Mikko P.

Solis JD 1-C

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1.) Caltex Philippines V. Palomar

2.) Philippine Apparel V. NLRC
3.) Corpuz V. People
4.) Director Of Lands V. CA
5.) Secretary Of Dpwh V. Tecson
6 People V. Mapa
7.) People V. Amigo
8.) Lokin Jr. V. COMELEC
9.) Maglasang V. People
10.) In Re Hon Mateo Valenzuela
11.) De Castro V. JBC
12.) PCA V. Enriquez
13.) Lamp V. Secretary Of Budget
14.) Belgica V. Ochoa
15.) Remman Enterprises Inc. V. PRBRSP
16.) Roos Industrial Construction Inc. V. Nlrc
17.) Estrada V. Sandiganbayan
18.) First Metro Investment Corp V. Este Del Sol Mountain Reserve
19.) Del Socorro V. Van Wilsen
20.) Tawang Multi-Purpose Copp V. La Trinidad Water District
21.) Banat V. Comelec
22.) Hon. Maria Lourdes V. St Scholastica
23.) White Light Corp V. City Of Manila
24.) Ortega V. People
25.) Commissioner of Internal Revenue V. PAL
26.) Commissioner Of Customs V. Esso Standard Eastern
27.) Socorro Ramirez V. CA
28.) PNB V. Tejano
29.) Domingo V. COA
30.) Republic V. CA
31.) Espiritu V. Cipriano
32.) Bolos V. Bolos
33.) Quijano V. DBP
34.) Security Bank And Trust Company V. RTC Of Makati
35.) Go V. Distinction
36.) Luzon Development Bank V. Enriquez
37.) Municipality Of Nueva Era, Ilocos Norte V. Municipality Of Marcos, Ilocos Norte
38.) Brent School Inc. V. Zamora
39.) Gonzales Iii V. Office Of The President
40.) Galicto V. Aquino III

2.
1.)
CASE #1
Caltex (Philippines), Inc. vs. Palomar
No. L-19650 September 29, 1966
Petitioner/Appellee: CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC
Respondents/Appellant: ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as THE POSTMASTER
GENERAL
Ponente: CASTRO, J.

Facts:
Caltex created a promotional scheme to increase its sales called the "Caltex Hooded Pump
Contest", it calls for participants therein to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas
pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a specified period.

MECHANICS
To join, no fee or consideration is required to be paid, no purchase of Caltex products
required to be made. Interested participants must fill up entry forms which are to be made
available upon request at each Caltex station where a sealed can will be provided for the
deposit of accomplished entry stubs.

Different prizes await the several winners, in cash or in kind. In order to publicize the said
scheme, representations were made by Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest to
be cleared in advance for mailing, having in view sections 1954 (a), 1982 and 1983 of the
Revised Administrative Code.

This was later formalized in a letter to the Postmaster General, dated October 31, 1960, in
which the Caltex, thru counsel, enclosed a copy of the contest rules and endeavored to
justify its position that the contest does not violate the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal
Law.

POSTMASTER GENERAL DENIES CLEARANCE

Unimpressed, the then Acting Postmaster General opined that scheme falls within the
purview of the provisions aforesaid and declined to grant the requested clearance.

Caltex sought a reconsideration of the foregoing stand, stressing that there being involved
no consideration on the part of any contestant, the contest was not, under controlling
authorities, condemnable as a lottery.

Postmaster General maintained his view that the contest involves consideration, or that, if it
does not, it is nevertheless a "gift enterprise" which is equally banned by the Postal Law. He
even threatened that if the contest was conducted, "a fraud order will have to be issued
against it (Caltex) and all its representatives"

Issue:
Whether or not the scheme proposed by the appellee is within the coverage of the
prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law inescapably requires an inquiry into the intended
meaning of the words used therein.
 Ruling:
No, the scheme proposed by Caltex is not within the coverage of the prohibitive provisions of
the Postal Law.

Statutes; Construction defined.

Construction is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning 'and intention
of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is
rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly
provided for in the law (Black, Interpretation of Laws, p. 1).

In the present case, the question of whether or not the scheme proposed by the appellee is
within the coverage of the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law inescapably requires an
inquiry into the intended meaning of the words used therein. This is as much a question of
construction or interpretation as any other.

Essential elements of lottery

The term "lottery" extends to all schemes for' the distribution of prizes by chance, such as
policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of
gambling. The three essential elements of a Iottery are: first, consideration; second, prize:
and third, chance.

Gratuitous distribution of property by chance

When element of consideration is not present. In respect to the element of consideration, the
law does not condemn the gratuitous distribution of property by chance, if no consideration is
derived directly or indirectly from the party receiving the chance, but does condemn as
criminal schemes in which a valuable consideration of some kind is paid directly or indirectly
for the chance to draw a prize ("El Debate", Inc. vs. Topacio, supra).

Under the rules of the proposed contest there is no requirement that any fee be paid, any
merchandise be bought, any service be rendered, or any value whatsoever be given for the
privilege to participate.

A prospective contestant has but to go to a Caltex station, request for the entry form which is
available on demand, and accomplish and submit the same for the drawing of the winner.
Viewed from all angles, the contest fails to exhibit any discernible consideration which would
brand it as a lottery, The scheme is but a gratuitous distribution of property by chance.

Meaning of "gift enterprise

The term "gift enterprise" is commonly applied to a sporting artifice under which goods are
sold for their market value, but by way of inducement each purchaser is given a chance to
win a prize.

As thus conceived, the term clearly cannot embrace the scheme at bar, where there is no
sale of anything to which the chance offered is attached as an inducement to the purchaser,
and where the contest is open to all qualified contestants irrespective of whether or not they
buy the appellee's products.
When gift enterprises are condemnable
Under the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law, gift enterprises and similar schemes
therein contemplated are condemnable only if, like lotteries, they involve: the element of
consideration. Because there is none in the contest herein, in question, the appellee may not
be denied the use of the mails for purposes thereof.

Finding none in the contest here in question, we rule that the Caltex, the appellee may not
be denied the use of the mails for purposes thereof.

Recapitulating, we hold that the petition herein states a sufficient cause of action for
declaratory relief, and that the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest” as described in the rules
submitted by the appellee does not transgress the provisions of the Postal Law.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. No costs

CASE #2
Philippine Apparel Workers Union vs. National Labor Relations Commission
No. L-50320. July 31, 1981
PHILIPPINE APPAREL WORKERS UNION, petitioner vs. THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION and PHILIPPINE APPAREL, INC., respondents.
MAKASIAR, J.:

FACTS
The Philippine Apparel Workers Union (petitioner) renewed their collective bargaining
agreement with the respondent and one of the provisions stipulated that effective April 1,
1977, EIGHTY CENTAVOS [P0.80] will be added to the basic daily wages of all said
employees.

The controversy arose when the petitioner union sought the implementation of the
negotiated wage increase of P0.80 as provided for in the collective bargaining agreement.
Respondent company asserts that since there was already a meeting of the minds between
the parties as early as April 2, 1977 about the wage increases which were made retroactive
to April 1, 1977, it fell well within the exemption provided for in the Rules Implementing P.D.
112, as follows: “Those that have granted in addition to the allowance under P.D. 525, at
least P60.00 monthly wage increase on or after January 1, 1977, provided that those who
paid less than this amount shall pay the difference."

The petitioner maintains that the living allowance under P.D. 1123 (originally P.D. 525) is
distinct and separate from the negotiated wage increase of P0.80 daily February 13, 1978,
the petitioner filed a complaint dated February 10, 1978 for unfair labor practice and violation
of the CBA against the respondent company.
The case was dismissed, and is referred to the parties or disputants for them to resolve their
disputes, grievances or matters arising from the implementation, application or interpretation
of their Collective Bargaining Agreement in accordance with the Machinery established in
the CBA." Both parties appealed to the respondent Commission.

ISSUE
Whether or not the P0.80 per day increase should be paid in addition to other increase in
wages.
RULING
Yes. such P 0.80 per day increase should be paid in addition to other increase in wages.

Statutory Construction
Great weight should be given to the interpretation of a given statute by the government
agency called upon to implement it. One thing is for sure. The Department had the right to
construe the word "granted", as used in Section 1 (k). The construction it had adopted
cannot be viewed as so wrong as to allow us to reverse it. The rule followed in this
jurisdiction since Madrigal vs. Rafferty (38 Phil. 414 [1918]) is that great weight shall be
given to the interpretation or construction given to a statute by the Government agency
called upon to implement the statute. In this case, the weight in favor of the Department of
Labor should be greater, because the Department is not interpreting or construing a statute,
but it had explained the extent of its own rule.

The meaning of the rule is that when an employer had "granted" increases to his employees
after January 1, 1977, such increases shall be credited against the P60.00 ECOLA provided
in PD 1123.

Considering that the Secretary of Labor could exempt distressed employers from complying
with PD 1123, it is believed that the regulation to debit the P60.00 ECOLA with wage
increases granted to employees after January 1, 1977 was within the authority of the
Secretary to make.

The writ of certiorari is hereby granted, the decision of the respondent commission is hereby
set aside, and private respondent is hereby directed to pay, in addition to the increased
allowance provided for in P.D. 1123, the negotiated wage increase of P0.80 daily effective
april 1, 1977 as well as all other wage increases embodied in the collective bargaining
agreement, to all covered employees. costs against private respondent. this decision is
immediately executory.
CASE #3
Corpuz vs. People
G.R. No. 180016. April 29, 2014.
LITO CORPUZ, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
PERALTA, J.

FACTS
Petitioner Lito Corpuz and private complainant Danilo Tangcoy had an agreement that the
former would sell the latter’s pieces of jewelry on a commission basis.

They both agreed that the petitioner shall remit the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold, to
return the same items, within a period of 60 days.

The period expired without petitioner remitting the proceeds of the sale or returning the
pieces of jewelry. When private complainant was able to meet petitioner, the latter promised
the former that he will pay the value of the said items entrusted to him, but to no avail.

A complaint was filed and subsequently the RTC held that petitioner was found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph one (1),
subparagraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code.

The accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of deprivation of liberty consisting of
imprisonment under the Indeterminate Sentence Law of FOUR (4) YEARS AND TWO (2)
MONTHS of Prisión Correccional in its medium period AS MINIMUM, to FOURTEEN (14)
YEARS AND EIGHT (8) MONTHS of Reclusion Temporal in its minimum period AS
MAXIMUM; to indemnify private complainant Danilo Tangcoy the amount of P98,000.00 as
actual damages, and to pay the costs of suit.

The case was elevated to the CA, however, the latter denied the appeal of petitioner and
affirmed the decision of the RTC.

The CA affirmed with modification on the imposable prison term, such that accused-
appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prisión
correccional, as minimum, to 8 years of prisión mayor, as maximum, plus 1 year for each
additional P10,000.00, or a total of 7 years. Hence, the petition.

ISSUE
Whether or not, applying the rules of statutory construction, the Court may, rather than
declare the relevant statutory penalties unconstitutional, determine the legislative intent with
respect to them and, accordingly, adjust the amount of the present fraud to its 1932
equivalent and impose the proper penalty.

RULING
The Court is in no position to conclude as to the intentions of the framers of the Revised
Penal Code by merely making a study of the applicability of the penalties imposable in the
present times. Such is not within the competence of the Court but of the Legislature.
The primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such a way that it shall not
usurp legislative powers by judicial legislation and that in the course of such application or
construction, it should not make or supervise legislation, or under the guise of interpretation,
modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the law a construction
which is repugnant to its terms.

Moreover, it is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a Fine; hence,
it can be increased by the Court when appropriate. Article 10 of the Civil Code mandates a
presumption that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.

Statutory Construction; View that in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws,
it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. Article 10 of the
Civil Code states: “In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed
that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.” The Code Commission found
it necessary to include this provision to “strengthen the determination of the Court to avoid
an injustice which may apparently be authorized in some way of interpreting the law.”

Verba Legis; View that the cardinal canon in statutory construction — the plain meaning rule
or verba legis — requires that “the meaning of a statute should, in the first instance, be
sought in the language in which the act is framed; if the language is plain, the sole function
of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.”

The cardinal canon in statutory construction — the plain meaning rule or verba legis —
requires that “the meaning of a statute should, in the first instance, be sought in the
language in which the act is framed; if the language is plain, the sole function of the courts is
to enforce it according to its terms.” In interpreting any statute in the exercise of its judicial
power of applying the law, the Court should always turn to this cardinal canon before all
others. “Courts should always presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and
means in a statute what it says there,” and that the legislature knows “the meaning of the
words, to have used them advisedly, and to have expressed the intent by use of such words
as are found in the statute.” Thus, when the law is clear and free from any doubt or
ambiguity, and does not yield absurd and unworkable results, the duty of interpretation, more
so of construction, does not arise; the Court should resort to the canons of statutory
construction only when the statute is ambiguous.

CASE #4
Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 102858. July 28, 1997
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO
ABISTADO, substituted by MARGARITA, MARISSA, MARIBEL, ARNOLD and MARY
ANN, all surnamed ABISTADO, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
 FACTS
Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title over
648 square meters of land under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529

However, during the pendency of his petition, the applicant died. Hence, his heirs—
Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado— represented by
their aunt Josefa Abistado, who was appointed their guardian ad litem, were substituted as
applicants.

