Upre111E Qcourt: 3republir Toe F) Dilippine%
Upre111E Qcourt: 3republir Toe F) Dilippine%
Upre111E Qcourt: 3republir Toe F) Dilippine%
~upre111e QCourt
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FIRST DIVISION
V
Decision 2 G .R. No. 241701
- versus -
DELIA DUMACON-HASSAN,
SALAMA DUMACON-
MENDOZA, ABDUL
DUMACON, BAILYN
DUMACON-ABDUL, all
represented by DELIA
DUMACON-HASSAN as
Administrator and Attorney-in-
Fact,
Respondents.
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Decision 4 G.R. No. 241701
DECISION
Tessis Nomen, Spouses Apolonia & Jamie Munez, and Mr. & Mrs. Epifanio
Palacious v. Delia Dumacon-Hassan, Salama Dwnacon-Mendoza, Abdul
Dumacon, Bailyn Dumacon-Abdul, at! represented by Delia Dumacon-
Hassan as Administrator and Attorney-in-Fact."
Respondents alleged that they are the owners of a parcel of land located
in Lot 31, Block 24, Pls - 59, situated along the National Highway,
Poblacion, Kidapawan City, containing an area of 43,881 square meters and
4
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-92084. Petitioners, on
the other hand, are the actual occupants of the subject property who were
classified into two groups: 1) Group A petitioners who are squatters,
occupying the land by mere tolerance of respondents; and, 2) Group B
petitioners who are lessees of their respective portions of the land on a
month to month basis, who failed to pay their rent.
4
ld.atll8-119.
Penned by Assisting Presiding Judge Alexander B. Yarra; id. at 55-63.
Decision 6 G.R. No. 241701
SO ORDERED.
For Group B petitioners, the MTCC declared that the respondents failed
to effect notices to vacate and notice to pay rentals to the said group, which
is a condition precedent to an action for unlawful detainer. Furthermore, in
the notices, Group B petitioners were only given ten (10) days to vacate the
subject property The lower court enunciated that based on Section 2 of Rule
70, the lessor can proceed against the lessee only after fifteen (15) days, in
case ofland, from dat~ of last-notice to vacate the subject property.
. No p!'Oncuncement_as to costs.
SO ORP.~RED.
The RTC opined that the case filed against Group A petitioners is
obvjously a compl.aint for forcible entry, not unlawful detainer, based on the
respondents' ailegaticn that they are squatters over the subject property.
For Group B petitjoners, the RTC found that the remedy availed of by
the respondents partakes the nature of an action for unlawful detainer. The
demand to vacate was made well within one year period prior to the filing of
the instant case. The RTC stated that the 15-day rule mentioned in Section 2
of Rule 70 does not pertain to the number of days mentioned in the notice to
vacate, but to the length of time lessees held their possession of the subject
property after receipt of said notice.
In an Order dated tv1ay 27, 2013, the RTC granted the respondents'
motion for reconsideration and reversed its earlier ruling. It affirmed the
dismissal of the case against Group B petitioners on the ground that
respondents failed to allege in their complaint the date when the month-to-
month lease was terminated. Nonetheless, the RTC found that Section 8,
Rule 40 of the Rules of Court is applicable and considered the instant case as
an action for recovery of possession. It required the respondents to pay
additional docket fees based on the rules on docket fees as a condition
8
precedent before proceeding to render judgment in the instant case.
In its Decision9 dated October 31, 2013, the RTC ruled that it erred
when it :::equired the payment of additional docket fees as a condition before
it proceeded to decide the case. The RTC in the instant case is exercising not
its original jurisdiction, but its appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Section 22
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691. As
respondent had already paid the docket fees in appealing the decision of the
l'v1TCC to the RTC, the latter had already acquired jurisdiction over the case.
It also opined that the possession of Group B petitioners became illegal
when they stopped paying rentals after the expiration of their month-to-
month lease cc•ntrnct, after learning that a case was filed by Moises Sibug
(l'vloises), Baidomero . Baya·-:van (Baldomero) and Annaliza Anahieza
(Annaliza) aga:in::t Delia Hassan (Delia). Thus~ tn treating respondents '
7
Id. at 71.
Id.
9
Penned by Presiding Judge Arvin Sadin B. B::lagot, CPA; 1d. at 68-90.
Decision 8 G.R. No. 241701
complaint as an action for recovery of possession, the RTC found that the
respondents are entitled to recover the possession of the subject property.
Furthermore, the RTC imposed J:!200.00 rental fee per month against
petitioners for the use and enjoyment of the portions of the subject property
they are currently occupying, respectively.
Undaunted, the petitioners seasonably filed their appeal before the CA.
Ruling of the CA
The CA found that the respondents paid the appeal fees under Rule 40
of the Rules of Court. However, the situation changed when the RTC, motu
proprio, took cognizance of the case as an original action for recovery of
possession and ruled on the merits.
