G.R. Nos.

146710-15, March 2, 2001

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner  VS. ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, RAMON
GONZALES et.al, respondents

G.R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner  VS. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, respondent
FACTS:
The case basically revolves around the series of events that happened prior and subsequent to the event
we know as EDSA II. During the 1998 elections, Joseph E. Estrada and Gloria Macapagal Arroyo were
elected as president and vice-president respectively. The downfall of the Estrada administration began
when For. Gov. Luis Chavit Singson went to the media and released his exposé that petitioner was part
of the Jueteng scandal as having received large sums of money. After this expose, a lot of different
groups and many personalities had asked for the resignation of the petitioner. Some of which are the
Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP), Sen. Nene Pimentel, Archbishop of Manila, Jaime
Cardinal Sin, For. Pres. Fidel Ramos, and For. Pres. Corazon Aquino who asked petitioner to make the
“supreme self-sacrifice”. Respondent also resigned as Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and
Services and also asked petitioner for his resignation. 4 senior economic advisers of the petitioner
resigned and then Speaker Manny Villar, together with 47 representatives, defected from Lapian ng
Masang Pilipino.
By November, an impeachment case was to be held as Speaker Manny Villar had transmitted the
Articles of Impeachment to the senate. On November 20, the 21 senators took oath as judges to the
impeachment trial with SC CJ Hilario Davide, Jr., presiding. The impeachment trial was one for the ages.
It was a battle royal of well known lawyers. But then came the fateful day, when by the vote of 11-10,
the judges came to a decision to not open the second envelop allegedly containing evidence showing
that the petitioner had a secret bank account under the name “Jose Velarde” containing P3.3 billion. The
not opening of the 2nd envelop resulted to the people going to the streets and the public prosecutors
withdrawing from the trial. On January 19, AFP Chief of Staff Angelo Reyes marched to EDSA shrine and
declared “on behalf of your Armed Forces, the 130,000 strong members of the Armed Forces, we wish
to announce that we are withdrawing our support to this government.” PNP Chief, Director General
Panfilo Lacson together with some Cabinet members made the same announcement.
June 20 was the day of surrender. At around 12:20 AM, negotiations started for the peaceful transition
of power. But at around 12 noon, respondent took oath as the 14 th president of the Philippines. At 2:30
PM, petitioner and his family left Malacanang. He issued the following Press Statement:
“20 January 2001
STATEMENT FROM
PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
At twelve o’clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the
Republic of the Philippines.  While along with many other legal minds of our country, I have strong and
serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do not wish to
be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for
the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation.  I leave the Palace of our
people with gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people.   I will not shirk from
any future challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people.
MABUHAY!
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA”
It also appears that on the same day, January 20, 2001, he signed the following letter:
“Sir:
By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this
declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office.   By operation of law and the
Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President.
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA”
On January 22, this Court issued the following Resolution in Administrative Matter No. 01-1-05-SC. The
said resolution confirmed the authority given by the 12 SC justices to the CJ during the oath taking that
happened on January 20. Soon, other countries accepted the respondent as the new president of the
Philippines. The House then passed Resolution No. 175 “expressing the full support of the House of
Representatives to the administration of Her Excellency Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the
Philippines.” It also approved Resolution No. 176 “expressing the support of the House of
Representatives to the assumption into office by Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of
the Republic of the Philippines, extending its congratulations and expressing its support for her
administration as a partner in the attainment of the nation’s goals under the Constitution.”
On February 6, respondent recommended Teofisto Guingona to be the vice president. On February 7,
the Senate adopted Resolution 82 which confirmed the nomination of Senator Guingona. On the same
day, the Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the impeachment court is functus officio and
has been terminated. Several cases were filed against the petitioner which are as follows: (1) OMB Case
No. 0-00-1629, filed by Ramon A. Gonzales on October 23, 2000 for bribery and graft and corruption; (2)
OMB Case No. 0-00-1754 filed by the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption on November 17, 2000
for plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct, violation of the Code
of Conduct for government Employees, etc; (3) OMB Case No. 0-00-1755 filed by the Graft Free
Philippines Foundation, Inc. on November 24, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery,
perjury, serious misconduct; (4) OMB Case No. 0-00-1756 filed by Romeo Capulong, et al., on November
28, 2000 for malversation of public funds, illegal use of public funds and property, plunder, etc., (5) OMB
Case No. 0-00-1757 filed by Leonard de Vera, et al., on November 28, 2000 for bribery, plunder, indirect
bribery, violation of PD 1602, PD 1829, PD 46, and RA 7080; and (6) OMB Case No. 0-00-1758 filed by
Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. on December 4, 2000 for plunder, graft and corruption.
A special panel of investigators was forthwith created by the respondent Ombudsman to investigate the
charges against the petitioner.  It is chaired by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervasio with
the following as members, viz:  Director Andrew Amuyutan, Prosecutor Pelayo Apostol, Atty. Jose de
Jesus and Atty. Emmanuel Laureso.  On January 22, the panel issued an Order directing the petitioner to
file his counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses as well as other supporting documents in
answer to the aforementioned complaints against him.
Thus, the stage for the cases at bar was set.  On February 5, petitioner filed with this Court GR No.
146710-15, a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction.   It sought to
enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in Case Nos. OMB 0-00-
1629, 1754, 1755, 1756, 1757 and 1758 or in any other criminal complaint that may be filed in his office,
until after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted.” Thru another
counsel, petitioner, on February 6, filed GR No. 146738 for Quo Warranto.  He prayed for judgment
“confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines
temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her
oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution.” Acting on GR Nos. 146710-15, the Court, on the same day, February 6,
required the respondents “to comment thereon within a non-extendible period expiring on 12 February
2001.” On February 13, the Court ordered the consolidation of GR Nos. 146710-15 and GR No. 146738
and the filing of the respondents’ comments “on or before 8:00 a.m. of February 15.”
In a resolution dated February 20, acting on the urgent motion for copies of resolution and press
statement for “Gag Order” on respondent Ombudsman filed by counsel for petitioner in G.R. No.
146738, the Court resolved:
“(1) to inform the parties that the Court did not issue a resolution on January 20, 2001 declaring the
office of the President vacant and that neither did the Chief Justice issue a press statement justifying the
alleged resolution;
 (2) to order the parties and especially their counsel who are officers of the Court under pain of being
cited for contempt to refrain from making any comment or discussing in public the merits of the cases at
bar while they are still pending decision by the Court, and
(3) to issue a 30-day status quo order effective immediately enjoining the respondent Ombudsman from
resolving or deciding the criminal cases pending investigation in his office against petitioner Joseph E.
Estrada and subject of the cases at bar, it appearing from news reports that the respondent
Ombudsman may immediately resolve the cases against petitioner Joseph E. Estrada seven (7) days after
the hearing held on February 15, 2001, which action will make the cases at bar moot and academic.”
ISSUES:
I Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy.
II Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable controversy, whether petitioner Estrada is a President
on leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President.
III Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent for the criminal
prosecution of petitioner Estrada.  In the negative and on the assumption that petitioner is still
President, whether he is immune from criminal prosecution.
IV Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined on the ground of prejudicial
publicity.
DECISION:
I No. The case is legal not political.
II No. He is not a president on leave.
III No. The impeachment proceedings was already aborted. As a non-sitting president, he is not entitled
to immunity from criminal prosecution
IV There is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the preliminary investigation of the
petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman.
RATIO/REASON:

