand, the probative value of evidence refers to the question of whether or not it proves
an issue. 46 Thus, a letter may be offered in evidence and admitted as such but its evidentiary
Nominal damages are awarded in every obligation arising from law, contracts, quasi-
weight depends upon the observance of the rules on evidence. Accordingly, the author of the
contracts, acts or omissions punished by law, and quasi-delicts, or in every case where
letter should be presented as witness to provide the other party to the litigation the
property right has been invaded. 50 Under Article 2223 of the Civil Code, "(t)he adjudication of
opportunity to question him on the contents of the letter. Being mere hearsay evidence,
nominal damages shall preclude further contest upon the right involved and all accessory
failure to present the author of the letter renders its contents suspect. As earlier stated,
questions, as between the parties to the suit, or their respective heirs and assigns."
hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative value. Thus:

Actually, nominal damages are damages in name only and not in fact. Where these are
The courts differ as to the weight to be given to hearsay evidence admitted
allowed, they are not treated as an equivalent of a wrong inflicted but simply in recognition of
without objection. Some hold that when hearsay has been admitted without
the existence of a technical injury. 51 However, the amount to be awarded as nominal
objection, the same may be considered as any other properly admitted
damages shall be equal or at least commensurate to the injury sustained by private
respondent considering the concept and purpose of such damages. 52 The amount of nominal on for almost two decades, we believe that an award of Two Million (P2,000,000.00) 59 in
damages to be awarded may also depend on certain special reasons extant in the case. 53 favor of private respondent as and for nominal damages is in order.

Applying now such principles to the instant case, we have on record the fact that petitioner's No pronouncement as to costs.
vessel Petroparcel was at fault as well as private respondent's complaint claiming the amount
of P692,680.00 representing the fishing nets, boat equipment and cargoes that sunk with SO ORDERED.
the M/V Maria Efigenia XV. In its amended complaint, private respondent alleged that the
vessel had an actual value of P800,000.00 but it had been paid insurance in the amount of G.R. No. 209264
P200,000.00 and, therefore, it claimed only the amount of P600,000.00. Ordinarily, the
receipt of insurance payments should diminish the total value of the vessel quoted by private
respondent in his complaint considering that such payment is causally related to the loss for DAMASO T. AMBRAY and CEFERINO T. AMBRAY, JR.,*Petitioners,
which it claimed compensation. This Court believes that such allegations in the original and vs
amended complaints can be the basis for determination of a fair amount of nominal damages SYLVIA A. TSOUROUS, CARMENCITA AMBRAY-LAUREL, HEDY AMBRAY-AZORES,
inasmuch as a complaint alleges the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of VIVIEN AMBRAY-YATCO, NANCY AMBRAY-ESCUDERO, MARISTELA AMBRAY-
action. 54 Private respondent should be bound by its allegations on the amount of its claims. ILAGAN, ELIZABETH AMBRAY-SORIANO, MA. LUISA FE AMBRAY-
ARCILLA, and CRISTINA AMBRAY-LABIT, Respondents.
With respect to petitioner's contention that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
amended complaint increasing the amount of damages claimed to P600,000.00, we agree DECISION
with the Court of Appeals that the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the case when private
respondent paid the docket fee corresponding to its claim in its original complaint. Its failure PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
to pay the docket fee corresponding to its increased claim for damages under the amended
complaint should not be considered as having curtailed the lower court's jurisdiction. Pursuant Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1are the Decision2 dated April 25, 2013 and the
to the ruling in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion, 55 the unpaid docket fee should Resolution3 dated September 24, 2013 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
be considered as a lien on the judgment even though private respondent specified the No. 95606, affirming the Decision4 dated June 11, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of San
amount of P600,000.00 as its claim for damages in its amended complaint. Pablo City, Branch 32 (RTC) in Civil Case No. SP-5831(01).

Moreover, we note that petitioner did not question at all the jurisdiction of the lower court on The Facts
the ground of insufficient docket fees in its answers to both the amended complaint and the
second amended complaint. It did so only in its motion for reconsideration of the decision of The subject matter of the present controversy is a parcel of land described as Lot 2-C of
the lower court after it had received an adverse decision. As this Court held in Pantranco subdivision plan Psd-04-009554, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
North Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 56 participation in all stages of the case before the 413825 of the Register of Deeds of San Pablo City (Lot 2-C) in the name of petitioners
trial court, that included invoking its authority in asking for affirmative relief, effectively barred Damaso T. Ambray (Damaso), and Ceferino T. Ambray, Jr. (Ceferino, Jr.; collectively,
petitioner by estoppel from challenging the court's jurisdiction. Notably, from the time it filed petitioners).
its answer to the second amended complaint on April 16, 1985, 57 petitioner did not question
the lower court's jurisdiction. It was only on December 29, 1989 58 when it filed its motion for
Petitioners and respondents Sylvia A. Tsourous,6 Carmencita Ambray-Laurel, Hedy Ambray-
reconsideration of the lower court's decision that petitioner raised the question of the lower
Azores, Vivien Ambray-Yatco, Nancy Ambray-Escudero, Maristela Ambray-Ilagan (Maristela),
court's lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner thus foreclosed its right to raise the issue of jurisdiction
Elizabeth Ambray-Soriano, Ma. Fe Luisa Ambray-Arcilla (Ma. Fe Luisa), 7 and Cristina
by its own inaction.
Ambray-Labit are siblings. With the exception of Sylvia,8 they are the children of the late
Ceferino Ambray (Ceferino, Sr.) and Estela Trias (Estela), who passed away on February 5,
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 14, 1992 in 1987 and August 15, 2002, respectively.
CA-G.R. CV No. 26680 affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch
121, is hereby MODIFIED insofar as it awarded actual damages to private respondent Maria
During their lifetime, Ceferino, Sr. and Estela owned several properties, one of which was a
Efigenia Fishing Corporation in the amount of P6,438,048.00 for lack of evidentiary bases
parcel of land located in San Pablo City, Laguna denominated as Lot 2 of subdivision plan
therefor. Considering the fact, however, that: (1) technically petitioner sustained injury but
Pcs-12441, with an area of 4,147 square meters, more or less, covered by TCT No. T-
which, unfortunately, was not adequately and properly proved, and (2) this case has dragged
112599 of the Register of Deeds of San Pablo City (Lot 2). On December 28, 1977, Ceferino,
Sr. mortgaged Lot 2 with Manila Bank for the amount of P180,000.00. The mortgage was Subsequently, citing an Affidavit26 dated February 18, 2008 executed by Ma. Fe Luisa, the
discharged on September 16, 1984.10 rest of the respondents moved27 that she be dropped as a plaintiff, which the RTC
granted.28 Thereafter, she was ordered29 impleaded as a party-defendant in respondents'
Prior to the discharge of the mortgage or sometime in August 1984, Lot 2 was subdivided into supplemental complaint. Later, she adopted30 petitioners' answer with counterclaim in
three (3) lots: Lot 2-A, Lot 2-B, and the subject property, Lot 2-C, resulting in the cancellation response thereto.
ofTCT No. T-11259. Lot 2-C was registered in Ceferino, Sr.' s name in accordance with his
letter11 dated August 29, 1984 requesting the Register of Deeds of San Pablo City to register The RTC Ruling
Lot 2-C in his name. Thus, TCT No. T-22749 12 was issued covering the said parcel under the
name of Ceferino, Sr., married to Estela.13 In a Decision31 dated June 11, 2010, the RTC nullified the Deed of Sale as well as TCT No.
T-41382 in the name of petitioners and rendered judgment in favor of respondents as follows:
In June 1996, Maristela discovered that TCT No. T-22749 covering Lot 2-C had been
cancelled and in its stead, TCT No. T-41382 was issued in the name of petitioners.1âwphi1 It a. Declaring Lot 2-C, Psd-04-009554, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-41382, as
appears that by virtue of a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale14 (Deed of Sale) dated January common property of the Heirs of Ceferino Ambray, Sr. and Estela Trias, to be divided equally
16, 1978, Ceferino, Sr., with the consent of Estela, allegedly sold "a portion of lot 2 of the among the heirs;
consolidation subd. plan (LRC) Pcs-12441"15 to petitioners for a consideration of
P150,000.00. The Deed of Sale was registered with the Register of Deeds of San Pablo City b. Declaring as null and void the Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 16, 1978, purportedly
only on February 5, 1996.16 executed between Ceferino Ambray and Estela Trias, as vendors, and Damaso T. Ambray
and Ceferino Ambray, Jr., as vendees, of the portion of Lot 2, Pcs-12441, covered by
This prompted respondents to file a criminal case for falsification of public document against Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-11259;
petitioners, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Damaso T Ambray and Ceferino T
Ambray"  and docketed as Criminal Case No. 39153 (falsification case) before the Municipal c. Declaring as null and void Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-41382 in the name of Damaso
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of San Pablo City. In a Decision 17 dated October 30, 2000, the T. Ambray, married to Mary Ann Loyola, and Ceferino T. Ambray, Jr.;
MTCC acquitted petitioners of the charge for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
d. Directing the defendants Damaso T. Ambray and Ceferino T. Ambray, Jr. to reconvey Lot
18 2-C, Psd-04-009554 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-41382 to the co-ownership
Thereafter, respondents filed the instant complaint  for annulment of title, reconveyance, and of the Heirs of Ceferino Ambray, Sr. and Estela Trias, for distribution in equal shares among
damages against petitioners and Estela (defendants), docketed as Civil Case No. SP- the said heirs; and
5831(01), alleging that TCT No. T-41382 and the Deed of Sale were null and void because
the signatures of Ceferino, Sr. and Estela thereon were forgeries.
e. Directing the Register of Deeds of San Pablo City, to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title
19 No. T-41382 in the name of Damaso T. Ambray and Ceferino Ambray, Sr., and cause the
In a motion to dismiss,  defendants claimed that the issue on the authenticity of the issuance of a new Transfer Certificate of Title, in the name of the Heirs of Ceferino Ambray,
signatures of Ceferino, Sr. and Estela on the Deed of Sale had already been passed upon in Sr. and Estela Trias.
the falsification case where petitioners were eventually acquitted; hence, the matter was res
judicata. In an Order20 dated June 6, 2002, the RTC granted the motion and dismissed the
case on said ground. The RTC found that respondents were able to prove, by a preponderance of evidence, that
the Deed of Sale executed by Ceferino, Sr. conveying Lot 2-C in favor of petitioners was
spurious and of dubious origin.32 It held that at the time of its execution in 1978, Ceferino, Sr.
On appeal,21 however, the CA reversed the said disposition in a Decision22 dated September could not have sold a specific  portion of Lot 2 to petitioners, considering that it was
29, 2005 in CA-G.R. CV No. 75507, finding that res judicata  does not apply. Thus, it subdivided only in 1984. Moreover, after the subdivision of Lot 2 in 1984, Ceferino, Sr.
remanded the case to the RTC for further proceedings. requested the Register of Deeds of San Pablo City to register Lot 2-C in his name, which he
would not have done had he already sold Lot 2-C to petitioners.33
Before the RTC, petitioners filed their answer23 and disclosed the death of their co-defendant
and mother, Estela, who passed away on August 15, 2002.24 By way of defense, they Furthermore, Ceferino, Sr. leased Lot 2-C to MB Finance Corporation from 1986 to 1989 in
averred, inter alia, that respondents were aware of the conveyance of Lot 2-C to them his capacity as the owner of the subject property. Subsequent thereto, as administrator of
through the Deed of Sale. They also claimed that respondents' action has prescribed, and Ceferino, Sr. 's properties upon the latter's death, Damaso executed a contract renewing the
maintained that it was barred by prior judgment and res judicata.25
lease of Lot 2-C to MB Finance Corporation. The RTC opined that the foregoing facts militate At the outset, it should be pointed out that, as a general rule, a re-examination of factual
against petitioners' purported ownership of Lot 2-C pursuant to the Deed of Sale.34 findings cannot be done by the Court acting on a petition for review on certiorari  because it is
not a trier of facts and only reviews questions of law.46 This rule, however, admits of certain
Finally, when confronted with the belated registration of the Deed of Sale in 1996, petitioners exceptions, namely: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
could only offer the excuse that their mother, Estela, kept the copy thereof until she became conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
sickly and finally gave the same to Damaso. The RTC declared the same to be a mere impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on
afterthought.35 a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making
its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are
contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are
With respect to the issue of forgery of the signatures of Ceferino, Sr. and Estela on the
contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
subject Deed of Sale, the RTC took note of the CA's opinion in CA-G.R. CV No. 75507 that
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
the MTCC, in the falsification case, made no categorical finding as to the existence of
petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings
falsification. Instead, the MTCC merely concluded that the prosecution failed to establish
of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
petitioners' participation in the alleged falsification.36
evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a
Petitioners and respondents separately appealed37 to the CA. Petitioners imputed error upon different conclusion.47 Finding a confluence of certain exceptions in this case, the general rule
the R TC in declaring null and void the subject Deed of Sale and TCT No. T-41382, 38 while that only legal issues may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari  under Rule 45 of the
respondents questioned the RTC's refusal to grant damages and attorney's fees in their Rules of Court does not apply, and the Court retains the authority to pass upon the evidence
favor.39 presented and draw conclusions therefrom.48