Thus, the CA held that there is a need for respondent to pay additional
docket fees to be detennined based on the fair market value of the subject
property. While non-payment of docket fees may render an original action
dismissible, the.rule on payment of docket fees may be relaxed whenever the
attending circumstance wan-ants it.
The Issues
10
Id. at 50.
V
Decision 9 C.R. No. 241701
In Aquino v. Hon. Casabar, 12 this Court had held that should there be
unpaid docket fees, the same should be considered as a lien on the judgment.
Thus, even on the assumption that additional docket fees are required, its
non-payment will not result in the court's loss of jurisdiction over the case.
This Court is unconvinced that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction
over the instant case due to the non-payment of the docket fees. The fact that
the respondents had raised the issue of the correctness of such ruling of the
RTC on appeal neither shows that they are not willing to pay the same nor
manifest their intention to defraud the government.
Petitioners take into issue that the respondents did not pay immediately
the correct docket fees upon receipt of the Decision dated December 7,
2017. However, it should be noted that the said decision ordered the RTC to
determine the proper docket fees in Civil Case No. 2010- 12that would be
paid by respondents. There was no showing that the R TC had already
complied with the said order of the CA that could be the basis for the
payment of docket fees by respondents.
11
Id. at 25-26.
12
752Phil. l, 14 (20 15).
\
Decision 10 G.R. No. 241701
Generally, in civil litigations, the party who alleges has the burden to
prove his/her affirmative allegations. 13 Petitioners had not shown even an
ounce of proof that respondents refused or disregarded the order of the court
to pay the deficient docket fees due against them. Even if respondents failed
to pay the said docket fees, the fair market value of the subject property was
pegged at Pl 9,931,608.00 as stated in the tax declaration. Therefore, a lien
can be put against the subject property, which is sufficient to satisfy the
payment of the deficient docket fees.
Petitioners also argue that the RTC should have tried the instant case on
its merits as if the case was originally filed with it before rendering its
Decision. In fact, the R TC did not touch the issue on possession but rather
on jurisdiction. Petitioners insist that the R TC should have determined who
has prior possession over the subject property to resolve the issue on who
has better right to possess the same.
In Spouses Valdez, Jr. v. Court ofAppeals, 14 the Court had held that an
"[a]ccion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession
which should be brought in the proper regional trial court when
dispossession has lasted for more than one year. It is an ordinary civil
proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty
independently of title."
Thus, the core issue in an action for the recovery of possession of realty
is who has the priority right to the possession of the real property. 15 Prior
possession is not relevant nor an issue in accion publiciana. Unlike in a
complaint against forcible entry, where proof of prior physical possession of
the subject property is an essential element for the action to prosper, the
same is not required to be alleged nor proved in an action for recovery of
possession of real property.
13
Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11 , 2018.
14
523 Phil. 39, 46 (2006).
15
Abobon v. Abobon, 692 Phil. 530, 541-542(2012).
Decision 11 G.R. No. 241701
does not hold water. Possession of a property can be acquired not only by
material occupation but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of
one's will or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for
acquiring such right. Thus, possession can be acquired by juridical acts, such
as donations, succession, execution, and registration of public instruments,
inscription of possessory information titles and the like. 16 It was established
in the instant case that TCT No. T-92084 was issued in name of the
respondents on October 20, 1997, from their predecessors-in-interest and
that Group B petitioners subsequently entered possession of their respective
portions of the subject property as lessees of Delia. Thus, Group B
· petitioners cannot now claim that they had prior possession over the subject
property.
Petitioners had sorely misapplied this Court' s ruling in the cited case of
David v. Cordova. 18 In the case of David, we held that "regardless of the
actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet
possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence or terror x x x
Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession
even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his
possession in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the
property until a person with a better right lawfully e jects him." Clearly,
16
Mangaser v. Ugay, 749 Phil. 372, 382 (2014).
17
Santos v. NSO, 662 Phil. 708, 72 1-722 (201 1).
IH 502 Phil. 626, 645 (2005).
Decision 12 G.R. No. 241701
Also, Group B petitioners are not being forcefully ejected from the
subject property by the respondents though violence or intimidation. In fact,
respondents had availed themselves of the remedy provided under the law
and instituted the instant complaint against herein petitioners before the
comi in order to be peacefully granted the physical possession of the subject
property. Even if we consider that petitioners may have been in prior
possession of the subject property, it does not mean that they cannot be
ordered to leave the premises and surrender possession of the same to
respondents once it is proven that the latter has a better right to the said
property.
SO ORDERED.
Decision 13 G.R. No. 241701
WE CONCUR:
.PERALTA
Chief~ tstice
Chairperson
:,____,,,-
AM ZARO-JAVIER
CERTIFICATION