Republic of the Philippines

Court of Appeals
Cebu City

EIGHTEENTH (18th) DIVISION

JOEY CALCETA y CAUTIBER, CA-G.R. SP NO. 12774

Petitioner,
Members:

- versus - INGLES, G.T., Chairperson,

MONTEJO-GONZAGA, D.P.,
CORPIN, JR., B.G. JJ.
HON. LOLITA R. MERCADO, IN
HER CAPACITY AS THE Promulgated: April 21, 2021
PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC
BRANCH 34 (46), TACLOBAN
CITY and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

MONTEJO-GONZAGA, J.:

This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of

Court seeking to nullify the Order1 dated October 24, 2018 and the
consequent Order2 dated March 13, 2019 of the Regional Trial Court,
8th Judicial Region, Branch 34 (46), Tacloban City (court a quo), in
Criminal Case Nos. R-TAC-18-00059-CR and R-TAC-18-00060-CR.

1
Rollo, p. 73.
2
Rollo, pp. 80-81.
CA-G.R. SP NO. 12774 Page 2 of 16
Decision

THE CASE

Joey Calceta y Cautiber (hereafter, petitioner) was charged with

violations of Section 5 and Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165 (R.A. No. 9165) in two (2) separate Informations, each of which
reads:

Criminal Case No. R-TAC-18-00059-CR3

“That on or about the 30th of December 2017 in

the Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Palo, Leyte, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, without any lawful authority
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
criminally sell, deliver and distribute one (1) small
heat-sealed plastic sachet, containing white crystalline
substance locally known as “shabu” weighing 0.0308
gram more or less, to Poseur-buyer PO3 Rhenee C.
Ladrera which was subsequently marked as “JCC-1”
12-30-17 with signature, for a consideration of PhP
500.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW.”

Criminal Case No. R-TAC-18-00060-CR4

“That on or about the 30th of December 2017 in

the Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Palo, Leyte, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, without any lawful authority
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
criminally possess and control four (4) pieces small
size heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing
white crystalline substance known as “Shabu”, a
dangerous drug; weighing 0.0313 gram, 0.0315 gram,
0.0403 gram and 0.0407 gram and marked as “JCC-2”,
“JCC-3”, “JCC-4” and “JCC-5” with date 12-30-17 and
signature, respectively.

CONTRARY TO LAW.”
3
Rollo, pp. 25-26.
4
Rollo, pp. 27-28.
CA-G.R. SP NO. 12774 Page 3 of 16
Decision

Upon arraignment on March 21, 2018,5 the petitioner pleaded

not guilty to the crimes charged. Pre-trial was conducted, and,
thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

On July 30, 2018, the petitioner, through counsel, filed a Motion

to Plea Bargain.6 He prayed that he be allowed to enter a plea of
guilty to a lesser offense of Sec. 12, Art. II, R.A. No. 9165 in Criminal
Case Nos. R-TAC-18-00059-CR and R-TAC-18-00060-CR, in
consonance with A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC.

On August 1, 2018, the prosecution filed its Joint Comment to

Motion to Plea Bargain.7 It argued that the State cannot give its
consent to the plea bargaining proposal for Criminal Case No. R-
TAC-18-00059-CR (for violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No.
9165). It explained that the State cannot agree to the private
respondent's plea to a lesser offense since it is not in accordance with
DOJ Circular No. 027 (Amended Guidelines on Plea Bargaining for
Republic Act No. 9165 Otherwise Known As the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002). The DOJ Circular authorizes a
prosecutor to give consent to a plea bargain only if the accused
bargains from a charge of Sec. 5, par. 1 to Sec. 11, par. 3, Article II of
R.A. No. 9165, and with a penalty of 12 years and 1 day to 20 years
and a fine of P300,000.00 to P400,000.00.

However, the State gave its consent to the plea bargain

proposal for Criminal Case No. R-TAC-18-00060-CR (for violation of
Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165) as the said proposal was well
within the conditions provided under DOJ Circular No. 027.

THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT

On October 24, 2018, the court a quo issued an Order8 denying

the private respondent's Motion to Plea Bargain, citing that the En
Banc Notice of the Supreme Court, in line with the Resolution dated
5
Rollo, pp. 29-32.
6
Rollo, pp. 33-35.
7
Rollo, pp. 67-69.
8
Rollo, p. 73.
CA-G.R. SP NO. 12774 Page 4 of 16
Decision

October 16, 2018 by the Highest Court, stated that all individuals
charged with violations of R.A. 9165, prior to the promulgation of
the case of Estipona vs Lobrigo,9 should be denied. The court a quo
explained that the plea bargaining, as merely procedural, has no
retroactive effect. It ruled, thus:

“However, a NOTICE dated October 22, 2018

was issued by Supreme Court through Justice
Disodado Peralta declaring that the Plea Bargaining
Framework of the Supreme Court shall not have
retroactive effect for cases filed before June 27, 2018,
the same being a procedural law, as such, the Motion
for Plea Bargaining filed by the herein accused is
hereby DENIED.

Continue the presentation of third prosecution

witness on March 13, 2019 at 8:30 o'clock in the
morning.
xxx

SO ORDERED.”

The petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration 10 but the

same was denied by the court a quo in an Order11 dated March 13,
2019.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

Aggrieved, the petitioner filed this instant Petition, with prayer

for issuance of a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, 12 raising
the following issues before this Court:13

I.
PUBLIC RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
9
G.R. No. 226679, August 15, 2017.
10
Rollo, pp. 75-79.
11
Rollo, p. 80-81.
12
Rollo, pp. 3-20.
13
Rollo, p. 9.
CA-G.R. SP NO. 12774 Page 5 of 16
Decision

DENYING PETITIONER TO PLEAD GUILTY TO

A LESSER OFFENSE OF VIOLATION OF
SECTION 12, ARTICLE II, RA 9165 FROM THE
ORIGINAL CHARGE OF VIOLATION OF
SECTION 5, ARTICLE II, RA 9165.

II.
PUBLIC RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
DENYING PETITIONER TO PLEAD GUILTY TO
A LESSER OFFENSE OF VIOLATION OF
SECTION 12, ARTICLE II, RA 9165 FROM THE
ORIGINAL CHARGE OF VIOLATION OF
SECTION 11, ARTICLE II, RA 9165.

The petitioner avers that the court a quo has a misplaced

interpretation on the SC Resolution dated October 16, 2018. Plea
bargaining may be availed of when the prosecution has rested its
case or even before it rests its case so long as the accused pleads
guilty to a lesser offense proven during trial which is necessarily
included in the crime charged. It is only when the accused is already
convicted by a final judgment that the plea bargaining may no longer
be availed of.

The petitioner further argues that the court a quo's act of

denying the Motion to Plea Bargain is inconsistent with the spirit and
intent of R.A. No. 9165 and its denial to the petitioner's plea to a
lesser offense is an exercise of grave abuse of discretion.

On the other hand, the State, as represented by the Office of the

Solicitor General (OSG), likewise avers that the court a quo
misinterpreted the subject Notice in relation to the Resolution dated
October 16, 2018. The Supreme Court clearly intended to apply the
case of Estipona to those cases that are still pending in court and have
not yet attained finality as of August 17, 2017 (the date Estipona was
promulgated) irrespective of whether they are filed before or after the
said date. The subject Resolution was clear and unambiguous and the
court a quo was bereft of any authority to place an interpretation
upon it. Moreover, nowhere was it stated that June 27, 2018 was the
CA-G.R. SP NO. 12774 Page 6 of 16
Decision

reckoning point in determining the availability of plea bargaining in

drug cases.