The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the petition “for
want of jurisdiction.”

However, it found that the applicants through their predecessors-in-interest had been in
open, continuous, exclusive and peaceful possession of the subject land since 1938. The
trial court dismissed the petition.

Private respondents appealed to Respondent Court of Appeals which, as earlier explained,

set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the registration of the title in the name of
Teodoro Abistado. The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in the challenged
CA Resolution. The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated this
recourse to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed “grave abuse of discretion” in holding that
publication of the petition for registration of title in LRC Case No. 86 need not be published in
a newspaper of general circulation, and in not dismissing LRC Case No. 86 for want of such
publication.”

RULING
This Court agrees with the Petitioner. In Statutory Construction; The word “shall” denotes an
imperative and thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute; If mailing of notices is
essential, then by parity of reasoning, publication in a newspaper of general circulation is
likewise imperative where the law includes such requirement in its detailed provision.

The law used the term “shall” in prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner of
Land Registration upon the latter’s receipt of the court order setting the time for initial
hearing. The said word denotes an imperative and thus indicates the mandatory character of
a statute.

While concededly such literal mandate is not an absolute rule in statutory construction, as its
import ultimately depends upon its context in the entire provision, we hold that in the present
case the term must be understood in its normal mandatory meaning.

In Republic vs. Marasigan, the Court through Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. held that
Section 23 of PD No. 1529 requires notice of the initial hearing by means of:
1. publication,
2. mailing and
3. posting,

All of which must be complied with. The respondents did not comply with the explicit
publication requirement of the law. Private respondents did not proffer any excuse; even if
they had, it would not have mattered because the statute itself allows no excuses.

VERBA LEGIS The law is unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and again, this Court
has declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room
for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for application.

There is no alternative. Thus, the application for land registration filed by private respondents
must be dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the future, after all the legal
requisites shall have been duly complied with.

The petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The application of private respondent for land registration is DISMISSED
without prejudice.

CASE #5
Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways vs. Tecson
G.R. No. 179334. April 21, 2015
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS and DISTRICT
ENGINEER CELESTINO R. CONTRERAS, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES HERACLEO and
RAMONA TECSON, respondents.
PERALTA, J.:

FACT
For the construction of the MacArthur Highway DPWH took the respondents’ property
without the benefit of expropriation proceedings while respondents demanded the payment
of the fair market value of the land.

The District Engineer of DPWH offered to pay for the subject land at Seventy Centavos
(P0.70) per square meter. However, the respondents demanded the return of their property,
or the payment of compensation at the current fair market value.

And so the respondents filed a complaint for recovery of possession with damages and they
were favored by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA), with the
subject property valued at One Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P1,500.00) per square
meter, with interest at six percent (6%) per annum. The respondents moved for the
reconsideration of said decision .

ISSUE
Whether or not the respondents should be paid for their property at the current fair market
value plus the interest of 12% per annum.

RULING
No. In previous cases the Court has uniformly ruled that the fair market value of the property
at the time of taking is controlling for purposes of computing just compensation.

Just compensation due respondents-movants in this case should, therefore, be fixed not
as of the time of payment but at the time of taking in 1940 which is Seventy Centavos
(P0.70) per square meter, and not One Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P1,500.00) per
square meter, as valued by the RTC and CA.

While disparity in the above amounts is obvious and may appear inequitable to respondents-
movants as they would be receiving such outdated valuation after a very long period, it
should be noted that the purpose of just compensation is not to reward the owner for the
property taken but to compensate him for the loss thereof. As such, the true measure of the
property, as upheld by a plethora of cases, is the market value at the time of the taking,
when the loss resulted.

In the Court’s own words: The Bulacan trial court, in its 1979 decision, was correct in
imposing interests on the zonal value of the property to be computed from the time petitioner
instituted condemnation proceedings and “took” the property in September 1969.

This allowance of interest on the amount found to be the value of the property as of the time
of the taking computed, being an effective forbearance, at 12% per annum should help
eliminate the issue of the constant fluctuation and inflation of the value of the currency over
time.

Indeed, the State is not obliged to pay premium to the property owner for appropriating the
latter’s property; it is only bound to make good the loss sustained by the landowner, with due
consideration of the circumstances availing at the time the property was taken. More, the
concept of just compensation does not imply fairness to the property owner alone.

We hold that putting to rest the issue on the validity of the exercise of eminent domain is
neither tantamount to condoning the acts of the DPWH in disregarding the property rights of
respondents-movants nor giving premium to the government’s failure to institute an
expropriation proceeding.

This Court had steadfastly adhered to the doctrine that its first and fundamental duty is
the application of the law according to its express terms, interpretation being called
for only when such literal application is impossible.

To entertain other formula for computing just compensation, contrary to those

established by law and jurisprudence, would open varying interpretation of economic
policies — a matter which this Court has no competence to take cognizance of. Time and
again, we have held that no process of interpretation or construction need be resorted to
where a provision of law peremptorily calls for application.
CASE #6
People vs. Mapa
No. L-22301. August 30, 1967
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARIO MAPA Y
MAPULONG, defendant-appellant
FERNANDO, J.

FACTS
Mario Mapa wilfully and unlawfully have in his possession and under his custody and control
one home-made revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22, without serial number, with six (6) rounds of
ammunition, but lacks the necessary license or permit.

Consequently, he is accused of a violation of Section 878 in connection with Section 2692

of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and as
further amended by Republic Act No. 4.

Gov. Leviste claims that he directed the accused to proceed to Manila, Pasay and Quezon
City on a confidential mission, and produced a certificate dated March 11, 1963, to the effect
that the accused "is a secret agent" of his.

The lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused "of the crime of illegal
possession of firearms.

ISSUE
Whether or not Mapa’s appointment to the position of a secret agent to the provincial
governor would constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for the crime of illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition.

RULING
No. Being a secret agent of the governor is not a defense.—The fact that a person, found in
possession of an unlicensed firearm, is a secret agent of a provincial governor does not
exempt him from criminal liability. The law does not contain any exception for a secret agent.

The first and fundamental duty of the courts is to apply the law. "Construction and
interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or
inadequate without them." It is not within the power of a court to set aside the clear and
explicit mandate of a statutory provision.

The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not
exempt. Our task is equally clear. The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the
law. "Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that
application is impossible or inadequate without them." The conviction of the accused must
stand. It cannot be set aside.
CASE #7
People vs. Amigo G.R. No. 196231 September 4, 2012
G.R. No. 116719. January 18, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PATRICIO AMIGO alias “BEBOT,”
accused-appellant.
MELO, J.
FACT
The crime of MURDER punishable under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code was charged
agains Patricio Amigo wherein he was charged guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

However, he argued that the court erred in imposing or meting out the penalty of reclusion
perpetua against him despite the fact that Sec. 19 (1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution was
already in effect when the offense was committed.

Furthermore, he contends that under the 1987 Constitution and prior to the promulgation of
Republic Act No. 7659, the death penalty had been abolished and hence, the penalty that
should have been imposed for the crime of murder committed by accused-appellant without
the attendance of any modifying circumstances, should be reclusion temporal in its medium
period or 17 years, 4 months and 1 day, to 20 years of reclusion temporal.

ISSUE
Whether or not as a result of the prohibition against the death penalty, the court meant to
require a corresponding modification in the other periods.

RULING
No. The Court ruled that Article III, Section 19(1) does not change the periods of the penalty
prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code except only insofar as it prohibits the
imposition of the death penalty and reduces it to reclusion perpetua. The range of the
medium and minimum penalties remains unchanged.

The applicable sentence is the medium period of the penalty prescribed by Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code which, conformably to the new doctrine here adopted and announced,
is still reclusion perpetua.

It is a settled rule of legal hermeneutics that if the language under consideration is plain, itis
neither necessary nor permissible to resort to extrinsic aids, like the records of the
constitutional convention, for its interpretation

A reading of Section 19(1) of Article III will readily show that there is really nothing therein
which expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty. The provision merely says that
the death penalty shall not be imposed unless for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes the Congress hereafter provides for it and, if already imposed, shall be reduced to
reclusion perpetua.

The language, while rather awkward, is still plain enough. And itis a settled rule of legal
hermeneutics that if the language under consideration is plain, it is neither necessary nor
permissible to resort to extrinsic aids, like the records of the constitutional convention, for its
interpretation.
CASE #8
Lokin Jr. vs. COMELEC
G.R. Nos. 179431-32 June 22, 2010
LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., as the second nominee of CITIZENS BATTLE AGAINST CORRUPTION
(CIBAC), Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and the HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.
BERSAMIN, J.:

FACT
CIBAC filed a certificate nomination, substitution and amendment of the list of nominees
dated May 7, 2007. The organization was one of the those duly registered under the party-
list system of representation that manifested their intent to participate in the May 14, 2007
synchronized national and local elections.

CIBAC’s nominees were: (1) Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva; (2) herein petitioner Luis K.
Lokin, Jr.; (3) Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales; (4) Sherwin Tugna; and (5) Emil L. Galang.
However, a certificate of nomination substitution and amendment of the list of nominees was
filed by CIBAC withdrawing the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and substituted
Armi Jane R. Borje as one of the nominees. Retaining only (1) Villanueva, (2) Cruz-
Gonzales, and (3) Borje.

Following the close of the polls, or on June 20, 2007, Villanueva sent a letter to COMELEC
Chairperson Benjamin Abalos, transmitting therewith the signed petitions of more than 81%
of the CIBAC members, in order to confirm the withdrawal of the nomination of Lokin, Tugna
and Galang and the substitution of Borje.

They also filed with the COMELEC en banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers a
motion seeking the proclamation of Lokin as its second nominee. The motion was opposed
by Villanueva and Cruz-Gonzales. The COMELEC failed to act on the matter, prompting
Villanueva to file a petition to confirm the certificate of nomination, substitution and
amendment of the list of nominees of CIBAC on June 28, 2007.

COMELEC resolved to set the matter through a resolution pertaining to the validity of the
withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and the substitution of Borje for
proper disposition and hearing. Cruz-Gonzales was proclaimed as the official second
nominee of CIBAC and took her oath of office as a Party-List Representative.

Lokin filed a petition for mandamus before the supreme court seeking to compel COMELEC
to proclaim his as the official second nominee of CIBAC.

He alleges that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 No change of names or alteration of the
order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the
COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination,
becomes incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed
last in the list. Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives who are
nominated in the party-list system shall not be considered resigned.”
The COMELEC argued that once the proclamation of the winning party-list organization has
been done and its nominee has assumed office, any question relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of the candidates to the House of Representatives will be under the
jurisdiction of the HRET. Lokin questions whether in an election protest or in a special civil
action for quo warranto in the HRET, not in a special civil action for certiorari in this Court.

ISSUE
Whether or not Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is invalid and of no effect

RULING
Yes. Lokin has correctly brought this special civil action for certiorari against the COMELEC
to seek the review of the September 14, 2007 resolution of the COMELEC in accordance
with Section 7 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, notwithstanding the oath and
assumption of office by Cruz-Gonzales.

As Rule 64 states, the mode of review is by a petition for certiorari in accordance with Rule
65 to be filed in the Supreme Court within a limited period of 30 days. Undoubtedly, the
Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over Lokin’s petitions for certiorari and for
mandamus against the COMELEC.

YES, the petitions for certiorari and mandamus was GRANTED.

Considering that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 – to the extent that it allows the party-list
organization to withdraw its nomination already submitted to the COMELEC – was invalid,
CIBAC’s withdrawal of its nomination of Lokin and the others and its substitution of them with
new nominees were also invalid and ineffectual. It is clear enough that any substitution of
Lokin and the others could only be for any of the grounds expressly stated in Section 8 of
R.A. No. 7941.

Resultantly, the COMELEC’s approval of CIBAC’s petition of withdrawal of the nominations

and its recognition of CIBAC’s substitution, both through its assailed September 14, 2007
resolution, should be struck down for lack of legal basis. Thereby, the COMELEC acted
without jurisdiction, having relied on the invalidly issued Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 to
support its action.

Prohibitive or negative words can rarely, if ever, be directory, for there is but one way to
obey the command “thou shall not,” and that is to completely refrain from doing the forbidden
act, subject to certain exceptions stated in the law itself.

The usage of “No” in Section 8—“No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees
shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases
where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, or becomes incapacitated, in
which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list” renders
Section 8 a negative law, and is indicative of the legislative intent to make the statute
mandatory.
Prohibitive or negative words can rarely, if ever, be directory, for there is but one way to
obey the command “thou shall not,” and that is to completely refrain from doing the forbidden
act, subject to certain exceptions stated in the law itself, like in this case.

When the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation
or construction, but only for application. Accordingly, an administrative agency tasked to
implement a statute may not construe it by expanding its meaning where its provisions are
clear and unambiguous.

The Court declares Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 invalid and of no effect to the extent
that it authorizes a party-list organization to withdraw its nomination of a nominee once it has
submitted the nomination to the Commission on Elections.

CASE #9
Maglasang vs. People
G.R. No. 90083. October 4, 1990.
KHALYXTO PEREZ MAGLASANG, accused-petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Presiding Judge ERNESTO B. TEMPLADO (San Carlos City Court),
Negros Occidental, respondents.

FACTS
After the dismissal of the petition filed by Atty. Marceliano L. Castellano, as counsel of the
petitioner, he then filed a motion for reconsideration.

