RULE 16

MOTION TO DISMISS
[Provisions either deleted or transposed]

HEIRS OF ANTONIO SANTOS and LUISA ESGUERRA SANTOS -versus- HEIRS OF CRISPULO
BERAMO et. Al G.R. No. 151454 August 9, 2010.

The general rule is that the allegations in a complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of action against
the defendant, if, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in
accordance with the prayer therein. To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the
complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist. The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals
that the Amended Complaint states a cause of action for reivindicacion and/or reconveyance.

FACTS:

On March 5, 1998, respondents heirs of Crispulo Beramo, Pacifico Beramo, Sr., Petra Beramo, Ramon
Beramo and Agapito Beramo filed an Amended Complaint for reivindicacion and/or reconveyance of
property against the heirs of Cornelio Borreros and Soledad Delfin (Spouses Borreros), Northern Capiz
Agro-Industrial Development Corporation (NORCAIC), Central Azucarera de la Carlota and Riverside
Commodities Trading, Inc. with the RTC of Roxas City, Branch 18 (trial court), presided over by Judge
Charlito F. Fantilanan.

On May 13, 1999, petitioners heirs of Antonio Santos and Luisa Esguerra Santos filed a Motion to
Dismiss 3 on the ground that the Amended Complaint stated no cause of action against them. They
pointed out that respondents were unable to substantiate their claim of ownership over the subject
property, since they failed to present any documentary proof which established prima facie that the
subject parcels of land were owned by their predecessor-in-interest. Moreover, respondents did not annex
documents to the Amended Complaint evincing their right over the subject property. Petitioners also
asserted that respondents failed to substantiate their claim of fraud on the part of defendants spouses
Antonio and Luisa Santos; hence, respondents were unable to establish a right that was allegedly violated
by the defendants Spouses Santos.

On October 27, 1999, the trial court issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss as the grounds relied
upon did not appear to be indubitable.

In a Decision dated May 15, 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

ISSUE:

Whether the Amended Complaint states a cause of action for reivindicacion and/or reconveyance of the
subject property. (YES)

RULING:

When the ground for dismissal is that the complaint states no cause of action under Section 1 (g), Rule 16
of the Rules of Court, such fact must be determined from the allegations of the complaint. In a motion to
dismiss, a defendant hypothetically admits the truth of the material allegations of the plaintiff's complaint
for the purpose of resolving the motion. The general rule is that the allegations in a complaint are
sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendant, if, admitting the facts alleged, the court can
render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer therein. To sustain a motion to
dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist.

The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the Amended Complaint states a cause of action for
reivindicacion and/or reconveyance. The Court of Appeals correctly found, thus:

From the amended complaint, it appears that since 1892, private respondents' predecessor, Don Juan
Beramo, was in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject
property, an agricultural land of the public domain; that the subject property was merely entrusted by
private respondents' predecessor, Don Juan Beramo, to Cornelio Borreros, from whom petitioners derived
their title; and that the titling of the subject property and transfers thereof were simulated and fraudulent.
These averments indicate that private respondents are the rightful owners of the subject property but the
same was wrongfully registered by petitioners' predecessors, the Borreros spouses. Such averments make
out a case for reconveyance (De la Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, 286 SCRA 230).

Contrary to the contention of petitioners, respondents did not have to present or append proof of their
allegations in the complaint to establish a sufficient cause of action for reivindicacion and/or
reconveyance in their Amended Complaint. The Court has held that in determining whether the
allegations of a complaint are sufficient to support a cause of action, it must be borne in mind that the
complaint does not have to establish or allege facts proving the existence of a cause of action at the
outset; this will have to be done at the trial on the merits of the case.
 LETICIA NAGUIT AQUINO et. al -versus- CESAR B. QUIAZON et. al
G.R. No. 201248 March 11, 2015

The trial court may hold a preliminary hearing on affirmative defenses. However, such hearing is not
necessary when the affirmative defense is failure to state a cause of action. The reception and the
consideration of evidence on the said ground, has been held to be improper and impermissible. The trial
court, thus, erred in receiving and considering evidence in connection with this ground.

FACTS:

A complaint for Annulment and Quieting of Title was filed by the petitioners alleging that they were the
heirs of Epifanio Makam and Severina Bautista, who acquired a house and lot by virtue of a Deed of Sale
and since then, they had been in open, continuous, adverse, and notorious possession for more than a
hundred years. Later, they received demand letters from the respondents claiming ownership over the
subject property and demanding that they vacate the same. Upon inquiry with the RD, it confirmed that
the property had been titled in the name of respondents and they claim that the title was invalid,
ineffective, voidable or unenforceable and that they were the true owners of the property. The respondents
asserted that they were the absolute owners of the subject land and they had inherited the same from their
predecessor-in interest and that petitioners had been occupying the property by mere tolerance. They
denied the allegations in the complaint and proffered affirmative defenses with counterclaims. They
argued that: First, the petitioners "have no valid, legal and sufficient cause of action" against them,
because their deed of sale was spurious. Second, the action was barred by prescription and that petitioners
were guilty of laches in asserting their interest over the subject lot. Third, the action was also barred by
res judicata and violated the prohibition against forum shopping, considering that petitioners had earlier
filed a similar case for quieting of title against respondents. The RTC set a preliminary hearing on the
affirmative defenses.

ISSUE:

Whether or not it is within the trial court’s discretion to receive other evidence in resolving an affirmative
defense on the ground of failure to state cause of action. (NO)

RULING:

The Court does not discount, however, that there are exceptions to the general rule that allegations are
hypothetically admitted as true and inquiry is confined to the face of the complaint. First, there is no
hypothetical admission of (a) the veracity of allegations if their falsity is subject to judicial notice; (b)
allegations that are legally impossible; (c) facts inadmissible in evidence; and (d) facts which appear, by
record or document included in the pleadings, to be unfounded. Second, inquiry is not confined to the
complaint if culled (a) from annexes and other pleadings submitted by the parties; (b) from documentary
evidence admitted by stipulation which disclose facts sufficient to defeat the claim; or (c) from evidence
admitted in the course of hearings related to the case.

Pointing to the exception that inquiry was not confined to the complaint if evidence had been presented in
the course of hearings related to the case, the CA ruled that it was within the trial court's discretion to
receive and consider other evidence aside from the allegations in the complaint in resolving a party's
affirmative defense. It held that this discretion was recognized under Section 6 of Rule 16 of the Rules of
Court, which allowed the court to conduct a preliminary hearing, motu proprio, on the defendant's
affirmative defense if no corresponding motion to dismiss was filed.

