Smart Grid Security Issues

Vasco Delgado-Gomes∗ , João F. Martins∗ , Celson Lima† and Paul Nicolae Borza‡
∗ CTS-Uninova, Faculty of Science and Technology, Nova University of Lisbon, 2829-516 Caparica, Portugal
Email: [email protected], [email protected]
† Institute of Engineering and Geosciences, Federal University of Western Pará, 68040-470 Santarém, Brazil

Email: [email protected]
‡ Faculty of Electrical Engineering and Computers, Transilvania University of Brasov, 500036 Brasov, Romania

Email: [email protected]

Abstract—The smart grid concept is being fostered due to The information and communication technology (ICT)
required evolution of the power network to incorporate dis- communication layer brings additional problems related to
tributed energy sources (DES), renewable energy sources (RES), security and privacy. In 2011, the Stuxnet worm demonstrated
and electric vehicles (EVs). The inclusion of these components the importance of cyber security [7], [8], [9]. This worm was
on the smart grid requires an information and communication deployed using a USB stick and proceed to infect all Windows
technology (ICT) layer in order to exchange information, control,
and monitor the electrical components of the smart grid. The
machines. Then, it searched for a specific control system used
two-way communication flows brings cyber security issues to the in Iran to run high-speed centrifuges that help to enrich nuclear
smart grid. Different cyber security countermeasures need to be fuel [10]. After finding the exact control system and auto-
applied to the heterogeneous smart grid according to the compu- update itself, the warm was supposed to spin the centrifuges
tational resources availability, time communication constraints, to a physical failure point while providing false feedback to the
and sensitive information data. This paper presents the main control system. In a smart grid environment, a cyber attack can
security issues and challenges of a cyber secure smart grid, whose cause outages and provide misleading monitoring information,
main objectives are confidentiality, integrity, authorization, and making the control system to have unwanted behaviour and
authentication of the exchanged data. even physical system failures.
Keywords—Smart grid, cyber security, challenges, information The smart grid cyber security issues are presented in this
and communication technology (ICT). paper. Section II gives a brief description and benefits of the
smart grid. The main cyber security issues of a smart grid
I. I NTRODUCTION are presented in section III. In section IV several smart grid
challenges are discussed. Finally, some conclusions and future
Power networks are suffering evolution during the last work are described in section V.
years. The first power networks were insulated and their
generation was based on local coal power plants with a close II. S MART G RID
correlation between generation and load. The next generation
of power networks began to be producer oriented with specific Using a raw definition, a smart grid is a power network
characteristics like bulk generation, wide power networks, operated using an ICT communication layer, managing two
captive consumers, and network stability. Nowadays, power bidirectional flows: electrical and informational. Despite the
networks start to have complete integration between energy increasing use, there is not yet a unique definition of smart
and information network, with self-healing systems able to grid. However, two main definitions can be considered, one
manage fluctuations on both sides of the network [1]. provided by SmartGrids.eu [11] and the other one from
national institute of standards and technology (NIST) [12]. The
The power network complexity is increasing due to the European definition of smart grid is:
integration of distributed energy sources (DES) that requires
a constant monitorization system because of the intermittency “A smart grid is an electricity network that can
characteristic of these sources. This increase in complexity, intelligently integrate the actions of all users con-
raise several problems in smart grids because they need to nected to it - generators, consumers and those that
accommodate economical, social, and technological require- do both - in order to efficiently deliver sustainable,
ments to ensure a proper power network operation and to economic and secure electricity issues.” [13]
facilitate energy trading [2], [3].
This definition is more oriented to the actors involved in the
Another complexity factor is the “prosumers” (producers power network, while the American definition is more oriented
and energy consumers) due to the integration of renewable en- to the technical specificities of the smart grid:
ergy sources (RES) and electric vehicles (EVs) in buildings [4],
[5]. The smart grid needs to efficiently control all power “ . . . advanced power grid for the 21st century
network devices with a “real-time” communication system, include the addition and integration of many varieties
which needs to detect a non-responsive power device and of digital computing and communication technolo-
maintain strict control of operation delays. Characteristics like gies and services with the power-delivery infras-
security, reliability and resiliency are also required to create a tructure. Bidirectional flows of energy and two-way
redundant communication system [6]. communication and control capabilities will enable

