A.C. No.

9000, January 10, 2018

TOMAS P. TAN, JR., Complainant, v. ATTY. HAIDE V. GUMBA, Respondent.

Factual Antecedents

According to complainant, respondent obtained from him a P350,000.00 loan with 12% interest per
annum. Incidental thereto, respondent executed in favor of complainant an undated Deed of Absolute
Sale over a 105-square meter lot located in Naga City, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
2055 under the name of respondent's father, Nicasio Vista. Attached to said Deed was a Special Power
of Attorney (SPA) executed by respondent's parents authorizing her to apply for a loan with a bank to be
secured by the subject property. Complainant and respondent purportedly agreed that if the latter
failed to pay the loan in or before August 2000, complainant may register the Deed of Absolute Sale with
the Register of Deeds (RD).

Respondent failed to pay her loan when it fell due. And despite repeated demands, she failed to settle
her obligation. Complainant attempted to register the Deed of Absolute Sale with the RD of Naga City
but to no avail because the aforesaid SPA only covered the authority of respondent to mortgage the
property to a bank, and not to sell it.

Complainant argued that if not for respondent's misrepresentation, he would not have approved her
loan. He added that respondent committed dishonesty, and used her skill as a lawyer and her moral
ascendancy over him in securing the loan. Thus, he prayed that respondent be sanctioned for her
infraction.

In Commissioner's Report, faulted respondent for failing to file an answer, and participate in the
mandatory conference. He further declared that the SPA specifically authorized respondent to mortgage
the property with a bank. He stressed that for selling the property, and not just mortgaging it to
complainant, who was not even a bank, respondent acted beyond her authority. Having done so, she
committed gross violation of the Lawyer's Oath as well as Canon 1, Rule 1.01, and Canon 7 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. As such, he recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for one year.

In the Resolution, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines - Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) resolved to
adopt and approve the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner de la Rama.

Action of the Supreme Court

the Court issued a Resolution, which sustained the findings and conclusion of the IBP. The Court
nonetheless found the reduction of the penalty proper, pursuant to its sound judicial discretion and on
the facts of the case. Accordingly, it suspended respondent from the practice of law for six months,
effective immediately, with a warning that a repetition of same or similar act will be dealt with more
severely.

the Court resolved to serve anew the October 5, 2011 Resolution upon respondent because its
previous copy sent to her was returned unserved. In its August 13, 2012 Resolution, the Court
considered the October 5, 2011 Resolution to have been served upon respondent after the March 14,
2012 Resolution was also returned unserved. In the same resolution, the Court also denied with finality
respondent's motion for reconsideration on the October 5, 2011 Resolution.
Subsequently, (Judge Armea) of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Naga City, wrote a letter inquiring
from the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) whether respondent could continue representing her
clients and appear in courts. She also asked the OCA if the decision relating to respondent's
suspension, which was downloaded from the internet, constitutes sufficient notice to disqualify her to
appear in courts for the period of her suspension.

According to Judge Armea, her inquiry arose because respondent represented a party in a case pending
in her court; and, the counsel of the opposing party called Judge Armea's attention regarding the legal
standing of respondent to appear as counsel. Judge Armea added that respondent denied that she was
suspended to practice law since she (respondent) had not yet received a copy of the Court's resolution
on the matter.

In her Answer/Comment to the query of Judge Armea, respondent countered that by reason of such
downloaded decision, Judge Armea and (Judge Formaran III) of (RTC) of Naga City disallowed her
appearance in their courts. She insisted that service of any pleading or judgment cannot be made
through the internet. She further claimed that she had not received an authentic copy of the Court's
October 5, 2011 Resolution.

the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) referred the October 5, 2011 Resolution to the OCA for circulation
to all courts.In response, the OCA issued OCA Circular addressed to the courts, the Office of Chief State
Prosecutor (CSP), Public Attorney's Office (PAO), and the IBP informing them of the October 5, 2011 and
August 13, 2012 Resolutions of the Court.

