BOOK TWO

CRIMES AND PENALTIES

Title One

CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY

AND THE LAW OF NATIONS

Crimes against national security

The crimes against national security are:

1. Treason. (Art. 114)

2. Conspiracy and proposal to commit treason. (Art. 115)

3. Misprision of treason. (Art. 116)

4. Espionage (Art. 117)

Crimes against the law of nations

The crimes against the law of nations are:

1. Inciting to war or giving motives for reprisals. (Art. 118)

2. Violation of neutrality. (Art. 119)

3. Correspondence with hostile country. (Art. 120)

4. Flight to enemy's country. (Art. 121)

5. Piracy in genera l and mutiny on the high seas or in

Philippine waters (Art. 122)

 Chapter One

CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY

SECTION ONE. — TREASON AND ESPIONAGE

ARTICLE 114 TREASON

Article 114 Treason — Any Filipino citizen who levies war against the Philippines or
adheres to her enemies, giving them aid or comfort within the Philippines or elsewhere,
shall be punished by reclusion Perpetua to death2 and shall pay a fine not to
exceed 100,000 pesos.

No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses

at least to the same overt act or on confession of the accused in open court.

Likewise, an alien, residing in the Philippines, who commits acts of treason as

defined in paragraph 1 of this article shall be punished by reclusion temporal to death3
and shall pay a fine not to exceed 100,000 pesos. (As amended by Sec. 2, Republic Act
No. 7659, which took effect on 31 December 1993)

Elements of treason:

1. That the offender is a Filipino citizen or an alien residing in the Philippines;

2. That there is a war in which the Philippine s is involved;

3. That the offender either —

A. levies war against the Government, or

B. adhere s t o the enemies, giving the m aid or comfort.

Treason, defined.

Treason is a breach of allegiance to a government, committed by a person who

owes allegiance to it. (63 C.J. 814)

Nature of the crime

Treason, in its general sense, is the violation by a subject of his allegiance to his
sovereign or to the supreme authority of the State. (U.S. vs. Abad, 1 Phil. 437)

The offender in treason is either a Filipino citizen or a resident alien.

Under the first paragraph of Art.114, the offender in treason must be a Filipino
citizen, as he should not be a foreigner. Before Art.114 was amended by Executive
Order No. 44, it was not possible under the Revised Penal Code to punish for treason,
resident aliens who aided the enemies. Now, as amended, the Revised Penal Code
punishes a resident alien who commits treason. (People vs. Marcaida, 79 Phil. 283)

How to prove that the offender is a Filipino citizen

When the accused is allegedly a Filipino, his being a Filipino citizen may be
proved by his prison record which sets out his personal circumstances properly
identified as having been filled out with data supplied by the accused himself. (People
vs. Martin, 86 Phil. 204; People vs. Morales, 91 Phil. 445)

The citizenship of the accused may also be proved by the testimony of witnesses
who know him to have been born in the Philippines of Filipino parents. (People vs.
Flavier, 89 Phil. 15)

Law on treason is of Anglo-American origin.

The Philippines Law on treason is of Anglo-American origin and so we have to

look for guidance from American sources on its meaning and scope. (People vs.
Adriano, 78 Phil. 566)

Allegiance defined

The first element of treason is that the offender owes allegiance to the
Government of the Philippines.

By the term "allegiance" is meant the obligation of fidelity and obedience which
the individuals owe to the government under which they live or to their sovereign, in
return for the protection they receive. (52 Am. Jur. 797)

Allegiance is either permanent or temporary

While it is true that the permanent allegiance is owed by the alien to his own
country, at the same time, he owes a temporary allegiance to the country where he
resides.

Allegiance as an element of treason seems to be either permanent or temporary.

Permanent allegiance consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience which a citizen
or subject owes to his government or sovereign. Temporary allegiance is the obligation
of fidelity and obedience which a resident alien owes to our government. (Laurel vs.
Misa, 77 Phil. 856) This justifies Executive Order No. 44, amending Art. 114.
Treason cannot be committed in time of peace

The second element of treason is that there is a war in which the Philippines is
involved.

Treason is a war crime. It is not an all-time offense. It cannot be committed in

peace time. While there is peace, there are no traitors. Treason may be incubated when
peace reigns. Treasonable acts may actually be perpetrated during peace, but there are
no traitors until war has started.

As treason is basically a war crime, it is punished by the state as a measure of

self-defense and self-preservation. The law of treason is an emergency measure. It
remains dormant until the emergency arises. But as soon as war starts, it is relentlessly
put into effect. (Concurring Opinion of Justice Perfecto, Laurel vs. Misa, 77 Phil. 865)

Two ways or modes of committing treason:

1. By levying war against the Government.

2. By adhering to the enemies of the Philippines, giving them aid or comfort.

Meaning of "levies war”

Levying war requires the concurrence of two things: (1) that there be an actual
assembling of men, (2) for the purpose of executing a treasonable design by force. (Ex
parte Bollman and Ex parte Swartwout, 1 U,S. Sup. Ct. Rep. [4 Cranch 75], p. 571)

There must be an actual assembling of men

Upon searching the house of the accused, the Constabulary officers found a
captain's commission under seal. It was held that the mere acceptance of the
commission from the secretary of war of the Katipunan Society by the accused, nothing
else having been done, was not an overt act of treason within the meaning of the law.
(U.S. vs. De los Reyes, 3 Phil 349)

The actual enlistment of men to serve against the government does not amount
to levying war, because there is no actual assembling of men.

But if a body of men be actually assembled for the purpose of effecting by force a
treasonable design, all those who perform any part, however minute, or however remote
from the scene of action, and who are actually leagued in the general conspiracy, are to
be considered as traitors. (Ex parte Bollman and Ex parte Swartwout, supra)
In treason by levying war, it is not necessary that there be a formal declaration of
the existence of a state of war.

It is not necessary that there be any formal declaration of the existence of a state
of war to justify the conclusion that those engaged in such attempt are levying war and
therefore guilty of treason. Actual hostilities may determine the date of the
commencement of war. (Justice Johnson, dissenting; U.S. vs. Lagnason, 3 Phil. 495)

The war must be directed against the government.

The levying of war must be with the intent to overthrow the government as such,
not merely to resist a particular statute or to repel a particular officer. (3 Wharton's
Criminal Law, 12th Ed).

An organized attempt on the part of persons joined together in a band to

overthrow and destroy the established government is a levying of war against the
government and constitutes treason.

It matters not how vain and futile the attempt was and how impossible of
accomplishment. It is not necessary that those attempting to overthrow the government
by force of arms should have the apparent power to succeed in their design in whole or
in part. (U.S. vs. Lagnason, 3 Phil. 473)

Those who, during war, rise publicly to inflict an act of hate or revenge upon the
persons of public officers do not commit treason by levying war because the public
uprising is not directed against the government.

Is it necessary that the purpose of levying war is to deliver the country in whole
or in part to the enemy?

Yes. Levying war as an act of treason must be for the purpose of executing a
treasonable design by force. Although in stating the acts constituting treason, Art. 114
uses the phrases (1) "levies war against" the Government of the Philippines or (2)
"adheres to" the enemies of the Philippines, "giving them aid or comfort," it does not
mean that adhering to the enemies is required only in the second mode of committing
treason. Since levying war against the Government is also punished as rebellion, there
must be a difference between treason committed by levying war and rebellion.

The levying of war must be in collaboration with a foreign enemy.

If the levying of war is merely a civil uprising, without any intention of helping an
external enemy, the crime is not treason. The offenders may be held liable for rebellion
under Art. 135 in relation to Art. 134 of this Code.
Requirements of the second way or mode of committing treason

In the second way or mode of committing treason, (1) adherence and (2) giving
aid or comfort to the enemy must concur together. Adherence alone, without giving aid
or comfort to the enemy, is not sufficient to constitute treason. And conversely, aid or
comfort alone, without adherence, is not treason.

Adherence to the enemy, defined.

The phrase "adherence to the enemy" means intent to betray. There is

"adherence to the enemy" when a citizen intellectually or emotionally favors the enemy
and harbors sympathies or convictions disloyal to his country's policy or interest.
(Cramer vs. U.S., 65 Sup. Ct. 918, April 23, 1945)

"Aid or comfort," defined.

The phrase "aid or comfort" means an act which strengthens or tends to

strengthen the enemy in the conduct of war against the traitor's country and an act
which weakens or tends to weaken the power of the traitor's country to resist or to
attack the enemy. (Cramer vs. U.S., supra)

Adherence alone, without giving the enemy aid or comfort, does not constitute
treason.

The fact that the accused had friendly relations with the Japanese during the war,
openly revealing himself sympathetic to the cause of the enemy and also believing in
the invincibility of the Japanese Armed Forces does not constitute in itself treasonable
act as denned by law. The crime of treason consists of two elements: (1) adherence to
the enemy; and (2) rendering him aid and comfort. (People vs. Tan, P.C., 42 O.G.
1263).

Emotional or intellectual attachment or sympathy to the enemy, without giving the

enemy aid or comfort, is not treason. (People vs Rbble 83 Phil. 1)

When there is no adherence to the enemy, the act which may do aid or comfort to
the enemy does not amount to treason.

The sale to the enemy of alum crystals and water pipes does not per se
constitute treason, because said articles or materials are not exclusively for war
purposes and their sale does not necessarily carry an intention on the part of the vendor
to adhere to the enemy. (People vs. Agoncillo, 80 Phil 33)

While the sale to the enemy of alum crystals and water pipes may do aid or
comfort to the enemy, if there is no evidence of intent to betray, the person making the
sale is not guilty of treason.
Giving information to, or commandeering foodstuffs for, the enemy is evidence of
both adherence and aid or comfort.

The defendant's act of giving information to the enemy constituted not only giving
aid and comfort, but also adherence to the enemy. (People vs. Paar, 86 Phil. 864) The
defendant's act of commandeering foodstuffs for the Japanese soldiers is sufficient
proof of adherence to the enemy. (People vs. Mangahas, 93 Phil. 1113)

Extent of aid or comfort

The aid and comfort must be given to the enemy by some kind of action. It must
be a deed or physical activity, not merely a mental operation. It must be an act that has
passed from the realm of thought into the realm of action.

The expression includes such acts as furnishing the enemy with arms, troops,
supplies, information, or means of transportation.

In a broad sense, the law of treason does not prescribe kinds of social, business
and political intercourse between the belligerent occupants of the invaded country and
its inhabitants. In the nature of things, the occupation of a country by the enemy is
bound to create relations of all sorts between the invaders and the natives. What aid
and comfort constitute treason must depend upon their nature, degree and purpose. To
draw a line between treasonable and unreasonable assistance is not always easy. The
scope of adherence to the enemy is comprehensive, its requirement indeterminate.

As a general rule, to be treasonous, the extent of the aid and comfort given to the
enemies must be to render assistance to them as enemies and not merely as
individuals and, in addition, be directly in furtherance of the enemies' hostile designs. To
make a simple distinction: To lend or give money to an enemy as a friend or out of
charity to the beneficiary so that he may buy personal necessities is to assist him as an
individual and is not technically traitorous. On the other hand, to lend or give him money
to enable him to buy arms or ammunition to use in waging war against the giver's
country enhances his strength and by the same count injures the interest of the
government of the giver. That is treason. (People vs. Perez, 83 Phil. 314-315)

The act committed need not actually strengthen the enemy.

It is not essential that the effort to aid be successful, provided overt acts are done
which if successful would advance the interest of the enemy. (Cramer vs. United States,
65 Sup. Ct. 918, cited in People vs. Alarcon, 78 Phil. 733)

It is said there is aid and comfort no matter how vain or futile the attempt may be,
as long as the act committed tends to strengthen the enemy. It is not the degree of
success, but rather the aim for which the act was perpetrated, that determines the
commission of treason.

Commandeering of women to satisfy the lust of the enemy is not treason.