The CA Ruling At the core of the present controversy is the validity of the Deed of Sale, the execution of
which purportedly conveyed Lot 2-C in favor of petitioners. To gauge the veracity thereof, it is
In a Decision40 dated April 25, 2013, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision and found that imperative to pass upon the genuineness of the signatures of the seller, Ceferino, Sr., and his
respondents were able to sufficiently discharge the required burden of proof that the subject wife, Estela, who gave her consent to the sale, as appearing thereon, which respondents, in
Deed of Sale is spurious. the present complaint, assert to be forgeries.

The CA also denied the award of moral damages for lack of factual basis. Consequently, WON the testimony by Estela in the falsification case has more probative weight. YES
without moral damages, it found that no exemplary damages may be given.41 Finally, the CA
held that the award of attorney's fees was not warranted under the circumstances of the case, As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing
the same being an exception and not the general rule.42 evidence, and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. One who alleges forgery
has the burden to establish his case by a preponderance of evidence, or evidence which is of
Both petitioners43 and respondents44 moved for reconsideration of the CA's Decision, which greater weight or more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it. The fact of
were denied in a Resolution45 dated September 24, 2014; hence, this petition. forgery can only be established by a comparison between the alleged forged signature and
the authentic and genuine signature of the person whose signature is theorized to have been
The Issue Before the Court forged.49

The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC's Under Rule 132, Section 22 of the Rules of Court, the genuineness of handwriting may be
nullification of the Deed of Sale dated January 16, 1978 and TCT No. T-41382 covering Lot proved in the following manner: (1) by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of
2-C in the name of petitioners. such person because he has seen the person write; or he has seen writing purporting to be
his upon which the witness has acted or been charged; (2) by a comparison, made by the
The Court's Ruling witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party, against whom
the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.50 Corollary
thereto, jurisprudence states that the presumption of validity and regularity prevails over
The petition is meritorious.
allegations of forgery and fraud. As against direct evidence consisting of the testimony of a
witness who was physically present at the signing of the contract and who had personal
knowledge thereof, the testimony of an expert witness constitutes indirect or circumstantial in the present case, although on different causes of action; (d)  the issue testified to by the
evidence at best.51 witness in the former trial is the same issue involved in the present case and (e) the adverse
party had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the former case. 56 The reasons for
In this case, the only direct evidence presented by respondents to prove their allegation of the admissibility of testimony taken at a former trial or proceeding are the necessity for the
forgery is Questioned Documents Report No. 266-39752 dated March 24, 1997 issued by testimony and its trustworthiness. However, before the former testimony can be introduced in
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Document Examiner II Antonio R. Magbojos evidence, the proponent must first lay the proper predicate therefor, i.e.,  the party must
(Magbojos), stating that the signatures of Ceferino, Sr. and Estela on the Deed of Sale, when establish the basis for the admission of testimony in the realm of admissible evidence.57
compared to standard sample signatures, are not written by one and the same person.
Records show that Estela died during the pendency of these proceedings before the RTC or
In refutation, petitioners offered in evidence, inter alia,  the testimony of their mother, Estela, on August 15, 2002. Her death transpired before the presentation of the parties' evidence
in the falsification case where petitioners were previously acquitted. In the course thereof, she could ensue. However, she was able to testify on direct and cross-examination in the
identified53 the signatures on the Deed of Sale as hers and Ceferino, Sr.' s, which was fully falsification case and affirmed that the alleged forged signatures appearing on the Deed of
corroborated54 by Atty. Zosimo Tanalega (Atty. Tanalega), the notary public who notarized the Sale were, indeed, hers and her deceased husband, Ceferino, Sr.'s. The parties in the
subject Deed of Sale and was present at the time the Ambray spouses affixed their falsification case involved respondents and petitioners herein, and the subject matter therein
signatures thereon. and in this case are one and the same, i.e., the genuineness and authenticity of the
signatures of Ceferino, Sr. and Estela.
Between the Questioned Documents Report presented by respondents and the testimony
given by Estela in the falsification case in support of petitioners' defense, the Court finds Clearly, the former testimony of Estela in the falsification case, being admissible in evidence
greater evidentiary weight in favor of the latter. Hence, respondent's complaint for annulment in these proceedings, deserves significant consideration. She gave positive testimony that it
of title, reconveyance, and damages in Civil Case No. SP-5831(01) should be dismissed. was Ceferino, Sr. himself who signed the Deed of Sale that conveyed Lot 2-C to petitioners.
She likewise verified her signature thereon. By virtue of these declarations, she confirmed the
genuineness and authenticity of the questioned signatures. Thus, it follows that the Deed of
While the principle of res judicata  in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment, as espoused
Sale itself is valid and duly executed, contrary to the finding of the RTC, as affirmed by the
by petitioners,55 is of doubtful application in this case - considering that the MTCC, in the
CA, that it was of spurious nature.
falsification case, failed to categorically pronounce that the Deed of Sale was not falsified and
merely concluded that petitioners had no participation in any alleged falsification - the Court
nonetheless observes that petitioners, through the testimony of Estela thereat, were able to Further lending credence to the validity of the Deed of Sale is the well-settled principle that a
establish the genuineness and due execution of the subject Deed of Sale which effectively duly notarized contract enjoys the prima facie  presumption of authenticity and due execution
conveyed title over Lot 2-C to them. Estela's testimony constitutes direct evidence of the as well as the full faith and credence attached to a public instrument. To overturn this legal
authenticity of the signatures on the Deed of Sale, having personal knowledge thereof, which presumption, evidence must be clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant to
undeniably prevails over the written findings of a purported handwriting expert that can only establish that there was forgery that gave rise to a spurious contract.58
be considered indirect or circumstantial evidence.
Hence, for the above-state reasons, whatever inferences the RTC had observed tending to
Notably, the admissibility of Estela's former testimony in the present case finds basis in defeat the existence of a valid sale in favor of petitioners are rendered inconsequential.
Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence or the "rule on former testimony" which
provides: In particular, the RTC noted, and found it puzzling, that the Deed of Sale did not specifically
mention the exact area that was being sold to petitioners, disposing only of "a portion of lot 2"
Section 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. – The testimony or deposition of without specifying the metes and bounds thereof. As such, the RTC concluded that Ceferino,
a witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or Sr. could not have sold a specific portion of Lot 2 to petitioners, having been subdivided only
administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence in 1984. However, Article 1463 of the Civil Code expressly states that "[t]he sole owner of a
against the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him. thing may sell an undivided interest therein." As Ceferino, Sr. was the sole owner of the
original Lot 2 from whence came Lot 2-C, he is therefore allowed by law to convey or sell an
unspecified portion thereof. Hence, the disposition of Lot 2-C to petitioners, a portion of Lot 2
Case law holds that for the said rule to apply, the following requisites must be
yet to be subdivided in 1978, was therefore valid.
satisfied: (a)  the witness is dead or unable to testify; (b) his testimony or deposition was
given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, between the same parties or
those representing the same interests; (c)  the former case involved the same subject as that
That Ceferino, Sr. requested the registration of the title of Lot 2-C in his name in 1984, while On July 22, 1987, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential
the property was supposed to have already been sold to petitioners in 1978, was likewise Commission on Good Government (PCGG), filed a complaint (docketed as Civil Case No.
fully explained during trial. Damaso clarified59 that their parents were apprehensive that he 0009) against Jose L. Africa, Manuel H. Nieto, Jr., Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos,
and Ceferino might mortgage or squander the property while they were still alive. Moreover, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile, and Potenciano Ilusorio
despite knowledge of the sale, they did not demand for its immediate registration because (collectively, the respondents) for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and
during their father's lifetime, they never questioned his decisions. This further explains why, damages before the Sandiganbayan. The petitioner alleged, inter alia, that the respondents
despite the disposition in petitioners' favor, it was Ceferino, Sr. himself who leased Lot 2-C to illegally manipulated the purchase of the major shareholdings of Cable and Wireless Limited
third parties, which Damaso renewed in his father's name after the latter's death. The delay in in Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI), which shareholdings respondents
the transfer of the title over Lot 2-C to petitioners was also occasioned by the fact that Estela Jose Africa and Manuel Nieto, Jr. held for themselves and, through their holdings and the
kept the Deed of Sale in her custody and gave it to petitioners only later on, by reason of her corporations they organized, beneficially for respondents Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R.
poor health.60 Be that as it may, and to reiterate, the delay in the registration of the sale in Marcos.4
favor of petitioners neither affects nor invalidates the same, in light of the authenticity of the
Deed of Sale itself. Civil Case No. 0009 is the main case subject of the present petition. Victor Africa (Africa), son
of the late Jose L. Africa, was not impleaded in and so is plainly not a party to Civil Case No.
In fine, the CA and the RTC both erred in finding that the Deed of Sale was of spurious origin. 0009.5
The authenticity and due execution of the Deed of Sale must be upheld against the
assumptions made by the RTC in its Decision. Accordingly, TCT No. T-41382 covering Lot 2- Civil Case No. 0009 spawned numerous incidental cases,6 among them, Civil Case No.
C in the name of petitioners remain valid. 0130.7 The present respondents were not made parties either in Civil Case No. 0130.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed April 25, 2013 Decision and the I. Civil Case No. 0130
September 24, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95606 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The instant complaint for annulment of title, In the August 7, 1991 PCGG-conducted ETPI stockholders meeting, a PCGG-controlled
reconveyance, and damages is DISMISSED. board of directors was elected. Later, the registered ETPI stockholders convened a special
stockholders meeting wherein another set of board of directors was elected. As a result, two
SO ORDERED. sets of ETPI board and officers were elected.8

