Concept and Theories of Structure: Unit 5

Unit 5
Concept and Theories of Structure

Contents
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Organic Analogy and Structure
5.3 Social Structure is a Reality: A.R. Radcliffe-Brown’s Contribution
5.4 Social Structure Refers to Relations between Groups:
The Contribution of E.E. Evans-Pritchard
5.5 Social Structure is a Model:
Contributions of Claude Lévi-Strauss and Edmund Leach
5.6 Conclusion
5.7 Further Reading
Learning Objectives
After going through this unit you will be able to
explain the concept of social structure
compare the theoretical contribution of Radcliffe-Brown and Evans Pritchard
critically discuss lrvi-strauss’s concept of structure.
5.1 Introduction
The term ‘structure’ (Latin structura from struere, to construct) was first
applied to ‘construction’. Later, during the classical period, it was used in
the scientific field of biology. To grasp the meaning of this oft-used concept
in sociology and social anthropology (and now, in other social sciences), let
us begin with the analogy of a house.
Irrespective of the type of community to which a house belongs, it is divided

into rooms, with each room set apart for conducting a particular set of
activities. For instance, one room may be used for cooking foods and keeping
raw ingredients and utensils for cooking, and it may be called the kitchen.
Another room may be used for housing the idols and pictures of sacred
deities and ancestors, and stacking sacred books and objects (such as lamps,
incense sticks, peacock feathers, etc), and it may be called the place of
worship, while another room may be used for spreading the bed, keeping
clothes, money and jewelry, storing grains, as happens in rural communities,
and it may called the bedroom. In this way, depending upon the purpose(s),
the other rooms of the house may be set aside, given some sort of
specialisation and name. Terms like ‘study room’, ‘store’, ‘guest room’,
‘toilet’, ‘bathroom’, ‘pantry’, ‘anteroom’, ‘children’s room’, etc, all indicate
the purpose for which a particular portion of the land is marked, and thus
designated. Where the tract of land is less, many of these ‘rooms’ may not
be there, but rather different corners of the same room may be associated
with different tasks and activities, so one of its sides may be used for
cooking, while another, for keeping deities.
Different rooms of a house are all interconnected. Passages, alleyways, and

corridors link different rooms, thus facilitating mobility from one part to the
other. Entry to rooms is through doors and their connection with the outside
world is through doors, windows and ventilators. When all of them are shut, 57
Social Structure as a the room becomes a well-demarcated and closed unit, bearing little interaction
Sociological Concept
with the external world, and when open, it is constantly interacting with
the other parts of the house. Each room has its own boundary, its
distinctiveness, which separates it from other rooms. At the same time, it
is not an ‘isolated entity’, for it is defined (as a bed room or study room)
as a distinct entity in relation to the other rooms, which are also defined
distinctly. In other words, the ‘wholeness of the room’, looking from one
point of view, by stationing oneself in the room, is juxtaposed to ‘its being
a part of the house’, when one looks at it by situating oneself outside it.
Pursuing this analogy further, a village or a neighbourhood may be described

as an aggregate of houses, where each village or neighbourhood maintains
its ‘wholeness’, at the same time, it is a part of the larger units. Each village
or neighbourhood maintains its boundary, its identity, and also, has several
connections (quite like the passages, alleyways, and corridors) with other
villages or neighbourhoods. The relevant concepts that emerge from this
analogy are of the ‘whole’, the ‘interconnections’, the ‘boundary-maintaining
mechanisms’, the ‘aggregation’, and the ‘vantage point of the observer’.
Like a house (or a village or a neighbourhood), a society may be conceptualised

(or imagined) as consisted of parts. One needs to begin with this analogy,
because society does not have the kind of concreteness one finds in a house,
village, or neighbourhood. In fact, the method of analogy is useful for trying
to know the unknown through the known. One knows what a house is, what
it looks like, and by extending its model, one tries to formulate a tentative
idea of society. However, it should not be forgotten that analogy is not
homology: the idea that society is like a house does not imply that society
is a house. Thus, after drawing similarities between a society and a house,
one should also look at the differences between them, for such an exercise
will direct us to the uniqueness of society – the distinct properties of society.
In their attempts to formulate the idea of society, different scholars have

adopted different analogies. Herbert Spencer (1873) is one of the first ones
to use the analogy of building, with which we have also begun. But of all the
analogies that were used in the formative stage of sociology to comprehend
the idea of society, the most frequently used analogy has been of the
organism: Society is like an organism (Rex 1961). In addition to the analogy
of building, Spencer also develops the organic analogy, believing that this
analogy will be greatly valid if we are able to show not only that society is
like an organism but also that ‘organism is like society’ (see Barnes, H.E.
1948; Harris 1968). Why organic analogy is used more than other analogies –
such as of the solar system, and later, of atomic and chemical systems – is
because an organism is far more concrete than other systems, and is easy
to understand, comprehend, and explain. This analogy was basic to the
understanding of the concept of social structure, a term used for the first
time by Spencer.
In this unit, we will explore the meaning of the term structure and then go
on to examining the contributions of Radcliffe-Brown, Evans Pritchard and
Levi-Strauss to the understanding of social structure.
5.2 Organic Analogy and Structure

The principal unit of an organism is a cell, which combines with others of
58 its kind to form a tissue. An aggregate of tissues is an organ, and an aggregate
of organs is an organism. Thus, an organism can be broken down into organs, Concept and
Theories of Structure
an organ into tissues, a tissue into cells, and from the latter, one of them
can be taken up for study. In a similar fashion, the basic unit of society is
a ‘socialised individual’, one who has internalized the norms and values, and
the ways of meaningful social behaviour. A collectivity of individuals is a
group, and several of them combine together to form a community. An
aggregate of communities is called society. As in the case of organism, a
society can be broken down into communities, which in turn can be divided
into groups, and groups into individuals.
Organic analogy is quite useful as a starting point, but it should not be

regarded as an end in itself, for it breaks down at many levels. For instance,
a single cell can survive; there are organisms made up of single cells. But no
individual can survive alone; the most elemental unit of human society is a
dyad, i.e., a group of two individuals. Aristotle had said long time back: ‘One
who lives alone is either a beast or god.’ Organic analogy helps us to
understand the concepts of society and its structure, but it should not blind
us to the specificities of society, not found in other systems of natural and
biological world.
The Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (1999) gives three meanings of the
term structure: 1) the way in which something is organised, built, or put
together (e.g., the structure of the human body); 2) a particular system,
pattern, procedure, or institution (e.g., class structure, salary structure);
and 3) a thing made up of several parts put together in a particular way
(e.g., a single-storey structure). When a sociologist speaks of structure, he
has all the three meanings in his mind. By structure, he means an
‘interconnectedness’ of parts, i.e., the parts of a society are not isolated
entities, but are brought together in a set of relationships to which the
term structure may be used.
Everything has a structure. Unless it is there, the entity will not be able to
carry out any tasks; it will not be able to work. When its structure breaks
down, or is jeopardized, it stops working, becomes inert, thereby affecting
the activities of the other systems because they are all interconnected. Why
the parts are connected in particular manner is because of the logical and
rational relationship between them. For those who regard structure as an
important analytical concept, the world is an organized entity; it comprises
interconnected parts, where each part is to be studied in relationship with
other parts. To sum up: ‘Structure refers to the way in which the parts of
an entity are interconnected so that the entity emerges as an integrated
whole, which for the purpose of analysis can be broken down into individual
parts.’
No dispute exists in sociology with respect to the idea that structure means
an ‘interconnectedness of parts’, but it exists as to the identity of these
parts – whether these parts are individuals, or groups, or roles, or institutions,
or messages. In other words, the question is: Which of these parts should
receive our primary attention? Second, a difference of opinion exists whether
the structure is an empirical entity, something that can be seen and observed,
or is an abstraction, arrived at from the regularity and consistency of human
behaviour. Around these two ideas are built different theories of social
structure. Robert Merton (1975) is quite right in saying that the notion of
social structure is ‘polyphyletic and polymorphous’, i.e., it has many meanings
and ideas. 59
Social Structure as a
Sociological Concept 5.3 Social Structure is a Reality: A.R. Radcliffe-
Brown’s Contribution
As said earlier, Spencer coined the term social structure, but did not offer
a theoretical perspective on it, except for advancing the analogy between
societies and organisms, which influenced later scholars in developing the
concepts of structure and function. For instance, Émile Durkheim (1938
[1895]), although a staunch critic of Spencer, was greatly attracted to organic
analogy, and said that the idea of function in social sciences was based on
analogy between the living organism and society. He used the term ‘social
morphology’, by which he meant what we mean by the term ‘social structure’.
Durkheim’s sociology exercised an indelible impact on the British social

anthropologist, A.R. Radcliffe-Brown, who was a student of the diffusionist
W.H.R. Rivers, and had carried out his first-hand fieldwork with the Andaman
Islanders from 1906 to 1908. The findings of this field study were first
submitted in the form of an M.A. dissertation in 1910. Subsequently, it was
reworked for a book published in 1922 titled The Andaman Islanders, which
is regarded as one of the first important books leading to the foundation of
the functional approach. Besides his contribution to what he called the
‘structural-functional approach’, one of his important contributions was to
the understanding of the concept of social structure. As said previously,
there are scholars prior to Radcliffe-Brown who had used the term social
structure, but it was Radcliffe-Brown (1952) who not only defined this concept
but also initiated a debate on it. Throughout his teaching, he emphasised
the importance of the study of social structure. This submission of Radcliffe-
Brown was closely linked to his notion of social anthropology, which he was
quite willing to call after Durkheim, ‘comparative sociology’.
a) A Natural Science of Society

For Radcliffe-Brown (1948), social anthropology is the ‘theoretical natural
science of human society’. That is to say, social phenomena are investigated
by methods similar to those used in natural and biological sciences. Each of
the sciences has a subject matter that can be investigated through our
senses. Thus, the subject matter is empirical, which can be subjected to
observation. Radcliffe-Brown pursues the analogy of the natural science: all
natural sciences systematically investigate the ‘structure of the universe as
it is revealed to us through our senses’. Each branch of science deals with
a ‘certain class or kind of structures’ — for instance, atomic physics deals
with the structure of atoms, chemistry with the structure of molecules,
anatomy and physiology with the structure of organisms. Then, it moves
further with the aim to ‘discover the characteristics of all structures of that
kind’. Each science endeavours to understand a structure with which it is
concerned, and then, all the structures of that type are compared to discover
their common characteristics. All sciences move from particular to general,
from understanding a structure to understanding the structure.
If social anthropology is a natural science of society, then its subject matter

must be amenable to observation and empirical enquiry. Social structure is
what social anthropologists study; it is the province of their enquiry. It is
observable; it has a concrete reality. Radcliffe-Brown (1952) writes: ‘Social
structures are just as real as are individual organisms.’ It is clear that Radcliffe-
Brown’s concept of social structure is tied to his natural science conception
of social anthropology.
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b) The Content of Social Structure Concept and
When we speak of structure, we have in mind, as said earlier, some sort of
an ordered arrangement of parts or components. A piece of musical
composition has a structure, and its parts are notes. Similarly, a sentence
has a structure: its parts are words, so does a building, the parts of which
are bricks and mortar. The basic part of social structure is the person. Here,
Radcliffe-Brown (1952) makes an important distinction between an ‘individual’
and a ‘person’. As an individual, ‘he is a biological organism’, comprising a
large number of molecules organised in a complex way, which keeps on
carrying out a multitude of physiological and psychological functions till the
time he is alive. This aspect of human beings — the ‘individual’ aspect — is
an object of study for biological and psychological sciences.
As a ‘person’, the human being is a ‘complex of social relationships’. It is the

unit of study for sociologists and social anthropologists. As a person, he is
a citizen of a country, a member of a family, a supporter of a political party,
a follower of a religious cult, a worker in a factory, a resident of a
neighbourhood, and so on. Each of these positions the person occupies
denotes a social relationship, because each position is related to another
position. A person is a member of a family in relation to other members and
the set of interrelationships of the members of a family constitutes its
structure. Each person occupies, therefore, a ‘place in a social structure’.
Radcliffe-Brown uses the term ‘social personality’ for the ‘position’ a human
being occupies in a social structure. It however does not imply that the
position remains the same throughout the life of an individual, for it changes
over time. New positions are added; old are deleted. We study persons in
terms of social structure and we study social structures in terms of persons
who are the unit of what it is composed.
Society is not a ‘haphazard conjunction of persons’, rather an organised

system where norms and values control the relationships between persons.
A person knows how he is expected to behave according to these norms and
values, and is ‘justified in expecting that other persons should do the same.’
Radcliffe-Brown includes the following two aspects within the social structure:
1) All social relations of person to person, i.e., interpersonal relations. For
example, the kinship structure of any society consists a number of dyadic
relations, such as father and son, mother and daughter, mother’s brother
and sister’s son, etc.
2) The differentiation of individuals and of classes by their social role. For
instance, the relation between men and women, chief and commoners,
employers and employees, etc, are aspects of social structure, for they
determine social relations between people.
In both cases, we are in fact concerned with relations between persons,

which norms and values of that society condition.
Bringing these together, Radcliffe-Brown says that social structure is that

concrete reality that comprises the ‘set of actually existing relations at a
given moment of time, which link together certain human beings.’ We can
conduct direct observation on social structure – we can see the ‘actually
existing relations’, describe and classify them, and understand the relations
of persons with others. Social structure is observable, empirical, and fully
amenable to study by methods of natural and biological sciences.
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Social Structure as a c) Structural Type
When a social anthropologist carries out his fieldwork in a particular,
territorially defined, society, what he actually investigates is its social
structure, i.e., ‘an actually existing concrete reality, to be directly observed.’
But from what he observes, he abstracts a general picture of that society.
In this context, Radcliffe-Brown makes a distinction between ‘social structure’
and ‘structural type or form’. This distinction is also related with Radcliffe-
Brown’s conception of science, and of social anthropology as a ‘natural
science of society’. He says that as distinguished from history (or biography),
science is not concerned with the particular or unique. It is concerned,
rather, with the general, with propositions that apply to the entire
phenomenon. We are concerned with, he says, ‘the form of the structure’.
Say, in the study of an Australian tribe, an anthropologist is concerned with

the relationship between the mother’s brother and sister’s son. He observes
several instances of this relationship in their actual context, from which he
abstracts its ‘general or normal’ form, which is largely invariant. If social
structure is bound by factors of time and space, varying from one context
to another, structural type is general and invariant.
Social structure continues over time, a kind of continuity that Radcliffe-