"Commandeering" of women to satisfy the lust of Japanese officers or men or to

enliven the entertainments held in their honor was not treason even though the women
and the entertainments helped to make life more pleasant for the enemies and boost
their spirit; he was not guilty any more than the women themselves would have been if
they voluntarily and willingly had surrendered their bodies or organized the
entertainments. The acts herein charged were not, by fair implication, calculated to
strengthen the Japanese Empire or its army or to cripple the defense and resistance of
the other side. Whatever favorable effect the defendant's collaboration with the
Japanese might have in their prosecution of the war was trivial, imperceptible and
unintentional. (People vs. Perez, supra)

Specific acts of aid or comfort constituting treason

The following are specific acts of aid or comfort:

1. Serving as informer and active member of the Japanese Military Police,

arresting guerilla suspects in an attempt to suppress the underground movement.
(People vs. Fernando, 79 Phil. 719)

2. Serving in the Japanese Army as agent or spy and participating in the raid of
guerrilla hideout. (People vs. Munoz, et al., 79 Phil. 702)

3. Acting as "finger woman" when a barrio was "zonified" by the Japanese,

pointing out to the Japanese several men whom she accused as guerillas. (People vs.
Nunez, 85 Phil. 448)

4. Taking active part in the mass killing of civilians by the Japanese soldiers by
personally tying the hands of the victims. (People vs Canibas, 85 Phil. 469)

Being a Makapili constitutes an overt act of psychological comfort.

Being a Makapili is in itself constitutive of an overt act. The crime of treason was
committed if he placed himself at the enemy's call to fight side by side with him when
the opportune time came even though an opportunity never presented itself. Such
membership by its very nature gave the enemy aid and comfort. The enemy derived
psychological comfort in the knowledge that he had on his side nationals of the country
with which he was at war. It furnished the enemy aid in that his cause was advanced,
his forces augmented, and his courage was enhanced by the knowledge that he could
count on men such as the accused and his kind who were ready to strike at their own
people. The practical effect of it was no different from that of enlisting in the invader's
army. (People vs. Adriano, 78 Phil. 563; People vs. Villanueva, 92 Phil. 637)

Acceptance of public office and discharge of official duties under the enemy do
not constitute per se the felony of treason.

The mere acceptance of a public office and the discharge of the functions and
duties connected therewith, during the Japanese military occupation in the Philippines,
do not constitute per se the felony of treason. But admitting that such acts were really of
aid and comfort to the enemy, they cannot be punishable in this particular case,
because there is no satisfactory proof of the adherence of the accused to the cause of
the enemy. (People vs. Alunan, P.C., 43 O.G. 1288)

When there is adherence to the enemy.

But when the positions to which the accused was appointed were not only highly
responsible positions but also policy-determining, because they denned the norm of
conduct that all the offices and officials under the departments he headed had to adopt
and enforce, and helped in the propagation of the creed of the invader, and the acts and
utterances of the accused while holding such position were an earnest implement to
such policy, the acceptance of public office and discharge of official duties constitute
treason. (People vs. Sison, P.C., 42 O.G.748)

Mere governmental work during the Japanese regime is not an act of treason.

1. Those who refused to cooperate, in the face of danger, were patriotic citizens;
but it does not follow that the faintheart, who gave in, were traitors. It is now undisputed
that mere governmental work under the Japanese regime — and pilotage service may
be considered in the same light — does not constitute per se indictable disloyalty.
(People vs. Godinez, 79 Phil. 776)

2. Appellant's membership in the Bureau of Constabulary under the government

of occupation is not treason. That institution was intended for the promotion and
preservation of law and order which were essential, during war, to the life of the civilian
population. (People vs. De Castro, 84 Phil. 118)

Membership in the police force during occupation is not treason; but active
participation with the enemies in the apprehension of guerrillas and infliction of
ill-treatments make such member liable for treason.

Appellant's membership in the police force of Manaoag does not in itself

constitute treason; but his having accompanied the Japanese soldiers to the places of
abode of guerrilla leaders and the several ill-treatments which he personally inflicted
upon them because of their refusal to disclose their connection with the guerrilla forces,
constitute treason. (People vs. Dizon, 84 Phil. 48; People vs. Galo, 84 Phil. 52; People
vs. Badili, 84 Phil. 71)

Guerilla warfare may be unlawful, but it should not be suppressed.

The argument is made that the accused was, at the most, merely obeying
superior orders in the suppression of guerrilla activities, which, in the opinion of his
counsel, are outlawed by the rules of war. But the evidence is clear that he identified
himself with the enemy's cause by acting as spy and causing the arrest of even his
close relatives to prevent them from taking part in the resistance movement, and while
guerrilla warfare may be unlawful from the standpoint of the conqueror, it cannot be so
regarded by those who, by natural right, are trying to drive him out of their invaded
territory. (People vs. Balingit, 83 Phil. 881)

When the arrest of persons alleged to have been guerrillas was caused by the
accused due to their committing a common crime, like arson, he is not liable for
treason.

The matter had no treasonous significance, when the persons arrested admitted
that they were suspected of, and investigated for, having burned the house of one
Pedro Daco, and were confined in the provincial jail, and not in the Japanese garrison.
(People vs. Dumapit, 84 Phil. 698)

The aid or comfort given to the enemies must be after the declaration of war. The
enemies must be the subject of a foreign power.

The aid or comfort given to the enemies must be after the declaration of war
between the countries, and the term "enemies" applies only to the subjects of a foreign
power in a state of hostility with the traitor's country. It does not embrace rebels in
insurrection against their own country (63 C.J. 816), because they are still citizens and
not enemies.

No treason thru negligence.

The overt act of aid and comfort to the enemy must be intentional, as
distinguished from merely negligent or undesigned ones. (Cramer vs. U.S., supra)

Is there a complex crime of treason with murder, physical injuries, etc.?

In the case of People vs. Prieto, 80 Phil. 138, where the accused, besides being
a Japanese spy, took part in the execution of some of the guerrilla suspects and in the
infliction of physical injuries on the others, the Supreme Court held that murder and
physical injuries were inherent in the crime of treason characterized by the giving of aid
and comfort to the enemy.
When killings and other common crimes are charged as overt acts of treason,
they cannot be regarded: (1) as separate crimes, or (2) as complexed with
treason.

In treason, the giving of aid and comfort can be accomplished only by some kind
of action — a deed or physical activity. This deed or physical activity may be and often
is in itself a criminal offense under another penal statute or provision.

Thus, where the accused rendered service to the Japanese army as a secret
agent, informer and spy and, in the performance of such service, he participated in the
Japanese expeditions against guerrillas and committed mass murders, arson and
robberies (People vs. Villanueva, 104 Phil. 450), and those deeds or physical activities
(committing mass murders, arson and robberies) were charged an element of treason
(giving the enemy aid or comfort), they become identified with the crime of treason and
cannot be the subject of a separate punishment or used in conjunction with treason to
increase the penalty as provided in Art. 48. (People vs. Prieto, 80 Phil. 138; People vs.
Vilo, 82 Phil. 524; People vs. Navea, 87 Phil. 1)

When the raping mentioned in the information is therein alleged not as a specific
offense but as mere element of the crime of treason (People vs. Adlawan, 83 Phil. 194)
and the illegal detention is another overt act of treason (People vs. Butawan, 83 Phil.
440), they are merged in the crime of treason.

When the accused is charged with treason and his act of arresting and detaining
guerrillas is proved, not only as the element of adherence to the enemy but also as the
element of giving aid or comfort, the accused cannot be considered guilty only of illegal
detention under Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code. (People vs. Tuason, 84 Phil. 670)

But this rule would not preclude the punishment of murder or other common
crimes as such, if the prosecution should elect to prosecute the culprit specifically for
these crimes, instead of relying on them as an element of treason. (People vs. Prieto,
80 Phil. 143)

Treason by Filipino citizen can be committed outside of the Philippines.

Treason can be committed by a Filipino who is outside of the Philippines, as Art.

114 says "in the Philippines or elsewhere."

Treason by an alien must be committed in the Philippines.

An alien residing in the Philippines can be prosecuted for treason. (Executive

Order No. 44, May 31, 1945) Therefore, an alien who is not residing in the Philippines
cannot commit treason.
Treason is a continuous offense.

Treason is of such a nature that it may be committed by one single act, by a

series of acts, or by several series thereof, not only in a single time, but in different
times, it being a continuous crime. (People vs. Victoria, 78 Phil. 129)

All overt acts the accused has done constitute but a single offense. (Guinto vs.
Veluz, 77 Phil. 801) Proof of one count is sufficient for conviction. (People vs. San Juan,
89 Phil. 359)

No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two

witnesses at least to the same overt act or on confession of the accused in open
court. (Art. 114, par. 2)

Treason cannot be proved by circumstantial evidence or by the extrajudicial

confession of the accused.

The Revised Penal Code as well as the Rules of Court not authorize the
conviction of a person accused of treason if the evidence against him is circumstantial,
however strong or convincing it may be, or is only an extrajudicial confession.

Ways of proving treason.

A person may be convicted of treason on any of the following evidence only:

1. Testimony of two witnesses, at least, to the same overt act; or

2. Confession of the accused in open court. (Art. 114, par. 2, Revised Penal
Code)

The two-witness rule

The testimony of two witnesses is required to prove the overt act of giving aid or
comfort. It is not necessary to prove adherence.

An overt act is defined as that physical activity, that deed that constitutes the
rendering of aid and comfort.

The two-witness rule must be adhered to as to each and every one of all the
external manifestations of the overt act in issue. (People vs. Abad, 78 Phil. 766)

The treasonous overt act of doing guard duty in the Japanese garrison on one
specific date cannot be identified with the doing of guard duty in the same garrison on a
different date. Both overt acts, although of the same nature and character, are two
distinct acts. Either one, to serve as a ground for conviction, must be proved by two
witnesses. That one witness should testify as to one, and another as to the other, was
held not to be enough. (People vs. Agpangan, 79 Phil. 334)

Where two witnesses testified that the accused took part in the alleged "zoning"
for the purpose of picking out the guerrillas, "but their testimony does not disclose that
they were referring to the same act, place and moment of time, it cannot be said that
one corroborated the other." (People vs. Flores, et al, 85 Phil. 403)

But it is not required that their testimony be identical. Thus, one witness might
hear a gun report, see a smoking gun in the hand of the accused and see the victim fall.
Another witness, who was deaf, might see the accused raise and point the gun and see
a puff of smoke from it. The testimony of both would certainly be to the same overt act.
(Hauft vs. United States, 67 S. Ct. 874)

The two-witness rule is "severely restrictive."

The authors of the two-witness provision in the American Constitution, from

which our treason law was taken, purposely made it "severely restrictive" and conviction
for treason difficult. The provision requires that each of the witnesses must testify to the
whole overt act; or if it is separable, there must be two witnesses to each part of the
overt act. (People vs. Escleto, 84 Phil. 121)

The defendant should be acquitted if only one of the two witnesses is believed by
the court.

This provision is so exacting and so uncompromising in regard to the amount of

evidence that where two or more witnesses give oaths to an overt act and only one of
them is believed by the court or jury, the defendant, it has been said and held, is entitled
to discharge, regardless of any moral conviction of the culprit's guilt as gauged and
tested by the ordinary and natural methods, with which we are familiar, of finding the
truth. Natural inferences, however strong or conclusive, flowing from the testimony of a
most trustworthy witness or from other sources are unavailing as a substitute for the
needed corroboration in the form of direct testimony of another eyewitness to the same
overt act. (People vs. Adriano, 78 Phil. 563-567)

Illustration of a case where the two-witness rule is not complied with.