G.R. No. 152375               December 16, 2011 Thereafter, Africa, as an ETPI stockholder, filed a petition for certiorari, with prayer for a
temporary restraining order/preliminary injunction with the Sandiganbayan (docketed as Civil
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, Case No. 0130), seeking to nullify the August 5, 1991 and August 9, 1991 Orders of the
vs. PCGG. These Orders directed Africa:
SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION), JOSE L. AFRICA (substituted by his heirs),
MANUEL H. NIETO, JR., FERDINAND E. MARCOS (substituted by his heirs), IMELDA R. [T]o account for his sequestered shares in ETPI and to cease and desist from exercising
MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., JUAN PONCE ENRILE, and POTENCIANO voting rights on the sequestered shares in the special stockholders’ meeting to be held on
ILUSORIO (substituted by his heirs), Respondents. August 12, 1991, from representing himself as a director, officer, employee or agent of ETPI,
and from participating, directly or indirectly[,] in the management of ETPI.9
DECISION
During the pendency of Africa’s petition, Civil Case No. 0130, Africa filed a motion with the
BRION, J.: Sandiganbayan, alleging that since January 29, 1988 the PCGG had been "illegally
‘exercising’ the rights of stockholders of ETPI,"10 especially in the election of the members of
Before us is the petition for certiorari1 filed by the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) to set the board of directors. Africa prayed for the issuance of an order for the "calling and holding
aside the February 7, 2002 resolution (2002 resolution) 2 of the Sandiganbayan3 denying the of [ETPI] annual stockholders meeting for 1992 under the [c]ourt’s control and supervision
petitioner’s Motion to Admit Supplemental Offer of Evidence (Re: Deposition of Maurice V. and prescribed guidelines."11
Bane)  (3rd motion).
In its November 13, 1992 resolution, the Sandiganbayan favored Africa’s motion in this wise:
THE ANTECEDENTS
WHEREFORE, it is ordered that an annual stockholders meeting of the [ETPI], for 1992 be On December 13, 1996, the Sandiganbayan resolved the Urgent Petition by granting
held on Friday, November 27, 1992, at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon, at the ETPI Board authority to the PCGG (i) "to cause the holding of a special stockholders’ meeting of ETPI for
Room, Telecoms Plaza, 7th Floor, 316 Gil J. Puyat Avenue, Makati, Metro Manila. x x x The the sole purpose of increasing ETPI’s authorized capital stock" and (ii) "to vote therein the
stockholders meeting shall be conducted under the supervision and control of this Court, sequestered Class ‘A’ shares of stock."22 Thus, a special stockholders meeting was held, as
through Mr. Justice Sabino R. de Leon, Jr. [O]nly the registered owners, their duly authorized previously scheduled, on March 17, 1997 and the increase in ETPI’s authorized capital stock
representatives or their proxies may vote their corresponding shares. was "unanimously approved."23 From this ruling, Africa went to this Court via a petition
for certiorari24 docketed as G.R. No. 147214  (Africa’s petition).
The following minimum safeguards must be set in place and carefully maintained until final
judicial resolution of the question of whether or not the sequestered shares of stock (or in a We jointly resolved the PCGG’s and Africa’s petitions, and ruled:
proper case the underlying assets of the corporation concerned) constitute ill-gotten
wealth[.]12 This Court notes that, like in Africa’s motion to hold a stockholders meeting (to elect a board
of directors), the Sandiganbayan, in the PCGG’s petition to hold a stockholders meeting (to
The PCGG assailed this resolution before this Court via a petition for certiorari docketed as amend the articles of incorporation to increase the authorized capital stock), again failed to
G.R. No. 10778913 (PCGG’s petition), imputing grave abuse of discretion on the apply the two-tiered test. On such determination hinges the validity of the votes cast by the
Sandiganbayan for holding, inter alia, that the registered stockholders of ETPI had the right to PCGG in the stockholders meeting of March 17, 1997. This lapse by the Sandiganbayan
vote.14 In our November 26, 1992 Resolution, we enjoined the Sandiganbayan from leaves this Court with no other choice but to remand these questions to it for proper
implementing its assailed resolution. determination.

In the meantime, in an April 12, 1993 resolution, the Sandiganbayan ordered the xxxx
consolidation of Civil Case No. 0130, among others, with Civil Case No. 0009, with the latter
as the main case and the former merely an incident.15 WHEREFORE, this Court Resolved to REFER the petitions at bar to the Sandiganbayan for
reception of evidence to determine whether there is a prima facie evidence showing that the
During the pendency of PCGG’s petition (G.R. No. 107789), the PCGG filed with this Court a sequestered shares in question are ill-gotten and there is an imminent danger of dissipation
"Very Urgent Petition for Authority to Hold Special Stockholders’ Meeting for [the] Sole to entitle the PCGG to vote them in a stockholders meeting to elect the ETPI Board of
Purpose of Increasing [ETPI’s] Authorized Capital Stock" (Urgent Petition). In our May 7, Directors and to amend the ETPI Articles of Incorporation for the sole purpose of increasing
1996 Resolution, we referred this Urgent Petition to the Sandiganbayan for reception of the authorized capital stock of ETPI.
evidence and immediate resolution.16 The Sandiganbayan included the Urgent Petition in Civil
Case No. 0130.17 The Sandiganbayan shall render a decision thereon within sixty (60) days from receipt of this
Resolution and in conformity herewith.
In the proceedings to resolve the Urgent Petition, the testimony of Mr. Maurice V. Bane
(former director and treasurer-in-trust of ETPI) was taken– at the petitioner’s instance and II. Civil Case No. 0009
after serving notice of the deposition-taking on the respondents18 – on October 23 and 24,
1996 by way of deposition upon oral examination (Bane deposition) before Consul General Although Civil Case No. 0009 was filed on July 22, 1987, it was only on November 29, 1996
Ernesto Castro of the Philippine Embassy in London, England. and March 17, 1997 that the first pre-trial conference was scheduled and concluded.25

Invoking Section 1, Rule 24 (of the old Rules of Court), purportedly allowing the petitioner to In its Pre-Trial Brief26 dated August 30, 1996, the petitioner offered to present the following
depose Bane without leave of court, i.e., as a matter of right after the defendants have filed witnesses:
their answer, the notice stated that "[t]he purpose of the deposition is for [Bane] to identify
and testify on the facts set forth in his affidavit19 x x x so as to prove the ownership issue in
favor of [the petitioner] and/or establish the prima facie factual foundation for sequestration of WITNESSES TO BE PRESENTED AND A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THEIR TESTIMONIES
[ETPI’s] Class A stock in support of the [Urgent Petition]."20 The notice also states that the
petitioner shall use the Bane deposition "in evidence… in the main case of Civil Case No. (1) Maurice V. Bane – representative of Cable and Wireless Limited (C & W) at the
0009."21 On the scheduled deposition date, only Africa was present and he cross-examined time ETPI was organized.
Bane.
xxxx
 (2) Mr. Manuel H. Nieto – x x x On April 1, 1998, the Sandiganbayan31 promulgated a resolution32 (1998 resolution) denying
the petitioner’s 1st motion, as follows:
(3) Ms. Evelyn Singson – x x x
Wherefore, the [petitioner’s] Motion x x x is –
(4) Mr. Severino P. Buan, Jr. – x x x
1. partly denied insofar as [the petitioner] prays therein to adopt the testimonies on
(5) Mr. Apolinario K. Medina - x x x oral deposition of Maurice V. Bane and Rolando Gapud as part of its evidence in Civil
Case No. 0009 for the reason that said deponents according to the [petitioner]
are not available for cross-examination in this Court by the [respondents].
(6) Mr. Potenciano A. Roque – x x x
(emphasis added)
(7) Caesar Parlade - x x x
2. partly Granted, in the interest of speedy disposition of this long pending case,
insofar as plaintiff prays therein to adopt certain/particular testimonies of Cesar O.
IIa. Motion to Admit the Bane Deposition Parlade, Evelyn Singson, Leoncio Martinez, and Ricardo Castro and documentary
exhibits which said witnesses have identified in incident Civil Case Nos. xxx 0130
At the trial of Civil Case No. 0009, the petitioner filed a Motion27 (1st motion), stating that – xxx, subject to the following conditions :

1. In the hearings of the incidents of [Civil Case No. 0009], i.e., Civil Case Nos. 0048, 1. xxx
0050, 0130, 014628 the following witnesses were presented therein:
2. xxx
a. Cesar O.V. Parlade
3. That the said witnesses be presented in this Court so that they can be
b. Maurice Bane cross-examined on their particular testimonies in incident Civil Cases xxx [by
the respondents].
c. Evelyn Singson
IIb. Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice
d. Leonorio Martinez
The petitioner did not in any way question the 1998 resolution, and instead made its Formal
e. Ricardo Castro; and Offer of Evidence on December 14, 1999.33 Significantly, the Bane deposition was not
included as part of its offered exhibits. Rectifying the omission, the petitioner filed an Urgent
f. Rolando Gapud Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice34 (2nd motion) dated February 21, 2000, with the
alternative prayer that:
2. [The petitioner] wishes to adopt in [Civil Case No. 0009] their testimonies and the
documentary exhibits presented and identified by them, since their testimonies and 1. An order forthwith be issued re-opening the plaintiff’s case and setting the same
the said documentary exhibits are very relevant to prove the case of the [petitioner] in for trial any day in April 2000 for the sole purpose of introducing additional evidence
[Civil Case No. 0009]. and limited only to the marking and offering of the [Bane deposition] which already
forms part of the records and used in Civil Case No. 0130 x x x;
3. The adverse parties in the aforementioned incidents had the opportunity to cross-
examine them. 2. In the alternative, x x x the [Sandiganbayan] to take judicial notice of the facts
established by the [Bane deposition], together with the marked exhibits appended
thereto. [emphasis ours]
The respondents filed their respective Oppositions to the 1st motion;29 in turn, the petitioner
filed a Common Reply30 to these Oppositions.
On August 21, 2000, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a resolution35 (2000 resolution)
denying the petitioner’s 2nd motion:
Judicial notice is found under Rule 129 which is titled "What Need Not Be Proved." The resolution triggered the filing of the present petition.
Apparently, this provision refers to the Court’s duty to consider admissions made by the
parties in the pleadings, or in the course of the trial or other proceedings in resolving cases THE PETITION
before it. The duty of the Court is mandatory and in those cases where it is discretionary, the
initiative is upon the Court. Such being the case, the Court finds the Urgent Motion and/or The petitioner filed the present petition claiming that the Sandiganbayan committed grave
Request for Judicial Notice as something which need not be acted upon as the same is abuse of discretion:
considered redundant.
I.
On the matter of the [Bane deposition], [its] admission is done through the ordinary formal
offer of exhibits wherein the defendant is given ample opportunity to raise objection on
grounds provided by law. Definitely, it is not under Article (sic) 129 on judicial notice. x x x IN HOLDING THAT ITS INTERLOCUTORY ORDER IN 1998 HAD BECOME
[Emphasis ours] FINAL.

On November 6, 2000 and on several dates thereafter, the respondents separately filed their II.
respective demurrers to evidence.36 On the other hand, the petitioner moved for the
reconsideration of the 2000 resolution, but was rebuffed by the Sandiganbayan in its April 3, x x x IN x x x REFUSING TO ADMIT THE BANE DEPOSITION –WHICH WAS
2001 resolution37 (2001 resolution). ALREADY ADMITTED AS EVIDENCE IN AN INCIDENT CASE (CIVIL CASE NO.
0130) – AS PART OF PETITIONER’S EVIDENCE IN THE MAIN x x x CASE (CIVIL
IIc.  Motion to Admit Supplemental Offer of CASE NO. 0009).
Evidence (Re: Deposition of Maurice Bane)
III.
On November 16, 2001, the petitioner filed its 3rd Motion, seeking once more the admission
of the Bane deposition.38 On February 7, 2002 (pending resolution of the respondents’ x x x IN REFUSING TO ADMIT A HIGHLY RELEVANT AND IMPORTANT PIECE
demurrers to evidence),39 the Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed 2002 OF EVIDENCE FOR THE PETITIONER ON THE BASIS OF FLIMSY AND
resolution,40 denying the petitioner’s 3rd motion. The Sandiganbayan ruled: TENUOUS TECHNICAL GROUNDS.

