a of the

Volume 0 : The Atlas Precursors

1
a of the

Volume 0 : Atlas Precursors

 First Privately Published Edition : June 2012 (v.8) | This Edition : Version # 14 (February 2015)

Copyright © David Howard 2015

David Howard claims copyright to the compilation of this document on the basis of using source material derived from records within the public domain being works of the US
Federal Government under the terms of 17 USC §105 and, as such, free of any copyright restrictions. Photos, drawings and other images contained in this document are not
copyrighted by David Howard as they are all assumed to be in one of the following categories: (1) Public Domain images - applicable to governemt released material; (2) Free
for non-commercial use - applicable to corporate 'press release' material, or (3) Not associated with any specific copyright statement or image owner details or assumed to fall
under (1) or (2). Any errors in this regard should be notified to the author who will make appropriate correction to any subsequent edition of this work.

The author may be contacted by e-mail at launch.vehicles (at) gmail.com

The Atlas Photo-History Series

Volume 0 - Atlas Precursors

Volume 1 - Atlas A Series

Volume 2 - Atlas B & C Series

Volume 3 - Atlas D Series

Volume 4 - Atlas E & F Series

Volume 5 - Atlas Space Launch Vehicles

The development of military (and eventually civilian) launch vehicles originated in Germany and, after World War 2, continued in Russia and America.
The American and Russian nuclear weapons programmes all evolved where the leading edges of science, engineering and management intersected.
The names V2, Manhatten, R7, Sputnik, Atlas, Titan, Polaris and Minuteman all serve as benchmarks along the ICBM (intercontinental ballistic
missile) pathway while, thankfully, making real the concept of nuclear deterrence. As a result of these programmes the free world prevailed,
throughout the cold war, over the threats of the World’s mightiest totalitarian regimes. Meanwhile peaceful, and inspiring, rocket-born adventures
allowed men and women to orbit the Earth (and everyone else to view their planet from space); a handful of men to land on the Moon and incredible
variety of truly miraculous machines to explore the distant reaches of the solar system.

The various stages of these myriad rocket-propelled journeys have been well illustrated over the decades, initially by the US government and more
recently by agencies in the east following the break-up of the Soviet Union. Notably, many images released to public view have attracted a global
audience - such as those of the Earth rising above the surface of the Moon captured by the Apollo 8 astronauts in December 1968. Other images,
rich in flame and steam, have more simply recorded the excitements - and disappointments - of aerospace engineering that carry strong echoes
of those long-gone railway workhorses of the steam age a century or more earlier.

The ways in which documentary collections can be used to tell such stories of technological daring-do will vary from one person to the next. In the
case of the author the result of such collecting over the past half-century now manifests itself in the preparation of a series of photo-histories of the
individual launch vehicles. However without the faithful support of a band of others with similar interests such a compilation as this would neither
be possible or as comprehensive as this,

Acknowledgement is accordingly made to the happy band of enthusiasts and collectors known to the author over the past decades. In chronological
order thanks are offered to Terry Franklin, Bill Dunn, Miles Henslow, Bill Gunston, Kenneth Gatland, Tim Furniss, Joel Powell, Gary Baker, Peter
Hunter, Edward Hujsak, Art Lebrun, Michael Nagel, Andrey Lys, Bill Beggs and Leroy Gross. Each has, over the years, made available valuable
items of both archival material and well-informed technical and historical opinion. Others, less well known, from distant government agencies and
industrial giants have, over the years, also generously responded to countless requests for information. Likewise, acknowledgement also must go
to the many unknown people whose efforts have made the web so fertile a territory for researchers by their efforts in broadcasting historical
information without selfish concern.
Finally specific recognition is owed to the US Department of Defense; the US Air Force; Convair | Astronautics (later General Dynamics |
Astronautics); North American Aviation’s Rocketdyne Division and the many associated sub-contractors, all of whom have been generous with the
provision of publicity and technical documentation. Notably, the flight history data sheets reproduced in this volume have been taken from General
Dynamics/Astronautics Report EM-1860, ‘Atlas Program Flight History’, dated 18 July 1963, and made publicly available to the author following its
30-year declassification.
David Howard / February 2015

5
 This compilation is dedicated to the memory of

Born February 9, 1904 in Antwerp – Died August 3, 1975 in San Diego, California
Origins 8 - 16

MX-774 17 - 27

MX-1593 28 - 38

X-11 39

X-12 41

Convair Model 7 Staging Options 43

Convair Atlas XSM-65A 44 - 47

Atlas Precursors compared with R-7 48

Point Loma Test Site 49 - 51

Large Scale Rocket Engine Development 52 - 54

Atlas Precursor & Rival : Navaho 55

Atlas Precursor Programme Chronology : 1944 - 1957 56 - 64

Biographies of the Three Key Atlas Players 65 - 67

THE ATLAS PROGRAM EVOLVED FROM GERMANY’S A4 (LATER V2) ROCKET AS DEVELOPED AT PEENEMUNDE. TEST STAND 7 WAS THE FOCAL
POINT OF EARLY FLIGHT TRIALS. IT WAS FIRST PHOTOGRAPHED BY THE RAF ON 23 JUNE 1943. THIS IMAGE REVEALS THREE
TEST ROCKETS UNDER CANVAS (AT ‘B’ AND ‘C’, ABOVE LEFT). ‘A’8 INDICATES THE BUILDING WHERE THE FIRST A4s WERE BUILT.
 The Second World War unleashed a host of new and revolutionary
weapons of war - both defensive and offensive. There was the early
introduction by the RAF of the new defensive weapon, popularly to become
known as radar, which enabled early warning of the arrival of attacking
aircraft. Deployed as part of a unique command and control system it
enabled Spitfire and Hurricane pilots to master victory over their Luftwaffe
adversaries in the Battle of Britain, thus preventing Hitler from securing a
safe passage for his intended ‘Operation Sealion’ invasion fleet in
mid-1940. There was also the invention of the proximity fuse, initially by
Britain’s Pye Radio Company in 1940, and then in 1941 with significant
further development in America. This fuse firstly transformed the
effectiveness of anti-aircraft fire and from early 1943 US Navy ships in the
Pacific were able to turn the tide against Japan’s bomber and Kamikaze
pilots. In mid-1944, with the start of the V1 flying bombs offensive on
London, and then Antwerp, the proximity fuse proved to be inordinately
successful and led to the ending of the offensive. With success in the air
the fuse was then deployed in artillery shells and played a vital role in
granting the Allies victory in the final German offensive of the war - the
Battle of the Bulge.

It was however in the field of strategic offensive weaponry that the most
spectacular advances took place with the development, and full-scale
operational deployment, of both cruise and long range ballistic missiles by
Germany and the atomic bomb by the United States. As the War ended
it was clear to many military leaders that a combination of the proven
principles underpinning Germany’s V1 and V2 weapons and America’s
‘Little Boy’ and ‘Fat Man’ atomic weapons would transform the strategic
balance between East and West as the Iron Curtain descended and the
Cold War started. It is against this backdrop that the story of the Atlas ICBM
begins - slowly and uncertainly as political, military and technical events
unfolded in an often incoherent pattern of decisions and reversals as
committee after committee deliberated how best to progress events so
that the United States could ensure that it would secure strategic global
V1 cruise missile; V2 ballistic missile; Fat Man, left; Little Boy right. mastery in the event of a Third World War.

9
THE THIRD OF MORE THAT 60 RECONDITIONED GERMAN V-2S IS LAUNCHED ON 10 MAY 1946 ON A FLIGHT TO 70 MILES ALTITUDE FROM THE
WHITE SANDS PROVING GROUND IN NEW MEXICO. LESS THAN A YEAR EARLIER THE FIRST EVER NUCLEAR DEVICE, NAMED ‘TRINITY’, WAS
EXPLODED SOME 70 MILES TO THE NORTH IN THE JORNADO DEL MUERTO DESERT. THE DEADLY PROMISE OFFERED BY THE COMBINATION
OF THESE TWO WORLD WAR 2 TECHNOLOGIES PROVIDED THE IMPETUS FOR AMERICA AND RUSSIA TO COMMIT TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF

10
 The Nazi war machine had introduced into operational service two new means by which almost
a ton of high explosive could be delivered to enemy targets some 200 miles distant. Neither was
manned and both were relatively inexpensive to produce in quantity - ignoring the initial research
and development costs. Both were terrifying to the civilian populations below the uncertain flight
path. The V1 buzz bomb and the V2 rocket were extensions of established military practice. The
V1 essentially emulated the airborne bomber while the V2 was seen by many as an extension
of land based artillery. The Luftwaffe had led the development of the V1 while the German Army
had led the development of the V2. At war’s end and faced with the termination of lucrative mass
production contracts for aircraft America’s aircraft industry had to move swiftly to stay in business.
Likewise entrenched high ranking interests in the US Army Land and Air Forces were perceptive
enough to see a new peacetime theatre of operations where ownership of proposed unmanned
long range missiles (be they airborne or ballistic in character) was the order of battle.