Witness A testified that he saw the defendant going to the house of Magno Ibarra
in search of the latter's revolver. Witness B testified that when Magno Ibarra went to the
garrison, the defendant required him (Ibarra) to produce his revolver. It was held that
the search for the revolver in the house of Ibarra is one overt act and the requiring to
produce the revolver in the garrison, another.
 Although both acts may logically be presumed to have answered the same
purpose, that of confiscating Ibarra's revolver, the singleness of purpose is not enough
to make one of two acts.

The theory that where the overt act is simple, continuous and composite, made
up of, or proved by several circumstances, it being not necessary that there be two
witnesses to each circumstance, is not well taken. (People vs. Abad, 78 Phil. 766)

It is sufficient that the witnesses are uniform in their testimony on the overt act; it
is not necessary that there be corroboration between them on the point they
testified.

While witness A.S. testified that the defendant, with a Japanese interpreter,
arrived at their house and inquired if his brother B.S. was at home and said that the
latter was wanted at the military police headquarters for questioning, witness E.S. did
not corroborate witness A.S. in this respect. Neither did witness A.S. corroborate E.S.
as regards the latter's testimony that B.S. was taking a bath and that B.S. said that the
defendant and his companion should wait. But said witnesses were uniform in their
testimony on the overt act that B.S. was arrested and the defendant actually aided in his
arrest. The two-witness rule was complied with. (People vs. Concepcion, 84 Phil. 789)

The two-witness rule is not affected by discrepancies in minor details of the

testimony.

The fact that the said witnesses were not uniform on the points whether or not
there were Japanese soldiers in the raiding party, or whether or not the persons
arrested and confined included not only the males but some women and children, is not
sufficient to entirely discredit their testimony, as the deficiency refers merely to minor
details. Neither may the negative testimony of E.E., an alleged victim of the raid, to the
effect that he did not see the appellant among the raiders prevail over the positive
testimony of M.F. and T.V. who, moreover, were not shown to have had any improper
motive in testifying against the appellant. (People vs. Lansanas, 82 Phil. 193)

Reason for requiring the two witnesses to testify to the same overt act

The special nature of the crime of treason requires that the accused be afforded
a special protection not required in other cases so as to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
The extreme seriousness of the crime, for which death is one of the penalties provided
by law, and the fact that the crime is committed on abnormal times, when small
differences may in mortal enmity wipe out all scruples in sacrificing the truth, require
that, at least, two witnesses must testify as to overt acts of treason, if the same should
be accepted by the tribunals as legal basis to condemn a person as a traitor.
(Concurring Opinion of Justice Perfecto, People vs. Marcaida, 79 Phil. 295)
Adherence may be proved:

1. by one witness,

2. From the nature of the act itself, or

3. From the circumstances surrounding the act. (Cramer vs. U.S., supra, cited in
People vs. Adriano, 78 Phil. 563; People vs Canibas, 85 Phil. 469)

Adherence to the enemy may be inferred from his act of arresting persons
suspected of being guerrillas, his being armed, and his being in company with armed
Japanese soldiers. (People vs. Icaro, 89 Phil. 12; People vs. Bernardino, 93 Phil. 940)

Reason why adherence to the enemy need not be proved by two witnesses

It seems obvious that adherence to the enemy, in the sense of a disloyal state of
mind, cannot be, and is not required to be, proved by deposition of two witnesses,
because what is designed in the mind of an accused never is susceptible of proof by
direct testimony.

Confession must be made in open court

The confession means a confession of guilt. It is not only an admission of facts

made by the accused in giving his testimony after a plea of not guilty, from which
admissions of his guilt can be inferred. Thus, if the accused testified in his behalf after
he had pleaded not guilty that he had been carried off by force by the insurgent soldiers;
that he was forced to join them; that they made him a lieutenant and gave him a
revolver; and that he stayed with them two weeks, although it was against his will; there
was only an admission, but not a confession of guilt. (U.S. vs. Magtibay, 2 Phil. 705) It
means pleading guilty in open court; that is, before the judge while actually hearing the
case.

Extrajudicial confession or confession made before the investigators is not

sufficient to convict a person of treason.

Aggravating circumstances in treason

1. Cruelty by subjecting guerrilla suspects to barbarous forms of torture before

putting them to death; and ignominy, by stripping the wife of her clothes and then
abusing her in the presence of her husband, a guerrilla suspect, are aggravating
circumstances in treason. (People vs. Adlawan, 83 Phil. 195)

2. Rapes, wanton robbery for personal gain, and brutality with which the killing or
physical injuries are carried out are regarded as ignominy and cruelty under paragraphs
17 and 21 of Art. 14 of the Code. (People vs. Racaza, 82 Phil. 623; People vs. Prieto,
80 Phil. 138)

3. But evident premeditation is not aggravating in treason, because in treason,

adherence and the giving of aid and comfort to the enemy is usually a long continued
process requiring reflective and persistent determination and planning. (People vs.
Racaza, supra)

4. Superior strength and treachery are circumstances inherent in treason.

Treachery is merged in superior strength. They are, therefore, not aggravating in
treason. (People vs. Adlawan, supra; People vs. Racaza, supra)

Art. 64 is not strictly applied to treason.

Ordinarily, when there are no mitigating and aggravating circumstances, the

divisible penalty is imposed in the medium period. (Art. 64)

The penalty for treason committed by Philippine citizens is reclusion Perpetua to

death and a fine not to exceed P100,000. In determining the proper penalty for treason,
the amount or degree of aid or comfort given the enemy as well as the gravity of the
separate and distinct acts of treason committed by the accused, rather than the
circumstances aggravating or mitigating the offense, determine the period of the penalty
to be imposed.

So, where there was no killing, not even torture of prisoners, the imposition of
imprisonment for 15 years, without reference to the mitigating or aggravating
circumstance, is proper. (People vs. Cana, 87 Phil. 577) Note: This ruling was made
when the penalty for treason committed by Filipino citizens was still reclusion temporal
to death.

The gravity or seriousness of the acts of treason considered.

Where the accused took part in the killing and torture of persons apprehended by
the Japanese forces through him, the penalty of reclusion Perpetua or even death was
imposed. (People vs. Ortega, 92 Phil. 263)

Upon the accused whose acts in torturing and killing guerilla suspects were
characterized by vindictive cruelty and inhuman savagery, death is the proper penalty.
(People vs. Ingalla, 83 Phil. 239)

Considering that many deaths resulted from the defendant's adherence to the
enemy, the Supreme Court believes that the appropriate penalty should be reclusion
perpetua besides fine of P10, 000. (People vs. Castillo, 90 Phil. 298)
Defense of suspended allegiance and change of sovereignty, not accepted.

Reasons:

(a) A citizen owes an absolute and permanent allegiance to his Government;

(b) The sovereignty of the Government is not transferred to the enemy by mere
occupation;

(c) The subsistence of the sovereignty of the legitimate Government in a territory

occupied by the military forces of the enemy during the war is one of the rules of
International Law; and

(d) What is suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty. (A. Laurel vs.
Misa, 77 Phil. 856)

Defense of obedience to de facto Government

In addition to the defense of duress, lawful obedience to a de facto Government

is a good defense in treason. The Philippine Executive Commission, as well as the
Republic established by the Japanese occupation army in the Philippines, had all the
characteristics of a de facto Government. (Go Kim Cham vs. Valdez, et al, 75 Phil. 113)

Defense of loss of citizenship by joining the army of the enemy People vs.
Manayao (78 Phil. 721)

Facts: The accused, being a Makapili, considered himself a member of the

Japanese armed forces. He contended that he thereby lost his Filipino citizenship under
paragraphs 3, 4 and 6 of Sec. 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63 providing: "... a Filipino
may lose his citizenship x x x by accepting commission in the military, naval or air
service of a foreign country x x x."

Held: The accused cannot divest himself of his Philippine citizenship by the
simple expedient of accepting a commission in the military, naval or air service of such
country. If the contention of the accused would be sustained, his very crime would be
the shield that would protect him from punishment.

Defense of duress or uncontrollable fear

In the eyes of the law, nothing will excuse that act of joining an enemy, but the
fear of immediate death; not the fear of any inferior personal injury, nor the
apprehension of any outrage upon property. (People vs. Bagalawis, 78 Phil. 174;
People vs. Villanueva, 104 Phil. 450)
 ART. 115. CONSPIRACY AND PROPOSAL TO COMMIT
TREASON
Art. 115. Conspiracy and proposal to commit treason4 — Penalty. — The
conspiracy and proposal to commit the crime of treason shall be punished respectively,
by prison mayor and a fine not exceeding 10,000 pesos, and by prison correctional and
a fine not exceeding 5,000 pesos.

How are the crimes of conspiracy and proposal to commit treason

committed?
Conspiracy to commit treason is committed when in time of war, two or more
persons come to an agreement to levy war against the Government or to adhere to the
enemies and to give them aid or comfort, and decide to commit it. (Arts. 8 and 114)

Proposal to commit treason is committed when in time of war a person who

has decided to levy war against the Government or to adhere to the enemies and to
give them aid or comfort, proposes its execution to some other person or persons. (Arts.
8 and 114)

Conspiracy or proposal as a felony

Although the general rule is that conspiracy and proposal to commit a felony is
not punishable (Art. 8), under Art. 115 the mere conspiracy to commit treason is a
felony. The mere proposal to commit treason is also a felony. Both are punishable
under Art. 115.

The reason is that in treason the very existence of the state is

endangered.
Example of conspiracy to levy war against the Government

In 1903, a junta was organized and a conspiracy entered into by a number of

Filipinos in Hongkong, for the purpose of overthrowing the Government by force of arms
and establishing in its stead a government to be known as the Republica Universal
Democratica Filipino; that one PrimoRuiz was recognized as the titular head of this
conspiracy and Artemio Ricarte as chief of the military forces to be organized in the
Philippines in furtherance of the plans of the conspirators; that Ricarte came to Manila
from Hongkong; that after his arrival in Manila, he held a number of meetings whereat
was perfected the conspiracy hatched in Hongkong; that defendant Francisco Bautista
took part in several of the meetings whereat the plans of the conspirators w e r e
discussed and perfected; and that at one of these meetings, Bautista, in answer to the
question of Ricarte, assured him that the necessary preparation had been made and
that he "held the people in readiness."

Francisco Bautista, with another defendant, was convicted of the crime of

conspiracy to overthrow, put down, and destroy by force the Government. (U.S. vs.
Bautista, et al., 6 Phil. 581)

The two-witness rule does not apply to conspiracy or proposal to

commit treason.
The two-witness rule does not apply to this crime, because this is a separate and
distinct offense from that of treason. (U.S. vs. Bautista, et al., 6 Phil. 581)

ART. 116. MISPRISION OF TREASON

Art. 116. Misprision of treason.'' — Every person owing allegiance to (the United
States or) the Government of the Philippine Islands, without being a foreigner, and
having knowledge of any conspiracy against them, who conceals or does not disclose
and make known the same, as soon as possible, to the governor or fiscal of the
province, or the mayor or fiscal of the city in which he resides, as the case may be, shall
be punished as an accessory to the crime of treason.

Elements:

1. That the offender must be owing allegiance to the Government, and not a
foreigner.

2. That he has knowledge of any conspiracy (to commit treason) against the
Government.

3. That he conceals or does not disclose and make known the same as soon as
possible to the governor or fiscal of the province or the mayor or fiscal of the city in
which he resides.

Misprision of treason cannot be committed by a resident alien

The offender must be owing allegiance to the Government, without being a
foreigner.

The conspiracy is one to commit treason

The phrase "having knowledge of any conspiracy against them" has reference to
conspiracy to commit treason defined in Art. 115.
 Art. 116 does not apply when the crime of treason is already
committed by someone and the accused does not report its
commission to the proper authority.
This is so because Art. 116 speaks of "knowledge of any conspiracy against" the
Government of the Philippines, not knowledge of treason actually committed by another.

The offender in misprision of treason is punished as an accessory to treason.

The offender under Art. 116 is "punished as an accessory to the crime of

treason." Note that Art. 116 does not provide for a penalty. Hence, the penalty for
misprision of treason is two decrees lower than that provided for treason.