But in the court’s view, it is not really a question of whether or not plaintiff has already rested The petitioner41 argues that the 1998 resolution of the Sandiganbayan is merely an
its case as to obviate the further presentation of evidence. It is not even a question of whether interlocutory order; thus, the petitioner’s failure to question this 1998 resolution could not
the non-appearing defendants are deemed to have waived their right to cross-examine Bane have given it a character of "finality" so long as the main case remains pending. 42 On this
as to qualify the admission of the deposition sans such cross-examination. Indeed, We do not basis, the petitioner concludes that the Sandiganbayan’s denial of its 3rd motion was plainly
see any need to dwell on these matters in view of this Court’s Resolution rendered on April 1, tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
1998 which already denied the introduction in evidence of Bane’s deposition and which has
become final in view of plaintiff’s failure to file any motion for reconsideration or On the issue of the Sandiganbayan’s refusal (in its 2002 resolution) either to take judicial
appeal within the 15-day reglementary period. Rightly or wrongly, the resolution stands notice of or to admit the Bane deposition as part of its evidence, the petitioner asserts that
and for this court to grant plaintiff’s motion at this point in time would in effect sanction Civil Case No. 0130 (where the Bane deposition was originally taken, introduced and
plaintiff’s disregard for the rules of procedure. Plaintiff has slept on its rights for almost two admitted in evidence) is but a "child" of the "parent" case, Civil Case No. 0009; under this
years and it was only in February of 2000 that it sought to rectify its ineptitude by filing a relationship, evidence offered and admitted in any of the "children" cases should be
motion to reopen its case as to enable it to introduce and offer Bane’s deposition as considered as evidence in the "parent" case.
additional evidence, or in the alternative for the court to take judicial notice of the allegations
of the deposition. But how can such a motion be granted when it has been resolved as early Lastly, the petitioner claims that given the crucial importance of the Bane deposition, the
as 1998 that the deposition is inadmissible. Without plaintiff having moved for reconsideration Sandiganbayan should not have denied its admission on "flimsy grounds," considering that:
within the reglementary period, the resolution has attained finality and its effect cannot be
undone by the simple expedient of filing a motion, which though purporting to be a novel
1. It was also already stated in the notice (of the taking of the Bane deposition) that it
motion, is in reality a motion for reconsideration of this court’s 1998 ruling. [emphases
would be used as evidence in Civil Case No. 0009. Notices having been duly served
ours]
 on all the parties concerned, they must accordingly be deemed to have waived their deposition should be done through the ordinary formal offer of evidence. Thus, the
right to cross-examine the witness when they failed to show up. Sandiganbayan seriously erred in considering the petitioner’s 3rd motion as a proscribed
motion for reconsideration. The petitioner generally submits that the dictates of substantial
2. The Bane deposition was a very vital cog in the case of the petitioner relative to its justice should have guided the Sandiganbayan to rule otherwise.
allegation that the respondents’ interest in ETPI and related firms properly belongs to
the government. The petitioner also clarifies that it has not yet rested its case although it has filed a formal
offer of evidence. A party normally rests his case only after the admission of the pieces of
3. The non-inclusion of the Bane deposition in the petitioner’s formal offer of evidence evidence he formally offered; before then, he still has the opportunity to present further
was obviously excusable considering the period that had lapsed from the time the evidence to substantiate his theory of the case should the court reject any piece of the offered
case was filed and the voluminous records that the present case has generated.43 evidence.50

THE RESPONDENTS’ COMMENTS The petitioner further maintains that the mere reasonable opportunity to cross-examine the
and THE PETITIONER’S REPLY deponent is sufficient for the admission of the Bane deposition considering that the deponent
is not an ordinary witness who can be easily summoned by our courts in light of his foreign
residence, his citizenship, and his advanced age. The petitioner asserts that Rule 24 (now
In the respondents’ Comments44 (filed in compliance with our Resolution of April 10, 2002 45 ),
Rule 23), and not Section 47, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court should apply to the present
they claim that the present petition was filed out of time - i.e., beyond the 60-day
case, as explicitly stated in the notice of the deposition-taking.
reglementary period prescribed under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.46 This
assertion proceeds from the view that the petitioner’s 3rd motion, being a mere rehash of
similar motions earlier filed by the petitioner, likewise simply assails the Sandiganbayan’s To date, respondents Imelda Marcos and the heirs of Potenciano Ilusorio have yet to file their
1998 resolution. Along the same line, they posit that the petitioner’s 3rd motion actually respective comments on the petition. Given the time that had lapsed since we required their
partakes of a proscribed third motion for reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan’s 1998 comments, we resolve to dispense with the filing of these comments and to consider this
resolution.47 They likewise assert, on the assumption that the 1998 resolution is interlocutory petition submitted for decision.
in character, that the petitioner’s failure to contest the resolution by way of certiorari  within the
proper period gave the 1998 resolution a character of "finality." THE ISSUES

The respondents further claim that after a party has rested its case, the admission of a On the basis of the pleadings, we summarize the pivotal issues for our resolution, as follows:
supplemental offer of evidence requires the reopening of the case at the discretion of the trial
court; the Sandiganbayan simply exercised its sound discretion in refusing to reopen the case 1. Whether the petition was filed within the required period.
since the evidence sought to be admitted was "within the knowledge of the [petitioner] and
available to [it] before [it] rested its case."48 The respondents also advert to the belated filing 2. Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion –
of the petitioner’s 3rd motion – i.e., after the respondents had filed their respective demurrers
to evidence.
i. In holding that the 1998 resolution has already attained finality;
On the petitioner’s claim of waiver, the respondents assert that they have not waived their
right to cross-examine the deponent; the Sandiganbayan recognized this right in its 1998 ii. In holding that the petitioner’s 3rd motion partakes of a prohibited motion
resolution and the petitioner never questioned this recognition. They also assert that the for reconsideration;
allegations in the Bane deposition cannot be a proper subject of judicial notice under Rule
129 of the Rules of Court. The respondents lastly submit that the Bane deposition is iii. In refusing to re-open the case given the critical importance of the Bane
inadmissible in evidence because the petitioner failed to comply with the requisites for deposition to the petitioner’s cause; and
admission under Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
iv. In refusing to admit the Bane deposition notwithstanding the prior
In its Reply,49 the petitioner defends the timeliness of the present petition by arguing that a consolidation of Civil Case No. 0009 and Civil Case No. 0130.
party may opt to wait out and collect a pattern of questionable acts before resorting to the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari. The petitioner stresses that it filed the 3rd motion precisely 3. Whether the Bane deposition is admissible under -
because of the Sandiganbayan’s 2000 resolution, which held that the admission of the Bane
 i. Rule 23, Section 4, par. (c) alone or in relation to Section 47, Rule 130 of the denial of the motion did not resolve the merits of the case, as something still had to be
the Rules of Court; and done to achieve this end.

