FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 194129. June 15, 2015]

PO1 CRISPIN OCAMPO y SANTOS , petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES , respondent.

DECISION

SERENO , C.J : p

Before this Court is an appeal from the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 1 in CA-
G.R. CR No. 30957 dated 23 April 2010 and Resolution 2 dated 13 October 2010. The
CA a rmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) dated 10 May 2006 in
Criminal Case No. 00-183183, nding accused-appellant Police O cer 1 (PO1) Crispin
Ocampo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide.
On 01 June 2001, accused-appellant was charged with the crime of homicide
under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The Information reads:
That on or about May 27, 2000, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
accused, with intent to kill, did [then] and there wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence upon one MARIO DE LUNA
y HALLARE, by then and there ring his service rearm, .9 mm Barreta Pistol
with Serial No. M19498Z, hitting the said Mario De Luna y Hallare on the chest
and other parts of the body thereby in icting upon him gunshot wounds which
were necessarily fatal and mortal and which were the direct and immediate
cause of his death thereafter.
Contrary to law. 3
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. 4
The prosecution's version of the events as narrated by the CA is as follows:
On May 27, 2000, at about seven o'clock in the evening, Mario De Luna,
Emil Hipolito and Florentino Magante were having a drinking session at Mario's
house located at Panday Pira Street, Tondo, Manila. HSAcaE

At about 8:30 in the evening, the three, together with Edwin Hipolito and
Jaime Mabugat continued their drinking session at the house of Edwin, also at
Panday Pira Street, Tondo, Manila. While drinking thereat, they noticed that
another group, with appellant (accused-appellant), was also having a drinking
session along Panday Pira Street which was about three to four arms length
from Edwin's place.
Emil, Mario, Jaime and Florante joined the group in their drinking session.
While drinking, appellant (accused-appellant) poked a gun at Jaime and told
him "wag kang magulo, babarilin kita." Jaime retorted, "san, bakit," and was then
approached by her sister who asked him to go home to which he acceded.
Thereafter, appellant (accused-appellant) called on Mario De Luna and red
several shots at him. Mario de Luna fell down to the ground. He was then
immediately brought to the hospital by his mother and sister where he was
pronounced dead on arrival.

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 Dr. Emmanuel Arenas, Medico-Legal Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory,
Camp Crame, Quezon City, conducted a post-mortem examination of the body
of Mario De Luna and found that the victim died as a result of the gunshot
wounds on the chest and different parts of his body. 5
For his part, accused-appellant admitted to having shot the victim to death, but
claimed to have done so in self-defense. 6 In support of this claim, defense witness
Marita averred that the shooting incident was precipitated by the victim's unprovoked
knife attack upon accused-appellant. The latter was allegedly left with no other
recourse but to use his service rearm to neutralize the aggressor. 7 As testi ed to by
witness Marita:
On May 27, 2000, at about 10:00 p.m., she was in front of their house at
1663 Interior 24, F. Varona, Tondo, Manila, when she saw Ferdie Tapang, her
nephew, and four others having a drinking spree beside a lighted electric post.
Shortly thereafter, she noticed appellant (accused-appellant) pass by. Then
Jaime together with Mario arrived at the scene and approached the group of
Ferdie Tapang, uttering the words: "Gusto nyo itaob ko tong lamesang ito."
Sensing trouble upon seeing two of Ferdie Tapang's drinking buddies rise from
the bench where they were seated, Marita rushed to the house of appellant
(accused-appellant) to ask for his help in preventing a confrontation between
the two groups. HESIcT

