CASE DIGEST

Power of Eminent Domain

 Didipio Earth-Saver Multi-Purpose Association vs. Gozun, G.R. No.

157882, March 30, 2006
 Manila Memorial Park vs. Secretary, DSWD G.R. No. 175356, December
03, 2013
 City of Manila vs. Chinese Community, 40 Phil 349
 Agan vs. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., G.R. No. 155001
 City of Manila vs. Prieto, G.R. No. 221366, July 08, 2019
 Republic vs Consuelo Diaz Heirs Association, Inc., G.R. No. 218732,
November 12, 2018

Aviso,MirafelC.
BPA 2-A
Prof:Ma’am Lily Rose Bautista
ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE
 MANILA MEMORIAL PARK, INC. vs. SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT

G.R. No. 175356

December 3, 2013

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS: On February 26, 2004, RA 9257 or the Expanded Senior Citizens Act amended certain
provisions of RA 7432, granting 20% discount to qualified senior citizens and the establishments
may claim the discounts granted as tax deduction based on the net cost of the goods sold or
services rendered: Provided, That the cost of the discount shall be allowed as deduction from
gross income for the same taxable year that the discount is granted. Provided, further, That the
total amount of the claimed tax deduction net of value added tax if applicable, shall be included
in their gross sales receipts for tax purposes and shall be subject to proper documentation and to
the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended.

The Secretary of Finance issued RR No. 4-2006 and the DSWD issued its own IRR for their
implementation of the tax provision of RA 9257.

Petitioners Manila Memorial Park, Inc. and La Funeraria Paz-Sucat, Inc., domestic
corporations engaged in the business of providing funeral and burial services, feeling aggrieved
by the tax deduction scheme, petitioners prayed that Section 4 of RA 9257 and the IRR issued by
DSWD and the DOF be declared unconstitutional insofar as these allow business establishments
to claim the 20% discount given to senior citizens as a tax deduction; that the DSWD and the
DOF be prohibited from enforcing the same; and that the tax credit treatment of the 20%
discount under the former Section 4 (a) of RA 7432 be reinstated.

ISSUES: Whether or not Section 4 of RA No. 9257 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations, insofar as they provide that the 20% discount to Senior Citizens may be claimed as
tax deduction by the private establishments are invalid and unconstitutional.

RULING: The Senior Citizens Act was enacted primarily to maximize the contribution of senior
citizens to nation-building, and to grant benefits and privileges to them for their improvement
and well-being as the State considers them an integral part of our society.
The priority given to senior citizens finds its basis in the Constitution as set forth in the law
itself.
As a form of reimbursement, the law provides that business establishments extending the
twenty percent discount to senior citizens may claim the discount as a tax deduction. The law is a
legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has general
welfare for its object.
 While the Constitution protects property rights, petitioners must accept the realities of
business and the State, in the exercise of police power, can intervene in the operations of a
business which may result in an impairment of property rights in the process.
Without sufficient proof that Section 4 (a) of R.A. No. 9257 is arbitrary, and that the
continued implementation of the same would be unconscionably detrimental to petitioners, the
Court will refrain from quashing a legislative act.
 DESAMA vs ELISEA GOZUN

G.R. No. 157882

March 30, 2006

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

FACTS: Executive Order No. 279, promulgated by then President Corazon Aquino, authorized
the DENR Secretary to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations
or foreign investors for contracts of agreements involving either technical or financial assistance
for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate
recommendation of the Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign proponent.

After some time, President Fidel V. Ramos signed into law Rep. Act No. 7942 entitled,
“An Act Instituting A New System of Mineral Resources Exploration, Development, Utilization
and Conservation,” otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995. Then DENR
Secretary Victor O. Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 23, Series of 1995,
containing the implementing guidelines of Rep. Act No. 7942. This was soon superseded by
DAO No. 96-40, s. 1996, which took effect on 23 January 1997 after due publication.