ii. The principle of judicial notice. We clarify, too, that an interlocutory order remains under the control of the court until the case
is finally resolved on the merits. The court may therefore modify or rescind the order upon
THE COURT’S RULING sufficient grounds shown at any time before final judgment.55 In this light, the
Sandiganbayan’s 1998 resolution – which merely denied the adoption of the Bane deposition
as part of the evidence in Civil Case No. 0009 – could not have attained finality (in the
We deny the petition for lack of merit.
manner that a decision or final order resolving the case on the merits does) despite the
petitioner’s failure to move for its reconsideration or to appeal.56
I. Preliminary Considerations
I (b). The 3rd motion was not prohibited by the Rules.
I (a). The interlocutory nature of the Sandiganbayan’s 1998 resolution.
We also agree with the petitioner that its 3rd motion cannot be considered as a proscribed
In determining the appropriate remedy or remedies available, a party aggrieved by a court third (actually second) motion for reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan’s 1998 resolution. As
order, resolution or decision must first correctly identify the nature of the order, resolution or Section 5, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court clearly provides, the proscription against a second
decision he intends to assail.51 In this case, we must preliminarily determine whether the 1998 motion for reconsideration is directed against "a judgment or final  order." Although a second
resolution is "final" or "interlocutory" in nature. motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order can be denied on the ground that it is a
mere "rehash" of the arguments already passed upon and resolved by the court, it cannot be
Case law has conveniently demarcated the line between a final judgment or order and an rejected on the ground that it is forbidden by the law or by the rules as a prohibited motion.57
interlocutory one on the basis of the disposition made. 52 A judgment or order is considered
final if the order disposes of the action or proceeding completely, or terminates a particular I (c). The 1998 resolution was not ripe for a petition for certiorari.
stage of the same action; in such case, the remedy available to an aggrieved party is appeal.
If the order or resolution, however, merely resolves incidental matters and leaves something
Under Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an aggrieved party may appeal from a
more to be done to resolve the merits of the case, the order is interlocutory 53 and the
judgment or final order which completely disposes of a case or from an order that the Rules
aggrieved party’s remedy is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Jurisprudence pointedly
of Court declares to be appealable. While this provision prohibits an appeal from an
holds that:
interlocutory order, the aggrieved party is afforded the chance to question an interlocutory
order through a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65; the petition must be filed within
As distinguished from a final order which disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or sixty days from notice of the assailed judgment, order, resolution, or denial of a motion for
terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by reconsideration.
execution what has been determined by the court, an interlocutory order does not dispose of
a case completely, but leaves something more to be adjudicated upon. The term "final"
On the premise that the 1998 resolution is interlocutory in nature, the respondents insist that
judgment or order signifies a judgment or an order which disposes of the case as to all the
the 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari  should be reckoned from the petitioner’s
parties, reserving no further questions or directions for future determination.
notice of the Sandiganbayan’s 1998 resolution. They argue that since this ruling had long
been rendered by the court, the petitioner’s subsequent filing of similar motions was actually
On the other hand, a court order is merely interlocutory in character if it leaves substantial a devious attempt to resuscitate the long-denied admission of the Bane deposition.
proceedings yet to be had in connection with the controversy. It does not end the task of the
court in adjudicating the parties’ contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as
We do not find the respondents’ submission meritorious. While the 1998 resolution is an
against each other. In this sense, it is basically provisional in its application.54 (emphasis
interlocutory order, as correctly argued by the petitioner and impliedly conceded by the
supplied)
respondents, the claim that the 1998 resolution should have been immediately questioned by
the petitioner on certiorari is not totally correct as a petition for certiorari is not grounded
Under these guidelines, we agree with the petitioner that the 1998 resolution is interlocutory. solely on the issuance of a disputed interlocutory ruling.58 For a petition for certiorari to
The Sandiganbayan’s denial of the petitioner’s 1st motion through the 1998 Resolution came prosper, Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court requires, among others, that neither an
at a time when the petitioner had not even concluded the presentation of its evidence. Plainly, appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law is available
to the aggrieved party. As a matter of exception, the writ of certiorari may issue
notwithstanding the existence of an available alternative remedy, if such remedy is In its second and third motions, respectively, the petitioner expressly admitted that "due to
inadequate or insufficient in relieving the aggrieved party of the injurious effects of the order oversight, [the petitioner] closed and rested its case";68 and that it "had terminated the
complained of.59 presentation of its evidence in x x x Civil Case No. 0009."69 In the face of these
categorical judicial admissions,70 the petitioner cannot suddenly make an about-face and
We note that at the time of its 1st motion in Civil Case No. 0009, the petitioner had not yet insist on the introduction of evidence out of the usual order. Contrary to the petitioner’s
concluded the presentation of its evidence, much less made any formal offer of evidence. At assertion, the resting of its case could not have been conditioned on the admission of the
this stage of the case, the prematurity of using the extraordinary remedy of certiorari to evidence it formally offered. To begin with, the Bane deposition, which is the lone piece of
question the admission of the Bane deposition is obvious. After the denial of the 1st motion, evidence subject of this present petition, was not among the pieces of evidence included in its
the plain remedy available to the petitioner was to move for a reconsideration to assert and formal offer of evidence and thus could not have been admitted or rejected by the trial court.
even clarify its position on the admission of the Bane deposition. The petitioner could
introduce60 anew the Bane deposition and include this as evidence in its formal offer61 – as The Court observes with interest that it was only in this present petition for certiorari that the
the petitioner presumably did in Civil Case No. 0130. petitioner had firmly denied having rested its case. 71 Before then, the petitioner never found it
appropriate to question on certiorari the Sandiganbayan’s denial of its 2nd motion which
Thus, at that point, the case was not yet ripe for the filing of a petition for certiorari, and the prayed, inter alia, for the reopening of the case. This is a fatal defect in the petitioner’s case.
denial of the 1st motion could not have been the reckoning point for the period of filing such a
petition. Although the denial of the petitioner’s first motion did not necessitate an immediate recourse
to the corrective writ of certiorari, the denial of the 2nd motion dictated a different course of
II. The Sandiganbayan’s ruling on the finality of its 1998 resolution was legally action. The petitioner’s non-observance of the proper procedure for the admission of the
erroneous but did not constitute grave abuse of discretion Bane deposition, while seemingly innocuous, carried fatal implications for its case. Having
been rebuffed on its first attempt to have the Bane deposition adopted in Civil Case No. 0009,
and without seeking reconsideration of the denial, the petitioner presented its other pieces of
In light of the above discussions and conclusions, the Sandiganbayan undoubtedly erred on
evidence and eventually rested its case. This time, the petitioner forgot about the Bane
a question of law in its ruling, but this legal error did not necessarily amount to a grave
deposition and so failed to include that piece of evidence in its formal offer of evidence.
abuse of discretion in the absence of a clear showing that its action was a capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment affecting its exercise of jurisdiction.62 Without this showing,
the Sandiganbayan’s erroneous legal conclusion was only an error of judgment, or, at best, More than two years later, the petitioner again tried to squeeze in the Bane deposition into its
an abuse of discretion but not a grave one.  For this reason alone, the petition should be case. In resolving the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan’s 2000
dismissed. resolution, the Sandiganbayan held that the Bane deposition has "become part and parcel" of
Civil Case No. 0009. This pronouncement has obscured the real status of the Bane
deposition as evidence (considering that, earlier, the Sandiganbayan already denied the
Despite this conclusion, however, we opt not to immediately dismiss the petition in light of the
petitioner’s attempt to adopt the Bane deposition as evidence in Civil Case No. 0009 for the
unique circumstances of this case where the petitioner cannot entirely be faulted for not
deponent cannot be cross-examined in court). Nevertheless, the Sandiganbayan ultimately
availing of the remedy at the opportune time, and where the case, by its nature, is
denied the petitioner’s motion to reopen the case. Having judicially admitted the resting of its
undoubtedly endowed with public interest and has become a matter of public concern. 63 In
case, the petitioner should have already questioned the denial of its 2nd motion by way
other words, we opt to resolve the petition on the merits to lay the issues raised to rest and to
of certiorari, since the denial of its attempt to reopen the case effectively foreclosed all
avoid their recurrence in the course of completely resolving the merits of Civil Case No. 0009.
avenues available to it for the consideration of the Bane deposition. Instead of doing so,
however, the petitioner allowed the 60-day reglementary period, under Section 4, Rule
Although the word "rested" nowhere appears in the Rules of Court, ordinary court procedure 65 of the Rules of Court, to lapse, and proceeded to file its 3rd motion.
has inferred it from an overview of trial sequence under Section 5, Rule 30 (which capsulizes
the order of presentation of a
Significantly, the petitioner changed its legal position in its 3rd motion by denying having
64
rested its case and insisting on the introduction of the Bane deposition. Rebuffed once more,
party’s evidence during trial), read in relation to Rule 18 on Pre-Trial,  both of the Rules of the petitioner filed the present petition, inviting our attention to the Sandiganbayan’s
Court. Under Section 5, Rule 30, after a party has adduced his direct evidence in the course resolutions,72 which allegedly gave it "mixed signals."73 By pointing to these resolutions,
of discharging the burden of proof,65 he is considered to have rested his case, and is ironically, even the petitioner impliedly recognized that they were then already ripe for review
thereafter allowed to offer rebutting evidence only.66 Whether a party has rested his case in on certiorari. What the petitioner should have realized was that its 2nd motion unequivocally
some measure depends on his manifestation in court on whether he has concluded his aimed to reopen the case for the introduction of further evidence consisting of the Bane
presentation of evidence.67 deposition. Having been ultimately denied by the court, the petitioner could not have been
prevented from taking the proper remedy notwithstanding any perceived ambiguity in the show that the lower court’s action was attended by grave abuse of discretion. Settled
resolutions. jurisprudence has defined this term as the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment,
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or, the exercise of power in an arbitrary manner by reason of
On the other end, though, there was nothing intrinsically objectionable in the petitioner’s passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a
motion to reopen its case before the court ruled on its formal offer of evidence. The Rules of positive duty, to a virtual refusal to perform the mandated duty, or to act at all in
Court does not prohibit a party from requesting the court to allow it to present additional contemplation of the law.81 Grave abuse of discretion goes beyond the bare and unsupported
evidence even after it has rested its case. Any such opportunity, however, for the ultimate imputation of caprice, whimsicality or arbitrariness, and beyond allegations that merely
purpose of the admission of additional evidence is already addressed to the sound discretion constitute errors of judgment82 or mere abuse of discretion.83
of the court. It is from the prism of the exercise of this discretion that the Sandiganbayan’s
refusal to reopen the case (for the purpose of introducing, "marking and offering" additional In Lopez v. Liboro,84 we had occasion to make the following pronouncement:
evidence) should be viewed. We can declare this Sandiganbayan action invalid if it had acted
with grave abuse of discretion. After the parties have produced their respective direct proofs, they are allowed to offer
rebutting evidence only, but, it has been held, the court, for good reasons, in the furtherance
III. The Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in ultimately refusing to reopen of justice, may permit them to offer evidence upon their original case, and its ruling will not be
the case for the purpose of introducing and admitting in evidence the Bane deposition disturbed in the appellate court where no abuse of discretion appears. So, generally,
additional evidence is allowed when it is newly discovered, or where it has been omitted
The basis for a motion to reopen a case to introduce further evidence is Section 5, Rule 30 of through inadvertence or mistake, or where the purpose of the evidence is to correct
the Rules of Court, which reads: evidence previously offered. The omission to present evidence on the testator's knowledge of
Spanish had not been deliberate. It was due to a misapprehension or oversight. (citations
omitted; emphases ours)
Sec. 5. Order of trial. – Subject to the provisions of section 2 of Rule 31, and unless the court
for special reasons otherwise directs, the trial shall be limited to the issues stated in the pre-
trial order and shall proceed as follows: Likewise, in Director of Lands v. Roman Archbishop of Manila,85 we ruled:

xxxx The strict rule is that the plaintiff must try his case out when he commences. Nevertheless, a
relaxation of the rule is permitted in the sound discretion of the court. "The proper rule for the
exercise of this discretion," it has been said by an eminent author, "is, that material
(f) The parties may then respectively adduce rebutting evidence only, unless the court,
testimony should not be excluded because offered by the plaintiff after the defendant
for good reasons and in the furtherance of justice, permits them to adduce evidence
has rested, although not in rebuttal, unless it has been kept back by a trick, and for the
upon their original case[.] [emphases ours]
purpose of deceiving the defendant and affecting his case injuriously."
Under this rule, a party who has the burden of proof must introduce, at the first instance, all
These principles find their echo in Philippine remedial law. While the general rule is rightly
the evidence he relies upon74 and such evidence cannot be given piecemeal.75 The obvious
recognized, the Code of Civil Procedure authorizes the judge "for special reasons," to change
rationale of the requirement is to avoid injurious surprises to the other party and the
the order of the trial, and "for good reason, in the furtherance of justice," to permit the parties
consequent delay in the administration of justice.76
"to offer evidence upon their original case." These exceptions are made stronger when one
considers the character of registration proceedings and the fact that where so many parties
A party’s declaration of the completion of the presentation of his evidence prevents him from are involved, and action is taken quickly and abruptly, conformity with precise legal rules
introducing further evidence;77 but where the evidence is rebuttal in character, whose should not always be expected. Even at the risk of violating legal formulæ, an
necessity, for instance, arose from the shifting of the burden of evidence from one party to the opportunity should be given to parties to submit additional corroborative evidence in
other;78 or where the evidence sought to be presented is in the nature of newly support of their claims of title, if the ends of justice so require. (emphases ours)
discovered evidence,79 the party’s right to introduce further evidence must be recognized.
Otherwise, the aggrieved party may avail of the remedy of certiorari.
In his commentaries, Chief Justice Moran had this to say:
80
Largely, the exercise of the court’s discretion  under the exception of Section 5(f), Rule 30 of
However, the court for good reasons, may, in the furtherance of justice, permit the parties to
the Rules of Court depends on the attendant facts – i.e., on whether the evidence would
offer evidence upon their original case, and its ruling will not be disturbed where no abuse of
qualify as a "good reason" and be in furtherance of "the interest of justice." For a reviewing
court to properly interfere with the lower court’s exercise of discretion, the petitioner must
discretion appears, Generally, additional evidence is allowed when x x x; but it may be Rule 31
properly disallowed where it was withheld deliberately and without justification.86 Consolidation or Severance

The weight of the exception is also recognized in foreign jurisprudence.87 Section 1. Consolidation. – When actions involving a common question of law or fact are
pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue
Under these guidelines, we hold that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders
refusing to reopen the case. Instead of squarely ruling on the petitioner’s 2nd motion to avoid concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or
any uncertainty on the evidentiary status of the Bane deposition, the Sandiganbayan’s action delay.94 (emphases ours)
actually left the petitioner’s concern in limbo by considering the petitioner’s motion
"redundant." This is tantamount to a refusal to undertake a positive duty as mandated by the Consolidation is a procedural device granted to the court as an aid in deciding how cases in
circumstances and is equivalent to an act outside the contemplation of law. its docket are to be tried so that the business of the court may be dispatched expeditiously
and with economy while providing justice to the parties. To promote this end, the rule permits
It has not escaped our notice that at the time the petitioner moved to re-open its case, the the consolidation and a single trial of several cases in the court’s docket, or the consolidation
respondents had not yet even presented their evidence in chief. The respondents, therefore, of issues within those cases.95
would not have been prejudiced by allowing the petitioner’s introduction of the Bane
deposition, which was concededly omitted "through oversight." 88 The higher interest of A reading of Rule 31 of the Rules of Court easily lends itself to two observations. First, Rule
substantial justice, of course, is another consideration that cannot be taken lightly.89 31 is completely silent on the effect/s of consolidation on the cases consolidated; on the
parties and the causes of action involved; and on the evidence presented in the consolidated
In light of these circumstances, the Sandiganbayan should not have perfunctorily applied cases. Second, while Rule 31 gives the court the discretion either to order a joint hearing or
Section 5, Rule 30 of the Rules of Court on the petitioner’s request to reopen the case for the trial, or to order the actions consolidated, jurisprudence will show that the term "consolidation"
submission of the Bane deposition. is used generically and even synonymously with joint hearing or trial of several causes. 96 In
fact, the title "consolidation" of Rule 31 covers all the different senses of consolidation, as
discussed below.
On the basis of this conclusion, a remand of this case should follow as a matter of course.
The state of the parties’ submissions and the delay that has already attended this aspect of
Civil Case No. 0009, however, dictate against this obvious course of action. At this point, the These observations are not without practical reason. Considering that consolidation is
parties have more than extensively argued for or against the admission of the Bane basically a function given to the court, the latter is in the best position to determine for itself
deposition. Civil Case No. 0009 is a 25-year old sequestration case that is now crying out for (given the nature of the cases, the complexity of the issues involved, the parties affected, and
complete resolution. Admissibility, too, is an issue that would have again been raised on the court’s capability and resources vis-à-vis all the official business pending before it, among
remand and would surely stare us in the face after remand. 90 We are thus left with no choice other things) what "consolidation" will bring, bearing in mind the rights of the parties
but to resolve the issue of admissibility of the Bane deposition here and now. appearing before it.