However, the motion for reconsideration did not contain the duplicate original or certified true
copies of the assailed orders. Thus, in a Resolution dated October 18,1989, the motion for
reconsideration was denied "with FINALITY."

Three months later, or on January 22, 1990 to be exact, the Court received from Atty.
Castellano a copy of a complaint dated December 19,1989, filed with the Office of the
President of the Philippines whereby Khalyxto Perez Maglasang, through his lawyer, Atty.
Castellano, as complainant, accused all the five Justices of the Court's Second Division with
"biases and/or ignorance of the law or knowingly rendering unjust judgments or resolution."

Atty. Castellano was required by the Justices of the Supreme Court to show cause why he
should not be punished for contempt or administratively dealt with for improper conduct.

The reason for such order was due to the strong and intemperate language of the complaint
and its improper filing with the Office of the President.
 ISSUE
Whether or not the President of the Philippines as Chief Executive may pass judgment on
any of the Court's acts, as implied by the complaint filed by Atty. Castellano.

RULING

No, there is no other department or agency may pass upon the judgments of the Judiciary
Department or declare them 'unjust," not even the President of the Philippines as Chief
Executive may pass judgment on any of the Court's acts.

The Supreme Court is supreme—no other department or agency may pass upon its
judgments or declare them "unjust", not even the President of the Philippines.

We further note that in filing the "complaint" against the justices of the Court's Second
Division, even the most basic tenet of our government system which is the separation of
powers between the judiciary, the executive, and the legislative branches has been lost on
Atty. Castellano.

We, therefore, take this occasion to once again remind all and sundry that "the Supreme
Court is supreme—the third great department of government entrusted exclusively with
the judicial power to adjudicate with finality all justiciable disputes, public and private.

CASE #10
In Re: Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta
Adm. Mat. No. 98-5-01-SC. November 9, 1998
IN RE APPOINTMENTS DATED March 30, 1998 OF HON. MATEO A. VALENZUELA and
HON. PLACIDO B. VALLARTA AS JUDGES OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
BRANCH 62, BAGO CITY AND OF BRANCH 24, CABANATUAN CITY, respectively.
NARVASA, C.J.:

FACTS
The President appoints Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of
the Regional Trial Court of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City during
the prohibited period provided by the constitution in Art. VII, Sec 15.

He "firmly and respectfully reiterate his request for the Judicial and Bar Council to transmit
the final list of nominees for the lone SupremeCourt vacancy in order to complete the
appointments.

However, this is opposed by Chief Justice Narvasa who claims that the election ban
provision also applies to appointments in the judiciary. The constitutional issues being raised
in this matter induced the Court En Bance to decide on the Administrative matter.

ISSUE
1.Whether during the period of the ban on appointments imposed by Section 15, Article VII
of the Constitution, the President is required to fill vacancies in the judiciary.

RULING

Statutory Construction
During the period stated in Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution, two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, the
President is neither required to make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so.

The Court’s view is that during the period stated in Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution
“(t)wo months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his
term” the President is neither required to make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do
so; and that Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII simply mean that the President is required to
fill vacancies in the courts within the time frames provided therein unless prohibited by
Section 15 of Article VII. It is noteworthy that the prohibition on appointments comes into
effect only once every six years.

Midnight Appointments
Now, it appears that Section 15, Article VII is directed against two types of appointments: (1)
those made for buying votes and (2) those made for partisan considerations.

The first refers to those appointments made within the two months preceding a Presidential
election and are similar to those which are declared election offenses in the Omnibus
Election Code.

The second type of appointments prohibited by Section 15, Article VII consists of the so-
called “midnight” appointments. In Aytona v. Castillo, it was held that after the proclamation
of Diosdado Macapagal as duly elected President, President Carlos P. Garcia, who was
defeated in his bid for reelection, became no more than a “caretaker” administrator whose
duty was to “prepare for the orderly transfer of authority to the incoming President.”

CASE #11
De Castro vs. Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)
G.R. No. 191149. March 17, 2010
JOHN G. PERALTA, petitioner, vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC), respondent
BERSAMIN, J.:

FACT
Seven days after the presidential election would be the compulsory retirement of Chief
Justice Puno oas provided in the Constitution in Section 9, Article VIII, that “vacancy shall
be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof” from a “list of at least three
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.”
On December 22, 2009, Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an ex officio member of the JBC,
addressed a letter to the JBC, requesting that the process for nominations to the office of the
Chief Justice be commenced immediately.

As a result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for application or recommendation,

The announcement was published on January 20, 2010 in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and
The Philippine Star.17 Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically
considered” for the position of Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of
the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C.
Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J.
Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two
declined their nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010,
respectively.

Others either applied or were nominated. Victor Fernandez, the retired Deputy Ombudsman
for Luzon, applied, but later formally withdrew his name from consideration through his letter
dated February 8, 2010. Candidates who accepted their nominations without conditions were
Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro;
Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion; and Associate Justice Edilberto G. Sandoval
(Sandiganbayan). Candidates who accepted their nominations with conditions were
Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio and Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales.
Declining their nominations were Atty. Henry Villarica (via telephone conversation with the
Executive Officer of the JBC on February 5, 2010) and Atty. Gregorio M. Batiller, Jr. (via
telephone conversation with the Executive Officer of the JBC on February 8, 2010)

The JBC excluded from consideration former RTC Judge Florentino Floro (for failure to meet
the standards set by the JBC rules); and Special Prosecutor Dennis VillaIgnacio of the Office
of the Ombudsman (due to cases pending in the Office of the Ombudsman). In its meeting of
February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to proceed to the next step of announcing the names of
the following candidates to invite the public to file their sworn complaint, written report, or
opposition, if any, not later than February 22, 2010, to wit: Associate Justice Carpio,
Associate Justice Corona, Associate Justice Carpio Morales, Associate Justice Leonardo-De
Castro, Associate Justice Brion, and Associate Justice Sandoval. The announcement came
out in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and The Philippine Star issues of February 13, 2010.2

ISSUE
Whether or not the JBC have the discretion to withhold the submission of the short list to
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.

RULING
Yes. The intervention of the JBC eliminates the danger that appointments to the Judiciary
can be made for the purpose of buying votes in a coming presidential election, or of
satisfying partisan considerations.
The presidential power of appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article.
Section 4(1) and Section 9 states that the appointment of Supreme Court Justices can only
be made by the President upon the submission of a list of at least three nominees by the
JBC.

Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII, we have no
doubt that the Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to appointments made in
the Executive Department.

The framers did not need to extend the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary,
because their establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and screening of
candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process of the JBC
ensured that there would no longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary.

Indeed, it is axiomatic in statutory construction that the ascertainment of the purpose of the
enactment is a step in the process of ascertaining the intent or meaning of the enactment,
because the reason for the enactment must necessarily shed considerable light on “the law
of the statute,” i.e., the intent; hence, the enactment should be construed with reference to
its intended scope and purpose, and the court should seek to carry out this purpose rather
than to defeat it.

CASE #12
Philippine Constitution Association vs. Enriquez
G.R. No. 113105. August 19, 1994
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, EXEQUIEL B. GARCIA and RAMON A.
GONZALES, petitioners, vs. HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, as Secretary of Budget and
Management; HON. VICENTE T. TAN, as National Treasurer and COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
respondents
QUIASON, J.:

FACT
On the same day that the President signed the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 into law,
he delivered his Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed
and on which he imposed certain conditions. No step was taken in either House of Congress
to override the vetoes.
ISSUE
Whether or not the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994 are
constitutional.

RULING
Petitioners claim that the conditions imposed by the President violated the independence
and fiscal autonomy of the Supreme Court, the Ombudsman, the COA and the CHR. In the
first place, the conditions questioned by petitioners were placed in the GAB by Congress
itself, not by the President.

The Veto Message merely highlighted the Constitutional mandate that additional or indirect
compensation can only be given pursuant to law. In the second place, such statements are
mere reminders that the disbursements of appropriations must be made in accordance with
law. Such statements may, at worse, be treated as superfluities.

A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is limited to

specified sums of money dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal unit.

The item veto was first introduced by the Organic Act of the Philippines passed by the U.S.
Congress on August 29, 1916. The concept was adopted from some State Constitutions.
Cognizant of the legislative practice of inserting provisions, including conditions, restrictions
and limitations, to items in appropriations bills, the Constitutional Convention added the
following sentence to Section 20(2), Article VI of the 1935 Constitution: “When a provision of
an appropriation bill affects one or more items of the same, the President cannot veto the
provision without at the same time vetoing the particular item or items to which it relates” In
short, under the 1935 Constitution, the President was empowered to veto separately not only
items in an appropriations bill but also “provisions.

CASE #13
Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP) vs. Secretary of Budget and
Management
G.R. No. 164987. April 24, 2012
LAWYERS AGAINST MONOPOLY AND POVERTY (LAMP), represented by its
Chairman and counsel, CEFERINO PADUA, Members, ALBERTO ABELEDA, JR.,
ELEAZAR ANGELES, GREGELY FULTON ACOSTA, VICTOR AVECILLA, GALILEO
BRION, ANATALIA BUENAVENTURA, EFREN CARAG, PEDRO CASTILLO,
NAPOLEON CORONADO, ROMEO ECHAUZ, ALFREDO DE GUZMAN, ROGELIO
KARAGDAG, JR., MARIA LUZ ARZAGA-MENDOZA, LEO LUIS MENDOZA, ANTONIO P.
PAREDES, AQUILINO PIMENTEL III, MARIO REYES, EMMANUEL SANTOS, TERESITA
SANTOS, RUDEGELIO TACORDA, SECRETARY GEN. ROLANDO ARZAGA, Board of
Consultants, JUSTICE ABRAHAM SARMIENTO, SEN. AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR., and
BARTOLOME FERNANDEZ, JR., petitioners, vs. THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, THE TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE COMMISSION ON
AUDIT, and THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE and the SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES in representation of the Members of the Congress, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS
Petitioners are of the opinion that the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) is
silent and prohibits an automatic and direct allocation of lump sums to individual senators,
and congressmen for the funding of projects.

The silence in the law of direct or even indirect participation by members of Congress
betrays a deliberate intent on the part of the Executive and the Congress to scrap and do
away with the ‘pork barrel’ system.”

Furthermore, several flaws in the implementation of the provision were decried by LAMP
namely:
1) the DBM illegally made and directly released budgetary allocations out of PDAF in favor of
individual Members of Congress; and

2) the latter do not possess the power to propose, select and identify which projects are to
be actually funded by PDAF.

Petitioners contend that the aforementioned flaws of the PDAF contradict with the principle
of separation of powers.

The reason for this perceived contradiction lies in the fact that the Members of Congress in
effect intrude into an executive function by receiving and, thereafter, spending funds for their
chosen projects.

Petitioner Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP) filed an action for certiorari
assailing the constitutionality and legality of the implementation of the Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for in Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General
Appropriations Act for 2004 (GAA of 2004).

ISSUE
Whether or not the implementation of PDAF violates the principle of separation of powers as
provided in our constitution.

RULING
The Court rules in the negative. Absent a clear showing that an offense to the principle of
separation of powers was committed, much less tolerated by both the Legislative and
Executive, the Court is constrained to hold that a lawful and regular government budgeting
and appropriation process ensued during the enactment and all throughout the
implementation of the GAA of 2004.

The powers of government are generally divided into three branches: the Legislative, the
Executive and the Judiciary.

Each branch is supreme within its own sphere being independent from one another and it is
this supremacy which enables the courts to determine whether a law is constitutional or
unconstitutional.

The powers of government are generally divided into three branches: the Legislative, the
Executive and the Judiciary. Each branch is supreme within its own sphere being
independent from one another and it is this supremacy which enables the courts to
determine whether a law is constitutional or unconstitutional.

The Judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch of government or
any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously
as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a
judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
Under the Constitution, the power of appropriation is vested in the Legislature, subject to the
requirement that appropriation bills originate exclusively in the House of Representatives
with the option of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments.

CASE #14
Belgica vs. Ochoa
G.R. No. 208566. November 19, 2013
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA et al. vs. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS
DUMMY NGOS
After six whistle-blowers declared in their sworn affidavits claiming that JLN Corporation
(stands for Janet Lim Napoles) had facilitated the swindling of billions of pesos from the
public coffers for “ghost projects” using no fewer than 20 dummy non-government
organizations for an entire decade.

INVESTIGATION COMMENCED
In July 2013, NBI began the investigation after several allegations that the government has
been defrauded of some P10 Billion over the past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from
the pork barrel of lawmakers and various government agencies for scores of ghost projects.”

PETITION TO DECLARE PORK BARREL UNCONSTITUTIONAL

In August 2013, the Commission on Audit released a report revealing substantial
irregularities in the disbursement and utilization of PDAF by the Congressmen during the
Arroyo administration.

Contained in the COA Report and the Napoles controversy were several filed petitions
seeking that the Pork Barrel System be declared unconstitutional

ISSUE
Whether or not the PDAF, CDF and Pork Barrel System is unconstitutional since they violate
the Principle of Separation of Powers.

RULING
Yes, the Supreme Court declared the PDAF, and CDF as unconstitutional. However, the
Presidential Pork Barrel is partially constitutional.