IBP's Report and Recommendation

resolved to adopt and approve the Report and Recommendation of (Commissioner Cachapero) to
dismiss the complaint against respondent. According to Commissioner Cachapero, there is no rule
allowing the service of judgments through the internet; and Judge Armea and Judge Formaran III acted
ahead of time when they implemented the suspension of respondent even before the actual service
upon her of the resolution concerning her suspension.

Statement and Report of the OBC

OBC stressed that respondent received the August 13, 2012 Resolution (denying her motion for
reconsideration on the October 5, 2011 Resolution) per Registry Return Receipt No. 53365. Thus, the
effectivity of respondent's suspension was from November 12, 2012 until May 12, 2013. The OBC also
pointed out that suspension is not automatically lifted by mere lapse of the period of suspension. It is
necessary that an order be issued by the Court lifting the suspension to enable the concerned lawyer
to resume practice of law.

The OBC further maintained in its Report that respondent has no authority to practice law and appear
in court as counsel during her suspension, and until such time that the Court has lifted the order of her
suspension. Thus, the OBC made these recommendations:
1. Respondent be REQUIRED to file a sworn statement with motion to lift order of her suspension,
attaching therewith certifications from the Office of the Executive Judge of the court where she
practices[h]er profession and IBP Local Chapter of which she is affiliated, that she has ceased and
desisted from the practice of law from 12 November 2012 to 12 May 2013, immediately; and

2. The IBP be REQUIRED to EXPLAIN within 72 hours why they should not be sanctioned for disciplinary
action for issuing said Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-359, dated 21 March 2013, purportedly
dismissing this case for lack of merit.

the Court noted the OBC Report, and directed respondent to comply with the guidelines relating to the
lifting of the order of her suspension.

Upon the request of respondent, the OBC issued a Certification, which stated that respondent had been
ordered suspended from the practice of law for six months, and as of the issuance of said certification,
the order of her suspension had not yet been lifted.

Complaint against the OCA, the OBC and Atty. Paraiso

respondent filed with the RTC a verified Complaint for nullity of clearance, damages, and preliminary
injunction with urgent prayer for a temporary restraining order against the OCA, the OBC, and Atty.
Paraiso).

Essentially, respondent accused the OCA and the OBC of suspending her from the practice of law even
if the administrative case against her was still pending with the IBP. She likewise faulted the OBC for
requiring her to submit a clearance from its office before she resumes her practice of law after the
suspension. In turn, she argued that Atty. Paraiso benefited from this supposed "bogus suspension" by
publicly announcing the disqualification of respondent to practice law.

In its Answer, the OCA argued that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action, which seeks reversal,
modification or enjoinment of a directive of the Court. The OCA also stressed that respondent should
raise such matter by filing a motion for reconsideration in the administrative case, instead of filing a
complaint with the RTC. It also stated that the issuance of OCA Circular No. 14-2013 was in compliance
with the Court's directive to inform all courts, the CSP, the PAO, and the IBP of the suspension of
respondent.

For its part, the OBC declared in a Report that during and after the period of her suspension, without the
same having been lifted, respondent filed pleadings and appeared in courts in the following cases:

The OBC likewise confirmed that as of the time it issued the March 24, 2015 Report, the Court had not
yet lifted the order of suspension against respondent. The OBC opined that for failing to comply with the
order of her suspension, respondent deliberately refused to obey a lawful order of the Court. Thus, it
recommended that a stiffer penalty be imposed against respondent.

the OBC reported that the RTC dismissed Civil Case for lack of jurisdiction, and pending resolution was
respondent's motion for reconsideration.
Issue

Is respondent administratively liable for engaging in the practice of law during the period of her
suspension and prior to an order of the Court lifting such suspension?

Our Ruling yes

Time and again, the Court reminds the bench and bar "that the practice of law is not a right but a mere
privilege [subject] to the inherent regulatory power of the [Court], It is a "privilege burdened with
conditions. As such, lawyers must comply with its rigid standards, which include mental fitness,
maintenance of highest level of morality, and full compliance with the rules of the legal profession.

