People vs. Castañeda, JR.: 562 Supreme Court Reports Annotated
People vs. Castañeda, JR.: 562 Supreme Court Reports Annotated
People vs. Castañeda, JR.: 562 Supreme Court Reports Annotated
Criminal Procedure; Wife may testify against husband for crime of falsification of a deed of sale of
conjugal house and lot where wife was made to appear as having given far consent to the sale.—With more
reason must the exception apply to the instant case where the victim of the crime and the person who stands
to be directly prejudic-
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
563
ed by the falsification is not a third person but the wife herself. And it is undeniable that the criminal
act complained of had the effect of directly and vitally impairing the conjugal relation. This is apparent not
only in the act of the wife in personally lodging her complaint with the office of the Provincial Fiscal, but
also in her insistent efforts in connection with the instant petition, which seeks to set aside the order
disqualifying her from testifying against her husband. Taken collectively, the actuations of the witness-wife
underscore the fact that the martial and domestic relations between her and the accused-husband have
become so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranguility which may be
disturbed. In such a case, as We have occasion to point out in previous decisions, “identity of interests
disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is nonexistent. Likewise, in such a
situation, the security and confidences of private life which the law aims at protecting will be nothing but
ideals which, through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home.” Thus, there is no reason to
apply the marital disqualification rule.
SANTOS, J.:
1
1
On the basis of the complaint of his wife, Victoria M. Manaloto, herein private respondent
Benjamin Manaloto was charged before the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, presided by
respondent Judge, Hon, Mariano C. Castañeda, Jr., with the crime of Falsification of Public
Document committed, according to the Information, as follows:
That on or about the 19th day of May, 1975, in the Municipality of San Fernando, province of Pampanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused BEN-
_______________
1 See Annexes “A”, “B”, and “B-1” of the Petition (Rollo, pp, 11-15).
564
JAMIN F. MANALOTO, with deliberate intent to commit falsification, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously counterfeit, imitate and forge the signature of his spouse Victoria M. Manaloto in
a deed of sale executed by said accused wherein he sold a house and lot belonging to the conjugal
partnership of said spouse in favor of Ponciano Lacsamana under Doc. No. 1957, Page No. 72, Book No.
LVII, Series of 1975, notarized by Notary Public Abraham Pa. Gorospe, thereby making it appear that2 his
spouse Victoria M. Manaloto gave her marital consent to said sale when in fact and in truth she did not.
At the trial, the prosecution called the complainant-wife to the witness stand but the defense
moved to disqualify her as a witness, invoking Sec. 20, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court
which provides:
The prosecution opposed said motion to disqualify on the ground that the case falls under the
exception to the rule, contending that it is a “criminal case for a crime committed by one against
the other.” Notwithstanding such opposition, respondent Judge granted the motion, disqualifying
Victoria Manaloto from testifying for or against her husband, in an order dated March 31, 1977.
A motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied by respondent Judge in an order dated
May 19, 1977.
Hence, this petition for certiorari filed by the office of the Provincial Fiscal, on behalf of the
People of the Philippines, seeking to set aside the aforesaid orders of the respondent Judge and
praying that a preliminary injunction or a tem-
_______________
2 Annex “C” of the Petition (Rollo, pp. 16-17).
565
_______________
3 Rollo, p. 39.
4 Ibid., p. 44.
5 Ibid., p. 76.
6 Ibid., p. 87.
7 Ibid., p. 99.
566
band in the deed of sale, been made with the consent of the wife, no crime could have been
charged against said husband. Clearly, therefore, it is the husband’s breach of his wife’s
confidence which gave rise to the offense charged. And it is this same breach of trust which
prompted the wife to make the necessary complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal which,
accordingly, filed the aforesaid criminal ease with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. To
rule, therefore, that such criminal case is not one for a crime committed by one spouse against the
other is to advance a conclusion which completely disregards the factual antecendents of the
instant case.
2. This is not the first time that the issue of whether a specific offense may be classified as a
crime committed by one spouse against8
the other is presented to this Court for resolution. Thus,
in the case of Ordoño v. Daquigan, this Court, through Mr. Justice Ramon C. Aquino, set up the
criterion to be followed in resolving the issue, stating that:
We think that the correct rule, which may be adopted in this jurisdiction, is that laid down in Cargill vs.
