RULE 8 The petitioner filed its Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings, tating

                  1.  Fernando Medical Enterprises vs. Wesleyan that the respondent had admitted the material allegations of its complaint
University 781 SCRA 508, January 20, 2016 and thus did not tender any issue as to such allegations. The respondent
opposed the Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings, arguing that it
DOCTRINE: had specifically denied the material allegations in the complaint,
It is basic in remedial law that a defendant in a civil case must apprise the particularly paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 11 and 12. The RTC issued the order
trial court and the adverse party of the facts alleged by the complaint that he denying the Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings of the petitioner.
admits and of the facts alleged by the complaint that he wishes to place into
contention — only a specific denial shall be sufficient to place into The petitioner moved for reconsideration, but its motion was denied. The
contention an alleged fact. A specific denial is made by specifying each petitioner assailed the denial in the CA on certiorari. The CA ruled that a
material allegation of fact, the truth of which the defendant does not admit judgment on the pleadings would be improper because the outstanding
and, whenever practicable, setting forth the substance of the matters upon balance due to the petitioner remained to be an issue in the face of the
which he relies to support his denial.   allegations of the respondent in its complaint for rescission. Hence, this
appeal. 
FACTS:
Petitioner, a domestic corporation dealing with medical equipment and The petitioner posits that the CA erred in going outside of the respondent’s
supplies, delivered to and installed medical equipment and supplies at the answer by relying on the allegations contained in the latter’s complaint for
respondent’s hospital. rescission; and insists that the CA should have confined itself to the
respondent’s answer in the action in order to resolve the petitioner’s motion
According to the petitioner, the respondent paid only P67,357,683.23 of its for judgment based on the pleadings.
total obligation of P123,901,650.00, leaving unpaid the sum of
P54,654,195.54.7 However, the petitioner and the respondent, respectively In contrast, the respondent contends that it had specifically denied the
represented by Rafael P. Fernando and Guillermo T. Maglaya, Sr., entered material allegations of the petitioner’s complaint, including the amount
into an agreement, whereby the former agreed to reduce its claim to only claimed; and that the CA only affirmed the previous ruling of the RTC that
P50,400,000.00, and allowed the latter to pay the adjusted obligation on the pleadings submitted by the parties tendered an issue as to the balance
installment basis within 36 months. owing to the petitioner.

Later, the respondent notified the petitioner that its new administration had ISSUE: Whether the CA commit reversible error in affirming the RTC’s
reviewed their contracts and had found the contracts defective and denial of the petitioner’s motion for judgment on the pleadings 
rescissible due to economic prejudice or lesion; and that it was consequently
declining to recognize the February 11, 2009 agreement because of the lack RULING: YES. 
of approval by its Board of Trustees and for having been signed by Maglaya The essential query in resolving a motion for judgment on the pleadings is
whose term of office had expired. whether or not there are issues of fact generated by the pleadings. Whether
issues of fact exist in a case or not depends on how the defending party’s
Due to the respondent’s failure to pay as demanded, the petitioner filed its answer has dealt with the ultimate facts alleged in the complaint. The
complaint for sum of money in the RTC. Respondents filed a Motion to defending party’s answer either admits or denies the allegations of ultimate
Dismiss which the RTC denied. Thereafter, respondents filed its Answer.  facts in the complaint or other initiatory pleading. The allegations of
ultimate facts the answer admit, being undisputed, will not require evidence

1
to establish the truth of such facts, but the allegations of ultimate facts the due to the petitioner; and (e) the execution of the February 11, 2009
answer properly denies, being disputed, will require evidence. agreement. The admission of the various agreements, especially the
February 11, 2009 agreement, significantly admitted the petitioner’s
The answer admits the material allegations of ultimate facts of the adverse complaint. To recall, the petitioner’s cause of action was based on the
party’s pleadings not only when it expressly confesses the truth of such February 11, 2009 agreement, which was the actionable document in the
allegations but also when it omits to deal with them at all.  The case. The complaint properly alleged the substance of the February 11, 2009
controversion of the ultimate facts must only be by specific denial. Section agreement, and contained a copy thereof as an annex. Upon the express
10, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court recognizes only three modes by which the admission of the genuineness and due execution of the February 11, 2009
denial in the answer raises an issue of fact. The first is by the defending agreement, judgment on the pleadings became proper.
party specifying each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does
not admit and, whenever practicable, setting forth the substance of the The respondent denied paragraph nos. 6, 7 and 8 of the complaint “for lack
matters upon which he relies to support his denial. The second applies to the of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or
defending party who desires to deny only a part of an averment, and the falsity thereof, inasmuch as the alleged transactions were undertaken during
denial is done by the defending party specifying so much of the material the term of office of the past officers of defendant Wesleyan University-
allegation of ultimate facts as is true and material and denying only the Philippines.” Was the manner of denial effective as a specific denial?
remainder. The third is done by the defending party who is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a We answer the query in the negative. Paragraph no. 6 alleged that the
material averment made in the complaint by stating so in the answer. Any respondent’s total obligation as of February 15, 2009 was P123,901,650.00,
material averment in the complaint not so specifically denied are deemed but its balance thereafter became only P54,654,195.54 because it had since
admitted except an averment of the amount of unliquidated damages. then paid P67,357,683.23 to the petitioner. Paragraph no. 7 stated that the
petitioner had agreed with the respondent on February 11, 2009 to reduce
In the case of a written instrument or document upon which an action or the balance to only P50,400,000.00, which the respondent would pay in 36
defense is based, which is also known as the actionable document, the months through 36 postdated checks of P1,400,000.00 each, which the
pleader of such document is required either to set forth the substance of respondent then issued for the purpose. Paragraph no. 8 averred that after
such instrument or document in the pleading, and to attach the original or a four of the checks totalling P5,600,000.00 were paid the respondent stopped
copy thereof to the pleading as an exhibit, which shall then be deemed to be payment of the rest, rendering the entire obligation due and demandable
a part of the pleading, or to set forth a copy in the pleading. The adverse pursuant to the February 11, 2009 agreement. Considering that paragraph
party is deemed to admit the genuineness and due execution of the nos. 6, 7 and 8 of the complaint averred matters that the respondent ought to
actionable document unless he specifically denies them under oath, and sets know or could have easily known, the answer did not specifically deny such
forth what he claims to be the facts, but the requirement of an oath does not material averments. It is settled that denials based on lack of knowledge or
apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the instrument information of matters clearly known to the pleader, or ought to be known
or when compliance with an order for an inspection of the original to it, or could have easily been known by it are insufficient, and constitute
instrument is refused. ineffective or sham denials.

In Civil Case No. 09-122116, the respondent expressly admitted paragraph That the respondent qualified its admissions and denials by subjecting them
nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 9 and 10 of the complaint. The admission related to the to its special and affirmative defenses of lack of jurisdiction over its person,
petitioner’s allegations on: (a) the four transactions for the delivery and improper venue, litis pendentia and forum shopping was of no consequence
installation of various hospital equipment; (b) the total liability of the because the affirmative defenses, by their nature, involved matters extrinsic
respondent; (c) the payments made by the respondents; (d) the balance still

2
to the merits of the petitioner’s claim, and thus did not negate the material As alleged by respondent, as early as 1996, Go Tong Electrical had applied
averments of the complaint. for and was granted financial assistance by the then Bank of South East
Asia (BSA). Subsequently, DBS Bank of the Philippines, Inc. (DBS)
Lastly, we should emphasize that in order to resolve the petitioner’s Motion became the successor-in-interest of BSA. The application for financial
for Judgment Based on the Pleadings, the trial court could rely only on the assistance was renewed on January 6, 1999 through a Credit Agreement. On
answer of the respondent filed in Civil Case No. 09-122116. Under Section even date, Go Tong Electrical, represented by Go, among others, obtained a
1, Rule 34 of the Rules of Court, the answer was the sole basis for loan from DBS in the principal amount of P40,491,051.65, for which Go
ascertaining whether the complaint’s material allegations were admitted or Tong Electrical executed Promissory Note for the same amount in favor of
properly denied. As such, the respondent’s averment of payment of the total DBS, maturing on February 5, 2000. Under the PN’s terms, Go Tong
of P78,401,650.00 to the petitioner made in its complaint for rescission had Electrical bound itself to pay a default penalty interest at the rate of one
no relevance to the resolution of the Motion for Judgment Based on the percent (1%) per month in addition to the current interest rate,  as well as
Pleadings. The CA thus wrongly held that a factual issue on the total attorney’s fees equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%) of the amount
liability of the respondent remained to be settled through trial on the merits. sought to be recovered. As additional security, Go executed a
It should have openly wondered why the respondent’s answer in Civil Case Comprehensive Surety Agreement (CSA) covering any and all obligations
No. 09-122116 did not allege the supposed payment of the P78,401,650.00, undertaken by Go Tong Electrical, including the aforesaid loan. Upon
if the payment was true, if only to buttress the specific denial of its alleged default of petitioners, DBS — and later, its successor-in-interest, herein
liability. The omission exposed the respondent’s denial of liability as respondent — demanded payment from petitioners, but to no avail,hence,
insincere.  the aforesaid complaint.