In December 1945 Theodore von Karmen’s report on the key approaches to military supremacy,
‘Towards New Horizons’ was published. After a review of German and Japanese technical
Following discussions with von Kármán, General advances he advised on the urgent need to master multi-disciplinary research and development
'Hap' Arnold established Project RAND ‘to techniques, as demonstrated in particular at Peenemunde, before attempting to solve the
connect military planning with research and problems associated with developing a ballistic missile. In February the US State Department
development decisions’ and asked him to develop became aware of the Kremlin’s growing post-war ‘neurotic view of world affairs’ which was
linked to Russia’s ‘traditional and intuitive sense of insecurity.’ George F Keenman of the Moscow
a blueprint for future Air Force research. Von
Embassy opined that the Kremlin represented ‘a political force committed frantically to the belief
Kármán formed the Army Air Forces Scientific
that with the US there can be no permanent modus vivendi; that it is desirable and necessary
Advisory Group and, following missions to that the internal harmony of US society be disrupted, its way of life be destroyed and the
German research centres, concluded that the international authority of America be broken if Soviet power is to be secure.’ By December the
technology existed to build long range missiles. US Embassy was warning Washington that ‘The USSR is out to get the atomic bomb. This has
His reports, “Toward New Horizons,” and been officially stated. The meagre evidence available indicates that great efforts are being made
“Science: The Key to Air Supremacy”, provided and that super-priority will be given to the enterprise.’
the major impetus for basic scientific research in
the USAF. In 1953 von Kármán led a nuclear Against this backdrop of the Iron Curtain the two opposing military/industrial machines laboured
weapons panel and reported that hydrogen to the same end - nuclear superiority by any means. In Russia the chosen direction was driven
bombs could be used in missile warheads leading by a belief in the V2 ‘ballistic missile’ driven approach whereas in America the manned bomber
to the successful deployment of operational enthusiasts were convinced - with some apparently good technical reasoning at the time - that
intercontinental ballistic missile in the early 1960s. the V1 ‘cruise missile’ approach was the best approach.

11
German rocketry and guided missile developments attracted the early interest of the American military during mid-1942 with the planning of RAF
bomber raids on the Peenemunde Research Establishment and then, more particularly, with the the opening of the Luftwaffe’s V1 (London, 13
June 1944) and the Army’s V2 (Paris, 8 September 1944) campaigns. Both the US Army Land Forces and Army Air Forces were attracted to an
early involvement in the development of unmanned bombing systems, each mainly wanting to secure a pre-eminent role in any subsequent
operational deployments. The record shows immense competition between the two military camps in Washington DC as each tried to assume a
lead responsibility. That is, until the distraction of the Korean War in June 1950.

Sharper focus on the issue of ‘missile ownership’ emerged in September 1947 when the US Army Air Force (USAAF) was disbanded and replaced
by the US Air Force (USAF), now to become a separate military force in its own right. While firmly attached to the concept of the manned strategic
bomber the new Air Force also saw itself as the natural home for any long range unmanned missiles - be they cruise or ballistic missiles.

It was the Experimental Engineering Section of the USAAF’s Materiel Division that initiated the first studies into rockets and missiles in the early
1940s under its MX Project series. The first ‘missile’ related project was MX-543, initiated in late 1943, to explore a copycat design for Germany’s
nascent V1. Influenced by the early findings of the Chief of Staff’s Combined Intelligence Objective Sub-Committee (CIOS) in late 1944 thinking
was moving towards the need to address rocket propulsion more seriously than hitherto. Robert Goddard’s pioneering work in the field of liquid
propellant rocketry during the mid-1930s - which strongly influenced the designs of the early German pioneers led by Werhner von Braun - was
generally overlooked by the American military. However by the end of 1944 there were 197 field agents in Europe searching for documentation
and materials related to advanced aircraft and rocketry projects. In 1945 the CIOS handed its responsibilities over to the Joint Intelligence Objectives
Agency (JIOA) which was responsible for Operation Paperclip and its task of ‘recruiting’ Germany’s rocket engineers for ‘service’ in the US.

By as early as October the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army wrote to the Commanding General of the USAAF that it was essential that research
and prototype development of a long range rocket design be started. He proposed that ballistic missiles would be within the domain of the Army
Ground Forces while the Army Air Forces would be responsible for air dropped and aerodynamic-lift missiles. By May 1945 the CIOS field teams
had located and taken ownership of the bulk of available records related to Germany’s aircraft and missile projects. In August the US learns that
Russia has instigated an active programme of development to use captured German engineers and scientists from Peenemunde (who decided not
to flee to the west) to use the V2 designs as a starting point for the design of a 3,000 mile range ballistic missile. At the end of October the USAAF’s
Air Technical Service Command invites proposals from 17 companies for a 10-year R&D programme leading to ground-to-ground pilotless aircraft
varying in range from the tactical battlefield (of 20 miles) to the intercontinental strategic (of 5,000 miles). By March 1946 North American Aviation
was awarded the first long range missile study under Project MX-770 to be followed weeks later by MX-771 to Martin; MX-772 to Curtiss-Wright;
MX-773 to Republic; MX-774 to Consolidated Vultee, and MX-775 to Northrop, all being for unmanned missile systems - either following a cruise
or ballistic trajectory to their distant target.

The stage was now set for a period of inter-service rivalry and in-fighting as vested interests jockied for positions of influence in the early stages
of what was viewed as a war for control of some very valuable turf between the proponents of mannned and unmanned bombers.
12
 Operation Paperclip (previously Operation Overcast) located the
leading engineers near Ober between May and August 1945.
Above left: Werhner von Braun surrenders in Oberjoch following
a car accident. Below: over 100 of the leading engineers and
scientists mustered at Fort Bliss, TX upon arrival in the US in late
1945. Above right: captured V2 missiles are prepared for
shipment from Antwerp to the US. In all 300 rail- cars were
necessary to transport the captured missiles and parts.

13
 NATIV (North American Test Instrument
Vehicle) rockets were the first fruits of
MX-770 being designed to investigate flight
dynamics and instrumentation systems.
Seven vehicles were built but only four were
launched, all from a special tower at
Holloman AFB, NM. The first launch was
made on 26 May 1948 reaching an altitude
of some 15 miles and a range of about 90
miles. The final flight test was made on 7
November the same year.

Using data gained from the NATIV series

NAA engineers developed their NA-704
design for an early version of what was
to become the Navaho long range
missile under early studies within Project
MX770. Three copies of the earliest
design ( the XSSM-A-2) were built but
none was flown

14
 America’s initial military interest in rocketry, resulting from the reality of V2
missiles raining down on London and Antwerp in 1945, enthusiasm for research
and development in this new field of aerial bombardment was, to say the
least, tepid. On 10 October 1947 a staff level Directorate of R&D was
established but its focus may best be judged by reference to the fact that it
included a Uniform Clothing Branch tasked with the development of a
distinctive uniform for the newly formed USAF. Funds for weapons’ R&D were
Joe-1 in short supply, not least because of a prevailing view that the cost of R&D
would have to be at the expense of operational budgets, not a prospect eagerly
endorsed by flying airmen. A review of the situation resulted in the Ridenour
Report which did little to effectively advance the R&D case other than to
highlight the importance of promotional equality for technical as well as
operational staff - something the Air Force top brass found hard to accept.
The Report did result in General Curtiss LeMay, of manned bomber fame,
Joe-1 bore striking similarities to America’s Fat Man. It was being made head of the previously created Directorate for R&D. However,
detonated at Semipalatinsk and produced a yield of 22 kT. within a year this post vanished and eventually another committee was
charged with reporting on the whole area of USAF R&D.

