80. Cobb-Perez v.

Lantin GR L-22320 1968

FACTS:
A civil case was filed by Ricardo Hermoso against Damaso Perez for the latter’s
failure to pay a debt of Php 17,000.00. Hermoso won and a writ of execution was issued
in his favor. The sheriff was to conduct public sale of a property owned by Perez worth
Php 300,000.00. This was opposed by Perez as he claimed the amount of said property
was more than the amount of the debt. Respondent Judge Lantin,issuing judge, found
merit on this, hence he amended his earlier decision and issued a second writ this time
directing the sheriff to conduct a public sale of Perez’ 210 shares of stock approximately
worth Php17,000.00Subsequently, Perez and his wife filed five more petitions for
injunction trying to enjoin the public sale. The case eventually reached the Supreme
Court where the SC ruled that the petition of the Perez spouses are without merit; that
their numerous petitions for injunction are contemplated for delay. I n saiddecision, the
Supreme Court ordered petitioners to pay the cost of the suit but said cost should be
paid bytheir counsels, Atty. Baizas and Atty. Bolinao. The counsels now appeal said
decision by the Supreme Court as they claimed that such decision reflected adversely
against their professionalism; that “If there was delay, it was because petitioners’
counsel happened to be more assertive… a quality of the lawyers(which) is not to be
condemned DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
ACCORDINGLY, the motion for partial reconsideration is denied. Our decision of
May 22, 1968 is hereby modified in the sense that Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A.N.
Bolinao, Jr. shall pay jointly and severally the treble costs assessed against the
petitioners.
DOCTRINE RELATED TO THE CPR:
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to
defeat the ends of justice.
Accordingly, should there be a conflict between his duty to his client and that to court,
he should resolve the conflict against the former and in favor of the latter, his primary
responsibility being to uphold the cause of justice.
OBUSAN v. OBUSAN

FACTS: Respondent Generoso B. Obusan, Jr. was working in the Peoples Homesite

and Housing Corporation, and became acquainted with Natividad Estabillo presented to
be a widow, in which they had a child named John. Later, it was known Natividad’s
marriage was still subsisting.

Four days after the birth of John, Generoso married Preciosa (petitioner) and lived for
more than a year. Respondent took a vacation in Camarines Norte but he has never
returned.

Preciosa looked for him and discovered that he was living and cohabiting with Natividad
in Quezon City.

The housemaid, neighbors and several other persons known to Natividad and Obusan
testified and confirmed their relationship.

He answered that his relationship with Natividad was terminated when he married
Preciosa and he only goes to Quezon City to provide financial support to Jun-Jun. He
also denied the testimonies of the maid, the plumber and several other persons and
contended that he does not live together with Natividad.

He also contended that he only left the conjugal home for he cannot contain the nagging
of his wife and her interference with his professional obligations.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Obusan should be disbarred.

RULING: Yes. He failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and

required of a member of the bar

Respondent was not able to overcome the evidence of his wife that he was guilty of
grossly immoral conduct. Abandoning one's wife and resuming carnal relations with a
former paramour, a married woman, fails within "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and
respectable members of the community"

Thus, lawyer shall be disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with
another woman who had borne him a child. 
Quingwa vs. Puno [A.C. No. 389 February 28, 1967]

FACTS:

Complainant Flora Quingwa filed before the Supreme Court a verified complaint
charging respondent Atty. Armando Puno, a member of the Bar, with gross immorality
and misconduct. Complainant and respondent were engaged to be married. One time,
the respondent invited the complainant to watch a movie, but later they went to a hotel
to perform the sexual act with a promise and assurance of marriage. Complainant
begged respondent not to molest her but respondent insisted, telling her: ‘anyway I
have promised to marry you’. Complainant submitted to respondent’s plea for sexual
intercourse because of respondent’s promise of marriage and not because of a desire
for sexual gratification or of voluntariness and mutual passion.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Puno should be disbarred.

HELD:
YES. Respondent’s name was ordered to be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.