The 24.79 Billion funds would be treated as a mere funding source allotted for several
purposes of spending. Consequently, it remains unconstitutional, considering the lack of
post-enactment legislative identification feature.
The President was denied the power to veto items since the system of budgeting did not
textualize the items into the appropriations bill.

From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress
or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law
violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.

The legislators have been authorized under the 2013 PDAF Article, to participate in “the
various operational aspects of budgeting,” including “the evaluation of work and financial
plans for individual activities” and the “regulation and release of funds”

The provision under Section 8 of PD 910 provides undue delegation of legislative power to
the President the power to appropriate funds intended by law for energy-related purposes
only to other purposes he may deem fit as well as other public funds under the broad
classification of “priority infrastructure development projects.”

Consequently, this has transgressed the principle of non-delegability. As a final order,

DIRECTED all prosecutorial organs of the government to, within the bounds of reasonable
dispatch, investigate and accordingly prosecute all government officials and/or private
individuals for possible criminal offenses related to the irregular, improper and/or unlawful
disbursement/utilization of all funds under the Pork Barrel System. This Decision is
IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY but PROSPECTIVE in effect.

CASE #15
Remman Enterprises, Inc. and Chamber of Real Estate and Builders’ Association vs.
Professional RegulatoryBoard of Real Estate Service and Professional
G.R. No. 197676. February 4, 2014
REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC. and CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS’
ASSOCIATION, petitioners, vs. PROFESSIONAL REGULATORY BOARD OF REAL
ESTATE SERVICE and PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION, respondents.
VILLARAMA, JR., J

FACTS

Under the R.A. No. 9646 also known as "Real Estate Service Act of the Philippines," there
were several provisions such as SEC. 28. Exemptions from the Acts Constituting the
Practice of Real Estate Service SEC. 29 Prohibition Against the Unauthorized Practice of
Real Estate Service, and SEC. 32. Corporate Practice of the Real Estate Service that were
questioned due to their unconstitutionality.

Prior to its enactment, real estate service practitioners were under the control of
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) through the Bureau of Trade Regulation and
Consumer Protection (BTRCP). Under the new law, it is now transferred to the Professional
Regulation Commission (PRC) through the Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate
Service (PRBRES).

Remman Enterprises Inc. (REI) and Chamber of Real Estate and Builders’ Association
(CREBA) filed an appeal in the Regional Trial Court to declare as void and unconstitutional
aforementioned provisions of R.A. No. 9646.
 ISSUES
● Whether or not R.A. No. 9646 is unconstitutional for violating the "one title-one
subject" rule under Article VI, Section 26 (1) of the Constitution

● Whether or not Section 28(a) is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection
clause

RULING
The Court finds the petition to be of no merit.

The one-subject requirement under the Constitution is satisfied if all the parts of the statute
are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they
are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title.—The Court has
previously ruled that the one-subject requirement under the Constitution is satisfied if all the
parts of the statute are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title,
or as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title.

It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored. In
order to effect a repeal by implication, the later statute must be so irreconcilably inconsistent
and repugnant with the existing law that they cannot be made to reconcile and stand
together.—It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not
favored. In order to effect a repeal by implication, the later statute must be so irreconcilably
inconsistent and repugnant with the existing law that they cannot be made to reconcile and
stand together.

The clearest case possible must be made before the inference of implied repeal may be
drawn, for inconsistency is never presumed. There must be a showing of repugnance clear
and convincing in character. The language used in the later statute must be such as to
render it irreconcilable with what had been formerly enacted. An inconsistency that falls short
of that standard does not suffice. Moreover, the failure to add a specific repealing clause
indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless an irreconcilable
inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws.

Equal Protection of the Laws; If classification is germane to the purpose of the law,
concerns all members of the class, and applies equally to present and future conditions, the
classification does not violate the equal protection guarantee.— Although the equal
protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification, it is imperative that the
classification should be based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable
relation to the subject of the particular legislation. If classification is germane to the purpose
of the law, concerns all members of the class, and applies equally to present and future
conditions, the classification does not violate the equal protection guarantee.

CASE #16
Roos Industrial Construction, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission
G.R. No. 172409. February 4, 2008
ROOS INDUSTRIAL CONSTRUCTION, INC. and OSCAR TOCMO, petitioners, vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and JOSE MARTILLOS, respondents
TINGA, J.
FACTS
Without any employment contract, the respondent worked as a drive-mechanic by the
petitioners. However, on March 16, 2002 he was terminated without due process.

The respondent acquired the status of a regular employee considering that his task was
necessary to the usual trade, and was illegally dismissed as determined by the Labor
Arbiter.

Petitioners were ordered to pay the respondent backwages, separation pay, salary
differential, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay and 13th-month pay.

A copy of the Labor Arbiter’s decision were received by the petitioners on 17 December
2003. Furthermore, the petitioners filed a Memorandum of Appeal before the NLRC and paid
the appeal fee on 29 December 2003, which was the last day of the reglementary period for
perfecting an appeal.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Extension of Time to Submit/Post Surety Bond instead of
posting the required cash or surety bond within the reglementary period.

Petitioners stated that they could not post and submit the required surety bond as the
signatories to the bond were on leave during the holiday season, and made a commitment to
post and submit the surety bond on or before 6 January 2004.

Due to the NLRC’s inaction, petitioners filed a surety bond equivalent to the award of the
Labor Arbiter. In a Resolution dated July 29, 2004, the Second Division of the NLRC
dismissed petitioners’ appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

After the petitioner’s appeal was denied in the Court of Appeals, the elevated the case to the
Supreme Court by way of a special civil action of certiorari.

ISSUES
Whether or not petitioners complied with the NLRC rules in filing the appeal bond.

RULING
No. The petitioners did not comply with the NLRC rules when they filed the appeal bond.

An appeal from the decision of the Labor Arbiter involving a monetary award is only deemed
perfected upon the posting of a cash or surety bond within ten (10) days from such decision;
The appeal bond is not merely procedural but jurisdictional.

The Court reiterates the settled rule that an appeal from the decision of the Labor Arbiter
involving a monetary award is only deemed perfected upon the posting of a cash or surety
bond within ten (10) days from such decision.
Contrary to petitioners’ assertion, the appeal bond is not merely procedural but jurisdictional.
Without said bond, the NLRC does not acquire jurisdiction over the appeal. Indeed, non-
compliance with such legal requirements is fatal and has the effect of rendering the
judgment final and executory. It must be stressed that there is no inherent right to an appeal
in a labor case, as it arises solely from the grant of statute.

It is only in highly meritorious cases that the Court opts not to strictly apply the rules and thus
prevent a grave injustice from being done.—No exceptional circumstances obtain in the case
at bar which would warrant a relaxation of the bond requirement as a condition for perfecting
the appeal. It is only in highly meritorious cases that this Court opts not to strictly apply the
rules and thus prevent a grave injustice from being done and this is not one of those cases.

CASE #17
Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 148560 November 19, 2001
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA,vs. SANDIGANBAYAN(Third Division) and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FERNANDO, J.
FACTS
No less than the President himself, Joseph Ejercito Estrada seeks to assail the
constitutionality of RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as
amended by RA 7659.

This is after he was charged with violation of the said law.

According to him the said law must be declared unconstitutional for the following reasons:

(a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness;

(b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and,
(c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised
Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the
accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.

ISSUE
Whether or not RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as amended
by RA 7659 should be declared unconstitutional.

RULING
No, every intendment of the law must be adjudged by the courts in favor of its
constitutionality, invalidity being a measure of last resort. In construing therefore, the
provisions of a statute, courts must first ascertain whether an interpretation is fairly possible
to side step the question of constitutionality.
The President, however, contends that there exists a failure of the said law to provide for the
statutory definition of the terms “combination” and “series” in the key phrase “a combination
or series of overt or criminal acts” found in Sec.1, par. (d),and Sec. 2, and the word “pattern”
in Sec. 4.

According to him, these issues render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being
impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right to due
process.

However, it should be noted that a statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely
because general terms are used therein, or because of the employment of terms without
defining them; much less do we have to define every word we use.

It is a well-settled principle oflegal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted

intheir natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification,unless it is evident that the
legislature intended a technical orspecial legal meaning to those words.

CASE #18
FIRST METRO INVESTMENT CORPORATION
vs. ESTE DEL SOL MOUNTAIN RESERVE
G.R. No. 141811, November 15, 2001
DE LEON, JR., J.

FACTS

Este del Sol obtained a loan of P 7,285,500.00 from FMIC to finance the construction of Este
del Sol Mountain Reserve.

Annual Interest rate of 16% was agreed upon by the parties as well as the staggered release
of the loan proceeds. Also, a 20% will be imposed on the amount due together with all the
penalties, fees, expenses or charges, plus attorney's fees equivalent to twenty-five (25%)

Several documents that served as security for payment was executed by Este del Sol. Also
among them, a Real Estate Mortgage and individual Continuing Suretyship agreements by
co-respondents.

Respondent Este del Sol also executed an Underwriting Agreement and Consultancy
Agreement, where they shall pay petitioner FMIC an annual supervision fee (P200,000.00)
and consultancy fee (P332,500.00) per annum for a period of four (4) consecutive years.
The said amounts of fees were deemed paid by respondent Este del Sol to petitioner FMIC
which deducted the same from the first release of the loan.

After the failure to pay based on the revised Schedule of Amortization as a result petitioner,
FMIC caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage.

The trial court favored FMIC, However, the appellate court reversed the challenged decision
of the trial court.
 ISSUE
Whether or not the illegal scheme employed by petitioner FMIC to collect excessively
usurious interest were disguised under the cover of Underwriting and Consultancy
Agreements.

RULING

Yes, the Court agrees with the factual findings and conclusion of the appellate court. The
stipulated penalties, liquidated damages and attorney's fees, excessive, iniquitous and
unconscionable and revolting to the conscience as they hardly allow the borrower any
chance of survival in case of default.

The 20% penalty on the amount due and 10% of the proceeds of the foreclosure sale as
attorney's fees would suffice to compensate the appellee, especially so because there is no
clear showing that the appellee hired the services of counsel to effect the foreclosure, it
engaged counsel only when it was seeking the recovery of the alleged deficiency.

Article 1957 of the New Civil Code clearly provides that:

Art. 1957. Contracts and stipulations, under any cloak or device whatever, intended to
circumvent the laws against usury shall be void. The borrower may recover in accordance
with the laws on usury.

The Court DENIED the instant petition, and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.

CASE #19
DEL SOCORRO V. VAN WILSEN
G.R. No. 193707 December 10, 2014
Petitioner: ORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO
NORJO VAN WILSEM
Respondent: ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM
Ponente: PERALTA, J.

The petitioner ORMA A. DEL SOCORRO in behalf of her minor child filed a complaint
affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City against ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN
VAN WILSEM for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s
unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner

Facts:
Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem
contracted marriage in Holland. Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended by virtue of a
Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. At that time, their son was only
eighteen (18) months old. After that Del Socorro and her son came home to the Philippines.

Van Wilsem made a promise to provide monthly support to their son. However, since the
arrival of Del Socorro and her son in the Philippines, Van Wilsem never gave support to the
son, Roderigo. Not long thereafter, Van Wilsem came to the Philippines and remarried. Now
all the parties, including their son, Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu City.

Del Socorro sued Van Wilsem for the latter’s unjust refusal to support their minor child.

RTC-Cebu dismissed the case against Van Wilsem on the ground that the facts charged in
the information do not constitute an offense with respect to the accused, he being an alien,
and accordingly, orders this case DISMISSED.

Del Socorro filed her Motion for Reconsideration contending that it is Van Wilsem’s
obligation to support their child under the Family Code, thus, failure to do so makes him
liable under “Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.”

Del Socorro contends that the law mentioned above "equally applies to all persons in the
Philippines who are obliged to support their minor children regardless of the obligor’s
nationality."

The Motion for Reconsideration was denied. The RTC reiterates its previous ruling and
reiterates its ruling that Van Wilsem, who is a foreign national, is not subject to our national
law (The Family Code) in regard to a parent’s duty and obligation to give support to his child.

The motion for reconsideration was DENIED for lack of merit.

After the RTC dismissed the criminal case against Van Wilsem, for violation of Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004, the case was elevated to the Supreme
Court through a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the Orders
of the lower court.

Van Wilsem contends that there is no sufficient and clear basis presented by Del Socorro
that she, as well as her minor son, are entitled to financial support.

He added that by reason of the of the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland, he is not
obligated to Del Socorro for any financial support.

Issue:
1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under
Philippine law; and

2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his
unjustified failure to support his minor child.

Ruling:
On this point, we agree with Van Wilsem that Del Socorro cannot rely on the Civil Code in
demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15 of the New
Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality.
In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the
Family Code on support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens.

By analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners such that they are governed by their
national law with respect to family rights and duties.

In the present case, Van Wilsem hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands,
he is governed by such laws on the matter.

However, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and
proved.

In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the
doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law
involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is
the same as our local or domestic or internal law.

Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been
properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with
Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and
penalizing the non-compliance therewith.

In addition, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have
for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective
by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a
foreign country.

Foreign laws should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to
the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function of law;
hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental
principles of Conflict of Laws.

Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s
obligation to support his child nor penalize the noncompliance therewith, such obligation is
still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to
be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.

Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that Van Wilse may be made liable under
SECTION 5 Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. Under the aforesaid
special law, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is considered an act of
violence against women and children.

Considering that Van Wilsem is currently living in the Philippines, we find strength in
petitioner’s claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the
New Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which provides that: "penal laws and those of
public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine
territory, subject to the principle of public international law and to treaty stipulations."
It is indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of Van Wilsem in refusing to support his
child with petitioner is committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are
residents of the Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction over
the offense charged against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the
respondent was acquired upon his arrest.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of the City
of Cebu are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the same
court to conduct further proceedings based on the merits of the case.

CASE #20
Tawang Multi-purpose Cooperative vs, La Trinidad Water District
G.R. No. 166471 March 22, 2011
TAWANG MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE Petitioner, vs. LA TRINIDAD WATER
DISTRICT, Respondent.
CARPIO, J.

FACTS

Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative filed with the National Water Resources Board (NWRB)
an application for a certificate of public convenience (CPC) to operate and maintain a
waterworks system in Barangay Tawang on 9 October 2000.

However, Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative opposed the application and claimed that its
franchise is exclusive under Section 47 of P.D. No. 198 which provides that no franchise
shall be granted to any other person or agency for domestic, industrial or commercial water
service within the district or any portion thereof unless and except to the extent that the
board of directors of said district consents thereto by resolution duly adopted, such
resolution, however, shall be subject to review by the Administration.

Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative’s application for a certificate of public convenience was

approved by the National Water Resources Board.

National Water Resources Board is of the opinion that La Trinidad Water District’s franchise
cannot be exclusive since exclusive franchises are unconstitutional and found that Tawang
Multi-Purpose Cooperative is legally and financially qualified to operate and maintain a
waterworks system.

On appeal, RTC where it ruled in favor of La Trinidad Water District and cancelled Tawang
Multi-Purpose Cooperative’s certificate of public convenience. It held that no franchise of
whatever nature can preclude the State, through its duly authorized agencies or
instrumentalities, from granting franchise to any person or entity, or to repeal or amend a
franchise already granted.

ISSUE
Whether or not Section 47 of P.D. no. 198 is unconstitutional.
 RULING
Yes. The court declared Section 47 of Presidential Decree No. 198 UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
The Court ruled that what cannot be legally done directly cannot be done indirectly. Indeed,
if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be
illusory.

The constitution clearly states that “franchises for the operation of a public utility cannot be
exclusive in character. The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions expressly and clearly state
that, "nor shall such franchise be exclusive in character."

Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the
constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive
branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and without
any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and
supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract."

Section 5 of Art. XIV of the 1973 Constitution reads:

"No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public
utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations
organized under the laws of the Philippines at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is
owned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate, or authorization be exclusive in
character or for a longer period than fifty years. Neither shall any such franchise or right be
granted except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or
repeal by the Batasang Pambansa when the public interest so requires. The State shall
encourage equity participation in public utiltities by the general public. The participation of
foreign investors in the governing body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their
proportionate share in the capital thereof."

Section 47 of P.D. 198, which vests an "exclusive franchise" upon public utilities, is clearly
repugnant to Article XIV, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution, it is unconstitutional and may
not, therefore, be relied upon by petitioner in support of its opposition against respondent’s
application for certificate of public convenience and the subsequent grant thereof by the
National Water Resources Board.

CASE #21
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) Party-
List vs. Commission on Elections
BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY
(BANAT) PARTY-LIST, represented by SALVADOR B. BRITANICO, petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
CARPIO, J.

FACTS
BANAT Party-List the petitioner, a duly accredited multisectoral organization, filed this
petition for prohibition alleging that RA 9369 have several provisions that are of
questionable application and doubtful validity for failing to comply with the provisions of the
Constitution.

Before the Court is a petition for prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction filed by petitioner Barangay
Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) Party List (petitioner)
assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9369 (RA 9369)3 and enjoining respondent

ISSUES
1. Whether RA 9369 violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution
2. Whether Sections 37 and 38 violate Section 17, Article VI and Paragraph 7,
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution
3. Whether Section 43 violates Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the Constitution; and
4. Whether Section 34 violates Section 10, Article III of the Constitution.

RULING
The Court’s Ruling The petition has no merit. It is settled that every statute is presumed to
be constitutional. The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible
and just law. Those who petition the Court to declare a law unconstitutional must show that
there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful,
speculative or argumentative one; otherwise, the petition must fail. In this case, petitioner
failed to justify why RA 9369 and the assailed provisions should be declared
unconstitutional.

It is settled that every statute is presumed to be constitutional. The presumption is that the
legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law. Those who petition the Court to
declare a law unconstitutional must show that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not merely a doubtful, speculative or argumentative one; otherwise, the petition
must fail.

1. RA 9369 does not violate Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution

- Although the constitution requires that “every bill passed by the Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof,” the
requirement is satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough to include subjects
related to the general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve.

2. Sections 37 and 38 do not violate Section 17, Article VI and Paragraph 7,

Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution
- In the present case, Congress and the COMELEC en banc do not encroach upon the
jurisdiction of the PET and the SET.

- There is no conflict of jurisdiction since the powers of Congress and the COMELEC
en banc, on one hand, and the PET and the SET, on the other, are exercised on
different occasions and for different purposes.
 - The PET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the President or Vice President.

- The SET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of members of the Senate.

- The jurisdiction of the PET and the SET can only be invoked once the winning
presidential, vice presidential or senatorial candidates have been proclaimed.

- On the other hand, under Section 37, Congress and the COMELEC en banc shall
determine only the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass.
Congress and the COMELEC en banc shall exercise this power before the
proclamation of the winning presidential, vice presidential, and senatorial candidates.

3. Section 43 does not violate Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the Constitution
- The Court does not agree with petitioner and the COMELEC that the Constitution
gave the COMELEC the “exclusive power” to investigate and prosecute cases of
violations of election laws.

- Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power to
“investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws,
including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.”

- It is clear that the grant of the “exclusive power” to investigate and prosecute election
offenses to the COMELEC was not by virtue of the Constitution but by BP 881, a
legislative enactment.

4. Section 34 does not violate Section 10, Article III of the Constitution

- There is no violation of the non-impairment clause. First, the non- impairment clause
is limited in application to laws that derogate from prior acts or contracts by enlarging,
abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the parties.
- There is impairment if a subsequent law changes the terms of a contract between
the parties, imposes new conditions, dispenses with those agreed upon or withdraws
remedies for the enforcement of the rights of the parties.

The petition was DISMISSED for lack of merit.

CASE #22
Fernando vs. St. Scholastica’s College
G.R. No.: 161107 March 12, 2013
HON. MA. LOURDES C. FERNANDO, in her capacity as City Mayor of Marikina City,
JOSEPHINE C. EVANGELIST A, in her capacity as Chief, Permit Division, Office of the
City Engineer, and ALFONSO ESPIRITU, in his capacity as City Engineer of Marikina
City, Petitioners, vs. ST. SCHOLASTICA'S COLLEGE and ST. SCHOLASTICA'S
ACADEMY-MARIKINA, INC., Respondents.
MENDOZA, J.
 FACTS
Ordinance No. 192, entitled “Regulating the Construction of Fences and Walls in the
Municipality of Marikina.” was issued by the City of Marikina .

The provisions below are the subject of this petition:

1. Section 3(1) Fences on the front yard – shall be no more than one (1) meter in
height. Fences in excess of one (1) meter shall be of an open fence type, at least eighty
percent (80%) see-thru.

2. Section 5 – in no case shall walls and fences be built within the five (5) meter parking
area allowance located between the front monument line and the building line of commercial
and industrial establishments and educational and religious institutions.

St. Scholastica’s College (respondent) was ordered by the City Government ordering them
to demolish and replace the fence of their property and to move it back about six (6) meters
to provide parking space for vehicles to park in accordance with the ordinance.

The City refused and insisted that it must be enforceable at once despite the respondent’s
request for an extension. Then the respondent files a prohibition with an application for a writ
of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order before the Regional Trial Court.

The petition of the respondent granted by the RTC. Furthermore, the petitioner was ordered
to permanently desist from enforcing the ordinance. After the Court of Appeals affirmed
RTC’s decision. Hence, the petitioner elevated the course to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES
Whether or not the enforcement of the City of Marikina of the provisions of Sections 3(1) and
5 of the Ordinance No. 192 was valid.

RULING
No. The legislative intent of Section 5 was to make parking space available for use by the
public, considering that it would no longer be the exclusive use of the respondents as it will
be also available for use by the general public which is in contravention of Section 9 of
Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution which provides that private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation. Moreover, the petitioner fails to show an adequate
reason that the provisions in Section 3(1) of the ordinance will achieve its ultimate goal
which is the prevention of crime to ensure public safety and security.

The provisions of this section violate the right to privacy of the respondent considering that
the residence of the nuns was also located within the property. This right is inherent in the
concept of liberty, indicated in the Bill of Rights in Sections 1, 2, 3(1), 6, 8 and 17, Article 3 of
the Constitution.

The Court declared that these two specific sections are invalid while the other sections that
are incapable of being separated from the invalid ones remain to be valid and enforceable.
CASE #23
White Light Corp. vs. City of Manila
G.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2009
WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST &
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioners, vs. CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE
CASTRO, MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, Respondent.
Tinga, J.

FACTS
Manila City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law an Ordinance prohibiting short time
admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in
Manila.

Short-time admission refers to the admittance and charging of room rate for less than twelve
(12) hours at any given time or the renting out of rooms more than twice a day or any other
term that may be concocted by owners or managers of said establishments but would mean
the same or would bear the same meaning.

Penalties shall be incurred against establishments found guilty of violation of this ordinance.
White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC) and Sta. Mesa Tourist and
Development Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached
complaint-in-intervention on the ground that the Ordinance directly affects their business
interests as operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila.

The three companies are components of the Anito Group of Companies which owns and
operates several hotels and motels in Metro Manila. The City filed an Answer dated January
22, 1993 alleging that the Ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power.

The RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance null and void. However, the Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the
Ordinance.

ISSUES
Whether or not the ordinance signed into law by Manila City Mayor Alfredo Lim should be
declared unconstitutional.

RULING
Yes. Ordinance No. 7774 of the City of Manila is hereby declared null and void for being
unconstitutional.

The goal of minimizing the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug
use and alike do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those means must
align with the Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its guarantees to the
people.
Those means must align with the Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its
guarantees to the people.

The primary constitutional question that confronts us is one of due process, as guaranteed
under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution. Substantive due process completes the
protection envisioned by the due process clause. It inquires whether the government has
sufficient justification for depriving a person of life, liberty, or property.

It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require an interference with private rights and the means must be
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of
private rights. It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the
purpose less intrusive of private rights can work.

CASE #24
Ortega vs. People
G.R. No. 151085 August 20, 2008
JOEMAR ORTEGA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
NACHURA, J.

FACTS
Joemar Ortega, 14 years old, was charged with the crime of Rape. by means of force,
violence and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal
knowledge of and/or sexual intercourse with a minor, then about 6 years old, against her will.

Joemar Ortega was found guilty by the RTC beyond reasonable doubt as Principal by Direct
Participation of the crime of RAPE and there being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstance.

The decision of the RTC was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

However, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9344, or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006,
was enacted into law on April 28, 2006 and it took effect on May 20, 2006.

The law establishes a comprehensive system to manage children in conflict with the law
(CICL) and children at risk with child-appropriate procedures and comprehensive programs
and services. The law also provides for the immediate dismissal of cases of CICL,
specifically Sections 64, 65, 66, 67 and 68 of R.A. No. 9344's Transitory Provisions.

ISSUES
Whether or not the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 9344 apply to Joemar’s case,
considering he was 13 years old when he committed the alleged rape.

RULING
Yes, petitioner Joemar F. Ortega’s cases is covered by R.A. No. 9344, and is hereby
referred to the local social welfare and development officer of the locality for the appropriate
intervention program.
Petitioner was only 13 years old at the time of the commission of the alleged rape. Under
R.A. No. 9344, when the accused is below 15 years of age, he is exempted from criminal
liability.

SECTION 68 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that:

“Persons who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of
this Act, and who were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of
the offense for which they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit
from the retroactive application of this Act.

They shall be entitled to appropriate dispositions provided under this Act and their sentences
shall be adjusted accordingly. They shall be immediately released if they are so qualified
under this Act or other applicable laws.”

CASE #25
Commissioner of Internal Revenue Vs. Philippine Airlines, Inc.
G.R. No. 160528 October 9, 2006
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.,
respondent.
PANGANIBAN, CJ.:

Respondent Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) through Atty. Edgardo P. Curbita, filed with the
Office of the then Commissioner of Internal Revenue, a written request for refund of the total
amount of 20% final withholding tax withheld from the respondent by various withholding
agent banks.

Relying on Section 13 of Presidential Decree No. 1590, the respondent is given the option to
pay either its corporate income tax or a franchise tax of two percent of its gross revenue and
either would be in lieu of all "other taxes." Respondent believed they are entitled to a refund
since they chose to pay the first option.

The CIR argues that the "in lieu of all other taxes" proviso is a mere incentive that applies
only when PAL actually pays something; that is, either the basic corporate income tax or the
franchise tax.

However, PAL was not eligible for exemption from other taxes since the respondent incurs
zero tax liability of under the basic corporate income tax system.

