THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 119645. August 22, 1996.]

SPO3 NOEL CABADA and SPO3 RODOLFO G. DE GUZMAN , petitioners,

vs . HON. RAFAEL M. ALUNAN III, Secretary of the Department of the
Interior and Local Government & Chairman, National Police
Commission (NAPOLCOM); HON. ALEXIS CANONIZADO,
Commissioner, NAPOLCOM, Manila; Chairman LEODEGARIO
ALFARO, Regional Appellate Board VIII; Regional Director
EDMUNDO LAVILLA LARROZA Philippine National Police (PNP)
Regional Command VIII; and MARIO VALDEZ , respondents.

Sergio C. Sumayod, Lauro G. Noel and Lucas D. de Guzman for petitioners.

Solicitor General for respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION; APPEALS THERETO

FROM DECISIONS OF A BUREAU OR OFFICE MAY INITIALLY BE FILED BEFORE THE
DEPARTMENT CONCERNED. — Section 45 of the DILG Act of 1990 speci cally
provides that if a RAB fails to decide an appeal within the reglementary period of sixty
days, the appealed decision becomes nal and executory without, however, prejudice to
the right of the aggrieved party to appeal to the Secretary of the DILG. The said
provision is, however, silent as regards the availability of an appeal from a decision
rendered by a RAB within the reglementary period. This gap in Section 45 cannot be
construed to prohibit appeals from decisions of the RAB rendered within the
reglementary period, for while the epigraph of the section is worded Finality of
Disciplinary Action, there is nothing therein that explicitly bars any further appeal.
Complementary laws on discipline of government o cials and employees must then
be inquired into considering that in conformity with the mandate of the Constitution
that the PNP must be national in scope and civilian in character, it is now a part, as a
bureau, of the reorganized DILG. As such, if falls within the de nition of the civil service
in Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the Constitution. For this reason, Section 91 of the DILG
Act of 1990 provides. The Civil Service Law referred to in Section 91 of the DILG Act of
1990 is Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 292).
Section 47 of Chapter 6 thereof provides, inter alia, that in cases where the decision
rendered by a bureau or o ce is appealable to the Commission, the same may initially
be appealed to the department and finally to the Commission.
2. ID; DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACT OF
1990; APPEALS FROM DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL APPELLATE BOARD AND THE
REGIONAL APPELLATE BOARD; MUST BE FILED BEFORE THE SECRETARY OF LOCAL
GOVERNMENT. — Only the Secretary of the DILG can act thereon, one way or the other.
The NAPOLCOM did not have authority over the appeal and the petition for review, and
just because both mentioned the Secretary of the DILG as Chairman or Presiding
O cer of the NAPOLCOM did not bring them within the jurisdiction of the NAPOLCOM.
The latter does not have such jurisdiction because Section 14 of the DILG Act of 1990
pertinently provides the NAPOLCOM exercises appellate jurisdiction only on the
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 following cases and THROUGH (a) the NAB in personnel disciplinary actions involving
demotion or dismissal from the service imposed by the Chief of the PNP, and (b) the
RAB in administrative cases against policemen and over decisions on claims for police
bene ts. It has no appellate jurisdiction over decisions rendered by the NAB and the
RAB. Consequently, the NAPOLCOM did not have the power or authority to issue,
through Commissioner Alexis Canonizado, the 24 March 1995 decision denying due
course to the appeal and petition for review filed by petitioners Cabada and De Guzman,
respectively, for lack of jurisdiction because of Section 5, Rule III of NAPOLCOM
Memorandum Circular No. 91-006 and Section 23, Rule IV of NAPOLCOM
Memorandum Circular No. 91-002. The reference to these rules suggest that the
NAPOLCOM believes it has jurisdiction over appeals from decisions of the RAB if the
latter has not decided the appeal within the reglementary period of sixty days. Such a
suggestion is awed because it would allow a ridiculous situation where the
NAPOLCOM vests upon itself an appellate jurisdiction from a decision rendered by it in
the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction through the RAB, per Section 14(k) of the DILG
Act of 1990. Moreover, Commissioner Canonizado cannot, singly, act for the
NAPOLCOM because it is a collegial body composed of a Chairman and four
Commissioners, pursuant to Section 13 of the DILG Act of 1990.
3. ID; EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; NOT APPLICABLE IF
THE DECISION IN QUESTION IS A PATENT NULLITY. — The plea of the O ce or the
Solicitor General that the instant action is premature for non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies is thus untenable. We would have sustained it if the Secretary
of the DILG was the one who denied due course to or dismissed the appeal of
petitioner Cabada and the petition for review of petitioner De Guzman. By then,
pursuant to Section 91 of the DILG Act of 1990; Section 47, Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Title I
Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987; and Sections 31 and 32 of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292, the appeal would have to be
led with the CSC. And futile would be the petitioners claim in their Reply to the
Comment of the OSG that their case falls within the exceptions to the rule on
exhaustion of Administrative remedies.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS, CERTIORARI; FILING OF A
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION MAY BE DISPENSED WITH IF THE QUESTIONED
DECISION IS A PATENT NULLITY. — In light of the foregoing, the petitioners could
properly invoke our original jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to annul and set aside the NAPOLCOM's decision of
24 March 1995. It being a patent nullity, the ling of a motion its reconsideration before
the institution of this special civil action may be dispensed with.
5. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; EVERY STATUTE MUST BE SO CONSTRUED
AND HARMONIZED WITH OTHER STATUTES AS TO FORM A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF
JURISPRUDENCE. — In view then of the aforementioned gap in Section 45 of the DILG
Act of 1990, the provisions of the Civil Law and the rules and regulations implementing
it must be taken into account in light of the maxim interpretare concordare legibus est
optimus interpretandi or every statutes must be so construed and harmonized with
other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. As thus construed and
harmonized, it follows that if a RAB fails to decide an appealed case within sixty days
from receipt of the notice of appeal, the appealed decision is deemed nal and
executory, and the aggrieved party may forthwith appeal therefrom to the Secretary of
the DILG. Likewise, if the RAB has decided the appeal within the sixty-day period, its
decision may still be appealed to the Secretary of the DILG.
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 DECISION

