[G.R. No. 9527. August 23, 1915.

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOSE TAMPARONG ET AL., Defendants-Appellants.

D E C I S I O N

TRENT, J.  :

The defendants were convicted by the justice of the peace of Baguio for having played the game of chance called
"monte" in violation of Ordinance No. 35. They appealed to the Court of First Instance, where they were again tried
and convicted upon the same charge. An appeal was allowed to this court because the validity of Ordinance No, 35
was drawn in question during the trial of the cause in the court below.

Two questions are raised by this appeal: (1) Is Ordinance No. 35 valid, and (2) is this court required under the law
to examine the evidence for the purpose of determining the guilt or innocence of the defendants?

The first question is answered in the affirmative by this court in the case of the United States v. Joson (26 Phil.
Rep., 1). The cases are on all fours, and a further discussion of this branch of the case is unnecessary.

With reference to the second question, it is said that by reason of the defendants’ having in the lower court
questioned the legality of Ordinance No. 35, for the violation of which they have been convicted, this case has been
brought to us in all its details of law and fact, including the evidence taken at the trial, on which the Court of First
Instance founded its judgment touching the guilt and condemning the defendants. While, on the other hand, it
is contended that the questions of fact, which we are [not] authorized to examine, are those which are
essential to be examined for the purpose of determining the legality of Ordinance No. 35 and the
penalties provided for therein, and no other.

At the outset it may be well to briefly outline the criminal procedure in force in this jurisdiction prior to the
promulgation on the 23d day of April, 1900, of General Orders No. 58.

The royal order dated December 17, 1886, directing the execution of the royal decree of September 4,
1884, wherein it was ordered that the Penal Code in force in the Peninsula, as amended in accordance with the
recommendations of the code committee, be published and applied in the Philippine Islands, as well as the
Provisional Law of Criminal Procedure which accompanied it. These two laws, having been published in the
Official Gazette of Manila on March 13 and 14, 1887, became effective four months thereafter.

According to the provisions of Rule 1 of the above-mentioned provisional law, the justices of the peace, or
gobernadorcillos, had original jurisdiction over the offenses set forth in Book 3 of the Penal Code.

Rule 2 provided that "when the justice of the peace or the gobernadorcillo receives notice that there has been
committed any one of the offenses provided for in Book 3 of the Penal Code which can be prosecuted by the
Government, he shall issue summons for an oral trial to the complainant, if any, to the alleged culprit, and to the
witnesses who may be able to testify as to the facts, fixing the day and hour for holding the trial. If this (the trial)
takes place at the residence of the promotor fiscal, he shall also be summoned." Rule 3 provided that the same
procedure should be followed in those cases which can only be prosecuted at the instance of a private party,
except that the promotor fiscal was not cited.

Neither the Provisional Law, the criminal procedural laws of the Peninsula, nor the autos acordados
prescribed any special form for the complaint to be presented to the justice of the peace or the
gobernadorcillo. As to this point, it seems that the Compilation of the Laws of Criminal Procedure of 1879 was
applicable. Articles 405, 406, and 412 read: "ART. 405. The complaint made in writing must be signed by the
complainant, and if he cannot do so, by some other person at his request. The authority or official who receives it
shall rubricate and seal every page in the presence of the person who presents it, which also he may do himself or
through another person at his request.

"ART. 406. When the complaint is oral, it shall be reduced to writing by the authority or official who receives it,
wherein, in the form of a declaration, shall be set forth such information as the complainant may have regarding
the act complained of and the circumstances thereof, and both shall sign it at the bottom. If the complainant
cannot sign his name, some other person shall do so at his request." cralaw virtua1aw library

"ART. 412. Criminal cases that are not instituted by the Government must begin with a complaint." cralaw virtua1aw library

The oral trial referred to in Rule 2 was held within three days next following the date when the justice of the peace
or the gobernadorcillo received information that the offense had been committed (Rule 4), the procedure being
that provided for in Rule 9, which reads: "The trial shall be public, beginning with the reading of the complaint, if
any there be, followed by the examination of the witnesses summoned and the introduction of such other evidence
as the complainant, accuser, and public prosecutor, if he take part, may request and the justice of the peace or the
gobernadorcillo may regard as pertinent. Immediately thereafter the accused shall be given a hearing, the
witnesses who appear in his defense shall be examined, and such other evidence as the justice or the
gobernadorcillo may declare to be admissible shall be adduced. The parties shall forthwith make such pleas as they
think expedient in support of their respective contentions, the first to speak being the public prosecutor, if he take
part, then the private complainant, and finally the accused.