2.  Go Tong Electrical Supply vs. BPI Family Savings Bank       In their Answer with Counterclaim (Answer), petitioners merely stated that
760 SCRA 486 they “specifically deny” the allegations under the complaint. Of particular
note is their denial of the execution of the loan agreement, the PN, and the
DOCTRINE: CSA “for being self-serving and pure conclusions intended to suit
[respondent’s] purposes.” By way of special and affirmative defenses,
 A general denial does not become specific by the use of the word
petitioners argued, among others, that: (a) the real party-in-interest should
“specifically.”
be DBS and not respondent; (b) no demand was made upon them; and (c)
 Failing to comply with the “specific denial under oath”
Go cannot be held liable under the CSA since there was supposedly no
requirement under Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules, the proper
solidarity of debtors. 
conclusion, as arrived at by the CA, is that petitioners had
impliedly admitted the due execution and genuineness of the
documents. During trial, respondent presented Ricardo O. Suñio (Suñio), the Account
Officer handling petitioners’ loan accounts, as its witness. Sunio attested to
the existence of petitioners’ loan obligation in favor of respondent, and
FACTS:
identified a Statement of Account which shows the amount due.
Respondent filed a complaint against petitioners Go Tong Electrical Supply
Co., Inc. (Go Tong Electrical) and its President, George C. Go (Go;
collectively petitioners) seeking that the latter be held jointly and severally On cross-examination, Suñio nonetheless admitted that he had no
liable to it for the payment of their loan obligation in the aggregate amount knowledge of how the PN was prepared, executed, and signed, nor did he
of P87,086,398.71, inclusive of the principal sum, interests, and penalties, witness its signing. For their part, petitioners presented Go Tong
as well as attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and costs of suit. Electrical’s Finance Officer, Jocelyn Antonette Lim, who testified that Go
Tong Electrical was able to pay its loan, albeit partially. However, she

3
admitted that she does not know how much payments were made, nor does purposes,” does not constitute an effective specific denial as contemplated
she have a rough Estimate thereof, as these were allegedly paid for in by law. Verily, a denial is not specific simply because it is so qualified by
dollars.  the defendant. Stated otherwise, a general denial does not become specific
by the use of the word “specifically.” Neither does it become so by the
RTC ruled in favor of respondent. Unconvinced, petitioners appealed to the simple expedient of coupling the same with a broad conclusion of law that
CA. CA sustained the RTC’s ruling.   the allegations contested are “self-serving” or are intended “to suit
plaintiff’s purposes. 
The CA discredited petitioners’ argument that respondent’s sole witness,
Suñio, was incompetent to testify on the documentary evidence presented as To add, Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules further requires that the defendant
he had no personal knowledge of the loan documents’ execution, given that “sets forth what he claims to be the facts,” which requirement, likewise,
petitioners, in their Answer, did not deny under oath the genuineness and remains absent from the Answer in this case.
due execution of the PN and CSA and, hence, are deemed admitted under
Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court (Rules). Thus, with said pleading failing to comply with the “specific denial under
oath” requirement under Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules,  the proper
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which was, however denied , conclusion, as arrived at by the CA, is that petitioners had impliedly
hence, this petition.  admitted the due execution and genuineness of the documents evidencing
their loan obligation to respondent.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in upholding the RTC’s ruling
To this, case law enlightens that “[t]he admission of the genuineness and
RULING: NO. The Court concurs with the CA Decision holding that the due execution of a document means that the party whose signature it bears
genuineness and due execution of the loan documents in this case were admits that he voluntarily signed the document or it was signed by another
deemed admitted by petitioners under the parameters of Section 8, Rule 8 of for him and with his authority; that at the time it was signed it was in words
the Rules which provides: and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the party relying upon it;
that the document was delivered; and that any formalities required by law,
such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are
SEC. 8. How to contest such documents.—When an action or defense is waived by him. Also, it effectively eliminated any defense relating to the
founded upon a written instrument, copied in or attached to the authenticity and due execution of the document, e.g., that the document was
corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding Section, the spurious, counterfeit, or of different import on its face as the one executed
genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted by the parties; or that the signatures appearing thereon were forgeries; or
unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth that the signatures were unauthorized.”
what he claims to be the facts; but the requirement of an oath does not apply
when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the instrument or
when compliance with an order for an inspection of the original instrument Accordingly, with petitioners’ admission of the genuineness and due
is refused.  execution of the loan documents as above discussed, the competence of
respondent’s witness Suñio to testify in order to authenticate the same is
therefore of no moment. “[W]hile Section [20],51 Rule 132 of the [Rules]
A reading of the Answer shows that petitioners failed to specifically deny requires that private documents be proved of their due execution and
the execution of the Credit Agreement, PN, and CSA under the auspices of authenticity before they can be received in evidence, i.e., presentation and
the above quoted rule. The mere statement in paragraph 4 of their Answer, examination of witnesses to testify on this fact; in the present case, there is
i.e., that they “specifically deny” the pertinent allegations of the Complaint
“for being self-serving and pure conclusions intended to suit plaintiff’s

4
no need for proof of execution and authenticity with respect to the loan multiplicity of suits. All the rights of the parties concerned would then be
documents because of respondent’s implied admission thereof.” adjudicated in one proceeding. This is a rule of procedure and does not
create a substantial right. Neither does it abridge, enlarge, or nullify the
The Court clarifies that while the “[f]ailure to deny the genuineness and due substantial rights of any litigant.15 This right to file a third party complaint
execution of an actionable document does not preclude a party from arguing against a third-party rests in the discretion of the trial court.
against it by evidence of fraud, mistake, compromise, payment, statute of
limitations, estoppel and want of consideration [nor] bar a party from FACTS: 
raising the defense in his answer or reply and prove at the trial that there is a Monark Equipment Corporation (MEC) filed a complaint for sum
mistake or imperfection in the writing, or that it does not express the true of money with damages against Asian Construction and Development
agreement of the parties, or that the agreement is invalid or that there is an Corporation (ACDC) with the RTC of Quezon City for equipment leased by
intrinsic ambiguity in the writing,” none of these defenses were adequately it and for purchases of various equipment, which despite demands, ACDC
argued or proven during the proceedings of this case.  failed to pay. MEC prayed for the payment of the 5M balance plus interest
and damages 
Of particular note is the affirmative defense of payment raised during the
proceedings a quo. While petitioners insisted that they had paid, albeit ACDC filed a motion to file and admit an answer with third-party complaint
partially, their loan obligation to respondent, the fact of such payment was against Bechtel Overseas Corp. (Betchel the third-party defendant). ACDC
never established by petitioners in this case. Jurisprudence abounds that, in admitted its indebtedness to MEC but the reason for their non-payment was
civil cases, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it; the due to Bechtel’s failure and refusal to pay its obligation with ACDC for the
burden rests on the defendant, i.e., petitioners, to prove payment, rather than leased equipment which was used for the construction project of Betchel
on the plaintiff, i.e., respondent, to prove nonpayment. When the creditor is and that Betchel should be served with summons.
in possession of the document of credit, proof of nonpayment is not needed
for it is presumed. Here, respondent’s possession of the Credit Agreement, ACDC alleged that Bechtel contracted the services of Asiakonstrukt (third-
PN, and CSA, especially with their genuineness and due execution already party plaintiff) for the construction work at its project using the leased
having been admitted, cements its claim that the obligation of petitioners equipment. Asiakonstrukt complied with its work but Becthel did not pay
has not been extinguished.  for its services despite repeated demands, that Bechtel needs to be
impleaded in this case for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or other
3. Asian Const. & Dev. Corp. vs. CA - 458 SCRA reliefs to offset or to pay the amount of money claim of Monark on the
  leased equipment. ACDC prays for the dismissal of the case filed against
DOCTRINE:  them and asks from the court for an order from Betchel to pay the 5M
Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court provides: Sec. 11. Third balance and the interest and damages incurred by MEC. 
(fourth, etc.)party complaint. – A third (fourth, etc.) – party complaint is a
claim that a defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person MEC opposes motion to file a third-party complaint on the ground that
not a party to the action, called the third (fourth, etc.) – party defendant, for ACDC already admitted its principal obligation to MEC and that these
contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his transactions were independent and the allowance of the complaint would
opponent’s claim. unduly delay the proceedings.

The purpose of Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court is to MEC then filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that there are no
permit a defendant to assert an independent claim against a third-party genuine issues as to the obligation of ACDC to MEC, only issue is the
which he, otherwise, would assert in another action, thus preventing amount of attorney’s fees and costs of litigation.