1. I. Whether or not the case involves a political question

Respondents contend that the cases at bar pose a political question. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo became a
President through the People power revolution. Her legitimacy as president was also accepted by other
nations. Thus, they conclude that the following shall serve as political thicket which the Court cannot
enter.
The Court rules otherwise. A political question has been defined by our Court as “those questions which,
under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government.  It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular
measure.”
Respondents allege that the legality of the Arroyo administration should be treated similarly with the
Aquino administration. Respondents propose that the situation of the Arroyo and Aquino
administrations are similar. However, the Court finds otherwise. The Court has made substantial
distinctions which are the following:
Aquino Arroyo
Government was a result of a successful revolution Government was a result of a peaceful revolution
In the Freedom constitution, it was stated that the Arroyo took the oath of the 1987 Constitution. She
Aquino government was instilled directly by the is discharging the authority of the president under
people in defiance of the 1973 Constitution as the 1987 constitution.
amended.
It is a well settled rule that the legitimacy of a government sired by a successful revolution by people
power is beyond judicial scrutiny for that government automatically orbits out of the constitutional loop.
But this would not apply as the Court finds substantial difference between the 2 EDSA Revolutions. It
 would show that there are differences between the 2 governments set up by EDSA I and II. This was
further explained by the Court by comparing the 2 EDSA Revolutions.
EDSA I EDSA II
Extra-constitutional. Hence, “Xxx IN DEFIANCE OF Intra-Constitutional. Hence, the oath of the
THE 1973 CONSTITUTION, AS AMENDED”—cannot respondent as President includes the protection
be subject of judicial review and upholding of the 1987 Constitution.—
resignation of the President makes it subject to
judicial review
exercise of the people power of exercise of people power of freedom of speech
revolution which overthrew the whole and freedom of assembly to petition the
government government for redress of grievances which only
affected the office of the President
Political question Legal Question
In this issue, the Court holds that the issue is legal and not political.