RATIO:

[T]he respondent has committed a grossly immoral act and has, thus disregarded and
violated the fundamental ethics of his profession. Indeed, it is important that members of
this ancient and learned profession of law must conform themselves in accordance with
the highest standards of morality. As stated in paragraph 29 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics:

… The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against the admission to the profession of
candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient in either moral character or education.
He should strive at all times to uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity of the
profession and to improve not only the law but the administration of justice.
[A] “grossly immoral conduct” is now one of the grounds for suspension or disbarment.
(Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court).

6. MORTEL V. ASPIRAS Adm. Case No. 145 December 28, 1956.

FACTS:
Sometime in August, 1952, the respondent, representing himself as single, courted her
and eventually won her affection. On December 22, 1952, following his instructions, she
came to Manila so they could get married, and she stayed with her sister at No. 10
Espiritu, Pasay City. On and after December 31, 1952, upon being assured of marriage
she allowed him to live with her as her husband. On January 3, 1953, a marriage
license was applied for, with the son of the respondent, Cesar Aspiras, as one of the
applicants. Upon suggestion of respondent, she was married to said Cesar Aspiras,
although she was not in love with the latter. After the marriage, she and respondent
continued cohabiting together, the ceremony being a mere formality performed at the
indication of respondent, who was a married man and who used his knowledge and
education to abuse and destroy her.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
Wherefore it becomes the duty of this Court to strike, as it does hereby strike his name
from the Roll of Attorneys. Disbarred.
DOCTRINE RELATED TO THE CANON OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:
The continued possession of a good moral character is a requisite condition for the
rightful continuance in the practice of the law and its loss requires suspension or
disbarment, even though the statutes do not specify that as a ground for disbarment.
Terre v. Terre

A.M. No. 2349, 3 July 1992

FACTS:

Dorothy Terre was then married to a certain Merlito Bercenillo, her first cousin. Atty.
Jordan Terre successfully convinced Dorothy that her marriage was void ab initio for the
reason of public policy and that they are free to contract marriage. They got married in
1977 where he wrote single under Dorothy’s status. After getting Dorothy pregnant,
Atty. Terre abandoned them and subsequently contracted another marriage to Helina
Malicdem in 1986. Atty. Terre was charged with abandonment of minor and bigamy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Terre’s marriage with Dorothy is null and void.

RULING:

Dorothy’s first marriage is indeed void ab initio considering that Merlito is her first cousin
thereby against public policy.

Article 40 states that the absolute nullity of a former marriage may be invoked for the
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void.

However, she did not file any declaration for the nullity of their marriage before she
contracted her marriage with Atty. Terre thus, her second marriage is void.

We believe and so hold that the conduct of respondent Jordan Terre in inveigling
complainant Dorothy Terre to contract a second marriage with him; in abandoning
complainant Dorothy Terre after she had cared for him and supported him through law
school, leaving her without means for the safe delivery of his own child; in contracting a
second marriage with Helina Malicdem while his first marriage with complainant Dorothy
Terre was subsisting, constituted "grossly immoral conduct" under Section 27 of Rule
138 of the Rules of Court, affording more than sufficient basis for disbarment of
respondent Jordan Terre. He was unworthy of admission to the Bar in the first place.
The Court will correct this error forthwith.

WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DISBAR respondent Jordan Terre and to STRIKE
OUT his name from the Roll of Attorneys. A copy of this decision shall be spread on the
personal record of respondent Jordan Terre in the Bar Confidant's Office. A copy of this
resolution shall also be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and shall be
circularized to all the courts of the land.
Delos Reyes v. Aznar, 1334, Nov. 28, 1989;

FACTS:

Complainant is a second year medical student of the Southwestern University in

which respondent Atty. Aznar is the then Chairman of the College of Medicine.
Complainant was compelled to go to Manila with respondent for three days where he
repeatedly had carnal knowledge of her upon the threat of respondent that if she would
not give in to his lustful desires, she would flunk in all her subjects and she would never
become a medical intern. After due investigation, the Solicitor General found the
respondent guilty of gross immoral conduct and recommends that since the complainant
is partly to blame for having gone with respondent to Manila knowing fully well that
respondent is a married man ,with children, a rich man and is not practicing his
profession before the court, he should merely be suspended from the practice of law for
not less than three (3) years.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the imposition of the penalty is proper.

