Nuclear Power Plant Information: Boiling Water Reactor (BWR)
Nuclear Power Plant Information: Boiling Water Reactor (BWR)
Nuclear Power Plant Information: Boiling Water Reactor (BWR)
Boiling
Water
Reactor
(BWR)
Systems
This chapter will discuss the purposes of some of the major systems and components associated with
a boiling water reactor (BWR) in the generation of electrical power.
Containment/Drywell
Reactor
Vessel
Steam
Line Turbine Building
Electrical
Throttle Generator
Valve
Steam Dryer
&
Moisture
Separator Turbine
Jet Pump
To/From
River
Recirculation
Pump
Pump
Containment Suppression Chamber
Inside the boiling water reactor (BWR) vessel, a steam water mixture is produced when very pure water
(reactor coolant) moves upward through the core absorbing heat. The major difference in the operation
of a BWR from other nuclear systems is the steam void formation in the core. The steam-water mixture
leaves the top of the core and enters the two stages of moisture separation, where water droplets are
removed before the steam is allowed to enter the steam line. The steam line, in turn, directs the steam
to the main turbine causing it to turn the turbine and the attached electrical generator. The unused steam
is exhausted to the condenser where it is condensed into water. The resulting water is pumped out of
the condenser with a series of pumps and back to the reactor vessel. The recirculation pumps and jet
pumps allow the operator to vary coolant flow through the core and change reactor power.
The reactor vessel assembly, shown on page 3-4, consists of the reactor vessel and its internal
components, including the core support structures, core shroud, moisture removal equipment, and jet
pump assemblies. The purposes of the reactor vessel assembly are to:
The reactor vessel is vertically mounted within the drywell and consists of a cylindrical shell with an
integral rounded bottom head. The top head is also rounded in shape but is removable via the stud and
nut arrangement to facilitate refueling operations. The vessel assembly is supported by the vessel
support skirt (20) which is mounted to the reactor vessel support pedestal.
The internal components of the reactor vessel are supported from the bottom head and/or vessel wall.
The reactor core is made up of fuel assemblies (15), control rods (16), and neutron monitoring
instruments (24). The structure surrounding the active core consists of a core shroud (14), core plate
(17), and top guide (12). The components making up the remainder of the reactor vessel internals are
the jet pump assemblies (13), steam separators (6), steam dryers (3), feedwater spargers (8), and core
spray spargers (11). The jet pump assemblies are located in the region between the core shroud and the
vessel wall, submerged in water. The jet pump assemblies are arranged in two semicircular groups of
ten, with each group being supplied by a separate recirculation pump.
The emergency core cooling systems, penetrations number 5 and 9, and the reactor vessel designs are
compatible to ensure that the core can be adequately cooled following a loss of reactor coolant. The
worst case loss of coolant accident, with respect to core cooling, is a recirculation line break
(penetrations number 18 and 19). In this event, reactor water level decreases rapidly, uncovering the
core. However, several emergency core cooling systems automatically provide makeup water to the
nuclear core within the shroud, providing core cooling.
The control cell assembly (page 3-5) is representative for boiling water reactor 1 through 6. Each control
cell consists of a control rod (7) and four fuel assemblies that surround it. Unlike the pressurized water
reactor fuel assemblies, the boiling water reactor fuel bundle is enclosed in a fuel channel (6) to direct
coolant up through the fuel assembly and act as a bearing surface for the control rod. In addition, the
fuel channel protects the fuel during refueling operations. The power of the core is regulated by
movement of bottom entry control rods.
Containment/Drywell
Safety/Relief Valve
Recirculation Loop
(Typical of 2)
Reactor
Core
Filter/
Demineralizer
Recirculation
Pump
Reactor Water
Cleanup Pump
Non-Regenerative
Heat Exchanger
Regenerative
Containment Suppression Chamber Heat Exchanger
The purpose of the reactor water cleanup system (RWCU) is to maintain a high reactor water quality by
removing fission products, corrosion products, and other soluble and insoluble impurities. The reactor
water cleanup pump takes water from the recirculation system and the vessel bottom head and pumps
the water through heat exchangers to cool the flow. The water is then sent through filter/demineralizers
for cleanup. After cleanup, the water is returned to the reactor vessel via the feedwater piping.