DAVIDE , JR. , J : p

This is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court 1 to
set aside the decision (in the form of a letter) of 24 March 1995 2 of public respondent
National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), which denied due course for lack of
jurisdiction the appeal and the petition for review led by petitioners SPO3 Noel
Cabada and SPO3 Rodolfo G. de Guzman, respectively. Challenged in the said appeal
and petition for review were the decision of 15 August 1994 3 and resolution of 25
October 1994 4 of the Regional Appellate Board of the Eighth Regional Command (RAB
8), which affirmed their dismissal from the service.
The pleadings and annexes led by the parties disclose the following factual and
procedural backdrop of this case:
On 29 October 1993, a complaint against the petitioners for Grave Misconduct,
Arbitrary Detention, and Dishonesty was led with the O ce of the Commission on
Human Rights in Tacloban City by private respondent Mario Valdez. 5 The complaint
was referred to the Philippine National Police Eight Regional Command (PNP-RECOM
8) which, after the conducting its own investigation, led an administrative charge of
Grave Misconduct against the petitioners and instituted summary dismissal
proceedings.
On 7 April 1994, the Regional Director of PNP-RECOM 8 handed down a decision
6 nding the petitioners guilty of grave misconduct and ordering their dismissal from
the police service. Pursuant to this decision, Special Order No. 174, dated 23 April
1994, 7 was issued ordering, among other things, the dismissal of the petitioners from
the service.
The petitioners claimed that they were not formally furnished with a copy of the
decision and that they were able to secure a copy thereof "thru their own effort and
initiative" only on 13 June 1994. 8 However, they received a copy of Special Order No.
174 on 26 April 1994.
Although they insist that the basis of the appeal before RAB 8 was Special Order
No. 174, 9 petitioner Cabada stated under oath in his Appeal 1 0 led with the
Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) that he in fact seasonably led
a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Regional Director of PNP-RECOM 8,
who, however, failed or refused to act on the said motion, and that he asked that the
said motion be treated as an appeal to the RAB.
In its decision of 15 August 1994, 1 1 the RAB 8 a rmed the decision of the
Regional Director. In its resolution of 25 October 1994, 1 2 it denied the petitioners'
motion for reconsideration of its decision. The petitioners received a copy of this
resolution on 26 January 1995.
Petitioners Cabada and De Guzman then filed with the Honorable Secretary of the
DILG and Chairman of the NAPOLCOM their "Appeal" 1 3 dated 5 February 1995 and
"Petition for Review" 1 4 dated 4 February 1995, respectively.
In its decision of 24 March 1995, the NAPOLCOM, through Commissioner Alexis
Canonizado, denied due course to the petitioners' appeal and petition for review for
lack of jurisdiction "it appearing . . . that both the Decision and the Resolution of the
Regional Appellate Board had long become nal and executory and there being no
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 showing that the RAB failed to decide respondents' appeal within the reglementary
period of sixty (60) days." 1 5 In support thereof, the NAPOLCOM cited Section 23, Rule
IV of NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. 91-002 and Section 5, Rule III of
NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. 91-006, which provide as follows:
Section 23. Effect of Failure to Decide Appeal. — Failure of the
Regional Appellate Board to decide the appeal within the reglementary period
shall render the decision nal and executory without prejudice, however, to the
ling of an appeal by either party with the Secretary of the Department of the
Interior and Local Government.
xxx xxx xxx