Brown calls ‘dynamic continuity’. It is like the ‘organic structure of a living
body’. As a living body constantly renews itself by replacing its cells and
energy level, in the same way, the actual ‘social life renews the social
structure.’ Relations between people change over time. New members are
recruited in a society because of birth or immigration. While the social
structure changes over time, there remains an underlying continuity and
relative constancy, which designates its structural form.
Reflection and Action 5.1

What does Radlliffe-Brown mean by dynamic continuity?
This certainly does not imply that the structural form is static — it also
changes, sometimes gradually, sometimes with suddenness, as happens in
cases of revolution. But even then, some kind of a continuity of structure
is maintained. Our job as sociologists and social anthropologists is to discover
the structural form of society. It is to move from particular to general, or in
the language of Radcliffe-Brown, from ‘ideographic’ to ‘nomothetic’. While
the former designates a specific social structure, the latter is the structural
form. While the former requires an intensive study of a single society, the
latter is an abstraction of the form of that society. Also, the study of a single
society needs to be compared with similar studies of other societies. This
process, systematically carried out, can lead us to the discovery of general
laws that apply to human society as a whole.
For Radcliffe-Brown, the various steps of reaching the general laws are:
1) Intensive study of a social structure using the standard anthropological
procedures.
2) Abstraction from this its structural type.
3) Comparing the structural type of a social structure with the structural
types of other social structures, by rigorously using the comparative
method.
62
4) Arriving at the laws of society, the invariant propositions that explain Concept and
human behaviour in diverse social situations.
For Radcliffe-Brown, there is only one method of social anthropology, i.e.,

the comparative method, for it helps us to move from the particular to the
general. Social structure is what we study, but what we arrive at is the
structural type.
d) Society and Social Structure

Radcliffe-Brown’s attempt was praiseworthy, for it was the first rigorous
attempt to define the concept of social structure, rather than just taking
its meaning for granted. However, it led to many questions and confusions.
If social structure is a collectivity of interpersonal relations, real and
observable, then what is society? Do we study society and find its structure?
In his letter to Claude Lévi-Strauss, Radcliffe-Brown gave the following
example: ‘When I pick up a particular sea-shell on the beach, I recognize it
as having a particular structure’ (see Kuper, ed., 1977). The question that
immediately comes in our mind is: What do I study? The seashell or its
structure? Pursuing the example further, Radcliffe-Brown says: ‘I may find
other shells of the same species which have a similar structure, so that I can
say there is a form of structure characteristic of the species.’ Here, do I
describe the structure of each of these shells and then subject their structures
to comparison? Or, do I assume that since they all happen to be seashells,
they will have a similar structure?
Further, Radcliffe-Brown writes: ‘By examining a number of different species,

I may be able to recognize a certain general structural form or principle, that
of a helix, which could be expressed by means of logarithmic equation.’ Do
I compare different species of seashells to arrive at their general structural
form? Or, do I compare the structural forms of each of the species of seashells
to reach at a structural form that is common to all? These questions clearly
show that while there is no confusion between the categories of particular
and general, confusion prevails with respect to the distinction between
‘society’ and ‘social structure’, ‘social life’ and ‘social structure’, and the
‘structural form’ of a social structure and the ‘structural form’ of social
structures. One more observation: what Radcliffe-Brown understands by the
term ‘structural type’ is what many understand by the term ‘social structure’.
And, what Radcliffe-Brown calls ‘social structure’ is what many would call
‘society’.
5.4 Social Structure Refers to Relations Between

Groups: The Contribution of E.E. Evans-
Pritchard
Radcliffe-Brown’s paper on social structure, originally the Presidential Address
to the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland in 1940,
referred to Evans-Pritchard’s idea of social structure. While Radcliffe-Brown
did not disagree with Evans-Pritchard’s use of social structure, he found it
more useful to include under the term social structure a good deal more than
what Evans-Pritchard had included. Evans-Pritchard delineated his concept
of social structure in the last section of the last chapter of his book, The
Nuer (1940).
Evans-Pritchard carried out a piece of intensive fieldwork with the Nuer of 63

Social Structure as a the Sudan. In his first monograph on them, he tried to describe Nuer society
on a more abstract plane of analysis than was usual at that time because of
a lack of a proper theory. Evans-Pritchard looked for such a theory in his
work on the Nuer, although many of his ideas that exercised impact on
sociology and social anthropology developed later.
In his monograph on the Nuer, he first gives an account of the importance

of cattle for the life of the people he had studied. The ecological system in
which they find themselves conditions their territorial distribution and
transhumance. The Nuer concepts of time and space arise largely from their
patterns of livelihood. Then, Evans-Pritchard examines the territorial sections
which form their political system, in the absence of a centralised political
authority. The Nuer are a good example of a stateless (or, acephalous) society.
Their discussion has given rise to the concept of segmentary political system,
where social order is largely a function of the opposition and balance of
different sections of society.
Evans-Pritchard’s description of the elements of Nuer society and their

interrelationship guided him to the concept of social structure. Instead of
beginning with the idea of person, as did Radcliffe-Brown, he began with
viewing social structure in terms of groups. To quote him (1940: 262):
By social structure we mean relations between groups which have a high

degree of consistency and constancy.
Structure is an ‘organised combination of groups’. Individuals come and go,

they are recruited and eliminated over time, but the groups remain the
same, for ‘generation after generation of people pass through them’ (1940:
262). The processes of life and death condition individuals, but the structure
of society endures. It is clear that for Evans-Pritchard, social structure deals
with units which are largely invariant, i.e., groups. What Radcliffe-Brown
means by ‘structural form’ is what Evans-Pritchard means by ‘social structure’.
The groups considered for describing social structure may be called ‘structural
groups’ – the examples of which among the Nuer are territorial groups,
lineages and age-sets.
Evans-Pritchard does not consider the family as a ‘structural group’. It is

because he thinks that the family does not have the kind of consistency and
constancy which other groups have. A family disappears at the death of its
members and a new family comes into existence. However, it does not imply
that the family is less important, for it is ‘essential for the preservation of
the structure’ (1940: 262). New members are born into family, which maintain
the system and its continuity. This formulation of structure, Evans-Pritchard
clarifies, does not imply that the groups — consistent and constant — that
constitute the structure are static. Territorial, lineage and age-set systems
do change, but slowly, and ‘there is always the same kind of interrelationship
between their segments.’
Reflecting on the example of the Nuer, Evans-Pritchard says that the tribe
is not a haphazard congregation of residential units. Every local group is
segmented, and these segments are fused in relation to other groups. Because
of this, each unit can only be defined in terms of the whole system. One
may conceptualise a society as a ‘system of groups’ in which relations exist
between ‘groups of persons’, and these relations are structural relations.
64 Thus, structure is a ‘relation between groups’. These relations can be spoken
of in terms of a system. Evans-Pritchard considers kinship relations as a Concept and
kinship system; or, one may speak of political relations as a political system.
This brings us to the issue of defining a group. For Evans-Pritchard, a group

is a congregation of people who consider themselves as a distinct unit in
relation to the other units. The members of a group have a discernible sense
of identity and they are defined so by other groups. Among the members of
a group exist reciprocal obligations. They are expected to fuse together
whenever they encounter an issue pertaining to their group or one of its
members. The ‘vengeance groups’ are formed on this basis. Their aim is to
avenge the death of one of their members. In a case of homicide, the
members of the group of the slain become one as opposed to the members
of the group of the slayer, thus emerge two ‘structurally equivalent and
mutually opposed groups’. In this sense, the segments of a tribe, a lineage,
and an age-set are all examples of groups. However, a man’s kindred does not
constitute a group, and so do the members of a neighbouring tribe or the
strangers.
To sum up: for Evans-Pritchard, the parts of social structure, among which
structural relations are to be described, are groups that endure over time.
Social structure is not an empirical entity for him. From the study of the
social relations of people, we move on to an understanding of their groups.
When we describe the relations between groups, we are already on our way
of describing their social structure. Therefore, social structure is an
anthropologist’s abstraction from the existing reality. It should be kept in
mind here that for Evans-Pritchard (1951), social anthropology is not a branch
of natural science, as it is for Radcliffe-Brown, but it is a kind of historiography.
Its kinship is with history, and not natural and biological sciences.
5.5 Social Structure is a Model: Contributions of

Claude Lévi-Strauss and Edmund Leach
Perhaps the most provocative and debatable contribution to the concept of
social structure was that of Claude Lévi-Strauss, the French structuralist,
who is famous for his ingenious cross-cultural analysis of myths and kinship
systems. If for functionalism, society is a ‘kind of living creature’, consisting
of parts, which can be ‘dissected and distinguished’, for structuralism, it is
the analogy from language that helps us in conceptualizing society. From the
study of a given piece of language, the linguist tries to arrive at its grammar,
the underlying rules which make an expression meaningful, although the
speakers of that language may not know about it. Similarly, the structuralist
from a given piece of social behaviour tries to infer its underlying structure.
In structuralism, the shift is from observable behaviour to structure, from
organic analogy to language (Barnard 2000).
Further, structuralism submits that the set of relations between different

parts can be transformed into ‘something’ that appears to be different from
what it was earlier. It is the idea of transformation — of one into another
— that lies at the core of structuralism, rather than the quality of relations.
Edmund Leach (1968: 486) has given a good example to illustrate this. A piece
of music can be transformed in a variety of ways. It is written down, played
on a piano, recorded on a phonographic record, transmitted over the radio,
and finally played back to the audience. In each case, the piece of music
passes through a ‘whole series of transformations’. It appears as ‘printed
notes, as a pattern of finger movements, as sound waves, as modulations of 65
Social Structure as a the grooves on a piece of bakelite, as electromagnetic vibrations, and so
on.’ But what is common to all these manifestations of music, one different
from the other, and each conditioned by its own rules, is their structure. In
a similar fashion, while different societies vary, what remains invariant (and
common) to them is their structure. Lévi-Strauss (1963) aptly showed this in
one of his studies where he compared the totemic society of the Australian
Aborigines with Indian caste system, and found that both of them had the
same structure. If for Radcliffe-Brown, structure is observable, for Lévi-
Strauss, it is an abstract concept. If for Radcliffe-Brown, what persists is the
‘structure’ of a particular society, at a particular point of time and place, for
Lévi-Strauss, what persists is the ‘structure of the entire human society’
(Barnes, R.H. 2001).
In his celebrated essay of 1953 in A.L. Kroeber’s Anthropology Today, titled

‘Social Structure’, Lévi-Strauss says that social structure is not a field of
study; it is not a ‘province of enquiry’. We do not study social structure, but
it is an explanatory method and can be used in any kind of social studies.
In opposition to Radcliffe-Brown, Lévi-Strauss says that the term ‘social
structure’ has nothing to do with empirical reality. It refers to the models
that are built up from empirical reality. He writes: ‘…the object of social-
structure studies is to understand social relations with the help of models’
(1953: 532). Social structure is a model; it is a method of study.
Here, Lévi-Strauss distinguishes the concept of social structure from that of

social relations. The latter are the ‘raw data of social experience’ – they are
the relations between people, empirical and observable. It is from social
relations that models comprising the social structure are built. Although the
models are built from raw, empirical reality, they cannot be reduced to it.
The ensemble of social relations in a given society can be described, but
social structure is an anthropologist’s construction, built for the purpose of
analysis.