The trial court may indeed elect to hold a preliminary hearing on affirmative defenses as raised in the
answer under Section 6 of Rules 16 of the Rules of Court. It has been held, however, that such a hearing
is not necessary when the affirmative defense is failure to state a cause of action, and that it is, in fact,
error for the court to hold a preliminary hearing to determine the existence of external facts outside the
complaint. The reception and the consideration of evidence on the ground that the complaint fails to state
a cause of action, has been held to be improper and impermissible. Thus, in a preliminary hearing on a
motion to dismiss or on the affirmative defenses raised in an answer, the parties are allowed to present
evidence except when the motion is based on the ground of insufficiency of the statement of the cause of
action which must be determined on the basis only of the facts alleged in the complaint and no other.
Section 6, therefore, does not apply to the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action. The
trial court, thus, erred in receiving and considering evidence in connection with this ground.
 THE UNITED ABANGAN CLAN, INC., represented by CRISTITUTO F. ABANGAN, -versus-
YOLANDA C. SABELLANO-SUMAGANG, ERNESTO TIRO, BASILISA CABELLON-MORENO,
MARTIN C. TABURA, JR., ROMUALDO C. TABURA, ROLANDO CABELLON, represented by
ROLANDO CABELLON, and THE HONORABLE CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF CEBU CITY
G.R. No. 186722 June 18, 2012

Litis pendentia, as a ground for the dismissal of an action, refers to a situation in which another action is
pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, and the second action becomes
unnecessary and vexatious. In order to successfully invoke the rule, the movant must prove the existence
of the following requisites: (a) the identity of parties, or at least like those representing the same interest
in both actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the
same facts; and (c) the identity of the two (2) cases, such that the judgment that may be rendered in the
pending case would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other.

There is no identity and similarity between the first and the second petitions with respect to the issues
under litigation. The action in the prior Petition (SP. PROC. No. 16171-CEB) involves a judicial
declaration of heirship, while the main issue in the present one (SP. PROC. No. 16180-CEB) pertains to a
cancellation of entry in the civil register.

FACTS:

The present case stemmed from the registration of the purported marital union between the late Anastacia
and Raymundo. They were allegedly married on 18 February 1873 at the Santo Tomas de Villanueva
Parish in El Pardo, Cebu City. A delayed registration of the marriage was entered in the records of the
Civil Registrar, and a Certificate of Marriage issued sometime in September 2007 or 134 years after their
purported matrimonial bond. The petition for late registration was filed by Rolando Cabellon, Edith T.
Casas, and Imelda T. Casugay, who were allegedly the true legal heirs and descendants of Anastacia and
Raymundo.

On 19 May 2008, the United Abangan Clan filed a Petition seeking the cancellation of the entry in the
Register of Marriages. It averred that Anastacia died single and without issue. On the other hand,
respondents argued that petitioner was engaged in forum shopping, since the fact of marriage between
Anastacia and Raymundo was an important issue to be resolved in another case. Docketed as SP. PROC.
No. 16171-CEB, the case involved a petition for the judicial declaration of the heirs of decedent
Anastacia (first petition).

On 6 February 2009, the RTC issued a Resolution dismissing the Petition for cancellation of the entry in
the Register of Marriages (second petition) on the ground of litis pendentia.

ISSUE:

Whether the instant petition was properly dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia. (NO)

RULING:

Litis pendentia, as a ground for the dismissal of an action, refers to a situation in which another action is
pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, and the second action becomes
unnecessary and vexatious. In order to successfully invoke the rule, the movant must prove the existence
of the following requisites: (a) the identity of parties, or at least like those representing the same interest
in both actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the
same facts; and (c) the identity of the two (2) cases, such that the judgment that may be rendered in the
pending case would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other.

There is no identity and similarity between the first and the second petitions with respect to the issues
under litigation. The action in the prior Petition (SP. PROC. No. 16171-CEB) involves a judicial
declaration of heirship, while the main issue in the present one (SP. PROC. No. 16180-CEB) pertains to a
cancellation of entry in the civil register. An action for declaration of heirship (declaracion de herederos)
refers to a special proceeding in which a person claiming the status of heir seeks prior judicial declaration
of his or her right to inherit from a decedent. On the other hand, an action for cancellation of entry in the
civil register refers to a special proceeding whereby a substantial change affecting the civil status of a
party is sought through the amendment of the entry in the civil register. In the former, what is established
is a party's right of succession to the decedent; in the latter, among those settled are the issues of
nationality, paternity, filiation, legitimacy of the marital status, and registrability of an event affecting the
status or nationality of an individual. Because the respective subject matters in the two actions differ, any
decision that may be rendered in one of them cannot constitute res judicata in the other. A judicial
declaration of heirship is inconclusive on the fact of occurrence of an event registered or to be registered
in the civil register, while changes in the entries in the civil register do not in themselves settle the issue
of succession.
 SAMUEL M. ALVARADO -versus- AYALA LAND, INC et. al
G.R. No. 208426 September 20, 2017

Two (2) categories of motions to dismiss may be recognized under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
first, those that must be filed ahead of an answer, and second, those that may be entertained even after an
answer has been filed. Motions to dismiss under the first category may plead any of the 10 grounds under
Rule 16, Section 1. Those under the second category may only plead four (4) of Rule 16, Section 1’s 10
grounds: lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendentia, res judicata, and prescription.

FACTS:

Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club, Inc. (Capitol) owned a 15,598-square-meter lot in Quezon City
(QC). This lot was levied entirely by the QC Treasurer due to unpaid real estate taxes. Then, it was
subjected to a tax deliquency sale. The lot was sold to Petitioner Alvarado, being highest bidder.
Individual respondents, who are members of Capitol, and Ayala Land, whose subdivision is inside the
subject property, filed a complaint against Alvarado to nullify the sale. Respondents (plaintiffs) alleged
irregularities in the delinquency sale of the subject property. Alvarado invoked three grounds to dismiss
answer: (1) that a condition precedent was not complied with (mandatory judicial deposit of taxes due
under the LGC); (2) that there was failure to state a cause of action (plaintiffs were not the registered
owners of the levied property); and (3) that the court has no subject-matter jurisdiction (plaintiffs have no
legal interest over the property). After filing an Answer, Alvarado filed a Motion to Dismiss on the same
grounds. The RTC denied Alvarado’s Motion to Dismiss, it being filed after the Answer.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC is correct in denying Alvarado’s motion to dismiss. (YES)

RULING:

The RTC correctly observed that petitioner filed his Answer ahead of his Motion to Dismiss. The filing of
an answer precludes a motion to dismiss. It is basic, then, that motions to dismiss are not to be entertained
after an answer has been filed. Out of Rule 16, Section 1's 10 grounds, four (4) survive the anterior filing
of an answer: lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendentia, res judicata, and prescription.
Common to all these four (4) grounds that survive the filing of an answer is that they persist no matter the
resolution of the merits of the case by the court. A judgment issued by a court without jurisdiction is null
and void. Judgments on a similar prior case will be redundant. Thus, res judicata and litis pendencia can
be raised even after an answer has been filed. Prescription attaches regardless of the resolution of the case
on the merits. Apart from the exceptions recognized in Rule 9, Section 1, jurisprudence has also clarified
that, despite the prior filing of an answer, an action may still be dismissed on a ground which became
known subsequent to the filing of an answer.