Appellant (accused-appellant) had just arrived from his duty as police

o cer at the Criminal Investigation and Detection Unit of the Western Police
District and was changing into civilian clothes when Marita came and apprised
him of the situation. Together with Marita, he proceeded to the site of the
drinking spree. Noticing the group was becoming rowdy, appellant (accused-
appellant) approached Mario and asked if the latter knew him. When Mario
replied yes, appellant (accused-appellant) went on to tell the group to put an end
to their drinking session. Mario and Jaime immediately left the scene while the
others voluntarily dispersed.
Minutes later, Mario and Jaime went back to the locus. While standing
beside appellant (accused-appellant), Marita heard Mario shout towards their
direction the words: "Walang pulis-pulis sa akin!" Appellant (accused-appellant)
likewise heard Mario's utterances: "Walang pulis-pulis sa amin! Anong akala mo
sa amin, basta-basta mo na lang pauuwiin." Mario then pulled out a knife and
lunged at appellant (accused-appellant) who evaded the rst thrust. Mario tried
to stab appellant (accused-appellant) a second time but the latter dodged the
knife, drew his pistol and red two successive shots at Mario. Appellant
(accused-appellant) was leaning backwards when he red at Mario. Fatally hit,
the latter slumped to the ground.
Having immediately left the crime scene after hearing the rst gunshot,
Marita failed to witness what transpired thereafter. 8
On 28 May 2008, accused-appellant, accompanied by Police Senior Inspector
(PS/Insp.) Rosauro Dalisay, arrived at the Western Police District and surrendered his
service firearm. 9
On 10 May 2006, the RTC convicted accused-appellant of homicide. The
dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE , premises considered, this Court nds the accused
GUILTY of the crime of Homicide and hereby imposes upon him the penalty of
six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years
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 and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum and to pay the heirs of
Mario De Luna the amount of Php1,600,000.00 as loss of earning capacity;
Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity; Php2,577.00 as hospital expenses; and
Php300.00 as funeral expenses; and Php250,000 as attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED. 10
On appeal, the CA a rmed the conviction of accused-appellant, but modi ed
some of the monetary damages awarded. It a rmed the P50,000 civil indemnity in
favor of the victim's heirs. 11 But instead of the actual damages in the total amount of
P2,877 (P2,577 for hospital expense plus P300 for funeral expenses), temperate
damages of P25,000 were awarded in their favor. 12 The appellate court deleted the
award of P1,600,000 for loss of earning capacity on the ground of lack of competent
proof to substantiate the claim and reduced the attorney's fees from P250,000 to
P100,000. 13 It a rmed the factual ndings of the RTC and the latter's assessment of
the credibility of the witnesses. 14 The CA likewise found that the trial court did not err
in overruling accused-appellant's plea of self-defense. 15
Hence, this appeal.
The sole issue for resolution is whether the prosecution was able to prove
accused-appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court has carefully reviewed the case records and nds accused-appellant's
conviction proper. caITAC

