Public Administration and Governance: Esther Randall

Public Administration
and Governance
Esther Randall
and Governance
and Governance
Edited by
Esther Randall
Published by The English Press,
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Copyright © 2019 The English Press
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ISBN: 978-1-9789-3765-9
Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Public administration and governance / edited by Esther Randall.

p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-9789-3765-9
1. Public administration. 2. Political science. I. Randall, Esther.
JF1351 .P83 2019
351--dc23
Contents

Preface...........................................................................................................................................................VII
Chapter 1 Does local government have capacity for enabling local economic
development? Lessons from Jamaica.......................................................................................................... 1
Eris D Schoburgh
Chapter 2 Learning in Australian local government: A roadmap for improving education

& training....................................................................................................................................................... 21
Ronald Woods, Sarah Artist and Geraldine O’Connor
WT
Chapter 3 Public participation in services delivery projects in Buikwe District Local
Government Uganda.................................................................................................................................... 40
Sylvester Kugonza and Robert Mukobi
Chapter 4 The ‘silent pistol’ in Ghana’s local government system: presiding

members vs. chief executives..................................................................................................................... 60
Issah Justice Musah-Surugu and Emmanuel Yeboah-Assiamah
Chapter 5 Local government administration in Nigeria: the search for relevance............................................. 80

Ozohu-Suleiman Abdulhamid and Paul Chima
Chapter 6 Mind the gap: Australian local government reform and councillors’
understandings of their roles...................................................................................................................... 95
Su Fei Tan, Alan Morris and Bligh Grant
Chapter 7 Australian local governments and the early national broadband

network roll-out................................. ......................................................................................................... 116
Tooran Alizadeh and Heather Shearer
Chapter 8 Supporting local governance and local economic development – some

experiences from Swaziland..................................................................................................................... 134
Terry Parker
Chapter 9 Citizen participation in urban local government: a case study of Kanaighat

Paurashava in Bangladesh........................................................................................................................ 147
Mohammad Shahjahan Chowdhury and Muhammad Aktaruzzaman
Chapter 10 Network governance and capacity of local governments to deliver LED

in Uganda..................................................................................................................................................... 163
Rose B Namara, Gerald Kagambirwe Karyeija and Betty C Mubangizi
Chapter 11 Can organisation development principles in India’s local governments improve

governance?.................................................................................................................................................. 189
Sonali Srivastava and Madhavi Rajadhyaksha
______________________WORLD TECHNOLOGIES______________________
VI Contents
Chapter 12 Women’s leadership in local government in the Caribbean.............................................................. 211

Kizzann Lee Sam

Permissions

List of Contributors

Index
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Preface
Public administration refers to the implementation of government administrative policy for effective
governance. Its approaches are aimed at maximizing efficiency and effectiveness. It also strives to provide
better customer service. Some of the significant aspects of public administration include human resource
management, organizational theory, policy analysis, budgeting and ethics. Decision-making is crucial
to the role of a public administrator. Various decision-making models have been formulated. These
include budget-maximizing model and bureau-shaping model. The topics included in this book on public
administration and governance are of the utmost significance and bound to provide incredible insights
to readers. It attempts to understand the multiple branches that fall under this discipline and how such
concepts have practical applications. It will be beneficial to public administrators, policymakers, students
and experts involved in this field at various levels.
WT
After months of intensive research and writing, this book is the end result of all who devoted their
time and efforts in the initiation and progress of this book. It will surely be a source of reference in
enhancing the required knowledge of the new developments in the area. During the course of developing
this book, certain measures such as accuracy, authenticity and research focused analytical studies were
given preference in order to produce a comprehensive book in the area of study.
This book would not have been possible without the efforts of the authors and the publisher. I extend
my sincere thanks to them. Secondly, I express my gratitude to my family and well-wishers. And
most importantly, I thank my students for constantly expressing their willingness and curiosity in
enhancing their knowledge in the field, which encourages me to take up further research projects for
the advancement of the area.
Editor
WT
1
Does local government have
capacity for enabling local
economic development? Lessons
from Jamaica
Eris D Schoburgh
University of the West Indies
WT
Mona Campus
Abstract
Implementation of the Caribbean Local Economic Development Project (CARILED) 1began in 2012 in
seven countries for a duration of six years, to support sustainable economic growth in the region.
CARILED has introduced the idea of local economic development (LED) to the ‘development’ debate
in the region but has also brought the organisational capacity of local government, and local
government’s role as ‘facilitator’ of LED,to the fore. This paper assesses organizational behaviour
and capability in local government in Jamaica to determine the state of readiness for a developmental
role. The paper draws on two sets of research data to aid its analysis–a capacity audit (CAPAUD)
conducted in 2010 and an organisational analysis (OA)commissioned by the Ministry of Local
Government in 2010, both of which targeted a sample of local authorities in Jamaica.
The study found that when assessed against established criteria for an LED organisation, ie: research
and information provision; marketing and coordination; learning and innovation; and leadership -
local government’s institutional and organisational capacity for development is unevenly distributed.
For instance, local leaders understood organisational purpose but efforts to give effect to this
appeared undeveloped, sporadic and uni-directional. It was also evident that participatory strategies
are used to gain information from communities but these were often devoid of systematic research
methodologies rendering formal community impact on local planning negligent. Finally there is
strong potential for the kind of administrative leadership required by a developmental local
government to evolve,indicated by the quality of training, quantum of managerial/supervisory staff,
and stability of staff establishment. However, this potential is threatened by the deficiencies in the
non-traditional functional areas that are strategic to the organisation’s effectiveness as a ‘facilitator’
of LED, ie:alignment of community engagement/interface with LED priorities, diffusion of
information technology in organisational processes, and utilisation of policy analysis and
development. These findings contribute important policy relevant information to the discourses in the
region about the construction of alternative solutions to institutional and organisational problems in
response to the economic crises of small island developing states (SIDS).
1
CARILED is funded by Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD) with support from the
Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM) as well as Caribbean and Commonwealth countries. CARILED partners with
50 local governments to support the growth and development of 500 micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs). The
project is valued at $23 million CAD.
2 Public Administration and Governance
Introduction
The Caribbean is a collection of small island states that differ in geographic and population size,
socio-cultural composition, political status (not all are independent nations), and level and pace
economic development. It is also a composite of regional economic and geopolitical sub-groupings,
including:
− the Commonwealth Caribbean that comprises the former colonies of Britainthat have retained
Westminster politico-administrative values and traditions to large degrees;
− Caribbean Community (CARICOM)2which is a loosely designed trading bloc enabled by the
Treaty of Chaguaramas of 1973 and which has been moving incrementally towards an
economic union;
− the Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME),3, and
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− the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS)45
Irrespective of the sub-groupings, the Caribbean is defined by two main features: small size and
vulnerability to external shocks (eg: global economic crises or natural disasters). These features
informed the Composite Vulnerability Index (CVI) developed by a Commonwealth Secretariat and
World Bank task-force,with the aim of leveraging special consideration for small-island developing
states (SIDs) in international negotiations. The CVI has unfortunately not been adopted by the
international development community but policy officials in the Caribbeanstill use vulnerability as a
bargaining chip.
2
CARICOM comprises 15 countries: Antigua and Barbuda, the Commonwealth of the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, the
Commonwealth of Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. Associate CARICOM Members are Anguilla, Bermuda,
British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands and Turks and Caicos Islands.
3
Under the legal framework of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, the CSME project is now scheduled for completion by
2015. As noted in the text, the original completion date had been scheduled for 1993. As Girvan noted: “The process of
CSME implementation has been marked by missed targets and unevenness of compliance among member countries.”(Girvan
2008).
Girvan went on to state that 55% of the “agreed-to measures” that are required for the full implementation of the CSME, had
not yet been implemented in 2007. The implementation deficit was principally in the second phase of the CSME project: that
is, the completion of the single economy. Agreements on the single market (CSM) were substantially advanced. Thus, while
most of the institutional infrastructure, tariffs, quotas and other impediments to free circulation of goods in CARICOM
markets were removed, those unifying the sub-region as a single economic space were lagging. These included the failure to
complete a single economy for services, investment, unified sectoral and social policies, government procurement, ICT,
monetary and fiscal coordination.
4
Seven micro-States in the Eastern Caribbean (with a combined population of 810,000 persons and a geographic area of just
over 29,000 square kilometres) formed a sub-grouping in 1981, the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS):
Antigua and Barbuda, the Commonwealth of Dominica, Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines, and
Montserrat. Within CARICOM, under the inaugurating Treaty, OECS member States are classified as Least Developed
Country (LDCs) and, as such, are afforded asymmetrical commitments, obligations and benefits. However, this sub-grouping
has since managed closer unity than the larger body. It operates with a common currency, pooled external reserves, a
common Central Bank (ECCB), its own Secretariat, Joint Foreign Missions, and an Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court.
OECS has achieved
much better economic performance and quality of life indicators than several of its “more developed” counterparts in
CARICOM.
5
Haiti and Cuba are sometimes treated as special cases but are important in the development profile of the Caribbean.
Does local government have capacity for enabling local economic development? Lessons... 3
This paper focuses on local government in the Commonwealth Caribbean,although local government
does not exist or function effectively in all member countries, challenging the proposition of a
developmental local government (DLG). A DLG is by definition ‘development-oriented’–ie: a system of
sub-national government mandated to design and implement policies aimed at increasing local economic
growth resulting in positive social transformation of the lives of residents in a sustainable way. DLG is
focused on improving the local environment to attract private sector investment and create employment,
and its policy style is thus proactive and driven by demand for effective responses to local needs. A
DLG thus requires a democratically decentralised institutional framework to bb operational.
The concept of a DLG and its close association with local economic development (LED) thus adds a
new dimension to the rhetoric of local government reform and development strategies in the region, as
the concept departs in a radical way from the ‘politically-oriented’ and ’controlled’ local government
WT
systems that currently exist (for a description of these see e.g. Commonwealth Local Government
Forum’s Handbook; Schoburgh 2006; Ragoonath and Duncan 2009). Although for ECLAC’s Report
(2009) it seems that ‘all that could be said on the topic[of Caribbean development] has already been
said’, this position has been rubbished in later analyses that assert a worsening development crisis in
the region but also see new opportunities foraddressing development problems. Against the
background of a decline in the region’s traditional economic base that has increased the vulnerability
of the states, LED presents new opportunities and is increasingly seen as a local government priority.
The World Bank defines LED as‘a process by which public, business and nongovernmental sector
partners, work collectively to create better conditions for economic growth and employment
generation’.For the Commonwealth Local Government Forum (CLGF) LED is‘a process which
brings together different partners in a local area to work together and harness local resources for
sustainable economic growth’.Implementation of the 6-year Caribbean Local Economic Development
Project (CARILED),aimed at sustainable economic growth in the region has examined the capacity of
local government to assume the new role of ‘facilitator’ of LED. CARILED has placed DLG in the
region firmly on the policy agenda.
This paper thus assesses organisational behaviour and capability in local government in Jamaica to
determine the state of readiness for a developmental role. The paper draws on two sets of research data
to aid its analysis. These are a capacity audit (CAPAUD) conducted in 2010 and an organisational
analysis (OA)commissioned by the Ministry of Local Government in 2010, both exercises of which
targeted a sample of local authorities in Jamaica. The paper provides important policy-relevant
information for reformers and henceforth develops its arguments in four sections. Section one highlights
the decentering development debate while section two engages the conceptual and practical issues
involved in capacitating local government for LED, integrating a discussion on what CARILED
portends for both local government reform and development policy in the region. The remaining two
sections analyse the findings of the CAPAUD and discuss the implications for local government.
Development context and the search for a new paradigm

‘Development’ defies precise definition, but it is clear from the discourse that it entails a process of
graduated positive change in the economic, social and political dimensions of a country. The holistic
approach to development has been acknowledged as a more sustainable basis on which to seek
improved collective welfare and is emphasised in both the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
and the Human Development Indices (HDIs). Despite the importance of the MDGs and HDIs,
economic measures of development retain prominence, in social goals, particularly for Caribbean
countries. ECLAC’s Report (2009) observes that:
For many Latin American and Caribbean countries, the debt problem, brewed in the
seventies, became a permanent obstacle to development in the eighties. It now
threatens to remain an important development issue as well as a contentious topic in
the arena of international economic co-operation. (p. 1)
WT
The necessity of attaining eeconomic measures of development is validated further in two World
Bank studies,A Time toChoose: Caribbean Development in the 21st Century(WB 2005a) and Towards
a NewAgenda for Growth(WB 2005b) both of which highlighted the region's unrealised economic
potential. The regional neoliberal debate on development, while accepting the need for a
'repositioning of the Caribbean withinglobalisation' has not fully embraced the World Bank’s
interpretation of Caribbean development problems and prescriptions, citing a disregard of indigenous
analyses. Yet, as the ECLAC Report (2009) affirms:development strategies in the Commonwealth
Caribbean have missed their targets, and its economicassessment of CARICOMhighlights the
negative effects of the global economic crisis (p. 6) and places growth at the top of the list of
economic performance indicators. ECLAC notes that for the period 2003-2007, GDP growth rates
averaged just 3.2%. More recently, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) found that growth in Latin
America and the Caribbean in 2012 was 3%, but in 2013 growth slowed to 2.6%. Slight increases are
predicted for 2014 and 2015 at 3.0% and 3.3% respectively6.
Arguably the starting point for a discourse around a DLG as a new paradigm of development in the
region is Dirlik’s1999 article, Place-based imagination: Globalism and the Politics of Place, in which
therelationship between the global and the local is framed in a social and political dialectic in which
place is recognised as both integral to human existence and as a counter ideology to globalisation. The
claim is that ‘place-based consciousness is closely linked to, and appears as the radical other of that
conspicuous phenomenon of the last decade, globalism’ (p. 151). The inference is, while globalisation
changes the relationship between countries and groups, people make sense of these changes in more
intimate settings in which they naturally coalesce. These settings are characteristically defined by
relationships around the household, ie: localities or communities. Thus the ‘advocacy of place’ is a
concern with the most appropriate means of sustaining the array of social and political relationships
that define space. ‘Place-based consciousness’ in Dirlik’s (1999) view ‘reaffirms the necessity of
reconstructing life from below in its very connectedness with nature’ (p. 182).
6
imf.org
The World Bank's 2009 World Development Report:ReshapingEconomic Geographyalso makes a

case for decentreing development because productive relationships are argued to be most evident in
spaces in a sub-section of a country or region. The World Development Report (WDR) (2009) notes
that, ‘production concentrates in big cities, leading provinces, and wealthy nations’ (p.xiii). However
at the same time the WDR is pointing to the unevenness of development when it states that:
Half the world’sproduction fits onto 1.5% of its land. Cairo produces more than half of Egypt’s
GDP,using just 0.5% of its area. Brazil’s three south-central states comprise 15% ofits land, but
more than half its production. And North America, the European Union, andJapan—with fewer
than a billion people—account for three-quarters of the world’s wealth (xiii).
Placed-based interventions are a useful means of redressing the problems of global development and
alleviating the problems of the ‘bottom billion’ for whom poverty and high mortality persist. It is
acknowledged however that place-based interventions might not produce equal economic outcomes.
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In this vein the WDR cautions that ‘economic growth will be unbalanced’ with placed-based
interventions and that ‘to try to spread it out is to discourage it–to fight prosperity, not poverty’.
Barca’s (2009) report about the economic state of the European Unionadvanced a similar position,
assertingthat aplace-based policy is useful for tackling under-utilisation of potential and
reducingsocial exclusion in specific places (vii). Barca (2009) asserts that ‘in place-based policy,
public interventions rely on local knowledge and are verifiable andsubmitted to scrutiny, while
linkages among places are taken into account’ (Ibid). For these reasons placed-based policy is seen as
superior to alternative strategies that do not make theirterritorial focusexplicit. Moreover at times
traditional development strategies hide their territorial focus behind a screen of space-blindness,
failing tointegrate services, either assuming that the state knows best or relying on the choices of a
few private actors (Barca 2009: vii).
Despite these compelling arguments, placed-based thinking has not necessarily engendered a new
paradigm in local and regional development but rather reinforced the assumptions of earlier theories
and models of LED (e.g. Plummer and Taylor 2001; Porter 1998; Myrdal 1957; Perroux 1950).
Renewed interest in the value of local government in place-based thinking is emerging. For instance
Tomaney (2010) argues that ‘place-based approaches require strengthened local and regional
institutions thatare able to assess and develop local economic assets in ways that amount to morethan
“tailoring national policies”’ (p. 7). Schoburgh (2012) makes a connection between local
government,community development and LED, and with Bureauregard (1993) reasons that local
institutions are at the nexus of these three processes (p. 26). The democratic value of local
government is now bolstered by its economic value in place-based approaches with LED strategiesat
the centre.
From project to policy: capacitating developmental local government
Adequate capacity is a key determinant of the success of place-based and LED strategies. Capacity
denotes the ability to do something, which manifests in individualcompetencies, collective capabilities
and overall system ability. Nonetheless, neither acknowledgment of the significance of institutions
and institutional capacity,noruse of both concepts in development discourses has clarified precisely
the meaning of capacity (see e.g. Kaplan 2000; Christensen and Gazley 2008). In Kaplan’s (2000)
view the visible elements of human and material resources, organisational structure and procedures,
do not tell the whole story about organisational performance. As Kaplan (2000) explains:
Organisations may have written statements of vision, of strategy, and of value, but these
writtenstatements do not in any sense indicate whether an organisation actually has a
workingunderstanding of its world.They do not indicate the extent to which an organisation
feelsresponsible for its circumstances or capable of having an effect on them, or to which
anorganisation is really striving to become a learning organisation,or to what extent it
WT
isdeveloping its staff or manifesting a team spirit or endeavour. Furthermore, they do
notindicate the extent to which an organisation is reflective, non-defensive, and self-critical (p.
520).
The suggestion is that there is an invisible side to the organisation that ought to be taken into account
when considering its capacity. Thus if capacity is being assessed from an institutional perspective, a
distinction ought to be made between two dimensions of the organisation observed by Kaplan (2000)
in the quote above, embodied in the ‘rules in form’ and the invisible elements of ‘rules in use’ (see
e.g. Ostrom 2007). Both institutional and organisational analyses recognise the potency of the
invisible elements on organisational performance and capacity.
The capacity of local governments or local agencies (where no local government exists) to facilitate
the growth of micro, small and medium size enterprises (MSMEs) to stimulate local economic
development in several Caribbean countries is the aim of CARILED, a six-year project valued at
CDN$23.2M. The CARILED project makes the most direct connection between local government
and local economic development sincethe 1970s when,under the rubric of democratic socialism,local
governments in Jamaica and Guyana were encouraged to facilitate community-based enterprises via
partnerships with community councils. However, unlike the 1970s where the advocacy for a role for
local government in development (see e.g Mill 1974) and strategies adopted had a strong political
undertone, the current discourse favours economic growth in localities as means of improving the
conditions of a significant portion of the population. CARILED is being implemented in CARICOM
despite ‘serious diseconomies of scale,low productivity, and high operating costs, for businesses and
in the provision of basic public andinfrastructural services’ (ECLAC 2009:12-13) and significant
variations in resources and capacities in the region. The IMF's sobering observation isthat: ‘most
Caribbean economies continue to navigate ina sea of elevated debt, weak external demand, and
unfavourable terms of trade' (IMF 2012 p. 5).
CARILED offers new perspectives on, and approaches to, managing the development process. It
incorporates cross-cutting themes such as gender in its focus on female-led MSMEs, and partnerships
between local government/local organisations and local businesses. The expectation is that CARILED
countries will see outcomes in local business expansion, improved local economic governance and
service delivery, and sound policy. Lessons from CARILED will inform domestic policieson LED
and assist in the design of innovativepolicy and management models relevant to the wider
Commonwealth Caribbean.
Clearly CARILED is more than a project. It represents a new ideology about economic development
models and strategy. It has introduced alternative ways of thinking about and practicing development
in the region. However, although CARILED invokes a specific developmental role for local
government it introduces a dialectic about the appropriateness of assigning this role to local
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government. First there is an uneasy nexus between Caribbean local governments and their
organisational capacity for development. Second reform policies have assigned a role for local
government beyond conventional local development eg: local business development, which situates
local development in broader processes of community development. The question of what should be
the focus in local government in the region –local development or LED – needs resolution in light of
the implications for institutional and organisational capacity (Schoburgh 2012).
Assessing local government capacity
A capacity audit (CAPAUD) of eight local authorities in Jamaica was undertaken in 2010 to assess
the institutional and organisational infrastructure of local government.The CAPAUD took the form a
questionnaire that covered aspects of local authorities’ organisational operations and relationships
administered by the researcher. Respondents from each local authority were interviewed for this part
of the audit – the mayor, the secretary manager, and the human resource director referred to in the
study as ‘local leaders’ (inclusive of administrative and political leadership roles). Those items that
relate specifically to the economic developmental role of the local authority as set out in Blakely and
Bradshaw (2002) and expanded in Schoburgh (2012) ie: research and information provision;
marketing and coordination; leadership; and learning and innovationwere isolated for analysis for
this paper using descriptive statistics. The CAPAUD results are supplemented by findings of a
Department of Local Government’s commissioned organisational analysis of the fourteen local
authorities in Jamaica. The assessment criteria used in this paper assume that the features of an
economic developmental organisation, whether taken singly or in combination, are important
indicators of organisational behaviour. In order to reduce the level of bias in the results the approach
adopted in the analysis was to gauge, in the current context of reform, whether there are tendencies
toward a transformational trajectory in the operations of the local authority. The next sections discuss
the findings within these parameters.
Findings
Research and information provision
The CAPAUD sought to determine the extent to which local authorities studied were orientated
towards:
i) Generation of policy relevant information, and
ii) Identification of policy issues in line with clearly articulatedlocal developmental goals.
The measures used to assess these two features were a) local leaders’ understanding of the mandate of
the local authority, b) whether the mandate reflected the needs of the parish (administrative
jurisdiction) and c) the method used by the local authority to ascertain local/parish needs.
In relation to the first measure – local leaders’ understanding of the mandate of the local authority –
the majority of local leaders viewed provision of services to communities as the primary mandate of
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the local authority (SO=29.4%)(Figure 1).However two other interpretations were that its mandate is
as the local governing body (GL=25.2%),or that the mandate is formalised in a legislative framework
(FI=16.8%).
On the question of whether the mandate of the local authority reflects the needs of the parish, all
respondents thought it did (Figure 2). Figure 3indicates that the most prevalent means of determining
local needs was through a consultative process.
Figure 1: Local
Local leaders’
Leaders' interpretation
Interpretation of mandate
of Mandate
0 S ervice-orientation (S O) =
Local s ervice provis ion body
16.80%
G overning locally (G L) =
29.40% Local governing body
Dictated by law and other

formal ins tituions (F I) –
F ormalis ed in law,
regulations , charters etc
25.20%
Does mandate reflect

Figure 2: Does the needs
the mandate ofthe
reflect theneeds
parish?
of the parish?
Y es
100%
Figure 3: Community needs-
assessment modalities
Does local government have capacity for enabling local
Community economic development?
Needs-Assessment Lessons...
Modalities 9
C ons ultations /c ommunity

4.20% reas onings /town hall meetings
16.80%
29.40% C ounc illors ’ ac tivities : interac tion
with res idents ; retreat;
obs ervations /walk through
Meetings c onvened by c ommunity
groups : P DC s /C DC s /P TA s /NG O s
a. Direc t reques t from res idents ;

25.20% b. R es earc h and feedbac k on
development plan; c . S urvey
The important finding is that local leaders understood organisational purpose but efforts to give effect
to this were sporadic and uni-directional as actions were conceived from within the local authority and
implemented internally and externally. Communities are consulted frequently but there is little
evidence of the deployment of appropriate recording methodologies and storage of community data to
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inform policy.Incorporation of formal research findings into the operations of local authorities is
negligible,and at the time of the capacity audit only one local authority in the sample had a
development plan. The criterion of research and information provision is at a basic level and is not
sufficiently oriented to transform the operations of the local authority even with evidence of an
adoption of participatory methods in community and local authority interface.
Marketing and coordination
Successful LED activities have two key activities in common - promotion of development attributes
(of the locale), and synchronisation of local interests for collective goals. Implicitly the local authority
should have the capacity to develop strategies to assist in effective performance of these two tasks.
The extent to which these features are evident in local authority operations in Jamaica were assessed
by two indicators:
i) the nature of the internal business process of the local authority, and
ii) responsiveness to community demands in service delivery (demand capacity).
With respect to the internal business process of the local authority, questions were posed to
respondents to find outwhether: the management of service delivery allows proper monitoring and
evaluation of the quality of service provision; there were clearly established protocols/guidelines for
service delivery, and staff had access to these protocols/guidelines, and the extent to which laws and
bye-laws are translated into service targets and performance indicators. The aim was to assess the
performance-orientation of the local authority.
More respondents (50.0%) said they had protocols/guidelines outside the law to monitor service
delivery than those who said these protocols/guidelines did not (43.8%) exist. Of the former group a
significant majority (70.0%) reported that these protocols/guidelines were available to all staff as
against a few (20.0%) who said they were not, and still fewer (10.0%) who said they did not know if
these were accessible to staff. The percentage margin between the local authorities in the sample that
had these protocols/guidelines in place and those that did not is small (6.2%), from which result one
may infer that there are as many local authorities that use administrative guidelines as those that do
not.7The services in which these protocols/guidelines were used were in the category of regulation, the
most cited activities being building approval and governance of burials on residential lots. Direct
provision of services followed, with drain cleaning and road maintenance named most frequently.
Interestingly the guidelines governing the building approval process are central government initiatives
which means that although local leaders’ cited these guidelines as an aspect of local innovation in
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service monitoring they are the outputs of decisions taken at a central government level.
Figure 4: Existence of monitoring mechanisms

Existence of Service Monitoring Mechanisms
31.25%
Y es
68.75% No
Figure 4shows that a majority of local authorities (68.8%) claimed that they had mechanisms in place
to monitor and evaluate service provision and these were identified as: status reports that were
presented at committee meetings; ‘expert’ opinions of technical staff; internal audits; advice of the
Portmore Municipal Council Advisory Committee (in the case of the Portmore Municipal Council);
informal feedback from service users, and formal service surveys. Also mentioned were
administrative actions such as setting timelines for staff, and the mayor’s scope to include service
monitoring and evaluation. However, 31.2% of the local authorities reviewed had no ‘checklists or
benchmarks’ against which service quality is assessed.Nor was the development of a workplan with
specific targets a general practice. For although a majority (56.2%) said they used these methods, a
contending minority (43.8%) reported that they did not for different reasons as a few comments
illustrate: “Service delivery is not systematically measured”; “We do not measure performance very
well”; “We are trying to develop a system but nothing is in place yet”. Moreover this ‘majority’ is
reduced by a 12.6% margin when compared with the 68.8% that indicated that they had mechanisms
in place to monitor and evaluate service provision(Figure 4). For local authorities that set service
targets, these are usually annual as shown in Figure 5,timed to strengthen negotiations for budgetary
allocation from central government, rather than to enhance performance at the local level.
7
Especially if a presumption is made that the single response that selected ‘don’t know’ means that there are
no guidelines (for if there were it was be known).
How often are

Figure 5: s ervicofesetting
Frequency targ service
ets s et?
targets
16.67%
A nnually
Quarterly
83.33%
The level of demand capacity was assessed in the audit by examining how the local authority prepares
WT
to meet the expectations of citizens. Local leaders responded to questions about ‘high demand’
services to find out: whether communities were informed of the extent of its responsibility for the
service, the level of demand for the service and whether the local authority has been able to meet the
demand.The majority of respondents (91.7%) thought that communities are aware of the local
authority’s responsibility the services, and even the few (8.3%) who thought that communities were
not aware indicated that it was important for them to become aware. An audit of key services shows
the most commonwaysthat communities are informedabout, and express preferences for, local
authority services.
Table 1: Community-local authority channel of communication
CM = community meetings/consultations; RK = residual knowledge; Cllr = councilor; Enf=

enforcement; PE/PR = public education/relations; O =- other
Table 1shows that consultations/community meetings (CM) emerge as the most frequently used
means through which the local authority communicates with communities about its service
responsibilities. The community also learns through historical/residual knowledge (RK). The third
most frequently cited source of service information is the Councillor (Cllr). Interestingly, enforcement
orders (Enf) that perhaps produce negative responses from citizens are the primary source through
which information about regulatory services are provided to local citizens aremore important than
public educational/relational (PE/PR) tools.
Estimate
Figure ofofDemand
6: Estimate demand forfor
localService
service by local authority
100.00%
90.00%
80.00%
70.00%
60.00%
50.00%
40.00% Don't K now
30.00%
20.00% Not V ery High
10.00% Not High
0.00%
High
il
c il
c il
il
cil
l
c il
cil
ci
nc
nc
un
un
un
un
un
un
V ery High
ou
ou
Co
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Co
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al
al
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ris
ip
ris
ip
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ris
ic
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n
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Figure 6 shows that the level of demand for all services in the sample of local authorities is estimated
by local leaders to be between “very high”and “high” but in most cases no formal measure of demand
was undertaken. In addition estimated demand for services is met ‘sometimes’ by all local authorities
according to local leaders which brings into question their responsiveness to local needs.
Business process in the Jamaican local authority makes insufficient use of environmental inputs. This
finding is reinforced by the absence of objective measurement of citizens’ uptake of local services.
The conclusion is that the local authority is operating without information about the true demand of
current services or an understanding of the changes in uptake levels, service needs and expectations.
The local authority would therefore need to build capacity for marketing and coordination functions
as neither its business process nor its modes of communicating or extracting information from
communities is at a level that can support a developmental role.
Leadership
High quality leadership is essential for the local authority to realise its fullest capacity. Yet, local
authority leadership is a double-edged sword given the nature of the local authority as a political and
administrative institution, and leadership can be tenuous given the blurred lines between the political
and administrative dimensions of the organisation. The truth is that the influence of the political
dimension transcends virtually all aspects of decision-making and is sometimes perceived by
communities as a negative value in organisational performance given the proclivity for the local
representatives to reflect party discipline in decision-making. Recognisably the extent to which
developmental local government (DLG) is achieved depends in large measure on the outlook and
quality of political leadership.
The CAPAUD presumes that local elected representatives are qualified and legitimate leaders on the
basis that they are chosen through a democratic process and therefore endowments such as education
and training are incidental rather than germane to the transformative agenda implied. From the
perspective of this study, it is perhaps more importantthat there is adequate administrative
infrastructure to implement the new mandate that DLG will evolve. As a consequence the
administrative dimension of the local authoritywas the focus of the audit. Particular attention is paid
to the staffing establishment and the quality of the human resource at the higher tiers of administrative
leadership as illustrated in Figure 7.
Figure 7: Staff establishment
S taff E s tablis hment (Mean S c ores )