Previously, however, or specifically on 20 June 1994, President Ramos executed an

FTAA with Arimco Mining Corporation (AMC) over a total land area of 37,000 hectares
covering the provinces of Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino. Included in this area is Barangay
Dipidio, Kasibu, Nueva Vizcaya. Counsels for petitioners filed a demand letter addressed to
then DENR Secretary Heherson Alvarez, for the cancellation of the CAMC FTAA for the
primary reason that Rep. Act No. 7942 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations DAO 96-40
are unconstitutional.

Subsequently, AMC consolidated with Climax Mining Limited to form a single company
that now goes under the new name of Climax-Arimco Mining Corporation (CAMC), the
controlling 99% of stockholders of which are Australian nationals.
MGB rejected the demand of counsels for petitioners for the cancellation of the CAMC FTAA.

Petitioners thus filed the present petition for prohibition and mandamus, with a prayer for
a temporary restraining order.

ISSUE: Whether or not the mining act and its implementing rules and regulations are void and
unconstitutional specifically Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-40
FOR IT allows the unlawful and unjust “taking” of private property for private purpose in
contradiction with Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

RULING: NO. Section 76 of Republic Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-40; Republic
Act No. 7942 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations contained in DAO 96-40 – insofar as
they relate to financial and technical assistance agreements referred to in paragraph 4 of Section
2 of Article XII of the Constitution are NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

While this Court declares that the assailed provision is a taking provision, this does not
mean that it is unconstitutional on the ground that it allows taking of private property without the
determination of public use and the payment of just compensation.

The taking to be valid must be for public use. Public use as a requirement for the valid
exercise of the power of eminent domain is now synonymous with public interest, public benefit,
public welfare and public convenience. It includes the broader notion of indirect public benefit
or advantage. Public use as traditionally understood as “actual use by the public” has already
been abandoned.

Mining industry plays a pivotal role in the economic development of the country and is a
vital tool in the government’s thrust of accelerated recovery. Irrefragably, mining is an industry
which is of public benefit. That public use is negated by the fact that the state would be taking
private properties for the benefit of private mining firms or mining contractors is not at all true.

There is also no basis for the claim that the Mining Law and its implementing rules and
regulations do not provide for just compensation in expropriating private properties. Section 76
of Rep. Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-40 provide for the payment of just
compensation

THE CITY OF MANILA,  vs. CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA

 G.R. No. L-14355

October 31, 1919

JOHNSON, J.:

FACTS: Petitioner (City of Manila) filed a petition praying that certain lands be

expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement namely, the extension of
Rizal Avenue, Manila and claiming that such expropriation was necessary.
Herein defendants, on the other hand, alleged (a) that no necessity existed for said
expropriation and (b) that the land in question was a cemetery, which had been used as such for
many years, and was covered with sepulchres and monuments, and that the same should not be
converted into a street for public purposes.
The lower court ruled that there was no necessity for the expropriation of the particular strip
of land in question.
Petitioner therefore assails the decision of the lower court claiming that it (petitioner) has the
authority to expropriate any land it may desire; that the only function of the court in such
proceedings is to ascertain the value of the land in question; that neither the court nor the owners
of the land can inquire into the advisable purpose of the expropriation or ask any questions
concerning the necessities therefor; that the courts are mere appraisers of the land involved in
expropriation proceedings, and, when the value of the land is fixed by the method adopted by the
law, to render a judgment in favor of the defendant for its value.

ISSUE:  W/N the courts may inquire into and hear proof upon the necessity of the
expropriation?

RULING Yes. The courts have the power to restrict the exercise of eminent domain to the
actual reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the law. When the
municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with
the conditions accompanying such authority. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a
municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is, without question, within the
power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the
right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question that
the courts have the right to inquire into.

Agan vs. Philippine International Air Terminals Co.