In Obando v. Figueras, the Court has allowed a defendant to file a motion to dismiss on the following
grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction, (2) litis pendentia,(3) lack of cause of action, and (4) discovery during
trial of evidence that would constitute a ground for dismissal.

** [NB: none of the exceptions applies to this case]

 SPOUSES CONRADO ANTONIO and AVELYN ANTONIO -versus- JULITA SAYMAN VDA. DE
MONJE, substituted by her heirs, namely: ANGELINA MONJE-VILLAMOR, LUZVISMINDA
MONJE-CORTEL, MARRIETA MONJE-ORTICO, LEOPOLDO MONJE, CONCEPCION SAYMAN-
MONJE, and ROLINDA MONJE-CALO
G.R. No. 149624 September 29, 2010

There is “bar by prior judgment” when, as between the first case where the judgment was rendered and
the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.
In this instance, the judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the second action.

In the present case, there is no question that there is identity of parties in Civil Case No. 007-125 and
Civil Case No. 506. However, as to identity of issues, a perusal of the records and other pleadings would
show that the issue raised in Civil Case No. 007-125 is whether the sale to petitioners of the 7,500 square
meter portion of Lot No. 1 being contested by respondents is valid. On the other hand, in Civil Case No.
506, the issues are whether petitioners were deprived of possession of the remaining 8,403 square meter
portion of Lot No. 1 which was validly sold to them and whether they are entitled to an accounting of the
proceeds of the copra harvested from their property which was supposedly appropriated by respondents.
The Court finds that there is no identity of issues as the issue raised in Civil Case No. 007-125 is different
from, and does not overlap with, the issue raised in Civil Case No. 506.

FACTS:

Spouses Catalino Manguiob and Andrea Pansaon were the original owners of the subject parcel of
coconut land, consisting of 15,903 square meters, particularly known as Lot No. 1 covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 1020 of the Register of Deeds of Davao.

On 02 September 1962, Andrea Pansaon who survived her husband Catalino Manguiob, together with
some other heirs, sold to Macedonio Monje 7,500 square meters only of the aforesaid property. The said
deed of absolute sale was duly notarized by Notary Public Ricardo Reyes and entered in his notarial book.

Macedonio Monje immediately took possession thereof and constructed a house worth P30,000.00.

The heirs of spouses Catalino Manguiob and Andrea Pansaon who also died, sold the subject property
which was already sold to Macedonio Monje in 1962, in favor of Nicanor Manguiob and Carolina V.
Manguiob.

Immediately thereafter, spouses Nicanor Manguiob and Carolina V. Manguiob had executed an absolute
deed of sale in favor of the former’s sister-in-law, Avelyn B. Antonio, the entire Lot No. [1] consisting of
15,903 square meters. The sale was entered in the notarial book of Notary Public Juanito T. Hernandez.

Macedonio Monje knew about it only when he received a letter from Avelyn B. Antonio, informing him
that she is now the registered owner of the subject property under a new Transfer Certificate of Title.

Aggrieved, Macedonio Monje filed before the CFI of Baganga, Davao Oriental, a complaint for the
annulment of the deed of sale between the heirs of Catalino Manguiob and Carolina Balanay/Nicanor
Manguiob, as well as the subsequent deed of absolute sale by the latter in favor of Avelyn Antonio and
the cancellation of TCT No. T-9643.

The aforesaid court rendered a decision declaring the 2nd and 3rd deeds of sale of the property as null and
void, and the transfer certificate title No. 9643 likewise null and void.

Plaintiff-appellants, Spouses Antonio appealed the above-mentioned decision all the way to the Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court in G.R. No. 69696, rendered a decision finding res judicata.

Plaintiff-appellants [herein petitioners] filed a case for a sum of money, accounting of the proceeds of the
copra, damages and attorney’s fees against herein defendant-appellees before the Regional Trial Court of
Baganga, Davao Oriental, Branch 7.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) issued an Order dismissing herein petitioners' complaint on the ground
of res judicata.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the RTC and dismissed the appeal of herein petitioners.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in applying the principle of res judicata. (YES)
RULING:

Res judicata is defined as “a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter
settled by judgment.” According to the doctrine of res judicata, an existing final judgment or decree
rendered on the merits, and without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any
matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other actions
or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in
issue in the first suit.

To state simply, a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is
conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on all points and matters determined
in the former suit.

The principle of res judicata is applicable by way of (1) “bar by prior judgment” and (2) “conclusiveness
of judgment.”

There is “bar by prior judgment” when, as between the first case where the judgment was rendered and
the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.
In this instance, the judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the second action.

Whereas, conclusiveness of judgment finds application when a fact or question has been squarely put in
issue, judicially passed upon, and adjudged in a former suit by a court of competent jurisdiction. The fact
or question settled by final judgment or order binds the parties to that action (and persons in privity with
them or their successors-in-interest), and continues to bind them while the judgment or order remains
standing and unreversed by proper authority on a timely motion or petition.

In the present case, there is no question that there is identity of parties in Civil Case No. 007-125 and
Civil Case No. 506.

However, as to identity of issues, a perusal of the records and other pleadings would show that the issue
raised in Civil Case No. 007-125 is whether the sale to petitioners of the 7,500 square meter portion of
Lot No. 1 being contested by respondents is valid. On the other hand, in Civil Case No. 506, the issues are
whether petitioners were deprived of possession of the remaining 8,403 square meter portion of Lot No. 1
which was validly sold to them and whether they are entitled to an accounting of the proceeds of the
copra harvested from their property which was supposedly appropriated by respondents. The Court finds
that there is no identity of issues as the issue raised in Civil Case No. 007-125 is different from, and does
not overlap with, the issue raised in Civil Case No. 506.

The Court has previously employed various tests in determining whether or not there is identity of causes
of action as to warrant the application of the principle of res judicata. One test of identity is the “absence
of inconsistency test” where it is determined whether the judgment sought will be inconsistent with the
prior judgment. If no inconsistency is shown, the prior judgment shall not constitute a bar to subsequent
actions.

In the instant case, the reliefs prayed for in Civil Case No. 506 are the payment of a sum representing the
proceeds of the copra supposedly harvested from petitioners' property and purportedly misappropriated by
respondents. Petitioners also pray for the award of moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's
fees and litigation expenses.