5
 be found to exist, whether the basis be one of indemnity, subrogation,
ACDC opposed the motion for summary judgment, alleging that there is contribution or other substantive right.
genuine issue on the amount claimed by MEC and that it had a third-party
complaint against Bechtel in connection with the reliefs sought against it The bringing of a third party defendant is proper if he would be liable to the
which had to be litigated. plaintiff or to the defendant or both for all or part of the plaintiff’s claim
against the original defendant, although the third party defendant’s liability
In its reply, MEC alleged that the demand of ACDC in its special and arises out of another transaction. There must be a causal connection
affirmative defenses partook of the nature of a negative pregnant, and that between the claim of the plaintiff in his complaint and a claim for
there was a need for a hearing on its claim for damages. contribution, indemnity or other relief of the defendant against the third -
party defendant. The third party complaint does not have to show with
RTC: ACDC’s motion for leave to file a third-party complaint denied. certainty that there will be recovery against the third party defendant, and it
MEC’s motion for summary judgment granted. ACDC to pay MEC is sufficient that pleadings show possibility of recovery.
P5,071,335.86.
In this case, the claims of the MEC against the ACDC arose out of the
CA on appeal: RTC decision affirmed. MEC prayed for summary contracts of lease and sale; such transactions are different and separate from
judgment, hence waived its claim for damages. MR denied. those between Becthel and the ACDC as third party plaintiff for the
construction of the latter’s project. Controversy is entirely distinct from
each other.
Petition for review on certiorari with SC.
The barefaced fact that the petitioner used the equipment it leased from the
ISSUE/S: respondent in connection with its project with Becthel does not provide a
Whether or not a third-party complaint is proper? (NO) substantive basis for the filing of a third party complaint against the latter.

RULING: NO.  There is no casual connection between MEC’s claim for rental and balance
Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court provides: of purchase price for equipment and the failure of Bechtel to pay balance to
ACDC after completion of its project.
The purpose of Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court is to permit a
defendant to assert an independent claim against a third-party which he, In ACDC’s third party complaint, ACDC allege that Becthel should be
otherwise, would assert in another action, thus preventing multiplicity of ordered to pay the balance of its account of P456,666.67 so it could pay
suits. All the rights of the parties concerned would then be adjudicated in MEC, however contrary to its plea, ACDC also sought the dismissal of the
one proceeding. This is a rule of procedure and does not create a substantial MEC’s complaint, hence the amount it sought to collect from Becthel
right. Neither does it abridge, enlarge, or nullify the substantial rights of any would not be remitted to MEC after all.
litigant. This right to file a third-party complaint against a third-party rest in
the discretion of the trial court.
  ACDC admitted liability for the principal claim, RTC did nor see in
The third-party complaint is actually independent of, separate and distinct rendering judgment on the pleadings against it. Petition denied for lack of
from the plaintiff’s complaint, such that were it not for the rule, it would merit.
have to be filed separately from the original complaint. A prerequisite to the
exercise of such right is that some substantive basis for a third-party claim

6
 Japan, however, Rogelio Lumibao received a report dated August 19, 1985,
from a surveyor in Japan stating that the cargo was 355 metric tons short of
the amount stated in the bill of lading. For this reason, petitioner Benguet
4. Benguet Exploration Inc. vs. CA – 351 SCRA made a claim of the loss to Seawood Shipping and Switzerland Insurance.
DOCTRINE: Authenticity and due execution constitutes only 4 things:  In its letter, dated August 21, 1985, petitioner Benguet made a formal
(1) that the document was signed; demand for the value of the alleged shortage. As both Seawood Shipping
(2) that the document complied with all the formalities under the and Switzerland Insurance refused the demand, petitioner Benguet brought
laws;  these cases against Seawood Shipping and Switzerland Insurance.
(3) that when the document was signed, it was in the original form
without any alteration; and  Ernesto Cayabyab had been with Benguet for 13 years and, at the time of
(4) that the document was delivered. his testimony, he was secretary of Nil Alejandre, manager of Benguet.
According to Cayabyab, he was sent to the warehouse at La Union to assist
FACTS:  in the loading of the copper concentrates. These copper concentrates were
- Nov 29 1985 - Benguet Exploration, Inc. (Benguet) filed a to be loaded on the ship Sangkulirang No. 3. Cayabyab said he was present
complaint for damages against Seawood Shipping, Inc. with the RTC of when the cargo was loaded on the ship, as evidenced by the Certificate of
Makati Loading, Certificate of Weight, and the Mate's Receipt all dated July 28,
1985. According to Cayabyab, the Marine Surveyor and the Chief Mate
would go around the boat to determine how much was loaded on the ship.
- March 4 1986 – Benguet filed another complaint for damages Cayabyab stated that he saw petitioner Benguet's representative and his
against Switzerland General Insurance, Inc. immediate superior, Mr. Alejandre, and the Inspector of Customs, Mr.
Cardenas, sign the Certificate of Weight. Cayabyab also witnessed the ship
- The two cases filed by Benguet were consolidated captain sign the Certificate of Weight, which stated therein that 2,243.496
wet metric tons of copper concentrates were loaded on the ship. Cayabyab
- Switzerland Insurance filed a 3rd party complaint against Seawood likewise confirmed the authenticity of the Mate's Receipt, saying that he
Shipping, praying to indemnify it for whatever might be adjudged against it witnessed the Chief Mate sign the document.
in favor of petitioner. Trial Court: Based on the evidence presented, the trial court dismissed
petitioner’s complaint as well as Switzerland Insurance’s third party
- The cases were tried jointly during which petitioner Benguet complaint against Seawood shipping.
presented its employees, Rogelio Lumibao and Ernesto Cayabyab, as
witnesses. CA: CA affirmed TC’s decision.

Rogelio Lumibao, marketing assistant of Benguet, was in charge of Petitioner Benguet contends that the Court of Appeals gravely
exportation. His responsibilities included the documentation of export erred in ruling that it failed to establish the loss or shortage of the subject
products, presentations with banks, and other duties connected with the cargo because such loss was sufficiently established by documentary and
export of products. He explained that private respondent Seawood Shipping testimonial evidence, as well as the admissions of private respondents.
was chartered by petitioner Benguet to transport copper concentrates. The
bill of lading stated that the cargo, consisting of 2,243.496 wet metric tons 1. Petitioner argues that documents regarding the tonnage of the
of copper concentrates, was loaded on board Sangkulirang No. 3 at Poro copper concentrates have been properly identified and that the bill of lading,
Point, San Fernando, La Union. It was insured by Switzerland Insurance the Certificate of Weight, and the Mate’s Receipt, all of which stated that
(marine insurance policy was marked. When the cargo was unloaded in

7
2,243.496 wet metric tons of copper concentrates were loaded on the ship, b. On the other hand, Certified Adjusters, Inc., to which
create a prima facie presumption that such amount was indeed what was Switzerland Insurance had referred petitioner’s claim, prepared a report
loaded on the vessel. which showed that a total of 2,451.630 wet metric tons of copper
concentrates were delivered at Poro Point.
2. Petitioner asserts that the Draft Survey Report of OMIC was
sufficient evidence to prove that the cargo which arrived in Japan had a Considering the discrepancies in the various documents showing
shortage of 355 wet metric tons. the actual amount of copper concentrates transported to Poro Point and
loaded in the vessel, there is no evidence of the exact amount of copper
ISSUE/S: concentrates shipped. 
Whether the establishment of the “genuineness and due execution” of the Thus, whatever presumption of regularity in the transactions might
documents results to prima facie presumption that the their contents are have risen from the genuineness and due execution of the Bill of Lading,
true?  Certificate of Weight, Certificate of Loading, and Mate’s Receipt was
successfully rebutted by the evidence presented by respondent Switzerland
RULING:  Insurance which showed disparities in the actual weight of the cargo
Petitioner contends that the genuineness and due execution of the transported to Poro Point and loaded on the vessel. This fact is compounded
documents presented, i.e., Bill of Lading, Certificate of Loading, Certificate by the admissions made by Lumibao and Cayabyab that they had no
of Weight, Mate’s Receipt, were properly established by the testimony of its personal knowledge of the actual amount of copper concentrates loaded on
witness, Ernesto Cayabyab, and that as a result, there is a prima facie the vessel.
presumption that their contents are true.
This contention has no merit. “When the law makes use of the RULE 9
phrase ‘genuineness and due execution of the instrument’ it means nothing
more than that the instrument is not spurious, counterfeit, or of different 1. BDO vs. Tansipek – 593 SCRA 456
import on its face from the one executed.”
DOCTRINE: A Motion to Lift Order of Default is different from an
Execution can only refer to the actual making and delivery, but it ordinary motion in that the Motion should be verified; and must show fraud,
cannot involve other matters without enlarging its meaning beyond reason. accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and meritorious defenses. 
The only object of the rule was to enable a plaintiff to make out a prima
facie, not a conclusive case, and it cannot preclude a defendant from The allegations of:
introducing any defense on the merits which does not contradict the  (1) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and
execution of the instrument introduced in evidence.  (2) of meritorious defenses must concur

a. In this case, respondents presented evidence which casts doubt FACTS: 

on the veracity of these documents. Respondent Switzerland Insurance J. O. Construction, Inc. (JOCI) entered into a contract with Duty
presented Export Declaration No. 1131/85 which petitioner’s own witness, Free Philippines, for the construction of Duty Free Shop.
Rogelio Lumibao, prepared, in which it was stated that the copper
concentrates to be transported to Japan had a gross weight of only 2,050 wet
 Payments were received by JOCI directly or through John
metric tons or 1,845 dry metric tons, 10 percent more or less.
Tansipek the authorized collected, which was initially remitted to
JOCI, however a payment through PNB Check was not turned