It is a well-settled doctrine that ndings of trial courts on the credibility of

witnesses deserve a high degree of respect. 16 Having observed their deportment in
court, the trial judge is in a better position to determine the issue of credibility. 17 For
this reason, the ndings of trial judges will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of
any clear showing that they have overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts
or circumstances of weight and substance that could have altered the conviction of
appellants. 18 In the case at bar, the circumstances pointed out by accused-appellant
are too trivial to affect the assessment and the eventual ndings of the trial court that
he indeed committed the crime.
The Court therefore nds that the courts a quo have correctly appreciated the
facts. Their Decisions are fully supported by evidence on record including the transcript
of stenographic notes, which are extant and complete.
We are convinced that accused-appellant is guilty of homicide. We note that he
admitted to having killed the victim albeit in self-defense. The rule consistently adhered
to in this jurisdiction is that when the accused admit that they are the authors of the
death of the victim, and their defense is anchored on self-defense, it becomes
incumbent upon them to prove the justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the
court. 19
Self-defense is a time-worn excuse resorted to by assailants in criminal cases. 20
We have held in a host of instances that for self-defense to prosper, the following
requisites must be met: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the attack; and (3)
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person engaged in self-defense. 21
In this case, accused-appellant has failed to prove by clear and convincing
evidence the rst element of self-defense: unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim. 22 Appellant showed no attack or assault that had placed his life in imminent or
actual danger. 23 As aptly ruled by the CA:
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 [A]ppellant's tale of self-defense is negated by the physical evidence,
speci cally the trajectory of the bullets that penetrated the victim's body.
Medico-Legal Report No. W-359-2000, the autopsy report, showed that the victim
sustained two gunshot wounds, one at the base of his neck and another in the
chest area. In both injuries, after penetrating the victim's body, the bullets
traveled from left side downward to the right portion of his body . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The graphic representation of the travel path of the bullets from the entry
to the exit points is shown in prosecution's Exhibit "B-5." On the basis of the
bullet's trajectory, Dr. Aranas concluded that the shooter must have been
positioned higher than the victim when the shots were red. Thus, the trial
court concluded that the results of the autopsy disproves appellant's
claim that he red the shots while leaning backward after the victim
tried to stab him a second time . 24 (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth, and it
ranks higher in our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence. 25 In criminal cases such as
murder/homicide or rape, in which the accused stand to lose their liberty if found guilty,
this Court has, on many occasions, relied principally upon physical evidence in
ascertaining the truth. 26 Where the physical evidence on record runs counter to the
testimonies of witnesses, the primacy of the physical evidence must be upheld. 27
Ineluctably, the victim in this case cannot be considered as the aggressor. For
one, an eyewitness attested that accused-appellant shot the victim without any
provocation. 28 Also, as correctly noted by the trial court, there was failure to impute ill
motive on the part of the eyewitness who had implicated accused-appellant in the fatal
shooting of the victim. 29 Jurisprudence holds that when there is no evidence to show
any improper motive on the part of the witness to testify falsely against the accused or
to pervert the truth, the logical conclusion is that no such motive exists, and that the
former's testimony is worthy of full faith and credit. 30
With regard to the second element of self-defense, the Court nds that the
means employed by accused-appellant was grossly disproportionate to the victim's
alleged unlawful aggression. The victim suffered multiple gunshot wounds in his chest
and different parts of his body. 31 Besides, the Advance Information prepared by Senior
Police O cer 1 (SPO1) Virgo Villareal, the investigator of the case, reveals that there
was no mention of either a stabbing incident that happened or a knife that was
recovered from the crime scene. 32 Su ce it to say that a plea of self-defense is belied
by the "nature, number, and location of the wounds" in icted on the victim, "since the
gravity of said wounds is indicative of a determined effort to kill and not just to defend."
33 Here, the wounds sustained by the victim clearly show the intent of accused-
appellant to kill and not merely to prevent or repel an attack. Verily, since the means
employed by the latter were unreasonable and excessive, his plea of self-defense is
unacceptable.
We, therefore, nd no reversible error in the Decisions of the CA and the RTC as
to the guilt of accused-appellant.
Anent the appropriate penalty, we a rm the penalty imposed by the RTC and the
CA: an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from six (6) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor as minimum 34 to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as maximum for the crime of homicide.
The penalty for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion
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 temporal. 35 Considering that there is one mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender and no aggravating circumstance that attended the commission of the crime,
the imposable penalty, pursuant to Article 64 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, is reclusion
temporal in its minimum period . 36 This being a divisible penalty, the Indeterminate
Sentence Law 37 is applicable. Accordingly, accused-appellant can be sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty, the minimum 38 of which shall be within the range of prision
mayor and the maximum 39 of which shall be within the range of reclusion temporal in
its minimum period, there being one ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender and no aggravating circumstance. ICHDca

With regard to the appropriate indemnity and damages, the CA retained the
award of P50,000 as civil indemnity and modi ed other monetary damages as follows:
(a) P25,000 as temperate damages; (b) P50,000 as moral damages; and (c) P100,000
as attorney's fees. 40
As correctly ruled by the CA, an award for civil indemnity in favor of the heirs of
the victim must be automatically imposed against the accused without need of proof
other than the fact of the commission of murder or homicide. 41 Based on recent
jurisprudence, 42 however, the award of civil indemnity ex delicto of P75,000 for the
heirs of Mario de Luna is in order.
With respect to other compensatory damages, the Court in People v. Agudez 43
declared that competent evidence must likewise be presented to support the claim for
those damages. In this case, the heirs of Mario de Luna claimed that they spent P2,577
for hospital expense and P300 for funeral expenses. However, when actual damages
substantiated by receipts presented during trial amount to less than P25,000, the
award of P25,000 as temperate damages, in lieu of actual damages for a lesser
amount, is justified. 44
The award for moral damages by the CA shall be adjusted from P50,000 to
P75,000 to conform to the prevailing jurisprudence. 45
We also depart from the CA and the RTC rulings awarding the heirs of the victim
attorney's fees, as none of the grounds therefor under Article 2208 46 of the Civil Code
is present in this case.
Finally, the Court also imposes interest on all the monetary awards for damages
at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of nality of this Decision
until fully paid. 47
WHEREFORE , the appeal is DISMISSED . The Decision of the Court of Appeals
Manila in CA-G.R. CR No. 30957 dated 23 April 2010 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in that accused-appellant PO1 CRISPIN OCAMPO y SANTOS is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of HOMICIDE and is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to
twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum. He is further
ordered to pay the heirs of Mario de Luna the amounts of P75,000 as civil indemnity,
P75,000 as moral damages, and P25,000 as temperate damages. All monetary awards
for damages shall earn interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of the
finality of this Decision until fully paid.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED .
Leonardo-de Castro, Bersamin, Perez and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
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 Footnotes

1. Rollo, pp. 117-133; Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador, with Associate
Justices Sesinando E. Villon and Amy C. Lazaro-Javier concurring.
2. Id. at 115-116.