Section 5. Finality of Decision/Resolution. — The decision of the

Regional Appellate Board on an appealed case shall become nal and executory
after ten (10) days from receipt of a copy thereof by the appellant, if no Motion
for Reconsideration is filed within said period.
A motion for Reconsideration may be led by either party from a Decision
rendered by the Regional Appellate Board on an appealed case, provided that the
same is led within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of the decision in
question. However, only one (1) Motion for Reconsideration may be allowed.

Hence, the instant petition.

The O ce of the Solicitor General seeks to dismiss this petition on the ground of
prematurity because the petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies; they
should have instead appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) pursuant to
Section 47, Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987
(E.O. No. 292), which vests upon the CSC appellate jurisdiction over disciplinary cases
of government personnel where the penalty imposed is, inter alia, dismissal from o ce.
The said provision reads:
Section 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. — (1) The Commission shall
decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition
of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or ne in an amount
exceeding thirty days salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, or removal or
dismissal from office. . . .
(2) The Secretaries . . . shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide
matters involving disciplinary action against o cers and employees under their
jurisdiction. . . . In case the decision rendered by a bureau or o ce head is
appealable to the Commission, the same may be initially appealed to the
Department and nally to the Commission and pending appeal, the same shall be
executory except when the penalty is removal, in which case, the same shall be
executory only after confirmation by the Secretary concerned.

The O ce of the Solicitor General opines that this provision covers PNP
personnel, like the petitioners; consequently, they should have appealed to the CSC. It
also advances the view that the instant petition should have been led with the proper
forum, the Regional Trial Court.
The core issues that present themselves for our determination are whether
(1) the NAPOLCOM committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
due course, for lack of jurisdiction, the petitioners' appeal from and petition for
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 review of the decision and resolution of the RAB 8; and
(2) this special civil action was prematurely led for failure of the
petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies.

I
Section 45 of the DILG Act of 1990 1 6 provides for the nality of disciplinary
actions against members of the PNP as follows:
SEC. 45. Finality of Disciplinary Action. — The disciplinary action
imposed upon a member of the PNP shall be nal and executory: Provided, That
a disciplinary action imposed by the regional director or by the PLEB involving
demotion or dismissal from the service may be appealed to the regional appellate
board within ten (10) days from receipt of the copy of the notice of decision:
Provided, further, That the disciplinary action imposed by the Chief of the PNP
involving demotion or dismissal may be appealed to the National Appellate Board
within ten (10) days from receipt thereof: Provided furthermore, That, the regional
or National Appellate Board, as the case may be, shall decide the appeal within
sixty (60) days from receipt of the notice of appeal: Provided, nally, That failure
of the regional appellate board to act on the appeal within said period shall render
the decision nal and executory without prejudice, however, to the ling of an
appeal by either party with the Secretary. (emphasis supplied)
The last proviso of this section is restated in Section 23, Rule IV of NAPOLCOM
Memorandum Circular No. 91-002. And Section 3, Rule III of NAPOLCOM Memorandum
Circular No. 92-006 provides:
Section 3. Period Within Which to Decide Appealed Cases; Finality of
RAB/NAB Decisions. — The NAPOLCOM appellate board concerned shall decide
the appealed cases within sixty (60) days from receipt of the entire records of the
case from the PNP summary dismissal authority. However, failure of the
NAPOLCOM Regional Appellate Board (RAB) to act on the appeal within said
period renders the decision nal and executory without prejudice to the ling of
an appeal by the respondent-appellant with the Secretary of the Department of
the Interior and Local Government. The decision rendered by the NAPOLCOM
National Appellate Board (NAB) disposing an appealed case shall be nal and
executory unless a timely Motion for Reconsideration is led within ten (10) days
from receipt thereof, in which case, it shall become nal and executory upon
receipt by the respondent-appellant of the resolution of the aforesaid board
denying, modifying or affirming the decision.