In November 1949 the Anderson Report endorsed the Ridenour Report and
went further to suggest that if the USAF did not embrace the R&D imperative
then maybe the Army or the Navy would. While this ploy focused attention
more than before it was Moscow that provided the final impetus to get R&D
off the tarmac in the USAF. On 3 September a radioactive cloud was detected
over the North Pacific and then later over British Isles. Analysis of the cloud
revealed that Russia had tested its first atomic bomb (the RDS-1 device, code
named Joe-1 by the US) in late August. The Generals started to focus. By
January 1950 USAF HQ had established the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff,
Development with responsibility for all R&D within a new Air R&D Command.
Conflict between this new Command and the older Air Materiel Command
dogged progress in 1950 but was eventually resolved by May 1951 when the
Pentagon decreed that all Air Force R&D would be assigned to the Air Materiel
Command at Wright-Patterson AFB.

15
 “There has been a great deal said about a 3000 miles high angle rocket. In my opinion
such a thing is impossible for many years. The people who have been writing these
things that annoy me have been talking about a 3000 mile high-angle rocket shot from
one continent to another, carrying an atomic bomb and so directed as to be a precise
weapon which would land exactly on a certain target, such as a city. I say, technically,
I don't think anyone in the world knows how to do such a thing, and I feel confident
that it will not be done for a very long period of time to come... I think we can leave
that out of our thinking. I wish the American public would leave that out of their think-
ing.”

Dr Vannevar Bush, Director of OSRD testifying to the special Senate Committee on

Atomic Energy (3 December 1945)

This view was also recorded in his 1949 book

“It is rather clear that Dr. Vannevar Bush was wrong when he wrote in his recent book
that long-range intercontinental guided missiles would be prohibitively expensive. It is
true that the finished guided missile of great accuracy and an almost human brain is
still in the future, and long-range missiles of supersonic speeds offer major problems.
But it is clear that those problems are being licked. Russia's progress in the guided
missiles field is an unknown quantity in this country, but it seems probable that she is
ahead of us in the development of missiles-particularly rockets for ground-to-ground
(field artillery) use-and she has continued with German assistance work on longer-
range missiles like the V-I and V-2. . . Some observers feel that the long-range guided
missile - capable of at least bursts of supersonic speeds and of transoceanic range -
has been developed already to a point where it is possible to say that the missile of
tomorrow can deliver a ton of explosive on an area traget in another continent far
cheaper than can a piloted plane.”

Hanson Baldwin, military analyst for The New York Times (7 May 1950)

16
 In 1945 the US Army Air Force let a contract to Consolidated Vultee (later Convair) for a
paper study of long range, surface-to-surface missiles under Project MX-774. The project
identified three design approaches (A, B and C) that could meet the objective. One was
based on aero-engine technology and the other two used rocket propulsion. Design A,
nicknamed the ‘Tee-totaler’ because it did not use alcohol) examined the use of
air-breathing cruise missiles with echoes of Germany’s V1. This resulted in two separately
funded cruise missile studies - Project MX-771 (later the Matador) and Project MX-775
(later the Snark).

Designs B and C were to be rocket powered designs. Design B, named HIROC

(HIgh-altitude ROCket) by the USAAF (nick-named ‘Old Fashioned’ after the V2 by
Convair) was inspired by the V2 missile and to serve as a concept evaluation test vehicle.
Design C, nicknamed ‘Manhattan’ after the program that gave birth to its intended
payload, the atomic bomb, would evolve based on the results of the HIROC test program.
In due course MX-774C evolved into Project MX-1593.

Consolidated-Vultee was awarded the MX-774 contract on 22 April 1946 with a

supplemental award being issued in June. By August paper studies had led to the first
‘cutting of metal’ for the first HIROC followed by the decision, on 19 April 1947, by the
USAAF to award a follow-on contract to Convair to build 10 HIROC test vehicles, the first
to be completed by June. Within months, however, the tide turned with shifts in attitudes
to the ongoing ‘manned versus unmanned bombers’ debate as well as budget cuts. The
USAAF decided to cancel the HIROC project on 1 July 1947, but agreed that unused funds
could be combined with Convair money to complete and fly three HIROCs. These tests
were made from White Sands Proving Ground, NM between July and December, 1948.
The historical record shows that in April 1947 the
MX-774 Design C (‘Manhattan’) configuration (left) was While none of the flights was rated successful they did demonstrate key capabilities, such
a 70ft long, 10ft diameter, eight-engined, two stage as thrust vectoring in flight while maintaining structural integrity and releasing the
vehicle with the first stage encasing the central main nosecone on command. It would take the detonation of Russia’s first atomic bomb before
stage. The far smaller Hiroc (right) was designed as a Convair engineers under the visionary designer Charlie Bossart would return in earnest,
proof of concept Program test vehicle. via Project MX-1593, to the design of what was to lead to America’s first ICBM - the Atlas.

17
 Overall Length 70 ft

Diameter 10 ft Fin-span 22 ft

Payload 5,000 lb

Guidance Thrust Vector Control

Range 4,340 nm

Booster cut-off 87 nm

Max altitude 695 nm

BOOST STAGE DETAILS MAIN STAGE DETAILS

Weight dry 19,000 lb Weight dry 10,600lb

Loaded 114,000 lb Loaded 36,000lb

Propulsion 4 engines Propulsion 4 engines

Fuel Alcohol / LOX Fuel Alcohol / LOX

Thrust / engine 60k lbf x 75 s Thrust / engine 10k lbf x 150 s

Cut-off vel 6,080 mph Cut-off vel 13,020 mph

THE MANHATTEN DESIGN ENVISAGED A CLAMSHELL STAGING

ARRANGEMENT. FROM LAUNCH ALL EIGHT ENGINES WOULD
DRAW FUEL FROM THE CLAMSHELL TANKS. AFTER SEPARATION
THE CENTRAL MAIN STAGE FUELS THE FOUR REMAINING
ENGINES TO BURN-OUT AND WARHEAD RELEASE.

18
The XLR35-RM-1 liquid
propellant rocket engine
that powered the MX-774
test missile produced
8,000 pounds of thrust
from four gimballed
combustion chambers that
could provided vectored Designated RTV-A-2 by the USAF the Hiroc test vehicle entered static testing in San Diego in
thrust by the swivelling of early 1947 before a brief three-flight test programme. It was the first missile to be guided by
the four chambers in the use of gimballed engines in place of thrust vanes in the exhaust stream to guide itself. Its
various combinations. The length was 31 ft. 7 in. (9.63 m) - the third and final flight model was slightly longer; it had a
propellants were liquid diameter of 30 in. (76 cm) and a finspan of 6ft 10 in (2.08 m). Empty it weighted 1,205 pounds
oxygen and alcohol. whilst ready for launch it weighed 4100 lb (1800 kg).

19
 The inspiration for the HIROC test vehicle came from Karel Bossart.
It was his belief in the need to break the mould of the heavier
aircraft-quality airframe construction, used by the V-2, which
contributed much to the success of the Atlas design. The weight-
saving advantages of a balloon-tank aero-shell airframe combined
with the reliability benefits of all engines firing at launch and the use
of a separable warhead all contributed to a lighter and more powerful
missile than at first envisaged. Above: one of three HIROC test
vehicles is seen being prepared for launch from White Sands Proving
Ground’s Launch Complex 33 in 1948. Left: the general arrangement
of the HIROC systems including the four-barrelled rocket engine.

20
ONCE AUTHORISED TO BUILD TEN HIROC TEST VEHICLES CONVAIR SELECTED REACTION MOTORS INC. TO PROVIDE A
FOUR-BARRELLED, 8,000 LBF THRUST ROCKET ENGINE WITH FULLY GIMBALLED CHAMBERS. IT WAS DEVELOPED FROM THE
HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL XLR-11 POWERPLANT BEING USED IN THE BELL X-1 ROCKET PLANE THAT WAS DESTINED TO BREAK THE
SOUND BARRIER FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THE FOLLOWING OCTOBER. THE HIROC MOTOR WAS UPRATED FROM 6,000 TO 8,000 LBF
THRUST. LEFT: BASIC XLR-11 ARRANGEMENT WITHOUT THRUST VECTOR CONTROLS; RIGHT: HIROC ENGINE BAY.