HELD: NO.

The fact that he is a rich man and does not practice his profession as a lawyer,
does not render respondent a person of good moral character. Evidence of good moral
character precedes admission to bar (Sec.2, Rule 138, Rules of Court) and such
requirement is not dispensed with upon admission thereto. Good moral character is a
continuing qualification necessary to entitle one to continue in the practice of law.

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court enumerates the grounds for
disbarment or suspension from his office as attorney, among others, by grossly immoral
conduct. Immoral conduct has been defined as that which is willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and
respectable members of the community.
 In the present case, it was highly immoral of respondent to have taken
advantage of his position in asking complainant to go with him under the threat that she
would flunk in all her subjects in case she refused.

Respondent Jose B. Aznar is DISBARRED.

Royong v. Oblena

FACTS:
• Complainant Josefina Royong charge the respondent Ariston Oblena, a member of the
bar and bench, with rape. The Solicitor General immediately conducted an investigation
and found out that there was no rape, the carnal knowledge between complainant and
respondent seems to be consensual sex.
• In view of his own findings as a result of his investigation, that even if respondent did
not commit the alleged rape, nevertheless, he was guilty of other misconduct. The
Solicitor General made another complaint charging the respondent of falsely and
deliberately alleging in his application for admission to the bar that he is a person of
good moral character, of living adulterously with Briccia Angeles at the same time
maintaining illicit relations with the 18 year old Josefina Royong. Thus rendering him
unfit to practice law, praying that this Court render judgment ordering the permanent
removal of the respondent as lawyer and judge.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the illicit relation of the respondent with Josefina Royong and the
adulterous cohabitation of respondent with Briccia Angeles warrants disbarment.

HELD:
Ariston Oblena was disbarred.

RATIO:
The continued possession of a fair private and professional character or a good moral
character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of law for
one who has been admitted, and its loss requires suspension or disbarment even
though the statutes do not specify that as ground for disbarment.
Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way directly bearing on
his profession, has nevertheless rendered him unfit and unworthy of the privileges of a
lawyer.
Fornication, if committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as have
proven in this case, as to shock common sense of decency, certainly may justify
positive action by the Court in protecting the prestige of the noble profession of the law.
As former Chief Justice Moran observed: An applicant for license to practice law is
required to show good moral character, or what he really is, as distinguished from good
reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is
held by the public in the place where he is known.
Respondent, therefore, did not possess a good moral character at the time he applied
for admission to the bar. He lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles, and the fact
that people who knew him sqemed to have acuuiesced to his utatus, did noq render him
a person of good moral character. It is of no moment that his immoral state was
discovered then or now as he is clearly not fit to remain a member of the bar.

A.M. No. 3049 December 4, 1989

PERLA Y. LAGUITAN, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. SALVADOR F. TINIO, respondent.

Joanes G. Caacbay for respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

In the instant Petition for Disbarment dated 21 May 1987, petitioner Perla Y. Laguitan
charged Atty. Salvador F. Tinio with immorality and acts unbecoming a member of the
Bar.

After answer was filed on 27 October 1987, the Court, in its Resolution dated 16
November 1987, referred the Petition to the Solicitor General for Investigation, Report
and Recommendation.

During the initial hearing of this case by the Solicitor General on 17 February 1988, only
respondent and his counsel appeared; it turned out that complainant had not been duly
served with notice of the hearing. The hearing scheduled for 24 March 1988 was
likewise reset to 27 April 1988 upon motion of respondent and upon failure of
complainant to appear before the Office of the Solicitor General.
This case was eventually transmitted by the Solicitor General to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline (Commission) for investigation and
proper action. Thus, in an order dated 18 August 1988, the Commission set the case for
hearing on 9 September 1988 and required both complainant and respondent to submit
additional copies of their pleadings within ten (10) days from notice.