Section 45 of the DILG Act of 1990 speci cally provides that if a RAB fails to
decide an appeal within the reglementary period of sixty days, the appealed decision
becomes nal and executory without, however, prejudice to the right of the aggrieved
party to appeal to the Secretary of the DILG. The said provision is, however, silent as
regards the availability of an appeal from a decision rendered by a RAB within the
reglementary period.
This gap in Section 45 cannot be construed to prohibit appeals from decisions of
the RAB rendered within the reglementary period, for while the epigraph of the section
is worded Finality of Disciplinary Action, there is nothing therein that explicitly bars any
further appeal. Complementary laws on discipline of government o cials and
employees must then be inquired into considering that in conformity with the mandate
of the Constitution that the PNP must be national in scope and civilian in character, 1 7 it
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 is now a part, as a bureau, of the reorganized DILG. 1 8 As such, it falls within the
de nition of the civil service in Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the Constitution. 1 9 For this
reason, Section 91 of the DILG Act of 1990 provides:
SEC. 91. Application of Civil Service Laws. — The Civil Service Law and
its implementing rules and regulations shall apply to all personnel of the
Department.

The Civil Service Law referred to in Section 91 of the DILG Act of 1990 is Subtitle
A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 292). Section 47 of
Chapter 6 thereof provides, inter alia, that in cases where the decision rendered by a
bureau or o ce is appealable to the Commission, the same may initially be appealed to
the department and finally to the Commission.
The rules and regulations implementing the Civil Service Law referred to in
Section 91 of the DILG Act of 1990 is the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of
Executive Order No. 292 known as the Administrative Code of 1987 promulgated by
the CSC. Section 31 and 32, Rule XIV of the said Rules provide as follows:
SEC. 31. Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law,
the Commission shall have the nal authority to pass upon the removal,
separation and suspension of all o cers and employees in the civil service and
upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline and e ciency of such o cers
and employees.
SEC. 32. The Secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities,
provinces, cities and municipalities shall have jurisdiction to investigate and
decide matters involving disciplinary action against o cers and employees under
their jurisdiction. Their decisions shall be nal in case the penalty imposed is
suspension for not more than thirty (30) days or ne in an amount not exceeding
thirty (30) days' salary. In case the decision rendered by a bureau or o ce head is
appealable to the Commission, the same may be initially appealed to the
department, then to the Merit Systems Protection Board, and nally to the
Commission and pending appeal, the same shall be executory except when the
penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be executory only after
confirmation by the Secretary concerned.