How does Levi-Strauss distinguish between the concept of social structure
and social relations?
Lévi-Strauss makes three distinctions: first, between observation and

experimentation on models; second, the conscious and unconscious character
of the models; and third, between mechanical and statistical models. The
observation of social relations and the construction of models after these
facts need to be distinguished from ‘experiments’ on models. By
experimentation, Lévi-Strauss means the ‘controlled comparison’ of models
of the same or of a different kind, with an intention to identify the model
that accounts best for the observed facts. In a structural analysis, the first
step is to observe the facts without any bias, then to describe them in
relationship to themselves and in relation to the whole. From this, models
are constructed, and in the final analysis, the best model is chosen. This
distinction is with reference to the anthropologist who studies society.
By comparison, the distinction between conscious and unconscious models

is made with reference to the society under study. Conscious models, also
known as ‘homemade models’ and ‘norms’, are the “insider’s models”: they
are those according to which the society views itself. Underneath these
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models are ‘deeper structures’, the unconscious models, which the society Concept and
does not perceive directly or consciously. Anthropologists principally work
with the models that they construct from the deeper lying phenomena,
rather than with conscious models. It is because, Lévi-Strauss says, the aim
of conscious models is to ‘perpetuate the phenomena’ and not to ‘explain’
it. But, from this, we should not infer that conscious models could be
dismissed, for in some cases, they are far more accurate than those that
anthropologists build. Even when conscious models are inaccurate, they
guide us to deeper structures.
Let us now come to the last distinction. The classic formulation of mechanical
models is that they are those models which lie on the same scale as the
phenomenon is. And, when they — the model and the phenomenon — lie on
a different scale, they are called statistical models. Unfortunately, as critics
have noted, Lévi-Strauss does not explain the meaning of the ‘same scale’.
But from the example he has given, it seems that he is concerned with the
quantitative differences between ‘what people say’ and ‘what they do’. To
make it clear, Lévi-Strauss gives the example of the laws of marriage. When
there is no difference between marriage rules and social groupings — the
two are placed on the same scale — the model formed will be mechanical.
And when several factors affect the type of marriage and people have no
option but to deviate from the rule, the model formed will be statistical.
Box 5.2: Edmund Leach on Social Structure

The British anthropologist, Edmund Leach (1954, 1961), also made a
significant contribution to the idea of social structure as a model, although
there are many significant differences between the approaches of Lévi-
Strauss and Leach to structuralism. For instance, whereas Lévi-Strauss is
interested in unearthing the ‘universal structures’ – structures applicable to
all human societies at all point of time — Leach applies the method of
structuralism to understand the local (or regional) structures. Because of
this, some term Leach’s approach ‘neo-structural’ (Kuper 1996 [1973]).
Leach has formulated a conception of social structure that is “essentially the

same as Lévi-Strauss’s” (Nutini 1970: 76). Like Lévi-Strauss, Leach divides the
‘social universe’ into different epistemological categories: the raw data of
social experience (i.e., social relations) and the models that are built from
it. Models are not empirical; they are the ‘logical constructions’ in the mind
of the anthropologist. Like Lévi-Strauss, Leach also arrives at the distinction
between the mechanical and statistical models, i.e., models built respectively
on ‘what people say’ and ‘what people do’, but he calls mechanical models
‘jural rules’ and statistical models ‘statistical norms’. The meaning Leach
gives to ‘jural rules’ and ‘statistical norms’ is essentially the same which
Lévi-Strauss gives to mechanical and statistical models.
But two important differences stand out. First, for Lévi-Strauss, both
mechanical and statistical models are of roughly equal analytical value and
they complement each other. For Leach, jural rules and statistical norms
should be treated as separate frames of reference. In an analysis, the
statistical norms should have priority over the jural rules. We should begin
our study with the actual behaviour of people, the deviations that occur and
the conformity they achieve. Second, Leach points out that mechanical
models or jural rules are qualitative rules of behaviour. Sanctions support
67
Social Structure as a them and they have the power of coercion. Statistical models or norms are
only ‘statistical averages of individual behaviour’. They do not have any
coercive power.
5.6 Conclusion
The concept of social structure has been a ‘pleasant puzzle’, to remember
the words of A.L. Kroeber (1948), to which, at one time, almost every
anthropologist and sociologist tried to make a contribution, either by drawing
attention to the part (or parts) of society that seemed important to the
author, or by lending support to an already existing idea or theory of social
structure. As noted in the beginning, the debate concerning social structure
has centered around two issues: (1) Among which parts of society are there
structural relations? And, (2) is social structure ‘real’ or a ‘model’ which the
investigator constructs? Of the two major opinions on social structure, Lévi-
Strauss’s is closely connected to his method of structuralism – social structure
is a ‘model’ devised for undertaking the study of social behaviour (relations
and experiences). For Radcliffe-Brown, social structure is an ‘empirical’ entity,
constituting the subject matter of social anthropology and sociology. In his
letter to Lévi-Strauss, Radcliffe-Brown expressed his disagreement with the
former’s concept of social structure and the confusion clouding the idea of
social structure as a ‘model’. Radcliffe-Brown also thought that what meant
by the term ‘structural type’ was what Lévi-Strauss’s term ‘model’ implied
(see Kuper, ed, 1977).
A concept of social structure that the Australian anthropologist, S.F. Nadel,

proposes tries to combine the views of both Radcliffe-Brown and Lévi-Strauss.
In his posthumously published The Theory of Social Structure (1957), Nadel
disagrees with Radcliffe-Brown’s idea that social structure is an observable
entity, but an abstraction from it. At the same time, he rejects Lévi-Strauss’s
view that social structure has nothing to do with empirical reality. From
Radcliffe-Brown, he borrows the idea that each person occupies a position
in the social structure, but from an empirical level of inter-personal interaction,
he moves to a level of abstraction where the person becomes the actor who
plays a role with respect to the others. This abstraction, however, does not
imply that it loses touch with reality. Nadel (1957: 150) writes:
I consider social structure, of whatever degree of refinement, to be still the

social reality itself, or an aspect of it, not the logic behind it…
For Nadel, the components of social structure are roles and the pattern (or
design) of interconnected roles constitutes the social structure of a society.
His definition of social structure is as follows (1957: 12):
We arrive at the structure of a society through abstracting from the concrete

population and its behaviour the pattern or network (or ‘system’) of
relationships obtaining ‘between actors in their capacity of playing roles
relative to one another’.
Besides Nadel, some other sociologists have also emphasised the importance
of roles in defining social structure. Parsons (1961), for example, says that
the structure of a social system is defined with respect to the ‘institutionalized
patterns of normative culture’. Norms vary according to, first, the position
of actors in interactive situations, and second, the type of activity. Norms
68 define roles, with the corresponding rules of behaviour, and they also
constitute the institutions. The aim of social structure is to regulate human Concept and
behaviour. In his conception of social structure, Peter Blau (1977) also speaks
of the ‘social positions among which a population is distributed.’ Some of
these concepts of social structure have been put to test in empirical situation.
For instance, Blau and Schwartz (1984) applied Blau’s ideas to understand
real life.
5.7 Further Reading

Barnard, Alan. 2000. History and Theory in Anthropology. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Harris, Marvin. 1968. The Rise of Anthropological Theory, A History of Theories
of Culture. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company.
Merton, R.K. 1975. Structural Analysis in Sociology. In P.M. Blau (ed),
Approaches to the Study of Social Structure. New York: Free Press.
Nadel, S.F. 1957. The Theory of Social Structure. London: Cohen & West Ltd.
References
University Press.
Barnes, H.E. 1948. Historical Sociology: Its Origins and Development. New
York: Philosophical Library.
Barnes, R.H. 2001. Structuralism. In N.J. Smelser and P.B. Baltes (eds),
International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences. Elsevier
(pp. 15222-15225).
Blau, P.M. 1977. Inequality and Heterogeneity: A Primitive Theory of Social
Structure. New York: Free Press.
Blau, P.M. and J. Schwartz. 1984. Cross-cutting Social Circles. Orlando, CA:
Academic Press.
Durkheim, Émile. 1938 [1895]. The Rules of the Sociological Method. New
York: Free Press.
Evans-Pritchard, E.E. 1940. The Nuer: A Description of the Modes of Livelihood
and Political Institutions of a Nilotic People. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
_________________, 1951. Social Anthropology: The Broadcast Lectures.
London: Cohen & West.
Kroeber, A.L. 1948. Anthropology. New York: Harcourt, Brace.
Kuper, Adam. 1996 [1973]. Anthropologists and Anthropology: The Modern
British School. London: Routledge.
Kuper, Adam (ed). 1977. The Social Anthropology of Radcliffe-Brown. London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Leach, Edmund R. 1954. Political Systems of Highland Burma. Boston: Beacon
Press.
_________________, 1961. Rethinking Anthropology. London: Athlone Press.
_________________, 1968. Social Structure. In International Encyclopedia of
Social Sciences, Volume 14. McMillan Co. and Free Press (pp. 482-489).
69
Social Structure as a Lévi-Strauss, Claude. 1953. Social Structure. In A.L. Kroeber (ed.), Anthropology
Today. Chicago: Chicago University Press (pp. 524-553).
_________________, 1963. The Bear and the Barber. Journal of the Royal
Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, 93: 1-11.
Merton, R.K. 1975. Structural Analysis in Sociology. In P.M. Blau (ed),
Approaches to the Study of Social Structure. New York: Free Press.
Nadel, S.F. 1957. The Theory of Social Structure. London: Cohen & West Ltd.
Nutini, Hugo G. 1970. Some Considerations on the Nature of Social Structure
and Model Building: A Critique of Claude Lévi-Strauss and Edmund Leach. In
E. Nelson Hayes and Tanya Hayes (eds.), Claude Lévi-Strauss, The
Anthropologist as Hero. Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press (pp. 70-122).
Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary. 1999. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Parsons, Talcott. 1961. An Outline of the Social System. In Talcott Parsons, E.
Shils, K.D. Naegele, and J.R. Pitts (eds), Theories of Society, Foundations of
Modern Sociological Theory. New York: Free Press of Glancoe (pp. 30-79).
Radcliffe-Brown, A.R. 1922. The Andaman Islanders. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
_________________, 1948. A Natural Science of Society. New York: Free Press.
_________________, 1952. Structure and Function in Primitive Society: Essays
and Addresses. London: Cohen & West.
Rex, John. 1961. Key Problems of Sociological Theory. London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul.
Spencer, Herbert. 1873. The Study of Sociology. New York: D. Appleton.
70
Unit 6
Structure and Function
Contents
6.1 Introduction
6.2 From Positivism to Functionalism
6.3 The Premises of Functionalism
6.4 Functionalism in Social Anthropology: Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski
6.5 Functionalism of Talcott Parsons and Robert K.Merton
6.6 Conclusion
6.7 Further Reading
Learning Objectives
After going through this unit, you will be able to
explain the premises of functionalism
discuss the relevance of the concept of function in understanding society
compare and contrast the theoretical approach of Radcliffe-brown,
Malinowski and parsons.
6.1 Introduction
Functionalism is the name of an approach in social anthropology and sociology
according to which a society is a whole of interconnected parts, where each
part contributes to the maintenance of the whole. The task of sociology is
to find out the contribution of each part of society and how society works
together as an ordered arrangement of parts. Literally, the word ‘function’
(from Latin, fungi, functio, to effect, perform, execute) means ‘to perform’
or ‘to serve’ (a purpose). In the field of architecture, it implies that a form
should be adapted to usage and material. In areas such as politics and
management, it means ‘getting things to work’. The word is used in
mathematics (in the sense of ‘A is a function of B’); it is used in everyday
conversation, where it may mean ‘job’ or ‘purpose’ (for instance, ‘What is
your function in the office’?). In fact, what I am asking in the latter question
is ‘what do you do in your office’, and for the act of doing I am using the
word ‘function’. This word is also used for celebrations and festal occasions,
such as ‘inaugural function’, ‘marriage function’, etc. In other words, ‘function’
is a multi-meaning and multi-usage term. Levy, Jr. (1968: 22) writes: ‘Perhaps
the major difficulty associated with the general concept of function has
been the use of a single term to cover several distinctly different referents.’
As a distinct approach, as a way of looking at and analysing society,

functionalism emerged first in social anthropology in early twentieth century,
and later in sociology, beginning in the 1930s. However, its roots are as
ancient as the concept of organic analogy, used in the philosophy of Antiquity
by Plato (B.C. 428/7-345/7) and Aristotle (B.C. 384-322). The concept of
‘purpose’ or ‘end’ goes back to Aristotle’s reference to the telos (purpose)
of things as their final cause. The idea of a latent telos is also found in Adam
Smith’s metaphor of the ‘invisible hand’ as the automatic mechanism that
maximises wealth, individual welfare, and economic efficiency through the
increase in labour. It is from telos that the word ‘teleology’ has come, which
means that ‘everything is determined by a purpose’ and the scholars should
find out what that purpose is. 71
Social Structure as a Some writers regard Claude Henri de Saint-Simon, the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth century scholar, writing after the French Revolution, as the
‘father of sociology’, because in his writings, one finds a coexistence of two
ideas — one from which a scientific study of society emerged, and the other
which contributed substantially to the growth of Marxian theory (Giddens
1973). The first idea is that ‘scientific methods’ should be used for the study
of society, and the second is that each society contains in it the germs of
its contradiction, because of which it changes over time. Saint-Simon also
recognises revolution as an important process of change.
It is the first thought of studying a society scientifically that Auguste Comte

(1789-1857), the collaborator of Saint-Simon and the person who has coined
the term ‘sociology’, fully develops under the rubric of what he calls
‘positivism’ or ‘positive philosophy’. In this view, the methods for the study
of society come from natural and biological sciences. The aim of the study
is to discover the ‘laws of evolution’ as well as the ‘laws of functioning’ of
society, i.e., ‘how has the society evolved with the passage of time and
what are the various stages through which it has passed’ and ‘how does the
society function (or work) at a particular point of time.’ The knowledge thus
generated, Comte thinks, will help us to bring about desirable changes in
society, in carrying out the tasks of social reconstruction and amelioration.
Comte’s aim is to make sociology a ‘science of society’, quite like the
natural and biological sciences, and assign it a place in the hierarchy of
sciences. For Comte, being the most general and most specific subject,
sociology occupies the summit of the hierarchy of sciences: it is the ‘queen
of sciences’.
In this unit we expose the concept of function in sociological writings. We

begin with the basic premises of functionalism and them look into the
theoretical contributions of Radcliffe-Brown, Malinowski, and Parsons.
6.2 From Positivism to Functionalism

