FACTS:

-Mavrommatis, a Greek national, was in 1914 granted concessions by the Ottoman authorities for
certain public works in what later became the British mandated territory of Palestine. The concessions
were related to constructions and working of electric tramway systems and supply of light power and
electric power in Jerusalem and Jaffa, as well as irrigation systems.

-Mavrommatis tried to claim from the concessions granted via ordinary channels, but such claims were
unheeded. Britain refused to recognize Mavrommatis’ rights.

-Ordinary channels resorted to by Mavrommatis: In long correspondence, Mavrommatis and his

-The dispute was initially between a private person (Mavrommatis) and a State (Britain).

-Greece took up Mavrommatis’ case because the latter is a Greek subject. Greece filed a case before the
PCIJ, alleging that Great Britain, through the Palestine Government, had refused to recognize the
concession in Jerusalem and Jaffa, principally by having granted to a Mr. Rutenberg concessions partially
overlapping those enjoyed by Mavrommatis, and accordingly sought compensation.

-Britain imposed its preliminary objection and argued that Greece had no standing in this case.

-Greece argued that it is entitled to protect its subjects such as Mavrommatis when they have been
injured by acts contrary to international law by another state.

Issues and Rulings

Did PCIJ have jurisdiction over the case? YES.

-Dispute was between States (Greece and Britain)

-Case cannot be negotiated (see above)

-The Mandate for Palestine provided for the court’s jurisdiction: “It must in the first place be
remembered that at the time when the opposing views of the two Governments took definite shape
(April 1924), and at the time when proceedings were instituted, the Mandate for Palestine was in force.
The Court is of opinion that, in cases of doubt, jurisdiction based on an international agreement
embraces all disputes referred to it after its establishment. In the present case, this interpretation
appears to be indicated by the terms of Article 26 itself where it is laid down that "any dispute
whatsoever .... which may arise" shall be submitted to the Court.”

-The Rutenberg concessions, which is covered by the Mandate, is said to be the alleged breach of the
concessions of Mavrommatis: “If the grant of the Rutenberg Concessions, in so far as they may be
regarded as incompatible, at least in part, with those of Mavrommatis, constitutes the alleged breach of
the terms of the Mandate, this breach, no matter on what date it was first committed, still subsists, and
the provisions of the Mandate are therefore applicable to it.”
 Did Greece have the standing to bring the present claim in the capacity of sole claimant? YES.

-A State like Greece can take up the case of its subjects when they are injured by acts contrary to
international law committed by another State from who said subject had been unable to obtain
satisfaction through ordinary channels. The dispute is now a dispute in international law.

-This is founded on Greece’s right to ensure respect for rules of international law, a right which in this
case appears to have been violated by Britain. By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by
resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on its behalf, a State is in reality
asserting its own rights – its right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respects for the rules of
international law.

-It should not be looked at not as a substitution between Greece and its subject, but as assertion of its
own rights as a State. This will lead to the conclusion that Greece is the sole claimant in this case.

-Greece has the right to ensure respect for rules of international law. It is not substituting itself with the
citizen, but is actually asserting its own rights.

-The court deemed as irrelevant whether the dispute originated from a personal injury or not. Once a
State has taken up a case on behalf of one of its subjects before an international tribunal, in the yes of
the latter the State is sole claimant. The fact that Great Britain and Greece are the opposing Parties to
the dispute arising out of the Mavrommatis concessions is sufficient to make it a dispute between 2
States is sufficient to make it a dispute between 2 States within the meaning of Art. 26 of the Palestine
Mandate.
Garcia and Garza Case (United Mexican States vs United States of America)

Facts:

-This claim is presented by the United Mexican States against the United States in behalf of Teodoro
Garcia and Maria Apolinar Garza, Mexican nationals, father and mother of Concepcion Garcia, a girl of
Mexican nationality, who on April 8, 1919, between 9 and 10 a.m., was killed by a shot from the
American side of the Rio Bravo del Norte or Rio Grande, while crossing from the American to the
Mexican side on a raft propelled by two men in the water, in the company of her mother and her aunt,
not far from Havana, Texas, the father, a laborer, looking on from the Mexican bank.