Since the respondent chose to pay its corporate income tax, CTA ruled that the former is not
entitled to the refund.

However, CA reversed the Decision of the CTA and held that PAL was bound to pay only the
corporate income tax or the franchise tax, and ruled that respondent is exempt from paying
all other taxes, duties, royalties and other fees of any kind under Section 13 of PD No. 1590.

Hence, this petition.

 ISSUE
Whether or not the respondent who paid no taxes under any of subsections (A) and (B) of
PD No. 1590 could apply the ‘in lieu of all other taxes’ provision of Section 13.

RULING
Yes. The court ruled that, the proviso of PD 1590 namely, "in lieu of all other taxes" intended
to give the respondent the option whether to avail Subsection (a) or (b) as consideration for
its franchise. Choosing any of the aforementioned option excludes the payment of other
taxes and dues imposed or collected by the national or the local government.

PAL has the option to choose the alternative that results in lower taxes. It is not the fact of
tax payment that exempts it, but the exercise of its option.

Applying the Plain Meaning Rule, Section 13 of the franchise of respondent leaves no room
for interpretation. Its franchise exempts it from paying any tax other than the option it
chooses: either the "basic corporate income tax" or the two percent gross revenue tax.

CASE #26
Commissioner of Customs v. Esso Standard Eastern Inc.
G.R. No. L-28329 August 17, 1975
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, petitioner, vs. ESSO STANDARD EASTERN, INC.,
(Formerly: Standard-Vacuum Refining Corp. (Phil.), respondent.
ESGUERRA, J.:

FACT
Esso Standard Eastern, Inc., respondent was assessed to be liable for the special import tax
after importing equipment, machinery, materials, and instruments. Respondent paid the said
tax under protest.

The protest was dismissed, by the Collector of Customs and held that respondent, was
subject to the payment of the special import tax provided in Republic Act No. 1394, as
amended by R.A. No. 2352. And despite respondent’s appeal, the ruling of the Collector of
Customs was affirmed by the Commissioner of Customs.

However, the Court of Tax Appeals reversed the decision of the Commissioner of Customs
and ordered the refund of the amount paid by respondent for the special import tax.

ISSUE
Whether or not the exemption enjoyed by ESSO Standard Eastern, Inc. from customs duties
granted by Republic Act No. 387 should embrace the special import tax imposed by R.A. No.
1394.
RULING
Yes, Republic Act No. 387, the Petroleum Act of 1949 provides for the exemption of ESSO
Standard Eastern, Inc. from special import tax.
The purpose of the legislature in enacting the law which is to encourage the exploitation and
development of the petroleum resources of the country is apparent in its title:

AN ACT TO PROMOTE THE EXPLORATION, DEVELOPMENT, EXPLOITATION, AND

UTILIZATION OF THE PETROLEUM RESOURCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; TO
ENCOURAGE THE CONSERVATION OF SUCH PETROLEUM RESOURCES; TO
AUTHORIZE THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES TO
CREATE AN ADMINISTRATION UNIT AND A TECHNICAL BOARD IN THE BUREAU OF
MINES; TO APPROPRIATE FUNDS THEREFORE; AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

The purpose of intensifying exploration for petroleum is embedded in the law, and it is a fact
that for the time being, no taxes, both national and local may be collected from the industry.

On the other hand, the legislature considered the special import tax as a tax distinct from
customs duties which was made apparent in the title of R.A. No. 1394, the Special Import
Tax Law which reads:

AN ACT TO IMPOSE A SPECIAL IMPORT TAX ON ALL GOODS, ARTICLES OR

PRODUCTS IMPORTED OR BROUGHT INTO THE PHILIPPINES, AND TO REPEAL
REPUBLIC ACTS NUMBERED SIX HUNDRED AND ONE, EIGHT HUNDRED AND
FOURTEEN, EIGHT HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-ONE, ELEVEN HUNDRED AND
SEVENTY-FIVE. ELEVEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-SEVEN AND THIRTEEN HUNDRED
AND SEVENTY-FIVE.

This implied repeal failed to include R.A. No. 387 among those it chose to bury by the
Special Import Tax Law. The purpose of the legislature which wanted to continue the
incentives for the continuing development of the petroleum industry provides for the
continuity of the exemption granted by Republic Act No. 387.

And so the Court denied the Petition of the Commissioner of Customs to reverse the
decision of Court of Tax Appeals.

CASE #27
Socorro Ramirez v. Court of Appeals and Ester S. Garcia
G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995
SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and
ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:

FACT
A civil case was filed against Garcia after she allegedly insulted and humiliated Ramirez.

However, private respondent filed a criminal case against petitioner for violation of RA 4200
entitled “An Act to prohibit and penalize wiretapping and other related violations of private
communication, and other purposes.”

Garcia argues that she did not authorize Ramirez to record their conversation via tape
recorder and to communicate in writing the contents thereof.
This was based on a tape recording of the confrontation made by the petitioner.

The petitioner filed a motion to quash and was approved by the trial court on the ground that
the facts do not constitute an offense under RA 4200.

Upon respondent’s petition, the CA assailed the decision of the trial court declaring it null
and void. CA held that the allegations constitute an offense punishable under Section 1 of
RA 4200.

ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioner was guilty for the crime under RA 4200, as expressly provided
by the language of the law and the intent of the lawmaking body?

RULING
Yes. The provision in RA 4200 clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not
authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such
communication by means of a tape recorder.

The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is
underscored by the use of the qualifier "any".

The statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized "recording" of private communications
with the use of tape-recorders as among the acts punishable.

Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the
language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express
terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be
either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice.

The Court rule that because RA 4200 as applied to the case at bench is clear and
unambiguous and leaves us with no discretion, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.

CASE #28
Philippine National Bank vs. Tejano
GR No.: 173615 October 16, 2009
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner, vs. CAYETANO A. TEJANO, JR.,
Respondent.
PERALTA, J.:

FACT
There were allegations of irregular and fraudulent transactions of Cayetano Tejano, the then
Vice-President and Manager of PNB with the participation of eight other employees at the
time when PNB was still a GOCC.
The offense of grave misconduct consisting of misappropriation of V & G funds by Tejano
must serve as an aggravating circumstance and must serve the penalty of forced resignation
with forfeiture of benefits as found by the PNB Board of Directors.

After being denied by the PNB Board of Directors, respondent appealed to the Civil Service
Commission. However, while the case was pending in the CSC, the PNB had ceased to be a
GOCC by virtue of E.O No. 80, which privatized the bank.

Then the CSC issued a resolution dismissing respondent’s appeal for being filed out of time.

Eventually, the respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. PNB contends that even if the
motion was filed on time, the same must be dismissed because of the privatization of the
bank. Consequently, CSC denied the respondent’s motion on the ground that it no longer
has jurisdiction in the case.

The respondent argues that the CSC’s erred in denying his appeal on the basis of the
privatization of the bank even when the incident happened prior to the privatization.

The CA granted the respondent’s petition and the case is remanded to the CSC for further
proceedings.

ISSUE
Whether or not, the PNB becoming a private banking institution by virtue of Executive Order
No. 80, removes the CSC’s jurisdiction on the appeal of the respondent which was already
pending before the CSC prior to the said conversion.

RULING
No. Section 6 of E.O. No. 80 does not invite an interpretation that reads into its clear and
plain language that the said E.O divested the CSC of jurisdiction to finally dispose of
respondent’s pending appeal despite the privatization of PNB.
There is always a presumption that the words employed in a law or statute correctly
expresses its intent and preclude even the courts from giving it a different construction.

While it is true that PNB ceased to be a GOCC, there was no provision in the E.O that stated
that the jurisdiction of the CSC will be divested over pending cases where acts involved were
committed while the bank was still a GOCC.

The Literal Rule provides that where a law is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it
must be given its literal meaning and applied without any interpretation or even construction.

For this reason, the petitioner’s interpretation of the E.O lacks merit. There is nothing said in
Section 6 of E.O No. 80 that indicates that it authorizes the transfer of jurisdiction from the
CSC to another tribunal over disciplinary and administrative cases already pending with the
said Commission prior to the enactment of the law.

The Court denied the petition to review the decision of the CA and affirmed the remand of
the case to CSC for further proceedings.
CASE #29
Domingo vs. Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 112371 October 7, 1998
AIDA DOMINGO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent
PURISIMA, J.:

FACT
Endorsed to the newly appointed Regional director for DSWD RO5 Aida Domingo’s office
were several government vehicles for the use of personnel of DSWD Region 05.

Despite being provided with government vehicles, officials of DSWD Regional Office were
still collecting transportation allowances as found by the COA Regional Auditor.

Regional Director instructed the employees concerned, including Domingo to cease

collecting transportation allowances.

Domingo asked for reconsideration claiming that on the days she did not use the vehicle,
she is entitled of the commutable transportation. She reimbursed Php 1,600 for the 32 days
that she actually utilized a government vehicle. Auditor denied her petition.

ISSUE
Whether or not a government official is still entitled to transportation allowance despite being
provided with a government vehicle, for the days the official did not actually use the vehicle.

RULING
No. The Court held that Domingo is not entitled to collect commutable transportation
allowance as she is provided with government, regardless of whether or not she utilized the
government vehicle.

As provided in Section 28 of Republic Act 6688, otherwise known as the General

Appropriations Act of 1989, states that:

The transportation allowance herein authorized shall not be granted to officials who are
assigned a government vehicle or use government motor transportation, except as may be
approved by the President of the Philippines. Unless otherwise provided by law, no amount
appropriated in this Act shall be used to pay for representation and/or transportation
allowances, whether commutable or reimbursable, which exceed the rates authorized under
this Section.

There is no need for an interpretation when the law speaks in clear and categorical
language, provided there is no legislative intent to the contrary. Words and phrases used in
a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning.

If the legislative intent was that government officials issued an official vehicle could still
collect transportation allowance when they don’t use the said vehicle, the word “use” instead
“assign” should have been employed.
CASE #30
Republic vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 103882 November 25, 1998
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS AND REPUBLIC REAL ESTATE CORPORATION, respondents, CULTURAL
CENTER OF THE PHILIPPINES, intervenor.
PURISIMA, J.:
FACT
The reclamation of foreshore lands by chartered cities and municipalities was authorized by
Republic Act No. 1899. Section I of said law provides that:

Sec. 1. Authority is hereby granted to all municipalities and chartered cities to undertake and
carry out at their own expense the reclamation by dredging, filling, or other means, of any
foreshore lands bordering them, and to establish, provide, construct, maintain and repair
proper and adequate docking and harbor facilities as such municipalities and chartered cities
may determine in consultation with the Secretary of Finance and the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications.

Invoking the aforementioned provision, Pasay City Council passed Ordinance No. 121, for
the reclamation of Three Hundred (300) hectares of foreshore lands in Pasay City.
Consequently, this empowered the City Mayor to award and enter into reclamation contracts,
and prescribing terms and conditions therefor.

However, the said Ordinance was amended by Ordinance No. 158 which authorized the
Republic Real Estate Corporation ("RREC") to reclaim foreshore lands of Pasay City.

The congress passed the law the including cities of Manila, Iloilo, Cebu, Zamboanga and
Davao from the operation of RA 1899 even the aforementioned cities don’t have offshore
based on the literal meaning of the word “Offshore”.

ISSUE
Whether or not Pasig City can reclaim and invoke the RA 1899 is valid.

RULING
Yes. The term "foreshore lands" includes submerged areas as provided under RA 1899. The
respondent court unduly stretched and broadened the meaning of "foreshore lands", which is
beyond the intention of the law, and is contrary to the legal connotation of "foreshore lands".

The rule is that when the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason
for interpretation or construction, but only for application. Hence the Supreme Court
interprets the meaning of the Offshore as “The strip of land that lies between the high and
low water marks and that is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. (Words
and Phrases, "Foreshore")”.
CASE #31
Espiritu v. Cipriano
G.R. No. L-32743 February 15, 1974
Primitivo Espiritu and Leonora A. De Espiritu, petitioners, vs. Ricardo Cipriano and
The Court of First Instance, Rizal, Branch XV, respondents
ESGUERRA, J.:

FACT
An oral contract of lease was between the petitioners and respondent was converted from a
year to year arrangement into a month to month basis, and an increase in rent was also
imposed. However, private respondent Cipriano failed to pay the rental since January 1969
at the present monthly rate.

On March 22, 1969, a formal notice to vacate was received by the respondent. In turn, the
spondents invoke the prohibitory provision of Republic Act 6126, entitled, “An Act to
Regulate Rentals of Dwelling Units or of Land on which another’s dwelling is located for one
year and penalizing violations thereof.

“Section 1. No lessor of a dwelling unit or of land on which another's dwelling is located

shall, during the period of one year from March 31, 1970, increase the monthly rental agreed
upon between the lessor and the lessee prior to the approval of this Act when said rental
does not exceed three hundred pesos (P300.00) a month.

Section 6. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

The respondent also contends that the Act should be applied retrospectively since it was
approved only on June 17, 1970.”

ISSUE
Whether or not Republic Act 6126 should be applied retrospectively and free Richard
Cipriano from his obligation to pay the rentals?

RULING
No, R. A. 6126 should not be applied retrospectively, thereby the respondent’s obligation to
pay the rentals should remain.