1. II. Whether or not petitioner resigned as President

Resignation is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble:  there must be an intent to

resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. There is no required form of
resignation. It can be expressed, implied, oral or written. It is true that respondent never wrote a letter
of resignation before he left Malacanang on June 20, 2001. In this issue, the Court would use the totality
test or the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing
a material relevance on the issue.
Using this test, the Court rules that the petitioner had resigned. The Court knows the amount of stress
that the petitioner had suffered. With just a blink of an eye, he lost the support of the legislative when
then Manny Villar and other Representatives had defected. AFP Chief of Staff General Angelo Reyes had
already gone to EDSA.  PNP Chief Director General Panfilo Lacson and other cabinet secretaries had
withdrawn as well. By looking into the Angara diaries, it was pointed out that the petitioner had
suggested a snap election at May on which he would not be a candidate. Proposing a snap election in
which he is not a candidate means that he had intent to resign. When the proposal for a dignified exit or
resignation was proposed, petitioner did not disagree but listened closely. This is proof that petitioner
had reconciled himself to the reality that he had to resign.  His mind was already concerned with the
five-day grace period he could stay in the palace.  It was a matter of time.
The negotiations that had happened were about a peaceful transfer of power. It was already implied
that petitioner would resign. The negotiations concentrated on the following: (1) the transition period of
five days after the petitioner’s resignation; (2) the guarantee of the safety of the petitioner and his
family, and (3) the agreement to open the second envelope to vindicate the name of the petitioner. Also
taken from the Angara diaries, The President says. “Pagod na pagod na ako.  Ayoko na masyado nang
masakit.  Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga.  (I am very tired.  I don’t want any more of
this – it’s too painful.  I’m tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue.) I just want to clear my
name, then I will go.” The quoted statement of the petitioner was a clear evidence that he has resigned.
The second round of negotiations were about the consolidating of the clauses which were proposed by
both sides. The second round of negotiation cements the reading that the petitioner has resigned.  It
will be noted that during this second round of negotiation, the resignation of the petitioner was again
treated as a given fact.  The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by
the parties during and after the transition period.
When everything was already signed by the side of the petitioner and ready to be faxed by Angara, the
negotiator for the respondent, Angelo Reyes, called to Angara saying that the SC would allow
respondent to have her oath taking. Before petitioner left Malacanang, he made a last statement.
The statement reads: ‘At twelve o’clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her
oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines.  While along with many other legal minds of our
country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as
president, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil
society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for
the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation.  I leave the Palace of our
people with gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people.   I will not shrik from
any future challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and our beloved people.
MABUHAY!’”
By making such statement, petitioner impliedly affirms the following: (1) he acknowledged the oath-
taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2)
he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order
to begin the healing process of our nation.  He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of
inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he
expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them.   Without doubt, he was
referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will
not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country. 
Petitioner’s reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has
given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit
of reconciliation and solidarity.  Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not
be attained if he did not give up the presidency.
Petitioner however argues that he only took a temporary leave of absence. This is evidenced by a letter
which reads as follows:
“Sir
By virtue of the provisions of Section II, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this
declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office.   By operation of law and the
Constitution, the Vice President shall be the Acting President.
(Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada”
The Court was surprised that the petitioner did not use this letter during the week long crisis. It would
be very easy for him to say before he left Malacanang that he was temporarily unable to govern, thus,
he is leaving Malacanang. Under any circumstance, however, the mysterious letter cannot negate the
resignation of the petitioner.  If it was prepared before the press release of the petitioner clearly
showing his resignation from the presidency, then the resignation must prevail as a later act.  If,
however, it was prepared after the press release, still, it commands scant legal significance.
Petitioner also argues that he could not resign. His legal basis is RA 3019 which states:
“Sec. 12.  No public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation, criminal or
administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under this Act or under the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery.”
During the amendments, another section was inserted which states that:
During the period of amendments, the following provision was inserted as section 15:
“Sec. 15. Termination of office — No public official shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an
investigation, criminal or administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under the
Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery.
The separation or cessation of a public official from office shall not be a bar to his prosecution under this
Act for an offense committed during his incumbency.”
The original senate bill was rejected because of the 2 nd paragraph of section 15. Nonetheless, another
similar bill was passed. Section 15 then became section 13. There is another reason why petitioner’s
contention should be rejected. In the cases at bar, the records show that when petitioner resigned on
January 20, 2001, the cases filed against him before the Ombudsman were OMB Case Nos. 0-00-1629, 0-
00-1755, 0-00-1756, 0-00-1757 and 0-00-1758. While these cases have been filed, the respondent
Ombudsman refrained from conducting the preliminary investigation of the petitioner for the reason
 that as the sitting President then, petitioner was immune from suit.  Technically, the said cases cannot
be considered as pending for the Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction to act on them.  Section 12 of RA No.
3019 cannot therefore be invoked by the petitioner for it contemplates of cases whose investigation or
prosecution do not suffer from any insuperable legal obstacle like the immunity from suit of a sitting
President.
Petitioner contends that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative investigation that, under
section 12 of RA 3019, bars him from resigning.  The Court holds otherwise. The impeachment
proceeding may be arguable. However, even if the impeachment proceeding is administrative, it cannot
be considered pending because the process had already broke down. There was also a withdrawal by
the prosecutors to partake in the impeachment case. In fact, the proceeding was postponed indefinitely.
In fact, there was no impeachment case pending when he resigned.