100.00% 100%
90.00%
84.90% 86.30% 87.10%
80.00%
70.00% 76.40%
60.00%
WT
50.00%
51.90%
40.00% S ample A verage
30.00% 37.50%
20.00% 25%
10.00%
0.00%
A dmin F in HTS TS P olA n Cl W el MIS /IT
C omp
 All local authorities in the sample had their full quota of technical services staff, followed
closely by administration in which two local authorities (St. Ann and Spanish Town8) had
90% and 89% of their staff, respectively.
 One local authority (Manchester) had its complement of managerial staff in the finance
category with the remaining local authorities ranging between 80% and 90% of their
establishment.
 One local authority (Clarendon) had its full complement of staff in the highly technical
services category, the remaining local authorities indicating between 83% and 91% of
establishment.
The local authority was assessed against the extent to which the staff establishment accounted for
particular functions considered instrumental to a development orientation in local government ie:
interaction with the community, utilisation of information technology (IT) in for example,
management information systems (MIS), and policy analysis and development.
8
Spanish Town is used to identify this local authority instead of St. Catherine, the name of the parish to distinguish it from
the Portmore Municipal Council that is also located in St. Catherine.
The results are that:
 With the exception of two local authorities, for most local authorities in the sample
community interface positions were not part of the staff establishment, or in other cases were
not filled;
 A similar situation exists with respect to IT/MIS that is in place in only three local authorities
in the sample.
 No local authority accounts for a policy analysis and development position, independently.
WT
The inference is that the managerial/supervisory staff establishment though not completely met is at a
fair level in all the traditional functional areas of the local authority. However, non-traditional
functions that are strategic to organisational effectiveness as a facilitator of development are at a low
level in the organisations.
L evel of Adherenc e to E duc ational
Qualific
Figure 8: Level ations
of adherence by J ob qualifications
to educational C ateg ories by job category
100%
90%
80%
70%
60% Admin
50%
F in
40%
HTS
30%
20% TS
10% CI
0% Wel
nd
MIS T/IT
es
nn
ela
wn
am
d
.A
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tm
St
r
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rtl
te
St
n
is h
es
do
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W
an
en
ch
Sp
ar
an
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M
On the matter of the ‘quality’ of human resources that the local authority attracts, it was found as
illustrated in Figure 8 that:
 Staff met entry requirements for the position most frequently in the administrative and
technical services categories; followed by finance and IT/MIS, but less so in highly technical
services and welfare/social services categories.
 All chief executive officers (CEOs) have attained university qualifications (though not
necessarily a degree) with one exception at the time of the audit, where it was revealed that
the CEO had equivalent qualifications, training and experience.
Administrative leaders in Jamaican local authorities are equipped for their posts, if the measurement
of capability is based on educational entry requirements and training. However leadership is
functionally distinctive from management and it is unclear the extent to which educational
qualifications and training are converted into leadership competencies. For instance the audit has not
uncovered a significant difference between the management orientation of a CEO with a master of
business administration (MBA) and that of other senior/middle managers with other social sciences
degree or traditional management qualifications. It can be assumed that an MBA equips an individual
with the requisite skills and competencies to develop and manage a business as well as innovate when
the circumstances dictate. Local government reform is an appropriate context for utilising these skills.
Innovation in local authorities in Jamaica is negligible evidenced by the absence of a clear
organisational strategy in response to Ministry Papers 8 of 1993 and 7 of 2003. The audit found:
WT
 A seeming lack of will on the part of senior managers to institute measures that might lead to
higher organisational performance.
 At time of the CAPAUD, senior administrative leaders had not seized the opportunity to
network and form alliances that could strengthen their leadership and management capacity in
the context of reform and the obvious dynamism that the process brings to organisational
operations.
 Arrangements akin to the Permanent Secretaries’ Board that exists at the national level were
absent leaving administrative leadership to operate in silos which mutes the organisation’s
ability to learn.
These issues bring into the question the capacity of the local authority for self-renewal and
sustainability in light of limited expressions in organisational operations of foresight, innovativeness
and autonomy even with strong endowments of education and training as manifested in its human
resources.
Learning and innovation
Already the potential for organisational learning is implicated by aspects of the audit results discussed
previously. Undoubtedly, information and communication technologies (ICTs) are important
contributors to technical capacity as well as enablers of organisational learning and innovation. It is
highly unlikely that DLG could be achieved without deliberate and sustained use of ICTs in local
government operations.
Under the parish infrastructure development programme (PIDP) implemented between 1993 and 1995
computerisation of local authorities resulted in the installation of 400 computers in all local authorities
across the island with training of 405 staff members. Ministry Paper 7 of 2003 hinted of plans to
activate a local area network (LAN) for local authorities However ICT diffusion appears to lack a
clear strategy compounded by weak infrastructure that has retarded progress. The CAPAUD revealed
that all local authorities in the sample demonstrated decent levels of computerisation in operations,
but these were unevenly spread across the functional areas and which perhaps might be described as
insufficiently developmentally oriented. For instance the audit showed that:
 There is an appreciable level of usage of computer technology in all functional areas of the
local authority except policy development, community interface and MIS, but a majority of
respondents rated the frequency of use as ‘sometimes’ (37.5%; 62.5% and 37.5%
WT
respectively).
 In welfare/social services the most frequent rating for use of computers was ‘never’ (50%)
with a minority indicating “sometimes” (37.5%).
The nature of ICT use gives a better understanding of the extent of organisational readiness for
innovation and by extension local government’s development orientation. The CAPAUD found that:
 Local authorities’ ICT use manifests in order of frequency as word processing, FMIS, and
Web-based technology (e.g. emails).
Nature
Figure 9: Nature of ICTof
useICinTlocal
Us authorities,
e Jamaica
70.00%
60.00%
50.00%
40.00%
30.00%
Don't K now
20.00%
10.00% Never
0.00% S ometimes
g
F requently
IS
s in
IS
ion
M
a il
FM
es
g
HR
at
in
Em
Always
oc
S
rm
rk
...
GI
Pr
o
fo
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d
In
d
an
or
Ne
ed
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W
as
cti
-b
lle
eb
Co
W
ta
Da
The conclusion is that ICTs in local authorities in Jamaica have not evolved beyond mundane usage
and their potential as sources of innovation and enhancers of organisational capability is still to be
realised.
Summary and analysis
A clear indication from the results of the CAPAUD is that local government’s capacity for
development in Jamaica is unevenly distributed when assessed against the requirements of a local
economic development organisation. Of course no organisation has all the requisite capacity to carry
out its functions at all times. Moreover, LED is a multifaceted process drawing on all types of
capacities that are not necessarily located within a single organisation. Nevertheless, irrespective of
the nature of a local authority's strategy at any juncture – whether focused on service delivery or on
enabling local economic development – deliberate steps need to be taken to bridge capacity gaps to
assure the long term viability of the organisation. Contemporary approaches to public management
are replete with concepts such as networked management,joined-up governance, andstrategic
alliances that can increase capacity at different levels of the organisation.
WT
Building capacity is a core function of leadership. It is an aspect of the visioning process that leaders
are to oversee. Admittedly capacity-building is rarely accepted as a dimension of administrative
responsibility in political institutions like local government. Administrative experience in Caribbean
local governments suggests that local problem-solving in capacity building as in other dimensions of
the local authority is more likely to be handled through extra-local institutions and processes rather
than through the efforts of local leadership. This practice does not sit well with DLG that requires
leadership with a particular mindset, orientation and style. Essentially DLG demands leaders that are
aware of the environment in which the organisation operates, are appreciative of the particular context
governing local policy decisions, understand the needs of the organisation, are attentive to factors that
can contribute to organisational viability and resilience, and are willing to take risks to reduce
uncertainty about future capacity requirements. The organisational analysis conducted by Price
Waterhouse Coopers assessed the management ethos of the local authority as having “a high level of
conservatism and resistance to change” (OPM/DLG/PwC 2010: 15).
Leadership does not operate in a vacuum and DLG is hampered by an organisational framework built
on values that are no longer compatible with contemporary leadership and management technologies
or development norms. There is little evidence also of an incentive structure that could assist in
transforming this framework at the local level. The operations of local government in the Caribbean
and in Jamaica specifically, lack a culture of high performance.
LED must contend with a public management culture that is characterised by nested institutions and
outdated embedded values such as:
a) Hierarchical organisational structures,
b) Paternalistic and autocratic policy and administrative leadership,
c) A self-regarding management ethos further demonstrated in unresponsiveness and a disregard
of customer needs,
d) Management techniques that limit participation and which favour rank and statusover
partnerships and teams, and
e) Technological phobia of the application of technology to policy and administrative processes
(Brown 2010, Jacome 1992).
Furthermore, the persistence of nepotism as a basis for personnel appointments rather than merit or
performance opens administration/management to corruption. ‘Everyone knows everyone’
WT
encapsulates organisational cultural norms in the Caribbean (Brown 2010, Jacome 1992). In the
context of local government this norm is a complicating factor inhibiting organisational change.The
value system underpinning a culture of poor performance in local government collides with the
normative framework of DLG that presumes a new way of doing things.
In contrast, a DLG has to rely on rational organisational framework to create and nurture the values
essential for LED. The discourse on place-based approaches to development offers important clues
about institutional and organisational value-creation strategies, and the experience with place-based
approaches to LED inNorth Carolina (USA), for example, is instructive. Indeed the underlying
philosophy in this instance is that sustainable LED is predicated on calculated and purposeful efforts
accompanied by an appreciation for both the possibilities and limitations of a particular geographic
space. The critical values accompanying this belief are that:
a) Local policy and management agendasare oriented around the triple bottom line – ie: ample
return on economic, social, and environmental investments,
b) Local leadership and management talent and culture are economic assets,
c) Creative entrepreneurship and long-range vision define the local economic development
process, and
d) Equity and sustainability are inherent to effective implementation of LED initiatives.
Finally, uneven capacity among Caribbean local governments as illustrated in the case of Jamaica
does not bode well for private sector development which is a central pillar of both LED strategies and
CARILED. The raison d'être of private businesses is profit-making, but the institutional values
outlined previously (e.g. Brown 2010) are not necessarily conducive to creating an enabling
environment for successful businesses. The findings of the CAPAUD suggest a level of
incompatibility between the business development objectives of Jamaican local authorities and the
goal of private sector development. The concept of ‘facilitator’ or ‘enabler’ must at some point make
the shift to implementable practice in local government policy.
Research and practice (see e.g. Hilhorstet al 2008) in local government’s development of the private
sector or general facilitation of LED suggest that key factors in LED include: the provision of high
quality services linked to efficient and effective economic governance; ensuring that physical
infrastructure needs are met to create an attractive environment for businesses, and efficient regulation
especially in relation to effective governance of the ‘commons’ Schoburgh 2012). As Hilhorstet
al(2008: 7) explain:
Local government can be an importantclient for the private sector, and they can use this
influence to guide the type of economic growthand employment generation. They can privilege
local enterprises, although they will have to staywithin the terms of law on procurement and
free competition. They can also specify the work insuch a way that they become highly intensive
in terms of labour requirements (for exampleinfrastructure-led economic development).
When these functional areas are examined they are clearly within the purview of local government.
Therefore there can no longer be questions about the role of local government in LED activities.
WT
Caribbean local governments must assume a coordinating role in order to establish a relationship
between it and the private sector. And any interpretation of the economic developmental role of local
government is in essence an interpretation of the capacities and competencies that are needed.
Conclusion
Given the weak results of national economic development strategies in the Caribbean, LED emerges
as a key alternative in the search for solutions to reduce national debt, strengthen the economy and
create wealth. The sub-national level is especially significant in light of deleterious impact of the
economic downturn on communities. LED is aligned to place-based approaches that are reorienting
development thinking, giving rise to the significance of the ‘local’ or locality-based perspectives and
action as a replacement for traditional approaches that emphasised strategies and interventions
devised at the national level. A gradual decentering of development is emerging complemented by
increased opportunity for the integration of goods and services fit to the context. High quality
institutions are required for this approach to development and therefore a niche is being created for a
new kind of local government, endowed with a range of capacities. Wherever an LED strategy is
adopted it sets in motion a raft of institutional changes with primary focus on local government.
The findings from the CAPAUD of a sample of local authorities in Jamaica suggest that the present
institutional environment for LED is not sufficiently supportive. A crucial point is that irrespective of
the capacity building strategies and organisational structuring that are implemented in the future; the
matter of high quality leadership must be a concern. Understandably the process of reorienting the
local authority to an economic developmental focus cannot disregard other responsibilities of the
organisation. Fundamentally perhaps the kind of revolutionary change that is sought in an LED policy
context requires keener attention to the invisible elements of the local authority, giving a strong signal
as to the priority for organisational change in giving effect to the concept of a DLG in Jamaica as well
as the Caribbean.
References
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http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/archive/policy/future/barca_en.htm. (Accessed March 27, 2013).
Baser, H. and Morgan, P. (2008) Capacity, Change and Performance. Study Report. ECDPM.
Boamah, H. (1989). Public finance in small open economies: the Caribbean experience. Greenwood Publishing
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Christensen, R.K. and Gazley, B. (2008) Capacity for Public Administration: Analysis of Meaning and
Measurement. Public Administration and Development.28 pp. 265–279.
Brown, D. R. (2010) Institutional Development in Small States: Evidence from the Commonwealth Caribbean.
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DFID (2009) UK Local Government Alliance for International Development. DFID White Paper
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Response.Dirlik, Arif. 1999. Place-based imagination: Globalism and the Politics of Place.Review 22 (2)
pp.151-187.
ECLAC (2009) Caribbean Development Report Volume II. United Nations Publication.
Hilhorst, T., Baltissen, G. and Lodenstein, E. (2008) What can rural local governments contribute to private
sector development? KIT Working Papers Series G2. Amsterdam: KIT.
Ibitoye, I. (2009) Small States in Global Economic Slowdown.Commonwealth Trade Hot Topics Issue 64
(October).
IMF (2012) Regional Economic Outlook – Update, Latin America and the Caribbean. [October] imf.org.
Jamaica. Ministry Paper 7 of 2003..
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Kaplan, A. (2000) Capacity building: Shifting the Paradigms of Practice. Development in Practice, Volume 10,
Numbers 3 & 4 (August) pp. 517-526.
Myrdal, G. (1957). Economic Theory and Underdeveloped regions.London: Duckworth.
Ostrom, E. (2007) Institutional Rational Choice: An Assessment of the Institutional Analysis and Development
Framework. In Sabatier, Paul, ed. 2007.Theories of the Policy Process. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Perroux, F. (1950) Economic Space: Theory and Applications. The Quarterly Journal of Economics.64,(1)
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Schoburgh.E. (2012)Local Government and Local Development: Bridging the Gap through Critical Discourse:
Evidence from the Commonwealth Caribbean. Commonwealth Journal of Local Governance Issue 10:
December 2011- June, 2012. Pp 5.31. http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/ojs/index.php/cjlg.
Tomaney, J. (2010) Place-based Approaches to Regional Development: Global Trends and Australian
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2
Learning in Australian local
government: A roadmap for
improving education & training
Ronald Woods
Teaching and Research
Centre for Local Government
University of Technology Sydney
WT
Sarah Artist
Manager Learning Solutions
Local Government NSW
Geraldine O’Connor
Senior Programmes Officer
Centre for Local Government
Abstract
Faced with a context of national and state reform agendas as well as resource scarcity, Australian
local government has pressing workforce development issues. This level of government is small in
scale, geographically dispersed and subject to variations in state jurisdiction. These factors represent
structural constraints to identifying and advocating a national approach for addressing workforce
needs such as the provision of tailored education and professional development. This paper
documents a sector consultation process exploring education and professional development for local
government which aimed to identify needs on both supply and demand sides. The research found that
aspirations for education and professional development tailored to the needs of local government aim
to support the development of better local governance and leadership, and to address critical skills
shortage issues. This may provide empirical grounds for promoting, planning, implementing and
evaluating capacity-building initiatives in this third tier of government in the Australian federation.
Keywords: Local government, workforce, education and professional development, Australia
Functions of Australian local government

In contrast to other English-speaking countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States of
America, Australia’s local government has historically had a relatively narrow range of functions.
Initially, it acted as the primary mechanism to transfer to the community the “administrative and
financial burden for the provision of basic local services” (Brackerz 2013, p. 5). Services to property
were at the core of its responsibilities, with provision of local roads being the most prominent.1
Following the Second World War, local government functions broadened to include town planning
and a range of welfare, environmental protection and leisure services.
The past few decades have been marked by an expansion of local government functions and there has
been a shift in emphasis away from the traditional focus on ‘services to property’ towards a more
expansive ‘services to people’ orientation (Dollery et al. 2009, p. 280). This has been partly due to
devolution of roles and responsibilities by other spheres of government, but also to market
deregulation, industrial relations reform, the privatisation of public utilities, competition policy,
technological advancement, and expanding service provision in response to community demands
(Brackerz 2013, p. 7).
WT
Local governments in Australia operate under the same legislation and administrative frameworks as
apply throughout the states in which they are located, with notionally the same powers and functions.
However, since the local government Acts tend to be “permissive rather than prescriptive” (Sansom
et al. 2012, p. 15), the larger and better resourced local governments are enabled to take on additional
roles. Local government “performs regulatory tasks that would be difficult for a state government to
administer because of their localised and varying nature” (Megarrity 2011, p. 2) for example the
upkeep of local roads and the preparation of local strategic and land use plans.
A diverse range of roles, responsibilities and activities are required for local government to efficiently
and innovatively deliver the range of local services that addresses community and stakeholder needs,
and “without an effective local government, local economies and communities would struggle to
operate, especially in regional Australia” (LGMA and ACELG 2013, p. 22). Larger local
governments can be significant players in metropolitan planning and management, but most are
relatively small and lack the capacity to increase their influence. There are no metropolitan-scale
councils (such as ‘upper-tier’ metropolitan or regional governments which comprise a number of
smaller municipalities), although South East Queensland, managed by seven large local councils, is
regarded as an exception (Sansom et al. 2012, pp. 12–13). In this region, Brisbane City Council, with
a population of 1,131,191 (estimated resident population as of June 2013, see Brisbane City Council
2014), is the most populous local government area in the country.
Council amalgamations have often been used as the key policy instrument for improving the
efficiency of local government (Dollery et al. 2008), although many councils have also opted for
shared service arrangements through partnerships formed between groups of councils (Dollery et al.
2011). The adoption of either approach suggests the need for a wide range of managerial, community
engagement and practical skills in order to ensure that service provision proceeds as smoothly as
1
As of 2011, Australia’s total road network length was 911,418km, with local councils being responsible for the
majority – approximately 670,000km (Australian Local Government Association [ALGA] 2014).
Learning in Australian local government: A roadmap for improving education & training 23
possible for the citizens concerned. Linked to these structural and other changes has been the growing
demand for the greater involvement of citizens – beyond voting in local government elections – in
decisions which affect their local areas, and this has inspired councils to explore novel forms of
network, consumer and participatory democracy (McKinlay 2012, p. 16).
A notable feature of recent decades has been the shift from ‘local government’ to ‘local governance’
(Denters and Rose 2005, p. 9), linked to trends such as increased urbanisation, globalisation and new
substantive and participatory demands. Governance implies that public decision-making concerning
local issues increasingly involves multi-agency working, partnerships and policy networks which cut
across organisational boundaries. In a governance milieu, local governments are taking part in
networks that “they cannot easily steer, let alone dominate…[and]…the private sector, the local civil
society and individual citizens have a much larger influence than before” (Van den Dool et al. 2010,
WT
p. 551).
This shift suggests that the capacity to operate explicitly within a ‘governance mode’ has become a
hallmark of modern local government. New forms of networked governance have been evolving in
practice and theory to replace narrow, hierarchical, adversarial and managerial modes that limit the
ability of any one level of government, or any single stakeholder, to actively solve the complex
problems that communities face (Abbott 2012, pp. 16–8). In keeping with this shift, community
consultation, guided by a community engagement strategy, has become an often legislated feature of
local government practice, including through the strategic planning that councils pursue (see Tan and
Artist 2013).
Local governments in Australia have an increasingly important role in environmental and

sustainability implementation, including energy management, natural resource management and
recycling (Thomas 2010). They have a role in community development, which includes the planning
and provision of community and cultural services, such as; childcare and family support; specialist
services to elderly people, people with disabilities, low-income households and young people; and
working with indigenous people and organisations (Hornby 2012, pp. 193–300). Local governments
have a significant involvement in arts and cultural development and from the early colonial times
have been “responsible for the construction of municipal halls, civic centres, performing arts centres,
art galleries, libraries and museum buildings, and associated infrastructure” (Hornby 2012, p. 309).
In summary, key functions that are common to local governments throughout the country at the
present time, whether as provider, contractor and/or coordinator of services, include services related
to:
 engineering and infrastructure, including public works design, construction and maintenance
of local roads, bridges and footpaths and drainage;
 property, including solid waste and recycling;
 administration, regulation and planning, including land use and town planning, development
approvals and building inspection;
 environment and health, including catchment management, parks and gardens, public toilets
and noise control;
 community and social services, including services for senior citizens, childcare services,
youth centres and community housing facilities;
 recreation, culture and education, including community halls, libraries and swimming pools.
(Productivity Commission 2008, p. xx)
Workforce characteristics and challenges
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Each council employs or contracts staff to provide local government services. In keeping with the
wide range of local government functions, the work is varied. A study undertaken by Government
Skills Australia in 2007 identified around 400 job roles across a typical council, and noted that these
can be further broken down into a range of individual job titles (Curry 2010, p. 7). The range of
occupations can be classified into four main streams:
 corporate services and governance, including councillor support, finance and customer
services;
 engineering and infrastructure, including roads and bridges, waste and sanitation and design
and architecture;
 human and community services, including community development, libraries and recreation
(including swimming pools);
 planning and environment, including strategic planning, regulatory services and natural
resource management.
(LGMA and ACELG 2013, pp. 24–25)
According to the recent Australian Local Government Workforce and Employment Survey (Hastings
et al. 2015), local government employs a large and diverse workforce that comprises around 10.2% of
the total public sector. As of 2013, there were 192,500 people working in Australian local
government, out of a total of 1.8m public sector employees nationally.
Within local government 37% of employees are aged 50 years or over, compared to the Australian
labour force average of 29%. Male employees are on average older than female employees (Hastings
et al. 2015). Local government employs a large number of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
people: although local government employees represent just over 10% of the total public service
workforce, 22% of all indigenous public sector workers are employed by local government.
Employees of local governments have higher levels of educational attainment than the all-industries-
workforce across Australia, with 65% of men and 70% of women in local government having a post-
school qualification compared to the national average of only 45% (Hastings et al 2015). In areas
where local government has difficulty recruiting staff due to skills shortages, it is also often in
competition with other industries for these workers. In recent years, it has been particularly difficult to
recruit engineers, planners, childcare staff, environmental health workers, surveyors and managers
(Hastings et al 2015). In addition to internal staff, local governments also make use of an external
workforce of temporary staff, contractors and volunteers, adding to the complexity of workforce
arrangements (McKeown and Lindorff 2011).
Factors such as an ageing workforce, changing technologies and skills shortages have an impact on
workforce planning (Freyens 2011; Neville 2012; Tan 2012). For example, changes in population
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settlement patterns are influential in determining the level and type of services to be delivered by local
authorities, and thus the demands for specific skills. In many parts of Australia, councils face
challenges in meeting the needs of an ageing population while dealing with the implications of an
ageing workforce. In rural and remote areas, staff recruitment and retention can be difficult where
populations are decreasing or where there is strong competition for workforce from the mining sector.
Building local government’s capacity to anticipate and plan for these changes is crucial to ensuring
the delivery of efficient and effective services (Tan 2012).
Both elected representatives and local council employees need to have an understanding of the
legislative environment as it impacts upon the work of local government, and they preferably also
need the skills to track the implications of legislative changes. Except for the Australian Capital
Territory, each jurisdiction has a local government Act that provides the rules for the creation and
operation of councils, in general covering how councils are elected and determining their powers to
make and enforce by-laws or local laws (Productivity Commission 2012, p. 7).
Teaching and learning environment for Australian local government

The teaching and learning environment for local government in Australia is diverse. This can be
linked to the complexity inherent in the local government sector described above, including the wide
range of professional, skilled and semi-skilled persons employed internally or externally. Stakeholders
and education providers include local councils themselves; local government associations,
professional associations and industry skills councils; registered training organisations (RTOs);
universities and colleges of technical and further education (TAFE); private sector providers;
departments of local government in each jurisdiction; the Department of Education, Employment and
Workplace Relations of the Australian Government; and unions. Local government in Australia is not
well serviced by the tertiary education sector. Many universities offer a postgraduate programme in
some form of government studies (eg public policy or public management), but at the time of the
inventory in 2010 only four offered postgraduate courses with an explicit focus on local government.
This is despite the fact that the sector includes a “complex mix of characteristics and motivations
which require specifically tailored solutions” (Artist 2010, pp. 7–8).
Staff activities and the character of each local council are guided by the decisions made by elected
councillors (Megarrity 2011, p. 1). There are around 6,600 elected councillors in Australia with an
average of just under ten councillors per council (Davy and Brands 2012, p. 9). In keeping with their
political function, the role of councillors is to represent their community at council meetings,
committees and functions; to communicate local council decisions to the public; to develop council
policies; and to make decisions relating to those policies (Megarrity 2011, p. 1), all of which require
knowledge and skills that suggest the need for tailored councillor training (Davy and Brands 2012).
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Rationale for the ‘Learning in Local Government’ study
In order to advance an understanding of education and professional development for Australian local
government and identify needs on both supply and demand sides, the Australian Centre of Excellence
for Local Government (ACELG) funded a study entitled ‘Learning in Local Government’ which
aimed to explore education and professional development in Australian local government and to put
forward an integrated national approach that would reflect the changing operational environment and
role of councils. Within the context of the study, conducted from 2010 to 2012, a research team from
the University of Technology, Sydney (UTS) Centre for Local Government aimed: to understand the
local government sector’s needs for essential skills now and into the future; to document the personal
needs of people working in the sector for enhanced skills and career development; and to map the
pathways between vocational and higher education and ongoing professional development. Key
findings and implications from this study are described in this paper, in which the rationale for a focus
on education and training is linked to understanding local governments as learning organisations
(Örtenblad 2002; Rashman et al. 2009), and to acknowledge the particular features and workforce
needs of local government in Australia.
The ‘Learning in Local Government’ study was undertaken within the context of a perceived lack of
data on local government investment in education and training, despite the importance of such
investment in light of the pressures on local government to be more efficient and effective. In
keeping with conclusions drawn by Rashman et al (2009), the study was seen as research that could
help to understand the processes and influences which shape sector-specific features of organisational
and inter-organisational learning within the local government sector. The intention was also to
generate evidence that would encourage local government to invest more in its current and future
workforce, and to find ways to more efficiently address its needs for essential skills in the longer term.
Research suggests that much organisational learning has tended to be based on performance
management and on development programmes orientated towards the individual (Vince and
Broussine 2000). Sanderson (2001) points out that a focus on organisational culture is likely to
enhance the capacity for longer-term change and improvement. There is a substantial literature
advocating the importance to individuals of engaging in lifelong learning to ensure their ongoing
employability in the changing world of work; and arguing that organisations need to display a
commitment to learning to enable them to face the challenges of globalisation, new technology,
market pressures, innovation and survival (Rashman et al 2009, p. 487; Johnston and Hawke 2002, p.
11). Barrados and Mayne (2003, p. 88) argue that there is a need to institutionalise learning processes
within public sector organisations, since – as is the case with private organisations – they are expected
to value information, to have the ability to learn from the past, and to adapt to changing
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circumstances.
A learning culture is fostered when employees have an increased capacity to contribute to decision-
making, and it is also often associated with working with a range of external stakeholders or other
partners (Johnston and Hawke 2002, p. 5). In order for organisational changes to endure, managers
and employees need to incorporate innovations into their daily routines, and this requires provision of
resources to develop new processes and practices, to train employees and to test and experiment with
innovations (Fernandez and Rainey 2006, p. 172); it also suggests that training should focus on
equipping local government managers to be generalists, so as best to meet the evolving and changing
needs of employees (Cox et al. 2010, p. 334).
Methods and data

The study was funded through the ACELG workforce development programme and was informed by
the concurrent development of the national government’s workforce strategy, entitled Future-proofing
Local Government: National Workforce Strategy 2013-2020 (ACELG 2013).
Data-gathering methods for the ‘Learning in Local Government’ study comprised:
 attendance at quarterly meetings and annual forums of the ACELG National Workforce
Development Reference Group, which represented key local government stakeholders across
all jurisdictions;
 a preliminary programme inventory, which was prepared in 2010 in order to profile existing
courses relevant to local government (Artist 2010);
 sector consultations, focusing on local government organisations (Artist and O’Connor 2011);
 an online survey, distributed to councils and professional and training organisations

throughout Australia, and attracting almost 900 respondents (Artist and O’Connor 2011);
 a closer examination of the place of e-learning and distance learning in the professional
development mix, drawing upon a more detailed analysis of data obtained via the online
survey (ACELG 2012);
 a study, based on a review of the literature and interviews with key stakeholders, of the need
for training in workforce development and planning, including identifying existing training
and capacity-building initiatives for councils (Tan 2012);
 a study on workforce shortages in key skills areas, drawing on labour market data, the
ongoing monitoring undertaken by local government sector organisations and data from the
National Skills Shortage Strategy 2007 (O’Connor and Artist 2012).
Findings from these several sources are discussed next.
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Programme inventory
The programme inventory included some innovative professional development initiatives which
utilise content and modes of delivery tailored to meet the needs of local government, but also
identified several difficulties in developing and accessing good education and professional
development in local government (Artist and O’Connor 2011, pp. 2–3). Some examples are given
here. The speed of change within the operating environment may outpace the time needed to develop
and accredit courses. Training budgets have to compete with other resourcing priorities and are often
at the discretion of individual managers. Individuals may have a reduced capacity to attend training
because of, for example, their need to travel or take time away from work, or because of limited skills
in coping with a learning environment. Councils are separated by distance and include small numbers
of individuals in multiple professions, reducing the financial feasibility of programme development
from a training provider point of view.
Specific gaps identified on the basis of this inventory include local government management skills
training, training for elected members, training in disciplines in which skills shortage are being
experienced, local government components in mainstream tertiary courses for key professions,
training on key policy issues for local government and workforce planning in local government (Artist
2010, pp. 9–12).
Sector consultations
The aim of the sector consultations was to ascertain what local government organisations in Australia
were considered to be key in order to improve education and professional development in local
government (Artist and O’Connor 2011, pp. 2–3). The following table was developed at the 2010
ACELG National Local Government Workforce Development Forum to capture reflections and
observations made by participants in workshop discussions on issues raised within the sector.
Table 1: Issues for education and professional development raised in sector consultations
Locus of Issues
issue
Within  Training budgets are scattered across councils, have to compete with other
individual resourcing priorities and are often at the discretion of individual managers.
councils  Individuals may lack the capacity or information to clearly define their own
training needs.
 Individuals experience variable levels of access for funds to complete further
education because policies vary across councils.
 Individuals are motivated to undertake qualifications which contribute to job
security and career progression, but these opportunities may not exist in all
councils.
 Individuals may have a reduced capacity to attend training because of the
need to travel, take time away from work or because of limited literacy skills.
Amongst  Councils are separated by distance and include small numbers of individuals
training in multiple professions, which reduces the financial feasibility of programme
providers development.
 There are significant costs in preparing relevant sector training materials and
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a need for experienced practitioners to contribute to the delivery of training.
 There is a lack of facilitated pathways for individuals between RTOs, TAFEs
and tertiary education qualifications.
 The speed of change within the operating environment often outpaces the
time needed to develop and accredit courses.
Across the  Good training development and provision at a broader scale requires a high
local degree of collaboration and significant time commitment.
government  There are inconsistencies across the states with regard to accessing federal
sector funding, and an under-utilisation and lack of knowledge of the vocational
education and training (VET) local government training package.
Survey
Respondents to the survey (N=900) were all local government employees and councillors. Around
three-quarters of the respondents had worked in local government for over five years, and included
executive and senior managers, line managers and supervisors, professional officers, administration
officers and skilled workers. The survey questions explored respondents’ involvement in education
and professional development while working in local government, their current level of education, the
modes of learning used, the quality of the learning experience, and their desired future educational
needs. Key findings from the survey data are described next.
Just over half of all survey respondents had a TAFE Certificate or Diploma, detailed in Table 2.
Table 2: TAFE qualifications of respondents
Respondents with TAFE qualifications
Role/position Total (%) Certificate (%) Diploma (%)
Councillor 42 62 46
Executive and senior manager 51 55 71
Line manager and supervisor 64 75 40
Professional 56 74 52
Administration 62 85 30
Skilled worker 69 82 36
Just over half of all the respondents had a university degree, detailed in Table 3.
Table 3: University qualifications

University qualification
Role/position Total (%) Graduate (%) Postgraduate (%)
Councillor 27 100 50
Executive and senior
84 87 57
manager
Line manager and supervisor 59 92 55
Professional 57 90 52
Administration 17 100 18
Skilled worker 22 67 44
Summary group 53 90 53
Seminars, workshops and conferences (full-day, half-day and one- or two-hour events) were the most
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commonly utilised mode of professional development across all roles. Only 26% of respondents had
participated in training that occurred over more than two days.
Most of the respondents reported that they make use of written reference material as a source of
learning: 68% of respondents used material distributed by a professional association; 53% used
reference books; and 51% used material prepared by their councils. The use of material prepared by
other councils was lower, with results showing that only 27% used material prepared by another
Australian council, and 10% had access to material from local governments in other countries.
Just over one-third of respondents had participated in formal work-related mentoring or coaching
from someone outside their council, and almost three-quarters rated this experience as ‘good’ or ‘very
good’. Major reasons given for these responses were that mentoring can be tailored to individual
needs and provides greater insight into personal ways of operating. Participants also liked to be able to
bounce around ideas and issues, particularly with someone from outside the organisation.
Distance and online learning had been utilised by almost half of all the respondents, although
councillors were an exception in that only 3% indicated that they had used this form of learning.
Distance learning was particularly favoured by those from more remote areas, and respondents also
noted that it gave them the ability to balance family and work commitments and flexibility to manage
study around their responsibilities. Many noted that self-discipline was required to make effective use
of distance learning and that the lack of peer support was sometimes a disadvantage.
Respondents were generally positive about the education and professional development activities in
which they had participated.
Figure 1: Levels of agreement with statements relating to relevance of and satisfaction with
education and professional development activities
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At the same time, they described the following as the major barriers to accessing education and
professional development:
Figure 2: Major barriers to accessing education and professional development
Topics and content that would be useful to respondents are described in Table 4. The results show that
the preferred topics and content for education and professional development programmes across all
role groups were ‘strategy and vision’ (73%), ‘community engagement’ (72%) and ‘change
management’ (67%).
Table 4: Education and professional development topics and content deemed most useful by
respondents
Role in local government Top five topics (in order of preference)
Councillors Strategy and vision
Community engagement
Asset and infrastructure management
Governance and probity
Financial management
Executives and senior Strategy and vision
management Change management
Workforce development
Line managers and Change management
supervisors Strategy and vision
Risk management
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Professional Strategy and vision
Local government law
Risk management
Administration Community engagement
Service delivery options
Change management
Strategy and vision
Trades, skilled and outdoor Community engagement
workers Service delivery options
Risk management
Councillor–manager relations
Also in connection with future preferences, 79% of respondents from all of the different role
categories expressed interest in participating in training which provides information about other
councils’ work and innovations. In addition, 72% were interested in facilitated problem-solving with
peers in other councils and 71% were interested in exchange opportunities with other councils. These
findings suggest that peer learning and good practice exchange would be fruitful methodologies to
incorporate in education and professional development programmes for local government.
The place of e-learning and distance learning

Included in the survey were questions relating to training providers’, councils’ and learners’ use of e-
learning and distance learning. Almost half of the respondents had utilised e-learning, with 62% of
these rating the experience as ‘very good’ or ‘good’ (ACELG 2012). Distance learning was
particularly favoured by respondents based in isolated, rural and regional locations, living with
physical disabilities or having full-time work, as well as those who needed to balance work and family
responsibilities, and those in mobile rather than office-based positions.
E-learning programmes for local government in Australia were found to include web-based modules,
units and courses distributed over an intranet or the internet; distance education that leads to formal
qualifications; webinars (web-based seminars), ie live lectures, workshops or presentations

transmitted over the internet; e-mentoring, in which web-based tools, such as emails and chat
applications, serve as the primary means of communication between a mentor and mentee; online
inductions for employees, contractors or visitors; and blended learning, in which components of a
course are offered partly online and partly face-to-face. The value of an e-Learning Portal to support
councils was tested. The portal was a web-based platform hosted by ACELG that aimed to bring
together a range of resources on e-learning for local government training providers and practitioners.
It also served as an online space for the exchange and sharing of ideas, experiences and opinions of e-
learning in local government. Findings from the study also suggested that local government training
providers and councils across Australia are at various phases of implementing e-learning programmes
as part of their education and professional development programmes.
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The study identified several benefits of and barriers to e-learning (ACELG 2012, pp. 8–14). Benefits
included the following:
 e-learning offers personalised learning experiences and enables learners to choose tools and
content appropriate to their learning needs, interests and skill levels;
 online delivery of training enables flexibility for individuals to balance their family, work and
study commitments, and the delivery time of most online courses is typically shorter than
instructor-led training, reducing the time an employee spends away from his/her job;
 the portability of mobile technologies enables learners to access and download content at their
own convenience;
 e-learning reduces the costs that may be associated with traditional learning, such as fares,
fuel, accommodation and childcare.
At the same time, respondents recognised that e-learning requires learners to have appropriate
equipment, a level of competence with the technology, and access to technical support (ACELG
2012). It also requires a level of self-directed motivation and the ability to work unsupervised –
unmotivated learners with poor study habits may fall behind. There may be high initial costs
associated with designing and developing courses, as well as with course and system maintenance and
updates. Some learners may miss the interactivity and networking opportunities that come with
traditional learning, as well as the opportunity for face-to-face communication with teachers. Other
learners may have trouble adapting to a new and unfamiliar mode of education delivery and may feel
that e-learning is too theoretical, with online courses easily forgotten (ACELG 2012).
Workforce development and planning

As a follow-up to the survey, a review was carried out of the need for training in workforce
development and planning, including identifying existing training and capacity-building initiatives for
councils (Tan 2012). Following a review of the literature which identified research and resources
available on this subject, selected councils, local government associations, professional institutes,
training providers and government agencies responsible for local government in each state and in the
Northern Territory were contacted and interviewed about their programmes and activities to
strengthen workforce development and planning.
Interview findings provided evidence that there is a lack of strategic importance accorded to
workforce planning and development. This is despite the fact that current employees have to update
and acquire new skills more frequently during their working lives than did workers from earlier
generations. Councils tend to be conservative in their responses to new technologies and there is
evidence that they struggle to understand the potential value of technologies such as social media to
provide services, to communicate, consult and engage with residents, and to recruit staff. Another
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challenge that was highlighted by the interviewees was the limited availability of data for councils to
plan ahead for workforce needs. This was due not only to the lack of a national minimum dataset for
local government, but also the lack of council-specific data of a more qualitative nature. It should be
noted that, since the time this survey was carried out, ACELG has conducted a ‘Profile of the
Australian Local Government Workforce’ (Hastings et al. 2015), which draws on the Australian Local
Government Workforce and Employment Survey, data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics and
other sources such as existing state and territory based workforce surveys. This provides a possible
template for the kinds of quantitative data including occupational classifications, gender and age of
local government employees, education and training, staff turnover and diversity issues (such as
indigenous and disability status) that may be useful for a national dataset. Interviewees noted that
useful data would include information on when particular people, especially those in critical roles,
plan to retire; career aspirations of staff; family commitments; and staff interest in flexible working
arrangements.
Workforce shortages in key skills areas

The next phase of the ‘Learning in Local Government’ study focused on workforce shortages in key
skills areas. Drawing on labour market data, the ongoing monitoring undertaken by local government
sector organisations and data from the National Skills Shortage Strategy 2007, the study explored
skills shortages experienced by Australian local governments in the key areas of civil engineering,
urban planning, building surveying and environmental health. Opportunities and gaps in education
and training in these four areas of skills shortage were explored, and several trends identified
(O’Connor and Artist 2012).
One of these trends is difficulty in attracting young professionals to train as environmental health
officers and building surveyors, and a particular difficulty in attracting women to train as building
surveyors. Also with respect to women in the local government workforce, a contributing issue to the
skills shortage in urban planning was identified as the ability to retain women in the profession: while
equal numbers of men and women graduate as planners, there are around twice as many men as
women practising as planners five years after graduation.
Professional organisations work closely with universities nationally to monitor training quality and to
encourage the development or adaptation of courses as demand requires. These organisations
encourage members to have a bachelor’s degree qualification as the minimum training requirement.
Education and training approaches should assist in maintaining a balance between knowledge and
experience, a crucial issue for each of the skill-shortage professions. Closer alignment between the
vocational education and training (VET) and higher education (HE) sectors would contribute to
finding this balance. Factors that promote the transition from VET to HE include: enhanced clarity of
the relationship between recognised prior learning and the proposed degree; the quality of the VET
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qualification; ensuring foundation subjects for the degree are covered; and supporting students to be
more university-ready. University students undertake work placements as part of their courses.
Training undertaken through work experience is an opportunity to support students to complete
degrees and gain valuable experience of working within local government.
There is a need to develop more local-government-specific course material in the skills shortage areas,
as well as new delivery modes that address the needs of smaller and rural and remote councils.
Professional associations and training providers could develop ways of adding material to existing
degrees and trade qualifications to meet the sector’s training needs. Increased and improved distance
learning options can support the local government sector by providing greater flexibility for staff to
choose suitable times to undertake training. Mentoring of new and emerging engineers (for example)
creates an additional role for engineers who are planning to retire from the workforce and could also
be incorporated as part of a workforce retention strategy.
Conclusions and implications