21
FINAL ASSMBLY OF A HIROC TEST VEHICLE

22
STATIC TESTING OF HIROC VEHICLES CARRIED OUT AT CONVAIR’S POINT LOMA TEST SITE. THE FIRST
STATIC TEST FIRING WAS MADE ON 17 NOVEMBER 1947.

23
The USAF contracted Convair to build 10 test vehicles but when the contract was cancelled Convair was advanced in the
construction of the first three test vehicles and accordingly the Air Force allowed remaining funds to be used together
with additional company funds to fly the three vehicles.

#1 - 13 July 1948
Thrust was lost at 12.6 seconds after a copy-book launch. The vehicle reached a height of 6,200 ft before
impact at 48.2 seconds just 415 ft from the launch pad. The payload recovery parachute however failed to
open due to human error during its stowage before launch. The flight was rated a partial success. A
camera and some instrumentation in the payload survived impact.

#2 - 27 September 1948
After launch the vehicle exhibited roll-oscillations of up to 10 degrees which induced drag and, despite the
guidance system working well, led to a loss of thrust and cut-off at 48 seconds at an altitude of 54,000 ft.
and a velocity of 2,350 ft per second. The vehicle coasted to a maximum altitude of some 24 miles. A
battery failure prevented the parachute from being released. During its free-fall the oxygen tank exploded
and the vehicle broke-up at some 20,000 ft and a velocity of 1,900 ft per second. A camera and some
instrument data was recovered after impact.

#3 - 2 December 1948
The final test flight was more successful than its predecessors. Its motor fired for only 51.6 of the
intended 70 seconds due to a premature closure of the main LOX valve. The vehicle reached a velocity of
2,653 ft per second. It then coasted to an altitude of 30 miles. However the nose cone separation charge
fouled the parachute as it was being ejected at from the main body at 121,000 feet while travelling at a
1,500 ft per second leading to its destruction. Following impact the on-board camera that had
photographed some instrument readings in flight was recovered partly damaged.

24
AFTER SYSTMS TESTING AT POINT LOMA HIROC TEST VEHICLES WERE TRANSPORTED TO WHITE SANDS PROVING
GROUND, NM WHERE THEY WERE ERECTED ON THE SAME LAUNCH COMPLEX 33 AS THE V-2 HERMES PROGRAM.

25
26
27
100 FT
30.5 M Following the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 the USAF on 23 January 1951
commissioned Convair under Project MX-1593 to re-open its Project MX-774 study of
Long Range Ballistic Missile concepts. Known formally within Convair as Model 7 the
missile was soon named ‘Project Atlas’ by its lead designer, Karel J Bossart (both
‘Boxcar’ and ‘Hot Rod’ having been rejected). In August 1951 the same name was
adopted by the USAF for the missile, now designated an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
(ICBM).

Phase 1 of the study evaluated the relative advantages of a ballistic missile versus a
glide missile for delivering an 8,000 lb atomic weapons payload over a distance of
5,000 nm with a circular error probable of 1,500 ft. Phase 2 was concerned with more
detailed evaluations of each type of missile. Convair presented its first design proposal
for an ICBM to the USAF in early 1953. It was large: 12 ft. in diameter, 110 ft. long
and powered by 4 peripheral booster motors, one central sustainer and two verniers.
During late 1954 and January 1955 Convair short-listed three specific approaches to
ICBM staging; namely, One-and-a-Half Staging; Parallel Staging and Tandem Staging.

By May 1953, after design refinements that took account of predicted advances in
smaller warhead designs, the USAF issued Convair with contracts to progress the
development of the envisaged strategic missile based on the One-and-a-Half staging
concept. Two test vehicles were identified by the USAF for development. The first,
designated the X-11, was to be developed around a single sustainer engine while the
second, the X-12, would include in addition four booster engines around the central
sustainer.

As the Atlas program progressed and vehicle size reduced in proportion to the latest
warhead weight estimates the X-11 morphed into the Atlas Series A test vehicle (which
would test twin booster motors without a central sustainer) and the X-12 morphed into
the Series B Atlas which had the added, central, sustainer engine. In January 1955 the
USAF was satisfied that the Atlas concept was a realistic proposition and accordingly
MX-774 MX-1593 MX-1593 it formally established a new Weapon System program, designated WS-107A-1, and
HIROC X-11 X-12 contracted with Convair to progress hardware development for the Atlas ICBM.

28
THE MUSHROOM CLOUD FORMED BY THE ‘IVY MIKE’ TEST OF AN EXPERIMENTAL THERMONUCLEAR DEVICE RISES ABOVE ENEWETAK ATOLL,
NOVEMBER 1, 1952. THE "MIKE" DEVICE HAD A YIELD OF 10.4 MEGATONS AND PROVED THE FEASIBILITY OF THE H-BOMB.

29
 Design began 19 January 1951 with first test flight scheduled for
December 1955 and first prototype launch for January 1958 and first
production article completed by 1961.

Length : 110 ft
Diameter : 12.5 ft
Empty Mass : 31,100 lb
Payload Mass : 3,000 lb for Range : 5,500 nm
(Payload Mass : 4,500 lb for Range : 4,250 nm)
(Payload Mass : 7,000 lb for Range : 2,000 nm)
Gross Mass : 440,100 1b
Launch Thrust : 656,100 lbf Burn Time : 300 sec
Accuracy : Circular Error Probable of 3,000 ft @ 5,500 nm

30
31
 In late 1953 the MX-1593 concept was
taking firmer shape (compare this
image with the one on the previous
page) but still required five engines.
However by mid-1954 projected
reductions in warhead weight had
resulted in a somewhat smaller design
envelope for the missile. Engineers
envisaged the use of two type of flight
test vehicles, subsequently funded by
the USAF as the X-11 and X-12. The
X-11 (lower left) was to test airframe
design and employ a single sustainer
rocket motor while the X-12 (below)
test vehicles would test the jettisoning
of twin booster engine, reduced from
the original four engines needed for
the original design.

32
33
34
 (As at December 1953)

Design work began on 19 January 1951 with

the first test flight scheduled for December
1956, the first prototype launch set for
January 1960 and the first production
article to be completed by 1962.

35
36
THE ‘CASTLE BRAVO’ NUCLEAR EXPLOSION OF 15 MT ON 1 MARCH, 1954, AT BIKINI ATOLL SO OUT-PERFORMED THE PLANNED LEVEL
OF 4-6 MT THAT IT CLEARED THE WAY FOR SMALLER NUCLEAR WARHEADS FOR THE ATLAS INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE.

37
On August 10, 1954 Convair management presented to General Schriever its plan
for the acceleration of the Atlas programme - ‘Atlas Plan VII’ - following the outcome
of the 1953 review of the intercontinental ballistic missile effort by the Teapot
Committee and a new series of ground rules (left) set out by Gen Shriever’s technical
team from the newly created Western Development Division (WDD) at a meeting
with Convair on 2 July.

Convair’s original undertaking was to deliver a missile capable of sending a 3,000lb

payload of 0.5MT yield over a range of 5,500 nm with a circular error probability
(CEP) of 1,500 ft. Under the proposed accelerated program it is required to deliver
a 1.0+ MT payload weighing between 1,500 and 3,000 lbs over the same range
but with a CEP of between 2 and 3 nm. (but 5 nm for initial operational capability).

The new approach changed the order of program priorities from

Economy/Reliability/Logistics/Earliest Availability/Invulnerability to Earliest
Availability/Reliability/Invulnerability/Logisitics/Economy.

It was a key conclusion from the joint WDD/Convair acceleration discussions that
the traditional aviation industry ‘prime contractor’ approach would not be suitable
for the Atlas effort. Instead WDD required Convair to adopt a systems approach
to both engineering and management including strict configuration control for the
development program. Key program deadlines are shown below.