978-1-4799-6301-0/15/$31.00 ©2015 IEEE 534

 an array of new functionalities and applications The Smart Infrastructure System is composed by the main
that go well beyond ‘smart’ meters for homes and infrastructures composing the smart grid and supporting a two-
businesses.” [14] way flow of information and electricity. Advanced manage-
ment, control services and functionalities compose the Smart
Despite the small differences in the smart grid definitions, Management System. Lastly, the Smart Protection System
both entities agree on most of the smart grid benefits, having provides advanced grid reliability analysis, failure protection,
in common: and security and privacy protection services. This paper only
• Increase power reliability and quality, not only in nor- targets the latter system, which can offer an efficient and
mal operation, but also improving the grid resilience effective protection mechanism to address cyber security issues
to disruption caused by natural disasters and attacks. and preserve user’s privacy.

• Allow a more active role of the consumer, increasing III. C YBER S ECURITY I SSUES
their choices by enabling new products, services, and
markets. A smart grid system needs to support all or some of
the following four operations: electricity generation, electricity
• Provide the users with energy usage information, distribution, electricity transmission, and electricity control. As
allowing the implementation of an energy awareness described in the previous section, an ICT layer to enable a two-
system. way secure communication channel is required, where the main
• Increase environmental benefits and reduce green- security objectives are confidentiality, integrity, authorization,
house emissions by enabling EV and RES integration. and authentication of the exchanged data [17], [18].

• Preventive maintenance through the continuous power A. Cyber Attacks

network monitoring system.
There are two main types of security attacks that can
The aforementioned benefits rely on an secure communication compromise the smart grid security: Passive Attacks and Active
layer to transfer data between all the actors of the power Attacks [19]. The Passive Attacks aim to learn and use the
network, as shown in Figure 1. system information without affecting the system resources.
The attack target is only the transmitted information in order
to learn the system configuration, architecture, and normal
operation behaviour. These types of attacks are difficult to
detect since the data is not modified and therefore, the main
focus is on prevention rather in detection. The Active Attacks
are planned to affect the system operation through data mod-
ification or introducing false information into the system.
The three main reasons for smart grids attacks are ma-
nipulation, sabotage and espionage [20]. Several types of
perpetrators can make attacks against the smart grid, namely:
state hackers, organised crime, terrorists, disgruntled employ-
ees / inside attackers, hobbyist, script kiddies, activist hackers
(hacktivists), and legitimate penetration testing [21]. The fol-
lowing subsections briefly describe the cyber security attacks
that can occur in a smart grid.
1) Eavesdropping: Example of a passive attack described
as an unauthorized interception of an on-going communication
Fig. 1. NIST smart grid conceptual model of smart grid actors interac- without the consent of the communication parties.
tion [14].
2) Traffic Analysis: This attack is very similar with the
The smart grid has similarities with an industrial process, previous one, but instead of content analysis the attacker
and the communication technology infrastructure with instru- monitors the traffic patterns in order to infer useful information
mentation telemetry [15]. In this context, advanced metering from it.
infrastructure (AMI), home automation network (HAN), de-
mand response (DR), monitoring and automation of substa- 3) Replay: This attack consists of capture transmitted mes-
tions, power network monitoring, and integration of photo- sages and their retransmission in order to cause an unautho-
voltaic panels are identified as Critical Applications. Relia- rized effect. The retransmitted messages are normally valid
bility, scalability, interoperability, congestion, latency, energy except the timestamp field.
efficiency, and security were identified in this analogy as 4) Message Modification: Similar to the previous attack,
Critical Parameters of the telemetry system. but the message is modified to cause unwanted behaviour in
the system. This attack can also involve message delay and
The smart grid system can be divided in three major
reordering a message stream.
systems, namely: Smart Infrastructure System, Smart Manage-
ment System, and Smart Protection System [16]. These major 5) Impersonation: This attack is also known by Identity
systems are also subdivided in other subsystems, applications Spoofing or Masquerading and it is when the intruder pretends
and/or objectives, as show in Table I. to be an authorized entity or device.