The initial hearing set by the Commission for 9 September 1988 was reset to 20
September 1988 because only complainant appeared, respondent having failed to
present himself despite due notice to him. The hearing of 20 September 1988 was
again reset to 20 October 1988 because neither complainant nor her counsel appeared.
The hearing for 20 October 1988 was once again reset to 14 November 1988 as only
complainant appeared, Finally, the hearing for 14 November 1988 was rescheduled two
(2) more times, first to 15 December 1988 and second to 17 January 1989.

In its Order dated 27 January 1989, the Commission, upon the unexplained failure of
respondent to appear at the hearing on 17 January 1989, required petitioner to make a
formal offer of evidence ex parte, and thereafter submit the case for resolution. The
Order was duly received by respondent's counsel on 31 January 1989.

On 9 February 1989, petitioner formally offered her exhibits as follows:

1. Exh. 'A' — Certificate of Live Birth of Sheila

Laguitan Tinio.

Purpose: To show and prove the filiation of the

child as shown on the document;

2. Exh. 'B' —Certificate of Live Birth of

Benedict Laguitan.

Purpose: To show and prove likewise the

filiation of the child as shown on the document:

3. Exh. 'C' to 'C-6' — Receipts issued by the

Mt. Carmel Maternity and Children's Hospital.

Purpose: To prove that petitioner herein gave

birth to a baby girl at the Mt. Carmel Maternity
and Children's Hospital and for which
respondent paid the bills for the hospitalization,
medicines and professional fees of doctors;

4. Exh. 'D' to 'D-2' — Receipts issued by the

Paulino Medical Clinic.
 Purpose: To show and prove that petitioner again gave birth
to a baby boy at said clinic and for which respondent paid
the bill for hospitalization, medicines and professional fees of
doctors;

5. Exh. 'E' to 'E-l' — Baptismal certificates of

Sheila L. Tinio and Benedict L. Tinio,
respectively

Purpose: To show and prove that respondent admits his

paternity of the children:

6. Exh. 'F' to 'F-4' — The family pictures

showing respondent either singly or with the
rest of the family during happier times.

Purpose: To show and prove that petitioner and respondent

really lived together as husband and wife and begot two
children and the respondent admits these through the
pictures:

7. Exh. 'G' to 'G-3' — The school records of

Sheila L. Tinio at the St. Mary's Academy.

Purpose: To show and prove that respondent was

supporting the schooling of the children as he himself signed
the correspondence and was marked as Exh. 'G-2-A'. 1

Based on the aforequoted exhibits, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of
Governors submitted to us its findings and recommendation, which may be summed up
as follows:

Sometime in June 1974, complainant and respondent Tinio met each other and in time
became lovers. Beginning in 1976, the parties lived together as husband and wife. As a
result, complainant bore respondent two (2) children: Sheila, now about ten (10) years
old and Benedict, now approximately nine (9) years old. In the course of this
relationship, petitioner discovered that respondent Tinio, before meeting her, had
contracted marriage with someone else and that the prior marriage was subsisting.
Nonetheless, complainant continued living in with respondent until eventually, ten (10)
years later, she and her children by respondent Tinio were abandoned by the latter in
November 1986. Feeling helpless and aggrieved, she sought the help of respondent's
parents in supporting her children who were then already in school. Respondent's
parents gave her P400.00 and advised her not to see them again.

After examination of the record of this case and noting that respondent Tinio appeared
before the IBP Investigating Commissioner and candidly admitted his illicit relationship
with complainant and his having begotten two (2) children by her, and promised the
Commissioner that he would support his illegitimate children but had not lived to his
promise, we agree with the findings of fact of the IBP Board. The IBP Board
recommends that respondent Tinio be suspended from the practice of law "not for
having cohabited with the complainant, but for refusal to support his illegitimate
children," the suspension to remain in effect until respondent Tinio complies with his
obligation of support.