8
 over, instead Tansipek endorsed said check and deposited the same court shall, upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending
to his account in PCIB. party, and proof of such failure, declare the defending party in default.
Thereupon, the court shall proceed to render judgment granting the claimant
such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in its discretion
requires the claimant to submit evidence. Such reception of evidence may
 PCIB allowed said deposit despite lack of authority of Tansipek.
be delegated to the clerk of court. (1a, R18)
 PCIB refused to pay JOCI the full amount of the check despite
(b) Relief from order of default. — A party declared in default may at any
demands made by the latter.
time after notice thereof and before judgment file a motion under oath to set
aside the order of default upon proper showing that his failure to answer
J.O. Construction, Inc. (JOCI), filed a complaint against Philippine was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence and that he has
Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB). a meritorious defense. In such case, the order of default may be set aside on
1. PCIB filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. The RTC such terms and conditions as the judge may impose in the interest of justice.
denied PCIB’s Motion to Dismiss. (3a, R18)
2. PCIB filed a Motion to Admit Amended Third-Party
Complaint. 
A Motion to Lift Order of Default is different from an ordinary
3. Upon Motion, Tansipek was granted time to file his
motion in that the Motion should be verified; and must show fraud,
Answer to the Third-Party Complaint. He was, however, declared in default
accident, mistake, or excusable neglect, and meritorious defenses.
for failure to do so. 
4. The Motion to Reconsider the Default Order was denied. 
5. Upon being declared in default, Tansipek filed a Motion The allegations of FAME and of meritorious defenses must concur.
for Reconsideration of the Default Order.  Assuming for the sake of argument, however, that Tansipek’s Motion for
6. Upon denial thereof, Tansipek filed a Petition for Reconsideration may be treated as a Motion to Lift Order of Default, his
Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was dismissed for failure to Petition for Certiorari on the denial thereof has already been dismissed with
attach the assailed Orders.  finality by the Court of Appeal’s.
7. Tansipek’s Motion for Reconsideration with the Court of
Appeals was denied for having been filed out of time. ≈ Tansipek did not appeal said ruling of the Court of Appeals to this Court.
The dismissal of the Petition for Certiorari assailing the denial of Tansipeks
Issue: Whether the motion for reconsideration of the default order was the Motion constitutes a bar to the retrial of the same issue of default under the
correct remedy. doctrine of the law of the case.

Ruling: No. 2. Salvador vs. Rabaja – 749 SCRA 654

Tansipek as 3rd party defendant did not follow the proper DOCTRINE: On the procedural aspect, the Court reiterates the rule that
procedure. the failure to attend the pre-trial conference does not result in the default of
Tansipek’s remedy against the Order of Default was erroneous from the an absent party. Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a defendant is
very beginning. Respondent Tansipek should have filed a Motion to Lift only declared in default if he fails to file his Answer within the
Order of Default, and not a Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to Section reglementary period. 29 On the other hand, if a defendant fails to attend the
3 (b), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court. Section 3. Default; declaration of. — If pre-trial conference, the plaintiff can present his evidence ex parte.
the defending party fails to answer within the time allowed therefor, the

9
The failure of a party to appear at the pre-trial has indeed adverse In the rescission case, the Salvadors filed their answer contending that there
consequences. If the absent party is the plaintiff, then his case shall be was no meeting of the minds between the parties and that the SPA in favor
dismissed. If it is the defendant who fails to appear, then the plaintiff is of Gonzales was falsified.
allowed to present his evidence ex parte and the court shall render judgment
based on the evidence presented. Thus, the plaintiff is given the privilege to -EJECTMENT CASE-
present his evidence without objection from the defendant, the likelihood METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT
being that the court will decide in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant The  MeTC ruled in favor of Spouses Salvador finding that valid grounds
having forfeited the opportunity to rebut or present its own evidence. The existed for the eviction of Spouses Rabaja from the subject property and
stringent application of the rules on pre-trial is necessitated from the ordering them to pay back rentals.
significant role of the pre-trial stage in the litigation process. Pre-trial is an
answer to the clarion call for the speedy disposition of cases. Although it REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
was discretionary under the 1940 Rules of Court, it was made mandatory The RTC reversed the MeTC finding that no lease agreement existed
under the 1964 Rules and the subsequent amendments in 1997. between the parties. 

FACTS: COURT OF APPEALS

Spouses Rabaja were leasing an apartment in the subject lot which was The CA ruled in favor of Spouses Salvador and reinstated the MeTC ruling
owned by Spouses Salvador. Since the Salvadors were looking to sell the ejecting Spouses Rabaja. Not having been appealed, the CA decision
lot, the Rabajas showed interest. Petitioner Herminia Salvador then became final and executory.
personally introduced Gonzales to them as the administrator of the said
property. Spouses Salvador even handed to Gonzales the owner’s duplicate
certificate of title over the subject property. Spouses Rabaja made an initial -RESCISSION CASE-
payment of ₱48,000.00 to Gonzales in the presence of Herminia. Gonzales REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
then presented the SPA executed by Rolando Salvador. On the same day, The RTC rendered a decision in favor of Spouses Rabaja, holding that the
the parties executed the Contract to Sell which stipulated that for a signature of Spouses Salvador affixed in the contract to sell appeared to be
consideration of ₱5,000,000.00, Spouses Salvador sold, transferred and authentic. It also held that the contract, although denominated as "contract
conveyed in favor of Spouses Rabaja the subject property. Spouses Rabaja to sell," was actually a contract of sale because Spouses Salvador, as
made several payments totalling P950,000.00, which were received by vendors, did not reserve their title to the property until the vendees had fully
Gonzales. paid the purchase price. Since the contract entered into was a reciprocal
contract, it could be validly rescinded by Spouses Rabaja. The RTC stated
that Gonzales was undoubtedly the attorney-in-fact of Spouses Salvador
Subsequently, the Salvadors complained to the Rabajas that they did not absent any taint of irregularity. Spouses Rabaja could not be faulted in
receive any payment from Gonzales. This prompted the Rabajas to suspend dealing with Gonzales who was duly equipped with the SPA from Spouses
further payment; and as a consequence, they received a notice to vacate the Salvador.
property from the Salvadors for non-payment of rentals.
COURT OF APPEALS
Thereafter, the Salvadors instituted an action for ejectment against the The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC with modification. It ruled that
Rabajas. In turn, the Rabajas filed an action for rescission of contract the "contract to sell" was indeed a contract of sale and that Gonzales was
against the Salvadors and Gonzales. armed with an SPA and was, in fact, introduced to Spouses Rabaja by
Spouses Salvador as the administrator of the property. 

10
The CA also ruled that Gonzales was not solidarily liable with Spouses considered as a justifiable excuse by the Court. As a result of their
Salvador. The agent must expressly bind himself or exceed the limit of his inattentiveness, Spouses Salvador could no longer present any evidence in
authority in order to be solidarily liable. It was not shown that Gonzales as their favor. Spouses Rabaja, as plaintiffs, were properly allowed by the
agent of Spouses Salvador exceeded her authority or expressly bound RTC to present evidence ex parte against Spouses Salvador as defendants.
herself to be solidarily liable.  Considering that Gonzales as co-defendant was able to attend the pre-trial
conference, she was allowed to present her evidence. The RTC could only
ISSUE: Whether or not failure of Spouses Salvador to attend pre-tral render judgment based on the evidence presented during the trial.
conference warrants the presentation of evidence ex-parte by Spouses
Rabaja?  3. Bitte vs. Jonas – 777 SCRA 489