1. III. Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as President

This issue arose from the January 20 letter which was addressed to then Speaker Fuentebella and then
Senate President Pimentel. Petitioner’s contention is that he is a president on leave and that the
respondent is an acting president. This contention is the centerpiece of petitioner’s stance that he is
a President on leave and respondent Arroyo is only an Acting President.
An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order.  It provides:
“SEC. 11.  Whenever the President transmit to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House
of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall
be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the Senate and to
the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall immediately assume the powers
and duties of the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume the powers
and duties of his office.  Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit within
five days to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress
shall decide the issue.  For that purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-
eight hours, in accordance with its rules and without need of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in session within
twelve days after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting
separately, that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-
President shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the powers and duties
of his office."
After studying in-depth the series of events that happened after petitioner left Malacanang, it is very
clear that the inability of the petitioner as president is not temporary. The question is whether this
Court has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary inability of petitioner Estrada and
thereafter revise the decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing respondent Arroyo as President
of the Philippines. The Court says that they cannot, for such is an example of a political question, in
which the matter has solely been left to the legislative,

1. IV. Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit. If yes, what is the extent of the
immunity

Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the cases filed against him before the respondent
Ombudsman should be prohibited because he has not been convicted in the impeachment proceedings
against him; and second, he enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit, whether criminal or civil. The
“immunity” the petitioner points to is the principle of non-liability.
The principle of non-liability simply states that a chief executive may not be personally mulcted in civil
damages for the consequences of an act executed in the performance of his official duties. He is liable
 when he acts in a case so plainly outside of his power and authority that he cannot be said to have
exercise discretion in determining whether or not he had the right to act.  What is held here is that he
will be protected from personal liability for damages not only when he acts within his authority, but also
when he is without authority, provided he actually used discretion and judgment, that is, the judicial
faculty, in determining whether he had authority to act or not.  In other words, he is entitled to
protection in determining the question of his authority.  If he decide wrongly, he is still protected
provided the question of his authority was one over which two men, reasonably qualified for that
position, might honestly differ; but he is not protected if the lack of authority to act is so plain that two
such men could not honestly differ over its determination.
The Court rejects the petitioner’s argument that before he could be prosecuted, he should be first
convicted of impeachment proceedings. The impeachment proceeding was already aborted because of
the walking out of the prosecutors. This was then formalized by a Senate resolution (Resolution #83)
which declared the proceeding functus officio. According to the debates in the Constitutional
Convention, when an impeachment proceeding have become moot due to the resignation of the
President, proper civil and criminal cases may be filed against him.
We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting President. 
The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character.  They involve plunder, bribery and
graft and corruption.  By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which
carries the death penalty, be covered by the allege mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president.  
Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and
wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability.   It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is
an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and omissions. As for civil immunity, it means immunity
from civil damages only covers “official acts”.

1. V. Whether of not the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined to prejudicial

publicity

Petitioner contends that the respondent Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting an
investigation of the cases filed against him for he has already developed a bias against the petitioner. He
submits that it is a violation of due process. There are two (2) principal legal and philosophical schools of
thought on how to deal with the rain of unrestrained publicity during the investigation and trial of high
profile cases. The British approach the problem with the presumption that publicity will prejudice a
jury.  Thus, English courts readily stay and stop criminal trials when the right of an accused to fair trial
suffers a threat. The American approach is different.  US courts assume a skeptical approach about the
potential effect of pervasive publicity on the right of an accused to a fair trial. During cases like such, the
test of actual prejudice shall be applied. The test shows that there must be allegation and proof that the
judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. The
Court rules that there is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the preliminary
investigation of the petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman.  Petitioner needs to offer more than
hostile headlines to discharge his burden of proof.
According to the records, it was the petitioner who assailed the biasness of the Ombudsman. The
petitioner alleges that there were news reports which said that the Ombudsman had already prejudged
the cases against him. The Court rules that the evidence presented is insufficient. The Court also
cannot adopt the theory of derivative prejudice of petitioner, i.e., that the prejudice of respondent
Ombudsman flows to his subordinates. Investigating prosecutors should not be treated like unthinking
slot machines. Moreover, if the respondent Ombudsman resolves to file the cases against the petitioner
and the latter believes that the finding of probable cause against him is the result of bias, he still has the
remedy of assailing it before the proper court.