The offender is, however, a principal in the crime of misprision of treason.

But the offender in Art. 116 is a principal in the crime of misprision of treason.
Misprision of treason is a separate and distinct offense from the crime of treason.

Article 20 does not apply.

Since the offender in misprision of treason is a principal in that crime, Art. 20

does not apply, even if the offender is related to the persons in conspiracy against the
government, because Art. 20 applies only to accessory.

Art. 116 is an exception to the rule that mere silence does not make a person
criminally liable.

The provision of Art. 116 is an exception to the general rule laid down in
connection with Art. 19 that a person who keeps silent as to what he knows about the
perpetration of an offense is not criminally liable, either as a principal, or as an
accomplice, or as an accessory. (U.S. vs. Caballeros, et al, 4 Phil. 350)

ART. 117. ESPIONAGE

Art. 117. Espionage — The penalty of prison correccional™ shall be inflicted upon
any person who:

1. Without authority therefor, enters a warship, fort, or naval or military

establishment or reservation to obtain any information, plans, photographs, or other
data of a confidential nature relative to the defense of the Philippine Archipelago; or
 2. Being in possession, by reason of the public office he holds, of the articles,
data, or information referred to in the preceding paragraph, discloses their contents to a
representative of a foreign nation.

The penalty next higher in degree shall be imposed if the offender be a public
officer or employee.

Espionage, defined.
Espionage is the offense of gathering, transmitting, or losing information
respecting the national defense with intent or reason to believe that the information is to
be used to the injury of the Republic of the Philippines or to the advantage of any
foreign nation. (See the opening sentence of Sec. 1 and other sections of
Commonwealth Act No. 616)

Two ways of committing espionage under Art.117

1. By entering, without authority therefor, a warship, fort, or naval or military

establishment or reservation to obtain any information plans, photographs or other data
of a confidential nature relative to the defense of the Philippines.

Elements:

(a) That the offender enters any of the places mentioned therein;

(b) That he has no authority therefor;

(c) That his purpose is to obtain information, plans, photographs or other

data of a confidential nature relative to the defense of the Philippines.
(Guevara)

2. By disclosing to the representative of a foreign nation the contents of the

articles, data or information referred to in paragraph No. 1 of Art. 117, which he had in
his possession by reason of the public office he holds.

Elements:

(a) That the offender is a public officer;

(b) That he has in his possession the articles, data or information referred
to in paragraph No. 1 of Art. 117, by reason of the public office he holds;

(c) That he discloses their contents to a representative of a foreign nation.

To be liable under par. 1, the offender must have the intention to obtain
information relative to the defense of the Philippines.
 If the accused has no such intention, even if he takes possession of plans or
photographs referred to in paragraph No. 1 of Art. 117, he is not liable under that
provision.

Even under Com. Act No. 616, the offender in entering any of the places
mentioned in Sec. 1 thereof must have the purpose of obtaining information respecting
national defense.

It is not necessary that information, etc. is obtained.

Under the first way of committing espionage, it is not necessary that the
offender should have obtained any information, plans, etc. mentioned in paragraph
No. 1 of Art. 117. It is sufficient that he has the purpose to obtain any of them when
he entered a warship, fort, or naval or military establishment.

Persons liable in two ways of committing espionage

Under paragraph No. 1 of Art. 117, the offender is any person, whether a
citizen or a foreigner, a private individual or a public officer.

When the offender is a public officer or employee, the penalty next higher in
degree shall be imposed.

Under paragraph No. 2, the offender must be a public officer who has in his
possession the article, data, or information by reason of the public office he holds.

Other acts of espionage are punished by Com. Act No. 616.

OUTLINE OF COMMONWEALTH ACT NO 616

An Act to Punish Espionage and Other Offenses

Against National Security

SEC.1. Unlawfully obtaining or permitting to be obtained information affecting

national defense .

Different ways of violating Section 1:

a. By going upon, entering, flying over or otherwise by obtaining information

concerning any vessel, aircraft, work of defense or other place connected with the
national defense, or any other place where any vessels, aircraft, arms, munitions or
other materials for the use in time of war are being made, or stored, for the purpose of
obtaining information respecting national defense, with intent to use it to the injury of the
Philippines or to the advantage of any foreign nation.
 b. By copying, taking, making or attempting or inducing or aiding another to copy,
take, make or obtain any sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blue print, plan,
map instrument, appliance, document, writing or note of anything connected with the
national defense, for the same purpose and with like intent as in paragraph a.

c. By receiving or obtaining or agreeing or attempting or inducing or aiding

another to receive or obtain from any sources any of those data mentioned in paragraph
b, code book or signal book, knowing that it will be obtained or disposed of by any
person contrary to the provisions of this Act.

d. By communicating or transmitting, or attempting to communicate or transmit to

any person not entitled to receive it, by willfully retaining and failing to deliver it on
demand to any officer or employee entitled to receive it, the offender being in
possession of, having access to, control over, or being entrusted with any of the data
mentioned in paragraph b, or code book or signal book.

e. By permitting, through gross negligence, to be removed from its proper place

or custody or delivered to anyone in violation of his trust, or to be lost, stolen, abstracted
or destroyed any of the data mentioned in paragraph b, code book or signal book, the
offender being entrusted with or having lawful possession or control of the same.

SEC.2. Unlawful disclosing of information affecting national defense.

Different ways of violating Section 2:

a. By communicating, delivering or transmitting or attempting or aiding or

inducing another to do it, to any foreign government or any faction or party or military or
naval force within a foreign country, whether recognized or unrecognized by the
Philippines, or to any representative, officer, employee, subject or citizen thereof, any of
the data mentioned in paragraph b of Section 1 hereof, code book or signal book.

If committed in time of war, the penalty is death or imprisonment for not more
than 30 years.

b. In time of war, by collecting, recording, publishing or communicating or

attempting to elicit any information with respect to the movement, number, description,
condition, or disposition of any of the armed forces, ships, aircraft, or war materials of
the Philippines, or with respect to the plans or conduct of any military, naval or air
operations or with respect to any works or measures undertaken for the fortification or
defense of any place, or any other information relating to the public defense, which
might be useful to the enemy.

The penalty is death or imprisonment for not more than 30 years.

SEC.3.Disloyal acts or words in time of peace.

Different ways of violating Section 3:

a. By advising, counseling, urging or in any other manner by causing

insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny or refusal of duty of any member of the military, naval
or air forces of the Philippines.

b. By distributing any written or printed matter which advises, counsels, or urges

such insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty.

SEC. 4.Disloyal acts or word s in time of war.

Different ways of violating Section 4:

a. By willfully making or conveying false reports or false statements with intent to

interfere with the operation or success of the Armed Forces of the Philippines; or

b. To promote the success of its enemies, by willfully causing or attempting to

cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny or refusal of duty in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines; or

c. By willfully obstructing the recruiting or enlistment service.

SEC. 5.Conspiracy to violate preceding sections

Requisites:

a. Two or more persons conspire to violate the provisions of sections one, two,
three or four of this Act;

b. One or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy.

Each of the parties to such conspiracy shall be punished as in said sections

provided in the case of the doing of the act the accomplishment of which is the object of
such conspiracy.

SEC. 6. Harboring or concealing violators of the law

Requisites:
 a. The offender knows that a person has committed or is about to commit an
offense under this Act;

b. The offender harbors or conceals such person.

Other acts punished by Commonwealth Act No. 616.

1. Using or permitting or procuring the use of an aircraft for the purpose of

making photograph, sketch, etc. of vital installations or equipment of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines. (Sec. 9)

2. Reproducing, publishing, selling, etc. uncensored copies of photograph,

sketch, etc. of the vital military, naval or air post, camp or station, without permission of
the commanding officer.

3. Injuring or destroying or attempting to injure or destroy war materials, premises

or war utilities when the Philippines is at war. (Sec. 11)

4. Making or causing war materials to be made in a defective manner when the

Philippines is at war. (Sec. 12)

5. Injuring or destroying national defense material, premises or utilities. (Sec. 13)

6. Making or causing to be made in a defective manner, or attempting to make or

cause to be made in a defective manner, national defense material. (Sec. 14)

Espionage distinguished from treason.

Espionage is a crime not conditioned by the citizenship of the offender. (Santos

vs. Misa, 76 Phil. 415) This is also true as regards treason, in view of the amendment to
Art. 114.

But treason is committed only in time of war, while espionage may be committed
both in time of peace and in time of war. Treason is limited in two ways of committing
the crime: levying war, and adhering to the enemy giFving him aid or comfort; while
espionage may be committed in many ways. (Com. Act No. 616)

SECTION TWO. — PROVOKING WAR AND DISLOYALTY IN CASE OF

WAR
What are the crimes classified as provoking war and disloyalty in case of war?

They are:
 1. Inciting to war or giving motives for reprisals.

2. Violation of neutrality.

3. Correspondence with hostile country.

4. Flight to enemy's country.

ART. 118. INCITING TO WAR OR GIVING MOTIVES FOR

REPRISALS
Art. 118. Inciting to war or giving motives for reprisals. — The penalty of reclusion
temporal shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee, and that of prison
mayor upon any private individual, who, by unlawful or unauthorized acts, provokes
or gives occasion for a war involving or liable to involve the Philippine Islands or
exposes Filipino citizens to reprisals on their persons or property.

Elements:

1. That the offender performs unlawful or unauthorized acts.

2. That such acts provoke or give occasion for a war involving or liable to
involve the Philippines or expose Filipino citizens to reprisals on their persons or
property.

Examples:

The raising, without sufficient authorization, of troops within the Philippines for
the service of a foreign nation against another nation

The public destruction of the flag or seal of a foreign state or the public
manifestations of hostility to the head or ambassador of another state

The intention of the offender is immaterial.

Viada says that to be liable for inciting to war or giving motives for reprisals, the
intention of the accused is immaterial.

If the unlawful or unauthorized acts of the accused provoke or give occasion for a
war or expose Filipino citizens to reprisals, the crime is committed regardless of his
intentions. The law considers the effects produced by the acts of the accused.

Such acts might disturb the friendly relation that we have with a foreign country,
and they are penalized even if they constitute a mere imprudence. (Albert)
Committed in time of peace

The crime of inciting to war or giving motives for reprisals is committed in time of
peace.

Penalty is higher when the offender is a public officer or employee.

If the offender is a private individual, the penalty is prison mayor. If the offender is
a public officer or employee, the penalty is reclusion temporal.

ART. 119. VIOLATION OF NEUTRALITY

Art. 119. Violation of neutrality. — The penalty of prison correctional shall be
inflicted upon anyone who, on the occasion of a war in which the Government is not
involved, violates any regulation issued by competent authority for the purpose of
enforcing neutrality.

Elements:

1. That there is a war in which the Philippines is not involved;

2. That there is a regulation issued by competent authority for the purpose of

enforcing neutrality;

3. That the offender violates such regulation.

Neutrality, defined.

A nation or power which takes no part in a contest of arms going on between

others is referred to as neutral. (Burril, L.D.)

There must be regulation issued by competent authority for the enforcement of

neutrality.

It is the violation of such regulation which constitutes the crime.

ART. 120. CORRESPONDENCE WITH HOSTILE COUNTRY

Art. 120. Correspondence with hostile country. — Any person, who in time of war,
shall have correspondence with an enemy country or territory occupied by enemy
troops shall be punished:

1. By prison correctional, if the correspondence has been prohibited by the

Government;
 2. By prison mayor, if the correspondence be carried on in ciphers or
conventional signs; and

3. By reclusion temporal, if notice or information be given thereby which might be

useful to the enemy. If the offender intended to aid the enemy by giving such notice or
information, he shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal to death.