Under Section 7 of E.O. No. 262, 2 0 the Secretary of the DILG has the power of
supervision and control of his Department. His powers and functions thereunder are
recognized and affirmed in Section 10 of the DILG Act of 1990. 2 1
In view then of the aforementioned gap in Section 45 of the DILG Act of 1990, the
provisions of the Civil Service Law and the rules and regulations implementing it must
be taken into account in light of the maxim interpretare concordare legibus est optimus
interpretandi or every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other
statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. 2 2
As thus construed and harmonized, it follows that if a RAB fails to decide an
appealed case within sixty days from receipt of the notice of appeal, the appealed
decision is deemed nal and executory, and the aggrieved party may forthwith appeal
therefrom to the Secretary of the DILG. Likewise, if the RAB has decided the appeal
within the sixty-day period, its decision may still be appealed to the Secretary of the
DILG.
In the instant case, Cabada's appeal was addressed to "the Honorable Secretary
of the Department of the Interior and Local Government . . . as Chairman and Presiding
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 O cer of the National Police Commission," 23 while De Guzman's petition for review
was addressed to "the Honorable Secretary, Department of the Interior and Local
Government and Chairman, National Police Commission, Makati City, Metro Manila." 24
We consider the appeal and the petition for review as appeals to the Secretary of
the DILG under Section 45 of the DILG Act of 1990.
Only the Secretary of the DILG can act thereon, one way or the other. The
NAPOLCOM did not have authority over the appeal and the petition for review, and just
because both mentioned the Secretary of the DILG as Chairman or Presiding O cer of
the NAPOLCOM did not bring them within the jurisdiction of the NAPOLCOM. The latter
does not have such jurisdiction because Section 14 of the DILG Act of 1990 pertinently
provides as follows:
SEC. 14. Powers and Functions of the Commission. — . . .
xxx xxx xxx
(j) A rm, reverse or modify, through the National Appellate Board,
personnel disciplinary action involving demotion or dismissal from the service
imposed upon members of the Philippine National Police by the Chief of the
Philippine National Police;

(k) Exercise appellate jurisdiction through the regional appellate

boards over administrative cases against policemen and over decisions on claims
for police benefits. . . .

This section clearly shows that the NAPOLCOM exercises appellate jurisdiction only on the
following cases and THROUGH (a) the NAB in personnel disciplinary actions involving
demotion or dismissal from the service imposed by the Chief of the PNP, and (b) the RAB
in administrative cases against policemen and over decisions on claims for police
benefits. It has no appellate jurisdiction over decisions rendered by the NAB and the RAB.
Consequently, the NAPOLCOM did not have the power or authority to issue,
through Commissioner Alexis Canonizado, the 24 March 1995 decision denying due
course to the appeal and petition for review filed by petitioners Cabada and De Guzman,
respectively, for lack of jurisdiction because of Section 5, Rule III of NAPOLCOM
Memorandum Circular No. 91-006 and Section 23, Rule IV of NAPOLCOM
Memorandum Circular No. 91-002. The reference to these rules suggest that the
NAPOLCOM believes it has jurisdiction over appeals from decisions of the RAB if the
latter has not decided the appeal within the reglementary period of sixty days. Such a
suggestion is awed because it would allow a ridiculous situation where the
NAPOLCOM vests upon itself an appellate jurisdiction from a decision rendered by it in
the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction through the RAB, per Section 14(k) of the DILG
Act of 1990. Moreover, Commissioner Canonizado cannot, singly, act for the
NAPOLCOM because it is a collegial body composed of a Chairman and four
Commissioners, pursuant to Section 13 of the DILG Act of 1990.
In light of the foregoing, the petitioners could properly invoke our original
jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court to annul and set aside the NAPOLCOM's decision of 24 March 1995. It being a
patent nullity, the ling of a motion for its reconsideration before the institution of this
special civil action may be dispensed with. 2 5
II

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 The plea of the O ce of the Solicitor General that the instant action is premature
for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is thus untenable. We would have
sustained it if the Secretary of the DILG was the one who denied due course to or
dismissed the appeal of petitioner Cabada and the petition for review of petitioner De
Guzman. By then, pursuant to Section 91 of the DILG Act of 1990; Section 47, Chapter
6, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987; and Section 31 and 32
of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292, the appeal
would have to be led with the CSC. And futile would be the petitioners claim in their
Reply to the Comment of the OSG that their case falls within the exceptions to the rule
on exhaustion of administrative remedies.
In view of all the foregoing, a discussion on the other issues raised by the
petitioners relating to the merits of the case and on the issue of due process is
unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
decision (in the form of a letter) of the National Police Commission of 24 March 1995
is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local
Government is DIRECTED to RESOLVE with reasonable dispatch the appeal and petition
for review of petitioners SPO3 NOEL CABADA and SPO3 RODOLFO G. DE GUZMAN,
respectively, from the decision of 15 August 1994 and resolution of 25 October 1994
of the Regional Appellate Board, Eighth Regional Command, if the same were led on
time.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Melo, Francisco, Jr. and Panganiban, JJ ., concur.