Containment/Drywell
Reactor
Vessel
Steam
Line
Electrical
Generator
Steam
Dryer
Assembly
Turbine
Bypass
Line
Reactor
Core
Jet Pump
To/From
River
Recirculation
Pump
Service Water
Heat is removed during normal power operation by generating steam in the reactor vessel and then using
that steam to generate electrical energy. When the reactor is shutdown, the core will still continue to
generate decay heat. The heat is removed by bypassing the turbine and dumping the steam directly to
the condenser. The shutdown cooling mode of the residual heat removal (RHR) system is used to
complete the cooldown process when pressure decreases to approximately 50 psig. Water is pumped
from the reactor recirculation loop through a heat exchanger and back to the reactor via the recirculation
loop. The recirculation loop is used to limit the number of penetrations into the reactor vessel.
Containment/Drywell
Safety/Relief Valve
Recirculation Loop
(Typical of 2)
Reactor
Core
RCIC
Recirculation RCIC Turbine
Pump Pump
The turbine is driven by steam supplied by the main steam lines. The turbine exhaust is routed to the
suppression pool. The turbine-driven pump supplies makeup water from the condensate storage tank,
with an alternate supply from the suppression pool, to the reactor vessel via the feedwater piping. The
system flow rate is approximately equal to the steaming rate 15 minutes after shutdown with design
maximum decay heat. Initiation of the system is accomplished automatically on low water level in the
reactor vessel or manually by the operator.
Containment/Drywell
Recirculation Loop
(Typical of 2)
Reactor
Core
Poison Tank
Recirculation (Boron)
Pump Explosive
Valve
The standby liquid control system injects a neutron poison (boron) into the reactor vessel to shutdown
the chain reaction, independent of the control rods, and maintains the reactor shutdown as the plant is
cooled to maintenance temperatures.
The standby liquid control system consists of a heated storage tank, two positive displacement pumps,
two explosive valves, and the piping necessary to inject the neutron absorbing solution into the reactor
vessel. The standby liquid control system is manually initiated and provides the operator with a
relatively slow method of achieving reactor shutdown conditions.
The emergency core cooling systems (ECCS) provide core cooling under loss of coolant accident
conditions to limit fuel cladding damage. The emergency core cooling systems consist of two high
pressure and two low pressure systems. The high pressure systems are the high pressure coolant
injection (HPCI) system and the automatic depressurization system (ADS). The low pressure systems
are the low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) mode of the residual heat removal system and the core
spray (CS) system.
The manner in which the emergency core cooling systems operate to protect the core is a function of the
rate at which reactor coolant inventory is lost from the break in the nuclear system process barrier. The
high pressure coolant injection system is designed to operate while the nuclear system is at high pressure.
The core spray system and low pressure coolant injection mode of the residual heat removal system are
designed for operation at low pressures. If the break in the nuclear system process barrier is of such a
size that the loss of coolant exceeds the capability of the high pressure coolant injection system, reactor
pressure decreases at a rate fast enough for the low pressure emergency core cooling systems to
commence coolant injection into the reactor vessel in time to cool the core.
Automatic depressurization is provided to automatically reduce reactor pressure if a break has occurred
and the high pressure coolant injection system is inoperable. Rapid depressurization of the reactor is
desirable to permit flow from the low pressure emergency core cooling systems so that the temperature
rise in the core is limited to less than regulatory requirements.
If, for a given break size, the high pressure coolant injection system has the capacity to make up for all
of the coolant loss, flow from the low pressure emergency core cooling systems is not required for core
cooling protection until reactor pressure has decreased below approximately 100 psig.
The performance of the emergency core cooling systems as an integrated package can be evaluated by
determining what is left after the postulated break and a single failure of one of the emergency core
cooing systems. The remaining emergency core cooling systems and components must meet the 10 CFR
requirements over the entire spectrum of break locations and sizes. The integrated performance for
small, intermediate, and large sized breaks is shown on pages 3-11 and 3-12.