Elements:

1. That it is in time of war in which the Philippines is involved;

2. That the offender makes correspondence with an enemy country or territory

occupied by enemy troops;

3. That the correspondence is either —

(a) Prohibited by the Government, or

(b) Carried on in ciphers or conventional signs, or

(c) Containing notice or information which might be useful to the enemy.

Meaning of "correspondence”

Correspondence is communication by means of letters; or it may refer to the

letters which pass between those who have friendly or business relations.

Even if correspondence contains innocent matters, if the correspondence has

been prohibited by the Government, it is punishable.

If the correspondence with an enemy country or territory occupied by enemy

troops has been prohibited by the Government, the crime is committed even if the
correspondence or letter contains innocent matters, because of the possibility that some
information useful to the enemy might be revealed unwittingly.

Prohibition by the Government is not essential in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Art. 120.

The phrases "if such correspondence" or "if notice or information be given

thereby" in paragraphs 2 and 3, respectively, do not require that there should be
prohibition by the Government to make the correspondence. The word "such" in
paragraph 2 makes reference to the correspondence mentioned in the opening
sentence of Art. 120.

Circumstances qualifying the offense

The following must concur together:

a. That the notice or information might be useful to the enemy.

b. That the offender intended to aid the enemy.

Note: If the offender intended to aid the enemy by giving such notice or
information, the crime amounts to treason; hence, the penalty is the same as that
for treason.

ART. 121. FLIGHT TO ENEMY'S COUNTRY

Art. 121. Flight to enemy's country. — The penalty of arresto mayor shall be
inflicted upon any person who, owing allegiance to the Government, attempts to flee or
go to an enemy country when prohibited by competent authority.

Elements:

1. That there is a war in which the Philippines is involved;

2. That the offender must be owing allegiance to the Government;

3. That the offender attempts to flee or go to enemy country;

4. That going to enemy country is prohibited by competent authority.

An alien resident may be guilty of flight to enemy country.

An alien resident in the country can be held liable under this article. The law does
not say "not being a foreigner." Hence, the allegiance contemplated in this article is
either natural or temporary allegiance.

Mere attempt to flee or go to enemy country consummates the crime.

It should be noted that mere attempt to flee or go to enemy country when

prohibited by competent authority consummates the felony.

"When prohibited by competent authority."

Art. 121 must be implemented by the Government. If fleeing or going to an

enemy country is not prohibited by competent authority, the crime defined in Art.
121 cannot be committed.

SECTION THREE. — PIRACY AND MUTINY ON THE HIGH SEAS IN

PHILIPPINE WATERS
 ART. 122. PIRACY IN GENERAL AND MUTINY ON THE HIGH
SEAS OR IN PHILIPPINE WATERS
Art. 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas or in Philippine waters. —
The penalty of reclusion perpetual shall be inflicted upon any person who, on the high
seas or in Philippine waters, shall attack or seize any vessel or, not being a member of
its complement nor a passenger, shall seize the whole or part of the cargo of said
vessel, its equipment, or personal belongings of its complement or passengers.

The same penalty shall be inflicted in case of mutiny on the high seas or in
Philippine waters. (As amended by Sec. 3, Rep. Act No. 7659)

Two ways or modes of committing piracy:

1. By attacking or seizing a vessel on the high seas or in Philippine waters;

2. By seizing in the vessel while on the high seas or in Philippine waters the
whole or part of its cargo, its equipment or personal belongings of its complement or
passengers.

Elements of piracy:

1. That a vessel is on the high seas or in Philippine waters;

2. That the offenders are not members of its complement or passengers of the
vessel;

3. That the offenders (a) attack or seize that vessel, or (b) seize the whole or part
of the cargo of said vessel, its equipment or personal belongings of its complement or
passengers.

Meaning of "high seas"

It does not mean that the crime be committed beyond the three-mile limit of any
state. It means any waters on the sea coast which are without the boundaries of low-
water mark, although such waters may be in the jurisdictional limits of a foreign
government. (48 C.J. 1207; footnote 13-a)

As the Supreme Court said in the case of People vs. Lol-lo, et al., 43 Phil. 19,
"nor does it matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a
foreign state."

The Convention on the Law of the Sea defines "high seas" as parts of the seas
that are not included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial seas, or in the
internal waters of a state, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic state.
Definition of piracy

It is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and
done with animo furandi and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility. (People vs.
Lol-lo, et al., 43 Phil. 19)

Seizure of a vessel

People vs. Catantan (G.R. No. 118075, September 5, 1997)

Facts: Accused-appellant argues that in order that piracy may be committed it is

essential that there be an attack on or seizure of a vessel.

He claims that he and his companion did not attack or seize the fishing boat of
the Pilapil brothers by using force or intimidation but merely boarded the boat, and it
was only when they were already on board that they used force to compel the Pilapils to
take them to some other place. Appellant also insists that he and Ursal had no intention
of permanently taking possession or depriving complainants of their boat. As a matter of
fact, when they saw another pumpboat they ordered the complainants to approach that
boat so they could leave the complainants behind in their boat. Accordingly, appellant
claims, he simply committed grave coercion and not piracy.

Held: We do not agree. Under the definition of piracy in PD No. 532 as well as
grave coercion as penalized in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code, this case falls
squarely within the purview of piracy. While it may be true that complainants were
compelled to go elsewhere other than their place of destination, such compulsion was
obviously part of the act of seizing their boat.

Mutiny is punished in Art. 122.

The last paragraph of this article provides that the same penalty provided for
piracy shall be inflicted in the case of mutiny on the high seas or in Philippine waters.

Mutiny is usually committed by the other members of the complement and may
be committed by the passengers of the vessel.

Definition of mutiny

It is the unlawful resistance to a superior officer, or the raising of commotions and

disturbances on board a ship against the authority of its commander. (Bouvier's Law
Dictionary, Vol. 2, p. 2283)
Piracy distinguished from mutiny.

In piracy, the persons who attack a vessel or seize its cargo are strangers to said
vessels; while in mutiny, they are members of the crew or passengers.

While the intent to gain is essential in the crime of piracy, in mutiny, the offenders
may only intend to ignore the ship's officers or they may be prompted by a desire to
commit plunder.

Piracy and Mutiny, when considered as Terrorism

Under Republic Act No. 9372, otherwise known as the Human Security Act of
2007, approved on March 6, 2007, a person who commits an act punishable as piracy
and mutiny under Art. 122 thereby sowing and creating a condition of widespread and
extraordinary fear and panic among the populace, in order to coerce the government to
give in to an unlawful demand shall be guilty of the crime of terrorism, and shall suffer
the penalty of forty (40) years of imprisonment, without the benefit of parole.

ART. 123. QUALIFIED PIRACY.22

Art. 123. Qualified piracy.22 — the penalty of reclusion Perpetua to death shall be
imposed upon those who commit any of the crimes referred to in the preceding article,
under any of the following circumstances:

1. Whenever they have seized a vessel by boarding or firing upon the same;

2. Whenever the pirates have abandoned their victims without means of saving
themselves; or

3. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, physical injuries, or

rape. (As amended by RA. No. 7659)

"Upon those who commit any of the crimes referred to in the preceding article."

The word "crimes" in the quoted phrase in the opening sentence of Art. 123,
refers to piracy and mutiny on the high seas. Piracy or mutiny is, therefore, qualified if
any of the following circumstances is present:

(a) Whenever the offenders have seized the vessel by boarding or firing upon the
same;

(b) Whenever the pirates have abandoned their victims without means of saving
themselves;
 (c) Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, physical injuries,
or rape.

Paragraph 2 of Art. 123 specifically mentions "pirates" thereby excluding

mutineers from said paragraph. It would seem, however, that it should be in paragraph
1 where the word "pirates" should be specifically mentioned and not in paragraph 2,
because in paragraph 1, the mutineers, being already in the vessel, cannot seize the
vessel by boarding or firing upon the same.

It is qualified piracy when the crime was accompanied by rape and the offenders
abandoned their victims without means of saving themselves.

A boat, in which there were eleven men, women and children, arrived between
the islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was
surrounded by six vintas manned by twenty-four Moros all armed. The Moros first asked
for food, but once on the boat, took for themselves all of the cargo, attacked some of the
men, and brutally violated two of the women by methods too horrible to be described.
All of the persons on the boat, with the exception of the two young women, were again
placed on it and holes were made on it, with the idea that it would submerge, but after
eleven days of hardship and privation they were succored. Two of the Moro marauders
were Lol-lo and Saaraw who later returned to their home in Sulu, Philippines. There
they were arrested and were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the
crime of piracy.

Held: It cannot be contended with any degree of force that the Court of First
Instance of Sulu was without jurisdiction on the case. Piracy is a crime not against any
particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of
any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. Nor does
it matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign
state.

The crime of piracy was accompanied by (1) rape, and (2) the abandonment of
persons without means of saving themselves.

Lol-lo who raped one of the women was sentenced to death, there being the
aggravating circumstance of cruelty, abuse of superior strength, and ignominy, without
any mitigating circumstance. (People vs. Lol-lo and Saraw, 43 Phil. 19)

Before Art. 122 was amended by R.A. No. 7659, only piracy and mutiny on high
seas was covered by the RPC. The commission of the acts described in Arts. 122
and/or 123 in Philippine waters was punished as piracy under P.D. No. 532.
 Under P.D. No. 532, any attack upon or seizure of any vessel, or the taking away
of the whole or part thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the personal belongings of its
complement or passengers, irrespective of the value thereof, by means of violence
against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, committed by any person,
including a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel, in Philippine
waters, shall be considered as piracy. The offenders shall be considered as pirates and
punished by the penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods. If
physical injuries or other crimes are committed as a result or on the occasion thereof,
the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. If rape, murder, or homicide is
committed as a result or on the occasion of piracy or when the offender abandoned the
victims without means of saving themselves, or when the seizure is accomplished by
firing upon or boarding a vessel, the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed.

Note: Republic Act 9346 prohibited the imposition of the death penalty. Thus,
instead of the mandatory penalty of death under PD 532, reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole shall be imposed.

P.D. 532 covers any person while Art. 122 as amended covers only persons who
are not passengers or members of its complement.

To summarize, Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, before its amendment,
provided that piracy must be committed on the high seas by any person not a member
of its complement nor a passenger thereof. Upon its amendment by Republic Act No.
7659, the coverage of the pertinent provision was widened to include offenses
committed "in Philippine waters." On the other hand, under Presidential Decree No. 532
(issued in 1974), the coverage of the law on piracy embraces an y perso n including "a
passenger or member of the complement of said vessel in Philippine waters." Hence,
passenger or not, a member of the complement or not, any person is covered by the
law.

Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the provisions on piracy
under Presidential Decree No. 532. There is no contradiction between the two laws.
There is likewise no ambiguity and hence, there is no need to construe or interpret the
law. All the presidential decree did was to widen the coverage of the law, in keeping
with the intent to protect the citizenry as well as neighboring states from crimes against
the law of nations. As expressed in one of the "whereas" clauses of Presidential Decree
No. 532, piracy is "among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal
statutes of all countries." For this reason, piracy under the Article 122, as amended, and
piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532 exist harmoniously as separate laws. (People
vs. Tulin, G.R. No. 111709, August 30, 2001)

Piracy under PD 532, when considered as Terrorism

 Under Republic Act No. 9372, otherwise known as the Human Security Act of
2007, approved on March 6, 2007, a person who commits an act punishable under
Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti Highway Robbery Law of 1974),
thereby sowing and creating a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic
among the populace, in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful
demand shall be guilty of the crime of terrorism. (Sec. 3)

Qualified piracy is a special complex crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to

death, regardless of the number of victims.

The number of persons killed on the occasion of piracy is not material. P.D. No.
532 considers qualified piracy, i.e., rape, murder, or homicide is committed as a result
or on the occasion of piracy, as a special complex crime punishable by death,
regardless of the number of victims. (People vs. Siyoh, 141 SCRA 356)

Note: Qualified piracy is now punishable by reclusion Perpetua to death.