IV. The admissibility of the Bane deposition To disregard the kind of consolidation effected by the Sandiganbayan on the simple and
convenient premise that the deposition-taking took place after the Sandiganbayan ordered
the consolidation is to beg the question. It is precisely the silence of our Rules of Procedure
IV (a). The consolidation of Civil Case No. 0009 and Civil Case No. 0130 did not
and the dearth of applicable case law on the effect of "consolidation" that strongly compel this
dispense with the usual requisites of admissibility
Court to determine the kind of "consolidation" effected to directly resolve the very issue of
admissibility in this case.
In support of its 3rd motion, the petitioner argues that the Bane deposition can be admitted in
evidence without observing the provisions of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of
In the context of legal procedure, the term "consolidation" is used in three different senses:97
Court.91 The petitioner claims that in light of the prior consolidation of Civil Case No. 0009 and
Civil Case No. 0130, among others,92 the "former case or proceeding" that Section 47, Rule
130 speaks of no longer exists. (1) Where all except one of several actions are stayed until one is tried, in which case
the judgment in the one trial is conclusive as to the others. This is not actually
consolidation but is referred to as such. (quasi-consolidation)98
Rule 31 of the old Rules of Court93 – the rule in effect at the time Civil Case Nos. 0009 and
0130 were consolidated – provided that:
 (2) Where several actions are combined into one, lose their separate identity, and before the Sandiganbayan itself and despite the aforementioned considerations) results in an
become a single action in which a single judgment is rendered. This is illustrated by a outright deprivation of the petitioner’s right to due process. We reach this conclusion
situation where several actions are pending between the same parties stating claims especially where the evidence sought to be admitted is not simply a testimony taken in one of
which might have been set out originally in one complaint. (actual consolidation)99 the several cases, but a deposition upon oral examination taken in another jurisdiction and
whose admission is governed by specific provisions on our rules on evidence.
(3) Where several actions are ordered to be tried together but each retains its
separate character and requires the entry of a separate judgment. This type of We stress on this point, too, that while the Sandiganbayan ordered the consolidation in 1993
consolidation does not merge the suits into a single action, or cause the parties to (that is, before the deposition was taken), neither does the Pre-Trial Order107 issued by the
one action to be parties to the other. (consolidation for trial)100 Sandiganbayan in 1997 in Civil Case No. 0009 contain any reference, formal or substantive,
to Civil Case No. 0130.108 Interestingly, in its Pre-Trial Brief dated August 30, 1996,109 the
Considering that the Sandiganbayan’s order101 to consolidate several incident cases does not petitioner even made a representation to present Bane as one of its witnesses.
at all provide a hint on the extent of the court’s exercise of its discretion as to the effects of
the consolidation it ordered – in view of the function of this procedural device to principally aid WON Bane deposition is admissible in evidence. NO
the court itself in dealing with its official business – we are compelled to look deeper into the
voluminous records of the proceedings conducted below. We note that there is nothing that IV (b). Use of deposition under Section 4, Rule 23 and as a former testimony under
would even suggest that the Sandiganbayan in fact intended a merger of causes of action, Section 47, Rule 130
parties and evidence.102 To be sure, there would have been no need for a motion to adopt
(which did not remain unopposed) the testimonies in the incident cases had a merger actually Since the present consolidation did not affect Civil Case No. 0130 as an original, albeit
resulted from the order of consolidation, for in that case, the Sandiganbayan can already take incidental, case, the admissibility of the Bane deposition cannot avoid being measured
judicial notice of the same. against the requirements of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court – the rule on the
admissibility of testimonies or deposition taken in a different proceeding. In this regard, the
Significantly, even the petitioner itself viewed consolidation, at most, to be merely a petitioner argues that Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court (then Rule 24)110 must, at any
consolidation for trial.103 Accordingly, despite the consolidation in 1993, the petitioner acceded rate, prevail over Section 47, Rule 130111 of the same Rules.
to the Sandiganbayan’s 1998 Resolution (which denied the petitioner’s 1st Motion on the
ground that the witnesses, whose testimony in the incident cases is sought to be adopted, At the outset, we note that when the petitioner’s motion to adopt the testimonies taken in the
"are not available for cross-examination in" the Sandiganbayan) by presenting these other incident cases drew individual oppositions from the respondents, the petitioner represented to
witnesses again in the main case, so that the respondents can cross-examine them. the Sandiganbayan its willingness to comply with the provisions of Section 47, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court,112 and, in fact, again presented some of the witnesses. The petitioner’s
These considerations run counter to the conclusion that the Sandiganbayan’s order of about-face two years thereafter even contributed to the Sandiganbayan’s own inconsistency
consolidation had actually resulted in the complete merger of the incident cases with the main on how to treat the Bane deposition, in particular, as evidence.
case, in the sense of actual consolidation, and that the parties in these consolidated cases
had (at least constructively) been aware of and had allowed actual consolidation without Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court on "Deposition Pending Action" (deposition de bene
objection.104 esse) provides for the circumstances when depositions may be used in the trial, or at the
hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding.
Considering, too, that the consolidated actions were originally independent of one another
and the fact that in the present case the party respondents to Civil Case No. 0009 (an action SEC. 4. Use of depositions. — At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an
for reconveyance, accounting, restitution and damages) are not parties to Civil Case No. interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the
0130 (a special civil action filed by an ETPI stockholder involving a corporate squabble within rules of evidence, may be used against any party who was present or represented at the
ETPI), the conclusion that the Sandiganbayan in fact intended an actual consolidation and, taking of the deposition or who had due notice thereof, in accordance with any one of the
together with the parties affected,105 acted towards that end - where the actions become fused following provisions:
and unidentifiable from one another and where the evidence appreciated in one action is also
appreciated in another action – must find support in the proceedings held below. This is
particularly true in a case with the magnitude and complexity of the present case. Otherwise, xxxx
to impose upon the respondents the effects of an actual consolidation (which find no clear
support in the provisions of the Rules of Court, jurisprudence, 106 and even in the proceedings (c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any
purpose if the court finds: (1) that the witness is dead; or (2) that the witness resides at a
distance more than one hundred (100) kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is out Examination to be done in open court. — The examination of witnesses presented in a trial
of the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was procured by the party offering the or hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is
deposition; or (3) that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness, incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of
infirmity, or imprisonment; or (4) that the party offering the deposition has been unable to the witness shall be given orally.
procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena; or (5) upon application and notice, that
such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the interest of justice and Indeed, any deposition offered to prove the facts set forth therein, in lieu of the actual oral
with due regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open testimony of the deponent in open court, may be opposed by the adverse party and excluded
court, to allow the deposition to be used[.] [emphasis ours] under the hearsay rule – i.e., that the adverse party had or has no opportunity to cross-
examine the deponent at the time that his testimony is offered. That opportunity for cross-
On the other hand, Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides: examination was afforded during the taking of the deposition alone is no argument, as the
opportunity for cross-examination must normally be accorded a party at the time that the
SEC. 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding.  – The testimony or deposition testimonial evidence is actually presented against him during the trial or hearing of a
of a witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or case.116 However, under certain conditions and for certain limited purposes laid down in
administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, the deposition may be used without the deponent
evidence against the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him. being actually called to the witness stand.117

A plain reading of Rule 23 of the Rules of Court readily rejects the petitioner’s position that Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is an entirely different provision. While a former
the Bane deposition can be admitted into evidence without observing the requirements of testimony or deposition appears under the Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule, the classification
Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. of former testimony or deposition as an admissible hearsay is not universally conceded.118 A
fundamental characteristic of hearsay evidence is the adverse party’s lack of opportunity to
cross-examine the out-of-court declarant. However, Section 47, Rule 130 explicitly
Before a party can make use of the deposition taken at the trial of a pending action, Section
requires, inter alia, for the admissibility of a former testimony or deposition that the adverse
4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court does not only require due observance of its sub-paragraphs
party must have had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness or the deponent in the prior
(a) to (d); it also requires, as a condition for admissibility, compliance with "the rules on
proceeding.
evidence." Thus, even Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court makes an implied reference to
Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court before the deposition may be used in evidence.
By reading Rule 23 in isolation, the petitioner failed to recognize that the principle conceding This opportunity to cross-examine though is not the ordinary cross-examination 119 afforded an
admissibility to a deposition under Rule 23 should be consistent with the rules on evidence adverse party in usual trials regarding "matters stated in the direct examination or connected
under Section 47, Rule 130.113 In determining the admissibility of the Bane deposition, therewith." Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court contemplates a different kind of cross-
therefore, reliance cannot be given on one provision to the exclusion of the examination, whether actual or a mere opportunity, whose adequacy depends on the
other; both  provisions must be considered. This is particularly true in this case where the requisite identity of issues in the former case or proceeding and in the present case where
evidence in the prior proceeding does not simply refer to a witness’ testimony in open court the former testimony or deposition is sought to be introduced.
but to a deposition taken under another and farther jurisdiction.
Section 47, Rule 130 requires that the issues involved in both cases must, at least, be
A common thread that runs from Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court and Section 47, substantially the same; otherwise, there is no basis in saying that the former statement was -
Rule 130 of the same Rules is their mutual reference to depositions. or would have been - sufficiently tested by cross-examination or by an opportunity to do
so.120 (The requirement of similarity though does not mean that all the issues in the two
proceedings should be the same.121 Although some issues may not be the same in the two
A deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery whose primary function is to supplement the
actions, the admissibility of a former testimony on an issue which is similar in both actions
pleadings for the purpose of disclosing the real points of dispute between the parties and
cannot be questioned.122 )
affording an adequate factual basis during the preparation for trial.114 Since depositions are
principally made available to the parties as a means of informing themselves of all the
relevant facts, depositions are not meant as substitute for the actual testimony in open court These considerations, among others, make Section 47, Rule 130 a distinct rule on evidence
of a party or witness. Generally, the deponent must be presented for oral examination in open and therefore should not be confused with the general provisions on deposition under Rule
court at the trial or hearing. This is a requirement of the rules on evidence under Section 1, 23 of the Rules of Court. In other words, even if the petitioner complies with Rule 23 of the
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.115 Rules of Court on the use of depositions, the observance of Section 47, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court cannot simply be avoided or disregarded.
Undisputably, the Sandiganbayan relied on the Bane deposition, taken in Civil Case No. The phrase "unable to testify" appearing in both Rule 23 and Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
0130, for purposes of this very same case. Thus, what the petitioner established and what the refers to a physical inability to appear at the witness stand and to give a testimony.127 Hence
Sandiganbayan found, for purposes of using the Bane deposition, refer only to the notwithstanding the deletion of the phrase "out of the Philippines," which previously appeared
circumstances laid down under Section 4(c), Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, not necessarily to in Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, absence from jurisdiction128 - the petitioner’s
those of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as a distinct rule on evidence that excuse for the non-presentation of Bane in open court - may still constitute inability to testify
imposes further requirements in the use of depositions in a different case or proceeding. In under the same rule. This is not to say, however, that resort to deposition on this instance of
other words, the prior use of the deposition under Section 4(c), Rule 23 cannot be taken as unavailability will always be upheld. Where the deposition is taken not for discovery purposes,
compliance with Section 47, Rule 130 which considers the same deposition as hearsay, but to accommodate the deponent, then the deposition should be rejected in evidence.129
unless the requisites for its admission under this rule are observed. The aching question is
whether the petitioner complied with the latter rule. Although the testimony of a witness has been given in the course of a former proceeding
between the parties to a case on trial, this testimony alone is not a ground for its admission in
Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court lays down the following requisites for evidence. The witness himself, if available, must be produced in court as if he were
the  admission of a testimony or deposition given at a former case or proceeding. testifying de novo since his testimony given at the former trial is mere hearsay.130 The
deposition of a witness, otherwise available, is also inadmissible for the same reason.
1. The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or otherwise unable to testify;
Indeed, the Sandiganbayan’s reliance on the Bane deposition in the other case (Civil Case
2. The testimony was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative; No. 0130) is an argument in favor of the requisite unavailability of the witness. For purposes
of the present  case (Civil Case No. 0009), however, the Sandiganbayan would have no basis
to presume, and neither can or should we, that the previous condition, which previously
3. Involving the same parties;
allowed the use of the deposition, remains and would thereby justify the use of the same
deposition in another case or proceeding, even if the other case or proceeding is before the
4. Relating to the same matter; same court. Since the basis for the admission of the Bane deposition, in principle, being
necessity,131 the burden of establishing its existence rests on the party who seeks the
5. The adverse party having had the opportunity to cross-examine him.123 admission of the evidence. This burden cannot be supplanted by assuming the continuity of
the previous condition or conditions in light of the general rule against the non-presentation of
The reasons for the admissibility of testimony or deposition taken at a former trial or the deponent in court.132
proceeding are the necessity for the testimony and its trustworthiness.124 However, before
the former testimony or deposition can be introduced in evidence, the proponent must first lay IV (d). The requirement of opportunity of the adverse party to cross-examine; identity
the proper predicate therefor,125 i.e., the party must establish the basis for the admission of of parties; and identity of subject matter
the Bane deposition in the realm of admissible evidence. This basis is the prior issue that we
must now examine and resolve. The function of cross-examination is to test the truthfulness of the statements of a witness
made on direct examination.133 The opportunity of cross-examination has been regarded as
IV (c). Unavailability of witness an essential safeguard of the accuracy and completeness of a testimony. In civil cases, the
right of cross-examination is absolute, and is not a mere privilege of the party against whom a
For the admission of a former testimony or deposition, Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of witness may be called.134 This right is available, of course, at the taking of depositions, as well
Court simply requires, inter alia, that the witness or deponent be "deceased or unable to as on the examination of witnesses at the trial. The principal justification for the general
testify." On the other hand, in using a deposition that was taken during the pendency of an exclusion of hearsay statements and for the admission, as an exception to the hearsay rule,
action, Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court provides several grounds that will justify of reported testimony taken at a former hearing where the present adversary was afforded
dispensing with the actual testimony of the deponent in open court and specifies, inter alia, the opportunity to cross-examine, is based on the premise that the opportunity of cross-
the circumstances of the deponent’s inability to attend or testify, as follows: examination is an essential safeguard135 against falsehoods and frauds.