RULING:  YES.  DOCTRINE: Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Default; The rule is that
On the procedural aspect, the Court reiterates the rule that the failure to “right to appeal from the judgment by default is not lost and can be done on
attend the pre-trial conference does not result in the default of an absent grounds that the amount of the judgment is excessive or is different in kind
party. Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a defendant is only from that prayed for, or that the plaintiff failed to prove the material
declared in default if he fails to file his Answer within the reglementary allegations of his complaint, or that the decision is contrary to law
period.29 On the other hand, if a defendant fails to attend the pre-trial
conference, the plaintiff can present his evidence ex parte. FACTS: On July 19, 1985, before Rosa Elsa went to Australia, she had
executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) authorizing her mother,
From the foregoing, the failure of a party to appear at the pre-trial has Andrea C. Serrano (Andrea), to sell the property.
indeed adverse consequences. If the absent party is the plaintiff, then his Sometime in May 1996, Cipriano Serrano (Cipriano), son of
case shall be dismissed. If it is the defendant who fails to appear, then the Andrea and brother of Rosa Elsa, offered the property for sale to Spouses
plaintiff is allowed to present his evidence ex parte and the court shall Benjamin and Farida Yap Bitte (Spouses Bitte) showing them the authority
render judgment based on the evidence presented. Thus, the plaintiff is of Andrea. On September 3, 1996, Cipriano received from Spouses Bitte the
given the privilege to present his evidence without objection from the amount of P200,000.00 as advance payment for the property. Later on, on
defendant, the likelihood being that the court will decide in favor of the September 10, 1996, he received the additional amount of P400,000.00.
plaintiff, the defendant having forfeited the opportunity to rebut or present
its own evidence.31 The stringent application of the rules on pre-trial is Spouses Bitte sought a meeting for final negotiation with Rosa
necessitated from the significant role of the pre-trial stage in the litigation Elsa, the registered owner of the subject property. At that time, Rosa Elsa
process. Pre-trial is an answer to the clarion call for the speedy disposition was in Australia and had no funds to spare for her travel to the Philippines.
of cases. Although it was discretionary under the 1940 Rules of Court, it To enable her to come to the country, Spouses Bitte paid for her  round trip
was made mandatory under the 1964 Rules and the subsequent amendments ticket.
in 1997.32 “The importance of pre-trial in civil actions cannot be
overemphasized.”
On October 10, 1996, shortly after her arrival here in the
Philippines, Rosa Elsa revoked the SPA, through an instrument of even
There is no dispute that Spouses Salvador and their counsel failed to attend date, and handed a copy thereof to Andrea. The next day, on October 11,
the pre-trial conference set on February 4, 2005 despite proper notice. 1996, the parties met at Farida Bitte's office, but no final agreement was
Spouses Salvador aver that their non-attendance was due to the fault of their reached. The next day, Rosa Elsa withdrew from the transaction.
counsel as he forgot to update his calendar.34 This excuse smacks of
carelessness, and indifference to the pre-trial stage. It simply cannot be

11
 On October 17, 1996, Spouses Bitte filed before the RTC a Spouses Jonas argue: that the SPA was not enforceable; that the
Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages seeking to compel Rosa deed of absolute sale executed by Andrea was a nullity because it was made
Elsa, Andrea and Cipriano to transfer to their names the title over the with knowledge on the part of Spouses Bitte of the revocation of Andrea's
subject property. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 24,77196 and authority; and that Spouses Yap could not be considered purchasers in good
raffled to RTC-Branch 13. faith as they failed to verify the authority of the vendors, Spouses Bitte,
considering that the certificate of title was still under Rosa Elsa's name.
While the case was pending, Andrea sold the subject property to
Spouses Bitte, through a deed of absolute sale, dated February 25, 1997, Spouses Bitte argue that the deed of absolute sale executed by
and notarized by one Atty. Bernardino Bolcan, Jr. Immediately thereafter, Andrea was valid and legal because the SPA was not validly revoked as the
Rosa Elsa asked Andrea about the sale. Her questions about the sale, revocation was not registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of
however, were ignored and her pleas for the cancellation of the sale and Davao City. Thus, Andrea's authority to transact with them on behalf of
restoration of the property to her possession were disregarded. Undisputed Rosa Elsa subsisted. No evidence was presented showing that Ganzon Yap
by the parties is the fact that Rosa Elsa earlier mortgaged the subject indeed bought the property in bad faith considering that the TCT did not
property to Mindanao Development Bank. Upon failure to pay the loan on bear any annotation that should have alarmed him before buying the
maturity, the mortgage was foreclosed and sold at a public auction on property. Ganzon could not have been expected to go beyond the title and
December 14, 1998 as evidenced by the annotation on the title. look for vices or defects that could have rendered him not a purchaser in
good faith and for value.
Armed with the deed of absolute sale executed by Andrea, Spouses
Bitte were able to redeem the property on September 14, 1998 from the ISSUE: Whether or not the Bitte spouses have already lost their legal
highest bidder, Thelma Jean Salvana, for P1.6 Million Pesos. Thereafter, personality due to their default??
Spouses Bitte sold the property to Ganzon Yap (Ganzon), married to Haima
Yap. RULING: YES.
The rule is that “right to appeal from the judgment by default is not lost and
Case #1 Civil Case No. 24,771-96: a Complaint for Specific Performance can be done on grounds that the amount of the judgment is excessive or is
with Damages seeking to compel Rosa Elsa, Andrea and Cipriano to different in kind from that prayed for, or that the plaintiff failed to prove the
transfer the title of the subject property to Spouses Bitte. material allegations of his complaint, or that the decision is contrary to
law.” If a party who has been declared in default has in his arsenal the
Case #2 Civil Case No. 27,667-99: Spouses Jonas filed before the RTC a remedy of appeal from the judgment of default on the basis of the decision
complaint for Annulment of Deed of Absolute Sale, Cancellation of TCT having been issued against the evidence or the law, that person cannot be
and Recovery of Possession, Injunction, and Damages against Spouses denied the remedy and opportunity to assail the judgment in the appellate
Bitte. court. Despite being burdened by the circumstances of default, the
petitioners may still use all other remedies available to question not only the
RTC: rendered a joint decision confirm dismissal of Civil Case No. 24,771- judgment of default but also the judgment on appeal before this Court.
96 and directing Spouses Bitte to pay Rosa Elsa the amount of Those remedies necessarily include an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of
P1,546,752.80, representing the balance of the sale of the subject. the Rules of Court.
On the propriety of the questions raised in the petition. Spouses Jonas
claims that that the issues raised here, being factual, are inappropriate for
CA: reversed the RTC decision. Hence, this petition by Farida Yap Bitte being beyond the inquiry of this Court; that the factual findings of the CA
and the Heirs of Benjamin Bitte. could no longer be modified or even reviewed citing the long-standing rule

12
that they are final and conclusive. Although the rule admits of exceptions,
they insist that none of them obtains in this case. The questions forwarded Matters involving the amendment of pleadings are primarily governed by
by Spouses Bitte are without doubt factual issues. This Court, being not a the pertinent provisions of Rule 10 and not by Section 4 of Rule 129 of the
trier of facts, has no recourse but to give credence to the findings of the CA. Rules of Court. Hence, allegations (and admissions) in a pleading — even if
Although it is true that there are exceptions as enumerated in Development not shown to be made through “palpable mistake” — can still be corrected
Bank of the Philippines v. Traders Royal Bank,16 none of these were or amended provided that the amendment is sanctioned under Rule 10 of the
invoked or cited in the petition. Rules of Court. 

The exceptions to the rule that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are FACTS:
binding on the Court are:  Stockholders of STRADEC, a domestic corporation engaged in business
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or development and investment, executed Pledge agreements where they
conjectures;  pledge a certain amount of stocks in favor of URAMI, the respondent.
(2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; These pledges serve as securities to the loan obtained by STRADEC from
 (3) when there is grave abuse URAMI. One of the stockholders who so pledged his shares is Yujuico.
On that score alone, this petition should be denied outright
         STRADEC failed to comply with its payment obligations. It received a
RULE 10 notice informing them of an impending auction sale of the stocked pledges
1. Yujuico vs. United Resources Asset Mgt. Corp. – 760 to satisfy STRADEC’s outstanding loan obligations. Notice was sent by a
SCRA (2015) certain Atty. Nethercott.

Amendment of Pleadings; Our rules of procedure allow a party in a civil On June 21, 2004, petitioner filed before RTC Pasig City an injunction
action to amend his pleading as a matter of right, so long as the pleading is complaint to enjoin the sale of public auction. One of the issues raised is
amended only once and before a responsive pleading is served (or, if the Atty. Nethercott’s lack of authority to represent URAMI for any purpose.
pleading sought to be amended is a reply, within ten [10] days after it is RTC did not act upon the complaint, and the public auction pushed through.
served).  Otherwise, a party can only amend his pleading upon prior leave On July 5, 2004 , RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction preventing
of court. URAMI from appropriating the stocks it purchased from sale. More than a
year later, the respondent filed a motion for leave to file an answer. In its
As a matter of judicial policy, courts are impelled to treat motions for leave answer, URAMI admitted that the auction was void and that it never
to file amended pleadings with liberality. This is especially true when a authorized Atty. Nethercott to cause the sale thereof. Petitioner filed a
motion for leave is filed during the early stages of proceedings or, at least, motion for summary judgment since there is no longer any genuine issue
before trial. Our case law had long taught that bona fide amendments to left by reason of respondent's admission. The resolution was deferred
pleadings should be allowed in the interest of justice so that every case may, because of a TRO issued by the court.
so far as possible, be determined on its real facts and the multiplicity of
suits thus be prevented. Hence, as long as it does not appear that the motion ISSUE:
for leave was made with bad faith or with intent to delay the proceedings, Whether the amendment answer may still be allowed even if it was filed
courts are justified to grant leave and allow the filing of an amended more than 2 years after the original answer has been filed?
pleading. Once a court grants leave to file an amended pleading, the same
becomes binding and will not be disturbed on appeal unless it appears that
the court had abused its discretion. RULING:
YES. Our rules of procedure allow a party in a civil action to amend his