Local government has undergone significant policy-driven changes in recent decades, but continues to
serve and support diverse metropolitan, regional, rural, remote and indigenous communities across
Australia. The diversity within the sector is also reflected in access to modes of learning, and the
programme inventory and survey undertaken within this study identified these as VET and tertiary
qualifications, seminars, workshops, conferences, mentoring, e-learning and written reference
material.
While survey participants were positive about their learning experiences – with almost 90% agreeing
with the statement that ‘my skills and abilities have improved’; and almost 80% agreeing that
‘education and professional development has been inspiring and enjoyable’ – a much lower level of
satisfaction was gauged with respect to the degree of suitability of these learning experiences for the
local government context. Just under 50% of survey participants felt that local government is not well
catered for in education and professional development, and 40% did not think that ‘relevant
programmes for doing my current role well are accessible’.
Barriers to accessing education and professional development were identified by participants in sector
consultations at individual, council and sector-wide levels. This exploratory study into workforce
planning and development suggests that this activity is not accorded high strategic importance.
Themes within the literature outlined earlier in this paper which link the capacity to derive evidence
from research, evaluation and learning to the capacity to achieve change and improvement, suggest
that this lack of focus on workforce development is a factor inhibiting the local government sector
from maximising its potential. With almost 200,000 employees and over 6,600 elected members, the
unique nature of this sector requires a joined-up approach to develop programmes which facilitate
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better local leadership and governance.
Australian local government is significant in terms of both function and scale, and quality education
and professional development are vital to ensure that the sector continues to respond to the changing
needs of local communities, resourcing constraints, pressure from other sectors and skills shortages.
Presented with a list of programme development content and topics, survey participants were very
interested in areas such ‘strategy and vision’, ‘community engagement’, ‘governance and probity’,
‘workforce development’ or ‘change management’. Their responses point to an appetite and
willingness within the sector at all levels to participate in learning opportunities which promote better
managerial, leadership and community engagement skills.
The ‘Learning in Local Government’ study aimed to promote an education and training approach that:
is forward-looking and reflects the changing environment and role of local government; focuses
equally on all employees across the sector and meets their personal needs to enhance their skills and
develop their careers; and promotes seamless pathways between vocational and higher education and
ongoing professional development.
Local government needs to be responsive to the needs and desires of its current and potential
workforce in order to effectively compete for skilled and talented employees. Demand for workers is
increasing, and there is a need to recruit a wide variety of skilled and semi-skilled labour to fully meet
the sector’s requirements. Taking a national approach to the identification of future learning needs for
local government will enable sharing of information about sector needs and programme activities. It
will also help to bridge the spatial isolation felt by some local government professionals, as well as
improving programme viability by spreading courses more widely.
In summary, the study suggests the following approaches to future programme development for local
government:
 collaborative programmes across jurisdictions and between providers;
 the facilitation of pathways between vocational and higher education;
 the provision of opportunities for peer learning and good practice exchange;
 a more expert use of e-learning on the part of both providers and users;
 training to support better workforce planning within councils;
 priority for initiatives in skills shortage areas.
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3
Public participation in services
delivery projects in Buikwe District
Local Government Uganda
Sylvester Kugonza
Uganda Management Institute (UMI)
Kampala, Uganda
Email: [email protected]
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Robert Mukobi
Secretariat for Accountability Sector
Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development
Kampala, Uganda
Email. [email protected]
Abstract
Public participation as a democratic right has gained wide acceptance in local governance, both to
improve accountability in service delivery and to enhance civic consciousness. Uganda now has two
decades’ experience of various forms of decentralisation. However, the extent of public participation
both in local planning and in holding local politicians to account has been inconsistent. Taking
Buikwe District local government as a case study, the authors argued that three key factors influence
public participation in local governance – access to information, ability to use information effectively,
and awareness of citizens’ rights, roles and responsibilities. They found that these factors positively
influenced overall respondents’ participation in local government projects by 10.2%, 19% and 22%
respectively based on Pearson Correlation Coefficient. The study further found that information is not
readily accessible or effectively disseminated to the majority of citizens and therefore is not fully
harnessed for planning, monitoring and evaluating government projects. Reasons for this inadequate
access included: limited and costly infrastructure for handling information: lack of skills in relation
to how and when to use information; and lack of analytical and simplification skills among those
disseminating information. In light of these findings, the paper recommends that information
dissemination must be planned and carried out in a targeted and systematic way, if citizens’
awareness of their rights, roles and responsibilities in service delivery is to be achieved.
Keywords: Participation, service delivery projects, information sharing, accountability, Uganda
Introduction
Since 1986, Uganda’s governance system has been described both as a ‘democratic surge’ and the
‘beacon of Africa’, but also as a ‘democratic recession’ (Mwenda 2007; World Bank 2000, Diamond
2008). The first two descriptions can be attributed to the era before 2001, and the latter applied to the
last ten years. Paradoxically, the period since 2001 coincides with one of the largest expansions in
Public participation in services delivery projects in Buikwe District Local Government Uganda 41
number of local governments in the world within a single country. On average six local governments
have been created per year in Uganda since 2008, with two main objectives: 1) to bring services
nearer to the people through increased participation; and 2) to secure democratic control by local
citizens of those local governments.
Participation, transparency and accountability are widely acknowledged to be key pillars of good
governance. It could therefore be inferred that prolific creation of local governments in Uganda will
have enhanced not only service delivery, but also participation. This paper asks the question: Has it?
This paper reports on an empirical study of factors affecting public participation in service delivery
projects in Buikwe District Local Government (BDLG), Uganda. It first sets out the contextual
background to the issues, explains the study methodology and links theory from literature to the actual
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practice of participation in BDLG. It then reports its research findings:
i) it assesses how access to information affects public participation;
ii) it examines how the ability to effectively use information influences public participation;
iii) it scrutinises the extent to which citizens’ awareness of participation as a right affects their
involvement.
Lastly, recommendations for encouraging more effective participation in service delivery projects in
local governments are proposed.
Contextual background
Modern efforts towards decentralisation in Uganda began with the enactment of the Resistance
Councils and Committee Statute 1987, which had two broad aims: to transform district councils into
corporate bodies with responsibility for service provision, and to delegate broad policy-making and
planning powers to local councils. The 1993 Local Government (Resistance Councils) Statute (LGS)
and the 1997 Local Government Act (LGA) further strengthened districts by devolving more planning
powers, which in theory meant that they ceased to be de jure arms of central government. These
institutional reforms were further bolstered by the promulgation of the constitution of 1995 (in
between the LGS 1993 and LGA 1997), which enshrined citizens’ participation in planning and
governance of the country. Within the section on National Objectives, the constitution states:
The State shall be based on democratic principles, which empower and encourage the
active participation of all citizens at all levels in their own governance… The State shall
be guided by the principle of decentralization and devolution of governmental functions
and powers to the people at appropriate levels where they can best manage and direct
their own affairs.
The constitution further prescribes the creation of a National Planning Authority (NPA) in Section
125; and the LGA 1997 in Section 36 stipulates a counterpart institution at sub-national level, such as
a district council, to discharge the planning functions of NPA as devolved. The LGA 1997 also
stipulates the creation of district technical planning committees chaired by the district’s chief
administrative officer. The law mandates district councils (in their role as a local planning authority)
to prepare comprehensive and integrated development plans, incorporating proposals of lower-level
local governments, for submission to the NPA. Formally, all projects are identified and developed as
part of this national and local government planning process. The public policy reforms that ushered in
these changes aimed at enhancing the right to participation, which was then enacted within the Access
to Information Act 2005. This Act gave effect to the constitutional guarantees of access to
government information.
BDLG, the focus of this paper, is one of the 112 district local governments of Uganda empowered by
the LGA as an autonomous entity. However, despite implementing initiatives to enhance public
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participation as outlined under the reforms, participation in government projects and community
ownership of them is still low – as the Buikwe District development plan for 2010–13 observes
(Buikwe District Local Government 2010).
Theorising and justifying local participation

The rationale for participative government at local level stems from a recognition that involving
people in governing processes makes local authorities accountable to citizens for services and
development in their area (Blair 2000; Sirker and Cosic 2007). An ancillary benefit is that the work of
the authorities becomes transparent to local people, as they are involved in all activities (Holdar and
Zakharchenko 2002; Manowong and Ogunlana 2006).
Scholarly thought (e.g. Stone 1989) and the work of practitioners was reflected in ‘Agenda 21’, the
outcome document of the 1992 United Nations ‘Earth Summit’ in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, which
highlighted stakeholder participation as a major factor in promoting sustainable development. Since
then, Agenda 21 has been given political, legal and regulatory force by national governments and by
United Nations organisations in every area of human endeavour. The involvement of stakeholders
(‘participation’) has now become a standard condition for approval or funding of many development
projects. In some jurisdictions, the right to public participation has been enshrined in law, conceived
as a human right or as a manifestation of the right to freedom of association and assembly. Countries
such as the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, the USA and Sweden – and also Uganda – have public
participation and freedom of information provisions in their legal systems (Zillman et al. 2002).
Model of participation
Public participation in development projects may be grounded in one or more of several theories and
models. This study uses the Mathbor (2008) model of effective community participation. This model
assumes that communities begin their dialogue when a development intervention is first discussed,
and continue to work together until successes and failures of the project are fully evaluated and
reintegrated into future planning. This process is depicted in Figure 1 below.
According to Mathbor (2008), community participation undergoes four stages:
1) Involvement: this includes information, education and planning (IEP) to provide adequate
and timely evidence, educate people about the development initiative, and outline a plan of
action.
2) Control: this encompasses implementation, co-ordination and monitoring (ICM). In this

stage it is assumed that once local people are well informed about a particular development
initiative, they are in a better position to plan on their own and implement project activities.
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3) Ownership: this stage assumes that local people share project costs – if not by contributing
money, then in kind by offering time, materials or other efforts. This sharing of costs is
assumed to engender a sense of ownership and commitment to the project.
4) Feedback: this stage includes consultation to harness local people’s knowledge and
experience, reassess their needs and evaluate outcomes of a development project. It also holds
local people accountable for successes and failures.
Figure 1: An Effective Community Participation Model for Development Projects

Source: Mathbor (2008)
In this model, therefore, community participation in development projects is hypothesised to be

effective by involving local people in all stages. Mathbor (2008) contends that each stage is the result
of a set of elements that emerges from the views, opinions, and perspectives of the stakeholders.
Further, although elements in the model are seen as different stages, in practice they are often
interrelated and interwoven (Mathbor 2008). The model further assumes that community participation
is a key tool for collecting indigenous knowledge and promoting social change in communities.
Analytical framework
The Mathbor model provided the basis for the analytical framework used by this study, as indicated in
Figure 2. It was conceptualised that accessibility and utilisation of information, and awareness of
citizens’ rights, roles and responsibilities would be the independent variables which would influence
public participation (the dependent variable) in local government projects. ‘Participation’ for the
purposes of this study is defined as involvement in planning and public demand for accountability,
including monitoring and evaluation (DeSario and Langton 1987; Malena 2009).
Figure 2: Analytical Framework

Source: Authors, with insights from Khwaja (2004) and Kugonza (2011)
Independent Variables Dependent Variables
Information Accessibility Participation

Planning
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Information Utilisation
Public demand for
Citizens’ awareness of
accountability
participation as a human right
Access, utilisation and right to information for participation
Effective access to meaningful information is the first step in empowering citizens to exercise control
over resources and institutions (Schwarte 2008). In his address to the World Bank conference ‘Global
Knowledge’ in 1997, Kofi Annan, the then Secretary-General of the United Nations, observed that the
great democratising power of information had given Africa a chance to effect change and alleviate
poverty in new ways.
Access to information enables citizens to articulate their voice, monitor effectively, hold government
accountable and enter into informed dialogue about decisions which affect their lives. Information
empowers all citizens, including vulnerable and excluded people, to claim their broader rights and
entitlements. Only informed citizens can stand up for their rights and hold public officials accountable
for their actions and decisions (Chege et al. 2008).
However, access to information and technology will not in itself create more informed citizens
without an understanding of and capacity to use the information effectively. Tise (2009) points out
that while the global information explosion has made information literacy skills essential if people
and nations are to fully harness this information, in many countries there are real structural and
political barriers to doing so. These obstacles affect both the capacity of citizens to realise their right
to information and to participate, demand better governance and ultimately better services, and the
incentives for them to do so (Pejova 2002). Lack of information literacy skills and failure to use
information effectively wastes resources and affects productivity in all spheres of life and work. For
development initiatives to gain ground, beneficiaries must first be aware of their rights, roles and
responsibilities (Mohammad 2010). But there is more to it than that: devolution can only be
successful if citizens are also aware of the channels through which they can exercise these rights
(Omolo 2010).
Research methodology
This research adopted a cross-sectional design and used mixed methods, nesting quantitative methods
into an overall qualitative approach. A sample of 291 respondents was chosen using the statistical
table used by Krejcie and Morgan (1970). The respondents at household level were selected using
multi-stage simple random sampling techniques from three sub-counties of BDLG: namely Ssi,
Wakisi and Ngogwe. Purposive sampling was used to select 14 key informants: five district officials,
three non-governmental organisation (NGO) officials, three sub-county chiefs and three local council
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officials (as summarised in Table 1) who were interviewed. In addition, three focus group discussions
were conducted in the three sub counties of Wakisi, Ssi and Ngogwe.
Table 1: Summary of Study Population

Population Category Population Sample Size Percentage Sampling
Household heads 1,124 291 26 Multi-stage random
District officials 5 5 100 Purposive
Sub-county officials 3 3 100 Purposive
NGO officials 3 3 100 Purposive
Local council officials 3 3 100 Purposive
Data obtained from household heads (using probability sampling) was analysed using the Statistical
Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). Relationships between variables were measured using the
Pearson correlation coefficient and tested using regression analysis and analysis of variance
(ANOVA) at a 5% level of significance. Qualitative data was categorised and themes developed in
accordance with the objectives of the study.
Findings and discussion

How information accessibility affects public participation in local government
The majority of respondents (62.5%) disagreed with the view that full information on government
projects (schools, health facilities etc) is available and accessible to community members. Of the
remainder, 5.8% were unsure and 31.7% felt that such information is available. Findings from focus
groups indicated that people’s involvement in development projects is impeded by inadequate
information. Participants observed that community members are hardly able to access information on
service delivery, or for planning and monitoring government projects and programmes:
Leaders have been arguing for us to get involved in government projects in this
community but we don’t know where to begin. You cannot know which school needs to be
constructed, when and where, or when drugs are brought to Ngogwe Health Centre. The
little information comes late, especially when everything has been completed, and we
hear it like rumours. Focus group participant, Ngogwe sub-county
In another focus group a similar situation was reported:

Accessibility of information in our community is so poor so we don’t get involved in most
of these government initiatives like NAADS, construction projects etc. It is always during
burial ceremonies or funeral rites that those politicians begin telling people that there
are new projects in the community, [and] arguing [for] people to participate; they don’t
tell us the details of such projects. Focus group participant, Wakisi sub-county
Some areas were found to lack structures to support access to information on development projects.
For instance, some community members mentioned that local councils were no longer effective on
issues concerning service delivery and, in most cases, had no staff member responsible for
information dissemination. Interviews with district officials similarly revealed that there was
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inadequate budget provision at sub-county and district levels to raise public awareness and
disseminate information to communities.
It was also claimed that a few people have access to some information, mostly friends and relatives of
district officials, or those willing to bribe them. This was especially the case for contracts. In Ssi one
participant explained:
What I have observed is that central government is doing the best to improve the welfare
of the people but officials at the district don’t deliver the information to the local people:
eg when there is money for tendering roads, information for bidding reaches only a few
people, especially those known to the district officials or those willing to bribe, thus
leaving many of us not involved in the development projects. Focus group participant, Ssi
sub-county
The study also included questions on the procedures and channels for obtaining information in the
community. The majority of respondents (58%) said such procedures and channels were not clear or
known to them, while 18.9% were unsure of their existence and only 23.1% felt knowledgeable about
such procedures and channels. In two focus groups – in Ssi and Ngogwe sub-counties – participants
were unaware of any formal process and mechanism for obtaining the information required to plan
and evaluate projects.
On the question of information dissemination, 55.3% of respondents said information for planning
and assessing performance was not regularly disseminated by either the government or other stake-
holders to the general public. Of the remainder, 25.4% were not sure while only 19.3% agreed that it
was regularly disseminated.
On methods of information dissemination, the majority of respondents (63.6%) agreed that publicity
channels included local radio stations, FM radio stations, newspapers and noticeboards. However,
22% disagreed, and were not aware of these, and 4.5% were not sure how information was publicised.
As one focus group participant pointed out:
There is awareness creation in the meeting for bulungi bwansi [unpaid community work]
from Buganda Kingdom and the need to fight malaria. Sometimes we obtain information
through churches, Central Broadcasting Service (CBS) radio Buganda, Baba FM, [and]
newspapers among others. Occasionally, information is pinned on the noticeboards at
the sub-county headquarters; sometimes our local council’s leaders give us information
during community meetings. Focus group participant, Ngogwe sub-county
Field observations revealed that some tools used to inform people were either absent or not
appropriately used. For instance, there was no noticeboard at the Buikwe district headquarters. At the
headquarters of Ssi and Ngogwe sub-counties, noticeboards were positioned outside office premises,
and thus susceptible to rain damage. FGD participants also mentioned that there was not continuous
updating of information on the noticeboards, so old information was kept for several months.
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Additionally, the majority of respondents (62.6%) felt that limited capacity and infrastructure such as
computers and internet connections affected access to the information required for planning and
ensuring accountability. Qualitative findings from the focus groups were similar; participants
highlighted a lack of basic technical equipment and communication systems such as computers and
internet connections within communities. Many participants were unaware of government websites
and their functions. Nor was there any library or community resource centre where people could
access vital information to use for planning and monitoring government projects. As one participant
observed:
They tell us that we can get information on the internet but some of us have never seen it,
we don’t have computers in our community and we don’t know how to use them because
we have not been trained, and even electricity is only in our neighbouring parish. Focus
group participant, Ssi sub-county
Researchers also asked respondents about the Access to Information Act 2005. Over half (56.7%) of
respondents felt the Access to Information Act 2005 was not known by or accessible to community
members, while another 29.2% were not sure of its existence. On coding and content of information
nearly half (44%) of respondents disagreed with the view that the Access to Information Act 2005
was clear and easily understood. Another 37.7% were unsure – probably because they had never seen
the Act. It seems clear that that many participants had never seen or even heard of the Access to
Information Act 2005, and thus could not use it to request for information that would be useful to
them for planning projects or holding service providers to account. This finding was borne out by
interviews with district officials. As one observed:
Officials from [the] Prime Minister’s office visited the district [on awareness creation
exercise for all] but [in the end] sensitised only the District Information Officer and
Chief Administrative Officer about the Access to Information Act 2005. Some of us were
left out and up to now there has been no attempt to sensitise the people about the Act.
District Planner, BDLG
The study also revealed a widespread view that there is a lack of transparency and openness when it
comes to making information available to the community. The majority of respondents (63.2%)
mentioned that some information, such as district work plans, details of funds released from the
central government and bills of quantities for construction works, are still treated as confidential.
Specifically, 68.3% of respondents said they could not access information such as LG work plans,
budgets, or details of central government financial releases. Additionally, respondents pointed out that
details of the tender processes are often inaccessible to the public. Seventy-six per cent of respondents
did not even know the procedures for obtaining such information, while those who did know them
claimed that the information was not provided in a timely manner, and that the cost of obtaining it was
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quite unreasonable.
The study then looked at associations between information accessibility and public participation. Its
findings indicate that lack of availability of meaningful information has a significant effect on
community participation in projects; for example, 60.5% of respondents said they could not
participate in monitoring and evaluation because they lacked any meaningful information to start
from. To establish the relationship between information accessibility and public participation, the
aggregated index of information accessibility (extent to which respondents said information was
readily accessible) and overall aggregated index of public participation (extent to which they had
participated in projects) were correlated using Pearson Product Coefficient. The result showed that
information accessibility accounts for 10.2% of variation in public participation. This finding implies
that making information available to the public and propping up mechanisms to access it increases
participation in planning and in holding service providers to account. This confirms hypothesis 1 of
the study, namely:
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between information accessibility and participation in

lower LG projects.
These findings support both Daruwala and Nayak (2007) and UNDP (2003), which both found that
access to accurate, clear and relevant information enables disadvantaged people to influence issues
that are critical to their lives through claiming basic rights and entitlements, availability of basic
services, work opportunities etc. It also helps them to understand government policies and
programmes, how participation and decision-making work, their role in these processes and how to
effectively monitor and hold government to account.
A related study by Holdar and Zakharchenko (2002), adds that in order to have effective citizen
participation, the information disseminated has to be relevant. This information should come from
both the general public and the government, and without information effective citizen participation is
virtually unattainable. Similarly, Bastidas (2004) and UN Habitat (2003) contend that free access to
information plays an important role in promoting transparency, participation and good governance.
They spell out that for it to be meaningful information must be relevant, provided in a timely manner,
and with its source clearly evident. They also note that the cost to citizens of obtaining the
information should be reasonable, and that it should be available across social class boundaries.
How information utilisation affects public participation in local government projects

In this study nearly half (47.7%) of respondents agreed that they didn’t know how to use available
information for the planning, monitoring and evaluation of government projects, 21.3% were not sure
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and only 31% said they knew how to use such information. Similarly, about half of respondents
(49.4%) cited complicated and costly infrastructure and technology as a hindrance. Similar views
were found in the focus groups, where participants pointed out that they lack access to information
sources such as public libraries, internet cafes, telecentres, workplace information centres and
conferences, and therefore cannot use information available through these channels.
Turning to the content of information, 57.7% agreed that financial releases, district plans and other
district documents are complex and difficult to use. A further 19.6% were not sure, although 22.7%
disagreed and felt the information content was not too complex. The study did find that 81% of
respondents were literate, but nevertheless the majority of respondents (65.3%) said the coding
(language) in which the information is disseminated is difficult, with just 26.5% saying it was not
difficult. District officials interviewed also noted that the terms used in, for instance, financial releases
are too technical for local people to understand as they contain public service jargon, acronyms and
abbreviations without explanation. The same situation prevailed even on public noticeboards.
Lack of information literacy skills was also found to affect information utilisation. Most respondents
(73.1%) said they lacked the capacity and skills to utilise information for planning and monitoring
development projects in their area, and only 21% felt they had such capacity and skills. Only 32.7%
of respondents had been trained in how to use information to enhance participation in service
delivery. Focus group participants observed sometimes they are not even aware of the need for
information, and also find difficulties accessing, manipulating, and creating meaning from
information to explain service delivery to their community.
District Officials noted that many official standards must be met at district level (e.g. the provisions of
the Decentralisation Act, the local clients’ charter, the Constitution of Uganda and other legislation,
the district development plan, and sub-county development plans); however most such documents
lack popular versions which can be used by members of communities with ease.
Further investigation revealed that 73.2% of respondents agreed that failure to utilise available
information well had negatively affected service delivery in their community. Community members
pointed out that had they utilised effectively available information, they could have held private
service providers and public officials at the district and sub-county levels accountable; and could also
have influenced decisions pertaining to service delivery more. These findings supported hypothesis 2,
namely:
Hypothesis 2: Information utilisation positively affects public participation in local government

projects.
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In this study information utilisation appeared to have significant influence on public participation. An
increase in information utilisation is associated with increased public participation in planning,
monitoring and assessing government projects. Similar studies (Ansari 2008; Chege et al. 2008) also
found that people who have access to information and understand how to use it to exercise their
political, economic and legal rights become empowered, which in turn enables them to build their
strengths and assets and improve their quality of life. This bears out the argument by Mukungu (2011)
that 21st century society requires access to and use of information for its decision-making, growth and
development.
It became clear in this study that community members and government officials both value
participation; however the ability to effectively utilise information – especially for the former group –
is constrained by lack of information literacy, analytical skills, and for the latter, ability to simplify
messages. For example, it was noted that the practice of putting information about central government
releases of funding and budget performance on noticeboards at sub-counties and district headquarters
was ineffective, as it had not spurred people to seek further information and increase their
participation to secure better service delivery. The same was corroborated by reports and records held
in sub county and district offices.
An important finding was that information in the community was supplied, as opposed to being
demand-driven, and rural people are seldom able to contact those who supplied information to
understand their intentions. Some community members believed the government programmes in their
area had nothing to do with them, so did not believe they should bother to get involved. Others felt
they did not have the capacity to understand and harness information to engage with service providers
to achieve better services. It is important that service providers and government officials be aware of
these barriers, rather than developing mistrust and being frustrated by community indifference.
These findings bear out the work of Herranz (2010), who suggests that the potential for access to
information to improve governance lies in the willingness of government to be transparent as well as
in the ability of citizens to demand and use information. Both these aspects may be constrained in
low-capacity settings. Pande (2008) posits that citizens’ and civil society organisations (CSOs) often
lack the skills and knowledge to process, analyse or use complex information. They may also have
limited capacity to conduct advocacy and to develop the networks and platforms that are needed in
order to ensure the concerns of their constituencies are heard.
Another important finding of the study was that community members are sceptical about the
objectives of government programmes, and therefore reluctant to get involved in another round of
‘broken promises’. This cynicism appears to flow from a presumption that public officers are corrupt
and dishonest, so whatever information they provide will be incorrect and/or insufficient, and not fit
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for purpose. Sub-county and district officials were also found to be reluctant or sometimes not
interested in involving local people, perhaps because there might indeed be a tendency towards
corruption. Evidence suggests that in Uganda, where demands for accountability and transparency are
ignored, there might be a syndicate composed of allied sub-county and district officials as well as
elected leaders. These findings are also supported by Uganda’s 2nd Public Procurement Integrity
Survey (Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Asset Authority 2011), which attributed poor
public participation in government projects to apathy.
To sum up this section, a significant proportion (47.7%) of people in Buikwe District did not know
how to use available information for planning, monitoring, evaluation and ensuring accountability by
service providers. Factors preventing them from doing so included limited and costly infrastructure
and technology, which is required to access and utilise information. Additionally, 73.1% of
respondents believed that inadequate information literacy skills were also a hindrance, with a
significant impact on public participation: 73.2% of respondents agreed that failure to utilise available
information well had negatively affected services in their community.
Public awareness of the right to participation as a human right

In line with a report by the Inspectorate of Government (2008), the Uganda National Integrity Survey
(NIS) this study documented a lack of awareness of rights by the general public – for example the
right to the protection of public property, to ensuring proper use of public utilities, and to access to
public utilities, among others. Due to limited awareness of these rights, public property and utilities
have been abused more or less with impunity, as there is little chance that anyone in the community
will report such crimes even when detected. For example, the central government’s ‘Community
Needs Assessment and Baseline on Baraza report’ (Office of the Prime Minister 2012) found that 9%
of the population is unaware of their right to demand local services that ought to be provided by
government. Even the majority who were aware of their rights did not know how to exercise them.
The study also found that CSOs had supplemented media efforts in building civic competency, by
mobilising and educating people about their rights and encouraging them to demand services as part
of their rights. CSOs act as a conduit between government and the people, pointing out shortcomings
in service delivery and stepping in to provide missing or inadequate services when government fails to
respond. However, in Buikwe district as already pointed out, the impact of CSOs in creating
awareness has been quite limited, due to a combination of factors ranging from limited resources to
political interference.
This study’s findings indicate that 26% of respondents were not aware of their rights, roles and
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responsibilities in local service delivery. Even among those who were aware of their rights, 50.5% did
not know how to exercise them. This lack of civic competence may explain the level of apathy
discussed above. These findings did not support hypothesis 3.
Hypothesis 3: Citizens’ awareness of participation as a right significantly increases their involvement

in local government projects.
It would seem that awareness of participation as a human right does not per se significantly affect
participation in local government projects; it is the civic competence to participate effectively that
seems important. Some respondents also criticised the behaviour of government functionaries,
especially security and intelligence staff, who tend to isolate individuals or groups that demand
accountability or attempt to assert certain rights. As one respondent pointed out:
We may know who to question and how to voice our concerns in various ways, but you
end up being labelled opposition and our people fear that. They choose to keep quiet [but
it’s] not because they are happy and don’t know how to react to poor service delivery.
Focus group participant, Ssi sub-county
Discussion with participants during focus groups indicated that some community members were
conversant with the idea of participation as a right, and in principle eager to participate in planning,
monitoring and holding service providers accountable. Yet this does not happen often. Why not?
Interview findings revealed: of the householders surveyed, over half (50.5%) believed that involving
people in decisions about their own projects is a time-wasting and exhausting process. Similarly,
71.2% of respondents said they would not participate in planning and demanding accountability
because they think nothing would change. Only 21.6% of respondents disagreed with this view; 7.2%
were unsure. Focus groups told a similar story: participants revealed they had lost interest in
following up government programmes because they felt the government was not concerned about
their plight of crushing poverty and unemployment.
The situation seemed to be aggravated by corruption: 78.3% of respondents reported that increased
levels of corruption had hindered community participation in decision-making. Only 13.4% felt this
was not an issue. Focus groups expressed specific concern over the increasing level of embezzlement
and bribery in their district. They claimed that district officials collude with suppliers and contractors
to deliver insufficient materials and provide sub-standard goods, and do shoddy work in the district –
with impunity.
The study also provided interesting insights into who should actually participate. Most of the district
officials interviewed appeared satisfied that participation through representatives, rather than by all
citizens, was sufficient. This view was shared by a majority of respondents (69.1%), who also
believed that it is the duty of their elected representatives to demand services on their behalf, and the
people merely receive what the leaders provide. Only 23.7% thought otherwise. These views were
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echoed during community discussions:
We elected our representatives to represent us, we give them our views and they decide
for us the projects we need in the community, so why should we do what is due for them...
I think it is a waste of time. Focus group participant, Ngogwe sub-county
This general tendency towards apathy, and for citizens to abdicate their right to seek accountability,
may explain why bottom-up planning has not enhanced public participation in Buikwe District.
Although structures do exist for community needs prioritisation and budget preparation (village
development committees, parish development committees and sub-county councils), this ideal has not
been realised. Some district officials claimed that the majority of the population hardly attend
meetings in their locality. It was also noted that it is mostly women who attend community gatherings
to discuss development priorities and service delivery, yet their views are often disregarded by the
men, who are much fewer in number but who manage the meetings. It was observed that many men
spend most of their time drinking, while male youths spend their time on boda boda (commercial
motorcycle transport) business, sports betting and discussing sports etc., and pay little attention to
community meetings. As an assistant chief administrative officer (ACAO) pointed out:
Whenever we call a meeting at the parish or village levels to discuss issues concerning
the community, mainly women attend and whatever is discussed is not taken seriously by
their husbands. The youths in this district are in gambling, in sports betting, or in
‘bibanda’ [makeshift video halls] watching football games and other movies. Whenever
we try to lure the youths into these meetings, their response is that they are tired of
government lies. ACAO, Buikwe District
This level of apathy could potentially be overcome by legal means through compelling people to
attend meetings and get involved in bulungi bwansi (community work). Such a law is not in existence.
As a result of this situation, the majority of respondents (79.1%) agreed that not getting involved in
planning, monitoring and assessing projects (schools, health facilities etc) was a key reason for poor
service delivery in their community. Only 13.7% disagreed. According to the Buikwe District
development plan 2010–13, lack of timely monitoring and supervision of activities means that
corrective measures to remedy defects are often taken too late, leading to shoddy and unsatisfactory
work in the district.
Summary and conclusion

The survey results revealed that the correlations of:
 the aggregated index of information accessibility and aggregated index of public
participation was 0.102;
 the aggregated index of the ability to utilise information effectively and aggregated index of
public participation was 0.192;
 and that awareness of citizens’ rights, roles and responsibilities and aggregated index of
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public participation was 0.22.
Therefore, all the independent variables in the survey were found to be positively correlated to the
dependent variable (public participation). The multiple regression analysis confirmed the effect of the
information accessibility, ability to use information effectively and awareness of citizens’ rights, roles
and responsibilities on public participation with the following key findings:
 information accessibility was found to cause a change in respondents’ participation in local
government projects by a margin of 10.2%, suggesting that an increase in information
accessibility may increase public participation in planning and demanding accountability;
 regression analysis disclosed that 19.2% of the variation in respondents’ participation in local
government projects is explained by ability of the public to utilise information effectively,
thus an increase in information utilisation appears to increase public participation in planning,
monitoring and assessing government projects; and
 22% of the variation in respondents’ participation in local government projects is explained
by public awareness on their rights, roles and responsibilities, suggesting that people will
increase their participation in local government projects if they become more aware of their
rights, roles and responsibilities.
By inference, the findings of this study lend credence to the Mathbor (2008) model of effective
community participation, which argues that providing adequate and timely information, educating
people about proposed development initiatives and outlining a plan of action are the first stages in the
process of citizen engagement in decision-making. However, the model does not anticipate how to
deal with apathy, especially in situations where there is active ‘gate-keeping’ by government
functionaries preventing community members from holding government to account for poor services
delivery.
Participation in local service delivery is widely recognised as a way of enriching democracy, building
trust, increasing transparency and accountability, and advancing fairness and justice in governance at
all levels. However, its successful implementation depends on resolving a number of complex issues.
Uganda’s decentralisation and drive for better governance provide a good case study and an
interesting one, but much more is required to be done before it can be said that this drive has achieved
its goals.
Recommendations
The main reason for undertaking public participation is to make development people-centred.
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However, this study has identified a number of challenges to public participation in Buikwe District,
including: limited access to information, inability to harness information, lack of citizens’ awareness
and civil competences, and lack of awareness of participation as a human right. To remedy this
situation, the following recommendations are proposed.
Increase information availability

Information is essential for citizens’ action. It enables people to know what is happening both around
them and elsewhere in other jurisdictions, to compare actual outcomes with what was planned or
pledged and to learn lessons from their own experiences and from what others have done.
There is a need for governments, both central and local, to develop community resource centres,
accessible bulletin boards, paper-based or digital centres, and suggestion boxes at the district and sub-
county levels to ensure a regular flow of information and feedback between community members and
service providers.
Develop and strengthen information infrastructure

Information sources, resources, ICT equipment and internet connections should be established,
strengthened and updated in all communities so that current and relevant information can be accessed,
utilised and updated.
Government should simplify technical documents such as budgets, translate important policies into
local languages, and rewrite them in popular versions.
Publicise relevant information and raise community awareness

The government and other key development partners should develop, implement and monitor a
programme to create public awareness about rights and responsibilities taking into account the
information needs and interests of both men and women in all communication programmes.
The procedures and channels for accessing information, and information dissemination schedules,
should be clearly and widely publicised. Information on community projects should be frequently
publicised in the mass media such as local and FM radio, televisions, newspapers and noticeboards.
Raise awareness of relevant legislation and other standards

There is a need to raise awareness of standard-setting laws and documents which affect the lives of
local people. Examples include the Access to Information Act 2005, the Decentralisation Act, the
Constitution, clients’ charters, district and sub-county development plans, central government releases
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of funds, bills of quantity and bids – among others. These should be simplified and translated into
local languages to make them more accessible, and then made available to the general public.
Train local people in information literacy skills and civil competences

Availability of information does not necessarily lead to greater citizen participation, state
accountability or state responsiveness, if the information is not properly harnessed. Therefore, the
provision of information and technology to access it must be accompanied by the capacity to
understand it and use it effectively. Sustained efforts must be made to equip people with computer
skills through training and information literacy programmes including analytical skills.
Revitalise and use local council structures

Communities should make use of local council structures to facilitate information flows between the
grass roots and the centre. Open barazas or town-hall-type meetings to discuss the performance of
projects and government institutions should be instituted.
Adopt and utilise ICT

ICT should be used to reinforce traditional communication channels and supplement the mass media
in publicising development information. The authors recommend that an e-government programme is
initiated to digitise public domain information and make it available through websites, public libraries
and other appropriate media.
Promote multilingualism and information dissemination to the community

The district, in collaboration with relevant partners, should develop freely accessible education
materials translated into popular versions in widely understood languages and have them
appropriately disseminated to sub-counties, parishes and villages. At the same time, key information
resources should also be translated into local dialects. To do this, central government will need to
work with sub-county and district authorities to develop localised information content in various
formats, taking into account the special needs of disadvantaged groups.
Make the public aware of the relevance of public participation