"The representative of the public prosecutor shall attend the trial for misdemeanors, whenever he is cited thereto,
in accordance with Rule 2." cralaw virtua1aw library

A record of the trial was made, wherein the whole procedure was clearly and succinctly set forth, and signed by all
the parties participating in the trial. (Rule 11.)

After trial and rendition of judgment, either of the parties could appeal to the Court of First Instance within the first
day next following that on which notice of the rendition of judgment was served. The appeal suspended the
judgment. After the appeal had been allowed, the justice of the peace or the gobernadorcillo remitted to the Court
of First Instance the original record and cited the parties to appear within the period of five days before the
appellate court. This time could be extended, if the circumstances of the case required. (Rule 14.) If the appellant
appealed, a day was fixed for the trial; but if he did not appear, the appeal was dismissed. (Rule 15.) Rule 16
provides the procedure for the trial in the second instance. This rule reads: "The hearing at the trial shall be public,
and all the proceedings in the case shall be read therein; then the parties or their attorneys may speak in their
turn, and thereafter the judgment shall be pronounced and communicated to them.

"A record of the trial shall be drawn up in the same manner as fixed by Rule 11." cralaw virtua1aw library

Rule 17 reads: "In this second instance no evidence may be admitted other than that which, offered in the first
instance, was not taken for reasons independent of the will of the parties who had offered it." cralaw virtua1aw library

Rule 19 provides: "The judgment of the Court of First Instance will be executory, and there will be no
recourse from the same except that of responsibility before the audiencia del territorio." cralaw virtua1aw library

The provisions of General Orders No. 58 pertinent to the question under consideration, are as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 43. From all final judgments of the Courts of First Instance or courts of similar jurisdiction, and in all cases in
which the law now provides for appeals from said courts an appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court as
hereinafter prescribed. Appeals shall also lie from the final judgments of justices of the peace in criminal cases to
the courts of the next superior grade, and the decisions of the latter thereon shall be final and conclusive except in
cases involving the validity or constitutionality of a statute, wherein appeal may be made to the Supreme Court."
library
cralaw virtua1aw

"SEC. 54. All cases appealed from a justice’s court shall be tried in all respects anew in the court to which the same
are appealed; but on the hearing of such appeals it shall not be necessary, unless the appeal shall involve the
constitutionality or legality of a statute, that a written record of the proceedings be kept; but shall be sufficient if
the appellate court keeps a docket of the proceedings in the form prescribed in the next preceding section." cralaw virtua1aw library

Section 43 has been amended by section 34 of Act No. 1627 so as to read as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"From all final judgments of the Court of First Instance or courts of similar jurisdiction, and in all cases in which the
law now provides for appeals from said courts, an appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court as hereinafter
prescribed. The convicted party may appeal from any final judgment of a justice of the peace in a criminal cause to
the Court of First Instance by filing a notice of appeal with such justice within fifteen days after the entry of
judgment. Upon such notice being so filed, the justice shall forward to the Court of First Instance all original papers
and a transcript of all docket entries in the cause, and the provincial fiscal shall thereupon take charge of the cause
in behalf of the prosecution. The judgment of the Court of First Instance in such appeals shall be final and
conclusive, except in cases involving the validity or constitutionality of a statute or the constitutionality of a
municipal or township ordinance." cralaw virtua1aw library