535
 TABLE I. S MART GRID SYSTEMS CLASSIFICATION ( ADAPTED FROM [16]).

Smart Grid
Smart Infrastructure System Smart Management System Smart Protection System
Smart System reliability
Smart energy Smart information Management Management Security and
communication and failure
subsystem subsystem objectives methods and tools privacy
subsystem protection

6) Denial of Service: This attack can also be named management using a PKI is pointed out as one of the most
Availability Attack and aims to suspend or interrupt the system effective solution for securing the smart grid communications
communications. To accomplish this effect, the attacker can infrastructure [25].
flood the communication network with messages to disable
the physical components access, inhibiting the system’s normal IV. C YBER S ECURITY C HALLENGES
operation.
There are several challenges that can be considered when
7) Malware: Malicious software attacks aim to exploit implementing an ICT-based secure communication channel.
internal weaknesses of the system with the goal of steal, New communication requirements, legacy devices, heteroge-
modify, and destroy information and/or physical components neous technologies and protocols, and proprietary systems are
of the system. Malware attacks can also obtain unauthorized some of the challenges that need to be faced [26].
access to the system.
Some authors state that is necessary to implement protocols
and standards for a secure smart grid [19], [23]. However, it
B. Attacks Detection and Countermeasures
can also bring additional risk to the grid due to a complexity
The power grid has always been vulnerable to physical increase, introducing vulnerabilities and rising the DoS prob-
attacks. With the smart grid, more infrastructures need protec- ability [27]. A trade-off is necessary between communication
tion against attackers (e.g. communication infrastructures, data security and latency. The smart grid protocols need to be
centres, etc.). Physical security of power plants, equipment, efficient and enable secure communication in wide-area moni-
and networks is required, such as barriers, locks and video toring systems (WAMS), ensuring secure routing and enabling
surveillance. Working personal screening, security awareness, data aggregation to maintain users’ privacy.
and training are also considerer required measures to prevent Scalability is another open challenge [28]. The current
attacks [22]. In this way, the attacks can be early detected or smart grids implementations have a small number of devices
even prevented. when compared to a country-scaled implementation. With
One of the worst attack to the smart grid is the denial more devices, the transmitted data volume will increase to-
of service (DoS) attack, due the impossibility to access the gether with the bandwidth usage. The PKI needs to manage
devices and systems. To detect this attack, four methods can more devices, requiring more computational resources and
be used: signal-based, packet-based, proactive, and hybrid [23]. technical staff to manage and ensure the proper operation of
The signal-based detection method consists of measuring the the smart grid [29]. Smart metes physical tampering needs also
signal strength, comparing it to a threshold value and raising an to be address in wide AMI deployment [30].
alarm when deviations occur. Packet-based detection method The smart grid challenges are not only technical but
measures the transmission result of each packet. It works also regulatory. More stakeholders and a coordinator to ac-
with the assumption that a performance degradation is caused celerate the adoption of sensitive institutional changes are
by packet transmission failure, indicating a DoS attack. The required [31]. The conformance of smart grid standards and
proactive method attempts to identify DoS attacks by sending devices need to be evaluated by designated authorities. Another
probing packets to test or measure the status of potential legal challenge is the users’ privacy. An attacker can find out
attackers. Lastly, the hybrid method combines different ideas to the user’s consumers pattern and learn their routine (when is
improve attack detection accuracy. For instance, signal-based at home and what is doing).
and packet-based methods can be used in wireless networks to
identify flooding or jamming attacks. Most of the aforementioned challenges do not have an
actual solution. Even though the known smart grids threats
To avoid cyber attacks on the smart grid there are also can have already some solutions, future threats need to be
cryptographic countermeasures, such as encryption, authenti- considered in the new smart grid generation development. The
cation, and key management [24]. Encryption is an elementary technology evolution will bring advance hacking techniques
cryptographic method to achieve secure communication and aided by powerful technology.
information protection for any information system. Several
degrees of encryption are needed due to the limited compu- In order to study and overcome smart grid security chal-
tational resources in some smart grid layers. All smart grid lenges, several European projects recently started. Nobel-
devices require an authentication process to avoid imperson- Grid [32] addresses the smart grid security in a new gen-
ation attacks. Lastly, key management is based on crypto- eration of low cost smart meters using security protocols.
graphic primitives and uses a public key infrastructure (PKI) SEGRID [33] and SPARKS [34] are very similar projects
to manage credentials and keys. Different scales are required aiming to study known and future cyber security threats in
to manage power substations networks or AMI networks. Key order to avoid them in future smart grid implementations.