Article 4 of the Civil Code states that ordains that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless
the contrary is provided and that where the law is clear, our duty is equally plain.

R.A. 6126 is a law being a "temporary measure designed to meet a temporary situation", it
had a limited period of operation as in fact it was so worded in clear and unequivocal
language that "No lessor of a dwelling unit or land ... shall, during the period of one year
from March 31, 1970, increase the monthly rental agreed upon between the lessor and
lessee prior to the approval of this Act."
It was only from March, 1970, up to March, 1971 that the prohibition against the increase in
rentals was effective. Outside and beyond that period, the law did not, by the express
mandate of the Act itself, operate.

There was no express provision in the aforementioned law that provides for a retroactive
operation. It is a well-established rule of statutory construction that "Expressium facit
cessare tacitum" and, therefore, no reasonable implication that the Legislature ever intended
to give the law in question a retroactive effect may be accorded to the same. As the
language of the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it plainly says.

Therefore, Ricardo Cipriano should be liable for his rental payments and his contention that
Section 1 of Article 6126 shall not be applied lacks merit.

CASE #32
Philippine Constitution Association vs. Enriquez
G.R. No. 113105. August 19, 1994
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, EXEQUIEL B. GARCIA and RAMON A.
GONZALES, petitioners, vs. HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, as Secretary of Budget and
Management; HON. VICENTE T. TAN, as National Treasurer and COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
respondents
QUIASON, J.:
FACT
On the grounds of under Article 36 of the Family Code, petitioner Cynthia Bolos filed a
petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent Danilo Bolos .

RTC granted the petition for annulment. The RTC denied due course to the appeal for
Danilo’s failure to file the required motion for reconsideration or new trial, in violation of
Section 20 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages.

A motion to reconsider the denial of Danilo’s appeal was likewise denied. Danilo filed with
the CA a petition for certiorari. The petition was granted, the RTC orders were reversed and
set aside.

It relied on the ruling of this Court in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli to the effect that the
“coverage [of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC] extends only to those marriages entered into during the
effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.”

ISSUE
Whether or not the “rule on declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of
voidable marriages” is applicable to marriages solemnized before the effectivity of the Family
Code.
RULING
No. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on
March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads:
Section 1. Scope- This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.

The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage
extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which
took effect on August 3, 1988. The rule sets a demarcation line between marriages covered
by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code.

A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any doubt
or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation there is only room for
application.

The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioner’s interpretation that the phrase “under
the Family Code” in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word “petitions” rather than to the
word “marriages.” A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and
free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation.

There is only room for application. As the statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it
must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is what is
known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi
sermo, or “speech is the index of intention.” Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non
est recedendum, or “from the words of a statute there should be no departure.”

CASE #33
Quijano vs. Development Bank of the Philippines
G.R. No. L-26419 October 16, 1970
GEDEON G. QUIJANO and EUGENIA T. QUIJANO, petitioners, vs. THE DEVELOPMENT
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE EX-OFICIO SHERIFF OF MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL,
respondents
BARREDO, J.

FACT
Petitioners-appellants filed a Petition for mandamus with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction in order to compel respondent-appellee to accept the former’s back pay certificate
payment for their loan.

Also, such payment was made in order to restrain the ex-officio sheriff from proceeding with
the scheduled foreclosure sale of the real properties mortgaged to the Development Bank of
the Philippines (DBP).

Petitioners filed an application for an urban estate loan with the Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation (RFC), predecessor-in-interest of DBP in amount of P19,500 and was approved
on April 30, 1953. The mortgage contract was executed by the petitioners in favor of DBP on
March 23, 1954. The first release of P4,200 was made on April 29, 1954, and the other
releases were made subsequent thereafter. The petitioner wrote DBP offering to pay in the
amount of P14,000 for the outstanding obligation with the respondent-bank.
The petitioners were advised by DBP, thru its Ozamis Brand advised of the non-acceptance
of his offer on the ground that the loan was not incurred before or subsisting on June 20,
1953 when Republic Act 897 was approved.

ISSUE
Whether or not the obligation of the petitioners was subsisting at the time of the approval of
Republic Act No. 897.

RULING
Yes, the obligation was subsisting at the time of the approval of R.A. No. 897 since it was
availed only when they executed the mortgage contract in March 23, 1954 and received the
installments thereafter.

On the other hand, however, We cannot see any room for interpretation or construction in
the clear and unambiguous language of the above-quoted provision of law. This Court has
steadfastly adhered to the doctrine that its first and fundamental duty is the application of the
law according to its express terms, interpretation being called for only when such literal
application is impossible. No process of interpretation or construction need be resorted to
here a provision of law peremptorily calls for application. Where a requirement or condition is
made in explicit and unambiguous terms, no discretion is left to the judiciary. It must see to it
that its mandate is obeyed. Thus, even before the amendment of the Back Pay Law, when
said law limited the applicability of back pay certificates to "obligations subsisting at the time
of the approval of this Act," this Court has ruled that obligations contracted after its
enactment on June 18, 1948 cannot come within its purview.

CASE #34
Security Bank and Trust Company vs. RTC of Makati
G.R. No. 113926 October 23, 1996
SECURITY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, petitioner,
vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI, BRANCH 61, MAGTANGGOL EUSEBIO and
LEILA VENTURA, respondents
HERMOSISIMA, JR. J.

FACT
Upon maturity of several promissory notes issued by the respondent in favor of petitioner the
principal balance remaining was still in huge amount.

Respondent Eusebio refused to pay the balance payable, which led to a collection case
being filed in court by petitioner SBTC, wherein a judgment was rendered in favor of the
latter. Eusebio is hereby ordered to pay SBTC the remaining balance plus 12% interest per
annum.

On August 6, 1993, a motion for partial reconsideration was filed by petitioner SBTC
contending that they agreed to the interest rate of 23%
The motion was denied and an order was issued to grant the rates of interest beyond 12%
per annum; and holding defendant Leila Ventura solidarily liable with co-defendants Eusebio.

ISSUE
Whether or not the 23% rate of interest per annum agreed upon by petitioner bank and
respondents is allowable as provided in Section 2 of CB Circular No. 905.

RULING
Yes, the imposition of the 23% annual interest rate is allowable. As provided in the records,
it was clear that the agreed rate of interest as stipulated on the three (3) promissory notes is
23% per annum.

The applicable provision of law is the Central Bank Circular No. 905 which took effect on
December 22, 1982. Sec. 2. fixes the interest rate at 12% per annum in the absence of
express contract. All the promissory notes were signed in 1983 and, therefore, were already
covered by CB Circular No. 905.

The parties freely agreed upon the rate of interest and since no question were raised, the
stipulations are in effect, binding. The respondent court a quo is not in the position to change
the stipulations in the contract where it is not illegal.

The court finds no valid reason for the respondent court a quo to impose a 12% rate of
interest on the principal balance owing to petitioner by respondent in the presence of a valid
stipulation.

The decision of the respondent court a quo, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that the rate of interest that should be imposed be 23% per annum.

Basic is the rule of statutory construction that when the law is clear and unambiguous, the
court is left with no alternative but to apply the same according to its clear language.

CASE #35
Go vs. Distinction Properties Development and Construction Inc.
G.R. No. 194024 April 25, 2012
PHILIP L. GO, PACIFICO Q. LIM and ANDREW Q. LIM Petitioners, vs. DISTINCTION
PROPERTIES DEVELOPMENT AND CONSTRUCTION, INC. Respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:

FACT
The petitioners are registered individual owners of condominium units in Phoenix Heights
Condominium. One of the petitioners Pacifico Lim, is one of the incorporators and the then
president of DPDCI, who executed a Master Deed and Declaration of Restrictions (MDDR)
of Phoenix Heights Condominium, which was filed with the Registry of Deeds.

Thereafter, Phoenix Heights Condominium Corporation (PHCC) was formally organized and
incorporated who then approved a settlement offer from DPDCI for the set-off of the latter’s
association dues arrears. The said settlement between the two corporations likewise
included the reversion of the 22 storage spaces into common areas. With the conformity of
PHCC, DPDCI’s application for alteration (conversion of unconstructed 22 storage units and
units GF4-A and BAS from saleable to common areas) was granted by the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).

The petitioners filed a complaint before the HLURB against DPDCI for unsound business
practices and violation of the MDDR. DPDCI denied that such allegations such as the
brochure attached to the complaint was "a mere preparatory draft" and not the official one
actually distributed to the public.

Furthermore, the said brochure contained a disclaimer as to the binding effect of the
supposed offers therein. Also, DPDCI questioned the petitioners’ personality to sue as the
action was a derivative suit.

Although the HLURB confirmed that the petitioner’s action was not a derivative suit, it stated
the it is one which involved contracts of sale of the respective units between the
complainants. However, the Court of Appeals held that HLURB has no jurisdiction over the
case.

ISSUE
Whether or not the court of appeals erred in holding that the HLURB has no jurisdiction over
the instant case.

RULING
NO. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims
asserted therein. Thus, it was ruled that the jurisdiction of the HLURB to hear and decide
cases is determined by the nature of the cause of action, the subject matter or property
involved and the parties.

The provision below states that the National Housing Authority jurisdiction.

SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business
and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National
Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following
nature:

(a) Unsound real estate business practices;

(b) Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit
buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and

(c) Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by
buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or
salesman.

This provision must be read in light of the law’s preamble, which explains the reasons for
enactment of the law or the contextual basis for its interpretation. A statute derives its vitality
from the purpose for which it is enacted, and to construe it in a manner that disregards or
defeats such purpose is to nullify or destroy the law. P.D. No. 957, as amended, aims to
protect innocent subdivision lot and condominium unit buyers against fraudulent real estate
practices.

Inasmuch as the HLURB has no jurisdiction over petitioners’ complaint, the Court sustains
the subject decision of the CA that the HLURB decision is null and void ab initio.

CASE #36
Luzon Development Bank vs. Enriquez
G.R. No. 168646. January 12, 2011
LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK, petitioner, vs. ANGELES CATHERINE ENRIQUEZ,
respondent.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
FACT
DELTA is a domestic corporation owned by Ricardo De Leon who owns Lot 4 of Delta
Homes I. Said Lot 4 is the subject matter of these cases.

In order to develop Delta Homes, De Leon and his spouse obtained a P4 million loan from
the BANK. To secure the loan, the spouses De Leon executed in favor of the BANK a real
estate mortgage (REM) on several of their properties, including Lot 4. Subsequently, this
REM was amended by increasing the amount of the secured loan from P4 million to P8
million.

Thereafter, DELTA executed a Contract to Sell with respondent Angeles Catherine

Enriquez (Enriquez) over the house and lot in Lot 4 for the purchase price of P614,950.00.
Enriquez made a downpayment of P114,950.00.

When DELTA defaulted on its loan obligation, the BANK, instead of foreclosing the REM,
agreed to a dation in payment or a dacion en pago.

The Deed of Assignment in Payment of Debt was executed on September 30, 1998 and
stated that the real estate with the building and improvements existing shall be the payment
of the total obligation owing to the Bank.

It appears, however, that the dacion en pago was not annotated on the TCT of Lot 4.

On November 18, 1999, Enriquez filed a complaint against DELTA and the BANK before the
Region IV Office of the HLURB alleging that DELTA violated the terms of its License to Sell
by selling the house and lots for a price exceeding that prescribed in Batas Pambansa (BP)
Bilang 220 and failing to get a clearance for the mortgage from the HLURB.

Enriquez sought a full refund of the P301,063.42 that she had already paid to DELTA, award
of damages, and the imposition of administrative fines on DELTA and the BANK.

According to DELTA, it did not violate the terms of its license because it did not obtain a new
mortgage over the subdivision project. It likewise assailed the award of moral and exemplary
damages to Enriquez on the ground that the latter has no cause of action.
 ISSUES
1. Whether or not the Contract to Sell conveys ownership

2. Whether or not the dacion en pago extinguished the loan obligation, such that DELTA
has no more obligations to the BANK.

RULING
1. No, Contract to sell does not transfer ownership Both parties are correct in arguing
that the Contract to Sell executed by DELTA in favor of Enriquez did not transfer
ownership over Lot 4 to Enriquez.

In the instant case, there is nothing in the provisions of the contract entered into by
DELTA and Enriquez that would exempt it from the general definition of a contract to
sell.

2.) The Dacion en Pago executed by DELTA and the BANK indicates a clear
intention by the parties that the assigned properties would serve as full payment for
DELTA’s entire obligation.

The contractual intention determines whether the property subject of the dation will be
considered as the full equivalent of the debt and will therefore serve as full satisfaction for
the debt.

Like in all contracts, the intention of the parties to the dation in payment is paramount
and controlling. The contractual intention determines whether the property subject of the
dation will be considered as the full equivalent of the debt and will therefore serve as full
satisfaction for the debt.

“The dation in payment extinguishes the obligation to the extent of the value of the
thing delivered, either as agreed upon by the parties or as may be proved, unless the
parties by agreement, express or implied, or by their silence, consider the thing as
equivalent to the obligation, in which case the obligation is totally extinguished.” In the case
at bar, the Dacion en Pago executed by DELTA and the BANK indicates a clear intention by
the parties that the assigned properties would serve as full payment for DELTA’s entire
obligation.