13
pleading as a matter of right, so long as the pleading is amended only once authority to cause the foreclosure on the pledged stocks on behalf of
and before a responsive pleading is served (or, if the pleading sought to be URAMI. With the existence of such board resolution, the statement in
amended is a reply, within ten days after it is served). Otherwise, a party URAMI’s original answer pertaining to the lack of authority of Atty.
can only amend his pleading upon prior leave of court. Nethercott to initiate the 23 June 2004 auction sale thus appears mistaken, if
not entirely baseless and unfounded. Hence, we find it only right and fair,
As a matter of judicial policy, courts are impelled to treat motions for leave that URAMI should be given a chance to file its amended answer in order to
to file amended pleadings with liberality. This is especially true when a rectify such mistakes in its original answer.
motion for leave is filed during the early stages of proceedings or, at least,
before trial. Our case law had long taught that bona fide amendments to Second. We also cannot agree with the petitioner’s accusation that the
pleadings should be allowed in the interest of justice so that every case may, amended answer was only interposed to further delay the proceedings in
so far as possible, be determined on its real facts and the multiplicity of Civil Case No. 70027. As the previous discussion reveal, the amended
suits thus be prevented. Hence, as long as it does not appear that the motion answer aims to correct certain allegations of fact in the original answer
for leave was made with bad faith or with intent to delay the proceedings, which, needless to state, are crucial to a full and proper disposition of Civil
courts are justified to grant leave and allow the filing of an amended Case No. 70027. It is, therefore, in the best interest of justice and equity that
pleading. Once a court grants leave to file an amended pleading, the same URAMI should be allowed to file the amended answer.
becomes binding and will not be disturbed on appeal unless it appears that
the court had abused its discretion.  Third. The mere fact that URAMI filed its motion for leave years after the
original answer is also not reason enough in itself to discredit the amended
First. We cannot subscribe to petitioner’s argument that Section 4 of Rule answer as a sheer dilatory measure. Readily observable from the established
129 of the Rules of Court precludes URAMI from filing its amended facts is that the perceived delay between the filing of the motion for leave
answer. To begin with, the said provision does not set the be-all and end-all and the filing of the original answer is not purely attributable to URAMI. It
standard upon which amendments to pleadings may or may not be allowed. must be remembered that some time after the original answer was filed, we
Matters involving the amendment of pleadings are primarily governed by issued a temporary restraining order in G.R. No. 177068 that effectively
the pertinent provisions of Rule 10 and not by Section 4 of Rule 129 of the suspended the proceedings in Civil Case No. 70027 for more than a year.
Rules of Court. Hence, allegations (and admissions) in a pleading — even if Thus, even if it wanted to, URAMI really could not have filed a motion for
not shown to be made through “palpable mistake” — can still be corrected leave to file amended answer sooner than it already had. On this score, we
or amended provided that the amendment is sanctioned under Rule 10 of the note that it only took URAMI a little over three months after the lifting of
Rules of Court. the temporary restraining order to replace its previous counsel of record in
Civil Case No. 70027 and to file its amended answer.
Nevertheless, even if we are to apply Section 4 of Rule 129 to the present
case, we still find the allowance of URAMI’s amended answer to be in Fourth. All in all, we find absolutely no cause to overrule the grant of leave
order. To our mind, a consideration of the evidence that URAMI plans to granted to URAMI to file its amended answer. The said grant is consistent
present during trial indubitably reveals that the admissions made by with our time-honored judicial policy of affording liberal treatment to
URAMI under its original answer were a product of clear and patent amendments to pleadings, especially those made before the conduct of trial.
mistake.
We should always remember that our rules of procedure are mere tools
One of the key documents that URAMI plans to present during trial, which designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their application should
it also attached in its amended answer as “Annex 8” thereof, is URAMI’s never be allowed to frustrate the truth and the promotion of substantial
Board Resolution38 dated 21 June 2004 that evinces Atty. Nethercott’s justice.39 Were we to succumb to petitioner’s arguments today, however,

14
we would have sanctioned an outcome totally inconsistent with the Whether LEI’s amended complaint should be admitted. 
underlying purpose of our procedural laws. That, we simply cannot
countenance.  RULING:
YES. It should be noted that respondents Lilian Soriano and the Estate of
Leandro Soriano, Jr. already filed their Answer, to petitioners' complaint,
2. Lisam Enterprises vs. Banco De Oro – 670 SCRA and the claims being asserted were made against said parties. A responsive
pleading having been filed, amendments to the complaint may, therefore, be
DOCTRINE: made only by leave of court and no longer as a matter of right. The granting
The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid a of leave to file amended pleading is a matter particularly addressed to the
multiplicity of suits and in order that the real controversies between the sound discretion of the trial court; and that discretion is broad, subject only
parties are presented, their rights determined, and the case decided on the to the limitations that the amendments should not substantially change the
merits without unnecessary delay. This liberality is greatest in the early cause of action or alter the theory of the case, or that it was not made to
stages of a lawsuit, especially in this case where the amendment was made delay the action. 
before the trial of the case, thereby giving the petitioners all the time
allowed by law to answer and to prepare for trial.Hence, the RTC was Nevertheless, as enunciated in Valenzuela, even if the amendment
directed to admit the Amended Complaint. Amendments are generally substantially alters the cause of action or defense, such amendment could
favored, it would have been more fitting for the trial court to extend such still be allowed when it is sought to serve the higher interest of substantial
liberality towards petitioners by admitting the amended complaint which justice, prevent delay, and secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition
was filed before the order dismissing the original complaint became final of actions and proceedings.
and executory. It is quite apparent that since trial proper had not yet even
begun, allowing the amendment would not have caused any delay. The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid a
Moreover, doing so would have served the higher interest of justice as this multiplicity of suits and in order that the real controversies between the
would provide the best opportunity for the issues among all parties to be parties are presented, their rights determined, and the case decided on the
thoroughly threshed out and the rights of all parties finally determined. merits without unnecessary delay. This liberality is greatest in the early
Hence, the Court overrules the trial court’s denial of the motion to admit the stages of a lawsuit, especially in this case where the amendment was made
amended complaint, and orders the admission of the same.  before the trial of the case, thereby giving the petitioners all the time
allowed by law to answer and to prepare for trial.Hence, the RTC was
FACTS: directed to admit the Amended Complaint.
Lisam Enterprises, Inc. (LEI), represented by Lolita Soriano filed a
Complaint against the respondents BDO Unibank, et. al. for Annulment of
Mortgage with Prayer for TRO & Preliminary Injunction with Damages
with the RTC. The RTC issued a TRO. Lilian Soriano and the Estate of 3. Tiu vs. Phil. Bank  of Communications – 596 SCRA 43
Leandro Soriano, Jr. filed an Answer. Thereafter, RTC dismissed LEI and
Lolita’s Complaint. The latter then filed a Motion for Reconsideration
(MR). While awaiting resolution of the MR, they also filed a Motion to DOCTRINE:
Admit Amended Complaint. The RTC denied both the MR and the Motion The granting of leave to file amended pleading is a matter particularly
to Admit Amended Complaint. addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court; and that discretion is
broad, subject only to the limitations that the amendments should not
substantially change the cause of action or alter the theory of the case, or
ISSUE: that it was not made to delay the action. Nevertheless, as enunciated in

15
Valenzuela, even if the amendment substantially alters the cause of action Management and Archives Office, through the Office of the RTC Clerk of
or defense, such amendment could still be allowed when it is sought to Court.
serve the higher interest of substantial justice; prevent delay; and secure a
just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of actions and proceedings. 
PBCOM instructed its counsel to file a complaint for collection against
The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid a petitioners.
multiplicity of suits and in order that the real controversies between the
parties are presented, their rights determined, and the case decided on the On July 3, 1999, petitioners filed their Answer. It alleged, among other
merits without unnecessary delay. This liberality is greatest in the early things, that they were not personally liable on the promissory notes, because
stages of a lawsuit, especially in this case where the amendment was made they signed the Surety Agreement in their capacities as officers of AWRI.
before the trial of the case, thereby giving the petitioners all the time They claimed that the Surety Agreement attached to the complaint as
allowed by law to answer and to prepare for trial.  Annexes “A” to “A-2” were falsified, considering that when they signed the
same, the words “In his personal capacity” did not yet appear in the
Amendments to pleadings are generally favored and should be liberally document and were merely intercalated thereon without their knowledge
allowed in furtherance of justice in order that every case, may so far as and consent.
possible, be determined on its real facts and in order to speed up the trial of
the case or prevent the circuity of action and unnecessary expense. That is, In support of their allegations, petitioners attached to their Answer a
unless there are circumstances such as inexcusable delay or the taking of the certified photocopy of the Surety Agreement issued on March 25, 1999 by
adverse party by surprise or the like, which might justify a refusal of the Records Management and Archives Office in Davao City,  showing that
permission to amend.  the words “In his personal capacity” were not found at the foot of page two
of the document where their signatures appeared.
FACTS:
In June 1993, Asian Water Resources, Inc. (AWRI), represented by herein Because of this development, PBCOM’s counsel searched for and retrieved
petitioners, applied for a real estate loan with the Philippine Bank of the file copy of the Surety Agreement. The notarial copy showed that the
Communications (PBCOM) to fund its purified water distribution business. words “In his personal capacity” did not appear on page two of the Surety
In support of the loan application, petitioners submitted a Board Resolution Agreement.
dated June 7, 1993. The loan was guaranteed by collateral over the property
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-13020. The loan was Petitioners’ counsel then asked PBCOM to explain the alteration appearing
eventually approved. on the agreement. PBCOM subsequently discovered that the insertion was
ordered by the bank auditor. It alleged that when the Surety Agreement was
In August 1996, AWRI applied for a bigger loan from PBCOM for inspected by the bank auditor, he called the attention of the loans clerk,
additional capitalization using the same Board Resolution, but without any Kenneth Cabahug, as to why the words “In his personal capacity” were not
additional real estate collateral. Considering that the proposed additional indicated under the signature of each surety, in accordance with bank
loan was unsecured, PBCOM required all the members of the Board of standard operating procedures. The auditor then ordered Mr. Cabahug to
Directors of AWRI to become sureties. Thus, on August 16, 1996, a Surety type the words “ In his personal capacity” below the second signatures of
Agreement was executed by its Directors and acknowledged by a notary petitioners. However, the notary public was never informed of the insertion.
public on the same date. All copies of the Surety Agreement, except two, Mr. Cabahug subsequently executed an affidavit attesting to the
were kept by PBCOM. Of the two copies kept by the notary public, one circumstances why the insertion was made.
copy was retained for his notarial file and the other was sent to the Records

