144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Same; 

Same; Same; Same; The period for prescription of penalties begins

only when the convict evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of
Pangan vs. Gatbalite
his sentence.—This Court pronounces that the prescription of penalties found in
G.R. No. 141718. January 21, 2005.* Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code, applies only to those who are convicted by
BENJAMIN PANGAN y RIVERA, petitioner, vs. HON. LOURDES F. final judgment and are serving sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty.
GATBALITE, as the Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, The period for prescription of penalties begins only when the convict evades
Branch 56, and COL. JAMES D. LABORDO, as the City Jail Warden of Angeles service of sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence. Since petitioner
City, respondents. never suffered deprivation of liberty before his arrest on January 20, 2000 and as
Criminal Law; Penalties; Prescription of Penalties;  The period of a consequence never evaded sentence by escaping during the term of his service,
prescription of penalties—the succeeding Article 93 provides—“shall commence the period for prescription never began.
to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his
sentence.”—The case of Tanega v. Masakayan falls squarely within the issues of PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
the present case. In that case, petitioner Adelaida Tanega failed to appear on the
day of the execution of her sentence. On the same day, respondent judge issued a The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
warrant for her arrest. She was never arrested. More than a year later, petitioner      Andin, Rodriguez & Pamintuan for petitioner.
through counsel moved to quash the warrant of arrest, on the ground that the      Froilan C. Zapanta for private respondent.
penalty had prescribed. Petitioner claimed that she was convicted for a light
offense and since light offenses prescribe in one year, her penalty had already AZCUNA, J.:
prescribed. The Court disagreed, thus: x x x The period of prescription of
penalties—the succeeding Article 93 provides—“shall commence to run from Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence.” Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the
Same; Same; Same; Evasion of Service of Sentence; Elements.—Elements 146
of evasion of service of sentence are: (1) the offender is a convict by final 146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
judgment; (2) he “is serving his sentence which consists in deprivation of Pangan vs. Gatbalite
liberty”; and (3) he evades service of sentence decision of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 56, rendered on
_______________ January 31, 2000.1
The facts of this case are undisputed. The petitioner was indicted for simple
*
 FIRST DIVISION. seduction in Criminal Case No. 85-816, at the Municipal Trial Court of Angeles
City, Branch 3.
145
During the trial of the case, Atty. Eduardo Pineda, counsel for petitioner,
VOL. 449, JANUARY 21, 2005 145 submitted the case for decision without offering any evidence, due to the
petitioner’s constant absence at hearings.
Pangan vs. Gatbalite On September 16, 1987, the petitioner was convicted of the offense charged
by escaping during the term of his sentence. This must be so. For, by the and was sentenced to serve a penalty of two months and one day of arresto
express terms of the statute, a convict evades “service of his sentence” by mayor.
“escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment.” On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, on October 24, 1988, affirmed in
That escape should take place while serving sentence, is emphasized by the toto the decision of the Municipal Trial Court.
provisions of the second sentence of Article 157 which provides for a higher On August 9, 1991, the case was called for promulgation of the decision in
penalty if such “evasion or escape shall have taken place by means of unlawful the court of origin. Despite due notice, counsel for the petitioner did not appear.
entry, by breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs, or floors, or by using Notice to petitioner was returned unserved with the notation that he no longer
picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation, or through resided at the given address. As a consequence, he also failed to appear at the
connivance with other convicts or employees of the penal institution, . . .” scheduled promulgation. The court of origin issued an order directing the
Indeed, evasion of sentence is but another expression of the term “jail breaking.” recording of the decision in the criminal docket of the court and an order of
arrest against the petitioner.2
 4
Pursuant to the order of arrest, on January 20, 2000, the petitioner was  Rollo, p. 6.
5
apprehended and detained at the Mabalacat Detention Cell. On January 24, 2000,  Id.
6
petitioner filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at the Regional Trial Court  Rollo, p. 27.
of Angeles City. He impleaded as respondent the Acting Chief of Police of
Mabalacat, Pampanga.3 Petitioner contended that his arrest was illegal and 148
unjustified on the grounds that: 148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
_______________ Pangan vs. Gatbalite
1
The elements of prescription are:
 Rollo, pp. 26-29.