The thesis of functionalism lies in the philosophy of positivism. Comte also
makes use of the analogy of society as an organism. Organic analogy has
aided the viewing of society as a system of interrelated parts, a view basic
to the functional approach. The immediate forerunner of functionalism in
sociology is Émile Durkheim (1858-1917), who is a sharp critic of Comte as
well as influenced by his ideas, for which he has earned in the words of Alvin
Gouldner (1973) the distinction of being ‘uneasy Comtean’.
Like Comte, Durkheim is keenly interested in defining the subject matter of

sociology as distinct from that of philosophy or biology. For him, sociology
is a comparative and an objective study of ‘social facts’, which are the
‘ways of thinking, acting and feeling’ that have the ‘noteworthy property’
of existing outside the ‘individual consciousness’. Social facts do not originate
in the individual but in the collectivity, in the ‘collective mind’ (l’ âme
collective). Because they exist outside the individual, they can be studied
in the same way as one studies the material objects. Social facts are comme
des choses, i.e., they are ‘things’, perceived objectively and outside the
individual. This however does not mean that they are as tangible as are the
‘material things’. Instead, for their study one uses the same frame of mind
which one uses for the study of natural and biological objects that constitute
the subject matter of natural and biological sciences. Like Comte, Durkheim
72 also believes that the methods of natural and biological sciences can be used
for the study of social facts. But, these methods are not to be used as they Structure and Function
are, rather their suitable application to the science of social facts should be
thoughtfully and critically investigated. Durkheim’s book titled The Rules of
the Sociological Method (1895) was basically concerned with these issues.
Box 6.1: Sociological Explanations

From the study of social facts, sociologists offer what Durkheim calls
‘sociological explanations’. Each sociological explanation is consisted of two
parts: to quote Durkheim (1895: 123) here: ‘…to explain a social phenomenon
the efficient cause which produces it and the function it fulfills must be
investigated separately.’ The first component of the sociological explanation
is the ‘causal-historical explanation’: to delineate the cause(s) which produce
a phenomenon by examining historical sources rather than indulging in what
Radcliffe-Brown calls ‘conjectural history’. The second component is
‘functional’, i.e., the contribution that a part makes to society ‘in the
establishment of…general harmony’ (Durkheim 1895: 125).
Durkheim’s definition of function has tremendously influenced the writings

of later functionalists, both in social anthropology and sociology. For him,
function is the ‘contribution’ a part makes to the whole for its ‘maintenance
and well being’. Thus, function is a ‘positive contribution’: it is inherently
good for society (the whole), for it ensures its continuity and healthy
maintenance. By making its contribution, each part fulfills one of the needs
or needs (besoin) of society. Once needs have been fulfilled, society will be
able to survive and endure. Durkheim applies this framework of social function
in all his studies.
For instance, in his doctoral work, which was on the division of labour,
Durkheim (1893) rejects Darwin’s idea that once the size of a human
population increases, there will be a struggle for existence and those who
happen to be fit will survive, while the rest will be eliminated. Instead of
lending support to the theory of competition, conflict and elimination,
Durkheim shows that as human population increases, society becomes more
and more differentiated with the division of labour moving towards the
specialisation of jobs. Rather than competing with others for survival, human
beings are able to depend on one another, for each specialises in a particular
work. Specialisation makes each one of the beings important for society.
Durkheim also rejects the explanations of the division of labour that

economists and psychologists had advanced – such as ‘the division of labour
increases economic efficiency and productivity’, or ‘it induces happiness’,
or its opposite, ‘it makes people bored with their jobs’. He is critical of the
utilitarian (i.e., economic) and individualistic (i.e., psychological) explanations,
because according to him none of them actually explains the real function
of the division of labour, the contribution it makes to society. For him, the
function of the division of labour is sociological: it contributes to social
solidarity. Modern industrial society is integrated because of the
interdependence that comes into existence with the specialisation of jobs.
In his study of Australian totemism, he shows that the function of religion
is to produce solidarity in society, ‘to bind people in a moral community
called church’ (Durkheim 1915).
Durkheim is particularly interested in showing that the function of social

facts is moral. Social institutions work to produce the goal of integration. 73
Social Structure as a With this perspective, he is able to account for the phenomena that to
many may appear ‘unhealthy’ for society. For example, he regards crime as
a ‘normal’ and ‘healthy’ feature of all societies, because it reinforces collective
sentiments and works towards the evolution of morality and law. He argues
that the existence of criminal behaviour constitutes an index of the flexibility
of society. A normal rate of crime indicates that the society lacks the total
authority to ‘suppress’ all ‘divergences’ of the individual. Crime shows the
existence of social conditions that enable individuals to express them as
‘individuals’. However, if crime exceeds the normal limits, then it becomes
unhealthy (or ‘pathological’), jeopardizing the normal functioning of society.
As is clear, Durkheim distinguishes between the ‘normal’ and the ‘pathological’
forms of social facts. What is general in a society is normal and what is not
is pathological. The former performs the function of integrating society,
whereas the latter, thwarts the process of integration. Therefore, it needs
to be brought under control with the help of concerted collective action.
Durkheim is also in favour of undertaking the attempts towards social
amelioration, but they should follow a rigorous sociological study of the
phenomenon.
6.3 The Premises of Functionalism

Durkheim is not a ‘functionalist’ in the sense in which this term has come
to be used for the approach that the British social anthropologists, A.R.
Radcliffe-Brown (1881-1955) and Bronislaw Malinowski (1884-1942), have
espoused. Durkheim does not use the term ‘functionalism’, although he
defines the concept of social function, as we noted previously, and the
second part of his sociological explanation deals with the functional
explanation. One comes across in Durkheim’s works a fine coexistence of
the diachronic (genetic, evolutionary, and historical) and the synchronic
(society ‘here and now’) approaches to the study of society, but it is quite
clear that the study of the contemporary society occupies a preferred place
in his writings. For instance, in his celebrated study of religion, he begins
with a consideration of Australian totemism as the most elementary form of
religious life, but he does not start speculating it as the earliest form and
then, as his predecessors had done, offering theories to explain it. He is
rather more concerned with the structure and function of totemism and
how its study can help us in understanding the place of religion in complex
societies. This emphasis on the study of synchronous (or ‘present’) societies
exerted a tremendous impact on later scholars.
The beginning of the twentieth century saw the continuation of the old
evolutionary approach and also, its gradual decline. It also witnessed the rise
of functionalism. Adam Kuper (1973) thinks that 1922 was the ‘year of wonder’
(annus mirabilis) of functionalism, for in this year were published two
monographs that substantiated the functional approach. One was by Radcliffe-
Brown titled The Andaman Islanders, and the other, by Malinowski, titled
Argonauts of the Western Pacific. The impact of anthropological functionalism
was felt in other disciplines, particularly sociology. Although there were
scholars — such as Kingsley Davis (1959) — who saw nothing new in functional
approach because they thought that sociologists had always been doing
what functionalists wanted them to do, there were others (such as Talcott
Parsons) who were clearly impressed with the writings of functional
anthropologists. As a result of the writings of these people, functionalism
emerged as an extremely important approach, holding its sway till the late
74 1960s and the early 1970s. In its history of about 150 years, first in the
positivism of Comte, then in the ‘sociologistic positivism’ of Durkheim, and Structure and Function
then, in the works of the twentieth-century functionalists, functionalism

has come to comprise a number of variants and foci. Pointed differences
exist between different functionalists — in fact, some of them happen to be
archrivals, like Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski. Notwithstanding their
differences, it seems that all functionalists share the following five
propositions:
1) Society (or culture) is a system like any other system, such as solar
system, mechanical system, atomic system, chemical system, or organic
system.
2) As a system, society (or culture) consists of parts (like, institutions,
groups, roles, associations, organisations), which are interconnected,
interrelated, and interdependent.
3) Each part performs its own function — it makes its own contribution to
the whole society (or culture) — and also, it functions in relationship
with other parts.
4) A change in one part brings about a change in other parts, or at least
influences the functioning of other parts, because all the parts are
closely connected.
5) The entire society or culture — for which we can use the term ‘whole’
is greater than the mere summation of parts. It cannot be reduced to
any part, or no part can explain the whole. A society (or culture) has its
own identity, its own ‘consciousness’, or in Durkheim’s words, ‘collective
consciousness’.
6.4 Functionalism in Social Anthropology: Radcliffe-

Brown and Malinowski
The first approach in social anthropology for the analysis of society was
evolutionary, which though present earlier, in the writings of Comte and
Spencer, was almost firmly established after the publication of Charles Darwin’s
On the Origin of Species (1859). During the second half of the nineteenth
century, almost every anthropologist was concerned with two issues. First,
how was the institution (or, cultural practice, trait) established in the first
place? What has been its origin? Second, what are the various stages through
which it has passed to reach its contemporary state? Both the questions
were important and relevant, but in the absence of authentic data, the
early (or, ‘classical’) evolutionists extravagantly indulged in speculations and
conjectures, imagining the causes (or, the factors) that gave rise to
institutions and the stages of their evolution. Most of the evolutionists —
barring a few possible exceptions, such as Lewis H. Morgan and Edward B.
Tylor — had not themselves collected any data on which they based their
generalisations. They almost completely relied upon the information that
travelers, missionaries, colonial officers, and soldiers, who were in touch
with non-Western societies, provided, knowing full well that much of these
data might be biased, exaggerated, incomplete, and incorrect. Because they
themselves did not carry out any fieldwork, they earned the notorious title
of ‘arm-chair anthropologists’.
Both the founders of the British functional approach (Radcliffe-Brown and

Malinowski) were vehemently critical of the nineteenth-century evolutionism.
Radcliffe-Brown (1952) said that it was based on ‘conjectural history’, a term
we used earlier, and not ‘authentic history’. It was ‘pseudo-historical’, thus
75
Social Structure as a devoid of a scientific value. For Malinowski (1944), classical evolutionism was
a ‘limbo of conjectural reconstructions’. With the works of these scholars
came a shift from:
1) Arm-chair anthropology to fieldwork-based studies;
2) The study of the origin and stages of evolution of society and its
institutions (diachronic studies) to society ‘here and now’ (synchronic
studies);
3) The study of the entire societies and cultures (macro approach) to the
study of particular societies, especially the small-scale societies (micro
approach); and
4) An understanding of society confined to a theoretical level to putting
the knowledge of society ‘here and now’ to practical use, to bring
about desired changes in society. Rather than remaining just an ‘academic
study of the oddities of society’ — different and bizarre customs and
practices — the knowledge we have acquired should be used for improving
upon the conditions of people, for improving upon the relations of local
people with the outside world. Incidentally, Malinowski called this concern
of anthropology ‘practical anthropology’.
The scholars who later came to be known as ‘functionalists’ sought to shift

the focus of their study from ‘what society was’ to ‘what society is’, and
this study should be carried out not by speculative methods, but by living
with people in their natural habitats and learning from them, from the field.
It was not against the processes of evolution and diffusion that the
functionalists leveled their criticism, for they knew that they were important
processes of change. In fact, both Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski thought
that after they were through most of their important fieldwork-based studies,
they would take up the study of the processes of evolution and diffusion.
What they were against was a study of the past through ‘imaginative history’
rather than one based on facts. If authentic documents were available about
societies, they must readily be used for some insights into change. But the
functionalists noted that these documents were not available about ‘primitive
and pre-literate’ societies, therefore we would not have any knowledge of
the development of social institutions among them. Instead of speculating
how they have evolved, we should study ‘what they are’, using the scientific
methods of observation, comparison, and arriving at generalisations.
a) Structural-functional Approach of Radcliffe-Brown

Abandoning the search for origins and the pasts of institutions, and the
ways in which cultural traits have diffused from one part of the world to the
other, Radcliffe-Brown (1952: 180) defines each society as a ‘functionally
interrelated system’ in which ‘general laws or functions operate’. He accepts
that Durkheim offered the first systematic formulation of the concept of
function and that this concept is based on an ‘analogy between social life
and organic life’. However, with reference to Durkheim’s use of the term
‘need’ for the conditions that must be satisfied for a system to continue,
Radcliffe-Brown thinks that this term would direct us towards a postulation
of ‘universal human or societal needs’. As a consequence, the theory
according to which events and developments are meant to fulfill a purpose
and happen because of that will trap us. Known as the theory of teleology,
as we said earlier, Radcliffe-Brown suspects that functionalism might become
teleological. He thus substitutes for the word ‘need’ the term ‘necessary
76
conditions of existence.’ He believes that the question of which conditions Structure and Function
are necessary for survival is an empirical one, and the study of a society will
tell us about this. Radcliffe-Brown recognizes the ‘diversity of conditions
necessary for the survival of different systems.’ Once we have recognized
this, we shall avoid asserting that each item of a culture must have a function
and that ‘items in different cultures must have the same function’ (Turner
1987: 48).
Radcliffe-Brown dislikes the use of the word ‘functionalism’, which Malinowski

propagated with enthusiasm. His objection is that ‘-isms’ (like functionalism)
are ideologies, schools of thought, philosophies, and realms of opinions.
Science does not have either of them. What it has are the methods of study,
opting for those methods that are regarded as the best for study. A scientist
does not have any passionate relationship with any methods. For him, they
are all of equal importance and worth, but their operational value lies in
carrying out a satisfactory study of a phenomenon according to the canons
of scientific research.
Moreover, Radcliffe-Brown also looks at the distinction between an organism

and society. For instance, an organism dies, but a society continues to
survive over time, although it may be changed and transformed. An organism
can be studied even when its parts have stopped working. In other words,
the structure of an organism can be studied separately from its function,
which is not the case with society. Social structure is observable only when
it functions. Structure and function are inalienable concepts in social
anthropology; that is why Radcliffe-Brown calls his approach ‘structural-
functional’, rather than ‘functional’, as many have done. He writes (1952:
180):
The concept of function…involves the notion of a structure consisting of a

set of relations amongst unit entities, the continuity of the structure being
maintained by a life-process made up of the activities of the constituent
units.
Radcliffe-Brown’s structural-functional approach comprises the following

assumptions:
1) A necessary condition for survival of a society is a minimal integration
of its parts.
2) The concept of function refers to those processes that maintain the
necessary integration or solidarity.
3) And, in each society, structural features can be shown to contribute to
the maintenance of necessary solidarity.
For Durkheim, the central concept is of solidarity, while for Radcliffe-Brown,

it is the ‘structural continuity’ of society. For example, in an analysis of the
lineage system, according to Radcliffe-Brown, one must first assume that
some minimal degree of solidarity must exist for it to continue. Then, one
must examine the processes associated with the lineage system, assessing
their consequences for maintaining social integration. One of the processes
the investigator would come across is the role of lineage systems in
adjudicating conflicts in societies where they are land-owning groups. They
define who has the right to land and through which side of the family it
would pass. In these societies, lineage is a ‘corporate group’. Descending
through these steps, one will explain the integration of the economic system. 77
Social Structure as a Then, one will move to the other systems of society, analyzing at each level
the contribution a part will make to the structural continuity of the whole.