16
PBCOM then filed a Reply and Answer to Counterclaim with Motion for however, when despite a substantial change or alteration in the cause of
Leave of Court to Substitute Annex “A” of the Complaint, wherein it action or defense, the amendments sought to be made shall serve the higher
attached the duplicate original copy retrieved from the file of the notary interests of substantial justice, and prevent delay and equally promote the
public. PBCOM also admitted its mistake in making the insertion and laudable objective of the rules which is to secure a “just, speedy and
explained that it was made without the knowledge and consent of the notary inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.”
public. PBCOM maintained that the insertion was not a falsification, but
was made only to speak the truth of the parties’ intentions. PBCOM also The granting of leave to file amended pleading is a matter particularly
contended that petitioners were already primarily liable on the Surety addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court; and that discretion is
Agreement whether or not the insertion was made, having admitted in their broad, subject only to the limitations that the amendments should not
pleadings that they voluntarily executed and signed the Surety Agreement substantially change the cause of action or alter the theory of the case, or
in the original form. PBCOM, invoking a liberal application of the Rules, that it was not made to delay the action.28 Nevertheless, as enunciated in
emphasized that the motion incorporated in the pleading can be treated as a Valenzuela, even if the amendment substantially alters the cause of action
motion for leave of court to amend and admit the amended complaint or defense, such amendment could still be allowed when it is sought to
pursuant to Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court. serve the higher interest of substantial justice; prevent delay; and secure a
just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of actions and proceedings.
On December 14, 1999, the RTC issued an Order allowing the substitution
of the altered document with the original Surety Agreement. The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid a
multiplicity of suits and in order that the real controversies between the
ISSUE: parties are presented, their rights determined, and the case decided on the
Whether the substitution of the altered document with the original Surety merits without unnecessary delay. This liberality is greatest in the early
Agreement is allowed stages of a lawsuit, especially in this case where the amendment was made
before the trial of the case, thereby giving the petitioners all the time
RULING: allowed by law to answer and to prepare for trial.
YES. “SECTION 3. Amendments by leave of court.—Except as provided
in the next preceding section, substantial amendments may be made only Furthermore, amendments to pleadings are generally favored and should be
upon leave of court. But such leave may be refused if it appears to the court liberally allowed in furtherance of justice in order that every case, may so
that the motion was made with intent to delay. Orders of the court upon the far as possible, be determined on its real facts and in order to speed up the
matters provided in this section shall be made upon motion filed in court, trial of the case or prevent the circuity of action and unnecessary expense.
and after notice to the adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard.” That is, unless there are circumstances such as inexcusable delay or the
taking of the adverse party by surprise or the like, which might justify a
This Court has emphasized the import of Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 refusal of permission to amend.
Rules of Civil Procedure in Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals, thus:
In the present case, there was no fraudulent intent on the part of PBCOM in
“Interestingly, Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure submitting the altered surety agreement. In fact, the bank admitted that it
amended the former rule in such manner that the phrase “or that the cause was a mistake on their part to have submitted it in the first place instead of
of action or defense is substantially altered” was stricken-off and not the original agreement. It also admitted that, through inadvertence, the copy
retained in the new rules. The clear import of such amendment in Section 3, that was attached to the complaint was the copy wherein the words “IN HIS
Rule 10 is that under the new rules, “the amendment may (now) PERSONAL CAPACITY” were inserted to conform to the bank’s standard
substantially alter the cause of action or defense.” This should only be true, practice. This alteration was made without the knowledge of the notary

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public. PBCOM’s counsel had no idea that what it submitted was the altered
document, thereby necessitating the substitution of the surety agreement
with the original thereof, in order that the case would be judiciously 4. Remington Industrial Sales Corp. vs. CA -382 SCRA 499
resolved.
DOCTRINE:
Verily, it is a cardinal rule of evidence, not just one of technicality but of A complaint can still be amended as a matter of right before an answer has
substance, that the written document is the best evidence of its own been filed, even if there is a pending proceeding for its dismissal before the
contents. It is also a matter of both principle and policy that when the higher court—before the filing of an answer, the plaintiff has the absolute
written contract is established as the repository of the parties’ stipulations, right to amend the complaint whether a new cause of action or change in
any other evidence is excluded, and the same cannot be used to substitute theory is introduced. Section 2, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Court
for such contract, or even to alter or contradict the latter. The original surety explicitly states that a pleading may be amended as a matter of right before
agreement is the best evidence that could establish the parties’ respective a responsive pleading is served. This only means that prior to the filing of
rights and obligations. In effect, the RTC merely allowed the amendment of an answer, the plaintiff has the absolute right to amend the complaint
the complaint, which consequently included the substitution of the altered whether a new cause of action or change in theory is introduced. The reason
surety agreement with a copy of the original. for this rule is implied in the subsequent Section 3 of Rule 10. Under this
provision, substantial amendment of the complaint is not allowed without
It is well to remember at this point that rules of procedure are but mere tools leave of court after an answer has been served, because any material change
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid in the allegations contained in the complaint could prejudice the rights of
application that would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather the defendant who has already set up his defense in the answer. 
than promote substantial justice must always be avoided. Applied to the
instant case, this not only assures that it would be resolved based on real Conversely, it cannot be said that the defendant’s rights have been violated
facts, but would also aid in the speedy disposition of the case by utilizing by changes made in the complaint if he has yet to file an answer thereto. In
the best evidence possible to determine the rights and obligations of the such an event, the defendant has not presented any defense that can be
party- litigants. altered or affected by the amendment of the complaint in accordance with
Section 2 of Rule 10. The defendant still retains the unqualified opportunity
Moreover, contrary to petitioners’ contention, they could not be prejudiced to address the allegations against him by properly setting up his defense in
by the substitution since they can still present the substituted documents, the answer. Considerable leeway is thus given to the plaintiff to amend his
Annexes “A” to A-2,” as part of the evidence of their affirmative defenses. complaint once, as a matter of right, prior to the filing of an answer by the
The substitution did not prejudice petitioners or delay the action. On the defendant. 
contrary, it tended to expedite the determination of the controversy.
Besides, the petitioners are not precluded from filing the appropriate The right granted to the plaintiff under procedural law to amend the
criminal action against PBCOM for attaching the altered copy of the surety complaint before an answer has been served is not precluded by the filing of
agreement to the complaint. The substitution of the documents would not, in a motion to dismiss or any other proceeding contesting its sufficiency. Were
any way, erase the existence of falsification, if any. The case before the we to conclude otherwise, the right to amend a pleading under Section 2,
RTC is civil in nature, while the alleged falsification is criminal, which is Rule 10 will be rendered nugatory and ineffectual, since all that a defendant
separate and distinct from another. Thus, the RTC committed no reversible has to do to foreclose this remedial right is to challenge the adequacy of the
error when it allowed the substitution of the altered surety agreement with complaint before he files an answer. 
that of the original. 