2
 RTC Decision, SP. PROC. No. 5784; Rollo, pp. 26-27. 1. 1.That the penalty is imposed by final judgment;
3
 Rollo, p. 6. 2. 2.That convict evaded the service of the sentence by escaping
147 during the term of his sentence;
3. 3.That the convict who had escaped from prison has not given
VOL. 449, JANUARY 21, 2005 147
himself up, or been captured, or gone to a foreign country with
Pangan vs. Gatbalite which we have no extradition treaty, or committed another
crime;
1. (a)the straight penalty of two months and one day of arresto 4. 4.The penalty has prescribed, because of the lapse of time
mayor prescribes in five years under No. 3, Article 93 [of the] from the date of the evasion of the service of the sentence by
Revised Penal Code, and the convict.
2. (b)having been able to continuously evade service of sentence
for almost nine years, his criminal liability has long been In this case, the essential element of prescription which is the evasion of the
totally extinguished under No. 6, Article 89 [of the] Revised service of sentence is absent. Admittedly, the petitioner herein has not served the
Penal Code.4 penalty imposed on him in prison and that during the service of the sentence, he
escaped therefrom. Notably, at the trial of Crim. Case No. 85-816 in the
After his transfer to the City Jail of Angeles City on January 25, 2000, petitioner Municipal Trial Court, Branch III, Angeles City and on the date set for the
filed an Amended Petition with the Regional Trial Court, impleading herein promulgation of the affirmed decision, the petitioner failed to appear and
respondent Col. James D. Labordo, the Jail Warden of Angeles City, as remained at large.
respondent.5 “There was no evasion of the service of the sentence in this case, because
In response, the Jail Warden alleged that petitioner’s detention was pursuant such evasion presupposes escaping during the service of the sentence consisting
to the order of commitment (mittimus), issued by Marlon P. Roque, Clerk of in deprivation of liberty.” (Infante vs. Warden, 48 O.G. No. 122) (92 Phil. 310).
Court III of the Municipal Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 3, dated January
Corollarily, the detention of the petitioner in Angeles City Jail in compliance
25, 2000.6
with the Order of Commitment (Exhibit “E”) is not illegal for—
On January 31, 2000, respondent Judge rendered the decision, which is the
“A commitment in due form, based on a final judgment, convicting and
subject of this present appeal, which pronounced:
sentencing the defendant in a criminal case, is conclusive evidence of the legality
The Court cannot subscribe to the contention of the petitioner that the penalty
of his detention, unless it appears that the court which pronounced the judgment
imposed on him in the decision adverted to above had already prescribed, hence,
was without jurisdiction or exceeded it.” (U.S. vs. Jayne, 24 Phil 90, 24 J.F. 94,
his detention is illegal for under Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code:
Phil. Digest, Vol. 2, 1398).
“The period of prescription of penalties shall commence to run from the date
WHEREFORE, for not being meritorious and well-founded, the petition for a
when the culprit should evade the service of sentence, and it shall be interrupted
writ of habeas corpus is hereby denied.
if the defendant should give himself up, be captured, should go to some foreign
SO ORDERED.”
country with which this Government has no extradition treaty, or should commit
another crime before the expiration of the period of prescription. 149
_______________ VOL. 449, JANUARY 21, 2005 149
 Pangan vs. Gatbalite There is no dispute that the duty of government to compel the service of
Angeles City, January 31, 2000.”7 sentence sets in when the judgment of conviction becomes final.
The dispute, however, is in the construction of the phrase “should evade the
From the above quoted decision, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on service of sentence.” When does the period of prescription of penalties begin to
a question purely of law and raised the following issue: run? The Infante ruling construes this to mean that the convict must escape from
HOW SHOULD THE PHRASE “SHALL COMMENCE TO RUN FROM THE jail “because such evasion presupposes escaping during the service of the
DATE WHEN THE CULPRIT SHOULD EVADE THE SERVICE OF sentence consisting in deprivation of liberty.”