Footnotes
1. Mistakenly designated by the petitioners as a "Petition for Review by Certiorari under
Rule 65. Rules of Court."
2. Annex "A" of Petition; Rollo, 33-34. Per NAPOLCOM Commissioner Alexis C. Canonizado.

3. Annex "C," Id.; Id., 65-70. Per RAB Chairman Atty. Leodegario J. Alfaro; P/Sr. Supt.
Antonio G. Dadula, Deputy Regional Director for Administration; and Regional State
Prosecutor Francisco Q. Aurillo, Jr..
4. Annex "F," Petition; Rollo, 74-76. Per P/Sr. Supt. Antonio G. Dadula and Regional State
Prosecutor Francisco Q. Aurillo, Jr., with RAB Chairman Atty. Leodegario J. Alfaro,
dissenting.
5. The private respondent also instituted three criminal cases against the petitioners, viz.,
(1) for arbitrary detention; (2) for violation of R.A. No. 7438 (An Act Defining Certain
Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial Investigation As Well As the
Duties of the Arresting, Detaining, and Investigating Officers and Providing Penalties for
Violations Thereof); and (3) for robbery. The first was docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-
05-15 in Branch 1 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Tacloban City, but was
dismissed on 10 August 1994 upon motion of the petitioners who invoked their right to
speedy trial, considering the private respondent's non-appearance during the previous
setting and the difficulty met by the sheriff in serving the subpoena upon the latter
(Annex "M" of Petition; Rollo, 89, per Judge Marino S. Buban). The second was docketed
as Criminal Case No. 94-05-278 in Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
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 Tacloban City, but was dismissed on 5 October 1994 upon a finding by the trial court
that the constitutional rights of the private respondent during custodial investigation
were not violated by the petitions (Annex "N," Id., Id., 90-91; per Judge Pedro S. Espina).
The third was docketed as Criminal Case No. 95-08-309 in Branch 8 of the RTC of
Tacloban City which was provisionally dismissed on 7 December 1995 upon motion of
the petitioners who invoked their right to speedy trial (Annex "A" of the petitioners'
Memorandum; Id., 158; per Judge Mateo M. Leanda).

6. Annex "D" of Petition; Id., 71-72.

7. Annex "E," Id.; Id., 73.
8. Petitioners' Memorandum, 8; Rollo, 154.
9. Paragraph 12 of Petition; Id., 17.
10. Annex "B-1," Id.; Id., 51. It may also be pointed out that in its decision of 15 August 1994
(supra note 3), RAB 8 stated that the appeal interposed by the petitioners is based on the
following grounds: (a) errors of law and irregularities have been committed during the
investigation prejudicial to their rights; (b) the findings of facts are not supported by
substantial evidence; and (c) the denial of their motion for reconsideration is contrary to
law and jurisprudence. This shows that the petitioners appealed from the decision of the
Regional Director of PNP-RECOM 8 and not from Special Order No. 174, and that the
motion for its reconsideration was denied.

11. Supra note 3.

12. Supra note 4.
13. Annex "B-1" of Petition; Rollo, 51.
14. Annex "B," Id.; Id., 35.
15. Annex "A." Petitioner; Rollo, 33-34.

16. R.A. No. 6975.

17. Section 6, Article XVI, 1987 Constitution.
18. Section 6, DILG Act of 1990, provides:
Section 6. Organization. — The Department shall consist of the Department Proper, the
existing bureaus and the offices of the Department of Local Government, the National
Police Commission, the Philippine Public Safety College, and the following bureaus: the
Philippine National Police, the Bureau of Fire Protection, and the Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology.
19. It provides as follows:

Section 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities
and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters.
20. Entitled "Reorganizing the Department of Local Government and for Other Purposes,"
issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on 25 July 1987.
21. The said section reads in part as follows:
Sec. 10. Specific Powers and Functions of the Secretary. — In addition to his powers
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 and functions as provided in Executive Order No. 262, the Secretary as Department head
shall have the following powers and functions . . . .

22. Republic vs. Asuncion, 231 SCRA 211, 232 [1994], citing RUBEN E. AGPALO, Statutory
Construction 192 [2nd ed., 1990].

23. Rollo, 51.

24. Id., 35.
25. See FLORENZ D. REGALADO, Remedial Law Compendium, vol. I [1988] 460, citing
cases.

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