3. Id. at 117-118.
4. Id. at 118.

5. Id. at 118-119.

6. Id. at 119.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 120-121.
9. Id. at 121.
10. Id. at 121-122.

11. Id. at 129.

12. Id. at 129.
13. Id. at 132.
14. Id. at 123.

15. Id. at 128.

16. People v. Pateo y Garcia, G.R. No. 156786, 03 June 2004, 430 SCRA 609.
17. Espano v. Court of Appeals, 351 Phil. 798 (1998).
18. Id.
19. People v. Ramos, G.R. No. 190340, 24 July 2013, 702 SCRA 204.

20. People vs. Maalat, 341 Phil. 200 (1997).

21. People vs. Angeles, G.R. No. 109660, 01 July 1997, 275 SCRA 19; People vs. Maalat, 341
Phil. 200 (1997); People vs. Unarce, 339 Phil. 826 (1997); 337 Phil. 430 (1997);
People vs. Nalangan, 336 Phil. 970 (1997); People vs. Tobias , 334 Phil. 851 (1997);
People vs. Cahindo, 334 Phil. 507 (1997); and People v. Supremo , G.R. No. 100915,
31 May 1995, 244 SCRA 548.
22. Supra note 1, at 124.
23. Id. at 125.
24. Id. at 125-127.

25. People v. Marquina, 426 Phil. 46-61 (2002).

26. Id.
27. People v. Marquina , 426 Phil. 46-61 (2002); Tan, Jr., vs. CA , 396 Phil. 808 (2000); People
vs. Roche, et al., 386 Phil. 287 (2000); and Jose vs. Court of Appeals, 379 Phil. 30
(2000).
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 28. Supra note 1, at 123-124.

29. Id. at 124.

30. Id. at 124. Citing People v. Barriga, 588 Phil. 376 (2008).
31. Id. at 119.
32. Id. at 127-128.
33. People v. Pateo, G.R. No. 156786, 03 June 2004, 430 SCRA 609.

34. In determining the minimum term of indeterminate penalty, it is left entirely within the
discretion of the court to x it anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower
without reference to the period into which it may be subdivided. (Reyes, Luis B., The
Revised Penal Code: Criminal Law, p. 776. Citing People v. Ducosin , 59 Phil. 109, 117
(1933)).
35. Revised Penal Code, Article 249.
36. Supra note 1, at 129.
37. Act No. 4103 as amended by Act No. 4225.
38. The penalty next lower must be based on the penalty prescribed by the Code for the
offense, without considering in the meantime the modifying circumstances, such as,
the mitigating or aggravating circumstances. (Reyes, Luis B., The Revised Penal
Code: Criminal Law, pp. 775-776. Citing People v. Gonzales , 73 Phil. 549, 552
(1942)).
39. The maximum term shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be
properly imposed under the rules of the Revised Penal Code. (Reyes, Luis B., The
Revised Penal Code: Criminal Law, p. 775. Citing Sec. 1, Act No. 4103 as amended by
Act No. 4225).
40. Id. at 132.
41. Id. at 129.
42. Mallillin v. People , G.R. No. 215366, 18 March 2015; People v. Villalba , G.R. No. 207629,
22 October 2014.
43. People v. Agudez, G.R. No. 138386-87, 20 May 2014, 428 SCRA 692.
44. Supra note 1, at 129. Citing People v. Gerasta, 595 Phil. 1087 (2008).

45. Mallillin v. People , G.R. No. 215366, 18 March 2015; People v. Villalba , G.R. No. 207629,
22 October 2014.

46. Art. 2208 . In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other
than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:

(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;

(2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third
persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;

(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;

(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;
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 (5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the
plaintiff's plainly valid, just and demandable claim;
(6) In actions for legal support;
(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers;

(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability laws;
(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;
(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;
(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation should be recovered.
In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.
47. People v. Palma y Varcas, G.R. No. 212151, 18 February 2015.

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