Single Single
Remaining ECCS Remaining ECCS
Failure Failure
Any
RHR
Pump
System System
HPCI
1(2) 2
System
RHR CS
Core
3-11
Cooling
Achieved
Any
RHR
Pump
System
1
System System System CS HPCI
2(1) 1 2
System
Diesel Diesel
Generator Generator
A A
T
C
HPCI System
RHR
System 1
Feedwater Line
Recirculation
Pump B
C Reactor B
Vessel
A D
To
Suppression D
Pool
RHR
System 2
Containment/Drywell
Safety/Relief Valve
Recirculation Loop
(Typical of 2)
Reactor
Core
HPCI
Recirculation HPCI Turbine
Pump Pump
The automatic depressurization system (ADS) consists of redundant logics capable of opening selected
safety relief valves, when required, to provide reactor depressurization for events involving small or
intermediate size loss of coolant accidents if the high pressure coolant injection system is not available
or cannot recover reactor vessel water level.
Containment/Drywell
Containment Spray
Recirculation Loop
Reactor (Typical of 2)
RHR
Core LPCI
Jet Pump Heat
Exchanger
Service Water
Recirculation
Pump
Containment Spray
RHR Pumps
(LPCI Mode)
Core Spray
Pump
The low pressure coolant injection mode of the residual heat removal system provides makeup water to
the reactor vessel for core cooling under loss of coolant accident conditions. The residual heat removal
system is a multipurpose system with several operational modes, each utilizing the same major pieces
of equipment. The low pressure coolant injection mode is the dominant mode and normal valve lineup
configuration of the residual heat removal system. The low pressure coolant injection mode operates
automatically to restore and, if necessary, maintain the reactor vessel coolant inventory to preclude fuel
cladding temperatures in excess of 2200EF. During low pressure coolant injection operation, the residual
heat removal pumps take water from the suppression pool and discharge to the reactor vessel.
The primary containment package provided for a particular product line is dependent upon the vintage
of the plant and the cost-benefit analysis performed prior to the plant being built. During the evolution
of the boiling water reactors, three major types of containments were built. The major containment
designs are the Mark I (page 3-16), Mark II (page 3-17), and the Mark III (page 3-18). Unlike the Mark
III, that consists of a primary containment and a drywell, the Mark I and Mark II designs consist of a
drywell and a wetwell (suppression pool). All three containment designs use the principle of pressure
suppression for loss of coolant accidents. The primary containment is designed to condense steam and
to contain fission products released from a loss of coolant accident so that offsite radiation doses
specified in 10 CFR 100 are not exceeded and to provide a heat sink and water source for certain safety-
related equipment.
The Mark I containment design consists of several major components, many of which can be seen on
page 3-16. These major components include:
• The drywell, which surrounds the reactor vessel and recirculation loops,
• A suppression chamber, which stores a large body of water (suppression pool),
• An interconnecting vent network between the drywell and the suppression chamber, and
• The secondary containment, which surrounds the primary containment (drywell and suppression
pool) and houses the spent fuel pool and emergency core cooling systems.
The Mark II primary containment consists of a steel dome head and either a post-tensioned concrete wall
or reinforced concrete wall standing on a base mat of reinforced concrete. The inner surface of the
containment is lined with a steel plate that acts as a leak-tight membrane. The containment wall also
serves as a support for the floor slabs of the reactor building (secondary containment) and the refueling
pools. The Mark II design is an over-under configuration. The drywell, in the form of a frustum of a
cone or a truncated cone, is located directly above the suppression pool. The suppression chamber is
cylindrical and separated from the drywell by a reinforced concrete slab. The drywell is topped by an
elliptical steel dome called a drywell head. The drywell inerted atmosphere is vented into the
suppression chamber through as series of downcomer pipes penetrating and supported by the drywell
floor.
The Mark III primary containment consists of several major components, many of which can be seen on
page 3-18. The drywell (13) is a cylindrical, reinforced concrete structure with a removable head. The
drywell is designed to withstand and confine steam generated during a pipe rupture inside the
containment and to channel the released steam into the suppression pool (10) via the weir wall (11) and
the horizontal vents (12). The suppression pool contains a large volume of water for rapidly condensing
steam directed to it. A leak tight, cylindrical, steel containment vessel (2) surround the drywell and the
suppression pool to prevent gaseous and particulate fission products from escaping to the environment
following a pipe break inside containment.
Mark I Containment
Mark II Containment