Philippine waters and vessel, defined.

Philippine Waters — It shall refer to all bodies of water, such as but not limited to,
seas, gulfs, bays around, between and connecting each of the Islands of the Philippine
Archipelago, irrespective of its depth, breadth, length or dimension, and all other waters
belonging to the Philippines by historic or legal title, including territorial sea, the sea-
bed, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas over which the Philippines has
sovereignty or jurisdiction.

Vessel — Any vessel or watercraft used for transport of passengers and cargo from
one place to another through Philippine waters. It shall include all kinds and types of
vessels or boats used in fishing.

Any person who aids or protects pirates or abets the commission of piracy shall
be considered as an accomplice.

Any person who knowingly and in any manner aids or protects pirates, such as
giving them information about the movement of police or other peace officers of the
government, or acquires or receives property taken by such pirates or in any manner
derives any benefit therefrom; or any person who directly or indirectly abets the
commission of piracy, shall be considered as an accomplice of the principal offenders
and be punished in accordance with the Rules prescribed by the Revised Penal Code.

It shall be presumed that any person who does any of these acts has performed
them knowingly, unless the contrary is proven.
Acts inimical to civil aviation is punished by Republic Act No 6235.

EXCERPTS FROM REPUBLI C ACT NO. 6235

An Act Prohibiting Certain Acts Inimical to Civil Aviation

SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person to compel a change in the course
or destination of an aircraft of Philippine registry, or to seize or usurp the control thereof,
while it is in flight. An aircraft is in flight from the moment all its external doors are closed
following embarkation until any of such doors is opened for disembarkation.

It shall likewise be unlawful for any person to compel an aircraft of foreign

registry to land in Philippine territory or to seize or usurp the control thereof while it is
within the said territory.

SEC.2. Any person violating any provision of the foregoing section shall be
punished by an imprisonment of not less than twelve years but not more than twenty
years, or by a fine of not less than twenty thousand pesos but not more than forty
thousand pesos.

The penalty of imprisonment of fifteen years to death, or a fine not less than
twenty-five thousand pesos but not more than fifty thousand pesos shall be imposed
upon any person committing such violation under any of the following circumstances:

1. Whenever he has fired upon the pilot, member of the crew or passenger
of the aircraft;

2. Whenever he has exploded or attempted to explode any bomb or

explosive to destroy the aircraft; or

3. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, serious

physical injuries or rape.

SEC.3. It shall be unlawful for any person, natural or juridical, to ship, load or
carry in any passenger aircraft operating as a public utility within the Philippines, any
explosive, flammable, corrosive or poisonous substance or material.
 SEC.4. The shipping, loading or carrying of any substance or material mentioned
in the preceding section in any cargo aircraft operating as a public utility within the
Philippines shall be in accordance with regulations issued by the Civil Aeronautics
Administration.

SEC.5. (Meaning of "explosive," "flammable," "corrosive" and "poisonous")

SEC.6. Any violation of Section three hereof shall be punishable by an

imprisonment of at least five years but not more than ten years or by a fine of not less
than ten thousand pesos but not more than twenty thousand pesos: Provided, That if
the violation is committed by a juridical person, the penalty shall be imposed upon the
manager, representative, director, agent or employee who violated, or caused, directed,
cooperated or participated in the violation thereof: Provided, further, That in case the
violation is committed in the interest of a foreign corporation legally doing business in
the Philippines, the penalty shall be imposed upon its resident agent, manager,
representative or director responsible for such violation and in addition thereto, the
license of said corporation to do business in the Philippines shall be revoked.

Any violation of Section four hereof shall be an offense punishable with the
minimum of the penalty provided in the next preceding paragraph.

SEC.7. For any death or injury to persons or damage to property resulting from a
violation of Sections three and four hereof, the person responsible therefor may be held
liable in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Revised Penal Code.

(Approved on June 19, 1971)

The act of the accused in People vs. Ang Cho Kio, 95 Phil. 475, who compelled
the pilot to change the course of the airplane from Laoag to Amoy instead of directing it
to Aparri and, in not complying with such illegal requirement, the accused discharged
various revolver shots, killing him, could have been punished under Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 6235, had this law been already in effect.
 TITLE TWO
CRIMES AGAINST THE FUNDAMENTAL
LAWS OF THE STATE

Chapter One

ARBITRARY DETENTION OR EXPULSION, VIOLATION OF DWELLING,

PROHIBITION, INTERRUPTION, AND DISSOLUTION OFPEACEFUL
MEETINGS AND CRIMES AGAINST RELIGIOUS WORSHIP
What are the crimes against the fundamental laws of the State?

They are:

1. Arbitrary detention. (Art. 124)

2. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities. (Art.
125)

3. Delaying release. (Art. 126)

4. Expulsion. (Art. 127)

5. Violation of domicile. (Art. 128)

6. Search warrants maliciously obtained and abuse in the service of those legally
obtained. (Art. 129)

7. Searching domicile without witnesses. (Art. 130)

8. Prohibition, interruption, and dissolution of peaceful meetings. (Art. 131)

9. Interruption of religious worship. (Art. 132)

 10. Offending the religious feelings. (Art. 133)

They are called crimes against the fundamental laws of the State, because they
violate certain provisions of the Bill of Rights (Article III) of the 1987 Constitution.

1. Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, provides that "no person shall be
deprived of x x x, liberty, x x x without due process of law, x x x."

Arts. 124,125 and 126 of the Code punish any public officer or employee in those
cases where an individual is unlawfully deprived of liberty.

2. Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that "the liberty of abode and of
changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon
lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the
interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law."

Art. 127 of the Code punishes any public officer or employee who shall unlawfully
expel a person from the Philippines or compel a person to change his residence.

3. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that "the right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purposes shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized."

Arts. 128, 129 and 130 of the Code punish any public officer or employee who
violates such rights.

4. Section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, provides that "no law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances."

Art. 131 of the Code punishes any public officer or employee who violates the
right peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances.

5. Section 5, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, provides that "no law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise
of civil or political rights."

Arts. 132 and 133 punish violations of the right to free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship.

SECTION ONE. — ARBITRARY DETENTION AND EXPULSION

Classes of arbitrary detention:

(1) Arbitrary detention by detaining a person without legal ground. (Art. 124)

(2) Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities.
(Art. 125)

(3) Delaying release. (Art. 126)

The penalties for the three classes of arbitrary detention are the same, as
provided in Article 124. Articles 125 and 126 do not provide penalties for their violation.
They make reference to the penalties provided for in Article 124.

ART. 124. ARBITRARY DETENTION

Art. 124. Arbitrary detention. — Any public officer or employee who, without legal
grounds, detains a person, shall suffer:

1. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in

its minimum period, if the detention has not exceeded three days;

2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the
detention has continued more than three but not more than fifteen days;

3. The penalty of prision mayor, if the detention has continued for more than
fifteen days but not more than six months; and

4. That of reclusion temporal, if the detention shall have exceeded six months.

The commission of a crime, or violent insanity or any other ailment requiring the
compulsory confinement of the patient in a hospital, shall be considered legal grounds
for the detention of any person.

Elements:
 1. That the offender if a public officer or employee.

2. That he detains a person.

3. That the detention is without legal grounds. (U.S. vs. Braganza, et al., 10 Phil.
79; Milo vs. Salonga, 152 SCRA 113; Astorga vs. People, G.R. No. 154130,
October 1, 2003)

The offender in arbitrary detention is a public officer or employee.

The public officers liable for arbitrary detention must be vested with authority to
detain or order the detention of persons accused of a crime, but when they detain a
person they have no legal grounds therefor.

Such public officers are the policemen and other agents of the law, the judges or
mayors. A barangay captain and a municipal councilor are public officers.

If the detention is perpetrated by other public officers, the crime committed may
be illegal detention, because they are acting in their private capacity.

If the offender is a private individual, the act of detaining another is illegal

detention under Article 267 or Article 268.

But private individuals who conspired with public officers in detaining certain
policemen are guilty of arbitrary detention. (People vs. Camerino, CA-G.R. No. 14207-
R, Dec. 14, 1956)

When is there a detention?

Detention is defined as the actual confinement of a person in an enclosure, or in

any manner detaining and depriving him of his liberty. (People vs. Gungon, G.R. No.
119574, March 19 1998, citing People vs. Domasian, G.R. No. 95322, March 1, 1993;
People vs. Flores, G.R. No. 116488, May 31, 2001) A person is detained when he is
placed in confinement or there is a restraint on his person. (U.S. vs. Cabanag, 8 Phil.
64)

Even if the persons detained could move freely in and out of their prison cell and
could take their meals outside the prison, nevertheless, if they were under the
surveillance of the guards and they could not escape for fear of being apprehended
again, there would still be arbitrary detention. (People vs. Camerino, supra)

Restraint resulting from fear

Where the accused-mayor refused to allow a DENR team to go home despite

their pleas, and the refusal was quickly followed by the call for and arrival of almost a
dozen "reinforcements," all armed with militaryissue rifles, who proceeded to encircle
the team, weapons pointed at the complainants and the witnesses, and the team was
instead brought to a house where after dinner, some of the members were allowed to
go down from the house but not to leave the barangay, and the rest just sat in the house
until 2:00 a.m. when they were finally allowed to leave, it was held that the restraint
resulting from fear is evident. It was not just the presence of the armed men, but also
the evident effect these gunmen had on the actions of the team which proves that fear
was indeed instilled in the minds of the team members, to the extent that they felt
compelled to stay in the barangay. The intent to prevent the departure of the
complainants and witnesses against their will is clear. (Astorga vs. People, G.R. No.
154130, October 1, 2003)

"Without legal grounds"

The detention of a person is without legal ground: (1) when he has not committed
any crime or, at least, there is no reasonable ground for suspicion that he has
committed a crime, or (2) when he is not suffering from violent insanity or any other
ailment requiring compulsory confinement in a hospital.

Thus, in the following cases, the detention was without legal ground:

1. A barrio lieutenant, seeing his servant quarreling with his daughter, seized the
servant and an hour later sent him to the Justice of the Peace. The servant was kept in
detention from 5 p.m. to 9 a.m. the next day when he was released by the Justice of the
Peace.

Held: The barrio lieutenant was guilty of arbitrary detention, because he detained
the offended party without any reason therefor, such as the commission of the crime,
and without having the authority to do so. (U.S. vs. Gellaga, 15 Phil. 120)

Note: Merely quarreling is not a crime,

2. A Manila detective sergeant arrested Aquilino Taruc because of the suspicion

that he might be implicated in the plot to assassinate the President and that he was
related to Luis Taruc, a Huh Supremo.

Held: Mere suspicion of his connection with any murderous plot is no ground
recognized by law for restraining the freedom of any individual. Lawlessness from
above can only lead to chaos and anarchy. (Taruc vs. Carlos, 78 Phil. 876)

3. In overtaking another vehicle, complainant-driver was not committing or had

not actually committed a crime in the presence of respondent-judge. Such being the
case, the warrantless arrest and subsequent detention of complainant were illegal.
(Cayao vs. del Mundo, A.M. No. MTJ-93-813, September 15,1993)
Legal grounds for the detention of any person

The following are legal grounds for the detention of any person:

(a) The commission of a crime;

(b) Violent insanity or any other ailment requiring the compulsory confinement of
the patient in a hospital. (Art. 124, par. 2)

Arrest without warrant is the usual cause of arbitrary detention

A peace officer must have a warrant of arrest properly issued by the court in
order to justify an arrest. If there is no such warrant of arrest, the arrest of a person by a
public officer may constitute arbitrary detention.