(3) that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or In resolving the question of whether the requirement of opportunity to cross-examine has
imprisonment[.] [emphases ours]126 been satisfied, we have to consider first the required identity of parties as the present
opponent to the admission of the Bane deposition to whom the opportunity to cross-examine
the deponent is imputed may not after all be the same "adverse party" who actually had such The provision explicitly vesting in the court the power to order that the deposition shall not be
opportunity. taken connotes the authority to exercise discretion on the matter. However, the discretion
conferred by law is not unlimited. It must be exercised, not arbitrarily or oppressively, but in a
To render the testimony of a witness admissible at a later trial or action, the parties to the first reasonable manner and in consonance with the spirit of he law. The courts should always see
proceeding must be the same as the parties to the later proceeding. Physical identity, to it that the safeguards for the protection of the parties and deponents are firmly maintained.
however, is not required; substantial identity136 or identity of interests137 suffices, as where the As aptly stated by Chief Justice Moran:
subsequent proceeding is between persons who represent the parties to the prior proceeding
by privity in law, in blood, or in estate. The term "privity" denotes mutual or successive . . . . (T)his provision affords the adverse party, as well as the deponent, sufficient protection
relationships to the same rights of property.138 against abuses that may be committed by a party in the exercise of his unlimited right to
discovery. As a writer said: "Any discovery involves a prying into another person's affairs —
In the present case, the petitioner failed to impute, much less establish, the identity of interest prying that is quite justified if it is to be a legitimate aid to litigation, but not justified if it is not
or privity between the then opponent, Africa, and the present opponents, the respondents. to be such an aid." For this reason, courts are given ample powers to forbid discovery which
While Africa is the son of the late respondent Jose Africa, at most, the deposition should be is intended not as an aid to litigation, but merely to annoy, embarrass or oppress either the
admissible only against him as an ETPI stockholder who filed the certiorari petition docketed deponent or the adverse party, or both. (emphasis ours)
as Civil Case No. 0130 (and, unavoidably, as successor-in-interest of the late respondent
Jose Africa). While Africa and the respondents are all ETPI stockholders, this commonality In the present case, not only did the Sandiganbayan fail to rule on respondent Enrile’s
does not establish at all any privity between them for purposes of binding the latter to the acts Opposition (which is equally applicable to his co-respondents), it also failed to provide even
or omissions of the former respecting the cross-examination of the deponent. The the bare minimum "safeguards for the protection of," (more so) non-parties,147 and to ensure
sequestration of their shares does not result in the integration of their rights and obligations that these safeguards are firmly maintained. Instead, the Sandiganbayan simply bought the
as stockholders which remain distinct and personal to them, vis-a-vis other stockholders.139 petitioner’s assertion (that the taking of Bane deposition is a matter of right) and treated the
lingering concerns – e.g., reasonability of the notice; and the non-party status of the
IV (d1). The respondents’ notice of taking of Bane deposition is insufficient evidence of waiver respondents in Civil Case No. 0130 - at whose incident (docketed as G.R. No. 107789) the
Bane deposition was taken - rather perfunctorily to the prejudice of the respondents.
The petitioner staunchly asserts that the respondents have waived their right to cross-
examine the deponent for their failure to appear at the deposition-taking despite individual In conjunction with the order of consolidation, the petitioner’s reliance on the prior notice on
notices previously sent to them.140 the respondents, as adequate opportunity for cross-examination, cannot override the non-
party status of the respondents in Civil Case No. 0130 – the effect of consolidation being
merely for trial. As non-parties, they cannot be bound by proceedings in that case.
In its first Notice to Take Oral Deposition of Mr. Maurice V. Bane dated August 30,
Specifically, they cannot be bound by the taking of the Bane deposition without the
1996,141 the petitioner originally intended to depose Mr. Bane on September 25-26 1996.
consequent impairment of their right of cross-examination.148 Opportunity for cross-
Because it failed to specify in the notice the purpose for taking Mr. Bane’s deposition, the
examination, too, even assuming its presence, cannot be singled out as basis for the
petitioner sent a Second Amended Notice to Take Deposition of Mr. Maurice V. Bane Upon
admissibility of a former testimony or deposition since such admissibility is also anchored on
Oral Examination where it likewise moved the scheduled deposition-taking to October 23-26,
the requisite identity of parties. To reiterate, although the Sandiganbayan considered the
1996.
Bane deposition in resolving Civil Case No. 0130, its action was premised on Africa’s status
as a party in that case where the Bane deposition was taken.
The records show that Africa moved several times for protective orders against the intended
deposition of Maurice Bane.142 On the other hand, among the respondents, only respondent
Corollarily, the idea of privity also permeates Rule 23 of the Rules of Court through its Section
Enrile appears to have filed an Opposition143 to the petitioner’s first notice, where he squarely
5 which provides:
raised the issue of reasonability of the petitioner’s nineteen-day first notice. While the
Sandiganbayan denied Africa’s motion for protective orders,144 it strikes us that no ruling was
ever handed down on respondent Enrile’s Opposition.145 Effect of substitution of parties.  — Substitution of parties does not affect the right to use
depositions previously taken; and, when an action has been dismissed and another action
involving the same subject is afterward brought between the same parties or their
It must be emphasized that even under Rule 23, the admission of the deposition upon oral
representatives or successors in interest, all depositions lawfully taken and duly filed in the
examination is not simply based on the fact of prior notice on the individual sought to be
former action may be used in the latter as if originally taken therefor. [italics and underscoring
bound thereby. In Northwest Airlines v. Cruz, 146 we ruled that -
ours]
In light of these considerations, we reject the petitioner’s claim that the respondents waived deposition and proceed with the deposition immediately upon securing a favorable ruling
their right to cross-examination when they failed to attend the taking of the Bane deposition. thereon. On that occasion, where the respondents would have a chance to be heard, the
Incidentally, the respondents’ vigorous insistence on their right to cross-examine the respondents cannot avoid a resultant waiver of their right of cross-examination if they still fail
deponent speaks loudly that they never intended any waiver of this right. to appear at the deposition-taking. Fundamental fairness dictates this course of action. It
must be stressed that not only were the respondents non-parties to Civil Case No. 0130, they
Interestingly, the petitioner’s notice of the deposition-taking relied on Rule 23 of the Rules of likewise have no interest in Africa’s certiorari petition asserting his right as an ETPI
Court. Section 15 of this rule reads: stockholder.

Deposition upon oral examination; notice; time and place. — A party desiring to take the Setting aside the petitioner’s flip-flopping on its own representations,151 this Court can only
deposition of any person upon oral examination shall give reasonable notice in writing to express dismay on why the petitioner had to let Bane leave the Philippines before taking his
every other party to the action. The notice shall state the time and place for taking the deposition despite having knowledge already of the substance of what he would testify on.
deposition and the name and address of each person to be examined, if known, and if the Considering that the testimony of Bane is allegedly a "vital cog" in the petitioner’s case
name is not known, a general description sufficient to identify him or the particular class or against the respondents, the Court is left to wonder why the petitioner had to take the
group to which he belongs. On motion of any party upon whom the notice is served, the court deposition in an incident case (instead of the main case) at a time when it became the
may for cause shown enlarge or shorten the time. technical right of the petitioner to do so.