The more common approach in ascertaining identity of causes of action is the “same evidence test,”
whereby the following question serves as a sufficient criterion: “would the same evidence support and
establish both the present and former causes of action?” If the answer is in the affirmative, then the prior
judgment is a bar to the subsequent action; conversely, it is not. In the instant case, it is unmistakable that
the pieces of evidence that would back up the cause of action in Civil Case No. 007-125 are different
from the set of evidence that would prove the cause of action in Civil Case No. 506.

Aside from the “absence of inconsistency test” and “same evidence test,” we have also ruled that a
previous judgment operates as a bar to a subsequent one when it had “touched on [a] matter already
decided,” or if the parties are in effect “litigating for the same thing.” A reading of the decisions of the
lower and appellate courts in Civil Case No. 007-125 would show that there were neither discussions nor
disposition of the issues raised in Civil Case No. 506.
 RULE 18
PRE-TRIAL

REAL BANK, INC. -versus- SAMSUNG MABUHAY CORPORATION

G.R. No. 175862 October 13, 2010

Since mediation is part of Pre-Trial, the trial court shall impose the appropriate sanction including
but not limited to censure, reprimand, contempt and such sanctions as are provided under the
Rules of Court for failure to appear for pre-trial, in case any or both of the parties absent
himself/themselves, or for abusive conduct during mediation proceedings.

It being daylight clear that the withdrawal of respondent Samsung’s original counsel was
sufficient as the same carried the stamp of approval of the client, the notice of mediation sent to
respondent Samsung’s original counsel was ineffectual as the same was sent at the time when
such counsel had already validly withdrawn its representation. Corollarily, the absence of
respondent Samsung during the scheduled mediation conference was excusable and justified.
Therefore, the trial court erroneously dismissed Civil Case No. 97-86265.

FACTS:

Samsung filed a Complaint for damages against petitioner Real Bank, Inc. Petitioner Real Bank,
Inc. filed its Answer6 on 23 February 1998, to which a Reply was filed by respondent Samsung
on 5 March 1998.

On 12 March 1998, respondent Samsung filed an Ex-Parte Motion To Set Case for Pre-Trial,
asking that the case be set for pre-trial. In a notice dated 24 March 1998, Judge Amelia Tria-
Infante (Judge Infante) of RTC, Br. 9 of Manila, set the case for pre-trial on 25 June 1998.

Meantime, petitioner Real Bank, Inc. filed on 26 May 1998 a Motion to Admit Third Party
Complaint against Reynaldo A. Senson alias Edgardo Bacea, to which was attached the Third
Party Complaint.

On 22 June 1998, respondent Samsung filed its Pre-trial Brief. The pre-trial was originally set on
25 June 1998 but was reset to 17 July 1998 upon motion of petitioner Real Bank, Inc. on the
ground that its Motion to Admit Third Party Complaint was still pending resolution. Thus, the
pre-trial was re-scheduled and reset to 10 September 1998.

Petitioner Real Bank, Inc. once again moved for the resetting of the pre-trial conference
scheduled on 10 September 1998 on the same ground that its Motion to Admit Third Party
Complaint has yet to be resolved.

On 22 February 1999, the trial court issued an Order granting petitioner Real Bank, Inc.’s Motion
to Admit Third Party Complaint and also ordered that summons be issued to third-party
defendant Reynaldo A. Senson alias Edgardo Bacea.

On 25 May 1999, respondent Samsung filed a Motion to Dismiss the Third Party Complaint for
failure of petitioner Real Bank, Inc. to prosecute its case and Motion to Set the Case for Pre-Trial.
On the other hand, petitioner Real Bank, Inc. filed a Motion to Serve Summons by Publication on
the third-party defendant Reynaldo A. Senson alias Edgardo Bacea. The judge denied the Motion
to Dismiss the Third-Party Complaint.

On 7 March 2001, the trial court issued an Order dated 17 March 2001 requiring both petitioner
Real Bank, Inc. and respondent Samsung to appear in a mediation proceeding set on 3 April
2001. This Order of the trial court was sent to respondent Samsung’s former counsel, V.E. Del
Rosario and Partners which had at that time already filed a notice of withdrawal of appearance.

The mediation proceedings took place as scheduled on 3 April 2001 and Mediator Tammy Ann
C. Reyes, who handled the mediation proceedings submitted her report to the Court stating
therein that no action was taken on the case referred for mediation because respondent Samsung
failed to appear.

An Order was issued dismissing the complaint of respondent Samsung for failure to appear at the
mediation conference previously scheduled by the trial judge of Branch 9 in her Order dated 17
March 2001.
ISSUE:

Whether failure of Samsung to appear at the mediation is a cause for the dismissal of the suit.

RULING:

No.Since mediation is part of Pre-Trial, the trial court shall impose the appropriate sanction
including but not limited to censure, reprimand, contempt and such sanctions as are provided
under the Rules of Court for failure to appear for pre-trial, in case any or both of the parties
absent himself/themselves, or for abusive conduct during mediation proceedings.

In this case, it is uncontroverted that the withdrawal of respondent Samsung’s original counsel,
V.E. Del Rosario and Partners on 19 October 2000, was with the client’s consent. Thus, no
approval thereof by the trial court was required because a court’s approval is indispensable only if
the withdrawal is without the client’s consent.

It being daylight clear that the withdrawal of respondent Samsung’s original counsel was
sufficient as the same carried the stamp of approval of the client, the notice of mediation sent to
respondent
 PHILIPPINE EXPORT AND FOREIGN LOAN GUARANTEE CORPORATION (now TRADE AND
INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES) -versus-
AMALGAMATED MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, FELIMON R.
CUEVAS, AND JOSE A. SADDUL, JR
G.R. No. 177729 September 28, 2011

The issues to be tried between the parties shall be limited to those defined in the pre-trial order. However,
it is unavoidable that there are issues that are impliedly included or that may be inferable from those listed
by necessary implication which are as much integral as those expressly listed At any rate, it remains that
the petitioner impleaded Cuevas and Saddul as defendants, and adduced against them evidence to prove
their liabilities. With Cuevas and Saddul being parties to be affected by the judgment, it was only
appropriate for the RTC to inquire into and determine their liability for the purpose of arriving at a
complete determination of the suit. Thereby, the RTC acted in conformity with the avowed reason for
which the courts are organized, which was to put an end to controversies, to decide the questions
submitted by the litigants, and to settle the rights and obligations of the parties.