What are the assumptions of Radcliffe-Brown’s structural functional approach?
Radcliffe-Brown is far from being dogmatic in his assertions. For him, the
functional unity (or integration) of a social system is a hypothesis. That we
look for integration and structural continuity of society does not imply that
it does not change. Radcliffe-Brown believes that the states of ‘social health’
(eunomia) and ‘social illness’ (dysnomia) constitute two ends of the
continuum, and the actual society seems to lie somewhere in between.
b) The functionalism of Malinowski

By comparison to Radcliffe-Brown, it is Malinowski who claims the creation
of a separate ‘school’, the ‘Functional School’. The aim of functional analysis
for him (1926: 132) is to arrive at the
explanation of anthropological facts at all levels of development by
their function, by the part they play within the integral system of
culture.
He (1926: 132-3) assumes that

in every civilization every custom, material object, ideas and belief
fulfills some vital function, has some task to accomplish, represents
an indispensable fact within a working whole.
Whereas Radcliffe-Brown begins with society and its necessary conditions of

existence (i.e., integration), Malinowski’s starting point is the individual,
who has a set of ‘basic’ (or ‘biological’) needs that must be satisfied for its
survival. It is because of the importance that Malinowski gives the individual
that the term ‘psychological functionalism’ is reserved for him, in comparison
to Radcliffe-Brown’s approach which is called ‘sociological functionalism’
because in this society is the key concept.
Malinowski’s approach distinguishes between three levels: the biological,

the social structural, and the symbolic (Turner 1987: 50-1). Each of these
levels has a set of needs that must be satisfied for the survival of the
individual. It is on his survival that the survival of larger entities (such as
groups, communities, societies) is dependent. Malinowski proposes that these
three levels constitute a hierarchy. At the bottom is placed the biological
system, followed next by the social-structural, and finally, by the symbolic
system. The way in which needs at one level are fulfilled will affect the way
in which they will be fulfilled at the subsequent levels.
The most basic needs are the biological, but this does not imply any kind of
reductionism, because each level constitutes its distinct properties and
needs, and from the interrelationship of different levels that culture emerges
as an integrated whole. Culture is the kernel of Malinowski’s approach. It is
‘uniquely human’, for it is not found to exist among sub-humans. Comprising
all those things — material and non-material – that human beings have made
right from the time they separated from their simian ancestors, culture has
been the instrument that satisfies the biological needs of human beings. It
is a need-serving and need-fulfilling system. Because of this role of culture
in satisfying biological needs that Malinowski’s functionalism is also known
78 as ‘bio-cultural functionalism.’
One more difference between Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski may be noted Structure and Function
here. A concept fundamental to Malinowski — the concept of culture — is a

mere epiphenomenona (secondary and incidental) for Radcliffe-Brown. He
believes that the study of social structure (which for him is an observable
entity) encompasses the study of culture; therefore, there is no need to
have a separate field to study culture. Further, whilst social structure is
concerned all about observations, what anthropologists see and hear about
the individual peoples, culture is in the minds of people, not amenable to
observation in the same way as social structure is. Radcliffe-Brown wants to
make social anthropology a branch of natural science, which would be possible
when there is an empirically investigable subject matter.

What are the major differences between the theoretical approaches of
Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski?
The basis of Malinowski’s approach is a theory of ‘vital sequences’, which

have a biological foundation and are incorporated into all societies. These
sequences number eleven, each composed of an ‘impulse’, an associated
physiological ‘act’, and a satisfaction which results from that act (see Table 6.1).
Table 6.1
Impulse Act Satisfaction

1. Drive to breathe; Intake of oxygen Elimination of CO2 in
gasping for air. tissues Satiation
2. Hunger Ingestion of food Quenching
3. Thirst Absorption of liquid Detumescence
4. Sex appetite Conjugation Restoration of
muscular and nervous
energy
5. Fatigue Rest Satisfaction of
fatigue
6. Restlessness Activity Awakening with
restored energy
7. Somnolence Sleep Removal of tension
Abdominal relaxation
8. Bladder pressure Micturition Relaxation
9. Colon pressure Defecation Return to normal state
10. Fright Escape from danger
11. Pain Avoidance by
effective act
Permanent Vital Sequences Incorporated in All Culture

For instance, the impulse of somnolence accompanies the act of sleep,
resulting in satisfaction by ‘awakening with restored energy’ (Malinowski
1944: 77; Barnard 2000: 68). Malinowski follows this eleven-fold paradigm
with a set of seven biological needs and their respective cultural responses
(see Table 6.2).
79
Social Structure as a Table 6.2
Basic Needs Cultural Responses
1. Metabolism Commissariat
2. Reproduction Kinship
3. Bodily comfort Shelter
4. Safety Protection
5. Movement Activities
6. Growth Training
7. Health Hygiene
For example, the first need is of food, and the cultural mechanisms are
centered on the processes of food getting, for which Malinowski uses the
term ‘commissariat’, which means the convoy that transports food. Similarly,
the second need is of reproduction (biological continuity of society) and the
cultural response to which is kinship concerned with regulating sex and
marriage. From this, Malinowski goes on to four-fold sequences, which he
calls the ‘instrumental imperatives’, and associates each one of them with
their respective cultural responses. The four-fold sequence is of economy,
social control, education, and political organisation. From here, he shifts to
the symbolic system — of religion, magic, beliefs and values — examining its
role in culture.
6.5 Functionalism of Talcott Parsons (1902-1979)

and Robert K. Merton (1910 - 2003)
In 1975, in an important article, Parsons labels his student, Robert Merton
and himself ‘arch-functionalists’. He also explains here why he has abandoned
the term ‘structural functionalism’, which, at one time, he used for his
approach. For him, structure refers to ‘any set of relations among parts of
a living system’. On empirical grounds, he says, it can be assumed or shown
that these relations are stable over a time period. By process, which is the
correlative concept with structure, one refers to the ‘changes’ that occur
in the state of the system or its relevant parts. With respect to structure,
the key concept is of stability, and with respect to process, it is of change.
Thus, by structure, we refer to a pattern of relationships in a social system,
and process refers to the changes occurring in that system. A significant
characteristic of ‘structural functionalism’ has been that it has stressed
‘structure’ more than ‘process’.
In the article mentioned above, Parsons states that the concept of function
stands at a ‘higher level of theoretical generality’. It is far more analytical
than the concept of structure, or even process, although function
encompasses the latter. It is because the concept of function is concerned
with the ‘consequences’ of the existence and the nature of structures that
can be empirically described. And, it is also concerned with the processes
that take place in these systems. Parsons thinks that his original formulation
under the rubric of ‘structural functionalism’ tends to analyze society as if
it is static, but the new formulation, where stress is laid on the concept of
function than structure, in the name of functionalism, takes much more
account of change and evolution. The new formulation sets out to examine
80 the functions of ‘processes’ and their consequences for ‘static’ structures.
For example, one may examine in the American context, the function of the Structure and Function
process of education of women on ‘static’ structures like family.
Parsons’ functionalism is best known in terms of the ‘functional imperatives’,

the essential conditions required for the enduring existence of a system
(Parsons 1951). Also known as the ‘AGIL model’ (based on the first letters of
the four functions that Parsons has devised) or the ‘four-function paradigm’,
it evolved from Parsons’ collaborative work with Robert F. Bales in experiments
on leadership in small groups (Rocher 1974). These four functions help us to
explain how a state of balance (i.e. equilibrium) emerges in a system. One
of the important problems in sociology for Parsons is what he has called the
‘Hobbesian problem of order’ — he calls it so after the famous political
philosopher, Thomas Hobbes, one of the founders of the theory of ‘social
contract’, who was concerned with the question of how order comes in
society. Parsons explores the role of these four functions in giving rise to
equilibrium in a system.
Earlier it was noted that the functionalist’s model of society as one of

‘interdependence and self-equilibrium’ is similar to the biological model of
an organism. Parsons traces his interest in equilibrium to W.B. Cannon’s idea
of homeostatic stabilization of physiological processes and to his training in
biology at Amherst College where he had studied. Also, the impact of
Malinowski on him was unmistakable, especially the idea of the primacy of
the biological system. In the case of society, Parsons submits that the
institutions (or structures) maintain (or re-establish) equilibrium by fulfilling
the ‘needs’, which must be satisfied if the system has to persist. Institutions
(or structures) also solve the recurring problems in a manner similar to the
way in which the units of the organism comparable to the institutions (or
structures) of societies do in their natural environment. The system ensures
that these institutions (or structures) work appropriately on everyday basis,
satisfying the needs. For achieving equilibrium, society requires the processes
of socialization, the internalization of societal values, and the mechanisms
of social control so that deviance is checked.
All ‘action systems’ — and society is one of them — face four major ‘problems’
(or have four major ‘needs’), namely Adaptation (A), Goal Attainment (G),
Integration (I), and Pattern Maintenance, or, as Parsons later renamed it,
Latent Pattern Maintenance—Tension Management, or simply, Latency (L).
Parsons pictures society (or the social system) as a large square, which he
divides into four equal parts. These parts are the four functional problems,
represented by the acronym, AGIL (see Diagram 1). The underlying idea is
that all systems need to accomplish these four functions in order to survive.
The meaning of these four ‘functional imperatives’ is as follows:
1) Adaptation: By this is meant the problem of securing sufficient resources
from the society’s external environment and distributing them throughout
the system. Each society needs certain institutions that perform the
function of adaptation to the environment – which is an external function.
Adaptation provides the means — the instrumental aspects — to achieve
goals. Biological organism performs the function of adaptation in the
general system of action. In the context of society, economic institution
performs this function.
2) Goal Attainment: This function is concerned with the need of the system
to mobilize its resources to attain the goals and to establish priorities
among them. It mobilizes motivations of the actors and organises their 81
Social Structure as a efforts. In the general system of action, personality performs this function,
while in case of society this task is given to the political institution,
because power is essential for implementation and decision-making. Goal
attainment is concerned with ends — the consummatory aspects. Since
goals are delineated in relation with the external environment, it is, like
adaptation, an external function.
3) Integration: It is regarded as the ‘heart’ of the four-function paradigm
(Wallace and Wolf 1980: 36). By integration is meant the need to
coordinate, adjust, and regulate relationships among various actors (or,
the units of the system, such as the institutions), so that the system
is an ‘ongoing entity’. According to the general theory of action, the
social system performs this function, whereas in society, legal institutions
and courts are entrusted with this task. Integration is concerned with
ends, and the internal aspects of the system.
4) Latency (Pattern Maintenance and Tension Management): This function
pertains to the issues of providing knowledge and information to the
system. In the general theory of action, culture — the repository of
knowledge and information — accomplishes this function. Culture does
not act because it does not have energy. It lays hidden, supplying actors
(who are high in energy) with knowledge and information they require
for carrying out action. Because culture exists ‘behind’ the actions of
people, it is called ‘latent’. Integration takes care of two things: first,
it motivates actors to play their roles in the system and maintain the
value patterns; and second, to provide mechanisms for managing internal
tensions between different parts and actors. The problem that every
society faces is of keeping its value system intact and ensuring that the
members conform to the rules. It will be possible when societal values
are properly transmitted and imbibed. The institutions that carry out
this function are family, religion, and education. Latency gives means to
achieve ends; it is internal to the system.
AGIL Model
Means (Instrumental) Ends (Consummatory)
External A Adaptation Goal attainment G
Internal L Latency (pattern

maintenance and
tension-relieving
mechanisms) Integration I
General Level of Action Theory
Organism Personality
Culture Social System
AGIL Functions in the Social System
Economy Polity
Fiduciary System Societal Community
Fig. 1
82
With this four-function paradigm in mind, Parsons (1973) jointly carried out Structure and Function
(with Gerald Platt) a study of higher education in America, by conducting a

