Final Exam: Development Economics at ICEF May 26, 2018 Part II: Problems
Final Exam: Development Economics at ICEF May 26, 2018 Part II: Problems
Final Exam: Development Economics at ICEF May 26, 2018 Part II: Problems
Final exam
May 26, 2018
Part II: Problems.
1. Early growth theories. Consider Harrod-Domar and Solow growth models with following
production functions. Harrod-Domar model: Y=K/5; Solow growth model Y =5 K 0.3 L0.7.
Depreciation rate = 5%. Population growth is zero. L=100.
a. (10pts) If K=2000, which savings rate maximizes the long run growth rate in Harrod-
Domar model?
b. (10 pts) Which savings rate maximizes per capita consumption in Solow model in long run?
You can refer to a theorem without proving it.
2. Suppose the distribution of incomes in an economy of 1000 individuals is given by the Lorenz
curve of the following form: L(x) = x4, where 0≤x≤1 denotes a fraction of population. The GDP
(aggregate income) is 10 million USD.
a. (15 pts) Find the income y(x) of each person in the economy, as function of x.
b. (15 pts) Suppose the government imposes a tax of 20% on all income, and distributes the
tax revenue to all people equally. Find everyone’s income after redistribution.
c. (15 pts) Find the Lorenz curve after redistribution.
d. (20 pts) Calculate the Gini coefficient before and after redistribution.
e. (15 pts) Identify which individuals will support the redistribution
True, false, uncertain? Provide comments on any 2 out of the following statements. (40 pts. each)
4. The effect of leadership on country development is impossible to measure because the change
of leadership is itself affected by country growth.
5. In the context of economic development, culture and institutions are completely interchangeable
and their effects cannot be separated.
Essays – provide a detailed answer to any 2 out of the following questions. (60 pts. each)
6. . Explain the mechanism through which better social security for old people is believed to have
reduced fertility. Which other factors are believed to have influenced fertility decline?
7. In the Persson-Tabellini model of inequality and growth, which tax rate maximizes the
economic growth rate? Explain the intuition of the model. Why does inequality lead to
suboptimal tax rate?
8. In the model of the “Regulation and Distrust” paper, outline the main building blocks without
providing the details. In that model, social welfare under government regulation is a quadratic
function of the share of civic individuals. Why?