Arrest without warrant — When lawful

A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has probable cause
to believe based on personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another. (Sec. 5, Rule 113, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure)

Paragraphs (a) and (b) refer to cases when a suspect is caught in flagrante
delicto or immediately thereafter, while paragraph (c) refers to escaping prisoners.
(Ilagan vs. Enrile, 139 SCRA 349)

"In his presence"

The phrase "In his presence" in paragraph (a), construed - When the officer sees
the offense being committed, although at a distance, or hears the disturbance created
thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof, or when the offense is continuing or
has not been consummated at the time the arrest is made, the offense is said to be
committed in his presence. (U.S. vs. Samonte, 16 Phil. 516)

It has been established that petitioner's vehicle figured in a hit and run — an
offense committed in the "presence" of Manarang, a private person, who then sought to
arrest petitioner. It must be stressed at this point that "presence" does not only require
that the arresting person sees the offense, but also when he "hears the disturbance
created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene." (U.S. vs. Samonte, 16 Phil. 516,
519, citing 3 Cyc , 886; Ramsey v. State, 17 S. E., 613; Dilger v. Com., 11 S. W., 651;
State v. McAfee, 12 S. E., 435; State v. Williams, 15 S. E., 554; and Hawkins v. Lutton,
70 N. W., 483) As testified to by Manarang, he heard the screeching of tires followed by
a thud, saw the sideswiped victim (balut vendor), reported the incident to the police and
thereafter gave chase to the erring Pajero vehicle using his motorcycle in order to
apprehend its driver After having sent a radio report to the PNP for assistance,
Manarang proceeded to the Abacan bridge where he found responding policemen SP0
2 Borja and SP0 2 Miranda already positioned near the bridge who effected the actual
arrest of petitioner. (Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 12197, March 12, 1997)

Personal knowledge is required.

Under Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, an officer
arresting a person who has just committed an offense must have probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it.

"Personal knowledge of facts" in arrests without a warrant must be based upon

probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. (U.S.
vs. Santos, 36 Phil. 851.)

The court indicated in the case of People vs. Bati (G.R. No. 87429, August 27,
1990) that police officers have personal knowledge of the actual commission of the
crime when it had earlier conducted surveillance activities of the accused. Thus, it
stated:

Probable cause

Probable cause can be defined as such facts and circumstances which could
lead a reasonable discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the object sought in connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched. (Pendon vs. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 429 [1990]; Quintero
vs. NBI, 162 SCRA 467 [1988]; Burgos vs. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 815 [1984]. It must
be within the personal knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses he may produce
and not based on mere hearsay. (Prudente vs. Judge Dayrit, 180 SCRA 69 [1989];
Quintero vs. NBI, supra)

Probable cause was found to be present in the following instances:

(a) where the distinctive odor of marijuana emanated from the plastic bag carried
by the accused (People vs. Claudio, 160 SCRA 646; 1988)

(b) where an informer positively identified the accused who was observed to be
acting suspiciously (People vs. Tangliben, 184 SCRA 220; 1990)

(c) where the accused who were riding a jeepney were stopped and searched by
policemen who had earlier received confidential reports that said accused would
transport a quantity of marijuana (People vs. Maspil, Jr., 188 SCRA 751; 1990).

A crime must in fact or actually have been committed first.

In arrests without a warrant under Sec. 6(b), however, it is not enough that there
is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A
crime must in fact or actually have been committed first. That a crime has actually been
committed is an essential precondition. The fact of the commission of the offense must
be undisputed, x x x (People vs. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1)

When the person to be arrested is attempting to commit an offense

Illustration:

A policeman, acting under orders of his chief who desired to put a stop to
pilfering in a certain locality, patrolled his district, and about midnight, seeing two
persons in front of an uninhabited house who afterward entered an uninhabited
camarin, arrested them without warrant, although no crime had been committed. The
policeman took them to the municipal presidencia where they were detained in jail for
six or seven hours before they were released.

Held: Prevention of crime is just as commendatory as the capture of criminals.

Surely the officer must not be forced to await the commission of robbery or other felony.
The rule is supported by the necessities of life. The applicable principles rest upon the
same foundation of reason and common sense. (U.S. vs. Santos, 36 Phil. 853)

When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it.

Illustration:
 A Constabulary officer was engaged to marry a girl, but later the engagement
was broken. Thereafter, while the officer was passing in front of the girl's house, he was
assaulted by the girl's two brothers, after the girl had approached him in a friendly
manner, which she never did before. He suspected the girl had conspired with his
assailants and so he ordered her arrest and detention. The officer filed a complaint
against her and her brothers. For the arrest and detention of the girl, he was charged
with arbitrary detention.

Held: The Constabulary officer was not guilty of arbitrary detention. (People vs.
Ancheta, 68 Phil. 415)

Note: The Constabulary officer, in ordering the arrest and detention of the girl,
had probable cause to believe that the girl participated in the assault as one of the
conspirators.

In arbitrary detention, the legality of the detention does not depend upon the
juridical and much less the judicial fact of a crime (the elements of the felony are
present and they were so found by the court), which at the time of the commission, is
not and cannot definitely be determined for lack of necessary data and of jurisdiction,
but upon the nature of the deed. It is sufficient that the agent or person in authority
making the arrest has reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an act
having the characteristics of a crime and that the same grounds exist for him to believe
that the person sought to be detained participated therein. The obligation to make an
arrest by reason of crime, does not presuppose as a necessary requisite for the
fulfillment thereof, the indubitable existence of a crime. (People vs. Ancheta, 68 Phil.
415)

Under Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the actual
commission of a crime by the person detained is not necessary to justify his
detention.

The legality of the detention of a person does not depend upon the actual
commission of a crime by him, but upon the nature of his deed when its characterization
as a crime may reasonably be inferred by the officer to whom the law at the moment
leaves the decision for the urgent purpose of suspending the liberty of that person. (U.S.
vs. Sanchez, 27 Phil. 442)

Illustration:

Two Bureau of Internal Revenue secret service agents, strangers in the

municipality, were seen acting suspiciously near the market place. The accused, two
policemen, called upon them to give an account of themselves and explain their
suspicious conduct, and at the same time demanded that they produce their cedulas,
which the agents were unable to do. Believing that their conduct and inability to
satisfactorily account for themselves justified the suspicion that they were in some way
connected with the recent robberies in the place, or that they were about to commit theft
or robbery, the accused placed the two men under arrest and took them forthwith to the
house of the justice of the peace, accused Battalones, informing the latter of the arrest
of the two men with them and asking him to decide what was proper to do. The justice
of the peace, without verifying the truth of the claims of the agents that they were of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, ordered them taken to the municipal jail to be detained until
further orders.

Held: No charge of arbitrary detention can be maintained against the two

policemen. In the light of after events, the suspicion directed against the secret service
agents was not well founded, but viewing the facts as they must have presented
themselves to the policemen at the time of the arrest, they must be held to have had
reasonable grounds upon which to base their suspicions as to the arrested men.

But the justice of the peace who arbitrarily and without investigation directed the
detention of the agents was held guilty of the crime of "detention arbitraria" through
negligence. The justice of the peace was not actuated by any special malice or ill-will
toward the prisoners, but he was willfully negligent of their rights. (U.S. vs. Battalones,
et al., 23 Phil. 46)

No reasonable ground if officer only wants to know the commission of crime.

In a case where the accused was arrested and prosecuted for illegal possession
of opium, the witness testified that the only reason why he ordered the arrest of the
accused was that he was acting suspiciously. He did not say in what way the accused
was acting suspiciously or what was the particular act or circumstance which aroused
his suspicion. He caused the arrest because, as he said, "I wanted to see if he had
committed a crime." It was held that it was not a legal reason for making an arrest. (U.S.
vs. Hachaw, 21 Phil. 514)

Note: There is no reasonable ground of suspicion that the accused

committed an offense.

That a police officer can make an arrest on mere complaint of the offended party
is a debatable question.

Facts: The municipal president and the acting chief of police of Caloocan, Rizal,
had information that two nights earlier, a robbery had occurred in a boat on the river.
Another robbery occurred in a billiard room. The acting chief of police acquired the
information that Benigno Aranzanso had been in that billiard room that night of the
robbery. The acting chief of police directed policeman Sanchez to look for Benigno
Aranzanso in order that he might be identified by the boatmen in connection with the
robbery committed in the boat. The description given of the person who had been in the
billiard room fitted Aranzanso. Policeman Sanchez proceeded to arrest him in the
cockpit on the next morning, took him to the town hall, and detained him in the
municipal jail until before nightfall of the same day, when he was set at liberty by order
of the municipal president. No warrant was previously issued for his detention.

Held: The arrest and detention of Benigno Aranzanso for the purpose of
identifying his person, were justified, since according to the acting chief of police
reasonable grounds existed for believing in the existence of a crime and suspicion
pointed to that individual.

It is, therefore, beyond dispute that defendant Sanchez did not commit the crime
charged against him.

Facts: Upon complaint of one Bernardo Malinao, charging the petitioners with
having committed the crime of robbery, policeman Benjamin Dumlao arrested the
petitioners. When the petition for habeas corpus was heard, the petitioners were still
detained and the fiscal had not yet released them or filed against them an information
with the proper courts of justice.

Held: A police officer has no authority to arrest and detain a person charged with
an offense upon complaint of the offended party even though, after investigation, he
becomes convinced that the accused is guilty of the offense charged.

What the complainant may do in such case is to file a complaint with the city
fiscal or directly with the justice of the peace court.

The theory that police officers may arrest any person just for questioning or
investigation, without any warrant of arrest, represents an ideology incompatible with
human dignity. Reason revolts against it.

Dissenting opinion of Justice Tuason in the case of Sayo vs. Chief of Police

Section 6 of Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and Section 2463 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as well as the authorities I have quoted, show the fallacy of the
idea that the arresting officer knows, or should know, all the facts about the offense for
the perpetration, or supposed perpetration, of which he has made the arrest.

A police officer can seldom make arrest with personal knowledge of the offense
and of the identity of the person arrested sufficient in itself to convict. To require him to
make an arrest only when the evidence he himself can furnish proves beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused, would endanger the safety of society." It
would cripple the forces of the law to the point of enabling criminals, against whom there
is only moral conviction or prima facie proof of guilt, to escape.

When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped

In a petition for habeas corpus, it was alleged that Nicasio Salonga was arrested
without a warrant of arrest and that he was not accused of any crime. It appears that
Salonga was committed to prison under judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Manila for the crime of illegal discharge of firearm. He was confined in Muntinlupa
prison and upon being transferred to Camp Nichols under custody, he effected an
escape. It was held that being a prisoner who escaped, he can be arrested without a
warrant of arrest not only by the authorities but also by any private person. (Salonga vs.
Holland, et al., 76 Phil. 412, citing the Rules of Court)

Under Section 5(c), Rule 113, one of the instances when a person may be validly
arrested without warrant is where he has escaped from confinement. Undoubtedly, this
right of arrest without a warrant of arrest, is founded on the principle that at the time of
the arrest, the escapee is in the continuous act of committing a crime — evading the
serving of his sentence. (Paraluman vs. Director of Prisons, 22 SCRA 638)

Arbitrary detention thru imprudence

The crime of arbitrary detention can be committed through imprudence.

The chief of police rearrested a woman who had been released by means of a
verbal order of the justice of the peace. The accused acted without malice, but he
should have verified the order of release before proceeding to make the re-arrest. The
crime committed by the chief of police is arbitrary detention through simple imprudence
provided for and punished under Article 365, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code,
in connection with Article 124, par. 1, of the same Code. (People vs. Misa, C.A., 36
O.G. 3496)

Periods of detention penalized.

(a) If the detention has not exceeded 3 days.

(b) If the detention has continued more than 3 days but not more than 15 days.

(c) If the detention has continued more than 15 days but not more than 6 months.
 (d) If the detention has exceeded 6 months.

(Art. 124, Nos. 1 to 4)

The law does not fix any minimum period of detention.