survey of members of American colleges and universities. An important
conclusion of this study was that American universities and colleges specialise
in furthering the rational (or ‘scientific’) approach to knowledge. The central
shared value within the American system of higher education is of cognitive
rationality. This value is of paramount significance to contemporary American
society. The American system of higher education, therefore, transmits and
maintains values central to its society (of which it is a part), thus performing
the function of pattern maintenance.
For the purpose of analysis, Parsons identifies sub-systems corresponding to

the AGIL model in all systems and their sub-systems (see Diagram 1). As we
have seen, at the general level of action theory, the biological organism
performs the function of adaptation, the personality system, the function of
goal attainment, the social system integrates different units, and the cultural
system is concerned with pattern maintenance. Then, the social system is
broken down into the four AGIL functions. We noted earlier that economy
performs the function of adaptation, whereas, polity (or political institution),
the function of goal attainment. For the sub-system that carries out the
function of integration, Parsons uses the term ‘societal community’, which
reminds one of Ferdinand Tönnies’s ideas of gemeinschaft (‘community’).
‘Societal community’ produces solidarity, unity, cohesiveness, and loyalty to
norms, values, and institutions. The function of pattern maintenance, Parsons
says, is the task of what he calls the ‘fiduciary system’, which pertains to
the nature of a trust or a trusteeship. This system produces and legitimizes
moral values, beliefs, and expressive symbols.
Each of the sub-systems of the system can be taken up for analysis by

treating it as a ‘system’, and then, breaking it down into four parts looking
for its components that respectively perform the functions of adaptation,
goal attainment, integration, and latency. This way of analyzing society is
known as the systemic approach.
6.6 Conclusion
Parsons’s AGIL model is an ideal type, applicable more to differentiated
societies than simple societies. In the latter case, institutions may collapse
into one, with the result that the same institution may perform different
functions. The example of family may be cited here, which carries out
economic, political, and religious functions, in addition to the functions
traditionally assigned to it, like socialization of the young. In communist
societies, the party may decide the aspects of economy – the processes of
production and distribution – and thus, adaptation and goal attainment may
appear indistinguishable.
Parsons’ theory is popularly known as a ‘grand theory’ – an all-encompassing,

unified theory – which is believed to have a large explanatory power. However,
Parsons’ student, Robert Merton, is skeptical of such a theory, for it is too
general to be of much use (Merton 1957). Instead, he expresses his preference
for mid-level (middle-range) theories, which cover certain delimited aspects
of social phenomena (such as groups, social mobility, or role conflict). Partially
because of this middle-range strategy, Merton’s functionalism is quite different
from that of Parsons.
83
Social Structure as a For instance, Merton abandons the search for any functional prerequisites
that will be valid in all social systems. He also rejects the idea of the earlier
functionalists that recurrent social phenomena should be explained in terms
of their benefits to society as a whole. For criticism, Merton identifies the
three postulates of earlier functionalists given below:
1) Postulate of the functional unity of society. It is an assumption that
there is unity in society, which comes about because of the contributions
that parts make to the whole.
2) Postulate of the universal functionalism. It is an assumption that all
social or cultural forms have positive functions, which are for the
maintenance and well being of society.
3) Postulate of indispensability. It is an assumption that the function that
a social or cultural form performs is an indispensable precondition for
the survival of society.
Merton notes that none of these postulates are empirically justifiable. For
instance, there is no reason to suppose that particular institutions are the
only ones to fulfill the functions. Empirical research shows that there may
be a wide range of what Merton has termed ‘functional alternatives’ that
may be able to perform the same function.
With a critical look, Merton tries to attempt what he calls a ‘codification of

functional analysis in sociology’, a functional paradigm (or perspective) (which
is not a grand theory) that takes into consideration the actual dimensions
of social reality, of conformity and deviance, understanding and explaining
them. Like other functionalists, he views society as a system of
interconnected parts, where the functioning of a part has implications for
the functioning of other parts and the entire system. Like his predecessors,
he is interested in the concepts of equilibrium and integration, and the
contribution of customs and institutions to the persistence of societies. His
definition of function is also in terms of the ‘positive contribution’ of a part
to the whole: functions are those contributions or consequences that
‘make for the adaptation or adjustment of a given system.’ For the
working of society and its institutions, it is important that all share a set of
common values and norms, which is another distinguishing property of
functionalism.
While agreeing with other functionalists on certain points stated above,

Merton has made a distinct contribution to a set of two typologies, namely,
the distinction between ‘function’ and ‘dysfunction’, and between ‘manifest’
and ‘latent’ functions. Most functionalists think that all contributions are
inherently good or ‘functional’ for society, a proposition Merton finds difficult
to accept. He thinks there are acts that have ‘consequences which lessen
the adaptation or adjustment of the system’. Such acts have harmful
consequences, the technical term for which is ‘dysfunction’. It is, therefore,
expected that the sociologist will always ask the following question: ‘For
whom are the consequences functional or dysfunctional?’ The same institution
can be functional in one context and dysfunctional in another. All social
institutions are expected to have some mix of functions and dysfunctions.
Whether the institution tilts to the pole of function or dysfunction in a
continuum will depend upon the net balance between the functional and
dysfunctional consequences.
84
Structure and Function
Box 6.2: Manifest and Latent Function
The distinction between manifest and latent functions has its roots in the
writings of the founders in sociology. In his study of religion, for example,
Durkheim (1915) makes a distinction between ‘what people do of which they
are aware’ and ‘what emerges from their collective acts which they had not
intended and anticipated.’ When people assemble for collective totemic
rituals, their explicit aim is to honour their totem, but what these rituals
produce is a sense of we-ness, which is an unintended, unrecognised, and
unanticipated consequence. Following this, one can say that manifest functions
are those consequences people observe or expect, while latent functions are
those consequences that are neither recognised nor intended.
Merton was able to advance four types of explanations in terms of the two
dichotomies (function and dysfunction; manifest and latent functions). The
earlier functionalists put forth only one explanation and that too with respect
to latent functions. Merton’s conceptual scheme guided empirical research,
rather than remaining a theory with several explanatory claims, like the
‘grand theory’ of Parsons.
6.7 Further Reading

University Press
Gouldner, Alvin W. 1973. For Sociology. London: Allen Lane
Turner, Jonathan H. 1987. The Structure of Sociological Theory. Jaipur: Rawat
Publications
References
University Press.
Davis, Kingsley. 1959. The Myth of Functional Analysis as a Special Method in
Sociology and Anthropology. American Sociological Review, 24: 757-72.
Durkheim, Émile. 1893. The Division of Labour in Society. Glencoe: The Free
Press.
________________, 1895. The Rules of the Sociological Method. New York:
The Free Press.
________________, 1915. The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. London:
Allen and Unwin.
Giddens, Anthony. 1973. The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies.
London: Hutchinson.
Gouldner, Alvin W. 1973. For Sociology. London: Allen Lane.
Kuper, Adam. 1973. Anthropologists and Anthropology: The Modern British
School. London: Routledge.
Levy, Jr., Marion J. 1968. Functional Analysis: Structural-Functional Analysis.
International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences. McMillan Co. and Free Press.
Malinowski, Bronislaw. 1922. Argonauts of the Western Pacific. London: George
Routledge & Sons.
________________, 1926. Anthropology. Encyclopedia Britannica. First
Supplementary Volume. 85
Social Structure as a ________________, 1944. A Scientific Theory of Culture and Other Essays.
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
Merton, Robert K. 1957. Social Theory and Social Structure. New York: The
Free Press (Revised and Enlarged Edition).
Parsons, Talcott. 1951. The Social System. New York: The Free Press.
________________, 1975. The Present Status of Structural-Functional Theory
in Sociology. In Lewis A. Coser (ed), The Idea of Social Structure: Papers in
Honor of Robert K. Merton. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Parsons, Talcott and Gerald M. Platt. 1973. The American University. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press.
Radcliffe-Brown, A.R. 1922. The Andaman Islanders. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
________________, 1952. Structure and Function in Primitive Society: Essays
and Addresses. London: Cohen & West.
Rocher, Guy. 1974. Talcott Parsons and American Sociology. London: Nelson.
Turner, Jonathan H. 1987. The Structure of Sociological Theory. Jaipur: Rawat
Publications.
Wallace, Ruth A. and Alison Wolf. 1980. Contemporary Sociological Theory.
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
86
Unit 7
Structure, Function and
Neo-Functionalism
Contents
7.1 Introduction
7.2 Criticism of Functionalism
7.3 The Thesis of Neo-Functionalism
7.4 Merits and Demerits of Neo-Functionalism: Conclusion
7.5 Further Reading
Learning Objectives
After going through this unit you will be able to
explain the major criticism of functionalism that led to they rise of neo-
functionalism
discuss the premises and basic of orientations of neo-functionalism
critically evaluate the merits and demerits of neo-functionalism.
7.1 Introduction
Without exaggeration, one may say that in the history of social anthropology
and sociology, no theory has generated so much of interest, enthusiasm, and
response as did functionalism. Known by different names (such as ‘functional
approach’, ‘structural-functional approach’, ‘structural-functionalism’,
‘Functional School’, etc.), functionalism emerged as some kind of a unified
methodology and theory in the 1930s. Earlier, right from the beginning of the
nineteenth century, it was a body of scattered ideas and propositions. Until
the 1960s, its reputation was unassailable, as its adherents were scholars of
outstanding merit, who were known (and are still known) for various other
contributions besides developing it both in terms of theory and method. For
example, the famous American functionalist, Talcott Parsons, is well known
for his contribution to family sociology, the school as a social system, role
analysis in medical institutions, professions and problems of the blacks,
evolutionism, etc. Similarly, Robert Merton’s contribution to social structure
and anomie, deviance and conformity, dysfunctions of bureaucracy, sociology
of science, survey methods, role-set, etc, will always be referred.
During this period from the 1930s to the 1960s, when functional approach
was virtually unchallenged in the United States of America and the other
parts of the world, some of its criticisms were undoubtedly surfacing. For
instance, the British social anthropologist, Sir E.E. Evans-Pritchard, rejected
the idea of social anthropology as a science (held by the protagonist of the
structural-functional approach, A.R. Radcliffe-Brown) and viewed it rather as
a ‘comparative history’. Although Evans-Pritchard began as a functionalist,
he transformed into a humanist. Sir Edmund R. Leach also started his career
in social anthropology as a functionalist, he then moved to the ‘processual
analysis’, i.e., looking at society as a ‘process in time’, as it is evident from
his 1954 book on political systems. Later, under the influence of Claude Lévi-
Strauss, he became a structuralist, and came to be known as a neostructuralist
(Kuper 1973). His 1961 publication of Rethinking Anthropology offered a
challenge to structural-functionalism. In spite of these criticisms, functionalism
continued to survive with glory. 87
Social Structure as a But by the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, the criticisms
of the functional theory increased manifold. Parsons’s attempts to merge
theories based on action with those based on structures were unconvincing
to many critics. The rehabilitation of Marxian approach in sociology and the
successful emergence of the conflict theory was a big blow to functionalism.
Several new theories and approaches, each trying to bring in the aspects
that functionalism had ignored, became the focal points. It seemed clear to
many critics that sociology had entered a post-functional, a post-Parsonian
phase in its development.
Gradually, after a brief hiatus, during the 1980s, there was a revival of interest
in Parsons’s work – some call it a phase of a ‘rediscovery’ of Parsons. Initially,
it had little to do with structural-functionalism, but with Parsons’s ability to
synthesize the works of the classical thinkers (such as Émile Durkheim, Max
Weber, Vilfredo Pareto) to explore a theory of social action in his The Structure
of Social Action (1937), which he ably used to advance fields like economy
and society, family and industrialisation, etc. Following this was a resurgence
of interest in Parsons’s functionalism, first in Germany and then, America. In
1985, Jeffrey C. Alexander introduced the term ‘neofunctionalism’ with an
aim to reconsider and revise Parsons’s theory. Neo-functionalism offered a
critique of the fundamental propositions of the original theory of
functionalism. It examined the aspects of several other theories – some of
which had conflicting relations with functionalism, for example, Marxism – in
order to integrate them with neofunctionalism. Because of this, neo-
functionalism does not manifest itself in one single theory, rather as several
variants put together under the same rubric. Against this background,
Alexander (1985) emphasizes that neofunctionalism should be considered to
a lesser extent as a theory and more as a ‘wide-ranging intellectual tendency
or movement’.
This unit centers around the critical evolution of functionalism and the
emergence of neo-functionalism. We will explore the concept of neo-
functionalism is n sociological writings and examine its merits and limitation.
7.2 Criticisms of Functionalism