38
 Design Start : May 1953 First Test Flight Due : December 1956
Length : 96 ft
Diameter : 12 ft
Empty Mass : 12,490 lb
Payload Mass : 1,200 lb
Propellant : Alcohol / Liquid Oxygen
Gross Mass : 80,000 lb
Propulsion : 1# XLR43-NA-5
Propellants : Alcohol (22,500 / 4,190 gal)* and LOX (29,500 / 4,120 gal)*
Launch Thrust : 120,000 lbf Burn Time : 135 sec
Typical Test Range : 150 nm
Maximum Velocity : Mach 10.6

* Tankage Capacity / Actual Flight Test Volume

39
 By mid-1954 prototype development of both the Atlas
balloon tank and the booster engine were underway

Above: Formation of a 12ft diameter experimental tank

section for manufacturing, pressure and integrity testing to
prove Bossart’s balloon tank concept.

Below: a mock up of the Rocketdyne booster rocket engine

is prepared forintegration with the Atlas ‘A’ series tankage
mock-up (right) at Convair’s San Diego factory

40
 Design Start : May 1953 First Test Flight Due : March 1958
Length : 103 ft
Diameter : 12 ft
Empty Mass : 18,333 lb Burnout : 13,845 lb
Payload Mass : 1,600 lb for Range : 5,500 nm
Gross Mass : 240,000 1b
Propulsion : 2# XLR43-NA-5 (jettisoned); 1# XLR43-NA-5 (sustainer)
Propellants : Alcohol (22,500 gal) and Liquid Oxygen (29,500 gal)
Launch Thrust : 360,000 lbf Burn Time : 220 sec (100 sec boost)
Typical Test Range : 1,420 nm Peak Altitude : 75 nm

41
42
Convair presented its first design proposal for an ICBM to the USAF in early 1953.
It was large: 12 ft. in diameter, 110 ft. Long and powered by 4 peripheral booster
motors, one central sustainer and two verniers.

One of the baseline reliability requirements for Atlas was that all its engines should
ignite before launch. Accordingly when during late 1953 Convair short-listed three
specific approaches to the issue of ICBM staging; namely, One-and-a-Half Staging
(top left); Parallel Staging (lower left) and Tandem Staging (lbelow) the concept
of tandem staging was soon eliminated.

By March 1954 design refinements were incorporated into the studies that took
account of predicted advances in lighter warhead designs and the stage and a half
design approach was selected. The USAF issued Convair with contracts to progress
the development of the envisaged strategic missile based on the this concept with
a tank diameter of 10 ft. in December 1954. Within the next few months Convair
determined the final design and began fabrication in early 1955.

43
FORWARD VIEW OF THE XSM-65A ATLAS ‘A’ TEST VEHICLE MOCK-UP PHOTOGRAPHED IN JUNE 1955.

44
45
By May 1956 the USAF had approved the initial design specification for their XSM-65A version of the Atlas missile, following the successful outcome
of the formal Mockup Inspection Board the previous October. Work therefore began on cutting metal for the first group of Atlas test vehicles - the
Fit Check Article that would validate the launch facilities and the sixteen test vehicles required for both static and flight test purposes. The main
change in design emphasis between the MX 1593 and XSM-65A concepts was that initial flights would test the twin-booster approach before the
incorporation of the single central sustainer motor.

46
47
 1953-1958
14 tests
1953-54 (baikonur)

1953-54
1955-58
8 tests
(cape
canaveral)

1942-45
265 tests
(peenemunde)

1945-48
3 tests
(white sands)

48
49
Early testing of the Atlas airframe was
carried out at Convair’s Point Loma test
facility. At left the first Atlas test
airframe is seen ready for transfer from
Plant 1 to Pt Loma in mid-April 1956.
Below are two views of the early test
towers - the taller commissioned for use
in March 1956. At right is an Atlas
airframe loaded with liquid oxygen.

50
 Development of the balloon
tank principle on which to
success of the Atlas missile
was to depend began in the
early 1950s when the tank
was envisaged as being 12 ft
in diameter. In early 1954 the
Solar Corporation was
contacted by Convair to
demonstrate the practicality of
manufacturing such a tank.
After successful hydraulic
testing it was concluded that
a 10 ft. diameter tank would
suffice for the Atlas missile
and the Solar trial tank (inset)
was retired from testing.

51
The Advent of Large Liquid Propellant Engines. From Left: German A-4 Model 39 engine (57k); NAA Rocketdyne’s ‘A’ series
“Engine One” (75k); Redstone A-7 (78k); Navaho XLR71-NA-3 (120k); Atlas LR79-NA-3 booster (150k) & Atlas LR105-NA-3
(60k) sustainer. These last two engine types comprise the MA-3 Atlas propulsion system.

52
 Rocketdyne’s XLR43 motors were
the first to out-rate the
performance of Germany’s V-2
rocket engine. Originally
developed for use in pairs (left) for
the Navaho program’s booster
stage their design was used by
North American Aviation’s
Rocketdyen Division as the basis
for the Atlas booster and sustainer
motors. Early test firings were
carried out at the Santa Susana
Field Laboratory in the Bowl Area
using vertical, inclined and
horizontal test stands from
November 1950 onwards.

53
54
The Navaho program
began in 1946 to ex-
plore the feasibility of
an intercontinental
missile system. The
R&D vehicle com-
prised the G-26 rocket
booster and the ‘pig-
gyback’ X-10 cruise
missile. The G-26
booster was powered
by two XLR71 rocket
engines, later to be
upgraded for the Atlas
‘A’ program. The first
test flight was made
on 6 November 1956.

After many test flight

failures, and with the
promise of Atlas
growing, Navaho was
cancelled in July
1957. Seven G-26 test
flights were then
made in support of
the Atlas programme.
Navaho’s success lay
in its spurring the
development of
innovations such as
titanium structures to
rocket engines and
electronic guidance.

55
1944 - 1945 German rocketry and guided missile developments attracted the early interest of the American military during mid-1942
with the planning of RAF bomber raids on the Peenemunde Research Establishment and then, more particularly, with the the opening of the
Luftwaffe’s V1 (London, 13 June 1944) and the Army’s V2 (Paris, 8 September 1944) campaigns. Both the US Army Land Forces and Army Air
Forces were attracted to an early involvement in the development of unmanned bombing systems, each mainly wanting to secure a pre-eminent
role in any subsequent operational deployments. The record shows immense competition between the two military camps in Washington DC as
each tried to assume a lead responsibility. That is, until the distraction created by the start of the Korean War in June 1950.

Sharper focus on the issue of ‘missile ownership’ emerged in September 1947 when the US Army Air Force (USAAF) was disbanded and replaced
by the US Air Force (USAF), now to become a separate military force in its own right. While firmly attached to the concept of the manned strategic
bomber the new Air Force also saw itself as the natural home for any long range unmanned missiles - be they cruise or ballistic missiles.

It was the Experimental Engineering Section of the USAAF’s Materiel Division that initiated the first studies for rockets and missiles in 1941 under
is MX Project series. The first ‘missile’ related project was MX-543, initiated in late 1943, to explore a copycat design for Germany’s nascent V1. By
March 1946 North American Aviation was awarded the first long range missile study under Project MX-770 to be followed weeks later by MX-771
to Martin; MX-772 to Curtiss-Wright; MX-773 to Republic; MX-774 to Consolidated Vultee, and MX-775 to Northrop, all being for unmanned missile
system - cruise or ballistic.

The WDD’s first offices at 409 Manchester Road, Inglewood in 1954 (left) and their offices when known as SAMSO inthe
1970s in Building 105, Area ‘A’ at Los Angeles Air force Station, El Segundo..

56
November 1945 North American Aviation (NAA) engineers Raymond Rice and William Bollay jointly propose ‘to add wings to the V-2’ and design a missile
similar to Germany’s A4b - the 1944 prototype for the A9 upper stage of the proposed A9/A10 ‘New York’ bombardment rocket. An initial design proposal
(NA-704) was made by NAA as part of the USAAF’s Project MX-770. It envisaged a rocket-boosted/air breathing cruise missile with a range of 500 miles. By
1950 this work led to the Navaho program.

December 1945 Vannevar Bush, head of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD), gives testimony to Congress stating that the
concept of the ‘3,000 mile, high-altitude rocket’ is technically one that he doesn’t think ‘anyone in the world knows how to do’. He added that ‘it will not be done
for a very long period of time to come. . . We can leave that out of our thinking.’

10 January 1946 Consolidated Vultee is awarded funds to undertake preliminary design studies for a long range (6,000 miles or greater) unmanned
weapon system

4 March 1946 The Army Air Forces, precursor of the U.S. Air Force, initiate two long term studies, Projects Wizard (794) and Thumper (MX-795),
that were to explore the feasibility of developing interceptor missiles that could destroy missiles moving as fast as 4,000 miles per hour at an altitude as high
as 500,000 feet.