In the case of U.S. vs. Braganza, 10 Phil. 79, a counselor and a barrio lieutenant
were convicted of arbitrary detention, even if the offended party was detained for less
than half an hour; and in the case of U.S. vs. Agravante, 10 Phil. 46, the detention was
only for one hour.

ART. 125. DELAY IN THE DELIVERY OF DETAINED

PERSONS TO THE PROPER JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES
Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial
authorities. — The penalties provided in the next preceding article shall be imposed
upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground
and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of:

 twelve (12) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by light penalties, or

their equivalent;
 eighteen (18) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by correctional
penalties, or their equivalent;
 and thirty-six (36) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by afflictive or
capital penalties, or their equivalent.

In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his detention
and shall be allowed, upon his request, to communicate and confer at any time with his
attorney or counsel. (As amended by Exec. Order No. 272)

Elements:

1. That the offender is a public officer or employee.

2. That he has detained a person for some legal ground.

3. That he fails to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within:

A. twelve (12) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by light penalties,

or their equivalent; or
 B. eighteen (18) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by correctional
penalties, or their equivalent; or

C. thirty-six (36) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by afflictive or

capital penalties, or their equivalent.

If the offender is a private person, the crime is illegal detention.

A private individual who makes a lawful arrest must also comply with the
requirements prescribed in Art. 125. If he fails to do so, he shall be guilty of illegal
detention (Art. 267 or Art. 268), not arbitrary detention. The periods of time in Art. 125
were applied to the arrests made by a private person. (People vs. Sali, et al., C.A., 50
O.G. 5676)

"Shall detain any person for some legal ground”

Under Art. 125, the public officer or employee has detained the offended party for
some legal ground. The detention is legal in the beginning, because the person
detained was arrested under any of the circumstances where arrest without warrant is
authorized by law. The detention becomes illegal after a certain period of time, because
the offended party is not delivered to the proper judicial authority, within the period
specified by Art. 125.

If the detention of a person is not for some legal ground, it will be a case under Art.
124, not under Art. 125.

Art. 125 does not apply when the arrest is by virtue of a warrant of arrest.

Art. 125 applies only when the arrest is made without warrant of arrest. But the
arrest must be lawful.

If the arrest is made with a warrant of arrest, the person arrested can be detained
indefinitely until his case is decided by the court or he posts a bail for his temporary
release.

The reason for this is that there is already a complaint or information filed against
him with the court which issued the order or warrant of arrest and it is not necessary to
deliver the person thus arrested to that court.

Disposition of person arrested without a warrant.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5, Article 113, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or
jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. (Sec. 5,
Rule 113, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure)

Section 7, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states that:

"When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant involving an offense which

requires a preliminary investigation, the complaint or information may be filed by a
prosecutor without need of such investigation provided an inquest has been conducted
in accordance with existing Rules. In the absence or unavailability of an inquest
prosecutor, the complaint may be filed by the offended party or a peace officer directly
with the proper court on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting
officer or person."

"Shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities"

It will be noted that what constitutes a violation of Article 125 is the failure to
deliver the person arrested to the proper judicial authority within the period specified
therein.

The delivery to the judicial authority of a person arrested without warrant by a

peace officer, does not consist in a physical delivery, but in making an accusation or
charge or filing of an information against the person arrested with the corresponding
court or judge, whereby the latter acquires jurisdiction to issue an order of release or of
commitment of the prisoner, because the arresting officer cannot transfer to the judge
and the latter does not assume the physical custody of the person arrested. (Sayo vs.
Chief of Police of Manila, 80 Phil. 859)

Duty of detaining officer is deemed complied with upon the filing

of the complaint with the judicial authority

"Proper judicial authorities"

The term "judicial authorities", as used in Art. 125, means the courts of justice or
judges of said courts vested with judicial power to order the temporary detention or
confinement of a person charged with having committed a public offense, that is, the
"Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be established by law." (Section 1,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution)
 The judicial authorities mentioned in Section 125 of the Revised Penal Code
cannot be considered to include the fiscal of the City of Manila or any other city,
because they cannot issue a warrant of arrest or of commitment for temporary
confinement of a person surrendered to legalize the detention of the person arrested
without warrant. (Sayo vs. Chief of Police, supra)

Detained person should be released when a judge is not available.

Where a judge is not available, the arresting officer is duty-bound to release a
detained person, if the maximum hours for detention provided under Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code has already expired. Failure to cause the release may result in an
offense under Art. 125. (Albior vs. Auguis, A.M. No. P-01-1472, June 26, 2003)

Waiver of the provisions of Art 125

Before the complaint or information is filed, the person arrested may ask for a
preliminary investigation in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in the presence of his
counsel. Notwithstanding the waiver, he may apply for bail and the investigation must
be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception. (Sec. 7, par. 2, Rule 112,
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure) Circumstances considered in determining liability
of officer detaining a person beyond legal period. For the purpose of determining the
criminal liability of an officer detaining a person for more than the time prescribed by the
Revised Penal Code, (1) the means of communication as well as (2) the hour of arrest
and (3) other circumstances such as the time of surrender and the material possibility
for the fiscal to make the investigation and file in time the necessary information, must
be taken into consideration. (Sayo vs. Chief of Police of Manila, 80 Phil. 861)

Thus, when the accused were arrested for direct assault, punishable by a
correctional penalty, on the evening of June 17, 1953, the complaint could not normally
been filed earlier than 8 o'clock in the morning of June 18, because government offices
open for business usually at 8 o'clock in the morning and close at 5 o'clock in the
afternoon. (People vs. Acosta, C.A., 54 O.G. 4742)

Violation of Art. 125 does not affect legality of confinement under process issued
by a court.

A was arrested and detained for theft. The arresting officer filed the complaint
with the City Fiscal only after 24 hours. An information for theft against A was filed with
the court on the same day by the fiscal. Warrant of arrest was issued by the court.
 Held: The failure of the arresting officer to deliver the person arrested to the
judicial authority within the time specified in Article 125, does not affect the legality of
the confinement of the petitioner who is detained because of the warrant subsequently
issued by a competent court when an information was filed therein. (Lino vs. Fuguso, et
al, 77 Phil. 933; Gunabe, et al. vs. Director of Prisons, 77 Phil. 993)

As a matter of fact, a violation of Art. 125 is not considered as one of the grounds
on which one can predicate a motion to quash the information under Rule 113, Sec. 2 of
the Rules of Court (Sec. 3, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure). (People
vs. Mabong, 100 Phil. 1069)

The illegality of detention is not cured by the filing of the information in court.

The detaining officer is liable under Art. 125, even if an information was filed with
the court, because a violation had already been committed before the information was
filed.

Fiscal not liable, unless he ordered detention

If the city fiscal does not file the information within the period of six hours
prescribed by law and the arresting officer continues holding the prisoner beyond the
six-hour (nine-hour, or eighteen-hour) period, the fiscal will not be responsible for
violation of said Article 125, because he is not the one who has arrested and illegally
detained the person arrested, unless he has ordered or induced the arresting officer to
hold and not release the prisoner after the expiration of said period. (Sayo vs. Chief of
Police of Manila, 80 Phil. 863)

If no charge is filed by the fiscal in court within the period fixed in Art. 125, the
arresting officer must release the detainee; otherwise, he will be guilty under Art. 125.

Remedy where warrant improperly issued.

If the accused was illegally detained because he was arrested without a
preliminary examination, what should have been done was to set aside the warrant of
arrest and order the discharge of the accused, but without enjoining the municipal judge
from conducting a preliminary examination and afterwards properly issuing a warrant of
arrest. (Alimpoos vs. Court of Appeals, 106 SCRA 159)

Rights of the person detained:

1. He shall be informed of the cause of his detention; and

2. He shall be allowed, upon his request, to communicate and confer at any time
with his attorney or counsel. (Art. 125, par. 2)
Public officer or employee is liable for preventing the exercise of the
right of attorneys to visit and confer with persons arrested.
Any public officer or employee who shall obstruct, prohibit, or otherwise prevent
an attorney entitled to practice in the courts of the Philippines from visiting and
conferring privately with a person arrested, at any hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of
the night, said visit and conference being requested by the person arrested or by
another acting in his behalf, shall be punished by arresto mayor. (Rep. Act No. 857)

Reason for the provisions of Article 125

Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code is intended to prevent any abuse resulting
from confining a person without informing him of his offense and without permitting him
to go on bail. (Laurel vs. Misa, 76 Phil. 372)

Art. 125 distinguished from Art. 124

In arbitrary detention under Art. 124, the detention is illegal from the beginning; in
arbitrary detention under Art. 125, the detention is legal in the beginning but the illegality
of the detention starts from the expiration of any of the periods of time specified in Art.
125, without the detained prisoner detained having been delivered to the proper judicial
authority.

DETENTION UNDER REPUBLIC ACT No . 9372.

Time for delivery of detained persons prescribed in Art. 125 does not apply to
suspected terrorists who are detained under Republic Act 9372.

A person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of

conspiracy to commit terrorism shall be delivered to the proper judicial authority within a
period of three days counted from the moment the said charged or suspected person
has been apprehended or arrested, detained, and taken into custody by the said police,
or law enforcement personnel, without the police or law enforcement personnel having
said person in custody incurring any criminal liability for delay in the delivery of detained
persons to the proper judicial authority. However, the arrest of the suspects must result
from the surveillance under Sec. 7 and examination of bank deposits under Sec. 27.
(See Sec. 18, R.A. 9372)

Under Republic Act 9372, a judge must be notified before a suspected terrorist is
detained.

Before detaining the person suspected of the crime of terrorism, the police or law
enforcement personnel concerned must present him or her before any judge at the
latter's residence or office nearest the place where the arrest took place at any time of
the day or night. It shall be the duty of the judge, among other things, to ascertain the
identity of the police or law enforcement personnel and the person/s they have arrested
and presented before him/her, to inquire of them the reasons why they have arrested
the person and determine by questioning and personal observation whether or not the
suspect has been subjected to any physical, moral and psychological torture by whom
and why. The judge shall then submit a written report of what he/she had observed
when the subject was brought before him to the proper court that has jurisdiction over
the case of the person arrested. The report shall be submitted within three (3) calendar
days from the time the suspect was brought to his/her residence or office.

Immediately after taking custody of a person charged with or suspected of the

crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism, the police or law enforcement
personnel shall notify in writing the judge of the court nearest the place of apprehension
or arrest: Provided, That where the arrest is made during Saturdays, Sundays, holidays,
or after office hours, the written notice shall be served at the residence of the judge
nearest the place where the accused was arrested.

The penalty of 10 years and 1 day to 12 years of imprisonment shall be imposed

upon the police or law enforcement personnel who fails to notify the judge as provided
in the preceding paragraph. (Sec. 18)

Period of Detention in the Event of an Actual or Imminent Terrorist

Attack
In the event of an actual or imminent terrorist attack, suspects may not be
detained for more than 3 days without the written approval of a municipal, city,
provincial or regional official of a Human Rights Commission or judge of the municipal,
regional trial court, the Sandiganbayan or a Justice of the Court of Appeals nearest the
place of the arrest. If the arrest is made during Saturdays, Sundays, holidays, or after
office hours, the arresting police or law enforcement personnel shall bring the person
thus arrested to the residence of any of the officials mentioned above that is nearest the
place where the accused was arrested. The approval in writing of any of the said
officials shall be secured by the police or law enforcement personnel concerned within 5
days after the date of detention of the persons concerned: Provided, however, That
within 3 days after the detention the suspects, whose connection with the terror attack
or threat is not established, shall be released immediately. (Sec. 19)

Penalty for Failure to Deliver Suspect to the Proper Judicial Authority

within Three Days
The penalty of 10 years and 1 day to 12 years imprisonment shall be imposed
upon any police or law enforcement personnel who has apprehended or arrested,
detained and taken into custody of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of
terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism and fails to deliver such charged or
suspected person to the proper judicial authority within the period of 3 days. (Sec. 20)