Public education campaigns should be undertaken to ensure that citizens are aware of their right to
participate in decision-making processes. If there is a lack of knowledge of rights, or of structures to
demand and enforce them, this should be addressed. Citizens need not only an awareness of their roles
and responsibilities, but also the knowledge and skills to fulfil them. This calls for capacity-building
in the areas of information, analytical skills and operational competences. Information dissemination
should be prompt and relevant, to spur citizens and other service users to participate.
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Areas for further research
The following are proposed areas for research to strengthen the academic literature on public
participation in Ugandan local government:
 An assessment of the role of public participation in service delivery – other area based cases or
sector specific ones (e.g. health, education etc.) could be studied;
 The level of public demand for accountability and service delivery in Uganda;
 Comparative studies on public demand for accountability and service delivery, looking at
different geographical areas and methodological approaches.
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4
The ‘silent pistol’ in Ghana’s local
government system: presiding
members vs. chief executives
Issah Justice Musah-Surugu
Public Administration & Policy Management
Department of Public Administration & Health Services Management
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University of Ghana Business School, Ghana
Emmanuel Yeboah-Assiamah
Public Management & Development Planning
School of Public Leadership
Stellenbosch University, South Africa
Abstract
Decentralisation and local governance aim at local economic development, but collaboration among
key actors at the local level is essential in realising this objective. However, at district assembly level
Ghana exhibits problematic conflicts between district chief executives (DCEs), who head the
executive committee, and presiding members (PMs) who convene and preside over assembly
deliberations, acting as speaker. This study aims to unpack the main causes of such unsavoury
conflicts by using 13 case studies from the Ashanti Region. Both primary and secondary data were
collected for the study. Primary data was gathered from a selection of 40 key informants drawn from
three main groups including DCEs, PMs, and other stakeholders such as regional coordinating
council members, assembly members and chiefs. The main research instrument was one-on-one in-
depth interviews with participants. The study found deep-seated conflicts between DCEs and PMs, in
some cases even transcending these two actors to involve a greater section of actors within the local
government administration. The study noted that professional bureaucrats within the local
government service are affected when allegations of affiliation are levelled against them. The study
also found that the legal status of DCEs and PMs appears to be the main driver of potential conflict,
although other context-specific issues were also prevalent.
Keywords: Conflicts, local government, decentralisation, district assemblies, presiding member,

district chief executive, Ghana
Introduction
Decentralisation and local government administration in Ghana seek to facilitate local development
and participation, which requires the active and cordial participation of all stakeholders in the
governance process. The Local Government Act (Act 462) of 1993 as well as Chapter 20 of the 1992
Republican Constitution envisage a partnership relationship with checks and balances between key
The ‘silent pistol’ in Ghana’s local government system: presiding members vs. chief executives 61
actors in the local government structure they enshrine. The main actors include the district chief
executive (DCE), the presiding member (PM), members of parliament (MPs), the district coordinating
director (DCD), assembly members both elected and appointed, and technical/professional and
supporting staff. Others include traditional authorities, opinion and religious leaders, economic
associations and occupational groupings, social groups and membership or faith-based associations,
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and community-based organisations (CBOs), labour
organisations or unions, the formal private sector and local media. A cordial relationship between
actors is a sine qua non to foster the socio-economic development required of metropolitan, municipal
and district assemblies (MMDAs) in Ghana. Local government areas are designated as Metropolitan,
Municipal or District Assemblies if they have minimum populations of 250,000, 95,000 or 75,000
people respectively.
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Though local governance requires cooperation and harmony among key actors to foster local
development, in Ghana the system has been rife with interpersonal and inter-agency conflict in many
MMDAs, which tends to reduce the efficacy of the system (Kessey 2006). Both anecdotal and
empirical evidence suggest power struggles and relational difficulties among key actors in most
MMDAs in Ghana that militate against unity of purpose or esprit de corps and hinder development at
local level.
Conflict, an outcome of behaviour, is an integral part of human life and an inevitable part of any
organisation, and occurs because of differences in opinion and thoughts (Rahim et al. 2000), as well
as differences in goals, values and aspirations among different stakeholders, whose goals may be
incompatible (Baron 1989; Hotepo et al. 2010). Conflicts within organisations are not necessarily a
bad phenomenon (Ongori 2009; Kapusuzoglu 2010) and therefore must not be completely suppressed
or eliminated, but instead managed to enhance organisational learning and effectiveness (Rahim
2002). The prevailing view is that whilst some level of conflict, or ordinary disagreement on issues, is
good to avoid ‘groupthink’ and collusion in corruption, conflict becomes destructive when it becomes
more sustained, personal and counter-productive. This point has forcefully been brought home by
Onyishi and Asogwa (2009), who show that conflict becomes destructive when it is allowed to tear
individuals, groups or society apart as a result of poor management. In such a case conflict becomes
dysfunctional and should be strenuously avoided. In this paper, the term ‘conflict’ is used to describe
a protracted, sustained and unsavoury lack of consensus and cooperation between actors, which
is different from ordinary and episodic disagreements on specific issues.
Such sustained tensions have prevailed in Ghana’s local government system for many years. For
instance, Ayee (1999, 2012) traces such local-level conflicts back to the independence era:
 From 1957 to 1966, the main conflict was among the then-ruling Convention People’s Party
functionaries at the local levels. There was also a lack of clear definition of roles between
district commissioners (DCs) and other local government officers, which resulted in
‘institutional dualism’ (Amonoo 1981).
 From 1967 to 1978 there were two main types of conflict in local governments in Ghana:
conflict over roles, responsibilities and relationships; and conflict over the establishment of
district councils and the siting of their headquarters. The main actors in these conflicts were
the regional officers, district officers and DCEs.
 From 1988 to 1992, before the Local Government Act 1993 was passed, conflicts over the
location of district capitals (where acrimonious lobbying took place over where the district
capital should be located) and over roles, mainly involved district secretaries, PMs, assembly
members, cadres of the revolution (CDRs) and chiefs. In some instances, assembly members
who felt their local chiefs were sabotaging them even bought parallel gong gongs (a noisy
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instrument) to mobilise people.
Since the 1992 Republican Constitution of Ghana ushered in a Fourth Republic, the country has
witnessed various protracted tensions among key local government officials, especially between
DCEs and MPs, between DCEs and DCDs, and between DCEs and PMs. The local government
system as provided in Chapter 20 of the Constitution was intended to encourage grassroots
participation, self-governance and accelerated development; however these goals have been hampered
by relationship conflicts in many assemblies. Often, the relationship between the DCE and other key
actors is characterised by deep-seated misunderstandings that lead to conflicts, tensions and
suspicions.
Though conflicts that occur at the local level are hydra-headed, it appears that in Ghana greater
attention has been paid to conflicts between DCEs and MPs (Tettey et al. 2003, p. 58) and less to
those between DCEs and PMs. Yet the conflicts that occur between DCEs and their PMs are
potentially important for discussion because under the 1992 Constitution the former is head of the
executive committee whilst the latter chairs and controls proceedings of the assembly (Article 244(2a)
of 1992 Constitution). Both also need to have adherents (at least a two-thirds majority) among
assembly members before assuming their positions, and their roles possess some similarities. The
DCE is appointed by central government (the president) with the approval of not less than two-
thirds of assembly members (Article 243(1)). The PM, on the other hand, is elected – but again, by
not less than a two-thirds majority of all assembly members (Section 17(1)(3) of the Local
Government Act 1993). A partnership between these two office holders is required to facilitate and
harmonise the executive and legislative roles of the assembly, and without esprit de corps between
these two foremost actors, assembly projects and proceedings cannot take place smoothly.
However, a conflict between DCE and PM may not necessarily just be between the two individuals,
but can be a team or group conflict in which a house (district assembly) may be divided among itself.
The phenomenon of conflict between DCEs and PMs has been widely reported in the Fourth Republic
local government dispensation; however, there is a paucity of literature on the subject. The main
object of this paper is to examine the causes and consequences of the tensions, conflicts and power
struggles between DCEs and PMs in Ghana, by examining case studies from 13 different local
government areas within the Ashanti Region. For brevity, the term ‘DCE’ in this paper includes not
just district chief executives, but also municipal and metropolitan chief executives (often referred to
by the acronym ‘MMDCEs’) (see Section 162 of the Local Government Act 1993).
The paper is organised into five main sections. The first section provides background and a definition
of the problem. Section two provides a brief review of relevant literature, whilst section three covers
the study’s methodology. The fourth section presents the data collected and a detailed discussion of
key research findings. The final section provides a summary, conclusions and policy suggestions.
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Literature review
Ghana’s current local government system
The thrust of Ghana’s decentralisation policy over the last 27 years has been to promote popular
participation by shifting the process of governance from ‘top-down’ to ‘bottom-up’, with a focus on
the devolution of power, competencies and resources to the district level (Yeboah-Assiamah 2014).
The main features of the policy as outlined in the government’s policy framework (see Local
Government Act 1993; Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development 1996) are devolution
of power and authority, administrative decentralisation, decentralised development planning, fiscal
decentralisation and public–private partnership (see also Mahama 2009).
This policy forms the basis of the current local government system, which is premised on three core
assumptions:
 development is that which responds to people’s problems and furthers their goals, objectives
and priorities;
 development is a shared responsibility between central government, local governments, non-

governmental organisations and the people – the ultimate beneficiaries of development – all
of whom must be closely linked;
 local government institutions are necessary to provide focal points for local energies,
enthusiasm, initiative and organisation to demonstrate new skills and leadership (Ministry of
Local Government and Rural Development 1996).
District assemblies are the human institutions created to give effect to these assumptions. They aim to
create a forum at the district level where a team of development agents, representatives of the people
and other agencies agree on the development problems of the district and their underlying causative
factors, and decide on the combined actions necessary to deal with them. District assemblies were
given legal form by the new local government system and legal backing by the Local Government
Law 1988, Provisional National Defence Council Law (PNDCL) 207, now superseded by Chapter 20
of the 1992 Constitution and the Local Government Act 1993.1
Section 10(1) of the Local Government Act 1993 states that a district assembly shall exercise political
and administrative authority in its district, and provide guidance, give direction to and supervise all
other administrative authorities in the district. The Act also outlines the responsibilities of the
assembly, which include:
 being responsible for the overall development of the district and ensuring the preparation and
submission of a) district development plans through the regional coordinating council to the
commissioner for approval; and b) the district budget related to the approved plans to the
Minister for Finance for approval;
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 formulating and executing plans, programmes and strategies for the effective mobilisation of
the resources necessary for the overall development of the district;
 promoting and supporting productive activity and social development in the district and
removing any obstacle to the initiation of development;
 in cooperation with the appropriate national and local security agencies, being responsible for
the maintenance of security and public safety in the district.
The district assembly performs these functions through the collaborative effort of its administrative
and political wings (executive and legislative). The DCE and PM head the executive and legislative
bodies, respectively, of the political wing. The roles of the DCE and PM encompass the overall
responsibilities of the district assembly.
The DCE’s role includes the following:
 responsibility for the day-to-day performance of the executive and administrative functions of
the assembly;
 supervision of decentralised departments of the assembly;
 chairing executive committee and assembly tender committee meetings; and
 representing the president in the district.
The PM meanwhile performs roles including:
 controlling deliberation and ensuring good conduct and good behaviour at assembly meetings;
 presiding over general assembly meetings; and
 chairing the public relations and complaints committee.
1
For the legal framework underpinning decentralisation, see Yeboah-Assiamah 2014, p. 6.
Conceptualising conflict and typologies

The concept of conflict in organisational settings has been defined in various ways in the literature
(see Appelbaum et al. 1999; Wall and Callister 1995; Dwivedi 2001). For instance, Appelbaum et al.
(1999) conceptualise conflict as a process of social interaction involving a struggle over claims to
resources, power and status, and/or over beliefs and other preferences and desires. On their part, Wall
and Callister (1995, p. 517) define it as “a process in which one party perceives that its interests are
being opposed or negatively affected by another party” whilst in the view of Dwivedi (2001) conflict
involves a process of hampering someone’s efforts by blockage, frustrating his or her plans.
Various sources of administrative conflicts have been identified in the literature (Robbins 1974;
Nelson and Quick 2012). For instance, Robbins (1974) cites three main driving forces or sources of
conflict; communication, structure and personal variables. This suggests that it is not just personal
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attributes and personality traits, but also poor communication and poor organisational structure, with a
lack of clarity on roles and functions, which can cause conflict in an organisation
Recently, scholars have grouped the causes of conflict into two main types: structural and personal
(Nelson and Quick 2012). Structural causes involve procedures, legislative provisions on roles, status,
and organisational processes, which are all a potential source of conflict where there is ambiguity or
lack of clarity; whilst personal causes are propelled by individualistic tendencies. The latter have been
characterised as involving individuals’ styles, values, beliefs, principles and mottoes in life, which
determine their choices and objectives (Baron 1989).
DCEs and PMs in context: a stage for potential conflict?

It is also important to relate the above theoretical conception of conflict to Ghana’s local government
case and the specific conflicts between DCEs and PMs.
DCEs are appointed by the president, so one could argue that their actions are most likely to reflect
the wishes and preferences of the ruling party in government (Yeboah-Assiamah 2014). The DCE
serves as a link between central government and the district (Ayee 1999). He/she also chairs the
executive committee, the most powerful committee in the assembly. The DCE is also responsible to
and removable by the president, so may be tempted to follow the central government line rather than
prioritising local circumstances (Yeboah-Assiamah et al. 2014).
By contrast, in accordance with Section 17(1, 3) of the Local Government Act 1993, the PM of a
district assembly is elected from amongst its members by at least a two-thirds majority (see also
Article 244(2) of the 1992 Constitution). He/she is one of the most powerful actors in the assembly, as
he/she convenes and presides over the day-to-day meetings of the assembly and performs other
functions prescribed by law (Article 244(3a, b)). Assembly decisions are taken by majority vote and
in situations where there is a tie the PM has a casting vote (see Section 18(3) of the Act). This
powerful officer holds office for two years, after which he/she is eligible for re-election (Section
17(4)). The PM is accountable mainly to the assembly, as he/she is directly elected by members.
However, the current system makes the DCE appear to have a dual allegiance: first to the president
who directly appoints him or her, and then perhaps to the assembly or to local people (see Yeboah-
Assiamah et al. 2014). At times, assembly members may disagree with the DCE, who may want to
serve his or her external (central government or presidential) party’s interest – perhaps at the expense
of local needs. Thus, DCEs and PMs may sometimes disagree on issues and courses of action to be
taken. Since these are two powerful actors in the assembly with their own constituencies (ie adherents
or power base within the assembly), any major disagreement between them has serious ramifications
for the modus operandi and activities of their district assembly. This paper argues that it is the legal
framework that is largely responsible for the observed conflict between DCEs and PMs in Ghana’s
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MMDAs.
A political structure has been deliberately created which ensures a clear separation of powers between
the DCE and the PM. The functions of the DCE and the PM serve as checks and balances to each
other in the district assembly, as can be seen in the following areas:
 the PM receives his/her mandate from the district assembly (as he/she is elected by assembly
members) and is supposed to act as a check on the DCE;
 the DCE chairs the executive committee, from which the PM is excluded;
 the PM can propose that assembly members pass a vote of no confidence in the DCE; and
 the PM chairs the assembly’s public relations and complaints committee and therefore in
principle has powers to investigate complaints, allegations or reports against the DCE.
Figure 1: Conceptual framework showing the relationship between DCEs and PMs
Source: Authors
MMDAs by law have both DCEs and PMs. The DCE is a representative of the president at the local
level, so he/she has dual allegiance: both to the citizens, and to the president who appointed him or
her. The DCE is nominated by the president, must be approved by two-thirds of the members of the
district assembly present and voting at a meeting convened for that purpose, and is subsequently
appointed by the president. The DCE has combined political, executive and administrative powers
within the MMDA. The approval of the DCE by the assembly is presided over by the PM, who is the
chair of the assembly. It is the duty of the assembly to either accept or reject the president’s nominee
for the position of DCE. Once accepted, the DCE becomes a voting member of the assembly, though
not an elected member.
The position of the PM is established in Chapter 20(244) of the 1992 Constitution and in the Local
Government Act 1993. He/she is elected from among the members of the assembly and must be
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approved by at least two-thirds of all members of the assembly present. The PM holds office for a
term of two years and may be eligible for re-election after the end of his or her term of office. The PM
presides over general assembly meetings, chairs discussions and ensures good conduct of and good
behaviour at meetings. This puts the PM in a powerful position regarding the DCE’s confirmation or
otherwise in post and at assembly meetings.
The DCE and the PM chair the two statutory committees of the district assembly: the executive
committee and the public relations and complaints committee respectively. These two committees
perform different roles for the smooth functioning of the assembly. The DCE presides over the
executive committee, of which the PM is not a member, as well as over the executive and
coordinating functions of the district assembly. This committee implements the decisions of the
district assembly. The PM is not a member of the executive committee partly because he/she leads the
process of its dissolution if it is not performing efficiently according to its remit under the Local
Government Act 1993. Under the Act, the assembly may by resolution of two-thirds of the members
dissolve the executive committee and elect another.
As noted above, the PM is the chair of the public relations and complaints committee. This is an
important committee of the assembly, as it receives, investigates and makes recommendations on
public complaints to the district assembly about the conduct of assembly staff. This committee is
meant to promote transparency, openness, effectiveness, efficiency and public accountability. It
serves as a platform for citizens to express their views on the conduct of people in the assembly and to
seek redress. The DCE is not a member of this committee, which means that complaints about the
DCE can be investigated by the PM, putting the PM in a powerful position.
The executive and administrative functions of the district assembly are discharged through the
executive committee, which is responsible for day-to-day performance of the executive and
coordinating functions and the implementation of the resolutions or decisions of the general assembly.
The executive committee of the assembly creates sub-committees to deal with specific relevant issues
and submit recommendations to the executive committee for consideration. The executive committee
has the following statutory sub-committees: development planning, social services, works, justice and
security, finance and administration – and any other sub-committee that the district assembly may
decide.
The Local Government Act states that “each sub-committee shall consist of such members of the
District Assembly as shall be determined by the Assembly; except that each member of the District
Assembly other than the Presiding Member shall serve on at least on sub-committee during that
member’s tenure of office”. The PM is deliberately left out in the composition of both the executive
committee and the sub-committees. The aim is clearly the separation of powers and the creation of a
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system of checks and balances. The DCE presides over matters brought by the sub-committees to the
executive committee for decision. The PM, not being a member, helps him/her address such issues
during assembly meetings as neutrally as possible. The plans and programmes of the sub-committees
are coordinated and submitted by the executive committee (chaired by the DCE) to the assembly as
comprehensive plans of action – where their reception is presided over by the PM. Thus it can be seen
that the PM and DCE plays dichotomous but complementary roles which have the potential to lead to
conflict between the two.
Methodology
This research adopted a multiple case study design within a qualitative approach, drawing on both
primary and secondary data. Thirteen multiple cases (namely, district assemblies) within the Ashanti
Region were purposively selected for the study. The Ashanti Region was chosen because it is the
stronghold of the opposition New Patriotic Party and therefore provided likely conditions for potential
conflict. This is because all DCEs are appointed by the president and are thus mainly from the ruling
National Democratc Congress party, whilst all PMs are chosen ‘endogenously’ from among assembly
members, who in Ashanti Region tend to have a ‘soft spot’ for the opposition New Patriotic Party.
The target population for this study included DCEs and PMs, together with selected stakeholders such
as chiefs, assembly members and some local government service staff in the selected areas. In all, 40
respondents were selected. In each of the 13 MMDAs, both the PM and the chief executive officers
were selected, giving 26 respondents. Additionally, five district coordinating directors, four chiefs and
five members of local legislative assemblies from some study areas contributed a convenience
sample. The main instrument for primary data collection was in-depth interviews, each lasting an
average of 45 to 60 minutes.
Discussion of results
Partnership between DCEs and PMs: the ideal for smooth governance
Chapter 20 of Ghana’s 1992 Constitution and its Local Government Act 1993 create the positions of
political and legislative head in every MMDA in Ghana. The PM performs the functions of the
legislative head and the DCE performs those of the executive head. However, to carry out their duties
effectively requires close interaction between them on both legislative and political matters.
Cooperative partnership working is the ideal for smooth governance. Though a PM is voted in whilst
a DCE is directly appointed by government and subsequently approved by assembly members, they
are both supposed to be non-partisan, neutral and loyal, and to serve the interest of the people at all
times. They consult each other on a myriad of governance issues. For example, whilst the DCE is
responsible for initiating a policy, the PM and his/her assembly members perform a legislative role of
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scrutiny and approval. Despite the theoretical separation of their functions in practice the two actors
find themselves often interacting. The framers of the 1992 Constitution and the Local Government
Act deliberately envisaged such separation of powers and interaction as paving the way for first-hand
information sharing, checks and balances and participatory governance. One local government official
interviewed maintained:
These two roles were purposely delineated to typify what occurs within central
governance structures where the speaker of parliament chairs the legislature [here, PM]
to serve as check and balance on the president [here, DCE]. There too, the president
needs to prudently lobby the speaker to get bills, policies, appointments and policies
approved. This lobbying and partnership is an ideal situation for governance especially
at the local level.
Another respondent confirmed these ‘interaction effects’, stating that:

The functional roles of the PM and the DCE are technically separate, [but] ideally they
are intertwined and symbiotic. This could create some grounds for conflict, especially
when the rules of engagement are not explicitly stated.
Respondents noted that when DCEs want approval for budgets and other development projects, they
need (in an ideal governance situation) to enlist the support of the PM to help facilitate the process.
However, in situations where there is a deep-seated conflictual relationship, a ‘missing link’ or
vacuum develops between the two, which stalls the business of the assembly entirely.
Table 1 below summarises the various functions of these two actors, as indicated by respondents:
Table 1: Respondents’ views on the functions of PM and DCEs

PM DCEs
 Presides over general assembly meetings  Presides over the day-to-day functioning of the
 Chairs the audit report implementation committee district
 Provides legal sign-off for all programmes of  Serves as a link between government and local
action before implementation people
 Summons the DCE to explain issues or to brief  Ensures development of the local area
the assembly on important matters  Presides over executive committee meetings
 Chairs the public relations and complaints  Heads local security services
committee  Acts as chief authorising officer for expenditure
Source: Field data 2014
In an ideal situation, there will be partnership and symbiotic co-existence, allowing the DCE to lobby
for his/her policies, budgets and projects and persuade the PM to approve them. But this ideal
situation remains a pipe-dream in most MMDAs because of difficult relationships between the two,
which tend to hold back even uncontroversial local development projects.
Evidence of DCE–PM relationship conflict, and its causes

According to Barron et al. (2004) conflict is inevitable in any society because of human nature. This
study asked respondents if there were any conflicts between DCEs and PMs. Table 2 below shows
that an overwhelming majority – 38 respondents or 95% of the sample – answered affirmatively. This
data provides empirical evidence that conflict between DCEs and PMs is a real phenomenon in
Ghana’s local governments.
Table 2: Evidence of any conflict between DCEs and PMs
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Frequency
Yes 38
No 2
Total 40
Probing further, the researchers asked respondents for their views on the relationship between the PM
and the DCE in their assembly. Whilst a few indicated that it was ‘excellent’, others indicated the
relationship was poor. Similarly, some respondents indicated ‘very good’, ‘good’ and ‘average’.
Those who indicated the relationship was ‘excellent’, ‘very good’ or ‘good’ cited as evidence to
support this, inter alia, that: there were regular consultations between the PM and the DCE before and
after executive committee meetings; they work in harmony; they collaborate in their capacities; and
they make decisions together. However, those who said the relationship was ‘average’ or ‘poor’
indicated that: (i) there is often high tension between the two, (ii) cooperation and consultation are
rarely in evidence and (iii) the two office holders sought to undermine each other. One PM had this to
say as a description of the relationship between PMs and DCEs:
Instead of ensuring a stronger partnership between legislation and execution at the
assembly level, it is however observed that individual values, personal interest, and past
events among actors have created [a] rather poor environment for such partnership in
governance.
From the interviews, nine major factors that cause tension in the working relationship of PMs and
DCEs were recorded. These have been discussed thematically below.
Potential candidacy for similar political office in future

A major observed cause of relationship conflict between a PM and a DCE is their interest in vying for
similar political positions in the future. It should be noted that both actors are politicians (‘small’
honourables) who typically aspire to higher political positions such as becoming MPs. If either has
reason to believe the other will be competing for a position in which he/she has an interest, the two
slip into unhealthy competition and sabotage. One DCE stated that:
I had discussed with my PM some time ago that I would want to contest the upcoming
primaries as candidate for member of parliament. We were working together and I made
the PM my unofficial campaign coordinator. This presupposes that we had a common
interest and agenda. Little did I know he wanted to contest too. After [a] few weeks, I
realised that he has been using my resources I have offered him as my campaign
coordinator to canvass for his personal support. This has created [a] serious problem
between us.
Perceived sabotage and ‘witch hunting’

Section 7 of the Local Government Act 1993 states that the emoluments of a PM shall be determined
by the district assembly and paid out of the assembly's own resources. It appears that payment of these
emoluments (however meagre) is often delayed, especially when districts do not have funds. It can
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happen that inadequate communication and poor consultation between the DCE and PM make the
latter believe that the former is sabotaging him/her by delaying the payment of his/her entitlement due
to ‘bad faith’ rather than economic challenges within the district. There is some evidence for this; for
example, in sharing his personal ordeal one PM remarked:
Do you know on several occasions the coordinating director and the accountant told me
the district chief executive has intentionally refused to release the allowance due me? I
was amazed when I was told, because I have complained on several occasions to the
DCE and he said there is no money. Since that day, I never trusted him and would resist
any attempt by him to impose any activity on the assembly. [albeit, this is not the case in
all situations or districts]
Respondents took the view that such sabotage aims to frustrate the work of assembly members and
the PM in order that either constituents will see them as unproductive and vote them out of office, or
that their future political aspirations will be frustrated. This point was well articulated by a key
informant:
If the DCE perceives the PM to have interest in, for example, contesting for a member of
parliament position (perhaps against him), then he will intentionally cut his financial
resources or at best distort the flow, so that the PM’s ambitions and plans get
disorganised and frustrated.
Political ideological differences and previous political encounters

As noted above, both the DCE and the PM are supposed to operate in a non-partisan fashion.
However, this does not really happen. The political ideologies or perceived political alignment of both
PM and DCE often create a poor working relationship. This challenge was very evident in the region
under study, as it was a stronghold of the opposition party at the time of the study. Most PMs and
assembly members tended to have differing views from DCEs on both policy and legislation. Almost
all respondents confirmed that political differences between DCEs and PMs was a basic cause of
relationship conflict at the district level. They acknowledged that when the political affiliation of these
two actors is different, then from the first days of taking office there is inherent chronic hatred of each
other.
One of the PMs indicated:

If I am an NPP [opposition party] and the DCE is not, [then] definitely as a rational
actor I may sabotage him to render him ineffective. It is likely that the sum effect of my
action can lead to a regime change and electoral victory for my party.
From another angle, an opinion leader interviewed indicated that, in instances where the DCE
attempts to manage certain government policies from a partisan perspective, such policies or
programmes may be rejected by the PM. One PM had this to say:
Some of our DCEs have approached most programmes [through a] political [lens]
without looking at [them] rationally, and at times we have fiercely rejected their
activities. Such circumstances have created some mistrust between us. These
circumstances are more prevalent in instances where we as PM fail to push through a
controversial agenda which we have already [agreed] with DCEs to undertake.
On the issue of previous political encounters, one DCE indicated that he had run for the post of PM
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but had lost to the current incumbent; however he then fortunately (appointed by the president)
became DCE for the district. He further explained that the election was keenly contested between the
two and involved a heated campaign (see Asamoah et al. 2014 on the acrimonious context of elections
in Ghana). He explained that this has led to frequent intense tension between them due to the
allegations made against each other during the campaign period. The importance of this factor –
acrimonious previous political encounters – was also cited by other assembly members, chiefs and
opinion leaders from another perspective. They indicated that political campaigns and accompanying
personal insults and other forms of victimisation prior to PM elections and DCE appointments create a
volatile environment that impedes subsequent harmonious coexistence.
Path dependency leading to loss of trust

Path dependency is a school of thought which argues that ‘history matters’ and that, if one wants to
understand contemporary issues or situations, one should assess what has occurred in the past. This
study observed that historical events within the district where the DCE and the PM were involved
could spark overt hatred. For example, where a DCE is removed from office by the president due to
campaigning involving the PM, the new DCE may fear that the PM can similarly ensure his or her
removal. From the start the newcomer will have some misgivings and mistrusts about the PM based
on such historical antecedents. This situation was reported by respondents as having happened on
several occasions since the 1992 constitutional democracy. Such situations undermine trust between
the two actors. Similarly, events leading up to the appointment of a DCE and their confirmation are
often muddied with politicking. Such politicking may lead to later falling out between the DCE and
the PM because of earlier comments, allegiances or disagreements.
One PM noted that:

My DCE does not want to see me; he barely involves me in decision-making. I feel very
unwelcome whenever I attempt to engage him on matters of legislation. However, I feel
strongly that the events that preceded his appointment and eventual confirmation, in
which I had a deferring opinion might have occasioned his behaviour. I feel that the past
is an event that should be forgotten and we must work together without much recourse to
the bad past.
Tenure insecurity and the quest for legitimacy

As DCEs are appointed by the president and can easily and abruptly be asked to leave office at the
whims and caprices of the president, this office is very volatile and insecure. This has been observed
by Ahwoi (2010) who points out that Article 243 (3) of the Constitution stating that “the office of
District Chief Executive shall become vacant if – (a) a vote of no confidence, supported by the votes of
not less than two-thirds of all the members of the District Assembly is passed against him; or (b) he is
removed from office by the President; or (c) he resigns or dies” makes DCEs very insecure. Ahwoi
further notes that this provision makes DCEs the most insecure of all political office holders under the
1992 Constitution:
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At best, he can be DCE for a maximum of 8 years only – it does not matter how well he
performs. In the process, he wakes up every morning wondering whether he still has a
job. This is because the president can decide to sack him at any time. He does not have to
give any reason. The district assembly can also decide to sack him at any time by passing
a vote of no confidence in him. They do not have to give any reasons.
In an attempt to prevent any sudden termination of appointment, DCEs are tempted to rush through a
development agenda that provides them with a positive image (to obtain legitimacy and favour from
their political party and the president) with a view to maintaining their position for a long while. By
contrast, the PM as an assembly member has a relatively stable four-year term (the mandate can be
revoked but the process is laborious and this rarely happens), and therefore enjoys some tenure
security. These differences in job security were noted by various respondents as a factor that creates
some insecurity for DCEs. As a result, if a PM may want more time to scrutinise a policy or project
before approval (which might delay the DCE’s efforts), the DCE may be tempted to perceive it as an
act of sabotage. At times, the PM may want procedures and methods extensively scrutinised and
extensive due diligence carried out before approval of projects – perhaps to ensure value for money –
but the DCE may not believe these are his/her genuine motivations.
Disregard for procedures and desire to ‘cut corners’

As noted above, DCEs may want to push through a certain agenda, policy, legislation or development
project on which the PM seeks further due diligence and time. The differences in views on such
matters can at times create conflict between the two actors. In Ghana, it is very evident that during
election years or by-elections, the government may want to accelerate the implementation of ongoing
projects as a vote-canvassing strategy. In some cases new projects are also introduced and these are
mostly carried out through the DCE, as the president’s representative in the district. When the PM and
the DCE have different political affiliations this always leads to relationship troubles. The DCE may
want to circumvent procedures and due process, but the PM will resist these attempts.
Some DCEs were very frank in admitting that they sometimes attempt to circumvent procedures and
are tempted to ignore best practice to avoid delays. One DCE said:
… sometimes a DCE would want to circumvent existing regulations in order to push
government’s agenda through. In most cases where we have attempted to do so without
prior unofficial approval of the PM and [a] majority of the assembly members we have
been met with fierce resistance and disapproval. When such resistance happens, the
DCEs are tempted to point accusing fingers to the PM [leader of the assembly members]
who could [did] not use his power and influence to support the agenda.
Appointment of political amateurs

In areas where conflict was rife, respondents unanimously noted that either the DCE or PM, or both,
were novices in the governance ‘game’ or hindered by administrative inexperience that made them
unable to manage even avoidable conflicts. Whilst lobbying has always been part of the political
system, experience and competence are essential to be able to utilise this tool effectively. Opinion
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leaders indicated that DCEs must have the skills to adopt strategies to lobby the PM to support
agendas even when they conflict with the PM’s ideologies. They were emphatic in saying that it has
become very easy for ‘idle youth’ to shout for regime change, and then receive political appointment
as a DCEs as a reward, without the necessary experience. They indicated that using this criterion to
choose DCEs affects the stability and development of the assembly since political novices end up
getting appointed. The study data indicated that in situations where the DCE and the PM both had
enormous work experience either in the public sector or private sector, fewer issues of relationship
conflict were registered. One respondent had this to say:
It is even worse when both are new to the subject area. Normally, they do not undergo
any induction or training before assuming office. This results initially in [a] confidence
crisis in the management of the affairs of the assembly.
Politicisation and ‘deep-seated’ opposition

The local government system in Ghana theoretically should be non-partisan but, unfortunately, this
has not been the case: most rifts between members are based on political orientation. Instead, local
government mimics the nature, structure and process of governance at the central level, where it can
be clearly seen that opposition MPs appear to oppose almost all activities of the government or
president. This creates a contentious and conflict-ridden assembly. For example, respondents reported
that when DCEs support a certain candidate to become PM, but that candidate fails to win, this can
sour the relationship between the ensuing winner and the DCE. Such situations, according to
respondents, create a volatile environment where the two actors struggle to coexist in harmony, since
they have taken entrenched positions about each other from the outset. A statement was made by a
PM that:
The current DCE of my district was supporting my opponent during PM elections. He
wished my opponent became the presiding member in the contest. This has created an
insecure relationship between us since assumption of duty.
Similar concerns, albeit from a different angle, were expressed by some DCEs who claimed that their
PM did not support their [DCEs] appointment; and hence since their confirmation into office, the PMs
exhibits an entrenched dislike for them.
Divergent personal and social values

As noted by Felati (2006), entrenched social or group interests lead to violent conflicts. It is perhaps
not surprising therefore that in this study, almost all respondents cited differences in individual values
and personal interests as a driver of conflict. The authors noted that whenever a decision or a position
(on even trivial social issues) by either actor does not align with the personal interests or values of the
other, it opens up an opportunity for bickering. Respondents defined the ‘personal’ dimension affected
very broadly, to include age, religion, tribe, marital status, past achievements, professional
background, sharing of resources, respect for each other etc. One PM had this to say:
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At times it is funny to know what really causes the rift between the PM and the DCE. We
cannot rule out issues such as [a] clash on a particular lady in the assembly, personality
clash, support of a football team, age differences and the like. When such funny issues
are poorly handled it has the tendency to create confusion among the two.
Effects of conflict between DCEs and PMs

Respondents did agree that disagreement between the DCE and the PM could occasionally be
positive, for example by preventing collusion and abuse of power, preventing fraud, and improving
participation, transparency and accountability. However, they were of the view that its negative
impact was a serious problem for assemblies. Notably, they reported that conflicts protract decision-
making and delay execution of development projects. Table 3 below lists what respondents cited as
the negative impacts of conflict on assembly functioning.
Table 3: Respondents’ views on effects of conflict on MMDA functioning

Effects of conflict on MMDAs Percentage
Excessively long-drawn-out decision-making by the assembly 90%
Delays or halts in implementation of developmental projects 70%
Increase in corrupt practices 62.5%
Ineffective leadership at the assembly 60%
Refusal of government to release funds to the MMDA 50.8%
Low patronage of assembly’s activities by stakeholders 50.3%
Political instability in the MMDA 50%
The conflict between PMs and DCEs is a major problem that must be thoroughly investigated. In one
extreme case, a PM respondent claimed that due to an ongoing clash between him and his DCE, his
assembly had had no meeting for a very long time. As a result, assembly deliberations on
development issues have been slowed:
The situation has gone further to involve professional bureaucrats whose actions and
inactions are judged by individuals as representing allegiance to the PM or the chief
executive, leading to poor human relationships in the entire assembly.
Other respondents confirmed that relational conflict between the two actors has implications for local
development, with several negative effects listed: excessively protracted decision-making; non-
implementation of assembly decisions; poor local-level governance; opportunities for the abuse of
power, leading to corrupt practices; ineffective leadership; low support for assembly activities by
stakeholders; and a poor political atmosphere in the MMDA.
Summary and conclusions