FACTS:

Amalgamated Management and Development Corporation (AMDC) obtained from the National
Commercial Bank of Saudi Arabia (NCBSA) a loan amounting to SR3.3 million to finance the working
capital requirements and the down payment for the trucks to be used in AMDC's hauling project in the
Middle East. Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation (PEFLGC), a GOCC which
guarantees foreign loans granted to any domestic entity, issued a letter of guaranty in favor of NCBSA as
the lending bank upon the request of AMDC. As the security for the guaranty, Amalgamated Motors
Philippines Incorporated (AMPI), a sister company of AMDC, acted as an accommodation mortgagor,
and executed in favor of PEFLGC a real estate mortgage. AMDC also executed a deed of undertaking
with Cuevas and Saddul, its President and Vice- President respectively, as its co-obligors in which they
were jointly and severally bound to pay PEFLGC whatever damages or liabilities that PEFLGC would
incur by reason of the guaranty. AMDC defaulted and upon demand, PEFLGC paid the obligation to
NCBSA. Hence, PEFLGC demanded that AMDC, Cuevas and Saddul should pay the obligation, but did
not comply. Hence, it extra-judicially foreclosed the real estate mortgage. The sheriff conducted a public
auction and PEFLGC acquired the mortgaged properties as the highest bidder. However, PEFLGC sued
AMDC, Cuevas and Saddul to recover for the deficiency since the proceeds of the foreclosure sale were
not sufficient to cover the guaranty. AMDC, Cuevas, and Saddul all sought the dismissal of the
complaint.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the liability of Cuevas and Saddul on the deficiency claim was already an admitted fact
under the pre-trial order. (NO)

RULING:

The pre-trial order nowhere stated that Cuevas and Saddul already admitted their liability on the
petitioner's deficiency claim. Their admission appearing in the pre-trial order referred only to the fact that
they and AMDC had received advances in large amounts from the petitioner, and that the real estate
mortgage securing the loan had already been foreclosed. Whether Cuevas and Saddul were liable on the
deficiency claim was proper for the ascertainment and determination by the RTC as the trial court and the
CA as the appellate tribunal, notwithstanding the silence of the pre-trial order on it, because such issue
was deemed necessarily included in or inferred from the stated issue of whether there was a deficiency
still to be paid by AMDC, Cuevas and Saddul.

It is true that the issues to be tried between the parties in a case shall be limited to those defined in the
pre-trial order. However, a pre-trial order is not intended to be a detailed catalogue of each and every
issue that is to be taken during the trial, for it is unavoidable that there are issues that are impliedly
included among those listed or that may be inferable from those listed by necessary implication which are
as much integral parts of the pre-trial order as those expressly listed.

At any rate, it remains that the petitioner impleaded Cuevas and Saddul as defendants, and adduced
against them evidence to prove their liabilities. With Cuevas and Saddul being parties to be affected by
the judgment, it was only appropriate for the RTC to inquire into and determine their liability for the
purpose of arriving at a complete determination of the suit. Thereby, the RTC acted in conformity with
the avowed reason for which the courts are organized, which was to put an end to controversies, to decide
the questions submitted by the litigants, and to settle the rights and obligations of the parties.
 RULE 19
INTERVENTION

LORENZA C. ONGCO -versus- VALERIANA UNGCO DALISAY

G.R. No. 190810 July 18, 2012

Intervention is not a matter of right, but is left to the trial court's sound discretion. The trial
court must not only determine if the requisite legal interest is present, but also take into
consideration the delay and the consequent prejudice to the original parties that the intervention
will cause. Both requirements must concur.

In this case, petitioner has not shown any legal interest of such nature that she "will either gain
or lose by the direct legal operation of the judgment." On the contrary, her interest is indirect
and contingent. She has not been granted a free patent over the subject land, as she in fact admits
being only in the process of applying for one. Her interest is at best inchoate.

FACTS:

Dalisay applied for registration of a parcel of land before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Binangonan. At the hearings, no oppositor aside from the Republic of the Philippines (the Republic)
came. Neither was there any written opposition filed in court. Thus, an Order of General Default was
issued against the whole world except the Republic. Consequently, the court found Dalisay to have
clearly shown a registrable right over the subject property and ordered that a decree of registration
be issued by the Land Registration Authority once the Decision had become final.

The Republic filed an appeal with the CA. While the case was pending appeal, Ongco filed a
"Motion for Leave to Intervene" with an attached Answer-in-Intervention seeking the dismissal of
Dalisay's Application for Land Registration on the ground that, contrary to the allegations therein,
the subject property was not free from any adverse claim. The CA denied Ongco’s Motion for
Intervention.

ISSUE:

Whether the CA committed reversible error in denying the Motion for Intervention of petitioner.

RULING:

No.Intervention is not a matter of right, but is left to the trial court's sound discretion. The trial
court must not only determine if the requisite legal interest is present, but also take into
consideration the delay and the consequent prejudice to the original parties that the intervention
will cause. Both requirements must concur. To help ensure that delay does not result from the
granting of a motion to intervene, the Rules also explicitly say that intervention may be allowed
only before rendition of judgment by the trial court.

In this case, petitioner has not shown any legal interest of such nature that she "will either gain
or lose by the direct legal operation of the judgment." On the contrary, her interest is indirect
and contingent. She has not been granted a free patent over the subject land, as she in fact admits
being only in the process of applying for one. Her interest is at best inchoate.

In any event, the Motion for Intervention was filed only with the CA after the MTC had
rendered judgment. By itself, this inexcusable delay is a sufficient ground for denying the motion.
To recall, the motion should be filed "any time before rendition of judgment."
 OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN -versus- LETICIA BARBARA B. GUTIERREZ
G.R. No. 189100 June 21, 2017

In the instant case, the Ombudsman moved to intervene in CAG. R. SP No. 91080 only after the Court of
Appeals had rendered its decision therein. It did not offer any worthy explanation for its belated attempt
at intervention, and merely offered the feeble excuse that it was not ordered by the Court of Appeals to
file a Comment on Magno's Petition. Even then, as the Court has already pointed out, the records disclose
that the Ombudsman was served with copies of the petition and pleadings filed by Magno in CA-G.R. SP
No. 91080, yet it chose not to immediately act thereon.

FACTS:

Owing to an irregular procurement of LCD projectors in the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD),
respondent Gutierrez, then its Director, was charged administratively for grave misconduct. The
Ombudsman found respondent liable and penalized her with dismissal. Respondent went to the CA
through Rule 65. The CA reversed the Ombudsman. Aggrieved, the Ombudsman sought intervention in
the CA and reconsideration of the CA’s reversal. The CA denied the Ombudsman’s motions for
intervention and reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether the Ombudsman may intervene on appeal in this case. (NO)

RULING:

The Ombudsman has legal standing to intervene on appeal in administrative cases that it has resolved.
Preliminarily, the Court rules that petitioner has legal standing to intervene. The issue of whether or not
the Ombudsman possesses the requisite legal interest to intervene in the proceedings where its decision is
at risk of being inappropriately impaired has been laid to rest in Ombudsman vs. De Chavez. In the said
case, the Court conclusively ruled that even if the Ombudsman was not impleaded as a party in the
proceedings, part of its broad powers include defending its decisions before the CA. And pursuant to
Section 1 of Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, the Ombudsman may validly intervene in the said proceedings
as its legal interest on the matter is beyond cavil.