19 April 1946 Consolidated Vultee awarded a contract to build ten MX-774 (Hiroc) test vehicles.

29 May 1946 The Stilwell Board, which had been convened in November 1945 to determine what equipment U.S. ground forces would
require following World War II, recommended the development of defenses against ballistic missiles. The report stated: "Guided missiles, winged
or non-winged, traveling at extreme altitudes and at velocities in excess of supersonic speed, are inevitable. Intercontinental ranges of over 3,000
miles and payload[s] sufficient to carry atomic explosive[s] are to be expected. Remotely controlled, and equipped with homing devices designed
to be attracted to sound, metal, or heat, such missiles would be incapable of interception with any existing equipment such as fighter aircraft and
antiaircraft fire. Guided interceptor missiles, dispatched in accordance with electronically computed data obtained from radar detection stations,
will be required."
June 1946 Design work on the MX-774 Hiroc test vehicle begins. Three concepts, A (Teetotaler), B (Old Fashioned) and C (Manhattan)

1947 Projects Wizard and Thumper are reviewed and it is recognized that the complex technical challenges of developing an
ABM system would take at least five to ten years. They determined: “If these missile programs as such are supported to the maximum intelligent
extent, the financial drain on the AAF program would be such as to seriously compromise the development of all other types of missiles.” As a
result, the Air Force subsequently combined its two ABM programs, closing Thumper in 1949, and consolidating its findings in the Wizard program,
which continued on a long-term study basis.

1948 The USAF is established as a military service independent of its Army origins, known as the US Army Air Force (USAAF).
As a result of this separation Army missiles are to be restricted to 500 miles and as a result the USAF redefined the range of MX-770 designs to
1,000 miles. Thus was born the Navaho long range missile.

1 October 1950 RAND Corporation completes feasibility study confirming the military practicability of long-range rocket propelled weapon
systems.

57
16 January 1951 Convair awarded $1.5m contract by the USAF for the MX-1593 Project. Phase 1 concerned evaluating the relative advantages
of a ballistic missile versus a glide or cruise missile for long range weapons delivery, centring on an 8,000 lb atomic payload over a distance of
5,000 nm with a circular error probable of 1,500 ft. Phase 2 was concerned more detailed evaluations of each type of missile.

August 1951 USAF approve the name of Atlas for the MX-1593 project

September 1951 Convair reported on MX-1593 (now named Project Atlas) indicating that the ballistic solution would require a missile 160
ft long and 12 ft in diameter. The missile would require seven large liquid propellant rocket motors. The glide vehicle weigh one-half of the ballistic
missile and be easier and less expensive to produce.

1952-3 During this period Convair had to develop its Atlas concepts without a definitive knowledge of the military payload
requirement due to tight nuclear weapon security regulations.

May 1952 With the glide missile programs - Snark and Navaho - proving to be very costly the Atlas ballistic missile design was
refined to about half the weight of the 1951 design and which could deliver a 3,000 lb warhead over 2,000 nm (or a 1.500 lb warhead over
3,000 nm).

August 1952 The USAF’s Air Research and Development Command (ARDC) Wright Air Development Center’s Bombardment Missile
Branch published plans for the latest version of the Atlas weapon system which required a missile that could deliver a 3,000 lb warhead over
5,000 nm with a with a circular error probable of 1,500 ft.

1 November 1952 Successful first US nuclear test using a fusion device which cleared the way for a more efficient warhead design. The
device, code-named “Ivy Mike”, had a yield of 10.4 MT.

20 January 1953 The inauguration of President Dwight D Eisenhower bodes ill for missile development with a complete review of all
government organisations after 20 years on Democratic government. The new Secretary of Defence, Charles Wilson, directed Air Force
Secretary, Harold Talbott, to form a committee to carry out an assessment of all guided missile programmes, with a view to cutting out
duplication and waste established in the Truman years. Talbott’s special assistant for R&D, Trevor Gardner, who had headed the wartime Office
of Scientific Research and Development’s (OSRD) early nuclear and rocket programs following the Manhatten and V2 projects.

March 1953 Convair development of the Atlas project employs just 10 people. Seven years later the workforce had grown to
12,000 working in the Kearny Mesa Plant.

20 August 1953 Model 7 | 5-engines | 110 ft x 12 ft | 3,000 lb w/h to 5,500 nm | Design started 19 Jan 1951 | First Test
Flight est Dec 1955 | First (P) Flight est July 1958 | First Operational flight due 1961

September 1953 Technical feasibility of a 1,500 lb warhead confirmed by US researchers. Meanwhile in the Soviet Union the prospect of
ICMB developments prompted the seven marshals who had led Soviet efforts in World War II to ask the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union to investigate the possible development of an ABM system. In response to this request, a feasibility study was

58
conducted and the determination reached that missile defenses were possible. This led the Soviets to initiate their ABM development program at
the end of 1953.

October 1953 Strategic Missiles Evaluation Committee (SMEC) was established under the chairmanship of Prof. John von Neumann. It
was given the codename of ‘Teapot’.

December 1953 Convair given access to latest nuclear weapon payload estimates.

9 December 1953 Model 7-0 | 5-engines | 108.7 ft x 12 ft | 3,000 lb w/h to 5,500 nm | Design started 19 Jan 1951 | First Test Flight
est December 1956 | First (P) Flight est Jan 1960 | First Operational flight due 1962.

8 February 1954 RAND Memo indicates that Atlas could be operational by early 1960s with higher priority and a warhead capability of
1,500 lb.

10 February 1954 Strategic Missiles Evaluation (‘Teapot’) Committee reports that Atlas programme funding should be expanded and
progress accelerated by the formation of a dedicated management organisation because of the significant possibility of a major technological
breakthrough in the size of thermonuclear weapons.

26 February 1954 Internal USAF review reveals that it will not be possible to deliver an operational ICBM by 1960 and that a radical change
in management practice is needed to implement a 5-year implementation plan to be led by Trevor Garner. The fact that the USAF (led by
General Curtis LeMay in particular) still sees the Atlas as a‘manned-bomber’ is reflected in its formal USAF designation as ‘the B-65 program’.
USAF contracts with NAA for the development of a propulsion system for Atlas based on the Navaho engines.

1 March 1954 First US test of a dry-fuel thermonuclear hydrogen bomb successfully made under the code-named “Castle Bravo” at
Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands. A yield of 15 MT was recorded. Work also formally begins on the development of the Atlas propulsion
system.

11 March 1954 Trevor Gardner and AF Secretary Harold E Talbott outline plans (and reaffirm funding at double the previous year’s
level) for Atlas programme to achieve ‘preliminary Initial Operational Capability’ (IOC) by June 1958 with two launcher sites and four missiles
rising to 20 sites and 100 missiles by 1960.

March 1954 Solar Corporation builds 12ft diameter stainless steel tank section to validate ‘balloon tank’ concept on which Karel
Bossart’s innovative design for Atlas relies.

3 May 1954 ARDC contracts with Ramo-Wooldridge for a 12-month technical review and redefinition of the Atlas ICBM

14 May 1954 Atlas program assigned highest (1-A) USAF development priority together with an S-1 materials supply priority.

59
1 June 1954 Brig Gen Bernard Schriever named as Special Assistant to Commander of ARDC and appointed as the special
representative for the Atlas Program at USAF headquarters.

21 June 1954 ARDC directed by Secretary of Defence to accelerate Atlas program “to the maximum extent that technical development
will allow” and to establish a dedicated field office on the west coast with a general rank officer in command to lead and manage the weapon
system program in all its aspects.

Left: an early Atlas tank is seen

undergoing propellant flow
tests at the Point Loma test
facility

Right: a new test airframe is

being prepared for off-loading.

Below: a 12ft diameter mock-

up, or whalebone, of the
Convair Model 7 en route in
mid-1953 to Point Loma. This
journey served as an earlt test
of the Atlas missile transporter
concept. Note the steersman
operating the rear wheel-set.

60
1 July 1954 The USAF establish the Western Development Division (WDD) to lead the responsibility for developing the United State’s
ICBM program under Gen Schriever.