With regard to suspension to practice law, the Court laid down the guidelines for the lifting of an order
of suspension, to wit:

1) After a finding that respondent lawyer must be suspended from the practice of law, the Court shall
render a decision imposing the penalty;

2) Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is immediately executory upon receipt thereof,
respondent has 15 days within which to file a motion for reconsideration thereof. The denial of said
motion shall render the decision final and executory;

3) Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, respondent shall file a Sworn Statement with the
Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, stating therein that he or she has desisted from the
practice of law and has not appeared in any court during the period of his or her suspension;

4) Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local Chapter of the IBP and to the
Executive Judge of the courts where respondent has pending cases handled by him or her, and/or
where he or she has appeared as counsel;

5) The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of respondent's compliance with the order of
suspension;

6) Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the lawyer under oath shall be a ground
for the imposition of a more severe punishment, or disbarment, as may be warranted.

Pursuant to these guidelines, in this case, the Court issued a Resolution dated October 5, 2011
suspending respondent from the practice of law for six months effective immediately. Respondent filed
her motion for reconsideration. And, on November 12, 2012, she received the notice of the denial of
such motion per Registry Return Receipt No. 53365.

While, indeed, service of a judgment or resolution must be done only personally or by registered mail,
and that mere showing of a downloaded copy of the October 5, 2011 Resolution to respondent is not a
valid service, the fact however, that respondent was duly informed of her suspension remains
unrebutted. she filed a motion for reconsideration on the October 5, 2011 Resolution, and the Court
duly notified her of the denial of said motion. It thus follows that respondent's six months suspension
commenced from the notice of the denial of her motion for reconsideration on November 12, 2012 until
May 12, 2013.
in this case, the Court notified respondent of her suspension. However, she continued to engage in the
practice law by filing pleadings and appearing as counsel in courts during the period of her
suspension.

It is common sense that when the Court orders the suspension of a lawyer from the practice of law,
the lawyer must desist from performing all functions which require the application of legal knowledge
within the period of his or her suspension. To stress, by practice of law, we refer to "any activity, in or
out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training, and
experience. It includes performing acts which are characteristic of the legal profession, or rendering any
kind of service which requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.” In fine, it will amount to
unauthorized practice, and a violation of a lawful order of the Court if a suspended lawyer engages in
the practice of law during the pendency of his or her suspension.

As also stressed by the OBC in its March 24, 2015 Report, during and even after the period of her
suspension and without filing a sworn statement for the lifting of her suspension, respondent signed
pleadings and appeared in courts as counsel. Clearly, such acts of respondent are in violation of the
order of her suspension to practice law.

Moreover, the lifting of a suspension order is not automatic. It is necessary that there is an order from
the Court lifting the suspension of a lawyer to practice law. a suspended lawyer shall, upon the
expiration of one’s suspension, file a sworn statement with the Court, and that such statement shall
be considered proof of the lawyer’s compliance with the order of suspension.

In this case, the Court directed respondent to comply with the guidelines for the lifting of the
suspension order against her by filing a sworn statement on the matter. However, respondent did not
comply. Instead, she filed a complaint (Civil Case No. 2015-0007) against the OCA, the OBC and a
certain Atty. Paraiso with the RTC. For having done so, respondent violated a lawful order of the
Court, that is, to comply with the guidelines for the lifting of the order of suspension against her.

To recapitulate, respondent's violation of the lawful order of the Court is two-fold:

1) she filed pleadings and appeared in court as counsel during the period of her suspension, and prior to
the lifting of such order of her suspension; and

2) she did not comply with the Court's directive for her to file a sworn statement in compliance with the
guidelines for the lifting of the suspension order.

Under Section 27,Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
from practice of law for willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, among other
grounds. Here, respondent willfully disobeyed the Court's lawful orders by failing to comply with the
order of her suspension, and to the Court's directive to observe the guidelines for the lifting thereof.
Pursuant to prevailing Jurisprudence, the suspension for six (6) months from the practice of law against
respondent is in order.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Haide V. Gumba is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for an additional
period of six (6) months (from her original six (6) months suspension) and WARNED that a repetition of
the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
Atty. Haide V. Gumba is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of her receipt of this Decision, to
determine the reckoning point when her suspension shall take effect.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines for their information and guidance. The Office of the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to
append a copy of this Decision to the record of respondent as member of the Bar.

SO ORDERED.