From the discussions above, the study draws the following useful conclusions. Firstly, protracted and
sustained conflict in the form of both bickering and ‘shows of might’ between DCEs and PMs is more
common, and its effects more devastating, than people imagine. It is like a ‘silent pistol’ thwarting
the developmental efforts of MMDAs in Ghana. The main sources of conflict were found to be:
competition for the same political office; perceived sabotage and ‘witch-hunting’; ideological and
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political differences; insecurity of tenure and a quest for legitimacy; divergent personal and social
values; politicisation and ‘deep-seated’ opposition; appointment of political amateurs; and a disregard
for procedure and desire to ‘cut corners’ by DCEs.
Secondly, the study found that the conflict between DCEs and PMs has profound negative
consequences for the development of local communities. In terms of general governance, such
conflict can spread to affect the entire assembly, reducing the house to two factions which each take
entrenched positions on any issue presented without necessarily assessing its merit. Professional local
government staff also tend to be affected, and may be claimed to belong to either of the two factions,
leading to ethical dilemmas and confusion. In terms of local economic development, five major
negative consequences were found: excessively prolonged decision-making by the assembly; delays
in or non-implementation of assembly decisions; opportunities for corruption due to a breakdown of
proper checks and balances; low support for assembly activities among stakeholders; and local
political instability, with its attendant effects.
The authors therefore conclude that protracted conflict between DCEs and PMs is – as indicated
above – a ‘silent pistol’ that affects local governance and holds back community development. This is
because conflict between the two powerful figures typically trickles down to the whole assembly
since both command significant support among assembly members (as approval of the DCE and
election of the PM both require at least a two-thirds majority).
We conclude that strategies to manage conflict better will be crucial in Ghana’s district assemblies.
MMDAs are already plagued by substantial challenges and cannot afford to worsen their plight with
trivial personal conflicts. It has long been known (see eg Boachie-Danquah 2005) that district
assemblies are not fully devolved in terms of resource- and capacity-building, technical expertise or
equipment to ensure the achievement of their core objectives effectively. Therefore any other factor
(such as trivial conflicts) that exacerbates the existing statutory and fiscal challenges should be
tackled vigorously. Whilst conflict occurrence has been observed to be inevitable and ubiquitous in
human organisations, within the district assembly system of Ghana strategies for managing it better
are essential and ought to be a matter of concern to individuals, groups and scholars.
Policy suggestions
This study provides five recommendations for managing conflicts in Ghana’s MMDA system, using
the DCE/PM relationship as a case study:
Firstly, internally this study recommends using a blended methodology for conflict resolution. For
example, a dialogue strategy should be explored in many circumstances to avert potential conflicts,
and improvements in communication between DCEs and PMs should also be sought.
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Secondly, in attempting to prevent and resolve development-retarding conflicts between DCEs and
PMs, we recommend using a framework by Thomas (1976). Drawing on the two main acknowledged
conflict dimensions – namely how assertive or unassertive the parties are and how cooperative or
uncooperative each appears – Thomas conceptualises five conflict resolution techniques. He posits
that the ease with which conflictual situations are resolved greatly depends on whether the two parties
involved want to cooperate, compromise or not yield at all. The first scenario, which he calls
competition, occurs when both parties are assertive (in pushing for their interests) and uncooperative.
Each wants to prove that ‘might is right’, making the process more cumbersome and difficult to
resolve. A second form – collaboration – occurs when each party is assertive, but cooperative. Here
the conflicting parties believe in ‘let’s work this out together’ but they appear too rigid in their
positions. A third form – avoidance – involves both parties exhibiting unassertive but also
uncooperative tendencies. The fourth – accommodation – involves unassertive, but very cooperative,
parties. A final form – compromise – arises from a middle position on both dimensions and leads to a
win–win situation in conflict resolution that tries to ‘split the difference’. However, appropriate
techniques for achieving this outcome will need to be fashioned depending on the context and nature
of the conflict, because there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ best approach.
Thirdly, this study recommends establishing clear guidelines on how emoluments for the PM and
assembly members are accessed, removing unilateral discretion from the DCE. Such guidelines
should compel the DCE to justify in writing any decision not to remit on time approved stipends,
allowances, or any other resources for PM and assembly members. One option, where there is a
suspicion of bad faith, is that a committee could be instituted to investigate the reasons and adjudicate
on approval or release of the assets, perhaps by a two-thirds to three-quarters majority vote.
Fourthly, regional coordinating councils should ensure they have in place monitoring mechanisms to
constantly assess the relationship between DCEs and PMs (and other actors) within their
administrative regions, and any hint of conflict should be immediately addressed by bringing together
relevant actors. Where there appear to be stalemate situations, the regional coordinating council
together with the particular district should as early as possible make a strong recommendation for
action that should pass through the appropriate channels to the appointing authority. Assembly
members also have an important role to play, since their combined efforts can make or unmake these
two foremost actors.
Finally, there should be specific and compulsory dates set for district assembly meetings – in addition
to arrangements for emergency meetings if required – so that any personal rancour between actors
cannot spill over into assembly business and impede development projects.
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5
Local government administration
in Nigeria: the search for relevance
Ozohu-Suleiman Abdulhamid
Department of Public Administration
Faculty of Management Sciences
University of Abuja, Nigeria
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Paul Chima
Faculty of Management Sciences
University of Abuja, Nigeria
Abstract
In the general discourse on the local government system in Nigeria, two major influences are notable:
the intervention of the military in politics, and the 1976 reform of local government. However, the
1979 constitution, which provided the legal framework for the 1976 reforms, plunged the local
government system into a crisis of identity, and ever since local government in Nigeria has remained
an idea in search of relevance. This paper examines both the inherent weakness of the constitutional
foundation and the contradictions created by the 1976 reforms. Using a theoretical analysis, the
paper finds that the combined effects of constitutional gaps and reform contradictions have rendered
Nigeria’s system of local government an unfortunate ‘orphan’, and that, lacking a strong
constitutional foundation, local government in Nigeria has been subject to the whims of both state and
federal governments. The paper argues that, despite numerous constitutional developments, current
constitutional provisions for local government in Nigeria leave much to be desired. The
recommendations to improve the system include that: local government should be given the status of a
federating unit in the constitution, with its powers and functions clearly spelt out; the constitutionally
mandated State Joint Local Government Account (SJLGA) should be abolished; and the constitution
should be amended to create a chapter which guarantees the identity and autonomy of local
government as a third tier of government.
Keywords: Administration, constitution, federation, government, local, reform
Local government administration in Nigeria: the search for relevance 81
Introduction
Since the 1950s, when the federal system came into operation in Nigeria, local government
administration has received considerable scholarly attention (Adamolekun 1979; Gboyega 1987; Ekpo
and Ndebbo 1998; Oyediran 2001; George 2010; Bamidele 2013). Gboyega, cited in Adeola (2008),
observed four major epochs in the development of the local government system in Nigeria: (i)
colonial rule, which was based on the traditional administrative system, and existed from 1903 until
the 1950s when the native authority system became obsolete; (ii) the more liberal and participatory
approach to local governance introduced in the 1950s; (iii) the advent of military rule, which replaced
the model of grassroots participatory democracy with military centralisation and a ‘unity of
command’ scheme; and (iv) the comprehensive reform of local government administration in 1976,
which restored liberal participatory values.
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The impact of these last two epochs on the structure and operational dynamics of local government in
Nigeria is still felt. Firstly, the centralisation introduced under military rule has remained a major
influence in the relationship between the federal government and local government. Secondly, the
reform of local government in 1976 has continued to shape subsequent discourse and reforms. It is
instructive to note that the 1976 reform acknowledged the local government system as government at
local level, established by law, with defined powers. We shall return to this in due course.
Local governments are created with the ultimate goal of bringing government closer to the people at
the grassroots. In Nigeria, the local government reforms aimed both to accelerate development and to
enable the local population participate and hold those in power accountable for their governance roles.
However, a true third tier has never taken off in the governance structure of Nigeria, despite the
widespread endorsement of local government as a potent system to mobilise people for local
participation in governance. Several studies have established the challenges bedevilling the Nigerian
local government system, including issues such as poor funding, paucity of human capital, corruption,
poor service delivery etc. However, little attention has been given to the deficiencies in the
constitutional framework and the reforms that have shaped the operation of local government in
Nigeria. This paper aims to review the groundswell of debate in the light of these reforms and their
constitutional provisions, and assess how local government could be made more relevant.
The paper is organised into eight sections. Section one is the introduction. Section two is the problem
statement; section three presents the objectives and methodology of the study; section four traces the
historical evolution of Nigeria’s local government system; section five explores its constitutional
foundation, and section six presents key findings from the study. Sections seven and eight conclude
the study and offer recommendations.
Statement of the problem

Nigeria is undoubtedly one of the world’s more prominent federal states. Like many other federal
unions, the Nigerian federation has evolved over time, and has undergone considerable political
restructuring to realise the object of true federalism. Perhaps unlike other federal unions, Nigeria’s
federalism has generated considerable debate and controversy. Part of this controversy revolves
around the three-tier structure of the federation: the federal government at the centre; the Federal
Capital Territory and 36 state governments; and 774 local governments.
Ever since the idea of a multi-tiered federation was conceived, there have been varying interpretations
of the constitutional status of local government as the third tier of the federation. Although the 1976
reform of local government attempted to clarify this, it did not provide the legal framework to
underpin any fundamental restructuring. Similarly, the 1979 constitution and the current 1999
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constitution failed to provide the necessary constitutional backing to operationalise the change. This
lacuna created the opportunity for manipulation by both the federal and state governments. Section
7(1) of the 1999 constitution provides that: “The system of local government by democratically
elected local government councils is under this constitution guaranteed; and accordingly, the
government of every state shall, subject to section 8 of this constitution, ensure their existence under
a law which provides for the establishment, structure, composition, finance and functions of such
councils” (authors’ emphasis). The constitution assumes that the law relating to local government
creation would be made by the state houses of assembly. Thus the legal framework does not see local
governments as a third tier of government, but merely recognises local government as an appendage
of state government where the latter enjoys absolute discretion over the former.
The constitutional status of the federal and state governments is clear and unmistakable. Thus Chapter
V, Part I (Sections 47–89) of the 1999 constitution makes extensive provision for the legislative arm
of government at the federal level. Similarly, Part II (sections 90–129) of the same chapter makes
provisions for legislative arms of government at the state level. Provisions are also made in respect of
the executive powers and functions of the federal and state governments. These provisions
automatically accord the federal and state governments the constitutional autonomy and legal
framework required for their operations. No such provision exists for local governments, and it is for
this reason that their constitutional guarantee of third-tier status should be treated with
circumspection.
In the second schedule of the 1999 constitution, two types of legislative power are categorised,
namely the Exclusive Legislative List and the Concurrent Legislative List.1 It is curious to note that in
the Concurrent Legislative List no mention is made of local government – a situation that further
undermines the third-tier status of LGs.
Moreover, a close perusal of the fourth schedule of the 1999 constitution, where the functions of local
government are listed, reveals that local government councils are effectively administrative units of
state government. For example, item 2(d) referring to the functions of local councils provides that:
“The functions of a local government council in the government of a state as respects the following
matters… and such other functions as may be conferred on local government councils by the
House of Assembly of the state” (authors’ emphasis). This provision grants state governments
unfettered discretion to decide on what local governments within their state can or should do, or to
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usurp some of the specific local government functions set out in item 1 (a)–(k).
Finally, the attempt by the reform of 1976 to accord financial autonomy to LGs was undermined by
the 1999 constitution through the introduction of the State Joint Local Government Account (SJLGA).
In the 1976 reform, it was envisaged that democratic federalism would start by extending popular
participation to the unit of government closest to the people, i.e. local government. This would require
a workable degree of financial autonomy recognised by the constitution. However, creation of the
contentious SJLGA has frustrated attempts to establish the third-tier status of local governments. The
SJLGA is reviewed in detail in the discussion section of this paper.
Objectives/methodology
The main objective of this study is to review contemporary debates on the local government in
Nigeria in order to underscore the relevance of the federal constitutional framework to the country’s
challenges. The specific objectives are to: (i) expose the constitutional fault lines that affect local
government in Nigeria; (ii) identify the tendencies on the part of state actors that have contributed to
this situation; and (iii) make policy recommendations that could restore and protect the status of local
government administration in the spirit of true federalism.
The authors have employed both descriptive and analytical methods. This approach drew on official
records, policy pronouncements and a considerable volume of related literature. In respect of official
records, extant provisions of the 1979 and 1999 constitutions of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the
reports of the various national political conferences and the report of the commission on the reform of
1
Exclusive Legislative List refers to items in Part I of Schedule 2 of the Constitution, referring to Federal responsibilities,
and the Concurrent Legislative List is set out in Part II of the Schedule 2, referring to Federal/State responsibilities.
local government in 1976 were used. A literature review provides a range of discussions on the topic.
The analysis/discussion that follows draws on findings from this theoretical research.
Evolution of the local government system in Nigeria

The development of Nigeria’s local government system can be traced to the Native Authority
Ordinance of 1916, which was passed by the British colonial government ostensibly to leverage the
existing traditional administrative systems in the different regions of the area now known as Nigeria.
The ordinance was the first legal framework to operationalise a system of indirect rule (Ikeanyibe
2009). However, this attempt to unify the system of local government met informed resistance from
the East and West regions, both because of its anti-democratic thrust and because the system did not
fit well with the existing traditional administrative systems in those regions. Nonetheless, the
ordinance endured until 1946, when the Richard constitution introduced the new regional assemblies.
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By 1949, the Eastern house of assembly provided a platform for debates that eventually led to the
Local Government Ordinance of 1950, which set the scene for a democratic system of local
government (Ogunna 1996).
By 1954, democratic values had permeated the local government system in the three regions of East,
West and Northern Nigeria, with each region having absolute control over the type, structure and
functions of local government (Ikeanyibe 2009). However, although the 1950 ordinance started to
introduce democratic values in local governance, it also marked the beginning of federal/regional
dominance over local government administration, which was evident throughout colonial rule and has
endured through the post-colonial era to contemporary Nigeria.
Despite this colonial history, Nigeria’s modern local government system started with the reform of
local government in 1976. This reform aimed to restructure and modernise local government
administration, and to make it one of the best in Africa. The good intentions of the 1976 reform
included the desire to extend the principle of federation by bringing government to the grassroots
level, and to achieve uniformity of local government administration across the federation (Olanipekun
1988).
The reform represented a fundamental change, because for the first time a single system of local
government was attained in Nigeria. The financial system was also restructured, introducing statutory
allocations of revenue from the Federation Account, 2 with fixed proportions of federal and each
state’s revenue given to local government. According to Ekpo and Ndebbio (1998), the reform also
ring-fenced revenue to protect local government revenue from state encroachment. It also defined a
2
Revenue for distribution from Federal to State or local governments is distributed through the Federation Account.
number of potential sources of internally generated revenue for local governments, e.g. rates,
including property rates, education rates and street lighting; taxes such as community, flat rate and
poll tax; and fines and fees, including court fines and fees, motor park fees, forest fees, public
advertisement fees, market fees, regulated premises fees, birth registrations etc. In order to make the
reforms work, local government officers and local politicians were given a free hand to operate with
little or no interference in their daily affairs. State ministries for local government only had
responsibility to advise, assist and guide – not to control the local governments under their
jurisdiction. Traditional rulers were also protected from party politics under the 1976 reforms.
Local government was reformed again in 1988, when the federal military government introduced civil
service reforms. These aimed to professionalise the local government service, by creating mandatory
departments (personnel, finance, supply etc) and officers (councillors, secretary, treasurer, auditor-
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general for local government). The 1988 reform also clearly defined the functions of the Local
Government Service Commission, which sets guidelines for staffing and monitoring local
governments. All these provisions sought to institute responsible local government in the Nigerian
federation.
Constitutional foundation of local government administration in Nigeria

Local government councils did not have definitive constitutional recognition until local government
was enshrined in the 1979 constitution, which provided the legal framework to implement the 1976
reforms. The primary goal was to ensure that every state government should, by law, provide for the
establishment, structure, composition, finance and functions of local councils (Diejomoah and Ebo
2010). However, this means that the degree of autonomy local councils enjoy in decision-making,
strength and relevance is determined by their respective state governments, and state governments
have always taken advantage of the lacuna created by this constitutional framework to dictate the
financial and operational structures of local governments.
The 1979 constitution did spell out the functions and responsibilities of local government. Functions
fall into three categories: areas for which local governments have full responsibility, areas where local
government shares responsibility with higher levels of government, and areas of responsibility that the
state or federal government may from time to time assign to local authorities (Oviasuyi et al. 2010).
Additionally, the constitution guaranteed democratically elected government councils all over the
country: “The system of local government by democratically elected government council is under this
constitution guaranteed…” (Chapter 1, Part 2, Section 7(1)). The 1979 constitution allowed for local
government to receive federal allocations, and in Section 149 prescribed that states should provide
funds for local governments in their areas (Bamidele 2013).
The 1999 constitution takes almost the same position on local government as the 1979 constitution,
with some modifications. In its fourth schedule, Section 7(2), the 1999 constitution sets out the
functions of local government in Nigeria. In theory, therefore, local government is a unit of
government with defined powers and authority, and relative autonomy. The functional areas for local
government included in the constitution are: provision and maintenance of health services;
agricultural and national resource development; provision and maintenance of primary, adult and
vocational education; and other functions as may be conferred on it by the state house of assembly.
Section 7(1) also guarantees democratically elected governments in Nigeria. On the strength of these
provisions, the 1999 constitution acknowledged the powers of local government councils as
articulated in the 1976 local government reform to the effect that:
These powers should give the council substantial authority over local affairs as well as
the staff and institutional and financial powers to initiate and direct the provision of
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services and to determine and implement projects so as to complement the activities of
the state and federal government. (Ibeto and Chinyeaka, no date, p. 183)
Section 162 (5, 6, 7, 8) also provides for the funding of local councils through the Federation
Account. Paragraph 6 specifically provides that “each state shall maintain a special account to be
called the State Joint Local Government Account” into which should be paid all allocations made to
local government councils from the Federation Account and from the government of the state. This is,
of course, a reversal of the reform introduced by the federal government in 1988 (Abutudu 2011). The
1999 constitution, as noted by Khalil and Adelabu (2011, p. 143) in Section 4 also provides that: “The
government of a state shall ensure that every person who is entitled to vote or be voted for at an
election to the House of Assembly shall have the right to vote or be voted for at an election to a local
government council.” The 1999 constitution further empowers the Revenue Mobilisation Allocation
and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC) to allocate revenue to the three tiers of government. The
constitutional basis for this allocation of revenue is set out in Section 160, sub-sections (2) to (8).
Thus: “Any amount standing to the credit of the Federation Account shall be distributed among the
federal, state and local government councils in each state, on such terms and on such manner as may
be prescribed by the National Assembly of Nigeria.” In addition, the 1999 constitution states that “the
government of every state shall, subject to Section 8 of the constitution, ensure their existence under a
law which provides for the establishment, structure, composition, finance and functions of such
council” (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, p. 88).
These provisions, among others, constitute the legal framework for local government administration
in Nigeria. The implications of this constitutional foundation for a well-functioning local government
administration will be examined in the latter part of this paper.
Discussion
In discussing local government administration in contemporary Nigeria, the reforms and
constitutional provisions have serious implications. Local government in a multi-ethnic federation is
important in that it creates a sense of belonging among the people. It is responsible for local affairs,
and designed to meet specific local needs. Laski (1975) corroborated this view when he argued that
“we cannot realise the full benefit of democracy unless we begin by admitting that all problems are
not central problems, and that all results of problems not central in their incidence require decisions
by the populace, and the persons, where and when the incidence is most deeply felt” (Laski 1975 in
Tonwe 2012). As might be expected, the constitutional developments and reforms carried out in
Nigeria have attempted to capture the essence of local government. However, these attempts leave
much to be desired, with many gaps evident. Their implications for a well-functioning local
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government system will now be explored.
Article 7 of the 1999 constitution empowers state governments to enact legislation with regard to “the
establishment, structure, composition and functions” of democratically elected local government
councils. The fourth schedule also assigns some critical functions to local government. However,
these provisions only exist on paper. In practice, state governments have taken over most local
government functions in order to justify spending funds earmarked for councils in the Joint Revenue
Account. For example, Ubani notes that: “Lagos state government constructed parks in various parts
of the state with money deducted from the state and local government Joint Revenue Account. In Ondo
state, government constructed a modern motor park in Akure, the state capital” (2012, p. 1). Actions
such as these contradict the provisions of the 1999 constitution, which provides that these projects
ought to have been executed by local government.
The 1999 constitution, like the 1979 constitution, gives states very wide powers to manage issues of
local government organisation and structure. This provision has proved confusing and counter-
productive, for example leading to prolonged disputes between the federal government and Lagos
state government. The constitutional neglect suffered by local government has resulted in a power
struggle between the federal and state governments over control at the local level – a situation that has
seriously hindered the democratisation process at the grass roots.
Similarly, Section 106 of the 1999 constitution provides that the minimum qualification for election as
chairperson or councillor in a local government shall be the post-primary school certificate. This low
threshold has made a career in local politics unattractive. A poorly-educated political officeholder
who is also inexperienced in the art of governance can hardly offer meaningful leadership.
An additional problem is that states often determine the tenure of elected members of local
government councils. Wilson (2013, p. 142) observes that:
On several occasions, the states of Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers truncated the tenure of
the democratically elected councils and replaced them with members of the ruling
political party in the state, as caretaker committees. In most cases, the state governments
decided not to conduct elections for the [local] councils, as in the case of Anambra State
which ran a caretaker system for over six years.
This practice is an assault on the principle of popular participation in grassroots democracy.
The financial autonomy of local government has also been eroded. The 1976 local government
reform, which was largely incorporated in the 1979 constitution, recommended direct funding from
the Federation Account, with local government receiving a defined percentage of funds in the revenue
allocation formula. This provision has been breached. Oyediran (2001) found that allocations
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channelled through state governments were not remitted to local governments. They were instead
credited to state governments, and used by state governments to reimburse themselves for expenditure
made on behalf of local governments. Abutudu (2011) notes that the Babangida regime attempted to
address this problem. From 1988, the federal government removed the state government from its
intermediary role in the transmission of funds from the Federation Account to local government. Until
2000, allocations from the Federation Account were collected directly by local governments from the
Federal Pay Offices in their respective states. However, this changed when the 1999 constitution
introduced the State Joint Local Government Account (SJLGA) (Section 160, sub-sections (2) to (8)),
which provides that:
the amount standing to the credit of local government councils in the Federation Account
shall be allocated to the states for the benefit of their local government councils on such
terms and in such manner as may be prescribed by the National Assembly; and that each
state should maintain a special account, to be called the State Joint Local Government
Account, into which shall be paid all allocations to local government councils of the state
from the Federation Account and from the government of the state.
The aim was that federal allocations would reach local governments via their respective state
governments. However, these SJLGAs have become infamous, as allocations are misappropriated.
Many state governors were accused of misappropriating local government funds during the first 12
years of democratic rule, with the aid of the SJLGA. For example, in 2010, 27 local governments in
Borno State threatened mass action in protest at alleged indiscriminate deductions from their monthly
allocations. Each local government lost 20% of its allocations (George 2010, p. 1). George further
notes that the Nasarawa state government under Alhaji Abdullahi Adamu, in collaboration with Alhaji
Aliyu Bala Usman, the Commissioner for Local Governments and Chieftaincy Affairs, also:
…allegedly abused the joint account system with reckless abandon by illegally
withdrawing over 5 billion in 36 months from the state local government joint account
belonging to the 16 local governments in the state. An act which is contrary to section 7
(6) (A) 162 (5), (6) (7) and (8) of the 1999 constitution and the local government laws of
Nasarawa state and the joint account laws. This offence, which is contrary and
punishable under section 104 of the criminal code act, landed the former governor in the
EFCC net. (George 2010, p. 1).
Some members of state houses of assembly were also alleged to have been ‘paid’ by their respective
local governments at the end of every month. Since state houses of assembly make local government
laws, some state parliaments exploit this power to extract financial rewards. Akaeze (2012) recalls a
similar experience in Ogun State, where Tunde Oladunjoye, a former chair of the Ijebu East local
government area, accused former governor Gbenga Daniel of diverting local government funds. The
case was reported thus:
In November 2009, ‘the total allocation for the 20 LGs in Ogun State was N1.7 billion.
But Daniel gave us N700 million, which was less than half of what was due to us.’
Before then, Oladunjoye and some of his colleagues had written to Daniel ‘to deduct
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only what is statutory from our allocation and specifically the exact amount of money
due to the teaching and non-teaching staff of the Local Government Education Authority,
LGEA.’ According to Oladunjoye, nothing came out of that. ‘For example, my bill for
LGEA was about N28 million monthly, but the governor was deducting N39 million. That
is N11 million in excess. With N11 million, I could build two or three community health
centres every month. I was angry. Why should state government pay primary
schoolteachers on our behalf? Was the federal government paying secondary school
teachers on behalf of the state government?’ (Akaeze 2012, p. 3).
Daniel, the former governor, was eventually charged in court with this and other offences by the
Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC).
The 1999 constitution is clear on the provisions of the SJLGA. The problem faced is the arbitrary use
of discretion by state governors to determine what is due to local governments.
Due to the constitutional barriers imposed by the SJLGA, and the way this account is being
manipulated, LGs have become ineffective. Even with the little that reaches them, post-budget control
imposes further restrictions on their operations, while local government chairs also siphon off funds
using all manners of strategies.
In Benue State, for example, three sub-committees were set up in 2010 by the house of assembly to
probe where funds received by local governments in the state had gone. Consequently:
12 council chairmen were suspended in the state for alleged fraud. They were asked to
refund a total of 150 million naira… The chairmen to go on suspension were those of
Logo, Ado, Obi, Apa, Ohimini, Oturpko and Ogbadibo local government. Others were
Guma, Gwer West, Ukum, Kwande and Ushongo. (George 2010, p. 2).
In a similar development, the chairs of Ibaji and Ogori Magongo local governments in Kogi State
were suspended over what was described as non-performance and misappropriation of resources.
According to the source:

the statutory allocation of 75 million naira received by the local government for
December 2008 was neither used for payment of salaries nor implementation of any
meaningful project. Similarly, neither was a loan of 200 million naira or the excess
crude fund of 380 million naira said to have been received by the local government
judiciously used. Instead, councillors were reported to have been sponsored to Jerusalem
on pilgrimage, and allowances of over 1 million naira each was made available to them,
despite the traveling allowance of 500,000 naira received by each of them. (George
2010, p. 2).
The consequence of the financial strangulation of local government councils is predictable: a local
government administration that is ineffectual, unable to connect with citizens, or to discharge its
statutory responsibilities, and a local population without responsive local representation.
Also worthy of note is the influence of the Local Government Service Commission (LGSC) which,
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though not established under the 1999 constitution, has nevertheless further marginalised local
government. State governments use the LGSC to set local government policies, and sometimes to
obstruct local government activities. It has also been claimed that incompetent staff may be sent to a
particular local government to undermine the implementation of democratically determined policies
(Wilson 2013). In the case of Delta State, Wilson notes:
The LGSC took over political control of the councils where the Heads of Personnel
Management (HPMs) were mandated by the LGSC through the Delta State House of
Assembly to run the affairs of the councils from May 2011 – November 2012, following
the expiration of the tenure of the elected councils in the state in 2011 (Wilson 2013, p.
143).
Recent political turmoil has further undermined local government. In the last 20 years, three
conferences have been convened to discuss the political and constitutional future of Nigeria: the
1994/95 Constitutional Conference, the 2005 National Political Reform Conference and the 2014
National Conference. Nigeria’s system of local government was a key issue discussed by participants.
For example, the 1994 conference expressed serious concerns over the increasing cost of local
government and, while recognising it as a third tier of government in Nigeria, recommended
scrapping the legislative arm of local government to save money (Constitutional Conference
1994/95). However, the merit of minimising the cost of local government level is questionable, and it
is worrying that the cost of federal and state governments was not mentioned.
The 2005 National Political Reform Conference also reaffirmed the three levels of government in the
constitution, but did not address the fractured constitutional arrangements which have rendered local
government administration more or less unworkable. The most protracted debates on the system of
local government were at the 2014 National Conference. Unlike previous conferences, this provided
ample opportunity for participants to discuss a wide range of political and constitutional issues,
encouraged by the spirit of democracy and freedom of expression made possible by 15 continuous
years of democratic rule. Perhaps in an effort to resolve the issue of funding, the conference
recommended scrapping the SJLGA and replacing this with a state Revenue Mobilization, Allocation
and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC) with representatives from local government and a chair nominated
by the state governor. However, it also recommended a two-tier government structure – federal and
state – with states able to create as many local governments as they wish (National Conference 2014).
The abolition of the SJLGA would help restore the financial autonomy of LGs and thus improve their
viability, the latter recommendation can be seen as the final blow to the constitutional establishment
of local governments. It decides the question of local government ‘paternity’ in favour of states (not
central government) but exacerbates the constitutional crisis of identity. Creating a two-tier, rather
than a three-tier system is a fundamental political restructuring, which automatically redefines the
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federation and has far-reaching implications for liberal democratic values and democratic
inclusiveness. Moreover, the discretion accorded to states to create local governments may be
unreasonably exercised, both as to numbers and as to operational autonomy. The authors note that in
the Second Republic from 1979-1983, state governors increased the number of local governments
from 301 to 1,000, while the Fourth Republic which started in 1999 under the Obasanjo
administration followed suit with local government numbers increasing from 774 to 2,000 (Eme
2009). Although there is an issue as to whether so many local governments can be funded and
sustained, the new arrangement severely constrains the actions of local governments, as they still lack
constitutional recognition. It is clear that the relevance or otherwise of local governments to
democratisation is in the hands of Nigeria’s state governments.
Conclusion
The debate on the desirability of local government administration in Nigeria has had considerable
impetus since the return to democracy in 1999. It is often assumed that the new framework will guide
state actors to make informed policy choices in the interests of democratic federalism. This paper
expresses doubt as to whether this is happening, although the choice of federalism as a principle to
organise the Nigerian nation is not an accident of history. Rather, it is the predictable outcome of a
political evolution dating back to the colonial era.
Under colonial rule Nigeria was conceived and nurtured from the periphery, with a system of indirect
rule built on the traditional ethic administrations to create the Nigerian federation. Thus, through a
series of political and constitutional developments, the Nigerian federation has evolved into what is
now described as a three-tier political structure with federal, state and local units of government.
However, the local units of governance which formed the nucleus of present Nigeria have not only
been undermined, but are now undergoing major constitutional assault. With the exception of the
1976 local government reforms, which attempted to restore the sanctity of local governance, political
restructuring has tended to downgrade local government administration. However, despite these
assaults, the principles of democratic inclusiveness and grassroots participation ensure that local
government survives. LG is fundamental to the democratisation process, as it remains the most potent
instrument to mobilise people for local participation and to spread democratic values. The authors
therefore conclude that, given the status of Nigeria as the largest democracy in Africa and the third
largest in the world, a constitutional framework that guarantees the powers and function of local
government is essential to give voice to the far-flung parts of the nation.
Recommendations
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In the light of issues raised, findings generated and discussed, and the conclusions drawn, the
following policy recommendations are suggested:
1. In order to drive the principle of democratic federalism to its logical conclusion and to give
constitutional reality to the concept of three-tier federalism, local government should be
clearly and unambiguously established in the General Provisions, Chapter I, Part I, sub-
section 2 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
2. Following the above, a chapter on local government as an autonomous unit of the federation
should be created in the constitution, analogous to Chapter V, Parts I and II for the federal and
state governments respectively. The new chapter should make provisions that ensure the
legislative and executive powers and functions of local government councils. These
provisions would automatically override the current ambiguous provision in Section 7, which
gives state governments the leeway to manipulate local governments, usurp their statutory
functions and plunder their resources.
3. The controversial SJLGA should be removed from the constitution, and replaced by a new
regime of fiscal federalism where local government councils would be accountable for funds
directly allocated to them.
4. This new regime of fiscal federalism would evolve measures to instil fiscal discipline among
local governments and encourage self-reliance through internally generated revenue. A clear
and unambiguous definition of the powers and functions of local government would help
local governments improve their revenue base and fund public services without over-reliance
on statutory allocations from the Federation Account.
5. The Local Government Service Commission should be strengthened and accorded

constitutional recognition. Given the commission’s laudable objectives, such strengthening
would support the human resource and staffing development of local governments in Nigeria.
6. Finally, the minimum qualifications for eligibility to seek election as a local government
chairperson should be reviewed. In the light of the complex tasks of local governance and
inclusive participation, the authors recommend that in order to stand as a local councillor,
candidates should have a National Diploma or above, and at least 15 years of relevant
experience. This recommendation is seen as fundamental to developing local leadership skills,
which will enable local politicians to achieve national relevance.
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6
Mind the gap: Australian local
government reform and councillors’
understandings of their roles
Su Fei Tan
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Australia
Alan Morris
Australia
Bligh Grant
Australia
Abstract
Over the last two decades a feature of local government reforms globally has been the introduction of
New Public Management (NPM). Under this broad approach to public administration there is an
expectation that councillors play a greater strategic role and move away from involvement in day-to-
day management. This research, carried out in the state of Victoria, Australia, examines councillors’
understandings of their roles. Based on 17 in-depth interviews and two focus groups, we found that
despite the evolving legislative requirements framing councillors as policymakers not managers, most
councillors continued to seek involvement in the day-to-day management of councils. We argue that
this gap may be linked to the diversity of views concerning the role of the councillor and the idea of
representation and how both play out at the local level. It may also signal a lack of awareness as to
how the legislatively inscribed role for councillors has changed over time.
Keywords: Councillor roles, local government leadership, local government reform, New Public
Management (NPM), local representation
Introduction
Across Australia local councils are de jure and de facto the level of government closest to
communities (Grant and Dollery 2012). They deliver an increasingly broad range of services from
critical infrastructure such as roads and sewage to community services such as sports and leisure
facilities, libraries and child-care (Dollery et al. 2006). Local councils were first established in the
mid-nineteenth century to help colonial administrations manage a rapidly growing population and
increasingly dispersed settlements (Power et al. 1981; Sansom 2009, p. 10). The early activities of
local governments saw an emphasis on public health and building regulation. In rural areas road
construction was a central activity. Although local governments raised their own revenues through
property taxes or rates, they operated under tight colonial control. The limited autonomy of local
government historically has persisted into the contemporary period and, despite local government
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being recognised to varying degrees within state constitutions, at present state governments exercise
considerable control over local government (see Brown 2008; Dollery et al. 2009; Grant and Dollery
2012). This has resulted in local government having a comparatively restricted range of functions, a
narrow fiscal base and limited revenue overall. Only approximately 3.5% of all government revenue
is raised by local government (Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development 2013, p. 10).
These factors have limited local governments’ focus to some services and local infrastructure. They
do not control electricity, policing, education, hospitals, or (except in the City of Brisbane) public
transport and their contribution to the provision of affordable housing is minimal, although variable
across the particular jurisdictions (Beer et al. 2014).
Nevertheless, in addition to their service provision function, local government is viewed as the ‘seat’
of local democracy. Aulich (2005, p. 198) described Australian local government as “giv[ing] voice
to local aspirations for decentralised governance” as well as providing “a mechanism for efficient
delivery of services to local communities”. Despite the particular characteristics of Australian local
government, it can be fruitfully compared to its counterparts in a myriad of contexts internationally.
For example, Barnett (2011, p. 275) described English local government “a key instrument for the
delivery of services whilst also attempting to represent recipients and defend local populations in
their interactions and struggles with those services”. More specifically, in the international literature
as well as in Australia, elected representatives, i.e. councillors, have variously been described as
workers, managers and policymakers; or as trustees, delegates and party soldiers; as member of a
governing body and an elected representative; or as having an external or internal focus (Mouritzen
and Svara 2002; Karlsson 2013b; Sansom et al. 2013; Grant et al. 2014). Further, as policymakers
have increasingly turned to strengthening leadership arrangements at the local level as a way to
enhance the performance of local government (see, for example Sansom 2012; Martin and Aulich
2012) scholarly attention has focused on the issue of power relations and ‘leadership at the apex’ of
local government (Mouritzen and Svara 2002).
Mind the gap: Australian local government reform and councillors’ understandings of their roles 97
Various approaches have been deployed to examine both the legislatively inscribed relationships and
informal interactions between councillors and senior staff and among councillors themselves. For
example, there have been analyses of the efficacy (or otherwise) of particular institutional
arrangements, especially the ideal role of the mayor in local governments (see, for example, Sansom
2012; Grant et al. 2014). Another focus has been the relationship between elected and appointed
officials. Drawing on a comparison of executive relations in 14 countries including Australia, and
using a range of statistical techniques, Mouritzen and Svara (2002) examined what they referred to as
the ‘constitutions’ of local government. They identified four ideal types of local governmental
arrangements. First, the strong mayor form, wherein the elected mayor controls the elected council
and is in charge of all executive functions. Second, the committee leader form, that sees the political
leader, who may or may not be called the mayor, share executive powers with collegiate bodies (e.g.
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standing committees) and with the chief executive officer (CEO). Third, the collective form, in which
an executive committee makes all executive decisions. Fourth, the council manager form, which most
accurately describes the overwhelming majority of local governments in Australia. In this case all
executive functions are in the hands of a professional administrator, the CEO, who is appointed by the
council.
Other studies have adopted a broadly qualitative approach to the study of local authorities and local
power, conducting in-depth interviews with a range of participants from the local level (see, for
example, Hutchinson et al. 2014; Smith-Ruig et al. 2016; Martin and Aulich 2012; Bochel and Bochel
2010; Ryan et al. 2000). However, to date little attention has been given to how the intended
directions of Australian reforms1 – especially the pursuit of efficiency, effectiveness and community
engagement through strategic and corporate planning – interact with frameworks for political and
community governance. In this article we examine the way councillors understand their roles and
whether their understandings coincide with the role prescribed under the auspices of reform, in
particular those informed by New Public Management (NPM) approaches. This article builds on a
research project funded by the Australian Centre of Excellence for Local Government examining the
changing nature of representation within the Australian context (see for example, Tan 2013; Tan and
Grant 2013). It also draws on a paper presented at the 2014 International Research Society for Public
Management conference (see Tan 2014). The article focuses on councillors in the state of Victoria,
Australia. Initially, we adopt an ‘institutional approach’, examining the legislative framework within
which local governments operate. According to this method, while it is recognised that “political
institutions do not determine the behaviour of political actors”, at the same time it is acknowledged
that they “shape political behaviour by providing a relatively systematic and stable set of
1
This is in contrast to the extensive examination of local government reform in the UK. For example, Laffin
(2008) provided an extensive overview of the ‘Local Government Modernisation Agenda’, such as the reforms
providing officers with a “new set of arguments for the primacy of management: and therefore the importance
of role of the CEO” (Laffin 2008, p. 115).
opportunities and constraints”, or “enforced prescriptions” of behaviour (Lowndes and Leach 2004,
p. 560). In the case of Victoria the reforms to the Local Government Act 1989 (Victoria) prescribe
that councillors should focus on strategy and policymaking and not be involved in the day-to-day
administration of councils.
The analysis of the legislative framework is then augmented by data drawn from 17 semi-structured
in-depth interviews with councillors and two focus group discussions. The main aim of the interviews
and focus groups was to examine councillors’ understandings of their roles. They indicated that there
is a considerable discrepancy between the prescribed roles of councillors under the Local Government
Act 1989 (Victoria) – which has been significantly amended over time – and how councillors perceive
the ambit of their authority and their roles.
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By way of introduction we commence with a brief overview of NPM as a mode of reform to
government generally and to Australian local government in particular, specifying how it has been
introduced to various local government acts generally and in Victoria in particular. We then examine
the setting for the study, local government in the state of Victoria. We go on to specify the
methodology of the qualitative element of the research, exploring the diversity of understandings
councillors have of their roles, their views on the optimal level of professionalisation of their offices,
the influence of the number of councillors and their views concerning representation of their
constituents. We conclude by exploring the implications of our findings for local government practice
and for future research.
New Public Management