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Plainly stated, we find no practical advantage in ordering the dismissal of with the CA stating that it had filed a Motion to Admit Amended Complaint
the complaint against respondent and for petitioner to re-file the same, when together with said Amended Complaint before the RTC. Hence, petitioner
the latter can still clearly amend the complaint as a matter of right. The prayed that the proceedings in the special civil action be suspended.
amendment of the complaint would not prejudice respondents or delay the RTC granted petitioner’s Motion to Admit Amended Complaint. CA
action, as this would, in fact, simplify the case and expedite its disposition.  granted the writ of certiorari and ordered the respondent judge to dismiss
without prejudice the Complaint against respondent.
The fact that the other defendants below has filed their answers to the
complaint does not bar petitioner’s right to amend the complaint as against ISSUE:
respondent. Indeed, where some but not all the defendants have answered, Whether a  complaint can still be amended as a matter of right before an
the plaintiff may still amend its complaint once, as a matter of right, in answer has been filed, even if there was a pending proceeding for its
respect to claims asserted solely against the non-answering defendant, but dismissal before the higher court
not as to claims asserted against the other defendants. 
FACTS: RULING:
Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money and damages arising from YES. Section 2, Rule 10 explicitly states that a pleading may be amended as
breach of contract. Among the defendants is respondent British Steel. a matter of right before a responsive pleading is served. This only means
Respondent moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that it that prior to the filing of an answer, the plaintiff has the absolute right to
failed to state a cause of action against it. RTC denied the motion to amend the complaint whether a new cause of action or change in theory is
dismiss, as well as the MR. Respondent filed a petition for certiorari and introduced. The reason for this rule is implied in the subsequent Section 3
prohibition before CA, claiming that the complaint did not contain a single of Rule 10. Under this provision, substantial amendment of the complaint is
averment that respondent committed any act or is guilty of any omission in not allowed without leave of court after an answer has been served, because
violation of petitioner’s legal rights. Apart from the allegation in the any material change in the allegations contained in the complaint could
complaint’s “Jurisdictional Facts” that: prejudice the rights of the defendant who has already set up his defense in
the answer.
1.05. Defendants British Steel (Asia) Ltd. and Ferro Trading Gmbh, while
understood by the plaintiff as mere suppliers of goods for defendant ISL, Conversely, it cannot be said that the defendant’s rights have been violated
are impleaded as party defendants pursuant to Section 13, Rule 3 of the by changes made in the complaint if he has yet to file an answer thereto. In
Revised Rules of Court  such an event, the defendant has not presented any defense that can be
altered or affected by the amendment of the complaint in accordance with
No other reference was made to respondent that would constitute a valid Section 2 of Rule 10. The defendant still retains the unqualified opportunity
cause of action against it. Since petitioner failed to plead any cause of to address the allegations against him by properly setting up his defense in
action against respondent as alternative defendant under Section 13, Rule 3, the answer. Considerable leeway is thus given to the plaintiff to amend his
RTC should have ordered the dismissal of the complaint insofar as complaint once, as a matter of right, prior to the filing of an answer by the
respondent was concerned. defendant.

Petitioner sought to amend its complaint by incorporating therein additional The right granted to the plaintiff under procedural law to amend the
factual allegations constitutive of its cause of action against respondent. complaint before an answer has been served is not precluded by the filing of
Pursuant to Section 2, Rule 10, petitioner maintained that it can amend the a motion to dismiss or any other proceeding contesting its sufficiency. Were
complaint as a matter of right because respondent has not yet filed a we to conclude otherwise, the right to amend a pleading under Section 2,
responsive pleading thereto. Petitioner filed a Manifestation and Motion Rule 10 will be rendered nugatory and ineffectual, since all that a defendant

19
has to do to foreclose this remedial right is to challenge the adequacy of the merits of the action and the ends of substantial justice will be subserved
complaint before he files an answer. thereby. The court may grant a continuance to enable the amendment to be
made.
Moreover, amendment of pleadings is favored and should be liberally
allowed in the furtherance of justice in order to determine every case as far RULE 12
as possible on its merits without regard to technicalities. This principle is 1. Fortune Life Ins. Co Inc. vs. COA 845 SCRA 599,
generally recognized to speed up trial and save party litigants from Nov. 21, 2018
incurring unnecessary expense, so that a
full hearing on the merits of every case may be had and multiplicity of suits *not related to Rule 12 omg
avoided. Facts
The remedy espoused by the CA in its assailed judgment will precisely Respondent Provincial Government of Antique (LGU) and the petitioner
result in multiple suits, involving the same set of facts and to which the executed a memorandum of agreement concerning the life insurance
defendants would likely raise the same or, at least, related defenses. Plainly coverage of qualified barangay secretaries, treasurers and tanod, the former
stated, we find no practical advantage in ordering the dismissal of the obligating P4,393,593.60for the premium payment, and subsequently
complaint against respondent and for petitioner to re-file the same, when the submitting the corresponding disbursement voucher to COA Antique for
latter can still clearly amend the complaint as a matter of right. The pre-audit. The latter office disallowed the payment for lack of legal basis
amendment of the complaint would not prejudice respondents or delay the under Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code). Respondent LGU
action, as this would, in fact, simplify the case and expedite its disposition. appealed but its appeal was denied.
Consequently, the petitioner filed its petition for money claim in the COA.
Furthermore, we do not agree with respondent’s claim that it will be COA DENIED the petition, holding that under Section 447 and Section 458
prejudiced by the admission of the Amended Complaint because it had of the Local Government Code only municipal or city governments are
spent time, money and effort to file its petition before the appellate court. expressly vested with the power to secure group insurance coverage for
We cannot see how the result could be any different for respondent, if barangay workers; and noting the LGU’s failure to comply with the
petitioner merely re-filed the complaint instead of being allowed to amend requirement of publication under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9184
it. As adverted to earlier, amendment would even work to respondent’s (Government Procurement Reform Act).
advantage since it will undoubtedly speed up the proceedings before the The petitioner received a copy of the COA decision on December 14, 2012,
trial court. Consequently, the amendment should be allowed in the case at and filed its motion for reconsideration on January 14, 2013. However, the
bar as a matter of right in accordance with the rules. COA denied the motion, the denial being received by the petitioner on July
14, 2014.
Section 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence. Hence, the petitioner filed the petition for certiorari on August 12, 2014, but
— When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with the express or the petition for certiorari was dismissed on August 19,2014 for (a) the late
implied consent of the parties they shall be treated in all respects as if they filing of the petition; (b) the non-submission of the proof of service and
had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may verified declaration; and (c) the failure to show grave abuse of discretion on
be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these the part of the respondents. Hence this Motion for Reconsideration.
issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after Issues
judgment; but failure to amend does not effect the result of the trial of these
issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not 1.     WON Petitioner complied with rule on proof of service
within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings 2.     WON the “fresh period rule” applies on Rule 64
to be amended and shall do so with liberality if the presentation of the 3.     WON the remedy of Certiorari is proper

20
Held: Motion for Reconsideration is without merit 2014, it had only until July19, 2014 to file the petition. However, it filed the
petition on August 13, 2014, which was 25 days too late.
1.     NO. The petitioner obviously ignores that Section 13, Rule 13
of the Rules of Court concerns two types of proof of service, 3.     No. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and
namely: the affidavit and the registry receipt, viz: whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; in other words, power is exercised in an
Section 13. Proof of Service. – x x x. If service is made by registered mail, arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or
proof shall be made by such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the personal hostility; and such exercise is so patent or so gross as to
mailing office. The registry return card shall be filed immediately upon its amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either
receipt by the sender, or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter together with to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of
the certified or sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the law.
addressee. Section 13 thus requires that if the service is done by registered
mail, proof of service shall consist of the affidavit of the person effecting the A close look indicates that the petition for certiorari did not sufficiently
mailing and the registry receipt, both of which must be appended to the disclose how the COA committed grave abuse of its discretion. For sure, the
paper being served. A compliance with the rule is mandatory, such that bases cited by the petitioner did not approximate grave abuse of discretion.
there is no proof of service if either or both are not submitted. To start with, the supposed delays taken by the COA in deciding the appeal
Here, the petition for certiorari only carried the affidavit of service executed were neither arbitrary nor whimsical on its part. Secondly, the mere
by one Marcelino T. Pascua, Jr., who declared that he had served copies of terseness of the denial of the motion for reconsideration was not a factor in
the petition by registered mail, with registered receipts attached to the demonstrating an abuse of discretion. And, lastly, the fact that Senator
appropriate spaces found on pages 64-65 of the petition." The petition only
14
Pimentel, even if he had been the main proponent of the Local Government
bore, however, the cut print-outs of what appeared to be the registry receipt Code in the Legislature, expressed an opinion on the issues different from
numbers of the registered matters, not the registry receipts themselves. The the COA Commissioners’ own did not matter, for it was the latter’s
rule requires to be appended the registry receipts, not their reproductions. adjudication that had any value and decisiveness on the issues by virtue of
Hence, the cut print-outs did not substantially comply with the rule. their being the Constitutionally officials entrusted with the authority for that
purpose.
2.     NO. Jurisprudence dictates that the belated filing of the It is equally relevant to note that the COA denied the money claim of the
petition for certiorari under Rule 64 on the belief that the fresh petitioner for the further reason of lack of sufficient publication as required
period rule should apply was fatal to the recourse. As such, the by the Government Procurement Act. In that light, the COA acted well
petitioner herein should suffer the same fate for having wrongly within its authority in denying the petitioner’s claim.
assumed that the fresh period rule under Neypes applied. Rules of
procedure may be relaxed only to relieve a litigant of an injustice
that is not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in
not complying with the prescribed procedure. Absent this reason
for liberality, the petition cannot be allowed to prosper.

The petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration on January 14, 2013,
which was 31 days after receiving the assailed decision of the COA on
December 14, 2012. Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 64, it had only five days
from receipt of the denial of its motion for reconsideration to file the
petition. Considering that it received the notice of the denial on July 14,

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