G.R. No. 155001 

 May 5, 2003

PUNO, J.:

FACTS: Some time in 1993, six business leaders, explored the possibility of investing in the
new NAIA airport terminal, so they formed Asians Emerging Dragon Corp. They submitted
proposals to the government for the development of NAIA Intl. Passenger Terminal III (NAIA
IPT III). The NEDA approved the NAIA IPT III project. Bidders were invited, and among the
proposal Peoples Air Cargo (Paircargo) was chosen. AEDC protested alleging that preference
was given to Paircargo, but still the project was awarded to Paircargo. Because of that, it
incorporated into, Phil. Intl. Airport Terminals Co. (PIATCO). The DOTC and PIATCO entered
into a concession agreement in 1997 to franchise and operate the said terminal for 21years. In
Nov. 1998 it was amended in the matters of pertaining to the definition of the obligations given
to the concessionaire, development of facilities and proceeds, fees and charges, and the
termination of contract. Since MIAA is charged with the maintenance and operations of NAIA
terminals I and II, it has a contract with several service providers. The workers filed the petition
for prohibition claiming that they would lose their job, and the service providers joined them,
filed a motion for intervention. Likewise several employees of the MIAA filed a petition
assailing the legality of arrangements. A group of congressmen filed similar petitions. Pres.
Arroyo declared in her speech that she will not honor PIATCO contracts which the Exec.
Branch's legal office concluded null and void.

ISSUE: Whether or Not the 1997 concession agreement is void, together with its
amendments for being contrary to the constitution.

RULING: The 1997 concession agreement is void for being contrary to public policy. The
amendments have the effect of changing it into and entirely different agreement from the
contract bidded upon. The amendments present new terms and conditions which provide
financial benefit to PIATCO which may have the altered the technical and financial parameters
of other bidders had they know that such terms were available. The 1997 concession agreement,
the amendments and supplements thereto are set aside for being null and void. The petitioners
have local standi. They are prejudiced by the concession agreement as their livelihood is to be
taken away from them.

CITY OF MANILA,  vs. ALEJANDRO ROCES PRIETO, BENITO ROCES PRIETO,

MERCEDES PRIETO DELGADO, MONICA , LOPEZ PRIETO, MARTIN LOPEZ
PRIETO, BEATRIZ PRIETO DE LEON, RAFAEL ROCES PRIETO, BENITO LEGARD
A, INC., ALEGAR CORPORATION, BENITO LEGARD A, JR., PECHATEN
CORPORATION, ESTATE OF ROSARIO M. LLORA, and all persons claiming interests
against them,

G.R. No. 221366

July 8, 2019

REYES, J. JR., J.:

FACTS: On January 19, 2004, the City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8070 that
authorized the City Mayor to acquire certain parcels of land belonging to Alejandro Roces
Prieto, et al to be used for the City of Manila's Land-For-The-Landless Program. Initially,
petitioner attempted to acquire the subject lots by negotiated sale, offering the amount of
P2,000.00 per square meter, which Alejandro Roces Prieto, et al. refused to accept on the ground
that their respective properties are worth more than that.

Invoking Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, City of Manila sought the issuance of
a writ of possession for it to be able to immediately take possession of the subject properties.
City of Manila manifested that it had already deposited the sum of P4,812,920.00 in the bank,
representing more than (100%) of the assessed value of the properties as shown in the
declarations of real property.
On February 2, 2005, the RTC issued an Order denying the issuance of a writ of
possession pending the deposit of the additional amount of ?852,519.00. Instead of the general
provisions on expropriation under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the RTC applied the provisions
of the Local Government Code (LGC), mandating the deposit of 15% of the fair market value of
the properties subject of expropriation, for City of Manilaimmediate possession thereof.

ISSUE: Whether the power to expropriate had complied with the provisions of the Constitution
and pertinent laws in the exercise thereof.

RULING: Several requisites must concur before a local government unit can exercise the power
of eminent domain, to wit: (1) an ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing
the local chief executive, in behalf of the local government unit, to exercise the power of eminent
domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property; (2) the power of
eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and
the landless; (3) there is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of
the Constitution, and other pertinent laws; and ( 4) a valid and definite offer has been previously
made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
R.A. No. 7279 is such pertinent law in this case as it governs the local expropriation of properties
for purposes of urban land reform and housing. Thus, the rules and limitations set forth therein
cannot be disregarded.