One of the main criticisms of functionalism is that it does not adequately
deal with history. In other words, it is inherently ahistorical (but not anti-
historical). It does not deal with the questions of past and history, although
the advocates of functionalism have considered evolution and diffusion as
important processes of change. Functionalism in social anthropology in the
1930s emerged as a reaction to the nineteenth century ‘pseudo-historical’
and ‘speculative’ evolutionism and diffusionism. It also tried to overcome
the ethnocentric biases of the earlier approaches, which regarded the
contemporary pre-literate societies, popularly known as ‘primitive societies’,
and certain customs and practices found among them as remnants of past.
Edward Tylor unhesitatingly regarded the ‘contemporary primitives’ as ‘social
fossils’ and ‘survivals’ of the past, assuming that their study would guide us
to an understanding of the cultural traits of the societies of prehistoric
times (Harris 1968: 164-5). This would help us in reconstructing the history
of humankind.
Closely related with this is another criticism of functionalism: it does not

effectively deal with the contemporary processes of social change. Thus, in
88 essence, because it is neither able to study the pasts of societies nor the
contemporary change process, it is more suited to the study of ‘contemporary Structure, Function and
Neo-Functionalism
static structures’, if there are any. Or, perhaps, it portrays the societies it
studies as if they are static, which, in reality, may not be so. The picture
of a society that functionalists present is like the picture of a ‘frozen river’
that tells nothing about its ebb and flow. By analogy, functionalists ‘freeze
society’ in the same manner as a still camera ‘freezes’ people and locations
in its frame.
There are two views on this issue. First, the problem is believed to lie with
the theory of functionalism, because when the parts of a society are seen
as reinforcing one another as well as the system, when each part fits well
with the other parts, then it is difficult to explain how these parts can
contribute to change (Cohen 1968). Or, why should the parts change or
contribute to change when they are all in a state of harmony? The second
opinion is that there is nothing in functionalism which prevents it from
dealing with the issues of history and change. For instance, Parsons’s 1966
book titled Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives reflects
the ability of structural-functionalism to handle the dimensions of change.
So does Smelser’s work of 1959 on industrial revolution. The problem lies,
according to some, not with the theory of functionalism, but its practitioners,
who rarely address the issues of change and even when they do, it is in
developmental and adaptive terms than in revolutionary (Turner and Maryanski
1979). Whether the problem of functionalism has to do with the theory or
its practitioners, ‘the fact remains that the main contributions of structural
functionalists lie with the study of static, not changing, social structures’
(Ritzer 2000: 115).
Another criticism of functionalism is that it is unable to deal effectively with

conflict. Functionalists have overemphasized harmonious relationships. They
tend to exaggerate consensus, stability, equilibrium, and integration,
disregarding the forces of conflict and disorder, and changes emerging from
them. For them, conflict is necessarily destructive and occurs outside the
framework of society. One may remember here Durkheim who regarded
‘anomie’ (the state of normlessness) as a ‘social sickness’. Both Comte and
later, Durkheim were staunchly critical of the Marxist and socialist thoughts,
for they believed that the need of that time (when they were writing) was
social reconstruction and order. Society had already become quite
disintegrated, Comte said, because of the French Revolution and any support
rendered to the idea of revolution would further accentuate disorder. Thus
Comte’s positivism and Durkheim’s ‘functional explanations’ paid scant
attention to the issues of conflict.
Box 7.1: Early Twentieth Century Functionalism

The early twentieth-century anthropological functionalism certainly inherited
the legacy of the past, the theory of social order, but there was another
reason why it consistently ignored the aspects of conflict and change. It
received its empirical substantiation not from philosophical premises (as it
did in case of Comte) or from secondary data (as was the case with Durkheim),
but from first-hand, observation-based studies of simple societies, like that
of Andamanese or Trobriand Islanders. The societies the anthropologists
studied were largely cut off from the outside world. By comparison to other
societies of the world, a higher degree of normative consensus prevailed
among them because they were largely homogeneous. They had by and large
one culture. Social sanctions were undisputed among them, contra-normative
89
Sociological Concept actions were negligible, conformity to rules and tradition was higher and
valued, and relatively speaking, the extent and magnitude of change was
definitely less. It however did not mean that they were ‘changeless’, but
they were changing slowly, at a snail’s speed.
In the words of Robert Redfield (1955), these societies were ‘past-oriented’

in comparison to modern societies which were ‘future-oriented’. The ‘past-
oriented’ societies were proud of their tradition, which for them was
sacrosanct; they wanted to keep it intact and therefore, any attempt to
assail it was strongly dealt with. The ‘future-oriented’ societies were not
satisfied with their lot; they looked forward to changing their lifestyles,
technology, and norms and values. Since the substantiation of anthropological
functionalism came from the empirical study of ‘past-oriented’, technologically
simpler, pre-literate, and non-civilized societies, it was obvious that the
characteristics of these societies would find their conspicuous presence in
the theory.
Because functionalism does not deal with the issues of conflict, disorder,
and change, many critics note that it has a conservative bias. In his critical
assessment of functionalism, Gouldner (1970) says that for Parsons, one of
the leading functionalists, a ‘partly filled glass’ is ‘half full’ rather than ‘half
empty’. The point here is that for those the ‘glass is half full’ are emphasising
the positive aspects of a situation in comparison to those who lay emphasis
on the negative side, seeing the ‘glass as half empty’. The conservative bias
in functionalism is not only because of what it ignores (history, change,
conflict, disorder) but also what it emphasises (society ‘here and now’,
norms and values, consensus, order). Functionalists are overwhelmingly
preoccupied with the normative order of society.
The individual in functionalism is devoid of dynamism and creativity. He is

simply a product of society and its forces constrain him at every juncture.
The opposite view is that it is the individual who in fact initiates change
in society. Individuals as much use the system as the system uses them.
Those who subscribe to the interactional approach argue that functionalism
has failed to conceptualise adequately the complex nature of actors and the
process of interaction. One of the reasons of why functionalism ignored the
role of the individual in society was that it was solely interested in explaining
the survival of society. It was interested in the ‘collectivity’ and not the
‘individual’, and even when it was interested in the individual, as was the
case with Malinowski, it was only till the point of the satisfaction of its
biological needs. It was not to look at and analyze the attitudes and
sentiments of the individual, and the role these psychic dimensions play in
initiating social changes.
The functionalists’s search for order led them to lend justification to the
existing norms and values, ideological and hierarchical structures, institutions,
and rules of power distribution prevalent in a society. They did not realize,
as Marxists had done, that the normative system in a society was a creation
of the ruling elite, and there may be several opposing forces to it. By looking
for order, they in fact were justifying the system, the established order, and
thus were helping in the maintenance of the status quo. Functionalism was
charged for supporting the dominant elite and the system as it was.
90
In addition to these, there were some important methodological and logical Structure, Function and
Neo-Functionalism
criticisms of functionalism. The belief of functionalism that there is a ‘single
theory’ that could be used in all situations was an illusion. Many scholars
found that it was difficult to apply functionalism to complex societies, which
were not only fast changing but were also conflict-ridden. The ideas of
relativism – i.e., things are meaningful in their respective cultural contexts
— to which functionalists gave support, made a comparative analysis difficult.
If ‘things’ can only be understood in the context of the social system of
which they are a part, then how can we compare it with similar ‘things’ in
other systems? If polyandry, for example, makes sense in the context of the
community of the Todas, how can we compare it to polyandry in Jaunsar-
Bawar? Some scholars have tried to deal with this matter of the lack of
comparability in functionalism. Walter Goldschmidt (1966) has argued in favour
of an approach he has called ‘comparative functionalism’. According to this
approach, there is a universality of functions to which institutions are a
response. All cultures require the same functions; however the institutions
that fulfill these functions vary from one society to another.
One of the important criticisms of functionalism is that it is inherently

teleological, i.e., explanations are given in terms of ‘purposes’ or ‘goals’.
With respect to this, Turner and Maryanski (1979) submit that teleology per
se is not a problem. As a matter of fact, social theory should take into
account the ‘teleological relationship between society and its component
parts’ (Ritzer 2000). The problem comes when teleology is stretched to
unacceptable limits, when it is believed that only the given and specific part
of society can fulfill the needs. Teleology becomes illegitimate when it fails
to take into consideration the idea that a variety of alternative structures
can fulfill the same needs. Why certain structures come up and why certain
structures become irreplaceable needs to be explained. The later functionalists
— such as Parsons and Merton — were aware of this problem and in their own
ways tried to overcome it. Merton, for example, proposed the concept of
functional alternatives. In his analysis of the family system, Parsons was able
to show that in the contemporary industrial society, nuclear family performed
the functions of primary socialisation and the stabilization of adult personality
and no other institution could carry them out. These functions were non-
transferable to any other institutions.
Functionalism has also been criticised for making explicit what is implicit in
the premise; the technical term used for this kind of reasoning is ‘tautology’.
For example, if religion exists, it must be functional, otherwise, it will cease
to exist, and its function must be to contribute to social solidarity, because
without it, society will not be able to survive. Many critics have pointed out
that functionalism suffers from ‘globular or circular reasoning’. Needs are
postulated on the basis of the existing institutions, that are, in turn, used
to explain their existence. For instance, society as a ‘social fact’ explains
the division of labour, and in turn, division of labour contributes to the
maintenance of solidarity in society. What is happening here is that the
whole is being defined in terms of its parts and then, parts are being defined
in terms of the whole. Because one is being defined in terms of the other,
in fact, none of them – neither the whole nor its parts – is actually being
defined. As we noted earlier, here also there is a debate whether tautology
is inherent in the theory or has come into existence because of the deeds
of its practitioners.
91
Sociological Concept Reflection and Action 7.1
Discuss the major criticisms of functionalism that led to thee emergence of
neo-functionalism.
7.3 The Thesis of Neo-functionalism

A revival of interest in Parsons’s work, first in Germany and then, the United
States of America, led to the emergence of neo-functionalism. The basic aim
has been to merge certain aspects of functionalism, those which have
withstood the test of time, with other paradigms that have better developed
critical perspectives. The aim has been to build a ‘hybrid’ that combines the
strong points of the other perspectives so that one can deal with the so-
called opposite issues (such as, consensus and conflict, equilibrium and
change, collectivity and individual) in a balanced manner.
a) Revival in Germany
Those associated with neo-functionalism in Germany are Niklas Luhmann and
Jürgen Habermas, who initially collaborated on a theory of social engineering
in modern society, but later worked separately. Although formally trained in
law, Luhmann has been a student of sociology and in 1960, spent a year at
Harvard where he had a chance to be in contact with Parsons. He developed
a sociological approach that combined certain aspects from Parsons’ structural
functionalism with general systems theory. He also introduced in it concepts
from cognitive biology and cybernetics (Ritzer 2000: 185). However, he
disagreed with Parsons about the options available to individuals as concrete
human beings. Parsons placed emphasis on value consensus, also believing
that because the social system penetrates the personality system, the options
available to the individual for social relationships and behaviour are limited.
But that is, Luhmann thinks, not simply correct. He moves the individual out
of the social system into the ‘society’ — what may be termed the ‘societal
environment’ — which is far more complex and less restrictive. It accords
people more freedom, especially freedom for carrying out ‘irrational and
immoral behaviour’ (Abrahamson 2001: 148).
Abrahamson (2001: 148) says that if Luhmann moved from Parsons, and then
discovered the problems with the concept of value consensus, Habermas
moved toward Parsons. Habermas’s early writings were strongly critical of
Parsons, but later, he accorded a place to cultural, social, and personality
systems in his theory. His conceptualisation of the relationship between
these systems was quite consistent with Parsons’s views. He also gave place
to Parsons’s concept of ‘self-regulating system’, which comes into existence
when societies become complex as a consequence of which structural systems
are separated from ‘lifeworld’, i.e., the inter-subjective realm for experiencing
and communicating about culture, society, and personality.
b) Revival in the United States of America

The main spokespersons of neofunctionalism in America are Jeffrey Alexander
and Paul Colomy. In one of their joint publications of 1985, they define
neofunctionalism as ‘a self-critical strand of functional theory that seeks to
broaden functionalism’s intellectual scope while retaining its theoretical core’
(p. 118). Under the rubric of ‘neo-functionalism’, they have made an effort
to extend structural functionalism by overcoming its difficulties. Structural
92 functionalism envisions a single, all embracing conceptual scheme that is
supposed to be applicable for all societies at all points of time. By comparison, Structure, Function and
Neo-Functionalism
neofunctionalism is a ‘loosely organised package’ built around a general logic.
It possesses a number of autonomous ‘proliferations’ and ‘variations’, which
work at different levels and in different empirical contexts (Alexander and
Colomy, eds., 1990).
The goal of neo-functionalists is to create a more synthetic theory. There is

no doubt that Parsons was an unparalleled synthesizer of grand theory and
structural functionalism has a strong synthetic core from the beginning. In
his variety of structural functionalism, Parsons tried to integrate a wide
range of theoretical inputs. He was also interested in drawing an
interrelationship between different systems that constitute the social world
— such as, cultural, social, and personality systems. So, Alexander and Colomy
say, the beginning of structural functionalism was quite promising, but
gradually, Parsons’s approach became overly narrow and deterministic. He
started viewing the cultural system as determining the other systems. Also,
his overwhelming preoccupation with the ‘problem of order’ led to insufficient
attention being paid to conflict and strain.
Alexander and Colomy think that the deficiencies of structural functionalism

are not irreversible. Its synthetic orientation can be recaptured. The concepts
of conflict and subjective meaning can be introduced. One can regard the
integration of the system and the interpenetration of its various subsystems
as a ‘tendency’, to be investigated rather than as a ‘given’ or ‘assumed’
fact.
Box 7.2: Neo-Functionalism: Problems that need to be Surmounted