In view of the fact that this court took the view, prior to the passage of Act No. 1627, that the military governor
and the framers of General Orders No. 58 intended by the use of the word "statute" found in section 43 (supra)
to include "ordinances," the amendment of this section by section 34 of that Act does not affect the issue in the
instant case. The original section provided that "an appeal may be made to the Supreme Court in cases
involving the validity or constitutionality of a statute," and the section, as amended, authorizes appeals
to the Supreme Court in the same class of cases.
It is urged that as the civil-law term "appeal" is used in section 43 (supra), we must apply the same
rule of construction that the courts in England and the United States have ,almost uniformly applied to
the same term and thus derive an unqualified review of both the law and the facts. This doubtless would
be a correct position in some jurisdictions in the American Union, as there the technical civil-law meaning of the
term "appeal" is followed. The reason for so doing is set forth in the case of Nashville Ry. & Light Co. v. Bunn (168
Fed. Rep., 862), wherein the court said: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The distinction between a ’writ of error,’ which brings up the record in an action of law for a review of questions of
law only, and an ’appeal,’ which involves a rehearing upon both the facts and the law, is vital. These remedies have
their origin and functions in the inherent difference between courts of law and courts of equity, differences which
are recognized in the Constitution of the United States and the laws of Congress. The ’writ of error’ is a common
law writ, and searches the record for errors of law in the final judgment of a common-law court. If error is found,
the judgment awards a venire facias de novo. The ’appeal’ is a procedure which comes to us from the civil law
along with the fundamentals which go to make up the jurisprudence of a court of equity. Its office is to remove the
entire cause, and it subjects the transcript to a scrutiny of fact and law and is in substance a new trial."
cralaw virtua1aw library

Under the system of procedure which obtains in the Philippine Islands, both legal and equitable relief is
dispensed in the same tribunal. We have no courts of law and courts of equity as they are known and
distinguished in England and the United States. All cases (law and equity) are presented and tried in
the same manner, including their final disposition in the Supreme Court. Therefore, the word "appeal,"
as used in section 43 (supra), does not necessarily imply the removal of the cause from one tribunal to
another in its entirety, subjecting the facts, as well as the law, to a review or a retrial, but it is to be
interpreted by the ordinary rules of construction.

The intention of the framers of General Orders No. 58 i8 the law. In order to ascertain that intention the provisions
of the order must be construed in the light of existing law and the circumstances at the time of its promulgation.

At the time General Orders No. 58 went into effect, criminal cases originating in Courts of First Instance came to
the audiencia in their entirety, subjecting both the law and the facts to a review or retrial. But the audiencia, or
Philippine Supreme Court, could not review the judgment of a Court of First Instance in any case tried
on appeal from courts of justices of the peace wherein the latter courts had jurisdiction. Such judgments
were final and conclusive. The aggrieved party could go no further with the case. The only recourse he had was
that mentioned in Rule 19 (supra). The penalties for violations of the provisions of Book 3 of the Penal Code
over which justices of the peace then had jurisdiction were generally arreto or arresto menor and small fines. This
was the law in force at the time section 43 (supra) was framed and these were the conditions confronting the
framers of that section at that time. What changes did the section make?

Section 43 authorizes appeals to the Supreme Court from all final judgments of Courts of First Instance
"and in all cases in which the law now provides for appeals from said courts." This part of the section is
limited to judgments rendered in criminal cases originating in Courts of First Instance. This is necessarily true
because the latter part of the section makes the decisions of the "courts of next superior grade (which
were Courts of First Instance) rendered in cases appealed from justices’ courts final and conclusive,
except in cases involving the validity or constitutionality of a statute." The result is that the former
procedure was amended by section 43 so as to also authorize appeals to the Supreme Court in the cases
mentioned in the latter part thereof when the validity or constitutionality of a statute was drawn in question. To
this extent only was the former procedural law changed in so far as, the question at issue is concerned. Among the
reasons which induced the lawmakers to make this change was the fact that the jurisdiction of justices of the peace
was "extended to all offenses which the Penal Code designates as punishable by arresto mayor in all of its grades."
(Sec. 108.)

If we had found the ordinance attacked in the case at bar to be illegal and unconstitutional, the
judgment appealed from would necessarily have to be set aside and defendants would have no interest
in presenting to us the evidence taken at the trial. But we have maintained the legality of that
ordinance, and in so doing have we exhausted our powers and reached the limit of our inquiry? Section
43 does not expressly so limit our power. Neither does it expressly authorize us to review the
testimony touching the guilt or innocence of the defendants.