536
Cyber attack risk management for utility providers is the focus [9] T. Chen and S. Abu-Nimeh, “Lessons from Stuxnet,” Computer, vol. 44,
of HyRiM [35]. no. 4, pp. 91–93, April 2011.
[10] D. Kushner, “The real story of Stuxnet,” Spectrum, IEEE, vol. 50, no. 3,
The smart grid security solution will require a holis- pp. 48–53, March 2013.
tic approach, including trusted computing elements and PKI [11] SmartGrids.EU, “European Technology Platform for the Electricity
technology based on industrial standards. However, complex Networks of the Future (ETP SmartGrids),” http://www.smartgrids.eu/,
software systems such as smart grids are not immune to errors, (Accessed 10-January-2015).
bugs, and cyber attacks. The ICT layer of the smart grid needs [12] NIST, “National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),”
to manage disturbances to normal operation through a secure, http://www.nist.gov/, (Accessed 10-January-2015).
resilient, and efficient implementation. [13] SmartGrids.EU, “SmartGrids SRA 2035: Strategic Research Agenda
- Update of the SmartGrids SRA 2007 for the needs by the
year 2035,” http://www.smartgrids.eu/documents/sra2035.pdf, European
V. C ONCLUSIONS AND F UTURE W ORK Technology Platform for the Electricity Networks of the Future (ETP
SmartGrids), Tech. Rep. Version 1.0, March 2012.
The smart grid evolution brings additional cyber secu-
[14] NIST, “NIST Framework and Roadmap for Smart Grid Interoperability
rity problems due to the necessity of an ICT-based secure Standards,” http://www.nist.gov/smartgrid/upload/NIST-SP-1108r3.pdf,
communication layer to interconnect all the actors involved National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Tech. Rep.
in the power network. The cyber security countermeasures Release 3.0, September 2014.
need to consider heterogeneous devices and networks archi- [15] J. Bhatt, V. Shah, and O. Jani, “An instrumentation engineer’s review
tectures, different delay constraints, and limited computational on Smart Grid: Critical applications and parameters,” Renewable and
resources, making unrealistic to use the same security approach Sustainable Energy Reviews, vol. 40, no. 0, pp. 1217–1239, 2014.
all over the smart grid. The main security objectives of [16] X. Fang, S. Misra, G. Xue, and D. Yang, “Smart grid - The new and
improved power grid: A survey,” Communications Surveys Tutorials,
the ICT layer are confidentiality, integrity, authorization, and IEEE, vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 944–980, Fourth 2012.
authentication. Additionally, users’ privacy is receiving more
[17] A. Ashok, A. Hahn, and M. Govindarasu, “Cyber-physical security
attention and requires further addressing to avoid information of Wide-Area monitoring, protection and control in a Smart Grid
misuse. environment,” Journal of Advanced Research, vol. 5, no. 4, pp. 481–
489, 2014, cyber Security.
As future work, a two steps work is considered. Firstly,
[18] E. Bou-Harb, C. Fachkha, M. Pourzandi, M. Debbabi, and C. Assi,
the most used, secure, suitable, and developed standards for “Communication security for Smart Grid distribution networks,” Com-
smart grid data exchange will be surveyed. Secondly, a secure munications Magazine, IEEE, vol. 51, no. 1, pp. 42–49, January 2013.
and standard-based ICT network interconnecting a micro grid [19] N. Komninos, E. Philippou, and A. Pitsillides, “Survey in Smart Grid
will be deployed. Several intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) and Smart Home security: Issues, challenges and countermeasures,”
with cryptographic countermeasures will be used to assess the Communications Surveys Tutorials, IEEE, vol. 16, no. 4, pp. 1933–
security delay impact on the communication time. 1954, Fourthquarter 2014.
[20] M. Wagner, M. Kuba, and A. Oeder, “Smart Grid cyber security:
A German perspective,” in Smart Grid Technology, Economics and
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT Policies (SG-TEP), 2012 International Conference on, Dec 2012, pp.
1–4.
This work is funded by Portuguese National Funds through
[21] A. Nicholson, S. Webber, S. Dyer, T. Patel, and H. Janicke, “SCADA