It is possible that any discussion of the contemporary pervasiveness of New Public Management
(NPM) will be viewed as anachronistic. In both the theory and practice of public administration,
NPM has been, if not superseded, at least significantly augmented by ‘public value management’ or
the ‘paradigm’ of public value creation (see, for example, Stoker 2006; O’Flynn and Alford 2008).
However, as will be demonstrated with respect to the particular context examined in this article, the
lasting impact of NPM can be seen in the relatively stable legislative frameworks that, while subject
to incremental change, for the most part have evolved in the specific direction of NPM over time.
As described by Orr (2005, p. 375), the “New Public Management discourse…suggested that
bureaucrats and producers had too much power and, as they were protected from market disciplines,
were consequently unresponsive to the needs of consumers”. In his concise yet comprehensive
account, Diefenbach (2009) provided a systematic and insightful survey of NPM, distilling five basic
assumptions and core elements as outlined in Table 1.
Table 1: Basic assumptions and core elements of New Public Management

Area Element
1. Business environment - assumption of strong external pressure, of a much more challenging and
and strategic objectives changing business environment
- conclusion that there is a need for a new strategy and that there is no alternative
for the organisation but to change according to larger trends and forces
- market-orientation: commodification of services under the slogan of ‘value for
money’
- stakeholder-orientation: meeting the objectives and policies of strong and
influential external stakeholders
- customer orientation: service delivery from a customer’s perspective
- increased organisational efficiency, effectiveness and productivity defined and
measured in technological terms
- cost-reduction, downsizing, competitive tendering, outsourcing, privatisation of
services
2. Organisational - decentralisation and re-organisation of organisational units, more flexible
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structures and processes structures, less hierarchy
- concentration on processes, that is, intensification of internal cross boundary
collaboration, faster decision-making processes and putting things into action
- standardisation and formalisation of strategic and operational management
through widely accepted management concepts
3. Performance - systematic regular and comprehensive capturing, measurement, monitoring and

management and assessment of crucial aspects of organisational and individual performance
measurement systems through explicit targets, standards, performance indicators, measurement and
control systems.
- positive consequences for the people working with and under such systems such
as increased efficiency, productivity and quality, higher performance and
motivation
4. Management and - establishment of a ‘management culture’: management is defined as a separate

managers and distinct organisational function, creation of (new types of) managerial posts
and positions, emphasising the primacy of management compared to all other
activities and competencies
- ‘managers’ are defined as the only group and individuals who carry out
managerial functions
5. Employees and - empowerment and subsidiarity, staff are expected to develop ‘business-like’ if not
corporate culture entrepreneurial, attitudes
- idea of leadership and a new corporate culture
Source: Adapted from Diefenbach (2009, p. 894)
Examining Table 1, while the key features listed in the left hand column, including inter alia changes
to organisational structures and processes, elements of performance management and changes to
employees’ conditions are important to note, what is of more interest is Diefenbach’s (2009)
characterisations of particular elements of organisations influenced by NPM. Thus, not only is the
area of reform toward a “business environment and strategic objectives” characterised by “customer
orientation” and “increased organisational efficiency”, for Diefenbach (2009, p. 894) this also entails
“the assumption of strong external pressure, of a much more challenging and changing business
environment” (emphasis added). Similarly with respect to “employees and corporate culture”,
Diefenbach (2009, p. 894) argued that “empowerment and subsidiarity” are ascribed to individual
units of government service delivery, such that “business-like, if not entrepreneurial approaches” are
key features of the NPM approach.
While all elements discussed by Diefenbach (2009) are relevant to a discussion of local government
reform, the emphasis upon business-like approaches and strategic objectives, coupled with the
establishment of management and managers ‘as a separate and distinct organisational function’ (see
Table 1) are, arguably, the aspects of NPM which have had the strongest impact upon the role of
councillors in Australia. Krapp et al. (2013) examined NPM in the context of local government,
arguing that NPM reforms pose a fundamental question about the function of local councillors, who
are now required to focus on strategic objectives and desist from interfering in operations. They also
argued that while councillors’ roles may change under NPM, at the same time they ought to expect
better performance from local government administrations. Ideally, this is achieved by elected
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members assigning the necessary responsibilities and resources to competent managers so as to ensure
that agreed objectives are achieved. Further, structures to monitor progress are established, such as
budget monitoring and performance measurement systems to enable politicians and citizens to
evaluate the performance of the administration (Krapp et al. 2013, p. 224). In the UK, Rao (2006)
explained that reforms to modernise the local government sector often involved greater delegation of
powers to officers (i.e. staff) and that councillors were often opposed to delegating any of their
powers to officers.
In Australia the local government policy context has evolved significantly over the last three decades
reflecting the introduction of NPM, which, it was argued, would improve efficiency and streamline
the delivery of services (Baker 2003; Marshall 2003; Aulich, 2005). Local government reforms
implemented in Australia from 1985 to 2005 have reshaped the municipal landscape (Marshall 2008).
This was achieved in two main ways. First, widespread programmes of council amalgamations were
undertaken across state jurisdictions except Western Australia, reaching a peak during the 1990s when
the number of councils nation-wide decreased from 866 to 626. In Victoria the amalgamation process
was especially dramatic. In January 1993 there were 210 local government councils and by
December 1995 there were 78, a decline of 73% in three years (Grant et al. 2009). Second,
substantial organisational and managerial restructuring, premised on a rethinking of the functions of
local government and councillors were implemented. This was reflected in the introduction of
corporate management systems for local governments including cost-accrual accounting and the
restructuring of reporting lines away from the ‘town clerk’ model to embrace divisional and sectional
management structures (Marshall 2003, 2008). NPM principles also affected the management of
councils and introduced a de jure clear delineation of responsibilities between elected and appointed
staff. Of all the jurisdictions Victoria probably adopted the most radical approach to managerial
reform, introducing compulsory competitive tendering, the separation of purchaser–provider functions
(see, for example, Ryan et al. 2000) and the extensive privatisation of utilities (Marshall 2008).
In contrast to most accounts of the reasons for the implementation of amalgamation programmes,
Baker (2003) linked the compulsory consolidation of councils in Victoria to the need for larger
administrative structures so that NPM reforms could be introduced and management pivoted away
from its traditional base in professional associations (engineering, town planning, for example) to a
discrete managerial layer within the sector. Otherwise, stated structural reform and NPM-style
administrative reforms were heavily linked rather than being justified separately.
In this model the role of councillors was re-envisaged. No longer were councillors expected to be
involved in the day-to-day running of their councils. This was to be left to appointed ‘experts’.
Councillors were now expected to focus on strategic decision-making. As Pierre (1999, p. 9)
explained, NPM approaches assume that service producers operate at an arm’s-length distance from
elected officials. Their main role is confined to defining long-term objectives for service production.
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Service production is to be guided via direct, market-like communication between producers and
customers. Newnham and Winston (1997, p. 106) contend that the redefinition of the role and
function of councillors is in fact necessary under NPM because of the requirements to distinguish
between policymaking and administration. They also argue, perhaps more importantly, that the
complexity and professionalism of modern management has become such that most councillors have
neither the background nor qualifications required. Ideally, the removal of these responsibilities
enables councillors to concentrate on policy direction and strategic planning for the municipality.
In Australian local government key elements of NPM have been implemented. For example, the
Local Government Act 1989 (Victoria) now states that the role of a council includes “providing
leadership by establishing key strategic objectives and monitoring their achievement” (s. 3D, 2B). It
is important to note that this incorporation of NPM principles has been incremental in that particular
jurisdiction. For example, the latter stipulation was introduced in 2003 with the passing of the Local
Government (Democratic Reform) Act 2003. In 1997, some eight years after the introduction of the
Local Government Act 1989 (Victoria), the powers of the CEO were explicitly expanded to include,
inter alia “appointing as many staff members as are required to enable the function of the council to
be carried out” (s. 94A, 2). The implementation of NPM-inspired legislation culminated in the Local
Government Amendment (Performance Reporting and Accountability) Act 2014. This Act requires
that councils implement a finely-granulated system for reporting against a series of performance
indicators. In this way, the broad tenants of NPM as discussed by Diefenbach (2009) have been
gradually introduced to enforce roles and behaviour across the Victorian local government sector.
There has been a similar trend in other Australian jurisdictions. In New South Wales the Local
Government Act 1993 now specifies that the role of a councillor is inter alia to provide civic
leadership in guiding the development of the ten-year community strategic plan and to review the
performance of the council (s. 232).2 In Queensland, s. 12 of the Local Government Act 2009 states
that all councillors are responsible for ensuring that local governments achieve their corporate plans.
Although these changes to Australian local government have been documented (Aulich 2005;
Marshall 2008) and the changes in the relationship between elected and appointed officials have been
examined (Martin and Aulich 2012; Grant et al. 2014), the overwhelming preoccupation of
researchers in the Australian local government context continues to be with assessing the resultant
change in operational efficiencies and long-term financial sustainability of local governments (see, for
example, Dollery et al. 2013; IPART 2015). In this article we are specifically concerned with how
councillors perceive their role and whether this coincides with the role of councillors prescribed under
the auspices of NPM reforms. It is to these questions in the context of the particular jurisdiction of
Victoria that we now turn.
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The research setting: local government in Victoria
The state of Victoria is 237,629 km² (comprising 3% of the Australian land area) and in June 2013 the
population was 5,737,600 (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2013). It is divided into 78 local
government areas (LGAs) and there are a total of 630 councillors (Municipal Association of Victoria
2013). Approximately 74% of Victoria’s population lives in greater Melbourne, the second largest
city in Australia (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2013). The constitutional arrangements of local
government in Victoria are not uniform. LGAs are either ‘unitary’ for voting purposes or
alternatively are subdivided into wards, with one or several councillors elected to represent a smaller
area within the LGA. The majority of councils in Victoria have multi-member wards (i.e. with two or
more councillors being elected to represent a smaller area within the local government boundary),
followed in descending order by unsubdivided councils (local government areas without wards), those
with a combination of multi- and single-member wards and local governments with single-member
wards only, as presented in Table 2.
2
It is difficult to overstate the radical nature of reforms to leadership roles entailed in the rewriting of the local
government acts across Australian jurisdictions. While in the case of Victoria the reforms to leadership were
introduced incrementally under various legislative adjustments (as discussed above) other jurisdictions adopted
a more vigorous approach to reforms. For example, under the current legislation in NSW the role of the mayor
is limited to “exercising, in cases of necessity, the policy-making functions of the governing body of the council;
to exercise such other functions as the council determines; to preside at meeting of the council and to carry out
the civic and ceremonial functions of the mayoral office” (s. 226; see Local Government Act 1993 [NSW]).
Prior to the introduction of the Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) the mayor had two roles:
One role makes him or her ‘first citizen’ representing the local authority on all formal occasions
and taking the lead in official functions... The second is the more powerful role of chief executive.
According to the decision of each individual council, this role may be purely a titular in function
or may have conferred upon the mayor complete control over the day-to-day running of the
council (Bains and Miles 1981, p. 149).
The redrafting of the Act in 1993 stripped the mayor of the CEO role such that their functions fall squarely
within the NPM approach, separating political leadership from the administration of public sector organisations.
Table 2: Victorian local government constitutional arrangements

Constitutional Arrangement Number of Councils Percentage
Multi-member wards 32 41%

Unsubdivided 22 28%
Mixed, single- and multi-member wards 13 17%
Single-member wards 11 14%
Total 78 100%
Source: based on Victorian Electoral Commission (2013)
In 2013 the Municipal Association of Victoria (MAV) published a profile of Victorian councillors. In
line with the European experience (Egner et al. 2013), the majority of elected representatives were
married, male and 56–65 years-old was the median age group. A majority were born in Australia;
however for more than 30% at least one parent was born overseas. The majority of councillors
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reported being ‘managers’ or ‘professionals’ (73% of the sample) with post-school qualifications and
were working in the private sector or were self-employed. In terms of political allegiances, 23% of
councillors stated that they identified with no political party or were self-declared ‘swing’ voters,
approximately 28% identified as Liberal (the conservative party in Australia), 21% as Labour and
15% listed their political preference as ‘other party/independent’ (MAV 2013).
Methodology
The study draws on 17 semi-structured interviews and two focus groups. Twelve councillors were
interviewed alongside five senior local government staff (CEOs and directors). The interviewees
were drawn from 18 councils in Victoria. Senior staff were interviewed to provide a different, yet
informed perspective of the effects of local government reform on the role of councillors. The
research was carried out in partnership with the Victorian Local Governance Association (VLGA).
The VLGA notified their members of the research and asked for expressions of interest from councils
to participate. Interviewees and the focus group participants volunteered to participate in the study.
The councils in the sample group represent a wide range in terms of size, geographical location (rural,
regional and metropolitan) and population. This allowed us to obtain a diversity of experiences and
viewpoints. Due to the geographical distances involved, the interviews were carried out by telephone
and were approximately thirty to forty-five minutes in duration. The interviewees are profiled in
Table 3:
Table 3: Profile of councils represented in the interviews

Interview Type of Structure Number of Elected member or staff
council* elected
members
1 RAV Unsubdivided 7 Elected member
2 URM Unsubdivided 9 Elected member
3 URM Unsubdivided 7 Elected member
4 UFL Multi-member wards 11 Staff
5 URM Multi-member wards 9 Elected member
6 UFS Single-member wards 7 Elected member
URS Unsubdivided 7
Elected members and
7 Focus Group RSG Multi-member ward 9
staff
URV Single-member wards 12
8 URL Multi-member ward 9 Elected member
9 UFM Single-member ward 7 Elected member
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10 RAL Multi-member 7 Elected member
12 UDM Multi-member ward 7 Elected member
14 UDL Multi-member ward 7 Staff
15 URM Multi-member ward 9 Staff
16 URS Unsubdivided 7 Elected member
17 UFM Multi-member ward 7 Staff
UFM Multi-member ward 9
18 Focus Group Elected members
UDV Multi-member ward 9
19 URL Multi- and single-member wards 9 Staff
Key: RAL – Rural Agricultural Large; RAV – Rural Agricultural Very Large; RSG – Rural Significant Growth;
UDL – Urban Development Large; UDM – Urban Development Medium; UDV – Urban Development Very
Large; URM – Urban Regional Medium; URS – Urban Regional Small; UFL– Urban Fringe Large; UFM –
Urban Fringe Medium; UFS – Urban Fringe Small; URL – Urban Regional Large; URS – Urban Regional
Small; URV – Urban Regional Very Large.
Source: Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development (2013)
The focus groups were constituted by locally elected representatives in the metropolitan areas of
Melbourne (four participants) and Geelong (six participants). This purposively selected sample size
and qualitative methodology broadly conforms to other work examining both elected and appointed
executive roles in local government (see, for example, Bochel and Bochel 2010).
The semi-structured interviews and focus groups were organised around a set of themes that together
sought to address the broad topic of local representation and how councillors perceived their role.
The interviews and focus groups concentrated on the following themes: The strengths and weaknesses
of the various local government structures; the role and election of mayors and deputy mayors; the
perceived roles of councillors; how they perceived local representation and the issue of remuneration
of councillors. The interview data were codified and analysed in accordance with these themes. In
this article we focus on interviewees’ understandings of the role of the councillor and councillors’
perceptions of local representation.
How councillors perceive their role

The discussion concerning the role of a councillor is important because NPM is predicated on
councillors taking a strategic and policymaking role and staying out of the day-to-day management of
the organisation (Pierre 1999, p. 9) as has been clearly stipulated by successive amendments to the
Local Government Act 1989 (Victoria) described above. However, the practice of local representation
is complex. As Sweeting and Copus (2012, p. 22) explained, there are “tensions inherent in the role
of councillors which include different sorts of relationships with citizens and parties, the concern with
both local responsiveness and national priorities and the political and managerial roles that
councillors assume”. This section explores the understandings of locally elected representatives with
regard to their role in order to compare these understandings with the objectives of local government
reforms.
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Diversity of understanding of councillor roles
Councillor roles are not generic across different systems, nor static in the face of reform (Egner et al.
2013, p. 13). While there is agreement that a fundamental aspect of politics is about managing
conflicts of interests between groups and individuals, there is no consensus about how political
representation should be interpreted and no right answer regarding which groups or interests a
representative ought to prioritise. To a certain extent, and despite the influence of legislative
requirements as emphasised above, each representative has the space to determine how they see their
role and to act accordingly.
This was reflected in the interviews and focus groups. There was a range of positions as to what role
councillors thought they should play and the legislation setting out the de jure role of a councillor
often had little or no bearing on their views or actions. As one councillor from a large council
commented:
How councillors execute their role is based on the individual… Some spend a lot of time
helping residents navigate council bureaucracy while others focus on strategy and policy
(interviewee 15).
Some councillors understood their role strategically, in the sense conveyed by the NPM reforms. For
example, interviewee 2 commented:
The role of a councillor is to set directions. They are close enough to the community to
know what is needed.
Similarly interviewee 15 stated:

The councillor’s role is to ensure that policy and strategic decision-making reflect
community expectations.
Alternatively, some councillors focused on their responsibility to help the community negotiate local
government procedures:
Councillors … translate shire processes for the community especially with regard to
planning and building matters, easing people through these processes (interviewee 5).
The role of councillors in the oversight of council expenditure was also highlighted:
We don’t want to burden the residents with rates that are too high. A councillor needs to
ensure value for money (interviewee 8).
This range of views of the role of the councillor from setting strategic directions, to helping the
community to navigate organisational bureaucracies and to providing oversight and scrutiny of
council expenditure is noteworthy. It indicates that there is no consensus as to what the role of the
councillor should be and that the role of the councillor as envisaged by local government reform
premised on a NPM approach has had a limited impact.
In addition, this range of views may also reflect ambiguity in the legislation, particularly when taking
into account its incrementally evolving nature over time. As we have seen, the Local Government Act
1989 (Victoria) states that the role of a council includes: “acting as a representative government by
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taking into account the diverse needs of the local community in decision-making” (s. 3D, 2a). In their
review of local government in another Australian state, New South Wales (NSW), Sansom et al.
(2013, p. 61) explained that under s. 232 of the Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) the role of a
councillor is divided into two parts: as a “member of the governing body” and as an “elected person”.
The former is seen as deliberative – planning, resource allocation, policy development and
performance monitoring. These functions align with councillors performing and behaving as a ‘board
of directors’. The role of a councillor as an elected person includes community representation,
leadership and communication. These are more clearly representative functions and encompass what
most councillors would regard as a central part of their job and fundamental to being re-elected
(Sansom et al. 2013).
The interviews indicated that the role of ‘trustee’ most closely aligned with councillors’ understanding
of their role and mode of operating. A trustee votes according to their own convictions, rather than
seeking to ‘mirror’ the wishes of the constituents themselves (see, for example, Grant et al. 2014, p. 6;
Karlsson 2013b). Elected members act on the premise that they have been given a personal
responsibility by the voters to make decisions drawing on their own judgement (Karlsson 2013b).
Several councillors stated that they used their own judgement to make informed decisions:
When it comes to making decisions councillors use their own judgement based on their
interactions with the community, on good information and on a knowledge of the
relevant legislation (focus group 1).
This was achieved through talking with their constituents, considering the relevant information
provided to them by staff and using their own knowledge in order to take a considered viewpoint on
an issue (interviewees 3 and 10; focus group 1): “By electing us, the community has said that they
value our judgement” (interviewee 10). This finding is broadly in line with Karlsson’s (2013b, pp.
98–100) analysis of councillors’ perceptions. He found that the most common understanding of
representation expressed by councillors is the trustee (57% of respondents).
Representation as a trustee aligns well with councillors taking a strategic role in governing their
communities and with the NPM approach which, generally speaking, likens the elected decision-
making body to a board of directors. This was expressed clearly by interviewee 3:
Councillors in this local government function as a board of directors. They set the
direction of the council and try not to get involved in operations. They stay out of the
detail.
However, although many of the councillors saw themselves as trustees in terms of representation,
only two of the 17 interviewees saw themselves in a strategic role as members of a board of directors.
One councillor (interviewee 9) from a smaller rural shire commented:
Councillors do not have enough power and are hamstrung by the advice that they are
given by officers [local government staff].
In her opinion councillors should have more power to act on behalf of residents. This councillor gave
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the example of a resident in dispute with the council administration over the cutting down of a tree,
with the councillor feeling that elected officials rather than staff should have the power to make
decisions in this regard.
These opposing points of view illustrate the differences between taking a strategic or policymaking
view of the role of a councillor on the one hand in contrast to one that expects elected members to be
involved in day-to-day decision-making. The current reform processes, which have been in place for
over 20 years, emphasise the importance of the strategic decision-making role of the councillor over
involvement in operational issues. However, our qualitative research clearly illustrated that many
councillors continue to feel that it is essential to be involved in the day-to-day running of the council.
Councillors as ‘laymen’ or professionals?

One aspect that has the potential to shape how councillors understand their role is whether they are
perceived as ‘laymen’ carrying out their representative roles on a voluntary part-time capacity, or
alternatively as ‘professionals’ who are remunerated and expected to carry out their duties on a full-
time basis (see, for example, Dollery and Grant 2011, p. 11). In the Australian context the
legislatively inscribed role of councillors as either laymen or as professionals differs by jurisdiction.
In the state of Queensland locally elected members are expected to dedicate their time and expertise on
a full-time basis and receive a commensurate payment. In Victoria, however, councillors are expected
to fulfil their position on a voluntary basis and are paid a moderate allowance (Tan 2013, p. 27).
These differences have a bearing on the kinds of citizens who are able to or are interested in standing
for election and influence how councillors perceive their role. Most of the interviewees recognised
that the low allowances may be a barrier to attracting a more diverse range of local government
candidates:
The net allowance for councillors and a low mayoral allowance are insufficient to attract
younger people and single parents and highly skilled people (interviewee 2).
Similarly:
If they [the allowances] stay at the same level, the current demographic/age group of
councillors will remain the same regardless of any programmes put into place
(interviewee 2).
As otherwise stated, the demographic cohort from which councillors are drawn may have a particular
view about the way that representation ought to function.
However, some caution was expressed about advocating for an increase in allowances. A participant
in focus group 2 commented that “locally elected members need to be community-minded”, and there
was concern that if the positions were paid too much it would attract the ‘wrong’ kind of people. As
such, whether a state’s local government act prescribes a full-time paid role or voluntary part-time role
to councillors is relevant to this discussion. It has a bearing on the kinds of citizens that are able to run
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for office, how the community views councillors and how local representation is carried out. Because
this study was limited to Victoria it was not possible to determine whether full-time paid councillors
have a different view of their role in comparison to part-time voluntary elected members.
Influence of the number of councillors

The number of councillors representing an area has the potential to impact on how councillors see
their role. A local government’s constitutional arrangement is the framework that de jure defines a
councillor’s function. These arrangements regulate the political sphere providing clear limitations in
some areas while leaving room for individual discretion in others. This also means that the
interpretations of representatives may be changed by means of institutional reforms (De Groot et al.
2010). Political systems are based on political institutions, i.e. a ‘constitutional setting’, which guides
and limits the actions of the actors within the system:
Situated in a political system, actors will consider the ‘lay of the land’, adapt their
notions about what the appropriate conduct is for actors like themselves in this
environment and then, as a consequence, adjust their behaviour (Karlsson 2013a, p.
681).
This constitutional framework is therefore an important element influencing councillor behaviour and
their understanding of their role. The Local Government Act 1989 (Victoria) sets out this particular
institutional framework. It states that:
 councils may have between five and 12 elected members

 local governments may be divided or undivided (i.e. have single-member or multi-member
wards)
 the variation of representation ratios among wards within a council area should be no greater
than 10%
 a mayor be elected from among the councillors (except in the cases of Melbourne and
Geelong).
The number of elected representatives on a council may also have a bearing on their understanding,
and implementation of their role. For example, several of the metropolitan local government areas of
Victoria are experiencing population growth which might result in an increase in councillor numbers.
According to participants in both interviews and focus groups undertaken for this article, an increase
in the number of councillors may have a significant impact on the way a council functions and how
councillors see their role. An interviewee from a local government where the number of councillors
had increased from nine to 11, explained:
This [increase] has meant a change in the way the group functions and group
dynamics… Councillors have had to think more carefully about their roles and the
organisation has had to respond to the growing interest in councillors not just being a
generalist on issues but allowing councillors to get involved in issues and with the
community in more depth.
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Elected members in this particular council moved from being generalists to becoming more closely
involved in particular areas with the result that they moved to a portfolio system (interviewee 4). For
example, some may choose to concentrate on sport and leisure infrastructure and services; others on
the provision of community services such as child-care and others on matters related to land use
planning.
The majority of the local governments in Victoria have either seven or nine elected members. A
seven-member council can pose a particular challenge in the Victorian context where the mayor is
elected by councillors for one year within the council’s four-year term. Several interviewees, both
senior staff and councillors, highlighted this issue. For example a councillor from a metropolitan
council commented:
In [our] council the election of the mayor was pre-planned. There is a flaw in the
election of the mayor by councillors when there are seven elected members in that four
can decide among themselves who will be mayor and the remaining three have no say in
the matter (interviewee 9).
What can happen is a split among councillors, where a majority of elected members work together to
make decisions and share the mayoral role. Although this phenomenon was discussed particularly in
the context of a seven-member council, this division of elected members can occur in other
configurations, for example, a block of six elected members on a council of eleven can work together
to determine the mayoralty and control decision-making. While the mayor does not have more power
than the other councillors, the position does attract a full-time allowance and fulfils a ceremonial role.
What is unclear is the impact of the development of these kinds of allegiances and factions on
councillors’ understanding of representation and how they carry out their decision-making
responsibilities. Thus, in the Victorian example there is the possibility that the structure of local
representation (particularly the election of the mayor by councillors) affects councillors’
understanding of their role and how they behave. Rather than thinking strategically in terms of the
governance of communities they are thinking strategically in terms of political alliances and
influence. The election of mayors by councillors can result in elected members voting on issues in
line with political allegiances rather than in the interests of their constituents.
Councillors’ views of representation

When interviewees were asked how they represented their communities and the role of councillors in
this regard, there were a range of views. All of the elected representatives said that their job was to
represent their constituents, wards or communities but there was variation in their conceptions of what
this representation entailed. Some commented that their main task was ensuring that residents receive
adequate service delivery or value for money from their council:
We don’t want to burden residents with rates that are too high; a councillor needs to
ensure value for money (interviewee 8).
The notion that a primary task should be to increase citizen participation was not part of this particular
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interviewee’s framework. Some interviewees saw themselves more as a ‘Board of Directors’, making
strategic and long-term decisions:
The councillor’s role is to ensure that policy and strategic decision-making reflect
community expectations… Councillors set the strategic and policy direction of the
organisation (interviewee 15).
Most of the interviewees viewed consultation with the community in decision-making as a central part
of their role. For example, a participant in focus group 1 stated, “[i]t is important for councillors to
consult with residents”. Interviewee 13 echoed this view: “You have to be a good listener to be a
councillor”.
There was consensus that in order to adequately represent their communities councillors need to
understand the views and wants of residents:
A councillor should consult as much as possible to make sure they understand the
interests of the community (interviewee 8).
A councillor represents the community … They identify the needs of residents and push
for those needs to be met (interviewee 13).
The importance of informed decision-making was raised by interviewees. Informed decision-making

requires adequate consultation with the community so that councillors have the knowledge required to
make decisions that are in line with the desires of their constituents. However, several councillors
noted that there were instances where residents may not have the required understanding of an issue
or of ‘the big picture’ in order to make informed decisions.
Only three councillors from the total of 17 interviewees emphasised their oversight role. It was
argued that elected members should:
Play a scrutiny role, questioning how things are done in the organisation and whether a
particular programme or activity is the right thing to spend money on over another
priority (interviewee 5).
In a similar vein, it was acknowledged that councillors also have a role in assuring service delivery
and value for money. This is in line with the observation by Krapp et al. (2013) concerning the
importance of the monitoring role of elected members under NPM reforms. The emphasis on the
need for councillors to understand the aspirations of their communities and provide monitoring or
scrutiny of the organisation is compatible with a strategic function for elected members. However, as
illustrated, the councillors interviewed felt that their role encompassed a broader range of
responsibilities. In addition to their oversight role during the interviews councillors spoke of the need
to engage with the community, to represent individual resident needs to staff, to be more involved in
day-to-day decision-making.
The interviews indicated that the various legislative arrangements of local governments can influence
whether councillors see themselves as representing the interests of the community as a whole. When
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discussing the relative merits of unsubdivided and subdivided councils, the four interviewees from
unsubdivided councils felt that in local governments without wards there was a broader and more
representative approach by councillors and councillors are more likely to govern for the whole of the
local government area (interviewee 15). Arguably – and importantly for the introduction of NPM
reforms – this arrangement enables councillors to take a more strategic view of governance. By
contrast, where a local government has ward structures, councillors are more likely to govern in the
best interests of their ward. Otherwise stated, one result of having subdivisions is that “councillors
become a champion for their ward” (focus group 1). The division of local government areas into
wards may therefore undermine the ability of elected members to function well as a board of
directors.
The varied understandings of councillors’ roles as regards to local representation is reflected in the
literature that describes representation as sitting along two extremes of a continuum between
collective versus individual interests. The ‘corporate’ view of representation claims that an elected
member represents the interests of the whole community rather than a specific group of constituents
(see for example, Grant et al. 2014). This view was articulated by many of the councillors
interviewed. In contrast, the ‘mirror’ approach proposes that different representatives are
spokespersons for different interests within the electorate (Karlsson 2013b, p. 101). Rather than
taking a collective view, politics is the aggregation of interests and votes (see for example, Thomassen
2010). The interviewees did not hold this latter understanding of local representation. Heinelt (2013,
p. 6) recently argued that in practice both concepts of representation complement each other. A
vibrant and broader involvement of citizens and public deliberation in some phases of the policy cycle
(such as identifying goals, setting agendas and implementation) can be compatible with the exclusive
power of elected representatives to take final decisions of common interest. This discussion of
councillors’ views of representation is important because it demonstrates the wider remit that elected
members fulfil beyond that of policymaking and setting strategic direction.
Concluding remarks
Local government reform in Victoria and in Australia generally is being driven by a NPM perspective
and the quest for a more financially sustainable sector. While this has important implications for the
role of councillors, how councillors understand their roles has been a neglected area of research. This
paper contrasted the changed prescribed roles for councillors under NPM-inspired reforms with
councillors’ understandings of their roles.
The research undertaken for this article emphasises that the introduction of NPM approaches and the
associated structural changes to promote efficiency have aimed to shift the historical role of local
government councillors. Councillors have been legislatively directed to move away from
involvement in the day-to-day running of their councils and have been prescribed a more strategic
function, identifying long-term goals and setting direction. However, the interviews and focus groups
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indicated that the reforms have not engendered the intended effect as to how councillors understand
their roles. The NPM reforms have focused on the strategic policymaking roles of councillors while
neglecting the broader community leadership aspects of the position. The research indicated that the
way councillors understand their roles is not necessarily altered by legislative reforms. As stressed by
Laffin (2008 pp. 120–121) “political modernisation illustrates an old lesson of administrative reform:
while it is relatively easy to change organisational forms, the underlying institutional patterns usually
prove less tractable”.
Despite the limitations of the research conducted here in terms of the sample size of individual
interviewees alongside two focus groups, it has demonstrated that there is a gap between the roles
local government reforms prescribed for locally elected members and the actual practice of
representation. The way the interviewees understood what representation involves does not concur
with the local government reforms. It is also influenced by the particular institutional form of local
government. As regards local representation the interviews and the focus groups suggest that some
councillors have a corporate understanding of democracy and others are keen on broader forms of
participation. However, many operate along a ‘democratic continuum’ at any given time to address
particular circumstances or contexts. A better understanding of how they conceptualise their role and
how they represent their community will inform efforts to improve the quality of local government.
There is clearly room for further research in this regard, in particular that incorporating greater detail
concerning individual participants from which qualitative data is derived.
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7
Australian local governments and
the early national broadband
network roll-out
Tooran Alizadeh
School of Environment
Griffith University, Australia
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Heather Shearer
Cities Research Institute
Griffith University, Australia
Abstract
A recent decision by the Australian Federal Government to reassess the scale of the National
Broadband Network (NBN) will leave the country with a patchwork of different levels of access to the
infrastructure. This intensifies the need to investigate and evaluate the implications of
telecommunication at the local level. The paper opens a discussion on the different approaches taken
by local government authorities towards the NBN in the early roll-out localities. Building upon the
international literature, it analyses the empirical data collected from the Australian local governments
involved with the early NBN roll-out using an online survey. The findings reveal an interesting diversity
in the approaches taken at the local level, and show how decision-making at higher levels of government
can impact local outcomes.
Keywords: Local government, telecommunication, national broadband network, Australia, high-

speed broadband, local planning
Introduction
In response to shortcomings in Australia’s telecommunication infrastructure (Barr 2008; Given 2008;
Middleton 2009; Middleton and Chang 2008), the National Broadband Network (NBN) was announced
in April 2009 to connect Australians to broadband (NBN Co Ltd 2010a). The NBN was described as
the largest single infrastructure project undertaken in Australia, with an initial estimated cost of A$43
billion (US$33bn) (DBCDE 2010).
Australian local governments and the early national broadband network roll-out 117
Previous studies have discussed the strong potential of telecommunication infrastructure to influence
societies, economies, and urban environments worldwide (Frieden 2005; Grubesic 2010; Lee et al. 2005;
Middleton 2009; Savage and Waldman 2005). More specifically, in the Australian context, the NBN
has highly influenced and in turn, been greatly affected by the political setting (Given 2008; Tucker
2010). Perhaps the high point of the latter was when three independent MPs cited the NBN as one of
the key reasons motivating their support for Labour over the Coalition following the hung parliament at
the 2010 Federal election. On the other hand, following the 2013 Federal election, the change of the
political setting had an utmost effect on the roll-out of the NBN, as the newly elected Coalition Federal
Government decided to reassess the scale of the national fibre project, and put the roll-out on hold in a
large number of areas. As of November 2013, only 300,000 premises listed in the earlier roll-out phases
were guaranteed to be connected directly to the fibre network. Since then, the announcements made by
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the Coalition Federal Government confirmed that a mixed technology network will be adopted
(Turnbull 2014), which means the roll-out speed could be significantly different for the rest of the
country (Duke 2013; Turner 2013).
This paper avoids making any judgement about the recent political decisions around the roll-out of the
telecommunication infrastructure. Instead it welcomes the current state as an opportunity to consider
and analyse the efforts put into the national project over the last few years. It is perhaps time to
acknowledge that despite the hefty investment on the NBN, there remains a dearth of evidence-based
research to understand the specific implications of the new infrastructure. Very little attention has been
paid to the specific impacts of the fast-growing telecommunication infrastructure at the local planning
level (Grubesic 2012; Maeng and Nedovic-Budic 2004). Moreover, the recent decision by the Federal
Government to build the national fibre project using mixed technology will have enormous impact on
the distribution of telecommunication across the nation (Nirmalathas 2014).What can be said with
certainty is that Coalition’s NBN will leave the country with a patchwork of different levels of access
to the infrastructure. This will intensify the need to investigate and evaluate the implications of
telecommunication at the local level across the nation, as Australian local government authorities
(LGAs) then need to respond differently based on the level of access provided in each case. For many
local governments, it means that even within their own jurisdictions, they have to deal with a diverse
level of access to telecommunication infrastructure.
The paper opens a discussion on the different approaches taken by Australian LGAs towards the NBN.
It starts with the history of the NBN roll-out plan. It then continues with a review of broadband
infrastructure and local planning in the international literature around the three main areas of
implications, namely e-governance, socio-economic development, and spatial planning. This provides
the foundation for the empirical part of the paper through which data were collected from the Australian
LGAs involved with the early NBN roll-out using an online survey. This paper is only a beginning in
the mapping of the implications for local planning of the telecommunication infrastructure, and the role
played by the Australian LGAs in relation to the dynamics of the NBN over the last few years. The
findings reveal an interesting diversity in the approaches taken at the local level, and show how
decision-making at higher levels of government impact local outcomes.
The national broadband network in Australia