The distinction between the illegality of a penalty imposed by a municipal corporation and the correctness of that
imposed by a justice of the peace under a municipal ordinance, and between the illegality of the ordinance and that
of the proceedings or actions taken under it, is plain and broad. An ordinance may, from the standpoint of the
regularity of all the proceedings leading up to and inclusive of its enactment, be absolutely faultless
and yet the ultimate act done or enacted may be inherently or intrinsically illegal or unconstitutional.
On the other hand, the latter may be perfectly unassailable and yet the ordinance be illegal or unconstitutional by
reason of some fact or circumstance connected with its passage. It may, for instance, have been presented in a
wrong manner, at a wrong time, or not voted for as directed by law. It is to facts of this class or character that
section 43 refers when it says "the latter thereon shall be final and conclusive except in cases involving the validity
or constitutionality of a statute." cralaw virtua1aw library

Such appears to be the meaning and intention manifested from the provisions of the latter part of section 43,
already quoted, especially when they are considered in the light of the former practice above indicated. Under that
practice no appeals whatever were allowed to the Supreme Court from judgments of Courts of First Instance in
cases originating in justices’ courts. We must assume that the framers of section 43 had knowledge of this practice
and its effects. The framers desired to amend this practice to the extent only of providing a way by which statutory
questions, which might arise in these cases, could be reviewed by the Supreme Court. This object could be very
imperfectly obtained, if, when the court assumed jurisdiction of such a case, it would not only
determine the statutory questions, but also inquire into and determine every other question raised
during the progress of the trial. In effect, this would entirely destroy the former practice, because it
would render it possible to bring every case here in its entirety. All that would be necessary would be to
raise some statutory question, whether material to the decision of the case or not, and the right of appeal and
reexamination of the whole case would be assured. Clearly, no such result was intended, nor is it manifest from the
language employed in section 43. But it is urged that our ruling in this matter "involves the legal absurdity of
disjoining a single case and turning over one fragment to one court and another parcel to another court." (Elliott on
Appellate Procedure, sec. 17.) In this section the author is speaking of appellate jurisdiction where the distinction
between law and equity is rigidly maintained. He says: "Where a court of equity retains jurisdiction for one
purpose, it will retain it for all purposes." The same author recognizes a difference in the two systems of appellate
jurisdiction — that is, the one where the distinction between law and equity is maintained and, the other, where
the two are blended. (Section 24.) In this last section the author says: "In some respects an appeal under the code
system may be less comprehensive in its scope than an appeal under the old system," citing Judge Curtis, wherein
he said that "it is evident that an appeal under the code system does not necessarily bring up the entire case." In
view of the fact that the code system prevails in the Philippine Islands, blending legal and equitable rights and
providing for one remedial system, our holding in the instant case is not in conflict with Elliot on Appellate
Procedure.

It is also urged that the rule announced in the case of Loeb v. . Columbia Township Trustees (179 U. S., 472), and
followed in the late case of Boise Artesian Hot and Cold Water Co., Ltd. v. Boise City (230 U. S., 84), is directly
opposed to our holding in the case under consideration. These two cases went to the Supreme Court of the United
States on writs of error directly from the circuit courts in accordance with the provisions of section 5 of the
Judiciary Act of March 3, 1891. This section provides "that appeals or writs of error may be taken from the district
courts, or from the existing circuit courts, direct to the Supreme Court in the following cases: . . ." Here Congress
maintains the distinction between "appeals" and "writs of error." In each case above cited the Supreme Court of
the United States held that it not only had jurisdiction to review the constitutional questions, but also every other
question properly arising. The court then proceeded to review all legal questions in those cases and not questions
of fact, for the reason that the cases were before the court on writs of error. Even granting that the Supreme Court
has jurisdiction under the Act above mentioned to review both questions of law and fact in cases appealed to that
court, such holding would not be antagonistic to our views in the instant case for the reason that our power to
review the facts touching the guilt or innocence of the defendants must be found in section 43 of General Orders
No. 58. Our view is, as above indicated, that the framers of that section did not intend to confer upon this court
that power. And all must admit that the military governor at the time he promulgated General Orders No. 58 had
the power to limit or restrict the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to statutory questions in cases of the character
of the one under consideration.

Our ruling in the case at bar is fully supported by the adjudicated cases of this Supreme Court.