Regardless of the foregoing, the OSG argues that the process of

plea bargaining involves the prosecution and the accused working
out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case rather than the
accused forcing the prosecution to give in to his demands. Without a
prior agreement of the prosecution and the accused (in relation to
Case No. R-TAC-18-00059-CR), there is nothing to submit to the court
a quo for its approval. In addition, Department Circular No. 027
clearly provides that it only allows a plea of guilty to the lesser
offense of Violation of Section 11, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165 from an
original charge of Violation of Section 5, Art. II Of R.A. No. 9165, not
the lesser offense of Violation of Section 12, Art. II of the same law.

However, as to Case No. R-TAC-18-00060-CR, the court a quo

may grant the petitioner's plea to a lesser offense since the
prosecution already expressed its consent to the same and the lesser
offense of Violation of Section 12, Art. II, R.A. No. 9165 is necessarily
included in the original crime charged of Violation of Section 11, Art.
II of the same law.

THIS COURT'S RULING

The petition is meritorious.

In the case at bench, the only issue for resolution is the

propriety of the court a quo's decision in denying the private
respondents' Motion to Plea Bargain.

We rule in the negative.

The court a quo acted

with grave abuse of discretion

Grave abuse of discretion connotes a capricious and whimsical

exercise of judgment, done in a despotic manner by reason of passion
CA-G.R. SP NO. 12774 Page 7 of 16
Decision

or personal hostility, the character of which being so patent and gross

as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law.
Verily, case law instructs that there is grave abuse of discretion when
an act: (a) is done contrary to the Constitution, the law or
jurisprudence, or executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily,
out of malice, ill will, or personal bias; or (b) manifestly disregards
basic rules or procedures.14

In the case at bench, the court a quo clearly misinterpreted the

SC En Banc Resolution dated October 16, 2018 which states:

Please take notice that the Court en banc issued a

Resolution dated OCTOBER 16, 2018 which reads as
follows:

A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC (Re: Letter of Associate

Justice Diosdado M. Peralta on the Suggested Plea
Bargaining Framework Submitted by the Philippines
Judges Association). Plea bargaining is generally
allowed during the arraignment and pre-trial, or
before the presentation of the evidence of the
prosecution. There is, however, an excepti on where
plea bargaining may take place even when the
prosecution has already rested its case. This
exception will only apply when at the time of the
prosecution has rested its case, or even before it
rests its case, the crime to which the accused
pleads is for a lesser offense proven during the
trial, which is necessarily included in the crime
charged in the Information. For example, if the
accused is charged with the crime of frustrated
homicide, and what was proven during the trial
is attempted homicide, the accused can plead
guilty to the latter offense. It is only in this
instance that plea for a lesser offense may be
allowed. Considering that the circumstances in
the letter request do not fall under this
exception, then the same must be denied.
Besides, plea bargaining is merely procedural,
14
Pascua v. People, G.R. No. 250578, September 7, 2020.
CA-G.R. SP NO. 12774 Page 8 of 16
Decision

hence, it has no retroactive effect on those who

are already convicted by final judgment.

WHEREFORE, the Request to Allow Plea

Bargaining for Individuals Charged and Accused of
Violation of R.A. No. 9165 Prior to the Case of
Salvador Estipona v. Hon. Frank E. Lobrigo. Dated
June 27, 2017 is DENIED.

From the above-mentioned Resolution, it is noted that the non-

retroactive application of A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC refers only to those
accused who have already been convicted by final judgment.
Further, the Resolution also does not prescribe for a period in time
when plea bargaining in drugs cases may only be allowed.