Delta Development and Management Services, Inc. is NOT LIABLE TO PAY Luzon
Development Bank the value of the subject lot; and respondent Angeles Catherine Enriquez
is ordered to PAY the balance of the purchase price and the interests accruing thereon, as
decreed by the Court of Appeals, to the Luzon Development Bank, instead of Delta
Development and Management Services, Inc.
The Luzon Development Bank is ordered to DELIVER a CLEAN TITLE to Angeles Catherine
Enriquez upon the latter’s full payment of the balance of the purchase price and the accrued
interests.

CASE #37
Municipality of Nueva Era, Ilocos Norte v. Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte
G.R. No. 169435 February 27, 2008
MUNICIPALITY OF NUEVA ERA, ILOCOS NORTE, represented by its Municipal Mayor,
CAROLINE ARZADON-GARVIDA, petitioner, vs. MUNICIPALITY OF MARCOS, ILOCOS
NORTE, represented by its Municipal Mayor, SALVADOR PILLOS, and the HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
REYES, R.T., J.:

FACT
Boundaries, settlement of boundary disputes between municipalities are fixed by the law
creating a municipality. Governor General Francis Burton Harrison, acting on a resolution
passed by the provincial government of Ilocos Norte, united several rancherias and created
the township of Nueva Era by virtue of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 66 dated September 30,
1916.

The Municipality of Marcos, on the other hand, was created on June 22, 1963 pursuant to
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3753 entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Marcos in the
Province of Ilocos Norte." Section 1 of R.A. No. 3753 provides:

SECTION 1. The barrios of Capariaan, Biding, Escoda, Culao, Alabaan, Ragas and Agunit
in the Municipality of Dingras, Province of Ilocos Norte, are hereby separated from the said
municipality and constituted into a new and separate municipality to be known as the
Municipality of Marcos.

Clearly, Marcos shall be derived from the listed barangays of Dingras, namely: Capariaan,
Biding, Escoda, Culao, Alabaan, Ragas and Agunit based on the first paragraph of the said
Section 1 of R.A. No. 3753.

However, the Municipality of Nueva Era or any of its barangays was not mentioned. Hence,
if based only on said paragraph, it is clear that Nueva Era may not be considered as a
source of territory of Marcos. The description of Marcos' boundaries seems problematic
since it stated in the second paragraph, particularly in the phrase: "on the East, by the Ilocos
Norte-Mt. Province boundary."

Marcos claimed that the middle portion of Nueva Era, which adjoins its eastern side, formed
part of its territory. On March 29, 2000, the SP of Ilocos Norte ruled in favor of Nueva Era.
The disputed area consisting of 15,400 hectares, more or less, is hereby declared as part
and portion of the territorial jurisdiction of respondent Nueva Era.
On appeal by Marcos, the RTC affirmed the decision of the SP in its decision of March 19,
2001. Thereafter, Marcos filed a petition for review of the RTC decision before the CA.

ISSUE
Whether or not the Eastern boundary of Marcos extends over and covers the middle portion
of Nueva Era.

RULING
The Court held that the legislative intent is to create Marcos out of the territory of Dingras
only. As provided in R.A. No. 3753, only the barangays of Dingras are enumerated as
Marcos' source of territory, Nueva Era's territory is, therefore, excluded.

The court cannot accept the contention of Marcos that " a portion of Nueva Era formed part
of its territory because, according to it, Nueva Era is between the Marcos and Ilocos Norte-
Mt. Province boundary.

Only Dingras is specifically named by law as source territory of Marcos. Hence, the said
description of boundaries of Marcos is descriptive only of the listed barangays of Dingras as
a compact and contiguous territory.

Considering that the description of the eastern boundary of Marcos under R.A. No. 3753 is
ambiguous, the same must be interpreted in light of the legislative intent. The law must be
given a reasonable interpretation, to preclude absurdity in its application.

CASE #38
Brent School, Inc. vs. Zamora
G.R. No. L-48494 February 5, 1990
BRENT SCHOOL, INC., and REV. GABRIEL DIMACHE, petitioners, vs. RONALDO
ZAMORA, the Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs, Office of the President, and
DOROTEO R. ALEGRE, respondents.
NARVASA, J.:

FACT
Brent School Inc. entered into a fixed contract for a specific term of 5 years with Doroteo R.
Alegre. In the said contract he will be in the position of athletic director of the said school.

At an annual compensation of P20,000.00, date of execution of the agreement was set on

July 17, 1976. However three months before the expiration of the contract, Alegre was given
a copy of the report filed by Brent School with the Department of Labor advising of the
termination of his services effective on July 16, 1976.

It was determined that the ground for the termination was "completion of contract, expiration
of the definite period of employment.".

Alegre accepted the payment for period May 16 to July 17, 1976, and signed a receipt as full
payment of the contract.
However, Alegre later protested and argued that although his contract did stipulate that the
same would terminate on July 17, 1976, he had acquired the status of a regular employee
and could not be removed except for valid cause.

The Regional Director required Alegre to be reinstated as a “permanent employee” to his

former position. According to the Regional Director, the termination is not sanctioned by the
PD 422 and prohibited by Circular no 8 of the Bureau of Private Schools.

The motion for reconsideration filed by Brent School to the Regional Director, Secretary of
Labor, and the Office of the President was dismissed for lack of merit.

ISSUE
Whether or not the provisions of labor code as amended, if applied in this case entitles
Alegre to reinstatement.

RULING
No, Alegre is not entitled to reinstatement and the other relief. The fact is that his contract of
employment with Brent School having lawfully terminated with and by reason of the
expiration of the agreed term of period thereof.

When the employment contract was signed between Brent School and Alegre on July 18,
1971, it was perfectly legitimate for them to include in it a stipulation fixing the duration
thereof Stipulations for a term were explicitly recognized as valid by this Court,

"Where a contract specifies the period of its duration, it terminates on the expiration of such
period." "A contract of employment for a definite period terminates by its own terms at the
end of such period."

As revised, said article, renumbered 270, 23 now reads:

. . . Regular and Casual Employment.—The provisions of written agreement to the contrary

notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be
deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are
usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer except where
the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or
termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or
where the work or service to be employed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for
the duration of the season.

An employment shall be deemed to he casual if it is not covered by the preceding

paragraph: provided, that, any employee who has rendered at least one year of service,
whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with
respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such
actually exists.
It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid presumption that
undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure, and that a
construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all
objecionable mischievous, undefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious consequences.

We have, here, then a case where the true intent of the law is clear that calls for the
application of the cardinal rule of statutory construction that such intent of spirit must prevail
over the letter thereof, for whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute, since
adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice and contradictions and would
defeat the plain and vital purpose of the statute.
CASE #39
Gonzales III vs. Office of the President
G.R. No. 196231 September 4, 2012
EMILIO A. GONZALES III, Petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES, ACTING THROUGH AND REPRESENTED BY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., SENIOR DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY JOSE AMOR M.
AMORANDO, OFFICER-IN-CHARGE - OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS, ATTY. RONALDO A. GERON, DIR. ROWENA TURINGAN-SANCHEZ,
AND ATTY. CARLITO D. CATAYONG, Respondents.
BRION, J.:

FACT
The Ombudsman investigated PSI Rolando Mendoza and four policemen for an alleged
robbery (extortion), grave threats and physical injuries amounting to grave misconduct
against Christian Kalaw. The case was dismissed by the Manila City Prosecutors Office for
lack of probable cause and for failure of the complainant (Christian Kalaw) to submit
evidence and prosecute the case.

However, when Mendoza et al. filed a case against Christian Kalaw regarding the incident,
such was given due course by the City Prosecutors Office.

The Ombudsman without citing any reason directed the PNP-NCR to endorse the case
against Mendoza and the arresting policemen to his office for administrative adjudication.

He also caused the docketing of the case and named Atty. Clarence V. Guinto of the PNP-
CIDG-NCR, who indorsed the case records, as the nominal complainant, in lieu of Christian
Kalaw, who in turn, did not also affirm his complaint-affidavit with the Ombudsman or submit
any position paper as required during the proceedings

After serving a preventive suspension, Mendoza was adjudged liable for grave misconduct
by Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales based on the sole and uncorroborated complaint-affidavit
of Christian Kalaw, which was not previously sustained by the City Prosecutor's Office and
the PNP Internal Affairs Service.

Mendoza interposed a timely motion for reconsideration. Despite the pending and
unresolved motion for reconsideration, the judgment of dismissal was enforced, thereby
abruptly ending Mendoza’s 30 years of service in the PNP with forfeiture of all his benefits.
As a result, Mendoza sent several hand-written letter-requests to the Ombudsman for
immediate resolution of his motion for reconsideration but was not given attention.

A decision dated March 31, 2011 was rendered by the Office of the President dismissing
petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III, Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law
Enforcement Offices (MOLEO)
A petition for Certiorari was filed seeking to declare as unconstitutional Section 8(2) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, which gives
the President the power to dismiss a Deputy Ombudsman of the Office of the Ombudsman.

ISSUE
Whether or not Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious and inexcusable
negligence and gross violation of their own rules of procedure by allowing Mendoza's motion
for reconsideration to languish for more than nine (9) months without any justification.

RULING
Yes. The Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious and inexcusable negligence and
gross violation of their own rules of procedure by allowing Mendoza's motion for
reconsideration to languish for more than nine (9) months without any justification, in
violation of the Ombudsman prescribed rules to resolve motions for reconsideration in
administrative disciplinary cases within five (5) days from submission.

The inaction is gross, considering there is no opposition thereto. The prolonged inaction
precipitated the desperate resort to hostage-taking. The Court finds him guilty of Gross
Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting betrayal of public trust, and hereby
meted out the penalty of DISMISSAL from service.

It is a basic canon of statutory construction that in interpreting a statute, care should be

taken that every part thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an
integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions.

A construction that would render a provision inoperative should be avoided; instead,

apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a
coordinated and harmonious whole. Otherwise stated, the law must not be read in truncated
parts.

Every part thereof must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to
the general intent of the whole enactment. Gonzales III vs. Office of the President of the
Philippines, 679 SCRA 614, G.R. No. 196231 September 4, 2012.

CASE #40
Galicto vs. Aquino III
G.R. No. 193978. February 28, 2012
JELBERT B. GALICTO, petitioner, vs. H.E. PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III,
in his capacity as President of the Republic of the Philippines; ATTY. PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary; and FLORENCIO B. ABAD, in his
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, respondents.
BRION, J.:
FACT
Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III is the President of the Republic of the Philippines (Pres.
Aquino); he issued EO 7 and has the duty of implementing it.

The Senate, through the Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public
Enterprises, conducted an inquiry in aid of legislation on the reported excessive salaries,
allowances, and other benefits of GOCCs and government financial institutions.

Based on its findings that “officials and governing boards of various GOCCs and GFIs have
been granting themselves unwarranted allowances, bonuses, incentives, stock options, and
other benefits as well as other irregular and abusive practices,” the Senate issued Senate
Resolution No. 17 “urging the President to order the immediate suspension of the unusually
large and apparently excessive allowances, bonuses, incentives and other perks of
members of the governing boards of GOCCs and GFIs.”

After the Congress called out this issue, the President issued EO 7 provided for the guiding
principles and framework to establish a fixed compensation and position classification
system for GOCCs and GFIs.

A Task Force was also created to review all remunerations of GOCC and GFI employees
and officers, while GOCCs and GFIs were ordered to submit to the Task Force information
regarding their compensation. Finally, EO 7 ordered (1) a moratorium on the increases in the
salaries and other forms of compensation, except salary adjustments under EO 8011 and
EO 900, of all GOCC and GFI employees for an indefinite period to be set by the President,9
and (2) a suspension of all allowances, bonuses and incentives of members of the Board of
Directors/Trustees until December 31, 2010.

Galicto, the petitioner filed a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to nullify and enjoin the
implementation of Executive Order No. (EO) 7.

ISSUES
Whether or not E.O. 7 is unconstitutional for having been issued beyond the powers of the
President and for being in breach of existing laws.

RULING
No, ecause of the transitory nature of EO 7, it has been pointed out that the present case
has already been rendered moot by these supervening events:

(1) the lapse on December 31, 2010 of Section 10 of EO 7 that suspended the allowances
and bonuses of the directors and trustees of GOCCs and GFIs; and

(2) the enactment of R.A. No. 10149 amending the provisions in the charters of GOCCs and
GFIs empowering their board of directors/trustees to determine their own compensation
system, in favor of the grant of authority to the President to perform this act.
With the enactment of the GOCC Governance Act of 2011, the President is now authorized
to fix the compensation framework of GOCCs and GFIs.

The new law amended R.A. No. 7875 and other laws that enabled certain GOCCs and GFIs
to fix their own compensation frameworks; the law now authorizes the President to fix the
compensation and position classification system for all GOCCs and GFIs, as well as other
entities covered by the law. This means that, the President can now reissue an EO
containing these same provisions without any legal constraints.

Statutory Construction: View that provisions of law should be read and understood in their
entirety and all parts thereof should be seen as constituting a coherent whole.—Provisions of
law should be read and understood in their entirety and all parts thereof should be seen as
constituting a coherent whole. In this context, the recognition under Section 9 of Joint
Resolution No. 4 of the authority granted to exempt entities like Philhealth to determine their
own compensation and position classification system seeks to exclude them from the salary
adjustments provided in Joint Resolution No. 4.