In the case of Trinidad v. Sweeney (4 Phil. Rep., 531), the court said: "Upon the facts stated in the complaint the
plaintiff is entitled to prosecute an appeal to this court; but upon such appeal the only question to be considered
will be that of the validity or invalidity of the ordinance. We cannot review the evidence nor pass upon any other
question of law which may appear in the record." cralaw virtua1aw library

In United States v. Trinidad (7 Phil. Rep., 325), the defendant was convicted in the municipal court of the city of
Manila for violating a municipal ordinance. He appealed to the Court of First Instance, where he was again
convicted. An appeal was allowed to the Supreme Court on the ground that the constitutionality or validity of the
ordinance was drawn in question. On appeal the appellant insisted, among other things, that the trial court erred in
deciding the case without first consulting with the two assessors. This court held the ordinance valid and, after
quoting with approval the language used in the case of Trinidad v. Sweeney (supra), said: "In cases where the
appeal involves the constitutionality or validity of a statute, the disagreement of the assessors with the judgment
of the Court of First Instance on appeal does not authorize this court to review the evidence, but its decision shall
be confined only to the question of the validity of the Act or statute in question, as occurs in the present case."
cralaw virtua1aw library

In the case of The United States v. Espiritusanto (23 Phil. Rep., 610), we examined the facts touching the due
enactment of the ordinance. After so doing, the ordinance was held valid, but the facts touching the guilt or
innocence of the appellant were not gone into.
In United States v. Ten Yu (24 Phil. Rep., 1), the court used this language at page 12: "While we have discussed at
length each of the assignments of error made by the appellants, nevertheless, the only question, in fact, presented
by the appeal under the law, in the first instance, is whether or not the ordinance under which the defendants were
sentenced is legal. Having concluded that said ordinance is legal and within the express powers of the Municipal
Board to enact, the appeal must be dismissed, with costs in this instance against the appellants in equal parts." cralaw virtua1aw library

In United States v. Abendan (24 Phil. Rep., 165), the court, after quoting the testimony of a sanitary inspector and
after holding the ordinance valid, said: "The evidence in the case, which is undisputed, is sufficient, in our
judgment, to warrant the order complained of. It does not appear therefrom, the defendant himself having
introduced substantially no proof in the case, that he was treated differently from other persons in that locality, or
that he was required to do a thing that the others had not been required to do, or that he had in any way been
discriminated against in the application of this ordinance to the facts of his case, or that its application was
oppressive or unreasonable in this particular instance.

"The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs." cralaw virtua1aw library

Considering this language, together with that used in the opinion wherein the court said, "The sole question raised
on this appeal is that presented by the claim of the appellant that the ordinance in question is unreasonable and
oppressive," it is clear that the court did not intend to hold that it had authority to examine into the question of the
guilt or innocence of the Appellant.

In United States v. Co Chee (R. G. No. 8269, not reported) the appellants were convicted of a violation of
Ordinance No. 152 of the city of Manila and, having drawn in question the validity of that ordinance, an appeal was
allowed to this court. In disposing of this case the court said: "Precisely this question was presented in the case of
the United States v. Ten Yu (24 Phil. Rep., 1), just decided by this court, in which we held that said Ordinance
No. 152 of the city of Manila was valid and constitutional. That case is on all fours with the present one, and the
judgment of conviction of the Court of First Instance is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellants, on the
authority of that case."cralaw virtua1aw library

No attempt was made to examine or pass upon the testimony touching the guilt or innocence of the appellants.

In United States v. Tiu Un (R. G., No. 7804); United States v. Gaw Kee (R. G., No. 7816); United States v. Lim Cui
(R. G., No. 7815); United States v. See Kea (R. G., No. 7828); United States v. Go Tin (R. G., No. 7481); United
States v. Sia Kim (R. G., No. 7716); United States v. Lim Baey (R. G., No. 7915); United States v. Li Tia (R. G.,
No. 7826); and United States v. Tam Bak (R. G., No. 7814), not reported, the appellants were convicted for a
violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 152 of the city of Manila and, having drawn in question the validity of that
ordinance, appeals were allowed to this court. This court, upon the authority of the United States v. Ten Yu
(supra), dismissed the appeals and directed the records to be returned to the court below for execution of the
sentences.

Other cases might be cited, but we think the above are sufficient to show that we have followed in the instant case
the uniform holding of this court for more than ten years. In fact, the court has not, since its organization, held in
any case that it has the power to review the facts touching the guilt of an accused person in cases of the character
of the one under consideration.