SENTENCE” IN ARTICLE 93 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE ON THE Petitioner, with due respect, disagrees because if that were the intention of
COMPUTATION OF THE PRESCRIPTION OF PENALTIES BE the law, then the phrase “should evade the service of sentence” in Article 93
CONSTRUED? PUT A LITTLE DIFFERENTLY, WHEN DOES THE would have read: “should escape during the service of the sentence consisting in
PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD OF PENALTIES BEGIN TO RUN?8 deprivation of liberty.” The legislature could have very easily written Article 93
to read this way—
Petitioner claims that: “The period of prescription of penalties shall commence to run from the date
x x x the period for the computation of penalties under Article 93 of the Revised when the culprit should escape during the service of the sentence consisting in
Penal Code begins to run from the moment the judgment of conviction becomes deprivation of liberty, and it shall be interrupted if the defendant should give
final and the convict successfully evades, eludes, and dodges arrest for him to himself up, be captured, should go to some foreign country with which this
serve sentence.9 Government has no extradition treaty, or should commit another crime before the
Petitioner supports his claim in the following manner: expiration of the period of prescription.”
The Decision subject of this appeal, which was based on the 1952 ruling But they did not.
rendered in Infante vs. Warden, 48 O.G. No. 122, 92 Phil. 310, is, petitioner most The legislature wrote “should evade the service of sentence” to cover or
respectfully submits, not good case law. It imposes upon the convict a condition include convicts like him who, although convicted by final judgment, were never
not stated in the law. It is contrary to the spirit, nature or essence of prescription arrested or apprehended by government for the service of their sentence. With all
of penalties, creates an ambiguity in the law and opens the law to abuse by the powers of government at its disposal, petitioner was able to successfully
government. evade service of his 2 months and 1 day jail sentence for at least nine (9) years,
from August 9, 1991 to January 20, 2000. This is approximately 3 years and 5
THE INFANTE RULING IMPOSES A months longer than the 5-year prescriptive period of the penalty imposed on him.
CONDITION NOT STATED IN THE LAW. That, as the respondent RTC Judge noted, petitioner did not attend the trial at
the Municipal Trial Court and the promulgation
It appears that the Infante ruling imposes that, as an essential element, the
convict must serve at least a few seconds, minutes, days, weeks or years of his 151
jail sentence and then escapes before the VOL. 449, JANUARY 21, 2005 151
_______________
Pangan vs. Gatbalite
7
 Rollo, pp. 27-29. of his judgment of conviction in August 9, 1991 is of no moment. His bond for
8
 Rollo, p. 9. provisional release was surely cancelled and an order of arrest was surely issued
9
 Rollo, p. 24. against petitioner. The undisputed fact is that on August 9, 1991 the judgment of
conviction was promulgated in absentia and an order for petitioner’s arrest was
150 issued by the Municipal Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch III.
150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED The duty of government, therefore, to arrest petitioner and compel him to
serve his sentence began on August 9, 1991. The 5-year prescriptive period of
Pangan vs. Gatbalite
his arresto mayor penalty also began to run on that day considering that no relief
computation of prescription of penalties begins to run. This, petitioner was taken therefrom. Since petitioner never gave himself up [n]or was [he], until
respectfully submits is not a condition stated in Article 93, which states that, the January 20, 2000, ever captured, for the service of his sentence nor did he flee to
prescription of penalties “shall commence to run from the date when the culprit some foreign country with which [our] government has no extradition treaty, that
should evade the service of sentence.”
5-year prescriptive period of his penalty ran continuously from August 9, 1991 A perusal of the facts in Infante v. Warden reveals that it is not on all fours with
when his judgment of conviction was promulgated in absentia and was never the present case. In Infante, the convict was on conditional pardon when he was
interrupted. re-arrested. Hence, he had started serving sentence but the State released him. In
For reasons known only to it, however, government failed or neglected, for the present case, the convict evaded service of sentence from the start, and was
almost nine (9) years, to arrest petitioner for the service of his arresto arrested eight years later.
mayor sentence [which] should not be taken against petitioner. He was able to The RTC decision, however, must stand, since it is in accord with applicable
successfully evade service of his sentence for a period longer than the 5-year decisions of this Court. The issue raised by petitioner is not novel. Article 93 of
prescriptive period of his penalty and, as such, is entitled to total extinction of his the Revised Penal Code14 has been interpreted several times by the Court.
criminal liability. _______________
To say, as was said in Infante, that the prescriptive period of the penalty
12
never began to run in favor of petitioner because he never escaped from jail  Supra, at p. 313.