In April 2009, the Australian Labour Federal Government announced the formation of the National
Broadband Network Company (NBN Co) to enable the broadband roll-out (NBN Co Ltd 2010b). This
was shortly followed by a second announcement in which the NBN roll-out started with a three-stage
trial phase in the island of Tasmania (NBN Co Ltd 2010a, 2011, 2012a). However, the roll-out of the
NBN on mainland Australia started one year later in March 2010 when NBN Co announced its five
first release sites as part of live trials of the network design and construction methods. The second
release sites, including 14 new locations and five sites adjacent to the existing first release sites, were
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announced in July 2010 (NBN Co Ltd 2012a). Furthermore, in October 2011 NBN Co released a 12-
month national roll-out schedule plan to cover half a million premises. The schedule listed a total of 60
locations in all Australian states and territories where roll-out would begin prior to September 2012, in
addition to working on the roll-out of the network that had already begun in the earlier release rounds
(NBN Co Ltd 2011).
Additionally, in March 2012, the first stage of the large-scale roll-out was released to provide NBN
fibre to a third of the country, including over 3.5 million homes in 1,500 communities (NBN Co Ltd
2012b). It was envisioned that the localities included in the updated schedule would be connected to
the fibre-optic component before mid-2015. However, the result of the Federal election in 2013 changed
the fate of the NBN roll-out. The elected Coalition Federal Government decided to reassess the scale
of the national fibre project, and put the first stage of the large-scale NBN roll-out on hold. Connection
dates were scrapped for almost two-thirds of premises that had been scheduled to connect to the NBN
under the first phase of the nationwide fibre-to-premises roll-out. As of October 2013, only 300,000
premises listed in the first large-scale roll-out phase were still guaranteed to be connected directly to
the fibre-to-premises network (Duke 2013; Turner 2013). The Coalition’s version of the NBN will
cover the rest of the nation using mixed technologies, with varied levels of access and final speed
(Turnbull 2014).
Since its origin, the NBN has been an important part of the political debates as the two major Australian
political parties have different approaches on how to deliver the NBN, particularly on the technical
details and the final roll-out speed. This paper, however, focuses on understanding the uptake of
Australian local governments involved with the early roll-out of the NBN. The analysis will provide an
opportunity for local planning to better engage with the telecommunication infrastructure, based on the
lessons learned from the NBN early roll-out experience.
Local governments and telecommunications (broadband) infrastructure

The link between local governments and telecommunication infrastructure is an under-studied area,
which is perhaps understandable given the short life of the new infrastructure and the conservative
nature and restricted resources available at the local level of governance. Having said this, the following
offers a brief review of the international literature to illustrate the international perspective on the
subject. It then presents some of the federally funded initiatives provided in the Australian context to
facilitate and guide the local implications of the NBN. A combination of the international perspective
plus the federally driven Australian initiatives will then inform the design of the empirical part of the
paper.
International perspective
A growing body of international literature is investigating the broad implications of telecommunications
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for urban and regional planning, loosely categorised under three areas of e-governance, socio-economic
development, and spatial planning. The following offers a summary of these, with a focus at the local
government level through which the level of uncertainty in this emerging area is well presented.
e-Governance: An extensive body of literature has investigated the impact of telecommunication

infrastructure on the nature of governance at both national and local government levels. Different
studies describe e-government as the use of telecommunication technologies by public organisations to
manage, redefine and disseminate information, communication, and transaction relations with
individual citizens, businesses and the general community at large (Edmiston 2003; Maeng and
Nedovic-Budic 2004). The implementation of e-government is expected to create increased government
access, better public service delivery, internal efficiency and long-term saving; and to support political
accountability, and participatory democracy (Bekkers 2003; Irani et al. 2005; Jesuale 2006; Moody
2007; Steyaert 2000). However, research coming out of the US and Europe warns that, while the
beneficial prospects of all levels of government are high, e-government has been penetrating at higher
levels of government much more rapidly than at local government level (Edmiston 2003; Evans-Cowley
and Conroy 2006, 2009; Simpson 2005). This is despite the push from the public for local governments
to more actively incorporate online applications facilitating e-government in the assessment of urban
planning proposals (Evans-Cowley and Hollander 2010).
Socio-economic development: Socio-economic research argues that public infrastructure is a powerful

driver of business productivity, investment, economic growth and social prosperity (Aschauer 1989;
Button et al. 1995; Gramlich 1994; Seitz 1995). Moreover, governments’ direct and indirect
involvement with broadband infrastructure worldwide is often justified by reference to social equity
grounds; and is based on assumptions that the new technology-based infrastructure will increase
productivity and innovation, and guarantee long-term economic competitiveness (Alizadeh et al. 2011;
Martin 1999; Willson et al. 2009). This justification is founded in part on the literature generated over
the last 10 to 15 years, describing the potential economic and social benefits of such infrastructure for
businesses, households and the overall community (Galloway 2007; Hesham 2000; Katz et al. 2010;
Martin and Rogers 1995). However, few empirical studies have analysed the impacts of
telecommunication infrastructure post-implementation (Lee et al. 2005; Strategic Networks Group
2003). Among them, even fewer have focused at the local level, and quantified the positive socio-
economic gains as a result of the broadband network deployment (Ford and Koutsky 2005). In other
words, the empirical research in this area is still in its early days; and it is extremely complex to establish
beyond doubt that the infrastructure per se results in a change in an economic indicator. Even though
the results should be qualified as ‘preliminary evidence’, broadband deployment needs to be considered
as an important policy issue for any local government seeking to play an active role in the new economy.
Spatial planning: There is a consensus in the literature that spatial planning does not have specific tools
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to deal with telecommunication infrastructure and its urban and regional implications. Studies focusing
on telework, as one of the ramifications of telecommunication, have long referred to cases where
planning regulations in-place do not allow for mixed-use development, and hinder web-based home
businesses (Alizadeh 2013; Handy and Mokhtarian 1995). Planning responses to other ramifications of
telecommunication such as new land uses (telecom hotels and telework centres) are also documented
as more varied than uniform (Alizadeh et al. 2014; Maeng and Nedovic-Budic 2004). While some local
planning jurisdictions have been facilitators of the telecommunication-related land uses, others consider
them as conflicting land uses. In general, the literature sees local governments as being more reactive
than proactive in dealing with the emerging land uses and their potential impacts (Evans-Cowley et al.
2002). Nevertheless, there is an emerging trend to regulate ICT-related developments and issues
through zoning, and designation of special districts or industrial corridors accompanied by tax-based
incentives (Maeng and Nedovic-Budic 2004).
Australian context
The introduction of the NBN in Australia was followed with the development of a National Digital
Strategy (DBCDE 2011b) that introduced a range of locally based initiatives to speed up some of the
potential socio-economic implications of the new infrastructure at the local government level. The
national strategy also included funded initiatives such as the Digital Local Government Programme to
facilitate e-governance at the local level (DBCDE 2011a). Over the last few years, a growing number
of LGAs have started to develop local digital economic strategies to increase the possibilities for their
local communities. However, it is important to understand that the majority of Australian local
governments have either not incorporated broadband opportunities in their current plans, or are only in
the preliminary stages of developing a digital economy strategy (Alizadeh and Sipe 2013). The
following briefly introduces the three main federally funded initiatives that aimed at guiding and
advancing the implications of the NBN at the local level:
Digital Hub Programme: The Digital Hub Programme was rolled out in 40 communities around
Australia, and aimed to assist local communities to increase their online engagement and better
understand the opportunities of the digital economy. Services offered included training, high-speed
internet, and access to online government and education services, videoconferencing, and various other
innovations.
Digital Enterprise Programme: This was rolled out to 69 communities, and aimed to provide free
training and support for small to medium enterprises (SMEs) and not-for-profit groups to assist them in
transitioning to delivering services online, improve productivity, reach wider markets, increase
efficiency and use videoconferencing. It also aimed to assist not-for-profit groups to use social media
and deliver more products and services using online means. It included a ‘virtual advisor’ programme
to also aid indigenous people and groups, and not-for-profit organisations in regional, rural and remote
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areas.
Digital Local Government Programme: This programme, as part of the National Digital Economy
Strategy, aimed to fund LGAs in providing innovative online services to customers and residents. The
aim was for innovations that could be used by LGAs across Australia, and that helped LGAs improve
the quality, availability and speed of services.
Methodology
This study used a combination of a desktop review and an online survey to collect data on the
implications of the NBN in the early roll-out LGAs. The NBN Co website, and the websites of the 60
LGAs involved in the initial roll-outs of the NBN (Figure 1) were extensively monitored. The initial
research involved identification of the LGAs affected by the early roll-out. The NBN Co website lists
specific suburbs rather than separate LGAs, so it was necessary to match the mapped areas to specific
LGAs.
An Excel spreadsheet was created with the name of the LGAs, the suburbs involved in the NBN roll-
out, URLs of the LGAs, and if possible, the names of the contact officer for any local digital strategy
or other relevant information on the NBN, high-speed broadband, or economic strategy. The final
spreadsheet contained 59 LGAs.
A short questionnaire survey was emailed to the LGAs identified in the desktop review. When names
and email addresses were available, emails were sent directly to the contact officers; where not
available, emails were sent to the customer service email address given on the LGA’s website. One
tranche of emails was sent, and three weeks later, follow up emails were sent to the non-responders.
Two LGAs were not contacted directly, Brisbane City Council (information on this LGA is already
known to the researchers) and the ACT government (as this is a Federal jurisdiction, and governance
and funding arrangements of this region were deemed too dissimilar to the other LGAs).
Figure 1: Australian LGAs involved in the NBN early roll-out (with those that responded to the survey cross-
hatched in red)
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The email survey which was entitled, “LGA Responses to High-Speed Broadband” consisted of five
items. Question 1 asked for the name of the LGA, and Question 5 asked if the respondent wished to be
involved in further research (a short telephone interview) and if so, to provide their name, email and
telephone number. The remaining three questions were based on the desktop analysis of the LGA
websites, and the relevant literature, and were as follows:
 Question 2 asked “How important does council consider access to high-speed broadband?”
Respondents were requested to rate this on a numerical scale, ranging from 1 (very important)
to 5 (very unimportant).
 Question 3 was based on the literature review which identified the three broad areas where
telecommunications might impact on local government, and asked “In which areas of the
council business do you expect to see the most implications of the high-speed broadband?” The
options given for this included: e-governance, land use planning, socio-economic development
and other. The question allowed for multiple choices.
 Question 4 asked, “How has the council responded to the roll-out of the NBN/fast broadband?”
The options were based on the literature and some of the federally initiated funds available to
the local governments, and included: drafting or implementing a Digital Economy Strategy
within council; hiring consultants to investigate or produce a digital economy strategy; creating
a Digital Hub; joining a coalition of councils to promote digital economic strategies; not yet
responded; and other. This question also allowed for multiple choices.
The questionnaire survey was an embedded Google Form within an email, and linked to a Google
Documents spreadsheet, which was updated when a survey was returned. The information from various
sources was copied to a master Excel spreadsheet, which had additional information, such as size of the
LGA, location (urban, regional or remote), state, links to the mapped NBN roll-out areas and a rough
approximation of the proportion of the LGA included in the roll-out. Given the small number of LGAs,
statistical analysis consisted of frequencies of responses only, together with graphs of responses.
Of note, the NBN early roll-out LGAs all experienced a phenomenon that all local governments across
the nation will go through sooner or later. Although the speed and the technical details of the Coalition’s
NBN may vary from the early roll-out, the latest decision is yet to provide broadband infrastructure
(one way or another) across Australia. Having said this, the online survey conducted for this study
portrays a snapshot of the major implications of the new infrastructure roll-out on the first release sites
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which could be useful for local planning for telecommunication infrastructure across the nation and
beyond. This exploratory methodology could also set the foundation for further longitudinal studies to
examine the local implications of the new infrastructure over the years to come.
Results: what we learned

Of the 59 LGAs emailed, 28 LGAs responded giving a 47% response rate, which is relatively consistent
with response rates for online surveys (McNulty 2008). Of those who responded, 17 stated on the email
survey that they were interested in participating in a short interview. A total of ten were eventually
interviewed, and the results of the interviews have been reported in a recent paper (Alizadeh and Shearer
2015).
Table 1: Responses
State Number Responded Interviewed
ACT 1 0 0
New South Wales 13 8 4
Northern Territory 1 0 0
Queensland 8 4 3
South Australia 3 2 0
Tasmania 12 4 0
Victoria 16 7 1
Western Australia 5 1 1
Total 59 26 9
The LGAs responding to the survey were differentiated into the following three categories: urban (i.e.
City of Gold Coast, Penrith); regional (i.e. Greater Taree, George Town); or rural (i.e. Glamorgan
Spring Bay, Hepburn Shire). The population of the LGAs ranged from 4,432 in the case of Glamorgan
Spring Bay (Tasmania) to 526,173 in the case of the City of Gold Coast (Queensland). It was not
possible to differentiate LGAs on the basis of population however, as in some states, such as
Queensland, LGAs are much larger and encompass entire cities (i.e. Brisbane and the Gold Coast), but
in Victoria and New South Wales, for example, the capital cities, Melbourne and Sydney are
differentiated into a number of smaller LGAs.
Importance of access
The majority of LGAs considered access to high-speed broadband as either highly important or highly
unimportant (Figures 2 and 3). This apparently dichotomous result could be interpreted in a number of
ways; including confusion when filling in the survey (two LGAs interviewed in the subsequent research
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phase indicated that they had incorrectly ticked “very unimportant” instead of “very important”). This
may also be indicative of whether the LGA was situated in an urban area (already having access to a
range of broadband options, such as cable and ADSL2) or in a rural or regional area, with limited access.
A brief scan of the answers showed that all councils (with the exception of one large regional town)
that ticked “very unimportant” were located in inner urban areas of major cities, such as Melbourne.
Figure 2: Population of LGAs responding to survey
Such a bifurcated pattern (urban vs rural) links well with the previous studies (Grubesic and Murray
2004; Mack et al. 2011) investigating spatial justice implications of telecommunication with a focus on
digital divide (Doctor 1994). The literature points out the complex and dynamic interplay between
geography, socio-economic status, and market forces which resulted in the uneven distribution of
broadband infrastructure across the US (Grubesic et al. 2011; Rowe 2003). In the Australian context
also, the question of equity and spatial justice is important, as our survey results show how eager rural
local governments are for the new infrastructure (considering it “very important”); this is the same
infrastructure which is already easily available in major urban local government areas.
Figure 3: Frequency of response to degree of importance given to access to high-speed broadband
How important does council consider access

to high-speed broadband?
16
10
2 2
1
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Very Important Important Neutral Unimportant Very
Unimportant
Areas of involvement
The following question asked, “In which areas of the council business do you expect to see the most
implications of the high-speed broadband?” The choice of answers was: e-governance, socio-economic
development, land use planning, and other. Respondents were allowed to choose multiple answers.
As shown in Figure 4, the majority of LGAs chose socio-economic development, followed by e-

governance, and to a lesser extent, land use planning. A number of respondents ticked “other”, and
answers included:
 Opportunity through the physical construction of the NBN to upgrade community assets
(footpaths and roads);
 Digital productivity and economic growth and competitiveness for the city;
 Internal services to field staff;
 Customer service;
 Community planning and engagement, new media enabled customer service, care programmes;
 Service delivery; and
 Innovation and digital divide.
Figure 4: Areas of council business relevant to high-speed broadband

In which areas of the council business do you expect to see the
most implications of the high-speed broadband?
30
25 24
20
20
15 14
11
10
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5
0
Socio-economic e-Governance Land Use Planning Other
Development
As is evident above, respondents felt that high-speed broadband was relevant to a wide diversity of
council business, ranging from infrastructure (upgrading assets), to economic growth (digital
productivity), customer service, and innovation.
An overview of the council’s perception of the potential impact of telecommunication on local

governments shows a broader understanding towards socio-economic implications. Such positive
perception is founded in part on the literature generated over the last 10 to 15 years, describing the
potential economic and social benefits of broadband infrastructure including increases in employment,
economic output, and aggregate consumption at national, regional and local levels (Katz et al. 2010;
Lee et al. 2005; Willson et al. 2009).
However, the survey also shows a less clear understanding when it comes to the link between
telecommunication and land use planning. This is very much in line with the international literature as
land use planning has been criticised for not having specific tools to deal with telecommunication
infrastructure and its urban and regional implications. Land use planning’s responses to ramifications
of telecommunication such as new land uses (telecom hotels and telework centres) are also documented
to be more varied than uniform (Alizadeh et al. 2014; Maeng and Nedovic-Budic 2004). Nevertheless,
there is an emerging trend to regulate telecommunication-based land use issues and opportunities
through zoning, and designation of special districts or industrial corridors accompanied by tax-based
incentives (Maeng and Nedovic-Budic 2004). The online survey results suggest that quite a number of
LGAs involved with the NBN early roll-out are not yet very familiar with such an emerging trend.
Variety of institutional arrangements in response to the NBN

A wide range of institutional arrangements in response to the NBN were evident, some of which were
based on federal funding initiatives, such as the Digital Local Government Programme, but others were
quite innovative, and sometimes specific to a single council. Some findings were that the LGAs focused
on the roll-out of fast broadband in the field of socio-economic development (e.g. providing multi-
lingual interactive online services to better engage with their diverse local communities), then creating
a digital hub, and joining a coalition of councils to promote digital economic strategies (also related to
economic development) (Figure 5). Of note, LGAs had widely differing and often innovative responses
to some terms, such as Digital Hub, with some LGAs taking this to mean full teleworking centres, and
others to mean the provision of free internet in council libraries. As with the previous question, the
respondents named a number of other institutional responses:
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 We have been allocated grant funding to promote the benefits of the digital economy to
SMEs;
 Lobbying Federal Government to include areas of municipality in roll-out;
 Community capacity development, including small business support;
 Series of digital economy projects underway; and
 Implemented Digital Local Government Programme.
A respondent, who chose to remain anonymous, answered: “Sought available funding for project;
responded to multitude of NBN Co/contractor processes of installation; responded to stuff-ups
[mistakes] of NBN Co/contractors; progressed digital readiness within council at operational level”.
Figure 5: How LGAs have responded to the roll-out of fast broadband

How has your council responded to the roll-out of the NBN/fast broadband?
Partnering with NBN 1
Not yet responded 3
Hiring consultants to investigate or produce a

4
digital economy strategy
Joining a coalition of councils to promote

12
digital economic strategies
Creating a Digital Hub 12
Drafting or implementing a Digital Economy

15
Strategy within council
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
With regard to joining a coalition of councils, follow up interviews clarified that this largely referred to
the membership of the organisation, Broadband Today Alliance (BTA), and not to a specific coalition
of councils set up for this purpose. Four LGAs who were not part of the BTA however, ticked “joining
a coalition of councils”; these included one LGA in Victoria, one in South Australia and two in
Tasmania. Further clarification was sought with these four councils which showed that they were
referring to sub-regional coalitions of councils with the neighbouring LGAs to share resources and
exchange experiences in dealing with the telecommunication-based issues and opportunities. More
specifically, local governments formed regional coalitions to join forces to be digital-ready (e.g. design
and implement suitable online platforms and move away from paper-based services to online alternative
formats), and incorporate e-governance opportunities with traditional local government responsibilities
(Moody 2007; Weerakkody et al. 2007). Such attempts are supported by the literature arguing that
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e-government can create improved decision-making, increased government access, better public service
delivery, internal efficiency; and support political accountability and participatory democracy (Irani et
al. 2005; Jesuale 2006; Moody 2007).
However, research coming out of the US and Europe warns that while the beneficial prospects of
telecommunication at all levels of government are high, they are penetrating at higher levels of
government much more rapidly than at the local level (Evans-Cowley and Conroy 2009; Evans-Cowley
and Hollander 2010). One obstacle seems to be the limited resources available at the local government
level (Norris and Reddick 2013). Our survey results also point out links between different levels of
resources available to different local governments and their approach towards the infrastructure. For
example, the results show that all the LGAs that used consultants to produce their economic digital
strategies were urban, whereas most regional LGAs had insufficient (financial) resources to hire
external advisers. Having said this, the coalitions formed between regional LGAs were deemed as
innovative ways of pooling together the limited resources available at the local level for better
outcomes.
Federally funded vs locally driven initiatives

Many of the telecommunication-related initiatives, noted in the online survey responses, referred to
tranches of federal (and state) funding for NBN related initiatives, such as the Digital Hubs, the Digital
Enterprise Programme and Digital Local Government Programmes, many of which were still ongoing
and were at various stages, depending on the roll-out stage of the LGA. However, the leadership role
of the Federal Government (and state in some cases) is now in question following the recent policy and
direction changes at the national level. In other words, it does not appear as if any of the above centrally
funded initiatives will be renewed. In the absence of funding from higher levels of governments, it is
highly unlikely that LGAs will be able to continue all of their telecommunication-related programmes.
This could in turn slow down the process of capitalising on the positive socio-economic and e-
governance implications of the new infrastructure, and then could result in Australia lagging behind a
number of countries that try to claim their share of digital economy.
Having said this, it is important to acknowledge that a number of initiatives (including the multi-council
collaborations, partnering with NBN Co, hiring external consultancies, etc.) to capitalise on the
potential implications of the new infrastructure were quite independent of the higher levels of
governments and based on locally driven forces. These locally driven initiatives are usually the ones
that are under-studied and further attentions are required to fill the existing gaps in the literature around
them. Nevertheless, when it comes to locally driven initiatives, there is a diverse pattern, as some LGAs
seem to be far more active than others. Different levels of (pro) activity at local level might be explained
by the fact that, in each LGA, the proportion of area in the roll-out differed widely, with some LGAs
having very high proportions of their area able to access the NBN and others with very small
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proportions. Moreover, the selection of NBN sites within each LGA was apparently somewhat random,
with some central business district areas, new industrial estates, residential areas and business parks
missing out. Last but not least, previous studies (Alizadeh 2013, 2015) examining the socio-economic
status of the early NBN release sites, show a great deal of diversity which could also be linked to the
different levels of resources available for the relevant LGAs which could again explain the diverse level
of local investment in the new infrastructure.
Conclusion
The paper started with the short history of the NBN in the Australian context, including the political
ups and downs that have highly influenced the roll-out of the national infrastructure project since its
introduction. It then continued with a brief review of broadband infrastructure and local planning in the
international literature, followed by a summary of the federally driven initiatives offered in the
Australian context to drive the socio-economic and e-governance implications of the new infrastructure.
Such a comparison between the international vs Australian perspective noted the leadership role played
by the Federal Government to speed up some of potential implications of the infrastructure. It was also
noted that spatial implications of telecommunications were not properly promoted in Australia. A
combination of above international and national investigation provided the theoretical foundation to
analyse the Australian context and what has happened so far in the case of the NBN. In the empirical
part of the paper, data were collected from the Australian local governments involved with the early
NBN roll-out using an online survey plus desktop research.
Two notable outcomes of this study were the significant role played by the Federal Government in
funding the NBN, enabling programmes at the local level; and the role of the NBN as an impetus in
encouraging locally driven initiatives mostly through collaboration between local governments.
First, many of the institutional arrangements responding to the NBN were based on Federal funding
initiatives, such as the Digital Local Government Programme and the Digital Hubs Programme. These
funding programmes played a significant role in directing the actions of local governments.
Nonetheless, the individual LGAs often responded to the programmes in varied and innovative ways,
such as partnering with the NBN and building on the funding programmes to improve the capacity of
small to medium business enterprises. This highlights how federal funding can initiate local innovation
and socio-economic development.
Second, the NBN also provided a trigger to encourage inter-council locally initiated collaboration, with
LGAs either initiating and growing a national coalition of councils (i.e. the Broadband Today Alliance)
or starting their own cooperative regional groups (i.e. Greater Western Sydney). Respondents largely
recognised the value of the NBN to local governments, and even in some cases, councils not included
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in the NBN roll-out were involved in these coalitions.
To sum up, it is important to acknowledge that this paper is only a beginning in the mapping of the local
planning implications of telecommunication infrastructure, and the role played by the Australian local
governments in relation to the dynamics of the NBN over the last few years. The recent political
decisions made around the NBN will leave the nation with a diverse range of access to
telecommunication which means that implications will vary quite significantly based on the different
level of access available at the local level.
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8
Supporting local governance and
local economic development –
some experiences from Swaziland
Terry Parker
Commonwealth Local Government Forum
Former Regional Adviser CLGF Southern Africa Programme
Abstract
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In the December 2012 issue of this Journal, Lucy Slack and Susan Rhodes (2012) of the
Commonwealth Local Government Forum (CLGF) introduced a new CLGF programme focussing on
improving governance and service delivery at local level in selected Commonwealth countries in
Southern and West Africa and South Asia (CLGF no date; CLGF 2015). The initiative is in the third
year of its four-year lifespan and it is opportune to examine progress made so far towards achieving
the development aims sought by the programme funders, CLGF and partners in 2012. This
contribution will explore the operationalisation of the programme to date through a snapshot of
implementation in one country under the Southern Africa component of the programme, Swaziland. It
will briefly describe how the project emerged, what it intends to achieve, examine progress to date
and conclude with some observations around what has been learned so far. The paper draws on the
author’s work as Regional Adviser for the CLGF Southern Africa Programme based in Pretoria and
project documentation (see Acknowledgements).
Background
The CLGF programme is funded by the UK Department for International Development (UK aid) and
primarily focusses on a range of pilot Local Economic Development (LED) related initiatives at
regional, national and local levels. Running from 2012 to 2016 the initiative is supporting CLGF’s
work to improve local government service delivery to reduce poverty and contribute to international
development goals. The approach underpinning the programme is that local governance is placed at
the centre of local development.
Supporting local governance and local economic development – some experiences from Swaziland 135
The Southern Africa component addresses two of the four outcomes expected from the UK funding:
 Improved skills, knowledge and organisational capacity for local authorities to deliver LED
services through successful implementation of CLGF funded projects with a good spread
across countries and regions.
 Improved national policy making and supporting frameworks for effective local government
service delivery.
Implementation began with an inception and information sharing workshop for the twelve
participating Southern African countries 1 that was held in Pretoria, South Africa, in February 2013.
The overall programme design called for the selection of four pilot countries to implement the
national and local level activities. Interested countries were invited to submit concept notes on
projects promoting LED for consideration as pilots and based on the submissions received: Botswana,
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South Africa and Zambia together with Swaziland, the subject of this commentary, were chosen.
The Kingdom of Swaziland

With an estimated population of 1.4 million, Swaziland is landlocked, bordering South Africa and
Mozambique (CLGF 2013b). The CLGF project takes cognisance of the challenges Swaziland faces
in relation to chronic unemployment of around 40% and high levels of poverty,2 exacerbated by an
estimated 26% of adults living with HIV and AIDS. The economy has been significantly impacted by
the global economic downturn which saw a pronounced decline in export oriented manufacturing
coupled with uncertainties of revenues from the Southern Africa Customs Union and the loss of status
under the United States African Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA).
The constitution of the Kingdom of Swaziland (Government of Swaziland 2005), which came into
effect on 8 February 2006, also impacts significantly on the project’s thinking. It reflects the desire to
ensure efficient management and national development, as well as to improve living conditions and
wellbeing of the people, be they residing in the urban centres or the traditionally administered areas,
whilst still preserving the values and systems of a traditional society.
The Constitution provides for the establishment of a single country-wide system of local government
based on the tinkhundla3 political philosophy and system of government. The purpose of this
provision is to bring government closer to the people so that those at sub-national or local community
level progressively take control of their own affairs.
1
Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania,
Zambia and Zimbabwe.
2
Per capita income is around US$3,000pa but as is common in many African countries, income is highly
skewed with 69% of people living below the poverty line.
3
Traditional system of devolution of state power to grassroots administrative and developmental units,
comprising several chieftaincies, within regions.
Additionally, a national Decentralisation Policy was adopted in August 2006 to:
provide an enabling environment for promoting and enhancing sustainable and local
participatory local and national economic, political and social development within a
decentralized governance framework and is based on the fundamental principles of
subsidiarity, empowerment, responsibility, partnership, connectivity, accountability,
transparency, equity, inclusiveness, responsiveness, efficiency, effectiveness,
participation, consensus, democratic representation and respect for the rule of law
(Government of Swaziland 2006, p.10).
To formally operationalise both the Constitutional provisions as applying to local government and the
Decentralisation Policy, a draft Tinkhundla and Regional Administration Bill, was prepared and is
currently being consulted.
The Swaziland government had also been active in pro-poor approaches, as evidenced by the Poverty
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Reduction Strategy and Action Programmes (also known as Yingcamu) which emphasises the
importance of decentralised institutional frameworks through devolved local government structures.
Project rationale and scope

The Swaziland component was designed via a collaborative and participatory process involving the
Swaziland Ministry of Housing and Urban Development (MHUD), Ministry of Tinkhundla
Administration and Development (MTAD), Swaziland Local Government Association (SWALGA),
Local Authority Managers Association of Swaziland (LAMAS), the Municipal Councils of Mbabane,
Manzini and Matsapha, and CLGF. The design process began by undertaking capacity assessments in
each of the three pilot municipalities, with the purpose of identifying service delivery gaps the project
may address and provide baseline information. The data gathered was used to prepare a report (CLGF
2013a) which together with the original project concept note (Government of Swaziland 2014)
submitted by Swaziland partners provided the background for a workshop where the final project
design was developed and eventually agreed by all stakeholders.
The strategic thrusts of the project are around:
 governance and an enabling policy environment for LED – including improved recognition of
local government in national development, effective inter-governmental relationships and
national policy and clear local authority mandates.
 institutionalising LED at the local level – encompassing capacity to plan and embed the LED
approach into service delivery, managing stakeholder engagement and empowerment,
advocacy and communication, knowledge management and issues around financing LED
projects.
 capacity building – strengthening individual capacities of elected leaders, ministry and
municipal officials and key community stakeholders particularly in facilitation of the LED
approach to service delivery.
 programmatic LED interventions – including developing local authority LED strategies,

design of LED undertakings and building on past and existing initiatives.
The project includes national level activities related to the recognition of local government and
projects in three selected pilot local authorities located within a recognised development corridor:
 Municipal Council of Mbabane – the capital city and administrative centre;
 Municipal Council of Manzini – the commercial hub and geographically central;
 Matsapha Town Council – the core industrial area.
The aim is to help enhance the capacities of these councils to effectively deliver LED-focussed services.
The project design incorporates a range of activities at the strategic and policy level, both nationally and
at local authority level, combined with catalytic initiatives within the pilot local authorities.
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In developing the CLGF project, it was apparent that stronger, better empowered and more
sustainable institutions at local level would be required to meet future expectations. An informed and
engaged constituency, well capacitated leadership, skilled management and effective systems were
clearly essential for success.
It was also noted that the principles of developmental local government, as expounded by the
Kampala Declaration,4 in fact resonate well with the objectives of the Swaziland Constitution and
Decentralisation Policy and would form a solid foundation for the project. In particular:
 local governance that is inclusive, transparent and participatory;
 innovative sustainable, people-sensitive local economic growth and social development;
 integrated and coordinated developmental activities of public and non-state actors; and
 leadership and building of social capital.
Project objectives and progress towards their achievement

The overall goal of the Swaziland project is to enhance the role of local government as a key agent in
local economic empowerment and national development. Specifically, the following objectives are
central to the programme.
1. Local government institutions are recognised as integral to national development

Local government’s key role in national development has been clearly recognised in the Constitution
and national Decentralisation Policy. The project aims to contribute to achieving the aims of these
instruments and in doing so enhance the institutional legitimacy of local government in Swaziland.
4
Kampala Declaration on Developmental Local Government adopted at the Commonwealth Local Government
Conference held in Kampala, Uganda in May 2013 and subsequently endorsed by Commonwealth Heads of
Government in Colombo, Sri Lanka, in November 2013.
Recognition and application of the concept of developmental local government was identified as the
most appropriate mechanism to add value in this area.
Within this objective are a variety of activities based on advocacy and sensitising local elected
leadership on the concept, purposes and potential value of developmental local government together
with strengthening lobbying and advocacy capacity of the key players – SWALGA and LAMAS – to
effectively promote and embed the role of local government in national development. A national
symposium on developmental local government will bring this action together. This high-level event
will reinforce the advocacy efforts and focus on policy and issues related to the value adding potential
of adopting a developmental local government approach and draw attention to the potential
contributions of local government to nation building. It will involve key political decision makers
with a view to building buy-in and and adopting concrete and realistic ways on how to better embed
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local government in the national governance landscape.
Progress on implementing the agreed activities under this first project objective has been slow. This is
indicative of the complexity surrounding the issues involved and the need to take time to sensitise and
bring on board key stakeholders and build sympathetic understanding by political decisions makers.
As such, a broader time frame has been allocated for the required tasks. Nonetheless significant
progress has been made in harnessing support of the MHUD and MTAD at both political and
operational levels.
In achieving the expected results, the importance of a stable and well-functioning local government
association is essential. SWALGA, supported technically by LAMAS, was tasked to take the lead in
driving the necessary actions in this outcome area, and at varying levels in the other three. SWALGA
is undergoing a strategic transformation process and this project is also seen as a catalyst to
SWALGA identifying its place in promoting local governance in Swaziland through tangible actions.
2. An enabling national policy and legislative framework is in place to facilitate LED

A guiding framework for LED was considered essential for:
 defining LED in the context of local government;
 ensuring linkages with the Constitution and Decentralisation Policy;
 coordination and focus of efforts with national LED related agencies and actors;
 making sure urban/rural dimensions and a pro-poor approach are included;
 capacity and information sharing information; and
 monitoring and evaluation.
Proposed initial actions include developing and gaining formal approval of an institutional framework
under which LED can be facilitated, undertaking research on regional and international good practices
and extensive consultations.
It was agreed in the project design that LED related project activities, particularly the orientation on
LED in the three pilot municipalities would proceed and learning from these will inform the
development of the national framework. It was, however, decided recently that the time is now right
to begin preparing the policy framework and expert technical assistance has been engaged to facilitate
this process.
Stakeholders also recognised the potential opportunities in exploring collaboration with the private
sector at local level via public/private partnerships (PPP). Development of a PPP policy and
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coordination structure for local authorities to complement the national PPP framework was included
in the project outputs, together with preparation of a guideline on how to identify and package
potential PPP projects based on revealed opportunities in the three pilot municipalities.
This activity is scheduled for the final stages of the project given the need to fully investigate the
application of a PPP approach to local government as this a complex area beset with risks and
requiring careful analysis and planning. Initial research and discussions are however underway,
drawing extensively on international and regional experiences with PPPs.
3. Poverty reduction, economic empowerment and sustainable community livelihoods

achieved through improved planning, management and implementation of LED initiatives
This outcome is the main focus area of the project and relates to a range of activities implemented at
the local authority/grassroots level.
The initial output considered in the project design as underpinning all activities was the development
of individual capacities of local authority elected leaders, officials and key stakeholders to facilitate
inclusive service delivery and LED. Orientation programmes were conducted in each of the three pilot
municipalities, facilitated by a prominent regional specialist in LED. The programmes were
successfully carried out in July/August 2014, resulting in the training of 100 councillors, senior
council officials, government ministry and statutory agencies officials and business association
representatives on LED and the development and implementation of LED strategies.
The orientation was immediately followed by a one day Business Indaba5 in each municipality where
the opportunity was taken by the councils to engage with their business community in dialogue and
sensitisation on LED and obtain inputs on LED in the local context to inform the LED strategies. A
5
An important gathering or meeting.
total of 474 business people attended these events; however Matsapha Municipality conducted two
separate Indabas, one for the formal businesses and another for informal traders.
The informal traders event in Matsapha attracted some 342 participants and resulted in a range of
recommendations aimed at assisting the more marginalised private sector participants, including the
establishment of an Informal Traders Association. These consultative and participatory events
contributed significantly to enhancing goodwill between the council and business community,
something that had not always been present. Manzini Municipality subsequently held an equally
successful workshop for 120 informal traders in November which also served to strengthen the
relationship between the formal and informal sectors.
The next step in the project plan was to prepare LED strategies for Manzini and Matsapha
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Municipalities.6 This activity included SWOT analysis, an environmental scan, baseline survey and
analysis of the local economy, and agreeing the strategic focus. The LED strategies have been drafted
and are currently awaiting consideration and adoption by the councils.
It was however discovered early in the implementation of this activity that collecting accurate
economic data in a cost-effective and efficient way was not easy. After investigation of alternative
modalities it was agreed that the councils carry out the data collection themselves, which it was
proved they were well capable of doing, in collaboration with the University of Swaziland which
provided specialist technical support to the analysis of the data and quality control of the processes.
A number of activities to localise the national poverty reduction strategy are also underway in parallel
with, and aimed at, informing the strategy development. Over the life of the project these include:
 a national urban agriculture promotion strategy;
 a public transport network and operation management strategy;
 local outsourcing and engaging community based labour/local contractors for local
maintenance tasks, including skills training;
 labour pooling and income generation projects for unemployed youth;
 waste management strategy;
 waste collection and recycling programme in peri-urban areas;
 training for market traders and demonstration projects.
Implementation to date has been focussed primarily on the waste management and market trader
activities. Matsapha Municipality has completed a waste management strategy which involved
sensitising stakeholders and successfully enlisting the support of relevant government agencies and
6
Mbabane Municipality had already prepared a five year LED strategy in 2011, but would be looking to review
this in due course.
the private sector (specifically those companies involved in waste management) via a series of
workshops and consultations. Recycling is a key component of the strategy and so far 30 informal
reclaimers have been formally registered and trained in creating value added products from waste,
hence opportunities for income generation. As a result of the project, 18 people are now employed.
The waste collection activity in peri-urban areas around Matsapha addresses serious waste
management issues and also creates economic opportunities through recycling and levies on
households. This project has been supported by the Regional Administration and traditional
authorities. Again this demonstrates how urban and rural authorities can effectively work together.
However in implementing both these initiatives Matsapha Municipality found that the community
consultation processes were lengthy due to the complexity of the political processes and the need to
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navigate protocols within the traditional system. In addition, the peri-urban communities were
sceptical due to past failed projects and required a deal of reassurance by the council on the practical
benefits and sustainability of the projects. Nonetheless, the strategies applied were successful and as a
result, 180 people have so far participated in the multi-stakeholder clean-up campaign.
Manzini Municipality operates a ‘Thursday Market’ which provides trading opportunities for people
from Manzini and also from rural and smaller urban areas from all over Swaziland. The CLGF project
is supporting the council to provide training and demonstration projects. Training is being undertaken
via a Training of Trainers modality in partnership with private sector entrepreneurship development
service providers. So far 200 trainers, who are mostly market vendors themselves, have been trained
and are imparting knowledge to their peers. As a result of the project, 20 informal sector traders were
able to exhibit their goods and traded at the Swaziland International Trade Fair held in Manzini from
29th of August to 7th September 2015.
Additionally, Manzini Municipality has developed guidelines on local outsourcing and engaged
community-based labour for local maintenance. The idea was piloted in two sites and has resulted in
the employment of 25 people.
Another cross-cutting output is around community and stakeholder engagement and empowerment on
LED. This involves developing LED advocacy and communications strategies, production of IEC
materials, capacity building of identified community structures on LED, facilitating structured and
regular community consultations around LED, particularly with the business community and
marginalised groups.
The final initiative under this objective is being undertaken by Mbabane Municipality and is aimed at
instilling understanding of the role played by the environment in sustainable local economic
development, whilst also providing an opportunity to generate income by local residents. It builds on
a twinning partnership between Mbabane Municipality and Salo Municipality in Finland. This output
involves a mix of capacity building and demonstration projects around sustainable environmental
management. In particular, waste prevention and minimisation, reuse and recycling, including
composting and production of commercial products, sustainable sanitation and climate smart organic
gardens.
This activity has also proved to be a success with 836 community people so far trained in sustainable
environmental management and production of commercial products from recyclable waste.
Additionally, 743 climate smart-gardens have been established, providing opportunities for food
security in the urban areas. Remarkably, the targets for each of these activities in the project design
were 200. Mbabane communities have also produced 2,438 kg of compost, against the planned 400kg,
most of which was used in the climate gardens while some is being sold for $7 per kg.
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Monitoring of implementation at a broad community level, however, became a challenge for the
council. This was overcome by part-time employment of university students to inspect progress and
ensure resources were effectively used, again creating employment.
4. Efficient and effective project management