Some discussion has arisen in regard to the language we should use in the final disposition of cases wherein the
statute or ordinance has been upheld. Sometimes we say, "The judgment is affirmed," and at other times we have
said "the appeal is dismissed," etc. The result is the same and it is of little importance which expression we use.
But, as the case comes to us on appeal for the purpose of testing the legality of the statute or ordinance upon
which the judgment rests and as the judgment cannot be executed without the sanction of this court, it is perfectly
legal to "affirm" or "reverse" the judgment as the case may be.

For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the defendants. So ordered.

=====================================================================================
G. R. No. 162322               March 14, 2012

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
BANTIGUE POINT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, J.:

This Rule 45 Petition requires this Court to address the issue of the proper scope of the delegated
jurisdiction of municipal trial courts in land registration cases. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines
(Republic) assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 70349, which
1 

affirmed the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan, Batangas in LRC Case No. N-
2 

98-20, LRA Record No. 68329, granting respondent Bantigue Point Development Corporation’s
(Corporation) application for original registration of a parcel of land. Since only questions of law have
been raised, petitioner need not have filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed CA Decision
before filing this Petition for Review.

The Facts

On 17 July 1997, respondent Bantigue Point Development Corporation filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Rosario, Batangas an application for original registration of title over a parcel of land
with an assessed value of ₱4,330, ₱1,920 and ₱8,670, or a total assessed value of ₱14,920 for the
entire property, more particularly described as Lot 8060 of Cad 453-D, San Juan Cadastre, with an
area of more or less 10,732 square meters, located at Barangay Barualte, San Juan, Batangas.  3

On 18 July 1997, the RTC issued an Order setting the case for initial hearing on 22 October
1997. On 7 August 1997, it issued a second Order setting the initial hearing on 4 November 1997.
4  5

Petitioner Republic filed its Opposition to the application for registration on 8 January 1998 while the
records were still with the RTC.6

On 31 March 1998, the RTC Clerk of Court transmitted motu proprio the records of the case to the
MTC of San Juan, because the assessed value of the property was allegedly less than ₱100,000. 7

Thereafter, the MTC entered an Order of General Default and commenced with the reception of
8 

evidence. Among the documents presented by respondent in support of its application are Tax
9 

Declarations, a Deed of Absolute Sale in its favor, and a Certification from the Department of
10  11 

Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) of Batangas City that the lot in question is within the alienable and disposable
zone. Thereafter, it awarded the land to respondent Corporation.
12  13

Acting on an appeal filed by the Republic, the CA ruled that since the former had actively
14 

participated in the proceedings before the lower court, but failed to raise the jurisdictional challenge
therein, petitioner is thereby estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the lower court on
appeal. The CA further found that respondent Corporation had sufficiently established the latter’s
15 

registrable title over the subject property after having proven open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by itself and its predecessors-in-interest
even before the outbreak of World War II. 16
Dissatisfied with the CA’s ruling, petitioner Republic filed this instant Rule 45 Petition and raised the
following arguments in support of its appeal:

I.

THE REPUBLIC CANNOT BE ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING THE JURISDICTION OF

THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OVER THE APPLICATION FOR ORIGINAL
REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLE EVEN FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL

II.

THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE

APPLICATION FOR ORIGINAL REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLE. 17

The Court’s Ruling

We uphold the jurisdiction of the MTC, but remand the case to the court a quo for further
proceedings in order to determine if the property in question forms part of the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain.

The Republic is not estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction in this case.

At the outset, we rule that petitioner Republic is not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the
lower court, even if the former raised the jurisdictional question only on appeal. The rule is settled
that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the law. It
18  19 

cannot be acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of the parties or conferred by the
acquiescence of the court. Consequently, questions of jurisdiction may be cognizable even if raised
20 

for the first time on appeal.

21

The ruling of the Court of Appeals that "a party may be estopped from raising such [jurisdictional]
question if he has actively taken part in the very proceeding which he questions, belatedly objecting
to the court’s jurisdiction in the event that the judgment or order subsequently rendered is adverse to
him" is based on the doctrine of estoppel by laches. We are aware of that doctrine first enunciated
22 

by this Court in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. In Tijam, the party-litigant actively participated in the
23 

proceedings before the lower court and filed pleadings therein. Only 15 years thereafter, and after
receiving an adverse Decision on the merits from the appellate court, did the party-litigant question
the lower court’s jurisdiction. Considering the unique facts in that case, we held that estoppel by
laches had already precluded the party-litigant from raising the question of lack of jurisdiction on
appeal. In Figueroa v. People, we cautioned that Tijam must be construed as an exception to the
24 

general rule and applied only in the most exceptional cases whose factual milieu is similar to that in
the latter case.