-An American officer, Second Lieutenant Robert L. Gulley, 4th United States Cavalry, was that morning
on duty on the border with an armed patrol of four men, had discovered the raft in contravention of the
laws, had fired in order to make them halt, and unfortunately had mortally wounded the young girl, who
died immediately thereafter.

-Having been tried before a court-martial, he had been sentenced on April 28, 1919, to be dismissed
from the military service, but the commanding officer at San Antonio, Texas, in reviewing and approving
the sentence, had used his right to reserve the case for the decision of the President of the United
States, and the President, acting on the advice of the Board of Review, the Judge Advocate General, and
the Secretary of War, had reversed the findings of the court-martial, released the lieutenant from arrest,
and restored him to duty (September, 1919).

-It is alleged that the United States is liable both for a wrongful killing by one of its officials and for denial
of justice; that the claimants sustained damages in the sum of 50,000 Mexican pesos; and that the
United States ought to pay them the said amount, with interest thereon.

Issue + Ruling:

Was the shooting justified under international standard? NO

Border officials may only use firearms when:

1. Delinquency is sufficiently well stated - Established

2. Preventing or repressing delinquency by firing is proportion to the danger arising from it- Not
Established

3. When there are no other practical ways of preventing or repressing delinquency- Not Established

4. When it won't create unnecessary danger – Not established

Bringing the facts of the present case to the test of these principles, the Commission holds that,

In the first place, the delinquency of crossing the river (not that of anything else or more) was
sufficiently established.
In the second place, the record only shows that the officer expected the delinquents to be engaged in
importing barrels of the native liquor called "mezcal," all other suppositions as to atrocious acts they
might have been perpetrating being mere inferences; a proportion between the supposed delinquency
and the endangering of lives is therefore not established by the record. Remarks in the record relative to
the "secrecy and speed with which the crime was committed," to the fact of its occurrence "at a hidden
point on the border" ("a secluded and secret place") and to the status of war still existing at the time
between the United States and Germany (April, 1919) cannot either supply new facts, or outweigh the
fact that the crossing occurred in broad daylight, between 9 and 10 a.m.; it is, moreover, stated in the
record by a Mexican district judge that "the inhabitants or residents of both sides of the river * * * cross
every day or very frequently to the other side" without looking "for the authorized shallow parts or
passages, some of which are situated thirty or forty kilometers from their place of residence."

In the third place, it appears from the record that the lieutenant did what he could to reach the place
where the raft would probably land on the American bank of the river, so as to be able to arrest them
without having resort to firing, but that the conditions of the bank did not allow him to be there in time
and that hailing was impossible; the Commission has a full comprehension of the difficulties presenting
themselves to an officer who in a case like this one has instantaneously to decide what to do.

In the fourth place, however, the statement that the firing merely intended to give notice to the culprits
of the officer's intention to investigate their business or to arrest them does not explain why the firing
took place in so dangerous a way; the record showing that while persons were "swimming in the water
and clinging thereto" (to the raft), he shot in the water quite near the raft, and that the child was
wounded by "one of the first shots." the lieutenant himself recognizing that he "would not have fired in
that direction if he had known women and children were on the raft." The allegation made by
Lieutenant Gulley that "he knew nothing about Bulletin No. 4" can have no weight with the Commission,
unless in so far as it might show that he considered himself as not having measured up to the
requirements of said Bulletin.

Was there a denial of justice? NO

The allegation of a denial of justice committed by the United States has no foundation in the record. In
order to assume such a denial there should be convincing evidence that, put to the test of international
standards, the disapproval of the sentence of the court-martial by the President acting in his judicial
capacity amounted to an outrage, to bad faith, to wilful neglect of duty, or to an insufficiency of
governmental action so far short of international standards that every reasonable and impartial man
would readily recognize its insufficiency. None of these deficiencies appears from the record.