July 1954 X-11/ Model 7-1 | 1-engine | 96 ft x 12 ft | 330 nm altitude and 150 nm range | Design started May 1953 | First
Test Flight est December 1956.

July 1954 X-12 / Model 7-3 | 3-engines | 103 ft x 12 ft | 75 nm altitude and 1,420 nm range | Design started May 1953 |
First Test Flight est March 1958.

20 July 1954 Scientific Advisory Committee complete review of Atlas options and technical status during which Convair recommends
the ‘stage and a half’ three-motor solution.

2 August 1954 General Bernard Schriever is assigned to command the WDD headquartered in an old church school building in
downtown Inglewood. Dress code is to be civilian to avoid drawing attention to the military nature of the high-security operation.

11 August 1954 USAF issues General Operational Requirement GOR # 21 (SA-1C) - further to GOR #1 of 1 September 1952 - leading
to an acceleration of the Atlas programme.

September 1954 WDD initiates a review of the increasingly expensive and lack-lustre Snark long range cruise missile program that
threatens to restrict funding for Atlas.

8 September 1954 Ramo-Wooldridge is appointed by WDD to the role of system engineering and technical direction mentor for the Atlas
program.

13 December 1954 First production funding authorised for the Atlas program and three days later USAF announced that construction was
underway.

1955 USAF changes from XB-65A to XSM-65A designation for Atlas A missile.

6 January 1955 First contract awarded to Convair by the USAF for production of XSM-65 Series ‘A’ test vehicles.

February 1955 Killian Committee reports to President that a serious weapons gap exists between the US and the USSR.

14 February 1955 USAF contracts with North American Aircraft’s Rocketdyne Division for production of 12 propulsion systems for the XSM-
65 Series ’A’ test vehicles.

21 April 1955 The first Development Plan is published for the Atlas Weapon System - WS-107A.

6 March 1955 USAF Chief of Staff, Nathan F Twioning, announces that the Snark, Navaho and Atlas ICBM programmes were all
being given highest priority due to Soviet threat.

61
27 July 1955 Development Directive 76 is issued calling for the immediate acceleration of the Atlas programme and assigning WS-
107A the highest Air Force priority.

30 August 1955 National Security Council recommends that Atlas be designated a priority second to no other within the US arsenal.

October 1955 First test firing of an Atlas 60,000 lbf sustainer engine by Rocketdyne.

December 1955 First test firing of an Atlas twin-engined booster set rated at 270,000 lbf thrust.

14 December 1955 SARDC assigns to General Schriever full responsibility for meeting the initial operational capability (IOC) target of 10
missiles on duty by April 1959.

January 1956 Paul Smith Construction Company starts US Army Corps of Engineers project to construct Launch Complexes CX12 and
14 for A|tlas R&D flight test programme.

22 May 1955 In the light of early progress with the Atlas weapon system the IOC target is changed to 25 missiles being on duty by 1
January 1960. This target was subsequently revised to be 10 missiles on three sites by March 1959.
March 1956 First Series ‘A’ booster R&D engines delivered to Convair’s plant at San Diego for engineering integration testing and
static firing tests at Sycamore Canyon.

3 May 1956 The Air Force disclose that a $41 million guided missile production facility (AF Plant #19) would be built at Sorrento,
CA, for the Atlas launch vehicle.

15 June 1956 Rocketdyne delivers the first production rated engine sets to Convair. A 'battleship' system was installed at test stand
1-4, Edwards AFB. The test was a failure but the engine sustained no damage and was successfully fired the following day.

22 June 1956 First fully successful captive test firing of the Atlas booster propulsion system at Edwards Rocket Base,for 4 seconds.

21 July 1956 Rocketdyne completes the first static test firing of the Atlas MA-1 propulsion system.

29 August 1956 Construction of the first non-flight rated ‘boilerplate’ Atlas missile is formally completed with its delivery to the USAF
for static systems testing at Sycamore Canyon, CA on August 29, 1956.

1 October 1956 Atlas facilities test article (FTA) leaves San Diego on its 64ft long, 14ft wide trailer for overland delivery to Cape
Canaveral. The 2,650 mile journey took nine days.

16 November 1956 Department of Defense announce the transfer the northern 64,000 acres of the Army’s 86,000 acre Camp Cooke, CA
to the Air Force to be used as first ICBM base. The base is to be named after General Hoyt S Vandenberg.

62
30 November 1956 The first flight rated Series ‘A’ test vehicle, Atlas 4A, is handed over to the USAF by Convair at its San Diego plant.

8 December 1956 Atlas 4A arrives at Hangar J in the Industrial Area of Cape Canaveral for preparation to pad-ready status.

5 December 1956 The first static test firing in the Atlas program is made by vehicle # 1A at Convair’s Sycamore Canyon. Follow-up test on
21st resulted in fire and severe damage to both test vehicle and pad facilities.

1 June 1957 WDD re-designated as Air Force Ballistic Missile Division (AFBMD) while suffering budget cuts.

11 June 1957 The first test flight in the Atlas program is made by vehicle 4A from Cape Canaveral but had to be destroyed shortly after
an otherwise successful lift-off. Despite loss of control the Atlas airframe withstood violent gyrations and conclusively proved the efficacy of the
balloon tank design.

The Consolidated Aircraft Corporation was founded in May 1923. A decade later in May 1933, Consolidated’s board of directors
authorized a conditional fifty-year lease with the City of San Diego for a site adjacent to the Lindbergh Field airstrip. The
company made the transcontinental move by train with 311 select employees. The new plant was dedicated on October 20,
1935. The initial factory covered 247,000 square feet of continuous flow along the Pacific Coast Highway. The production of
aircraft began in October 1936 with the US Navy’s Catalina patrol bomber, later followed by B-24 Liberator bombers for the
USAAF. In 1938, federal investment added another 450,000 square feet of building space. Consolidated employed 3,700
people by August of that year. In December 1939, the Navy’s Bureau of Aeronautics awarded to Consolidated its largest and
most expensive contract since World War I in a contract for two hundred Catalinas. This $20 million contract necessitated
greater factory floor space, and the construction of Buildings Two and Three began in the spring of 1940.

On March 17, 1943, Consolidated merged with Vultee Aircraft of Los Angeles, creating the conglomerate Consolidated Vultee
Aircraft Corporation, better known informally by the portmanteau term ‘Convair’. This later later became the company’s official
name. In 1947 control of Convair passed into the hands of the Atlas Corporation which was a financial investment firm formed
in 1928 from a merger of the United Corporation, an investment firm started in 192, and Atlas Utilities and Investors Ltd. The

63
Atlas Corporation specialized in capital formation and management with general transport and aviation related interests. By 1929 Atlas had grown
into a major investment trust which was able to weather the stock market crash and continue to grow through the 1930s and 1940s.

In March 1953 Convair was acquired by General Dynamics, the new name since 24 April 1952 of the long established Electric Boat Company whose
core business had since the end of WW 2 moved progressively from the maritime to aerospace sector. In the two years before the acquisition
General Dynamics' sole aircraft manufacturing unit had been Canadair, a Canadian company. But because U.S. law prevented American aerospace
contracts from being fulfilled outside the United States, General Dynamics had not been involved in the U.S. aerospace market. With the acquisition
of Convair, General Dynamics could now bid on U.S. aerospace contracts, perhaps the greatest benefit of the acquisition.

Throughout 1955 and 1956, steps were taken to form the ‘Atlas Model 7’ project, successor to the previous MX-1593 research studies of the early
1950s, into a separate operating division of Convair, borrowing the fortuitously appropriate name of the Corporation’s previous major shareholder
for the undertaking expected to shape Convair’s future. This new operating division was known as Astronautics. Directors of General Dynamics
voted to appropriate $20 million to acquire land and to build an Astronautics plant at San Diego. A similar amount was provided by the US Air Force
for equipment. With this commitment 1956 saw the beginning of construction of the main Atlas plant on San Diego's Kearny Mesa location which
was dedicated on 12 July 1958 with a workforce of 9,600 employees. An Atlas component test facility was also established on Point Loma in San
Diego; captive missile test facilities were created by Convair at Sycamore Canyon near to its San Diego production plants as well as at the USAF
managed Edwards Rocket Site north of Los Angeles. In 1959 Convair | Astronautics was set up to operate independently from the traditional Convair
Aircraft division and by mid-1961 the Kearny Mesa site comprised 22 buildings with a total workforce of more than 27,000 employees.