The facts are starkly different in this case, making the exceptional rule in Tijam inapplicable. Here,
petitioner Republic filed its Opposition to the application for registration when the records were still
with the RTC. At that point, petitioner could not have questioned the delegated jurisdiction of the
25 

MTC, simply because the case was not yet with that court. When the records were transferred to the
MTC, petitioner neither filed pleadings nor requested affirmative relief from that court. On appeal,
petitioner immediately raised the jurisdictional question in its Brief. Clearly, the exceptional doctrine
26 

of estoppel by laches is inapplicable to the instant appeal.

Laches has been defined as the "failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that
the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it." In this case, petitioner
27 

Republic has not displayed such unreasonable failure or neglect that would lead us to conclude that
it has abandoned or declined to assert its right to question the lower court's jurisdiction.

II

The Municipal Trial Court properly acquired jurisdiction over the case.

In assailing the jurisdiction of the lower courts, petitioner Republic raised two points of contention: (a)
the period for setting the date and hour of the initial hearing; and (b) the value of the land to be
registered.

First, petitioner argued that the lower court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the application, because
the RTC set the date and hour of the initial hearing beyond the 90-day period provided under the
Property Registration Decree. 28

We disagree.

The Property Registration Decree provides:

Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. - The court shall, within five days from filing of the
application, issue an order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier
than forty-five days nor later than ninety days from the date of the order. x x x.

In this case, the application for original registration was filed on 17 July 1997. On 18 July 1997, or a
29 

day after the filing of the application, the RTC immediately issued an Order setting the case for initial
hearing on 22 October 1997, which was 96 days from the Order. While the date set by the RTC was
30 

beyond the 90-day period provided for in Section 23, this fact did not affect the jurisdiction of the trial
court. In Republic v. Manna Properties, Inc., petitioner Republic therein contended that there was
31 

failure to comply with the jurisdictional requirements for original registration, because there were 125
days between the Order setting the date of the initial hearing and the initial hearing itself. We ruled
that the lapse of time between the issuance of the Order setting the date of initial hearing and the
date of the initial hearing itself was not fatal to the application. Thus, we held:

x x x [A] party to an action has no control over the Administrator or the Clerk of Court acting as a
land court; he has no right to meddle unduly with the business of such official in the performance of
his duties. A party cannot intervene in matters within the exclusive power of the trial court. No fault is
attributable to such party if the trial court errs on matters within its sole power. It is unfair to punish
an applicant for an act or omission over which the applicant has neither responsibility nor control,
especially if the applicant has complied with all the requirements of the law. 32

Indeed, it would be the height of injustice to penalize respondent Corporation by dismissing its
application for registration on account of events beyond its control.
Moreover, since the RTC issued a second Order on 7 August 1997 setting the initial hearing on 4
November 1997, within the 90-day period provided by law, petitioner Republic argued that the
33 

jurisdictional defect was still not cured, as the second Order was issued more than five days from the
filing of the application, again contrary to the prescribed period under the Property Registration
Decree. 34

Petitioner is incorrect.

The RTC’s failure to issue the Order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing within five days
from the filing of the application for registration, as provided in the Property Registration Decree, did
not affect the court’s its jurisdiction. Observance of the five-day period was merely directory, and
failure to issue the Order within that period did not deprive the RTC of its jurisdiction over the case.
To rule that compliance with the five-day period is mandatory would make jurisdiction over the
subject matter dependent upon the trial court. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only
by the Constitution or the law. It cannot be contingent upon the action or inaction of the court.
35 

This does not mean that courts may disregard the statutory periods with impunity. We cannot
assume that the law deliberately meant the provision "to become meaningless and to be treated as a
dead letter." However, the records of this case do not show such blatant disregard for the law. In
36 

fact, the RTC immediately set the case for initial hearing a day after the filing of the application for
registration, except that it had to issue a second Order because the initial hearing had been set
37 

beyond the 90-day period provided by law.