Plea-bargaining in criminal cases

In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as "a

process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a
mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court
approval." There is give-and-take negotiation common in plea
bargaining. The essence of the agreement is that both the prosecution
and the defense make concessions to avoid potential losses. Properly
administered, plea bargaining is to be encouraged because the chief
virtues of the system - speed, economy, and finality - can benefit the
accused, the offended party, the prosecution, and the court. 15

Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage, the rules

on plea bargaining neither create a right nor take away a vested right.
Instead, it operates as a means to implement an existing right by
regulating the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties
recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy
and redress for a disregard or infraction of them.16

15
Estipona v. Lobrigo, G.R. No. 226679, August 15, 2017.
16
Supra.
CA-G.R. SP NO. 12774 Page 9 of 16
Decision

The Supreme Court, in Estipona, struck down Sec. 23 of

Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002, which prohibits plea bargaining in drug cases, for violating
the constitutionally conferred power of the Supreme Court to issue
rules of pleading, practice and procedure. Consequently, the
Supreme Court issued Administrative Matter No. 18-03-16-SC to
provide guidelines to courts for plea-bargaining agreements in drug
cases. Furthermore, the Highest Tribunal held that plea bargaining is
a rule of procedure and is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-
trial, or even up to the point when the prosecution already rested its
case.

In Tan, Jr. v. CA,17 the Supreme Court thoroughly explained the

retroactive effectivity of procedural rules, viz:

The general rule that statutes are prospective and

not retroactive does not ordinarily apply to
procedural laws. It has been held that "a retroactive
law, in a legal sense, is one which takes away or
impairs vested rights acquired under laws, or creates
a new obligation and imposes a new duty, or attaches
a new disability, in respect of transactions or
considerations already past. Hence, remedial statutes
or statutes relating to remedies or modes of
procedure, which do not create new or take away
vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the
remedy or confirmation of rights already existing, do
not come within the legal conception of a retroactive
law, or the general rule against the retroactive
operation of statutes." The general rule against giving
statutes retroactive operation whose effect is to
impair the obligations of contract or to disturb vested
rights does not prevent the application of statutes to
proceedings pending at the time of their enactment
where they neither create new nor take away
vested rights. A new statute which deals with
procedure only is presumptively applicable to all
actions — those which have accrued or are
pending.

17
G.R. No. 136368, January 16, 2002.|
CA-G.R. SP NO. 12774 Page 10 of 16
Decision

Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts

will be construed as applicable to actions pending
and undetermined at the time of their passage.
Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to
that extent. The fact that procedural statutes may
somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude
their retroactive application to pending actions. The
retroactive application of procedural laws is not
violative of any right of a person who may feel that
he is adversely affected. Nor is the retroactive
application of procedural statutes constitutionally
objectionable. The reason is that as a general rule no
vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural
laws. It has been held that "a person has no vested
right in any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot
insist on the application to the trial of his case,
whether civil or criminal, of any other than the
existing rules of procedure."

Being procedural in nature, the plea bargaining framework in

drugs cases can be given retroactive effect on the petitioner's criminal
cases which are still pending before the public respondent. Thus, the
court a quo committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the
petitioner's Motion to Plea Bargain on the sole ground that plea
bargaining in drugs cases cannot be allowed in cases filed prior to
June 27, 2018.

Plea-bargaining in drug cases

In drug cases, there is no offended party. Instead, the State as

the “guardian of the rights of the people,” is the offended party. 18
The “pernicious effect [of dangerous drugs] is felt not only by the
addicts themselves but also by their families. As a result, society's
survival is endangered because its basic unit, the family, is the
ultimate victim of the drug menace.” 19

Indeed, the State is the offended party in drug cases simply

because “[t]he maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life,

18
People v. Villarama, Jr., G.R. No. 99287, June 23, 1992.
19
Id.
CA-G.R. SP NO. 12774 Page 11 of 16
Decision

liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are
essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
democracy.” 20 Accordingly, “the consent of the offended party [in a
plea bargain], i.e. the state, will have to be secured from the Fiscal
who acts in behalf of the government.” 21

Notably, Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court uses the word
may which implies that the trial court exercises discretion on whether
it will allow the plea bargain. 22 Still, courts are “exhorted to keep in
mind that a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that actually
charged is not supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or
compromise for the convenience of the accused.” 23 In addition, the
trial court’s exercise of discretion should neither be arbitrary nor
should it be capricious and whimsical. 24