FCT - Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia in the context security in the light of cyber-warfare,” Computers & Security, vol. 31,
of the UID/EEA/UI00066/2013 project. no. 4, pp. 418–436, 2012.
[22] A. J. McBride and A. R. McGee, “Assessing Smart Grid security,” Bell
R EFERENCES Labs Technical Journal, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 87–103, Dec 2012.
[23] W. Wang and Z. Lu, “Cyber security in the Smart Grid: Survey and
[1] S. Blumsack and A. Fernandez, “Ready or not, here comes the Smart
challenges,” Computer Networks, vol. 57, no. 5, pp. 1344–1371, 2013.
Grid!” Energy, vol. 37, no. 1, pp. 61–68, 2012, 7th Biennial Interna-
tional Workshop ”Advances in Energy Studies”. [24] C. Bekara, “Security issues and challenges for the IoT-based Smart
[2] C. Clastres, “Smart Grids: Another step towards competition, energy Grid,” Procedia Computer Science, vol. 34, no. 0, pp. 532–537, 2014,
security and climate change objectives,” Energy Policy, vol. 39, no. 9, the 9th International Conference on Future Networks and Communica-
pp. 5399–5408, 2011. tions (FNC’14)/The 11th International Conference on Mobile Systems
and Pervasive Computing (MobiSPC’14)/Affiliated Workshops.
[3] J. A. Sautter, J. Landis, and M. H. Dworkin, “The energy trilemma in
the Green Montain state: An analysis of Vermont’s energy challanges [25] A. Metke and R. Ekl, “Security technology for Smart Grid networks,”
and policy options,” Vermont Journal of Environmental Law, vol. 10, Smart Grid, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 99–107, June 2010.
pp. 478–506, 2010. [26] J. Liu, Y. Xiao, S. Li, W. Liang, and C. L. P. Chen, “Cyber security
[4] J. Crispim, J. Braz, R. Castro, and J. Esteves, “Smart Grids in the EU and privacy issues in Smart Grids,” Communications Surveys Tutorials,
with smart regulation: Experiences from the UK, Italy and Portugal,” IEEE, vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 981–997, Fourth 2012.
Utilities Policy, vol. 31, no. 0, pp. 85–93, 2014. [27] Y. Wang, D. Ruan, D. Gu, J. Gao, D. Liu, J. Xu, F. Chen, F. Dai,
[5] E. Negeri, F. Kuipers, and N. Baken, “Designing reliable and resilient and J. Yang, “Analysis of Smart Grid security standards,” in Computer
smart low-voltage grids,” International Journal of Critical Infrastruc- Science and Automation Engineering (CSAE), 2011 IEEE International
ture Protection, no. 0, pp. –, 2015. Conference on, vol. 4, June 2011, pp. 697–701.
[6] V. Delgado-Gomes and P. Borza, “A biological approach for energy [28] Y. Yan, Y. Qian, H. Sharif, and D. Tipper, “A Survey on cyber security
management in smart grids and hybrid energy storage systems,” in for Smart Grid communications,” Communications Surveys Tutorials,
Optimization of Electrical and Electronic Equipment (OPTIM), 2014 IEEE, vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 998–1010, Fourth 2012.
International Conference on, May 2014, pp. 1082–1086. [29] H. Khurana, M. Hadley, N. Lu, and D. Frincke, “Smart-grid security
[7] R. Langner, “Stuxnet: Dissecting a cyberwarfare weapon,” Security issues,” Security Privacy, IEEE, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 81–85, Jan 2010.
Privacy, IEEE, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 49–51, May 2011. [30] P. McDaniel and S. McLaughlin, “Security and privacy challenges in
[8] D. Fidler, “Was Stuxnet an act of war? Decoding a cyberattack,” the Smart Grid,” Security Privacy, IEEE, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 75–77, May
Security Privacy, IEEE, vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 56–59, July 2011. 2009.

537
 [31] I. L. Pearson, “Smart Grid cyber security for Europe,” Energy Policy, [34] SPARKS, “Smart Grid Protection Against Cyber Attacks (SPARKS),”
vol. 39, no. 9, pp. 5211–5218, 2011. https://project-sparks.eu/, (Accessed 31-March-2015).
[32] NobelGrid, “New Cost-efficient Business Models for Flexible Smart [35] HyRiM, “Hybrid Risk Management for Utility Providers (HyRiM),”
Grids (NobelGrid),” http://nobelgrid.eu/, (Accessed 31-March-2015). https://hyrim.net/, (Accessed 31-March-2015).
[33] SEGRID, “Security for Smart Electricity GRIDs (SEGRID),”
http://www.segrid.eu/, (Accessed 31-March-2015).

538

Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)