In June 1961, the official name of Convair | Astronautics changed to General Dynamics | Astronautics, a division of the General Dynamics Corporation,
denoting full corporate division status which recognised it as being the largest business element of General Dynamics Corporation. In February
1965, the Convair and Astronautics divisions of the corporation were recombined under the Convair name as Convair Space Division, following
completion of the Atlas weapon system design, development, and base activation tasks for which the Astronautics division had been organized.
In 1985 it was further re-organised as GD/Space Systems, charged with continuing the work of the Convair space programs, primarily related to
the Atlas Centaur launch vehicle as well as the production of OV-1 auxiliary space vehicles, together with specialist spacecraft fairings and electronic
systems. General Dynamics Space Systems Division was the prime contractor for integration, checkout and launch of Atlas and Centaur vehicles.

The GD Space Systems Division was sold to Martin Marietta on 2 May 1994 and all Atlas production facilities were moved from San Diego to be
consolidated with the Titan facilities in Denver. The name Convair was finally extinguished in 1996 as Atlas and Titan technologies were fused.
Atlas, as a reputable name however lived on even though the new twin-engined Atlas 5 was now more akin technologically to a Titan launch vehicle
with its basic design being based on a structural ‘tube’ rather than a pressurised ‘balloon’.

64
Karel J. (Charlie) Bossart was born in Antwerp, Belgium on February 9, 1904, and he graduated from the University
of Brussels in 1925 with a degree in mining engineering. In 1930, he won a scholarship to the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (MIT) with the proviso that he learn English, which he did in just six weeks. At MIT he
studied aeronautics, specializing in structures. He worked on avionics projects during World War II and by the
war's end he was Chief of Structures at Consolidated-Vultee Aircraft in California, (later renamed Convair, and
later still a part of General Dynamics.)

In 1946, he took part in Project MX-774, the first US study of the German V-2 rocket, with the goal of producing
America's first intercontinental ballistic missile. Bossart emerged as the driving force that successfully transformed
the MX-774 from a study to a vehicle test program, and when the Air Force requested that Convair develop a
rocket with a 5,100-mile range, he was placed in charge of developing ten MX-774 vehicles.

However when the MX-774 project was cancelled Bossart was able to convince the Pentagon to complete the
three vehicles for tests. Though the tests were less than satisfactory by their conclusion in December 1948, Bossart
was able to demonstrate the viability of several design concepts including his most important innovation,
pressurized, monocoque tanks.

In 1955, Bossart was named chief engineer of the newly established Atlas project and two years later he was
promoted to Technical Director of Aeronautics at General Dynamics. His singular most important contribution to
the success of the Atlas programme was in conceiving, and proving, the design of the propellant tanks, which
served as the primary structure for the ICBM and its subsequent space launch vehicles. The tanks consisted of
pressure-stabilized thin guage stainless steel with a common inter-tank bulkhead - essentially a ‘steel balloon.’

More than a decade of his work culminated in the first successful flight of an Atlas test missile late in 1957. The
next year Bossart received the Air Force's Exceptional Civilian Award for his work in developing America's first
ICBM. He also won the 1959 Collier Trophy for the U.S. Air Force and General Dynamics.

Karel Bossart was recognized as one of the finest technical men in the country and credited with spearheading a
major advance in the art of rocketry, his use of a monocoque design (a construction technique that supports
structural loads by using an object's external skin) in which the rocket's structural integrity was maintained by
the pressure of the fuel. Thus the Atlas liquid propellant tanks served as both the primary vehicle structures and
the propellant containers.

Karel Bossart retired from General Dynamics in 1967. He died in San Diego, California on August 3, 1975.

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While Karel Bossart was identified with being'the father of Atlas' then James R. Dempsey was the
leader of the overall program for the development and deployment of the Atlas ICBM.

Dempsey graduated from West Point IN January 1943. After graduation he few P-38s with the 34th
Photo Reconnaissance Squadron in England, completing 43 combat missions. After the war, he received
a master’s degree in Aeronautical Engineering while a member of the first Air Force guided missile
course at the University of Michigan. He then served as chief of guided missile projects in the Air Force
Office of Research and Development and executive officer for the Deputy Chief of Staff for Development.
In this latter position, he was involved in the Air Force reorganization that created the Air Research
and Development Command, separating research and development of advanced technology from
logistics. He was one of the first USAF officers to arrive at Patrick Air Force Base and helped shape
development of Cape Canaveral. As operations officer for the missile test range, he had primary
responsibility for the establishment of down-range monitoring stations and the installation of advanced
instrumentation.

In 1953, he joined Convair, just a short while before the Department of Defense decided upon a national
effort to develop the Atlas missile in 1954. Assigned as director of the Atlas program Dempsey led the
Convair | General Dynamics team that developed all facets of America’s first intercontinental ballistic
missile ystem. Because of a daunting time schedule, the Atlas missile was developed concurrently with
the construction of eleven bases across the United States. Due to his managerial skills and singular
devotion to mission accomplishment, the project was completed ahead of schedule and within budget.
By 1960 the Strategic Air Command was able to conduct the first Atlas operational test launch. In that
same year, the Collier Trophy, presented annually by the National Aeronautics Association for the
greatest achievement in astronautics in America, was awarded to the United States Air Force and the
Convair Division of General Dynamics. Jim Dempsey, now president of Convair/Astronautics, accepted
the award on behalf of his company for accomplishments “that were vital to the security and space
exploration needs of the United States and the free world” from President Eisenhower.

In 1965, the Astronautics and Convair divisions of General Dynamics were combined as Convair, and
Dempsey was named president. In this capacity he led the development of Centaur, the world’s first
liquid hydrogen/oxygen space vehicle, as a second stage for both the Atlas and Titan missiles.

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Bernard Adolph Schriever was born in Bremen, Germany, in 1910. came to America in 1917 when his parents
emigrated from Germany. He became a naturalized citizen in 1923, and graduated from Texas A&M in 1931 with
a bachelor of science degree. He was commissioned in the Field Artillery but in July 1932 began flight training at
Randolph Field and earned his wings and commission in the Air Corps in June 1933. He was promoted to First
Lieutenant in June 1933 . In September 1937 he left the Air Corps to fly as a pilot with Northwest Airlines, before
returning to duty in October 1938 with the 7th Bomb Group at Hamilton. A year later he became a test pilot at
Wright Field, where he also attended the Air Corps Engineering School, graduating in July 1941. He then took an
advanced course in aeronautical engineering at Stanford University, was promoted to captain in April 1942, and
got his master's degree in June as a newly promoted Major.

In July Schriever went to the Pacific for combat with the 19th Bomb Group, taking part in the Bismarck Archipelago,
Leyte, Luzon, Papua, North Solomon, South Philippine and Ryukyu campaigns. In January 1943 he moved to the
5th Air Force Service Command in maintenance and engineering assignments, and as chief of staff, finally becoming
commanding officer of advanced headquarters for the Far East Air Service Command which supported theater
operations from bases in Hollandia, New Guinea, Leyte, Manila and Okinawa.

He was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel in August 1943 and to Colonel that December. After the war Schriever
went to Headquarters Army Air Forces as chief of scientific liaison in materiel for three and a half years. He graduated
from the National War College in June 1950 and returned to Headquarters Army Air Forces as assistant for evaluation,
in development. In January 1951 he continued the same type of work with the title of assistant for development
planning and was promoted to Brigadier General in June 1953.

Schriever began his long association with the Air Research & Development Command - later to become Air Force
Systems Command - in June 1954 as assistant to the commander. The next month he headed a small group of
officers who went to Los Angeles to organize and form what has since become the Air Force's ballistic and systems
divisions under AFSC with the end product such ballistic missiles as Thor, Atlas, Titan and Minuteman, and all the
aerospace systems which supported NASA in its Mercury man-in-space and other programs.

The architect of the Air Force's ballistic missile and military space program Schriever was promoted to two-star
rank in December 1955. He left Los Angeles for Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland, in April 1959 as commander of
ARDC, which became AFSC April 1, 1961, under a reorganization initiated by him. He was promoted to Lieutenant
General on that date, April 25, 1959, and to full General on July 1, 1961.

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