State, 35 ALR, 133. 220, Pac. 64, 26 Okl. 314, wherein the court said:
“The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the person is too narrow; and the rule that any offense
remotely or indirectly affecting domestic harmony comes within the exception is too broad. The better rule is that,
WHEN AN OFFENSE DIRECTLY ATTACKS, OR DIRECTLY AND VITALLY IMPAIRS, THE CONJUGAL
RELATION, IT COMES WITHIN THE EXCEPTION, to the statute that one shall not be a witness against the other
except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed (by) one against the other.”
Applying the foregoing criterion in mid case of Ordoño v. Daquigan, this Court held that the rape
committed by the husband of the witness-wife against their daughter was a crime committed by
the husband against his wife. Although the victim of the crime committed by the accused in that
case was not
_______________
8 G.R. No. L-39012, January 31, 1975, 62 SCRA 270, at 273.
567
his wife but their daughter, this Court, nevertheless, applied the exception
9
for the reason that
said criminal act “positively undermine(d) the connubial relationship.”
With more reason must the exception apply to the instant case where the victim of the crime
and the person who stands to be directly prejudiced by the falsification is not a third person but
the wife herself. And it is undeniable that the criminal act complained of had the effect of directly
and vitally impairing the conjugal relation. This is apparent not only in the act of the wife in
personally
10
lodging her complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, but also in her insistent
efforts in connection with the instant petition, which seeks to set aside the order disqualifying
her from testifying against her husband. Taken collectively, the actuations of the witness-wife
underscore the fact that the martial and domestic relations between her and the accused-
husband have become so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and
tranquillity which may be disturbed. In such a case, as We have occasion to point out in previous
decisions, “identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that
identity is nonexistent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidences of private life
which the law aims at protecting will11
be nothing but ideals which, through their absence, merely
leave a void in the unhappy home.” Thus, there is no reason to apply the martial disqualification
rule.
3. Finally, overriding considerations of public policy demand that the wife should not be
disqualified from testifying
_______________
9 Id., p. 274.
10 Victoria Manaloto, through her counsel, assisted the Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga in filing the instant petition for
certiorari (rollo, pp. 9-10). Furthermore, she filed on Aug. 22, 1977 a memorandum in support of the petition (rollo, pp. 68-
74), and, on Dec. 28, 1977, a pleading entitled “Chronologically—Effected Observations and Circumstances in Support of
or to Butress Memorandum for Private Petitioner Victoria M. Manaloto, dated August 18, 1977 “informing this Court that
the trouble in her marital relation with her husband, the herein private respondent, is “beyond repair.” (rollo, pp. 105-
108).
11 People vs. Francisco, 78 Phil. 694, 704 (cited in Ordoño vs. Daquigan, supra.).
568
against her husband in the instant case. For, as aptly observed by the Solicitor General, “(t)o
espouse the contrary view would spawn the dangerous precedent of a husband committing as
many falsifications against his wife as he could conjure, seeking shelter in the anti-marital
privilege as a license to injure and prejudice her in secret—all with unabashed and complete
impunity.”
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the order of the lower court dated March 31, 1977,
disqualifying Victoria Manaloto from testifying for or against her husband, Benjamin Manaloto,
in Criminal Case No. 1011, as well as the order dated May 19, 1977, denying the motion for
reconsideration are hereby SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court is
hereby lifted and the respondent Judge is hereby ordered to proceed with the trial of the case,
allowing Victoria Manaloto to testify against her husband.
SO ORDERED.
Note.—The husband’s sale of conjugal lot without the wife’s consent is not valid. (Villocino vs.
Doyon, 18 SCRA 1094; Reyes vs. De Leon, 20 SCRA 369).
The wife may ask the court to renounce the administrative of conjugal properties from the
husband for her protection. (Ysasi vs. Fernandez, 23 SCRA 1079).
A debt contracted by the wife is a debt of the conjugal partnership where the husband was
negligent in allowing the wife to incur debts. (Garcia vs. Cruz, 25 SCRA 224).
An illegal detainer judgment against the husband alone over a piece of land paraphernal in
character cannot bind nor affect the wife’s possession thereof. (Plata vs. Yatco, 12 SCRA 718).
——o0o——
569