Under this provision, we do not believe that the petitioner could reasonably expect that the V. The petitioner cannot rely on principle of judicial notice
individual notices it sent to the respondents would be sufficient to bind them to the conduct of
the then opponent’s (Africa’s) cross-examination since, to begin with, they were not even The petitioner also claims that since the Bane deposition had already been previously
parties to the action. Additionally, we observe that in the notice of the deposition taking, introduced and admitted in Civil Case No. 0130, then the Sandiganbayan should have taken
conspicuously absent was any indication sufficient to forewarn the notified persons that their judicial notice of the Bane deposition as part of its evidence.
inexcusable failure to appear at the deposition taking would amount to a waiver of their right
of cross-examination, without prejudice to the right of the respondents to raise their objections Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts that judges may properly take and act on
at the appropriate time.149 We would be treading on dangerous grounds indeed were we to without proof because these facts are already known to them.152 Put differently, it is the
hold that one not a party to an action, and neither in privity nor in substantial identity of assumption by a court of a fact without need of further traditional evidentiary support. The
interest with any of the parties in the same action, can be bound by the action or principle is based on convenience and expediency in securing and introducing evidence on
omission of the latter, by the mere expedient of a notice. Thus, we cannot simply deduce matters which are not ordinarily capable of dispute and are not bona fide disputed.153
a resultant waiver from the respondents’ mere failure to attend the deposition-taking despite
notice sent by the petitioner. The foundation for judicial notice may be traced to the civil and canon law
maxim, manifesta (or notoria) non indigent probatione.154 The taking of judicial notice means
Lastly, we see no reason why the Bane deposition could not have been taken earlier in Civil that the court will dispense with the traditional form of presentation of evidence. In so doing,
Case No. 0009 – the principal action where it was sought to be introduced – while Bane was the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it would not be disputed.
still here in the Philippines. We note in this regard that the Philippines was no longer under
the Marcos administration and had returned to normal democratic processes when Civil Case The concept of judicial notice is embodied in Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
No. 0009 was filed. In fact, the petitioner’s notice itself states that the "purpose of the Rule 129 either requires the court to take judicial notice, inter alia, of "the official acts of the x
deposition is for Mr. Maurice Bane to identify and testify on the facts set forth in his Affidavit," x x judicial departments of the Philippines,"155 or gives the court the discretion to take judicial
which Mr. Bane had long executed in 1991 in Makati, Metro Manila. 150 Clearly, a deposition notice of matters "ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions." 156 On the
could then have been taken - without compromising the respondents’ right to cross-examine other hand, a party-litigant may ask the court to take judicial notice of any matter and the
a witness against them - considering that the principal purpose of the deposition is chiefly a court may allow the parties to be heard on the propriety of taking judicial notice of the matter
mode of discovery. These, to our mind, are avoidable omissions that, when added to the involved.157 In the present case, after the petitioner filed its Urgent Motion and/or Request for
deficient handling of the present matter, add up to the gross deficiencies of the petitioner in Judicial Notice, the respondents were also heard through their corresponding oppositions.
the handling of Civil Case No. 0009.
In adjudicating a case on trial, generally, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of
After failing to take Bane’s deposition in 1991 and in view of the peculiar circumstances of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are
this case, the least that the petitioner could have done was to move for the taking of the Bane
pending in the same court, and notwithstanding that both cases may have been tried or are VI. Summation
actually pending before the same judge.158 This rule though admits of exceptions.
To recapitulate, we hold that: (1) the Sandiganbayan’s denial of the petitioner’s 3rd motion –
As a matter of convenience to all the parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the the Motion to Admit Supplemental Offer of Evidence (Re: Deposition of Maurice Bane) – was
original record of a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case pending before a legal error that did not amount to grave abuse of discretion; (2) the Sandiganbayan’s refusal
it, when, with the knowledge of, and absent an objection from, the adverse to reopen the case at the petitioner’s instance was tainted with grave abuse of discretion; and
party, reference is made to it for that purpose, by name and number or in some other (3) notwithstanding the grave abuse of discretion, the petition must ultimately fail as the Bane
manner by which it is sufficiently designated; or when the original record of the former case or deposition is not admissible under the rules of evidence.165
any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives at the court's direction, at the request or
with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the case then VII. Refutation of Justice Carpio’s Last Minute Modified Dissent
pending.159
At the last minute, Justice Carpio circulated a modified dissent, quoting the Bane deposition.
Courts must also take judicial notice of the records of another case or cases, where sufficient His covering note states:
basis exists in the records of the case before it, warranting the dismissal of the latter case.160
I have revised my dissenting opinion to include the Bane deposition so that the Court and the
The issue before us does not involve the applicability of the rule on mandatory taking of public will understand what the Bane deposition is all about. (underlining added)
judicial notice; neither is the applicability of the rule on discretionary taking of judicial notice
seriously pursued. Rather, the petitioner approaches the concept of judicial notice from a In light of this thrust, a discussion refuting the modified dissent is in order.
genealogical perspective of treating whatever evidence offered in any of the "children" cases
– Civil Case 0130 – as evidence in the "parent" case – Civil Case 0009 - or "of the whole
family of cases."161 To the petitioner, the supposed relationship of these cases warrants the First: Contents of the Bane deposition not an Issue. The dissent perfectly identified what is at
taking of judicial notice. issue in this case – i.e., the admissibility of the Bane deposition. Admissibility is concerned
with the competence and relevance166 of the evidence, whose admission is sought. While the
dissent quoted at length the Bane deposition, it may not be amiss to point out that the
We strongly disagree. First, the supporting cases162 the petitioner cited are inapplicable either relevance of the Bane deposition (or, to adopt the dissent’s characterization, whether
because these cases involve only a single proceeding or an exception to the rule, which "Maurice V. Bane is a vital witness") is not an issue here unless it can be established first that
proscribes the courts from taking judicial notice of the contents of the records of other the Bane deposition is a competent evidence.
cases.163 Second, the petitioner’s proposition is obviously obnoxious to a system of orderly
procedure. The petitioner itself admits that the present case has generated a lot of cases,
which, in all likelihood, involve issues of varying complexity. If we follow the logic of the Second: Misrepresentation of Cited Authority. The dissent insists that "in Philippine
petitioner’s argument, we would be espousing judicial confusion by indiscriminately allowing Jurisprudence, the consolidation of cases merges the different actions into one and the rights
the admission of evidence in one case, which was presumably found competent and relevant of the parties are adjudicated in a single judgment," citing Vicente J. Francisco. In our
in another case, simply based on the supposed lineage of the cases. It is the duty of the discussion on consolidation, we footnoted the following in response to the dissent’s position,
petitioner, as a party-litigant, to properly lay before the court the evidence it relies upon in which we will restate here for emphasis:
support of the relief it seeks, instead of imposing that same duty on the court. We invite the
petitioner’s attention to our prefatory pronouncement in Lopez v. Sandiganbayan:164 In the 1966 edition of Vicente J. Francisco’s Revised Rules of Court, Francisco wrote:

Down the oft-trodden path in our judicial system, by common sense, tradition and the law, the The effect of consolidation of actions is to unite and merge all of the different actions
Judge in trying a case sees only with judicial eyes as he ought to know nothing about the consolidated into a single action, in the same manner as if the different causes of actions
facts of the case, except those which have been adduced judicially in evidence. Thus, when involved had originally been joined in a single action, and the order of consolidation, if made
the case is up for trial, the judicial head is empty as to facts involved and it is incumbent upon by a court of competent jurisdiction, is binding upon all the parties to the different actions until
the litigants to the action to establish by evidence the facts upon which they rely. (emphasis it is vacated or set aside. After the consolidation there can be no further proceedings in the
ours) separate actions, which are by virtue of the consolidation discontinued and superseded by a
single action, which should be entitled in such manner as the court may direct, and all
We therefore refuse, in the strongest terms, to entertain the petitioner’s argument that we subsequent proceedings therein be conducted and the rights of the parties adjudicated in a
should take judicial notice of the Bane deposition. single action (1 C.J.S., 113, pp. 1371-1372).
At the very beginning of the discussion on consolidation of actions in the Corpus Juris Respondent Enrile had a pending Opposition to the notice of deposition-taking (questioning
Secundum, the following caveat appears: the reasonableness thereof – an issue applicable to the rest of the respondents) which the
Sandiganbayan failed to rule on. To make the Sandiganbayan’s omission worse, the
The term consolidation is used in three different senses. First, where several actions are Sandiganbayan blindly relied on the petitioner’s assertion that the deposition-taking was a
combined into one and lose their separate identity and become a single action in which a matter of right and, thus, failed to address the consequences and/or issues that may arise
single judgment is rendered; second, where all except one of several actions are stayed until from the apparently innocuous statement of the petitioner (that it intends to use the Bane
one is tried, in which case the judgment in the one is conclusive as to the others; third, where deposition in Civil Case No. 0009, where only the respondents, and not Africa, are the
several actions are ordered to be tried together but each retains its separate character and parties).169 There is simply the absence of "due" in due process.
requires the entry of a separate judgment. The failure to distinguish between these methods
of procedure, which are entirely distinct, the two latter, strictly speaking, not being Fifth: Misstatement of the Sandiganbayan’s Action. The dissent repeatedly misstates that the
consolidation, a fact which has not always been noted, has caused some confusion and Sandiganbayan "granted" the request for the deposition-taking. For emphasis, the
conflict in the cases. (1 C.J.S., 107, pp. 1341-1342) (Emphasis added). Sandiganbayan did not "grant" the request since the petitioner staunchly asserted that the
deposition-taking was a matter of right. No one can deny the complexity of the issues that
In defining the term "consolidation of actions," Francisco provided a colatilla that the term these consolidated cases have reached. Considering the consolidation of cases of this
"consolidation" is used in three different senses, citing 1 C.J.S. 1341 and 1 Am. Jur. 477 nature, the most minimum of fairness demands upon the petitioner to move for the taking of
(Francisco, Revised Rules of Court, p. 348). the Bane deposition and for the Sandiganbayan to make a ruling thereon (including the
opposition filed by respondent Enrile which equally applies to his co-respondents). The
burgeoning omission and failures that have prevailed in this case cannot be cured by this
From the foregoing, it is clear that the dissent appears to have quoted Francisco’s statement
Court without itself being guilty of violating the constitutional guarantee of due process.
out of context. As it is, the issue of the effect of consolidation on evidence is at most an
unsettled matter that requires the approach we did in the majority’s discussion on
consolidation.167 Sixth: Issues Posed and Resolved Go Beyond Technicalities. The above conclusions,
contrary to the petitioner’s claim, are not only matters of technicality. Admittedly, rules of
procedure involve technicality, to which we have applied the liberality that technical rules
Third: Misappreciation of the Purpose of Consolidation. The dissent then turns to the purpose
deserve. But the resolution of the issues raised goes beyond pure or mere technicalities as
of consolidation – to "expeditiously settle the interwoven issues involved in the consolidated
the preceding discussions show. They involve issues of due process and basic unfairness to
cases" and "the simplification of the proceedings." It argues that this can only be achieved if
the respondents, particularly to respondent Enrile, who is portrayed in the Bane deposition to
the repetition of the same evidence is dispensed with.
be acting in behalf of the Marcoses so that these shares should be deemed to be those of the
Marcoses. They involved, too, principles upon which our rules of procedure are founded and
It is unfortunate that the dissent refuses to recognize the fact that since consolidation is which we cannot disregard without flirting with the violation of guaranteed substantive rights
primarily addressed to the court concerned to aid it in dispatching its official business, it would and without risking the disorder that these rules have sought to avert in the course of their
be in keeping with the orderly trial procedure if the court should have a say on what evolution.
consolidation would actually bring168 (especially where several cases are involved which have
become relatively complex). In the present case, there is nothing in the proceedings below
In the Court En Banc deliberations of December 6, 2011, the Court failed to arrive at a
that would suggest that the Sandiganbayan or the parties themselves (the petitioner and the
conclusive decision because of a tie vote (7-7, with one Justice taking no part). The same
respondents) had in mind a consolidation beyond joint hearing or trial. Why should this Court
vote resulted in the re-voting of December 13, 2011. In this light, the ponencia is deemed
– which is not a trial court – impose a purported effect that has no factual or legal grounds?
sustained.
Fourth: The Due Process Consideration. The dissent argues that even if the consolidation
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit. No costs.
only resulted in a joint hearing or trial, the "respondents are still bound by the Bane deposition
considering that they were given notice of the deposition-taking." The issue here boils down
to one of due process – the fundamental reason why a hearsay statement (not subjected to SO ORDERED.
the rigor of cross-examination) is generally excluded in the realm of admissible evidence –
especially when read in light of the general rule that depositions are not meant as substitute ARTURO D. BR
for the actual testimony, in open court, of a party or witness.