The Court agrees that respondent Tinio deserves to be suspended from the practice of
law but not merely because he has failed in his obligation to support the children
complainant bore him but also because for a prolonged period of time, he lived in
concubinage with complainant, a course of conduct inconsistent with the requirement of
good moral character that is required for the continued right to practice law as a
member of the Philippine Bar, 2 Concubinage imports moral turpitude and entails a
public assault upon the basic social institution of marriage.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent Salvador F. Tinio from

the practice of law until further orders from this Court. The Court will consider lifting the
suspension upon evidence satisfactory to the Commission and to this Court that
respondent is supporting or has made provision for the support of his illegitimate
children and that he has given up his immoral course of conduct.

7. CORDOVA V. CORDOVA A.C. No. 3249 November 29, 1989

FACTS:
Complainant and respondent Cordova were married on 6 June 1976 and out of this
marriage, two (2) children were born. Respondent Cordova left his family as well as his
job at Cabarroguis, Quirino Province, and went to Mangagoy, Bislig, Surigao del Sur
with one Fely G. Holgado. Fely G. Holgado was herself married and left her own
husband and children to stay with Respondent as couple. On 6 April 1986, respondent
Cordova and his complainant wife had an apparent reconciliation.
In February 1987, complainant found, upon returning from a trip to Manila necessitated
by hospitalization of her daughter Loraine, that respondent Cordova was no longer living
with her (complainant’s) children in their conjugal home; that respondent Cordova was
living with another mistress, one Luisita Magallanes, and had taken his younger
daughter Melanie along with him. Respondent and his new mistress hid Melanie from
the complainant, compelling complainant to go to court and to take back her daughter
by habeas corpus. The Regional Trial Court, Bislig, gave her custody of their children.
Notwithstanding respondent’s promises to reform, he continued to live with Luisita
Magallanes as her husband and continued to fail to give support to his legitimate family.
Finally, the Commission received a telegram message from complainant, stating that
complainant and respondent had been reconciled with each other.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law
indefinitely and until further orders from this Court. The Court will consider lifting his
suspension when respondent Cordova submits proof satisfactory to the Commission
and this Court that he has and continues to provide for the support of his legitimate
family and that he has given up the immoral course of conduct that he has clung to.

DOCTRINE RELATED TO THE CANON OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:

Reconciliation between complainant and respondent, assuming the same to be real,
does not excuse and wipe away the misconduct and immoral behavior of the
respondent carried out in public, and necessarily adversely reflecting upon him as a
member of the Bar and upon the Philippine Bar itself. An applicant for admission to
membership in the bar is required to show that he is possessed of good moral
character. That requirement is not exhausted and dispensed with upon admission to
membership of the bar.
ORBE v. ADAZA
MECARAL V. VELASQUEZ
(April 23, 2010, A.C. No. 8392
[ Formerly CBD Case No. 08-
2175], Per Curiam,June 29,
2010)Complainant was hired as a
secretary by the atty.
Velasquez who later became
hiscommon-law wife.Mecaral
was later brought to
Upper San Agustin in
Caibiran,Biliran where he left her
with a religiousgroup known as
the
Faith HealersAssociation of the
Philippines. Later, Mecaral
returned home andupon
knowing,Velasquez brought her
back to San Agustin where, on
his instruction,
hisfollowerstortured,
brainwashed and injected her
with drugs. Her mother,
Delia Tambis Vda. De Mecaral
(Delia),having received
information that she was
weak,pale and walking barefoot
along the i the mountainousarea
of Caibiran caused
therescue operation of Mecaral.
Thus, Mecaral filed a
disbarment
complaintagainstrespondent and
charged the latter with bigamy
for contracting a
second marriage toLeny H.Azur
on August 2, 1996, despite the
subsistence of his marriage to
his firstwife, Ma. Shirley G.
Yunzal.
Issue: whether respondent is
guilty of grossly immoral and
acts which
constitutegross misconduct
Held: WHEREFORE,
respondent, Atty. Danilo S.
Velasquez, is DISBARRED,
and
hisname ORDEREDSTRICKEN
from the Roll of Attorneys.
This Decision is
immediatelyexecutory and
ordered to be part of the records
of respondent in the
Office of theBar Confidant,
Supreme Court of the
Philippines.Ruling: Investigating
Commissioner of the CBD
found that [respondents] acts of
converting his
secretaryinto a mistress;
contracting two marriages with
Shirley andLeny, are
grossly immoral which no
civilizedsociety in the world
can countenance. The
subsequent detention and
torture of the complainant is
grossmisconduct[which]
only a beast may be able to do.
Certainly, the respondent had
violatedCanon 1 of the
Code of Professional
Responsibility. The practice of
law is not a right but a
privilege
bestowed by the state upon
thosewho show that theypossess,
and continue to possess, the
qualifications required bylaw
for the conferment of such
privilege.When a lawyers
moral character isassailed, such
that his right to continue
practicing his cherishedprofession
isimperiled, it behooves him to
meet the charges squarely and
present evidence,
tothesatisfaction of the
investigating body and this Court,
that he is morally fit to
keephis name in the Roll of
Attorneys.Respondent has not
discharged the burden. He
never attended the hearings
beforethe IBP to rebut thecharges
brought against him, suggesting
that they are true.Despite his
letter dated March 28,
2008manifesting that he would
come up with hisdefense in a
verified pleading,he never did
MECARAL V. VELASQUEZ
(April 23, 2010, A.C. No. 8392
[ Formerly CBD Case No. 08-
2175], Per Curiam,June 29,
2010)Complainant was hired as a
secretary by the atty.
Velasquez who later became
hiscommon-law wife.Mecaral
was later brought to
Upper San Agustin in
Caibiran,Biliran where he left her
with a religiousgroup known as
the
Faith HealersAssociation of the
Philippines. Later, Mecaral
returned home andupon
knowing,Velasquez brought her
back to San Agustin where, on
his instruction,
hisfollowerstortured,
brainwashed and injected her
with drugs. Her mother,
Delia Tambis Vda. De Mecaral
(Delia),having received
information that she was
weak,pale and walking barefoot
along the i the mountainousarea
of Caibiran caused
therescue operation of Mecaral.
Thus, Mecaral filed a
disbarment
complaintagainstrespondent and
charged the latter with bigamy
for contracting a
second marriage toLeny H.Azur
on August 2, 1996, despite the
subsistence of his marriage to
his firstwife, Ma. Shirley G.
Yunzal.
Issue: whether respondent is
guilty of grossly immoral and
acts which
constitutegross misconduct
Held: WHEREFORE,
respondent, Atty. Danilo S.
Velasquez, is DISBARRED,
and
hisname ORDEREDSTRICKEN
from the Roll of Attorneys.
This Decision is
immediatelyexecutory and
ordered to be part of the records
of respondent in the
Office of theBar Confidant,
Supreme Court of the
Philippines.Ruling: Investigating
Commissioner of the CBD
found that [respondents] acts of
converting his
secretaryinto a mistress;
contracting two marriages with
Shirley andLeny, are
grossly immoral which no
civilizedsociety in the world
can countenance. The
subsequent detention and
torture of the complainant is
grossmisconduct[which]
only a beast may be able to do.
Certainly, the respondent had
violatedCanon 1 of the
Code of Professional
Responsibility. The practice of
law is not a right but a
privilege
bestowed by the state upon
thosewho show that theypossess,
and continue to possess, the
qualifications required bylaw
for the conferment of such
privilege.When a lawyers
moral character isassailed, such
that his right to continue
practicing his cherishedprofession
isimperiled, it behooves him to
meet the charges squarely and
present evidence,
tothesatisfaction of the
investigating body and this Court,
that he is morally fit to
keephis name in the Roll of
Attorneys.Respondent has not
discharged the burden. He
never attended the hearings
beforethe IBP to rebut thecharges
brought against him, suggesting
that they are true.Despite his
letter dated March 28,
2008manifesting that he would
come up with hisdefense in a
verified pleading,he never did