13
during the service of his sentence imposes a condition not written in the law. It  Supra, at p. 313.
14
also violates the basic principle that the criminal statutes are construed liberally  The period of prescription of penalties shall commence to run from the date
in favor of the accused and/or convict and is contrary to the spirit behind or when the culprit should evade the service of his sen
essence of statutes of limitations [and] prescription, in criminal cases.10
153
The Regional Trial Court based its decision on the case of Infante v. Warden.11 In VOL. 449, JANUARY 21, 2005 153
said case, Infante, the petitioner, was convicted of murder and was sentenced to
Pangan vs. Gatbalite
seventeen years, four months and one day of reclusion temporal. After serving
The case of Tanega v. Masakayan15 falls squarely within the issues of the present
fifteen years, seven months and eleven days, he was granted a
case. In that case, petitioner Adelaida Tanega failed to appear on the day of the
_______________
execution of her sentence. On the same day, respondent judge issued a warrant
10 for her arrest. She was never arrested. More than a year later, petitioner through
 Rollo, pp. 9-13.
11 counsel moved to quash the warrant of arrest, on the ground that the penalty had
 92 Phil. 310 (1967).
prescribed. Petitioner claimed that she was convicted for a light offense and
152 since light offenses prescribe in one year, her penalty had already prescribed.
152 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED The Court disagreed, thus:
x x x The period of prescription of penalties—the succeeding Article 93 provides
Pangan vs. Gatbalite —“shall commence to run from the date when the culprit should evade the
conditional pardon. The condition was that “he shall not again violate any of the service of his sentence.” What then is the concept of evasion of service of
penal laws of the Philippines.” Ten years after his release on conditional pardon, sentence? Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code furnishes the ready answer.
Infante was found guilty by a Municipal Court for driving without a license. Says Article 157:
Infante was immediately ordered rearrested for breach of the condition of his “ART. 157. Evasion of service of sentence.—The penalty of prision
pardon. One of the issues raised by Infante in his petition, correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon any
x x x was that the remitted penalty for which the petitioner had been recommitted convict who shall evade service of his sentence by escaping during the term of
to jail—one year and 11 days—had prescribed. x x x 12 his imprisonment by reason of final judgment. x x x”
The Court disagreed and reasoned out thus: Elements of evasion of service of sentence are: (1) the offender is a convict
The contention is not well taken. According to article 93 of the Revised Penal by final judgment; (2) he “is serving his sentence which consists in deprivation
Code the period of prescription of penalties commences to run from the date of liberty”; and (3) he evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of
when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence. It is evident from this his sentence. This must be so. For, by the express terms of the statute, a convict
provision that evasion of the sentence is an essential element of prescription. evades “service of his sentence” by “escaping during the term of his
There has been no such evasion in this case. Even if there had been one and imprisonment by reason of final judgment.” That escape should take place while
prescription were to be applied, its basis would have to be the evasion of the serving sentence, is emphasized by the provisions of the second sentence of
unserved sentence, and computation could not have started earlier than the date Article 157 which provides for a higher penalty if such “evasion or escape shall
of the order for the prisoner’s rearrest.13
 16
have taken place by means of unlawful entry, by breaking doors, windows, gates,  Supra, at pp. 968-971; 19 SCRA 564, 566-569.
17
walls, roofs, or floors, or by using picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit,  394 SCRA 221 (2002).
violence or intimidation, or
_______________ 155
VOL. 449, JANUARY 21, 2005 155
tence, and it shall be interrupted if the defendant should give himself up, be Pangan vs. Gatbalite
captured, should go to some foreign country with which this Government has no we declared that, for prescription of penalty imposed by final sentence to
extradition treaty, or should commit another crime before the expiration of the commence to run, the culprit should escape during the term of such
period of prescription. imprisonment.
15
 125 Phil. 966; 19 SCRA 564 (1967). The Court is unable to find and, in fact, does not perceive any compelling
reason to deviate from our earlier pronouncement clearly exemplified in the
154
Tanega case.