[However, in this case, the Court ruled that the Ombudsman’s motion for intervention was belatedly
filed.]: Thus, in the three cases that seemingly strayed from Samaniego, it can be said that under the
circumstances obtaining therein, the appellate court had a valid reason for disallowing the Ombudsman to
participate in those cases because the latter only moved for intervention after the CA already rendered
judgment. By that time, intervention is no longer warranted. In the same vein, there is no cogent reason
for the Court to disturb the ruling of the CA. The appellate court did not abuse its discretion and neither
did it commit reversible error when it denied the Office of the Ombudsman's Omnibus Motion, having
been filed after the appellate court promulgated the assailed Decision.

In the instant case, the Ombudsman moved to intervene in CAG. R. SP No. 91080 only after the Court of
Appeals had rendered its decision therein. It did not offer any worthy explanation for its belated attempt
at intervention, and merely offered the feeble excuse that it was not ordered by the Court of Appeals to
file a Comment on Magno's Petition. Even then, as the Court has already pointed out, the records disclose
that the Ombudsman was served with copies of the petition and pleadings filed by Magno in CA-G.R. SP
No. 91080, yet it chose not to immediately act thereon.
 RULE 23
DEPOSITIONS PENDING ACTIONS

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES -versus- SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION), JOSE L.

AFRICA (substituted by his heirs), MANUEL H. NIETO, JR., FERDINAND E. MARCOS (substituted
by his heirs), IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., JUAN PONCE ENRILE, and
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO (substituted by his heirs)
G.R. No. 152375 December 16, 2011

Before a party can make use of the deposition taken at the trial of a pending action, Section 4, Rule 23 of
the Rules of Court does not only require due observance of its sub-paragraphs (a) to (d); it also requires,
as a condition for admissibility, compliance with "the rules on evidence." Thus, even Section 4, Rule 23
of the Rules of Court makes an implied reference to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court before the
deposition may be used in evidence. By reading Rule 23 in isolation, the petitioner failed to recognize that
the principle conceding admissibility to a deposition under Rule 23 should be consistent with the rules on
evidence under Section 47, Rule 130. In determining the admissibility of the Bane deposition, therefore,
reliance cannot be given on one provision to the exclusion of the other; both provisions must be
considered. This is particularly true in this case where the evidence in the prior proceeding does not
simply refer to a witness’ testimony in open court but to a deposition taken under another and farther
jurisdiction.

Undisputably, the Sandiganbayan relied on the Bane deposition, taken in Civil Case No. 0130, for
purposes of this very same case. Thus, what the petitioner established and what the Sandiganbayan found,
for purposes of using the Bane deposition, refer only to the circumstances laid down under Section 4(c),
Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, not necessarily to those of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as a
distinct rule on evidence that imposes further requirements in the use of depositions in a different case or
proceeding. In other words, the prior use of the deposition under Section 4(c), Rule 23 cannot be taken as
compliance with Section 47, Rule 130 which considers the same deposition as hearsay, unless the
requisites for its admission under this rule are observed.

FACTS:

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG), filed a complaint (docketed as Civil Case No. 0009) against Jose L. Africa, Manuel H. Nieto,
Jr., Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile, and Potenciano
Ilusorio (collectively, the respondents) for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages
before the Sandiganbayan. The petitioner alleged, inter alia, that the respondents illegally manipulated the
purchase of the major shareholdings of Cable and Wireless Limited in Eastern Telecommunications
Philippines, Inc. (ETPI), which shareholdings respondents Jose Africa and Manuel Nieto, Jr. held for
themselves and, through their holdings and the corporations they organized, beneficially for respondents
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos.

During the pendency of PCGG’s petition (G.R. No. 107789), the PCGG filed with this Court a "Very
Urgent Petition for Authority to Hold Special Stockholders’ Meeting for [the] Sole Purpose of Increasing
[ETPI’s] Authorized Capital Stock" (Urgent Petition). In our May 7, 1996 Resolution, we referred this
Urgent Petition to the Sandiganbayan for reception of evidence and immediate resolution. The
Sandiganbayan included the Urgent Petition in Civil Case No. 0130.17 In the proceedings to resolve the
Urgent Petition, the testimony of Mr. Maurice V. Bane (former director and treasurer-in-trust of ETPI)
was taken– at the petitioner’s instance and after serving notice of the deposition-taking on the respondents
– on October 23 and 24, 1996 by way of deposition upon oral examination (Bane deposition) before
Consul General Ernesto Castro of the Philippine Embassy in London, England.

Invoking Section 1, Rule 24 (of the old Rules of Court), purportedly allowing the petitioner to depose
Bane without leave of court, i.e., as a matter of right after the defendants have filed their answer, the
notice stated that "[t]he purpose of the deposition is for [Bane] to identify and testify on the facts set forth
in his affidavit x x x so as to prove the ownership issue in favor of [the petitioner] and/or establish the
prima facie factual foundation for sequestration of [ETPI’s] Class A stock in support of the [Urgent
Petition]." The notice also states that the petitioner shall use the Bane deposition "in evidence… in the
main case of Civil Case No. 0009." On the scheduled deposition date, only Africa was present and he
cross-examined Bane.
After the trial of Civ Case No. 0009, petitioner filed several motions to adapt the deposition of Bane. But
the Sandiganbayan denied these.

ISSUE:

Whether Bane’s deposition should be admitted. (NO)

RULING:

A reading of Rule 31 of the Rules of Court easily lends itself to two observations. First, Rule 31 is
completely silent on the effect/s of consolidation on the cases consolidated; on the parties and the causes
of action involved; and on the evidence presented in the consolidated cases. Second, while Rule 31 gives
the court the discretion either to order a joint hearing or trial, or to order the actions consolidated,
jurisprudence will show that the term "consolidation" is used generically and even synonymously with
joint hearing or trial of several causes.

Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court on "Deposition Pending Action" (deposition de bene esse)
provides for the circumstances when depositions may be used in the trial, or at the hearing of a motion or
an interlocutory proceeding.

A plain reading of Rule 23 of the Rules of Court readily rejects the petitioner’s position that the Bane
deposition can be admitted into evidence without observing the requirements of Section 47, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court.