In neo-functionalism, the problems that need to be surmounted are:
1) Anti-individualism — the individual in structural functionalism is passive
and lacks creativity, and is simply a product of the social forces, which
he neither checks nor controls;
2) Antagonism to change — structural functionalism is a theory of social
order rather than of change;
3) Conservatism — structural functionalism has worked toward offering a
justification of the system and its practices, often justifying inequality,
exploitation, and oppression.
4) Idealism — structural functionalism speaks in terms of an ideal society,
where everything is in order and stability.
5) Anti-empiricist bias — structural functionalism is more concerned with
abstract social systems instead of real societies.
Neo-functionalism can be seen as an ‘effort’ or ‘tendency’ to overcome

these problems. Alexander was skeptical of calling this a developed theory
and more an orientation sensitive to the criticisms of structural functionalism.
The basic orientations of neofunctionalism may be outlined. Neofunctionalism

operates with a descriptive model of society. For it, society comprises elements
that are constantly in interaction with other elements, and together they
form a pattern. Because of this pattern, society is differentiated from its
environment, with which it has its ceaseless interaction. Parts of a system
are symbiotically connected – one contributing to the other. However, there
is no overarching force that determines their interaction. Neofunctionalism
rejects any monocausal determinism; it is open-ended and pluralistic.
93
Social Structure as a Neo-functionalism allocates equal attention to action and order. According
to Alexander (1982: 65), these concepts constitute the ‘true presuppositions
of sociological debate.’ Structural functionalism has a tendency to focus
almost exclusively on the macro-level sources of order in social structures
and culture. It gives little attention to micro-level actions — actions that
take place at the local level. In its analysis, neo-functionalism includes rational
as well as expressive actions. It is far from viewing that human actions are
only rational, gain-multiplying, profit-oriented, and ‘scientific’. One of the
main functions of culture is that it allows people to express themselves,
sometimes aesthetically.
Like structural functionalism, neo-functionalism retains interest in integration,

but it is not an accomplished fact. Rather, it is a social possibility. It recognises
that deviance is a ubiquitous social reality, and to check it, each system
must have the instruments of social control, forcing the deviants to subscribe
to rules lest punishments to their actions become cumulatively stringent.
Social control tries to restore some sort of stability in the system. Neo-
functionalism is concerned with equilibrium, but it is broader than the concern
of structural functionalism. Neo-functionalism does not believe that any
system can ever be in a state of ‘static equilibrium’; it is always moving and
partial. Moreover, the concept of equilibrium is to be regarded as a reference
point for functional analysis. It does not describe the lives of individuals in
actual social systems, which is perennially in action. It brings us once again
to the point about neofunctionalism mentioned earlier – it is concerned
equally with order and action.
Of all the functionalists, it was Parsons’s structural functionalism that exercised

the maximum impact on later scholars, some of whom later became famous
as neo-functionalists. The latter accept the traditional Parsonian emphasis
on culture, social, and personality systems, which are vital to any society.
These systems interpenetrate one another, because of which they produce
tension, which is one of the important sources of change and control.
Further, change occurs when cultural, social, and personality systems are
differentiated over time. This change does not occur because of conformity
and harmony, but because of the rise of individualism and institutional strains.

What are the major similarities and differences between structural
functionalism and neo-functionalism?
Neo-functionalism submits that in order to enrich our understanding of the

processes of order and action in society, we should think of borrowing from
other theories and perspectives in sociology and other social sciences.
Alexander and Colomy have tried synthesizing structural functionalism with
other theoretical traditions. To overcome the idealist bias in structural
functionalism, neo-functionalism encourages materialist approaches. To
counter the structural functional tendency to emphasize order has led neo-
functionalists to explore the theories of culture. Insights from approaches
such as exchange theory, symbolic interactionism, pragmatism, and
phenomenology are being drawn to compensate for macro-level biases of the
traditional functional approach.
The future of neo-functionalism has been cast into doubt by the fact that
94 Alexander in his book Neofunctionalism and After (1998) has stated that he
has outgrown a neo-functionalist orientation in his career. He says that one Structure, Function and
Neo-Functionalism
of his important goals was to show the importance of Parsons’ theory. Parsons
had built a theoretical scheme that was potentially capable of overcoming
the contradictions inherent in classical sociology, but neither he nor any of
his collaborators and students was able to take full advantage of the theory.
Alexander saw his aim as that of developing the theoretical strands that lay
incipient in Parsons’s work. Since he thinks that he has succeeded in this
venture, his project of neo-functionalism is over. It will however, Alexander
says, keep on influencing his later thoughts, and his present work on civil
societies.
7.4 Merits and Demerits of Neo-functionalism:

Conclusion
Although some of the traits of what has come to be called ‘neo-functionalism’
are found in the German interest in Parsons’s works, this theoretical
‘tendency’ is principally associated with an American sociologist, Jeffrey C.
Alexander, and later, his younger collaborator, Paul Colomy. A restricted use
of the term ‘neo-functionalism’ is also found in ecological studies where it
basically means assigning primary importance to techno-environmental forces
in an analysis of the processes of cultural adaptation (Bettinger 1996).
Alexander does not seem to be happy with the use of the term ‘neo-
functionalism’. He also thinks that ‘functionalism’ was not really an appropriate
term to describe Parsons’s approach. Parsons himself tried to discard the
term ‘structural functionalism’ for his approach, but he knew that it would
continue to be used for his sociology. Some of his associates preferred to call
his theory ‘action theory’. Alexander (1985) also thinks that notwithstanding
the inappropriateness of the term ‘functionalism’, Parsons’s sociology will be
known in future by this name. Thus, not much will be gained by discarding
the term; rather one should cling to it, and redefine it. Instead of being a
unified theory, neofunctionalism is a ‘tendency’, characterised by the
following propositions (Alexander 1985: 10):
1) An open and pluralistic description of society as a whole.
2) An even-handed apportionment when it comes to action vs. structure
(or action vs. order).
3) Integration is viewed as a possibility; deviance and social control are
considered realities.
4) Discernment between personality, culture, and society.
5) Differentiation is viewed as the central driving force producing social
change.
6) The development of concepts and theory is considered to be independent
of all the levels involved in sociologic analysis.
There have been marked variations in the responses to the efforts of Alexander
and others to revive functionalism. Some have found Alexander’s account of
the functional tradition as extremely vague. They also question the purported
continuity between functionalism and neo-functionalism, because ‘neo-
functionalism seems to include everything functionalism has been criticized
as lacking’ (Fauske 2000:245). There are limits to the length to which any
theoretical perspective can go in accommodating incompatible notions and
yet retain its name and lineage. For some critics, the changes introduced in
structural functionalism are more cosmetic than real. Neo-functionalism is 95
Social Structure as a still imbued with the features that distinguish functionalism. For instance,
the view that societies can be studied objectively continues to predominate.
Individuals are still regarded as ‘reactors to the system’ rather than ‘dynamic
and creative actors’. Conflict is recognised but remains at a secondary place
in the theory (Abrahamson 2001). And, revolution is certainly not considered.
So, isn’t neofunctionalism old wine in new bottles?
Alexander suggests that sociology should be based on a post-positivistic

understanding of science, which means that we can understand the world
around us as much through theoretical explanations as through empirical
enquiry. This view opposes positivism because it reduces theory to empirical
data; in other words, for it, there cannot be a theory divorced from empirical
facts. Positivism makes a sharp distinction between empirical observations
and non-empirical propositions. The latter constitute the realm of philosophy
and metaphysics, thus deserving no place in empirical science.
Post-positivism submits that a theory can be discussed, examined, verified,

and elaborated with reference to other theories rather than empirical
research. In other words, the referent for a theory might be another theory
rather than an ensemble of facts. Theories are viewed as if they represent
the ‘empirical observations’. Alexander is critical of empirically-based
inferences in social sciences. One of the fundamental differences between
social sciences and natural sciences is that theoretical perspectives always
permeate every work that social scientists do. Sociological theory, therefore,
can be scientifically significant irrespective of its ability and capacity to
explain empirical observations.
In future, Alexander thinks, there will be a ‘grand theory’, built on the

premises of post-positivism. This theory will be multidimensional with respect
to various polarities in classical sociological theory, such as micro-macro,
order-conflict, equilibrium-stability, structure-agency, etc. But even after its
‘hybridization’, drawing upon different theoretical perspectives, neo-
functionalism will not be a ‘distinct paradigm’, much less a grand theory. In
other words, skepticism prevails about the future of neofunctionalism.
7.5 Further Reading

Alexander, Jeffrey C. (ed). 1985. Neofunctionalism. Beverley Hills, CA: Sage
School. London: Routledge
Ritzer, George. 2000. Modern Sociological Theory. McGraw Hill Higher Education
References
Abrahamson, Mark. 2001. Functional, Conflict and Nonfunctional Theories. In
George Ritzer and Barry Smart (eds), Handbook of Social Theory. Sage
Publications (pp. 141-51).
Alexander, Jeffrey C. 1982. Positivism, Presuppositions and Current
Controversies. Theoretical Logic in Sociology. Vol. 1. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
_________________, 1998. Neofunctionalism and After. London: Blackwell.
Alexander, Jeffrey C. (ed). 1985. Neofunctionalism. Beverley Hills, CA: Sage.
Alexander, Jeffrey C. and Paul Colomy. 1985. Toward Neo-functionalism.
96 Sociological Theory, 3: 11-23.
Alexander, Jeffrey C. and Paul Colomy (eds), 1990. Differentiation Theory Structure, Function and
Neo-Functionalism
and Social Change: Comparative and Historical Perspectives. New York: New
York University Press.
Bettinger, Robert. 1996. Neofunctionalism. In D. Levinson and M. Ember
(eds), Encyclopedia of Cultural Anthropology. Henry Holt Reference Book
(pp. 851-3).
Cohen, Percy. 1968. Modern Social Theory. New York: Basic Books.
Fauske, Halvor. 2000. Neofunctionalism. In Heine Andersen and Lars Bo
Kaspersen (eds), Classical and Modern Social Theory. Oxford: Blackwell
Publishers (p. 235-50).
Goldschmidt, Walter. 1966. Comparative Functionalism. An Essay in
Anthropological Theory. Berkeley: University of California Press.
School. London: Routledge.
Leach, Edmund R. 1954. Political Systems of Highland Burma: A Study of
Kachin Social Structure. London: The Athlone Press.
_______________, 1961. Rethinking Anthropology. London: The Athlone Press.
Parsons, Talcott. 1937. The Structure of Social Action. New York: McGraw-Hill.
_______________, 1966. Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives.
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
Redfield, Robert. 1955. Peasant Society and Culture. Chicago: Chicago
University Press.
Ritzer, George. 2000. Modern Sociological Theory. McGraw Hill Higher
Education.
Smelser, Neil. 1959. Social Change in the Industrial Revolution. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Turner, Jonathan and A.Z. Maryanski. 1979. Functionalism. Menlo Park, Calif.:
Benjamin/Cummings.
97

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Unit 5

Concept and Theories of Structure

Irrespective of the type of community to which a house belongs, it is divided

Different rooms of a house are all interconnected. Passages, alleyways, and

Pursuing this analogy further, a village or a neighbourhood may be described

Like a house (or a village or a neighbourhood), a society may be conceptualised

In their attempts to formulate the idea of society, different scholars have

5.2 Organic Analogy and Structure

Organic analogy is quite useful as a starting point, but it should not be

Durkheim’s sociology exercised an indelible impact on the British social

a) A Natural Science of Society

If social anthropology is a natural science of society, then its subject matter

As a ‘person’, the human being is a ‘complex of social relationships’. It is the

Society is not a ‘haphazard conjunction of persons’, rather an organised

In both cases, we are in fact concerned with relations between persons,

Bringing these together, Radcliffe-Brown says that social structure is that

Say, in the study of an Australian tribe, an anthropologist is concerned with

Social structure continues over time, a kind of continuity that Radcliffe-

Reflection and Action 5.1

For Radcliffe-Brown, there is only one method of social anthropology, i.e.,

d) Society and Social Structure

Further, Radcliffe-Brown writes: ‘By examining a number of different species,

5.4 Social Structure Refers to Relations Between

Evans-Pritchard carried out a piece of intensive fieldwork with the Nuer of 63

In his monograph on the Nuer, he first gives an account of the importance

Evans-Pritchard’s description of the elements of Nuer society and their

By social structure we mean relations between groups which have a high

Structure is an ‘organised combination of groups’. Individuals come and go,

Evans-Pritchard does not consider the family as a ‘structural group’. It is

This brings us to the issue of defining a group. For Evans-Pritchard, a group

5.5 Social Structure is a Model: Contributions of

Further, structuralism submits that the set of relations between different

In his celebrated essay of 1953 in A.L. Kroeber’s Anthropology Today, titled

Here, Lévi-Strauss distinguishes the concept of social structure from that of

Reflection and Action 5.2

Lévi-Strauss makes three distinctions: first, between observation and

By comparison, the distinction between conscious and unconscious models

Box 5.2: Edmund Leach on Social Structure

Leach has formulated a conception of social structure that is “essentially the

A concept of social structure that the Australian anthropologist, S.F. Nadel,

I consider social structure, of whatever degree of refinement, to be still the

We arrive at the structure of a society through abstracting from the concrete

5.7 Further Reading

As a distinct approach, as a way of looking at and analysing society,

It is the first thought of studying a society scientifically that Auguste Comte

In this unit we expose the concept of function in sociological writings. We

6.2 From Positivism to Functionalism

Like Comte, Durkheim is keenly interested in defining the subject matter of

Box 6.1: Sociological Explanations

Durkheim’s definition of function has tremendously influenced the writings

Durkheim also rejects the explanations of the division of labour that

Durkheim is particularly interested in showing that the function of social

6.3 The Premises of Functionalism

then, in the works of the twentieth-century functionalists, functionalism

6.4 Functionalism in Social Anthropology: Radcliffe-

Both the founders of the British functional approach (Radcliffe-Brown and

The scholars who later came to be known as ‘functionalists’ sought to shift

a) Structural-functional Approach of Radcliffe-Brown

Radcliffe-Brown dislikes the use of the word ‘functionalism’, which Malinowski