In the very recent case of People v. Reafor,25 the Supreme Court

has already clarified the need of the prosecutor's consent in plea-
bargaining cases. The Higher Court has laid out the following rules,
to wit:

Nonetheless, it is well to clarify that "a

defendant has no constitutional right to plea
bargain. No basic rights are infringed by trying
him rather than accepting a plea of guilty; the
prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to go to
trial. Under the present Rules, the acceptance of
an offer to plead guilty is not a demandable right
but depends on the consent of the offended party
and the prosecutor, which is a condition
precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser
offense that is necessarily included in the offense
charged. The reason for this is that the prosecutor
has full control of the prosecution of criminal

20
Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 5.
21
Rules of Court, Rule 116, Section 2.
22
Daan v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 163972-77, March 28, 2008, citing People v. Besonia, 266 Phil. 822
(2004).
23
Id., citing People v. Judge Kayanan, 172 Phil. 728 (1978).
24
Daan v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 163972-77, March 28, 2008.
25
G.R. No. 247575, November 16, 2020.
CA-G.R. SP NO. 12774 Page 12 of 16
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actions; his duty is to always prosecute the proper

offense, not any lesser or graver one, based on
what the evidence on hand can sustain."

In view of the foregoing, the basic

requisites of plea bargaining are: (a) consent of
the offended party; (b) consent of the prosecutor;
(c) plea of guilty to a lesser offense which is
necessarily included in the offense charged; and
(d) approval of the court. (Underscoring ours)

Thus, notwithstanding the error of jurisdiction committed by

the court a quo, this Court finds that the plea bargaining proposal for
Criminal Case No. R-TAC-18-00059-CR (for violation of Section 5,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165) should be denied by the lower court since
the State did not give its consent thereto. Additionally, The Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for the requisites of a valid
plea bargaining agreement:

SECTION 2. Plea of Guilty to a Lesser Offense. — At

arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the
offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by
the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is
necessarily included in the offense charged. After
arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be
allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after
withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the
complaint or information is necessary. 26 (Emphasis
supplied)

It is crucial to note that Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of

Court, also uses the word allowed which indicates that the trial
court’s exercise of discretion only operates after the offended party
and prosecutor express their consent to the plea bargain; hence, it is
the plea-bargaining agreement that is subject to the court’s approval. In
other words, the trial court acts upon a plea bargain that has the
prior consent from the offended party and the prosecutor. Sans
consent, there is no plea bargaining that is made subject to the court’s
approval.

26
Rules of Court, Rule 116, Section 2.
CA-G.R. SP NO. 12774 Page 13 of 16
Decision

Additionally, and equally important, is the Department

Circular No. 027 issued by the Department of Justice, in view of
Administrative Matter No. 18-03-16-SC (as previously cited). The said
Circular sets limits on the scope of authority of the prosecutors to
give consent to plea bargaining in drug cases.

Per DOJ Department Circular No. 027, the acceptable plea for
bargaining for violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165 involving a
quantity of less than 5 grams of shabu is Section 11 (3), Article II of the
same law. On the other hand, in A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC, the acceptable
plea for bargaining for the same violation is Section 12, Article II of
R.A. No. 9165.

An obvious variance exists in the acceptable plea bargain in the

two issuances as regards Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
However, the prosecution can withhold its consent to a plea bargain
when the lesser offense is not acceptable under DOJ Circular No. 027
even if it is acceptable under A.M. 18-03-16-SC.

The validity of DOJ Circular No. 27 vis-a-vis A.M. No. 18-03-16-

SC was already resolved in Sayre v. Xenos.27 The Supreme Court ruled
that A.M. No. 18-03-16 “is a rule of procedure established pursuant to
the rule-making power of the Supreme Court that serves as a
framework and guide to the trial courts in plea bargaining violations
of R.A. 9165.”28 However, it clarified that plea bargaining in drug
cases “still requires the mutual agreement of the parties and remains
subject to the approval of the court.”29 Hence, it does not mandate the
prosecution on what offense it should prosecute.