154 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code provides when the prescription of
Pangan vs. Gatbalite penalties shall commence to run. Under said provision, it shall commence to run
through connivance with other convicts or employees of the penal from the date the felon evades the service of his sentence. Pursuant to Article
institution, . . .” Indeed, evasion of sentence is but another expression of the term 157 of the same Code, evasion of service of sentence can be committed only by
“jail breaking.” those who have been convicted by final judgment by escaping during the term of
xxx his sentence.
We, therefore, rule that for prescription of penalty of imprisonment imposed As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, “escape” in legal parlance
by final sentence to commence to run, the culprit should escape during the term and for purposes of Articles 93 and 157 of the RPC means unlawful departure of
of such imprisonment. prisoner from the limits of his custody. Clearly, one who has not been committed
Adverting to the facts, we have here the case of a convict who—sentenced to to prison cannot be said to have escaped therefrom.
imprisonment by final judgment—was thereafter never placed in confinement. In the instant case, petitioner was never brought to prison. In fact, even
Prescription of penalty, then, does not run in her favor.16 before the execution of the judgment for his conviction, he was already in hiding.
Now petitioner begs for the compassion of the Court because he has ceased to
In Del Castillo v. Torrecampo,17 the Court cited and live a life of peace and tranquility after he failed to appear in court for the
reiterated Tanega. Petitioner, Del Castillo, was charged for violation of Section execution of his sentence. But it was petitioner who chose to become a fugitive.
178 (nn) of the 1978 Election Code. The trial court found Del Castillo guilty The Court accords compassion only to those who are deserving. Petitioner’s guilt
beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate sentence was proven beyond reasonable doubt but he refused to answer for the wrong he
of imprisonment of 1 year as minimum to 3 years as maximum. On appeal the committed. He is therefore not to be rewarded therefor.
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto. During the The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is based on settled
execution of judgment on October 14, 1987, petitioner was not present. The jurisprudence and applicable laws. It did not engage in judicial legislation but
presiding Judge issued an order of arrest and the confiscation of his bond. correctly interpreted the pertinent laws. Because petitioner was never placed in
Petitioner was never apprehended. Ten years later, petitioner filed a motion to confinement, prescription never started to run in his favor.18
quash the warrant of arrest on the ground that the penalty imposed upon him had
already prescribed. The motion was denied by the trial court. Del Castillo, on a Consistent with the two cases cited above, this Court pronounces that the
petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals, questioned the denial by the trial prescription of penalties found in Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code, applies
court. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Upon denial only to those who are con-
of his Motion for Reconsideration, Del Castillo raised the matter to this Court. _______________
The Court decided against Del Castillo and after quoting the ratio decidendi of
18
the Court of Appeals in full, it ratiocinated, thus:  Supra, at pp. 225-226.
The foregoing conclusion of the Court of Appeals is consistent with the ruling of
this Court in Tanega vs. Masakayan, et al., where 156
_______________ 156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
 Pangan vs. Gatbalite      Quisumbing  (Actg. Chairman), Ynares-Santiago and Carpio,
victed by final judgment and are serving sentence which consists in deprivation JJ., concur.
of liberty. The period for prescription of penalties begins only when the convict      Davide, Jr.  (C.J., Chairman), On Leave.
evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence. Since Judgment affirmed.
petitioner never suffered deprivation of liberty before his arrest on January 20, Notes.—For prescription of penalty imposed by final sentence to commence
2000 and as a consequence never evaded sentence by escaping during the term of to run, the culprit should escape during the term of such imprisonment. (Del
his service, the period for prescription never began. Castillo vs. Torrecampo, 394 SCRA 221 [2002])
Petitioner, however, has by this time fully served his sentence of two months Under Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code, prescription of penalties shall
and one day of arresto mayor and should forthwith be released unless he is being commence to run from the date the felon evades the service of his sentence.
detained for another offense or charge. Evasion of service of sentence can be committed only by those who have been
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, convicted by final judgment by escaping during the term of his sentence. (Del
Branch 56 is AFFIRMED, but petitioner is ordered released effective Castillo vs. Torrecampo, supra)
immediately for having fully served his sentence unless he is detained for
another offense or charge. ——o0o——
No costs.
SO ORDERED.