Before a party can make use of the deposition taken at the trial of a pending action, Section 4, Rule 23 of
the Rules of Court does not only require due observance of its sub-paragraphs (a) to (d); it also requires,
as a condition for admissibility, compliance with "the rules on evidence." Thus, even Section 4, Rule 23
of the Rules of Court makes an implied reference to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court before the
deposition may be used in evidence. By reading Rule 23 in isolation, the petitioner failed to recognize that
the principle conceding admissibility to a deposition under Rule 23 should be consistent with the rules on
evidence under Section 47, Rule 130. In determining the admissibility of the Bane deposition, therefore,
reliance cannot be given on one provision to the exclusion of the other; both provisions must be
considered. This is particularly true in this case where the evidence in the prior proceeding does not
simply refer to a witness’ testimony in open court but to a deposition taken under another and farther
jurisdiction. Undisputably, the Sandiganbayan relied on the Bane deposition, taken in Civil Case No.
0130, for purposes of this very same case. Thus, what the petitioner established and what the
Sandiganbayan found, for purposes of using the Bane deposition, refer only to the circumstances laid
down under Section 4(c), Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, not necessarily to those of Section 47, Rule 130
of the Rules of Court, as a distinct rule on evidence that imposes further requirements in the use of
depositions in a different case or proceeding. In other words, the prior use of the deposition under Section
4(c), Rule 23 cannot be taken as compliance with Section 47, Rule 130 which considers the same
deposition as hearsay, unless the requisites for its admission under this rule are observed.
 RULE 24
DEPOSITIONS BEFORE ACTION OR PENDING APPEAL

HARRY L. GO, TONNY NGO, JERRY NGO AND JANE GO -versus- THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and HIGHDONE COMPANY, LTD., ET AL
G.R. No. 185527 July 18, 2012

But for purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more particularly of a prosecution witness
who would forseeably be unavailable for trial, the testimonial examination should be made before the
court, or at least before the judge, where the case is pending as required by the clear mandate of Section
15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Since the conditional examination of a prosecution witness must take place at no other place than the
court where the case is pending, the RTC properly nullified the MeTC's orders granting the motion to take
the deposition of Li Luen Ping before the Philippine consular official in Laos, Cambodia.

FACTS:

Petitioners Harry Go, Tonny Ngo, Jerry Ngo and Jane Go were charged before the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC) of Manila for Other Deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) docketed
as Criminal Case No. 396447.

The prosecution's complaining witness, Li Luen Ping, a frail old businessman from Laos, Cambodia,
traveled from his home country back to the Philippines in order to attend the hearing held on September
9, 2004. However, trial dates were subsequently postponed due to his unavailability. On October 13,
2005, the private prosecutor filed with the MeTC a Motion to Take Oral Deposition6 of Li Luen Ping,
alleging that he was being treated for lung infection at the Cambodia Charity Hospital in Laos, Cambodia
and that, upon doctor's advice, he could not make the long travel to the Philippines by reason of ill health.

Notwithstanding petitioners' Opposition, the MeTC granted8 the motion after the prosecution complied
with the directive to submit a Medical Certificate of Li Luen Ping. Petitioners sought its reconsideration
which the MeTC denied, prompting petitioners to file a Petition for Certiorari before the RTC.

On September 12, 2006, the RTC granted the petition and declared the MeTC Orders null and void. The
RTC held that Section 17, Rule 23 on the taking of depositions of witnesses in civil cases cannot apply
suppletorily to the case since there is a specific provision in the Rules of Court with respect to the taking
of depositions of prosecution witnesses in criminal cases, which is primarily intended to safeguard the
constitutional rights of the accused to meet the witness against him face to face. Upon denial by the RTC
of their motion for reconsideration through an Order dated March 5, 2006, the prosecution elevated the
case to the CA. On February 19, 2008, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision which held that no
grave abuse of discretion can be imputed upon the MeTC for allowing the deposition-taking of the
complaining witness Li Luen Ping because no rule of procedure expressly disallows the taking of
depositions in criminal cases and that, in any case, petitioners would still have every opportunity to cross-
examine the complaining witness and make timely objections during the taking of the oral deposition
either through counsel or through the consular officer who would be taking the deposition of the witness.

ISSUE:

Whether the deposition should be taken. (NO)

RULING:

But for purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more particularly of a prosecution witness
who would forseeably be unavailable for trial, the testimonial examination should be made before the
court, or at least before the judge, where the case is pending as required by the clear mandate of Section
15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Since the conditional examination of a prosecution witness must take place at no other place than the
court where the case is pending, the RTC properly nullified the MeTC's orders granting the motion to take
the deposition of Li Luen Ping before the Philippine consular official in Laos, Cambodia.
Certainly, to take the deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere and not before the very same court
where the case is pending would not only deprive a detained accused of his right to attend the proceedings
but also deprive the trial judge of the opportunity to observe the prosecution witness' deportment and
properly assess his credibility, which is especially intolerable when the witness' testimony is crucial to the
prosecution's case against the accused.

It is true that Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules of civil procedure apply to all
actions, civil or criminal, and special proceedings. In effect, it says that the rules of civil procedure have
suppletory application to criminal cases. However, it is likewise true that criminal proceedings are
primarily governed by the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
 RULE 25
INTERROGATORIES TO PARTIES

SPOUSES VICENTE AFULUGENCIA and LETICIA AFULUGENCIA -versus-

METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO. and EMMANUEL L. ORTEGA, Clerk of Court,
Regional Trial Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff, Province of Bulacan
G.R. No. 185145 February 5, 2014

As a rule, in civil cases, the procedure of calling the adverse party to the witness stand is not
allowed, unless written interrogatories are first served upon the latter. This is embodied in Section
6, Rule 25.

One of the purposes of the above rule is to prevent fishing expeditions and needless delays; it is
there to maintain order and facilitate the conduct of trial. It will be presumed that a party who
does not serve written interrogatories on the adverse party beforehand will most likely be unable
to elicit facts useful to its case if it later opts to call the adverse party to the witness stand as its
witness. Another reason for the rule is that by requiring prior written interrogatories, the court
may limit the inquiry to what is relevant, and thus prevent the calling party from straying or
harassing the adverse party when it takes the latter to the stand. Thus, the rule not only protects
the adverse party from unwarranted surprises or harassment; it likewise prevents the calling party
from conducting a fishing expedition or bungling its own case. In the case, Metrobank’s officers
were sought to be presented by the petitioner as its initial witness and to present documents in the
possession of Metrobank, which move cannot be allowed in the petitioner’s presentation of its
evidence-in-chief.

FACTS:

Petitioners, spouses Afulugencia, filed a Complaint for nullification of mortgage, foreclosure,

auction sale, certificate of sale and other documents, with damages, against respondents
Metrobank and Ortega. Upon the conclusion of pre-trial, petitioners filed a Motion for Issuance
of Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum to require Metrobank’s officers to appear and
testify as the petitioners’ initial witnesses during the August 31, 2006 hearing for the presentation
of their evidence-in-chief, and to bring the documents relative to their loan with Metrobank, as
well as those covering the extrajudicial foreclosure and sale of petitioners’ land. With this,
Metrobank filed an Opposition arguing that the Motion must be denied for lack of proper notice
of hearing as it is a litigated motion. Petitioners replied by stating that the lack of proper notice
was cured by Metrobank’s filing of Opposition, hence the defect may be ignored.