On the other hand, DOJ Circular No. 27 was issued as an

internal guideline to the prosecution as to whether it should give its
consent to a plea bargain.30 As stated in the Concurring Opinion of
Mr. Justice Leonen in Sayre v. Xenos, “[c]ontrol over the prosecution
of criminal offenses is not within judicial discretion. Just as legislative
enactments cannot run counter to this Court's procedural rules, so
27
G.R. Nos. 244413 & 244415-16, February 18, 2020.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
CA-G.R. SP NO. 12774 Page 14 of 16
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too should judicial interference not be allowed in prosecutorial

decisions.”31

Therefore, the DOJ Circular No. 27 provision pertaining to

acceptable plea bargain for Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165 did not violate
the rule-making authority of the Court. Moreover, the prosecutor
may still refuse the offer of the accused. The Court considers this
interpretation to be in harmony with the constitutional provision on
the rule making power of the Court and the nature of plea bargaining
in drug cases. 32

By contrast, records revealed that the State, during the

proceedings before the court a quo, has already given its consent to
the plea for a lesser offense in Criminal Case No. R-TAC-18-00060-
CR (for violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165). The lesser
offense of Violation of Sec. 12, Art. II, R.A. No. 9165 is deemed
acceptable for the State as it was both allowed in DOJ Circular No. 27
and A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC. Thus, the court a quo may grant the same.

No Writ of Preliminary Injunction

may be issued

Finally, this Court finds no reason to grant the petitioner's

prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction.

For a Writ of Preliminary Injunction to issue, the following

requisites must be present, to wit:33

(1) The applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right to

be protected, that is a right in esse;
(2) There is a material and substantial invasion of such right;
(3) There is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable
injury to the applicant; and
(4) No other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to
prevent the infliction of irreparable injury.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Bicol Medical Center v. Botor, et al., G.R. No. 214073, October 4, 2017.
CA-G.R. SP NO. 12774 Page 15 of 16
Decision

Here, the petitioner has not shown that it has an unmistakable

right to plea bargain. The acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a
lesser offense is not demandable by the accused as a matter of right
but is a matter addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the trial
court.34 As correctly pointed out by the OSG, there was likewise no
showing that the court a quo committed a material and substantial
invasion of the petitioner's right nor was there any irreparable injury.
Since the petitioner has no inherent right to plea bargain, there
cannot be a violation of such non-existent right. Moreover, no injury
could result from the State's punishment of imprisonment by virtue
of a valid conviction.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for

Certiorari with Prayer for Issuance of a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Order35 dated October 24,
2018 and the consequent Order36 dated March 13, 2019 of the Regional
Trial Court, 8th Judicial Region, Branch 34 (46), Tacloban City, in
Criminal Case Nos. R-TAC-18-00059-CR and R-TAC-18-00060-CR are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE for denying the petitioner's Motion to
Plea Bargain.

The petitioner's prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary

Injunction is DENIED.

The court a quo is DIRECTED, within the bounds of law, to take

the appropriate steps so it could appropriately rule on the petitioner's
plea bargain proposal.

SO ORDERED.

ORIGINAL SIGNED
DOROTHY P. MONTEJO-GONZAGA
Associate Justice

34
Daan v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 163972-77, March 28, 2008.
35
Rollo, p. 73.
36
Rollo, pp. 80-81.
CA-G.R. SP NO. 12774 Page 16 of 16
Decision

WE CONCUR:

ORIGINAL SIGNED ORIGINAL SIGNED

GABRIEL T. INGLES BAUTISTA G. CORPIN, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is

hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court.

Original signed ORIGINAL SIGNED

GABRIEL T. INGLES
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Eighteenth Division