HIGHWAYS (DPWH), Petitioner, v. JOSE GAMIR-CONSUELO DIAZ HEIRS

ASSOCIATION, INC., Respondent.
G.R. No. 218732

November 12, 2018

J. REYES, JR., J.:

FACTS: Respondent Republic of the Philippines through DPWH executed a

Deed of Absolute Sale on the agreement that Jose Gamir would sell the subject property. The
property was eventually registered under the name of the petitioner after the receipt of the full
consideration by the respondent. Respondent filed a case against DPWH alleging that the
compensation they paid is the valuation of the property during 1957 and that DPWH owes the
respondent an interest starting from 1957 because DPWH failed to pay the just compensation.
The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The respondent filed an appeal to the CA
and the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration in
which the CA denied, hence the petition.

ISSUE: Whether respondent Jose Gamir is entitled to the interest even if it is not stipulated in
the Deed of Sale?

RULLING:No, Jose Gamir is not entitled to interest, the petition is with merit.
The CA surmised that the execution of deed of sale did not amount to a waiver on the part of
respondent for the payment of interest. The rationale for the payment of interest in expropriation
cases is to compensate landowners for the income they would have made had they been properly
compensated for their properties at the time of taking. Nonetheless, the required payment of
interest is related to the computation of just compensation, which is judicially determined in
expropriation proceedings. Interest payment should be viewed in a different light when there is a
voluntary sale between the landowner and the government. As above-mentioned, expropriation
and voluntary sale have different legal effects, especially considering that in the latter, the parties
could freely negotiate the terms and conditions of the contract, i.e., they could include a
stipulation concerning the payment of interest. In addition, in entering into a voluntary purchase
or sale, the state does not exercise its power of eminent domain. In the present case, it is
undisputed that the Deed of Absolute Sale between petitioner and respondent
does not contain any provision regarding the payment of interest. Petitioner agreed to convey
its
property upon full payment of the purchase price without reservation for any claim of
interest. No parole evidence can be admitted to support respondent's claim of interest cause it
never put in issue in its complaint the ambiguity or validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale, or its
failure to reflect the parties' true intention. In addition, respondent cannot rely on its August 1,
2005 Letter demanding payment of interest because the said correspondence was made prior to
the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale. Thus, it could be reasonably concluded that
respondent had abandoned its demand for interest after it acquiesced with the contract
notwithstanding the lack of stipulation concerning payment of interest. Respondent freely agreed
to enter into the covenant knowing fully well that petitioner was not bound by its terms to pay
interest. If it feels shortchanged, the Court cannot offer any reprieve. After all, courts have no
alternative but to enforce contractual stipulations in the manner agreed upon by the parties, and
they do not have the power to modify contracts or save parties from disadvantageous provisions.
Further, the Court disagrees with the CA's observation that respondent was left with no choice
but to sign the Deed of Absolute Sale sans any provision on the payment of interest. In
respondent's complaint, there was no allegation that it was coerced into signing the document or
that its consent was vitiated in any manner. It was not compelled to sign the said deed should it
find itself placed in a disadvantageous position. In fact, respondent could have opted to initiate
expropriation proceedings if it was adamant in its claim for legal interest - or, at the very least,
included a clause in the perfected deed of sale that it was reserving the right to claim legal
interest. In the same vein, it did not protest or place any objection when it acknowledged receipt
of the full purchase price embodied in the Deed of Absolute Sale. It is noteworthy that the deed
of sale executed in National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals contained a clause that it
was without prejudice to the landowner's pursuance for just compensation and interest.
Unfortunately in the said case, the National Power Corporation repudiated the deed resulting in
judicial intervention for the determination of just compensation. Here, in accordance with the
Deed of Absolute Sale, respondent voluntarily agreed to convey its property to petitioner upon
full payment of the purchase price - without any other restrictions, limitations or conditions.