Second, petitioner contended that since the selling price of the property based on the Deed of Sale
38 

annexed to respondent’s application for original registration was ₱160,000, the MTC did not have
39 

jurisdiction over the case. Under Section 34 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act, as amended, the 40 

MTC’s delegated jurisdiction to try cadastral and land registration cases is limited to lands, the value
of which should not exceed ₱100,000.

We are not persuaded.

The delegated jurisdiction of the MTC over cadastral and land registration cases is indeed set forth
in the Judiciary Reorganization Act, which provides:

Sec. 34. Delegated Jurisdiction in Cadastral and Land Registration Cases. - Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts may be assigned by the Supreme
Court to hear and determine cadastral or land registration cases covering lots where there is no
controversy or opposition, or contested lots where the value of which does not exceed One hundred
thousand pesos (₱100,000.00), such value to be ascertained by the affidavit of the claimant or by
agreement of the respective claimants if there are more than one, or from the corresponding tax
declaration of the real property. Their decision in these cases shall be appealable in the same
manner as decisions of the Regional Trial Courts. (As amended by R.A. No. 7691) (Emphasis
supplied.)

Thus, the MTC has delegated jurisdiction in cadastral and land registration cases in two
instances: first, where there is no controversy or opposition; or, second, over contested lots, the
value of which does not exceed ₱100,000.

The case at bar does not fall under the first instance, because petitioner opposed respondent
Corporation’s application for registration on 8 January 1998. 41
However, the MTC had jurisdiction under the second instance, because the value of the lot in this
case does not exceed ₱100,000.

Contrary to petitioner’s contention, the value of the land should not be determined with reference to
its selling price. Rather, Section 34 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act provides that the value of the
property sought to be registered may be ascertained in three ways: first, by the affidavit of the
claimant; second, by agreement of the respective claimants, if there are more than one; or, third,
from the corresponding tax declaration of the real property. 42

In this case, the value of the property cannot be determined using the first method, because the
records are bereft of any affidavit executed by respondent as to the value of the property. Likewise,
valuation cannot be done through the second method, because this method finds application only
where there are multiple claimants who agree on and make a joint submission as to the value of the
property. Here, only respondent Bantigue Point Development Corporation claims the property.

The value of the property must therefore be ascertained with reference to the corresponding Tax
Declarations submitted by respondent Corporation together with its application for registration. From
the records, we find that the assessed value of the property is ₱4,330, ₱1,920 and ₱8,670, or a total
assessed value of ₱14,920 for the entire property. Based on these Tax Declarations, it is evident
43 

that the total value of the land in question does not exceed ₱100,000. Clearly, the MTC may
exercise its delegated jurisdiction under the Judiciary Reorganization Act, as amended.

III

A certification from the CENRO is not sufficient proof that the property in question is alienable and
disposable land of the public domain.

Even as we affirm the propriety of the MTC’s exercise of its delegated jurisdiction, we find that the
lower court erred in granting respondent Corporation’s application for original registration in the
absence of sufficient proof that the property in question was alienable and disposable land of the
public domain.

The Regalian doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State. The applicant
44 

for land registration has the burden of overcoming the presumption of State ownership by
establishing through incontrovertible evidence that the land sought to be registered is alienable or
disposable based on a positive act of the government. We held in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.
45 

that a CENRO certification is insufficient to prove the alienable and disposable character of the land
sought to be registered. The applicant must also show sufficient proof that the DENR Secretary has
46 

approved the land classification and released the land in question as alienable and disposable. 47

Thus, the present rule is that an application for original registration must be accompanied by (1) a
CENRO or PENRO Certification; and (2) a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR
48 

Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. 49

Here, respondent Corporation only presented a CENRO certification in support of its

application. Clearly, this falls short of the requirements for original registration.
50 
1âwphi1

We therefore remand this case to the court a quo for reception of further evidence to prove that the
property in question forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain. If
respondent Bantigue Point Development Corporation presents a certified true copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary, the application for original registration should be
granted. If it fails to present sufficient proof that the land in question is alienable and disposable
based on a positive act of the government, the application should be denied.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is DENIED. Let this case be
REMANDED to the Municipal Trial Court of San Juan, Batangas, for reception of evidence to prove
that the property sought to be registered is alienable and disposable land of the public domain.