The RTC denied petitioner Motion. Motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied.
Subsequently, petition for certiorari was raised to the CA, which it later on dismissed holding that
petitioners’ Motion is a litigated motion that requires a proper notice of hearing to the parties
specifying the date and time of hearing, as contained under Section 4 and 5 of Rule 15.
Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration, which the CA denied. Hence, the present
Petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the request by a party for the issuance of subpoenas do not require notice to other parties
to the action.

RULING:

As a rule, in civil cases, the procedure of calling the adverse party to the witness stand is not
allowed, unless written interrogatories are first served upon the latter. This is embodied in Section
6, Rule 25.

One of the purposes of the above rule is to prevent fishing expeditions and needless delays; it is
there to maintain order and facilitate the conduct of trial. It will be presumed that a party who
does not serve written interrogatories on the adverse party beforehand will most likely be unable
to elicit facts useful to its case if it later opts to call the adverse party to the witness stand as its
witness. Instead, the process could be treated as a fishing expedition or an attempt at delaying the
proceedings; it produces no significant result that a prior written interrogatories might bring.

Besides, since the calling party is deemed bound by the adverse party’s testimony, compelling the
adverse party to take the witness stand may result in the calling party damaging its own case.
Otherwise stated, if a party cannot elicit facts or information useful to its case through the facility
of written interrogatories or other mode of discovery, then the calling of the adverse party to the
witness stand could only serve to weaken its own case as a result of the calling party’s being
bound by the adverse party’s testimony, which may only be worthless and instead detrimental to
the calling party’s cause.

Another reason for the rule is that by requiring prior written interrogatories, the court may limit
the inquiry to what is relevant, and thus prevent the calling party from straying or harassing the
adverse party when it takes the latter to the stand.

Thus, the rule not only protects the adverse party from unwarranted surprises or harassment; it
likewise prevents the calling party from conducting a fishing expedition or bungling its own case.
Using its own judgment and discretion, the court can hold its own in resolving a dispute, and need
not bear witness to the parties perpetrating unfair court practices such as fishing for evidence,
badgering, or altogether ruining their own cases. Ultimately, such unnecessary processes can only
constitute a waste of the court’s precious time, if not pointless entertainment. In the present case,
petitioners seek to call Metrobank’s officers to the witness stand as their initial and main
witnesses, and to present documents in Metrobank’s possession as part of their principal
documentary evidence. This is improper. Petitioners may not be allowed, at the incipient phase of
the presentation of their evidence-in-chief at that, to present Metrobank’s officers – who are
considered adverse parties as well, based on the principle that corporations act only through their
officers and duly authorized agents – as their main witnesses; nor may they be allowed to gain
access to Metrobank’s documentary evidence for the purpose of making it their own. This is
tantamount to building their whole case from the evidence of their opponent. The burden of proof
and evidence falls on petitioners, not on Metrobank; if petitioners cannot prove their claim using
their own evidence, then the adverse party Metrobank may not be pressured to hang itself from its
own defense.

It is true that under the Rules, a party may, for good cause shown and to prevent a failure of
justice, be compelled to give testimony in court by the adverse party who has not served written
interrogatories. But what petitioners seek goes against the very principles of justice and fair play;
they would want that Metrobank provide the very evidence with which to prosecute and build
their case from the start. This they may not be allowed to do.
 RULE 26
ADMISSION BY ADVERSE PARTY

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES -versus- HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS and ROSALINDA CANADALLA-GO, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact,
BENITO A. CANADALLA G.R. No. 153034 September 20, 2005

A party cannot be deemed to have impliedly admitted the matters set forth in the Request for Admission
for the mere reason that its Comment was not under oath. That the Comment was not under oath is not a
substantive, but merely a formal defect which can be excused in the interest of justice.

DBP cannot be deemed to have impliedly admitted the matters set forth in the Request for Admission for
the mere reason that its Comment was not under oath. That the Comment was not under oath is not a
substantive, but merely a formal defect which can be excused in the interest of justice conformably to the
well-entrenched doctrine that all pleadings should be liberally construed as to do substantial justice. The
filing of such Comment substantially complied with Rule 26.

FACTS:

Rosalinda Canadalla-Go filed a Supplemental Complaint for the Exercise of Right of Redemption and
Determination of Redemption Price, Nullification of Consolidation, Annulment of Titles, with Damages,
Plus Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. After the DBP filed its Answer but before the parties
could proceed to trial, Go filed a Request for Admission by Adverse Party. Thereafter, the DBP filed its
Comment. Go objected to the Comment reasoning that it was not under oath as required by Section 2,
Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, and that it failed to state the reasons for the admission or denial of matters
for which an admission was requested. For its part, the DBP manifested that, first, the statements,
allegations, and documents contained in the Request for Admission are substantially the same as those in
the Supplemental Complaint; second, they had already been either specifically denied or admitted by the
DBP in its Answer; and third, the reasons for the denial or admission had already been specifically stated
therein.

ISSUE:

Whether or not matters requested to be admitted under Rule 26 of the Rules of Court which are mere
reiterations of the allegations in the complaint and are specifically denied in the answer may be deemed
impliedly admitted on the ground that the response thereto is not under oath. (NO)

RULING:

DBP cannot be deemed to have impliedly admitted the matters set forth in the Request for Admission for
the mere reason that its Comment was not under oath. As held in Po v. Court of Appeals [a] party should
not be compelled to admit matters of fact already admitted by his pleading and to make a second denial of
those already denied in his answer to the complaint. The Po doctrine was brought a step further in
Concrete Aggregates Co. v. Court of Appeals, where it is ruled that if the factual allegations in the
complaint are the very same allegations set forth in the request for admission and have already been
specifically denied or otherwise dealt with in the answer, a response to the request is no longer required.
It becomes unnecessary to dwell on the issue of the propriety of an unsworn response to the request for
admission. A request for admission that merely reiterates the allegations in an earlier pleading is
inappropriate under Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, which, as a mode of discovery, contemplates of
interrogatories that would clarify and tend to shed light on the truth or falsity of the allegations in the
pleading. Rule 26 does not refer to a mere reiteration of what has already been alleged in the pleadings.

That the Comment was not under oath is not a substantive, but merely a formal defect which can be
excused in the interest of justice conformably to the well-entrenched doctrine that all pleadings should be
liberally construed as to do substantial justice. The filing of such Comment substantially complied with
Rule 26.