Shambu Nath Mehra v. State of Ajmer
Shambu Nath Mehra v. State of Ajmer
Shambu Nath Mehra v. State of Ajmer
A LLB 2017
FACTS:
The appellant was put up for trial under s. 420 of the Indian Penal Code and s. 5(2) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act of 1947 for obtaining a total sum of Rs. 23- 12-0 from the
Government as T.A., being second class railway fares for two journeys, one from Ajmer to Abu
Road and the other from Ajmer to Reengus, without having actually paid the said fares. The
prosecution proved from the railway books and registers that no such second class tickets were
issued at Ajmer on the relevant dates and the same witness who proved this also proved that
tickets were not always issued and the passengers could pay the fare in the train and if the second
class was fully booked, no further tickets were issued till the train arrived,in which case
passengers sometimes bought third class or inter-class tickets and thereafter paid the difference
to the guard of the train, if they could find second class accommodation on the arrival of the
train. There was no proof that one or other - of those courses were not followed by the appellant
and the prosecution instead of proving the absence of any such payments, in the same way as it
had proved the non-issue of second class tickets, relied on Illustration (b) to s. 106 of the
Evidence Act and contended that it was for the appellant to prove that he had actually paid the
second class fares.
ISSUE(S) INVOLVED:
Whether the burden is on the appellant to show that he did not misappropriate funds as per
Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act or not?
RELEVENT SECTION:
Section 106 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872
Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge: When any fact is especially within the
knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.
Pravir Malhotra, JGU ID: 20171436; Section-D; B.A LLB 2017
JUDGEMENT:
• Held, that Illustration (b) to s. 106 of the Evidence Act had no application, the
evidence adduced by the prosecution did not warrant a conviction and the accused
should, having regard to the long lapse of time, be acquitted.
• That s. 106 of the Evidence Act does not abrogate the well- established rule of
criminal law that except in very exceptional classes of cases the burden that lies on
the prosecution to prove its case never shifts and s, 106 is not intended to relieve the
prosecution of that burden.' On the contrary, it seeks to meet certain exceptional
cases where it is impossible, or disproportionately difficult, for the prosecution to
establish facts which are especially within the knowledge of the accused and which
can be proved by him without difficulty or inconvenience. But when knowledge of
such facts is equally available to the prosecution if it chooses to exercise due
diligence, they cannot be said to be especially within the knowledge of the accused
and the section cannot apply.
• Attygalle v. Emperor, (A.I.R. 1936 P.C. 169) and Seneviratne v.B., ([1936] 3 All E.R.
36), referred to. That illustrations to a section do not exhaust its full content even as
they cannot curtail or expand its ambit, and in applying s. 106 the balance of
convenience, the comparative labour involved in finding out and proving the facts
and the ease with which the accused can prove them must be taken into
consideration.
• That cases coming under ss. 112 and 113 of the Indian Railways Act to which
Illustration (b) to -s. 106 has obvious application stand on a different footing.
RATIO:
SC held that what he did with the travel allowance was not something within the special
knowledge of the accused and w/e he did with the travel allowance not only the accused but he
prosecution had full knowledge as well as the means to find out. The prosecution could not
discharge its burden u/s 106 was not proved by the prosecution. The general rule is that in
criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and sec 106 is designed not to relieve it of
its duty. On the contrary it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be
impossible or at any rate disproportionately difficult for the prosecution to establish facts which
are especially within the knowledge of the accused and which could be proved without difficulty
or inconvenience.
Pravir Malhotra, JGU ID: 20171436; Section-D; B.A LLB 2017