A Project Steering Committee (PSC) comprising representatives of all the partners 7 was established at
the commencement of the project to provide strategic guidance and oversight, prepare annual
workplans, approve fund disbursements, ensure contractual and reporting requirements are met,
project protocols are followed and promotion of the project. The PSC has met religiously at least
quarterly, with full attendance of members at most meetings, and has delivered effectively on its
mandate. In accordance with CLGF preferred approach, planning and implementation of projects is as
far as practicable locally driven. The CLGF Southern Africa Programme Office based in Pretoria,
however, is responsible for overall management of the Southern African component of the
programme. Responsibility for local project implementation rests with each respective Municipal
Council. The project design specifies that in-country project coordination is provided by the
SWALGA Director, who reports on project execution to the Regional Programme Manager.
Risks and risk management

Consistent with projects of this nature, there are some inherent risks which might impact on
successful implementation. However, to a large extent these flow from the very factors that make the
project necessary. Some of the risk management strategies adopted include:
 regular communication between partners and ensuring alignment with national and sectoral
strategies to maintain political and administrative support;
7
The PSC comprises Ministry of Housing and Urban Development (Chair); Ministry of Tinkhundla
Administration and Development; Chief Executive Officers and LED Officers of Mbabane, Manzini and
Matsapha, Swaziland Local Government Association and CLGF Southern Africa.
 adopting a flexible management approach and maintaining a strong partnership and working
relationships to sustain buy-in;
 realistically managing expectations and maintaining a technical focus;
 taking cognisance of absorptive capacity of implementing institutions when setting targets;
 ensuring accurate budgeting and remaining within allocations;
 making consistent visible achievements to retain community participation;
 a focus on quality of inputs and outputs through regular internal evaluation;
 effective two-way internal and external communication with all stakeholders to ensure
understanding of project actions.
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Monitoring and evaluation
As noted, quality of outputs will determine the achievement of project outcomes and impact. The
programme design provided for gathering baseline information at the beginning of the project, in
particular via service delivery satisfaction surveys. Although a comprehensive template and
methodology for the surveys was developed, several challenges were encountered in how to
objectively and cost-effectively administer the surveys. Private services providers were found to be
disproportionately expensive and it was then decided to integrate the satisfaction surveys with the
business environment surveys that are a component of developing LED strategies for Manzini and
Matsapha. Fortunately Mbabane Municipality had recently carried out a customer satisfaction survey
which can be applied. Other quantitative indicators based on numbers have been included in the
overall programme together with country specific project designs which are monitored through
relevant data collection. Although somewhat early to actively consider the outcomes and impact of the
Swaziland project, some internal qualitative assessments such as pre and post training evaluations
have been carried out (these have been positive). However more work remains to be done on impact
evaluation.
Overview and observations

The question often posed when stepping back and looking at a project such as this is – so what? Here
are a few reflections on what has happened so far and what has been learned. Although realistically
only a little over two years into implementation, it is becoming apparent that this project is
meaningful and has potential to facilitate positive change (CLGF 2014). The evolution of local
government in Swaziland has provided an appropriate foundation and entry point for the CLGF
project, which was welcomed by the Government of Swaziland, the local government association and
the selected pilot local authorities. Opportunities to assist with the development of a new approach to
local government and its systems were clearly at hand, which reinforces the potential value and
appropriateness of this project.
CLGF is distinguished by its singular focus on local government, the ‘trusted partner’ approach and
working in collaboration with implementing partners as equals. As with most CLGF projects,
activities are agreed with, and implemented by, relevant in-country partner agencies. Although the
success or failure of projects rests on this basis and implementation invariably takes longer than other
more direct execution modalities, evidence from this project, such as the quality of outputs so far,
reveals that the national execution method provides greater potential for sustainable outcomes.
However challenges around maintaining solid partnerships need to be monitored, with a ‘Plan B’
always at hand to manage any emerging fragilities and ensure implementation is not delayed.
At this stage of implementation, it has been noted that activities with a social component, such as the
Mbabane environmental sustainability, Manzini market and Matsapha solid waste undertakings, have
been implemented more expeditiously and effectively. The focus on social cohesion as a precondition
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to effective LED promotion, and that LED activities can also reinforce social cohesion, became very
clear as these activities were implemented. The project also highlights the multidimensional nature
and complexity of development and poverty. Successful poverty-related interventions need to
collectively target different angles of development such as social, economic and capacity
development.
Equally, activities implemented at local government management/administrative level (Objective 3

primarily) have so far been implemented more successfully than those with a more political focus,
such as those in Objectives 1 and 2. The complexities at political level, particularly around
decentralisation, need to be factored in and will likely cause delays; however it is essential to obtain
the necessary high-level political buy-in before proceeding. The project should harness the strengths
of this complexity to build a solid political foundation for enhancing the key role of local government
in national development. Clearly local participation, partnerships and relationships remain the heart of
this endeavour. Making sense of, valuing and harnessing the knowledge of the ‘doers’ is essential. To
achieve this it is apparent from experiences so far that all partners should adopt an implementation
attitude of flexibility and shared curiosity rather than individual certainty.
There have been several instances, such as longer than anticipated time taken to align national and
local government reporting protocols with CLGF requirements, where the project may be ‘building
the ship while sailing along’. It is not possible to foresee all variables in a project design and it was
considered important to spend time to establish the systems that will remain in place for the entire
project. The importance of having a dedicated LED official in each pilot municipality became
apparent as the project began the implementation phase. Apart from giving a tangible emphasis to the
critical area of LED at local government level, the LED officer is a logical focal point for the project.
Mbabane Municipality had already established a position of LED officer and Manzini and Matsapha
Municipalities made similar appointments shortly after the project commenced.
On the subject of monitoring and evaluation, the project design contains quantitative targets which
can be monitored to a reasonable extent, but evaluating impact is a different story. Projects which aim
for socio-economic change and contain complex, intangible outcomes require a different approach to
evaluation. It may be necessary to look beyond measures such as service delivery satisfaction surveys
that are subjective and imperilled by a range of variables and consider complementing the surveys
with other participation and/or theory techniques to deliver a more balanced formative and summative
evaluation. Some stakeholders were concerned at the adopted ‘pilot’ local authority approach. People
generally do not like pilot projects, they are not politically appetising especially if their organisation is
not a part, preferring an all-inclusive arrangement. Due to budget constraints and the need for
experimentation before expansion, this was not possible, however, efforts to involve other local
authorities in the project were made, such as inclusion in the LED orientations, councillor training and
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symposia. Learning from the pilots will also be disseminated and hopefully additional resources
mobilised to roll out to all local authorities in the country.
The Swaziland project highlights how the bottom-up and top-down approaches to development can be
used in one endeavour – how local government enables this and how the LED approach becomes the
means to translate national policy at the local level while at the same time responding to local needs.
The role of local government in development can be clearly defined in all levels of this process, for
example how the project seeks to localise the Poverty Reduction Strategy and the PPP policy in
parallel with developing LED strategies. One of the strengths of the CLGF project revealed during the
first two years is the robust commitment from partners and stakeholders, and their positive and
collaborative approach to addressing the challenges that have emerged. If this continues the future of
the project is bright and leads to expectations of enhanced and sustainable achievements in the
forthcoming year and beyond.
Acknowledgement
From September 2012 to end December 2014 the author was the Regional Adviser for the CLGF
Southern Africa Programme based in Pretoria. As part of his work for CLGF, he was responsible for
managing the Swaziland project. The contextual information and findings in the article were based on
the overall programme document, the project scoping and design and implementation processes, and
current data provided by the Swaziland partners and the CLGF Southern Africa Regional Programme
Manager. The observations and conclusions in this paper are those of the author.
The author is extremely grateful to CLGF Southern Africa Regional Programme Manager, Nyasha
Simbanegavi, for comments on and inputs to this article.
The contributions of the Chief Executive Officers and LED Officers of Mbabane, Manzini and
Matsapha Municipalities, together with senior officials of the Ministries of Housing and Urban
Development, Ministry of Tinkhundla Administration and Development and the Swaziland Local
Government Association in provision of data for this article, together with their passionate
commitment to the project, are also acknowledged with appreciation.
References
Commonwealth Local Government Forum. (CLGF) (2013a) Southern Africa regional programme Swaziland
pilot project. Project Design Document. Unpublished.
Commonwealth Local Government Forum. (CLGF) (2013b) Swaziland country profile. Available at:
www.clgf.org.uk/swaziland [Accessed May 2015].
Commonwealth Local Government Forum. (CLGF) (2014) Swaziland project progress report April to
September. Unpublished.
Commonwealth Local Government Forum. (CLGF) (2015) Southern Africa programme. Available at:
www.clgf.org.uk/southern-africa-programmes [Accessed May 2015].
Commonwealth Local Government Forum. CLGF) (no date) Southern Africa programme flyer. Available at:
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www.clgf.org.uk/userfiles/1/file/CLGF_Southern_African_Regional_Programme_flyer.pdf
Government of Swaziland. (2005) The constitution of the Kingdom of Swaziland Act (Act No 001).
Government of Swaziland. (2006) Decentralization policy. Swaziland Government, August 2006.
Government of Swaziland. (2014) - Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, Swaziland Ministry of
Tinkhundla Development and Administration, Swaziland Local Government Association. Project
Concept Note. Unpublished.
Slack, L. and Rhodes, S. (2012) New CLGF four-year grant to help local government service delivery and boost
CLGF research capacity. Commonwealth Journal of Local Governance, 11, 136–138. Available at:
https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/cjlg/article/view/3080.
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/cjlg.v0i0.3080
9
Citizen participation in urban local
government: a case study of
Kanaighat Paurashava in
Bangladesh
Mohammad Shahjahan Chowdhury
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Shahjalal University of Science and Technology
Bangladesh
Muhammad Aktaruzzaman
Shahjalal University of Science and Technology
Bangladesh
Abstract
Scholars have identified many variables as determinants of citizen participation, but not all of these are
relevant to citizen participation in specific cultural and political contexts. This paper seeks to identify
the specific factors which work as drivers for citizen participation in Bangladesh through a case study
of Kanaighat Paurashava (municipality), an urban local government. It identifies the following
variables which strongly affect citizen participation: the role of elected representatives, notably their
willingness and awareness; the provision of information to citizens; citizens’ capacity; and resources
available. Findings also suggest that a holistic approach is needed to understand and change
representatives’ attitudes towards citizens and ensure participation.
Keywords: Citizen participation, local government, elected representative, citizens’ capacity
Introduction
Citizen participation is a mechanism to guide local development and governance. There are various
ways of involving citizens in the governance process, including providing information; enabling
citizens to take part in decision-making, implementation or evaluation; and sharing benefits. The value
of engaging citizens in local government is argued by many scholars (Barber 1984; Charlick 2001;
Patsias et al. 2013; Thomas 1995; Yang and Pandey 2011; Yang and Callahan 2007). Bherer (2010)
mentions two main drivers for implementing citizen participation: (1) citizens’ demand for
participation; and (2) the presence of local leaders, elected officials and public servants who wish to
open up political processes to citizens. However, other scholars argue that dialogue between voters and
their elected representatives is limited. One reason cited is that elected positions are captured by
political elites and power groups, while voters are placed at arms’ length who only communicate with
them through opinion polls or market research. A second reason cited is that citizens’ influence is
mainly through the voting system, while the outcomes are governed by public administrators – who
have policy influence due to the rise of delegation and devolution, but who often lack grounded
knowledge and may not be fully accountable for their decisions (Skelcher and Torfing 2010, p. 74).
Citizen participation has been characterised as necessary to ensure a good relationship with the public,
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better service quality and better decision-making – which in turn requires a shift in policy, budget and
commitment (ODPM 2002). Moreover, citizen participation is thought to promote accountability,
legitimacy, transparency and empowerment (Bohman 2005; Schillemans 2008). However, whether
citizen participation actually brings these positive outcomes depends on related actors and factors.
Most studies on citizen participation focus on developed countries, not developing countries. The
identification of key determinants in developing countries is important to ensure the active involvement
of citizens and achieve positive outcomes. This paper offers a case study of Kanaighat Paurashava
(municipality) in Bangladesh and looks at three key variables – elected representatives, citizens’
capacity and resource availability – and their implications for participatory governance. The paper is
structured as follows: firstly, a discussion of perspectives on citizen participation; secondly, the
methodology and framework used; and finally, the authors’ research findings and discussion, followed
by conclusions.
Perspectives on citizen participation

There is agreement among scholars and practitioners of the value of citizen participation in a democratic
polity. However, considerable disagreement and debate exist over the process, design, determinants and
outcomes of, and barriers to, citizen participation – notably because cultural and political contexts vary
widely across nations. For example, Agarwal (2001) identified five rungs in the ladder of participation,
based on the degree of engagement from nominal to interactive; while other researchers have
conceptualised participation as occurring on an institutional continuum from low (information-seeking)
to high (interactive dialogue through a governance network) (Skelcher and Torfing 2010). These
categorisations are not exhaustive, but they can help to identify levels and effectiveness of participation.
In the South Asian context, Agarwal (2001) identified systemic factors (rules, norms, perceptions, and
attributes) and their impacts on participation – or lack of it – in the areas of gender equity, empowerment
and institutional efficiency. Taking a normative view in the European context, Skelcher and Torfing
Citizen participation in urban local government: a case study of Kanaighat Paurashava... 149
(2010) argue that the problem of democratic participation may be overcome through institutional means.
Similarly, Lowndes et al. (2006) favour changes to institutional rules to shape participation, as these
are seen as more malleable than resources and social capital, which cannot easily be changed.
This paper argues that neither institutional design/rules nor systemic factors alone can overcome the
barriers to citizen participation. An institutional arrangement may not work due to other factors – for
example the representation system. In a developing country like Bangladesh democratic values are not
well established and local governance is no exception – although, perhaps paradoxically, turnout is high
in both national and local government elections, thus avoiding one of the problems faced by
representative democracy in many developed countries. Similarly, in Bangladeshi local government
specific institutions, laws and rules do exist to promote citizen participation, but their impact is minimal
due to other factors such as lack of citizen capacity. For example, although reserved seats for women
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are provided on councils, this is not a solution to exclusionary problems concerning gender. Also, a
number of studies have examined citizen participation from an administrative perspective and find that
organisational factors – such as political support, political control, leadership, red tape, hierarchical
authority, mutual trust, citizenship education, technological knowledge, accessibility, infrastructure,
training, budget and resource authority, and variables related to participants’ competence and
representativeness – all have strong impacts on participation outcomes (ODPM 2002; Yang and
Callahan 2007; Yang and Pandey 2011; Aulich 2009; Bherer 2010).
Yang and Callahan (2007) identified the important ‘actors’ in citizen participation as being elected
officials, government agencies, citizens, the local media and non-profit organisations. However, this
analysis examined participation based on the views of executives of public organisations, ignoring
citizens’ and representatives’ perspectives. The weakness of this approach is highlighted by the work
of Copus (2010), which examined how representatives’ attitude and willingness affect participation
effectiveness. Using survey data, he found that most representatives like to enact measures that they
and their parties believe are right, rather than measures which citizens demand. However, although his
findings offer important insights, his analysis neglects other socio-economic-political and cultural
variables, as well as the gender aspect. This is important as the predominance of male elected
representatives is the key factor in determining participation and outcomes in developing countries like
Bangladesh.
While these studies have identified many actors and factors affecting citizen participation, it is hard to
specify which are the most crucial in a given social, political or cultural context. In addition, testing all
factors simultaneously is expensive and strenuous. It is therefore useful to identify critical actors and
factors, especially as doing so may lead to the strengthening of related actors and factors. For example,
a strong representation system may lead to responsive leaders, who are well placed to influence
organisational variables. Citizens’ capacity (Verba et al. 1995) and resources (Aulich 2009; Rainnie
2005) also have a powerful impact on other factors, including administrators and representatives
(Charlick 2001). This suggests that unless citizens are capable of effective advocacy and adequate
resources are available to local government, the road to participation will remain a difficult one. Some
studies have ignored these factors, on the grounds that they are difficult to change. However, this paper
argues that intervention on those factors is equally important, and there are many instances in
Bangladesh where poor and illiterate people have been mobilised to become active citizens. Thus, to
identify the principal actors and factors in citizen participation, a holistic approach from all three of
citizens’, representatives’ and administrators’ perspectives is needed.
The outcomes of participation are also disputed. On the one hand, some studies demonstrate that citizen
participation has a number of positive impacts (e.g. Michels and Graaf 2010; Lombard 2013). On the
other hand, other studies question the benefits of participation (Stewart 2006; Wiseman 2006). The
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study of Michels and Graaf (2010) in two municipalities of the Netherlands revealed that citizen
participation has a wide range of positive outcomes, including increasing citizens’ feelings of
responsibility, encouraging people to listen to diverse opinions, and enhancing the legitimacy of
decision-making. However, they note that women, the young, poorly educated people and minority
groups were under-represented, albeit without identifying why. Similarly, Lombard (2013) found that
a long tradition of autonomous participation and collective action means that Mexico has a relatively
participant-oriented urban local government system, in contrast to many other cultural contexts where
governments are struggling to motivate people to participate in local government. As a result, citizens
make their demands, and local governments provide services through participatory processes. Public
representatives are now more involved in rural development projects and citizens participate in projects
through various means such as bearing costs, donating items in kind, and volunteering (Waheduzzaman
2010). In contrast, however, a study of participatory engagement in Australia by Wiseman (2006)
concludes that the benefits – strengthening the social bond and engagement – are exaggerated and that
participation has not been successful due to structural inequality and injustice. The present paper adds
to the debate by arguing a further point of view. Using the framework developed by Michels and Graaf
(2010) on citizen participation and democracy, it finds that citizen participation does not necessarily
bring democratic outcomes in terms of inclusion, civic skill and virtue, deliberation or legitimacy.
Studies have identified a range of barriers to effective participation, including lack of citizens’ time,
lack of trust in government, lack of information, lack of expertise, inadequate government–citizen
communication, poorly defined objectives, and the exclusion of some social groups due to social
segmentation by law. Participation is also burdensome and unequal for people who are living with low
incomes (Yang and Callahan 2007; Lombard 2013; Agarwal 2001). Moreover, government staff and
public representatives may hinder citizen participation because these actors may fear their irregularities
may come to light (Waheduzzaman 2010). All these observations suggest that the barriers are context-
specific and relate to all three of the areas discussed above: the representation system, citizens’ capacity
and resources.
This paper tries to be realistic and explore the present scenario of participation in urban local
government in Bangladesh. It asks: Which factors are most salient in ensuring citizen participation in
urban local governments in a developing country like Bangladesh? Have participation initiatives
brought positive outcomes? And finally, what are the barriers to effective participation?
Methodology and framework

A case study methodology was applied to study citizen participation in urban local government, using
Kanaighat Paurashava as the subject. Kanaighat Paurashava was chosen as a fairly typical urban local
government body in Bangladesh. Established as an administrative area on 25 October 2005, it is situated
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within Kanaighat Upazila1 in the Sylhet District. It has a land area of around 4,700 acres, which
encompasses nine wards, 23 moujas (mouza is the lowest revenue collection unit) and 31 villages. It
has a population of 27,078 (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics 2011), of which 12,793 are voters.
In Bangladesh, there are two tiers of urban local government: municipal corporations (city corporations)
in large cities, and municipalities (paurashava) in small cities and towns. The local government system
follows a ‘dual supervision model’ inherited from British colonial rule, where centrally appointed
officials play a strong role alongside sectoral and functional ministries in providing local services (Shah
and Shah 2006).
This study explored the scope for citizen participation in the development process of paurashava,
including planning, decision-making, budgeting, monitoring and evaluation. The study also examined
whether the participation process in paurashavas is passive or active, using the framework set by
Michels and Graaf (2010). The framework is developed from the theories of participatory democracy,
deliberative democracy and social capital. These theories claim that citizen involvement has positive
impacts on democracy, which ensure the inclusion of citizens in the policy process and the development
of civic skills and civic virtues. It is held that this leads to rational decisions based on the public voice
and increases the legitimacy of the process and the outcome (Michels and Graaf 2010, p 481). Finally,
the study investigated which actors and factors are the most critical in influencing citizen participation
in the Bangladeshi context.
The target respondents for the study were citizens, elected representatives, government officials,
community leaders and stakeholders in the Kanaighat Paurashava. The sample size was 50 and a
1
An upazila is the lowest administrative unit where government officials work as central government agents.
Both rural (upazila parishad) and urban (paurashava) local governments also exist in an upazila. The upazila
parishad (council) is the second tier of rural local government and the paurashava is the lowest tier of urban
local government in Bangladesh.
purposive sampling method was used to select representative respondents (Table 1). Data were collected
through surveys and in-depth interviews with key informants, allowing quantitative data to be supported
by qualitative data.
Table 1: Categories of respondents

Respondents N = 50
Citizens
30
Ordinary citizens
05
Stakeholders
05
Community leaders
Representatives
Mayor 01
Councillors (general seats) 04
Women councillors (reserved seats) 02
Government (mid-level) officials 03
Source: Field data, collected from the Kanaighat Paurashava area, August 2013
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The elected representatives are mayors and councillors. They also act as local political leaders as many
of them are involved in party politics. The stakeholders are identified as those citizens whose interests
are directly affected by paurashava activities. Community leaders are people who are not elected, but
nevertheless have an influential voice in paurashava activities. Citizens are the voters and residents of
the paurashava.
Respondents were contacted by the authors personally, and the objective of the study was explained.
Respondents were given assurances of anonymity, privacy and confidentiality. Those who agreed to
provide information were interviewed using a semi-structured interview schedule.
Respondents were asked about their participation in development planning, decision-making, project
implementation, monitoring and evaluation. They were also asked whether they felt their participation
was effective enough to bring positive results. Finally, they were asked what, if any, obstacles they
encountered in participating in local government.
The paper then analysed its findings based on the three themes outlined above: attitudes of elected
representatives, citizens’ capacity and resource availability. These themes were selected based on
background research and in-depth interviews with research participants.
Findings and discussion

Elected representatives
Elected representatives are important actors in the process of citizen participation. Copus (2010) argues
that the way in which councillors view citizen participation has an impact on its effectiveness. Eulau et
al. (1959, p. 742) categorised representatives into three types – delegates, trustees and politicos
(politicians) – to illustrate how representatives operate within a governance network. According to this
typology, delegate leaderships work based on local people’s opinion, trustee leaderships work based on
their own judgement and ‘politico’ leaderships combine the two. In Bangladesh, the majority of leaders
fall in the ‘trustee’ category as they like to go their own way, ignoring public opinion. They believe that
engaging citizens would constitute a threat to them, and hence they are not interested in ensuring citizen
participation or providing data on participation. Bangladesh is not alone in this. Even in a developed
country like the United Kingdom (UK), councillors are sceptical about citizen participation. They think
themselves more knowledgeable than the general public. For example, Copus cites the following
comment from a councillor in the UK:
Local government is complex and difficult and we have access to information and advice
that the public doesn’t have. You just can’t go around asking people what they think; it’s
not that easy; people don’t have the knowledge or information to make sensible decisions
(Copus 2010, p. 584).
Another study in the UK found that citizens are deterred from participation by negative attitudes within
the council, lack of information on opportunities to participate, and a belief that the council will not
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respond to their concerns (ODPM 1998). Similarly, a study of United States local government found
that:
Meaningful participation is rarely found, as many public officials are reluctant to include
citizens in decision-making, or if they do, they typically involve citizens after the issues
have been framed and decisions have been made (Yang and Callahan 2007, p. 249).
In situations such as these, citizen participation may turn into passive or nominal participation, and this
was found to be the case in Kanaighat Paurashava. Structural factors also affect citizen participation.
Skelcher and Torfing (2010) argue that institutional designs (which they identify as rules, laws,
procedures and norms) enable or constrain actors’ agency in participation.
Within Kanaighat Paurashava, there is some scope for people to participate in development activities.
Paurashavas do have a legal framework to ensure citizen participation, under sub article 122 of Article
58 in Bangladesh’s Local Government (Paurashava) Act 2009 (Government of Bangladesh 2009). This
mandates that paurashavas should ensure citizen participation through a range of different committees.
However, many elected representatives, government officials and citizens are unaware of this provision,
mainly because they are not fully informed or well trained (Table 2). If representatives are not aware of
their legal responsibilities, then it is hardly surprising if citizens do not participate in development
activities.
This issue can be examined in Kanaighat Paurashava using the example of participatory budgeting.
This process has been advocated as a medium for empowering citizens to strengthen their voice and
promoting transparency and accountability (Cabannes 2014). Opportunities for citizen participation in
the budget-making process do exist in Kanaighat Paurashava (Table 2), as the paurashava annual budget
is generally published in June in the presence of the general public, local leaders, journalists, political
leaders and other local opinion-formers. Additionally, public input is sought during the budget planning
process. However, the attitude of one of the elected representatives towards this process tends to be
negative, for example:
I think there is no need for the ordinary citizen to take part in the budget-making process.
You know many men means many minds. So it will be better if they don’t participate in this
process (elected male representative, interview 13, June 2013).
Similarly, with regard to citizen participation, each paurashava is supposed to have two committees: a
Town-Level Coordination Committee (TLCC) and a Ward-Level Coordination Committee (WLCC).
The TLCC has 50 members, including the mayor and other councillors, and is responsible for organising
regular open public meetings in the paurashava. This committee is mandated to encourage citizens to
participate through discussion and sharing of views. Its remit is to look after the overall condition of
the municipality. The WLCC in principle has 11 members, including the female councillor of each
ward, with one of the ward councillors as its chairman. This committee is mandated to ensure citizen
participation in every ward. However, in practice, the study found that such committees were not
constituted.
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Among those respondents who were representatives and officials, three claimed there was a
coordination committee, another three said there was no such committee, and the rest did not want to
comment (Table 2). The respondents who provided positive answers were unable to give any specifics
such as the structure, composition or functions of the committee. Notably, it was observed that the chief
executive was unable to say anything about either committee, as they were not functional.
Table 2: Opinion of respondents (representatives and officials) as to existence of participation

frameworks: legal requirement, coordination committees, scope for participatory budgeting
Opinion Statute in paurashava's Coordination committees Scope for participation in
legal framework N = 10 (TLCC and WLCC) N = 10 budgeting N = 10
Yes 04 03 09
No 03 03 01
No comments 03 04 0
Additional provisions exist to form different standing committees such as law and order and public
security, accounts and audit, communication and infrastructure, urban planning and development, and
women and children’s committees. These committees are supposed to perform a range of functions.
When asked about standing committees in the paurashava, six out of the 10 respondents had no
knowledge of them (Table 3). The standing committees in principle comprise five members from among
councillors and are open to the public:
If any expert person or any citizen or citizens expresses interest to be present at any
meeting, municipal or standing committee or other, any committee can permit him to be
present and he can raise his opinion. The committee can take a decision or make a
suggestion according to his opinion (Local Government (municipality amendment)
ordinance 2010, p. 31).
However, it was observed that these committees exist only in legal documents and are not effective.
Table 3: Opinion of respondents (representatives and officials) as to existence of standing committees

in Kanaighat Paurashava
Standing committees N = 10
No knowledge of committees 06
Law and order and public security, accounts and audit, communications and infrastructure,
03
urban planning and development, women and children’s committees
Bid committee, finance committee, hut-bazar (market) development committee 01
Among citizen respondents, 27 out of 40 citizens said they did not participate in the planning process
at Kanaighat Paurashava as they were not informed about it. When it came to decision-making, 36 out
of 40 respondents did not participate, while 23 out of 40 did not participate in the implementation,
monitoring or evaluation of any development activities (Table 4). It appears that either citizens are not
invited to participate, or they do not know where and how development projects are planned, even
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though they are willing to participate (Table 4). Among those who did participate in development
projects, seven participated in road construction, six in market development and two in the
establishment of a primary school (Table 5).
Table 4: Participation of respondents (citizens) in development projects

Participation Planning Decision-making Implementation,
N = 40 monitoring and evaluation
Yes 13 04 17
No 27 36 23
Reasons behind no answer N = 27 N = 36 N = 23
No one informed me 27 36 21
Unwillingness to participate 0 0 0
Other reasons 0 0 02
Table 5: Types of development project participated in by respondents (citizens)

Activities N = 17
Road construction 7
Market development 6
Establishment of primary school in paurashava 2
Other development activities 2
From the above discussion, some conclusions can be drawn. First, because elected representatives are
not interested in engaging citizens in local government, they do not provide information on
participation. In cases where they do inform the local community, people do not get an opportunity to
be heard on the issues under discussion. As a consequence, the level of participation in the paurashava
is perceived by citizens to be low (Table 6).
Table 6: Citizen respondents’ views on their level of participation

Views N = 40
Very good 01
Good 14
Poor 20
Very poor 05
As one respondent puts it:

I had a strong intention to speak, but nobody called on me. So I did not participate in the
decision-making process of our paurashava (citizen, interview 7, June 2013).
Elected representatives see themselves as the sole actors in local development. They do not attach
importance to citizen engagement, as they think people lack the skills to participate in council activities.
They also believe people are cynical and will hinder development activities (Waheduzzaman 2010).
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Furthermore, they see themselves as patrons and citizens as their clients; and as leaders they are not
interested in educating and engaging citizens in the development process, because this could mean their
mistakes and self-interest come to light. One respondent explained:
The mayor or councillors have never invited us to join in the planning process of any
development activities, even if we want to participate voluntarily; they don’t disclose their
plan to us (community leader, interview 4, June 2013).
Another respondent said:

We are common people. We are valuable when an election comes. We elect our
representatives through an election; afterwards they become our boss. They do not create
any opportunity for us to participate in the planning of paurashava activities (stakeholder,
interview 5, June 2013).
Citizens’ capacity
The success of participation also depends on citizens’ capacity as stakeholders in terms of education,
wealth and civic skills (Pattie et al. 2004; Skelcher and Torfing 2010). Verba et al. (1995) in their SES
(socioeconomic status) model argued that people with higher socioeconomic status (money, education
and civic skills) are more active in politics. Similarly, Skelcher and Torfing (2010) argue that large
inequalities in education and wealth often make it extremely difficult to ensure equal participation and
influence. As another researcher notes: “The very fact of providing mechanisms and spaces of
participation may become a burden for some people rather than an opportunity, especially when the
burden is predominantly placed on communities which are already multiply disadvantaged” (Blakeley
2010, p. 139).
Hence even if participation increases it may not include all relevant and affected sections of society.
Many people in Bangladesh are not educated enough to participate in the activities of local government.
According to the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, in 2011 the adult literacy rate in Bangladesh was
58.3% (male 63.1% and female 53.5%); in Kanaighat Paurashava it was even lower, at just 43.5% (male
45.8% and female 41.4%). As a result, people do not know how to participate and do not get adequate
information from government and local authorities. One respondent stated:
This is the mayor’s or other representative’s job; what is my business in their works? And
they will not allow me to join in their functions (citizen, interview 6, June 2013).
It is also the case that affluent people with political power can more easily participate in planning
processes. Party affiliation plays a significant role in this regard, as supporters of political parties get
more opportunity to participate than citizens. Poor people are also prevented from participating because
they lack opportunities to be heard. One respondent pointed out that:
Participation in the planning process is only for those who occupy a high socio-cultural
background and have political power. We are poor and we have no political power. So we
have no right to participate (citizen, interview 9, June 2013).
Another respondent noted that:
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I am poor. Never have I directly been informed about any development activities of the
paurashava, I know only through the mass media and public conversation, but can’t
participate; we are neither rich nor politically influential. So who will ask us? (citizen,
An additional problem is that the rules and regulations for participation are too complex for ordinary
people to understand. This makes them fear participation, as this opinion indicates:
No, this participation could bring problems for me. I don’t want to touch government
money, because if I participate, people will blame me (citizen, interview 16, June 2013).
Citizens’ capacity is also affected by gender, as women are one of the most disadvantaged sections of
society in Bangladesh. Khan et al. (2007) emphasised that understanding and intervening in local culture
is the key to improving social capital, using a participatory development model. They identified
religious clerics (who are almost invariably male) as a barrier to women’s engagement in development
activities. The clerics obstruct female participation because of their religious dogma. They explain
religious values wrongly in a way which favours patriarchy. Similarly, Drechsler and Jutting (2010)
argue that the mindset of people in patriarchal societies is another important factor which impairs
women’s agency. Such attitudes, based on prevailing norms and traditions, are impediments to women’s
advancement. The studies above are based on research carried out in Algeria and Afghanistan. However,
the observations are also true of Bangladesh and specifically of Kanaighat Paurashava. As one female
respondent put it:
I, participate? (smiles) I am female! Who will inform me? Am I rich? Have I any value?
Participation is only for those who have a lot of money and influence on us (female citizen,
Resource availability
Local government needs adequate resources to ensure citizen participation. Bangladeshi local
governments are financially dependent on central government grants, which provide about 60% of their
total revenue (Chowdhury and Al-Hossienie 2012). These grants are for specific purposes and local
governments cannot choose how to spend them. However, resource problems are also prevalent in
developed countries like the UK and Australia (Aulich 2009). Kanaighat Paurashava’s annual revenue
is TK4,000,000 (equivalent to US$50,000), but this study found that neither the government nor the
paurashava allocates any funds to ensure citizen participation. Instead, elected representatives are
expected to collect ‘own income’ funds from within the paurashava. However, they are typically
unwilling to collect such funds, as they think that if they impose taxes on residents they will lose public
support in future elections.
Outcomes of participation
Responsibility, legitimacy and civic skills
This study observed that in Kanaighat Paurashava participation did not increase feelings of
responsibility, confidence in the quality and legitimacy of decision-making, or civic skills. As a
consequence, citizens tended to lose interest in participation. As one respondent stated:
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I was invited to take part in decision-making and I was present at the meeting. But I
observed that it was held only to inform us that a project is to be undertaken. After that the
meeting was closed. That’s my participation. Isn’t it a mockery of us? (stakeholder,
Another respondent said:

I was present at a meeting where it was planned to prepare a football stadium in the
paurashava. But I could not express my opinion. From that time, I promised that I will
never participate in such types of staged meetings (community leader, interview 3, June
2013).
Another commented that:

I participated, it’s true, but there was no consideration of my own demand and opinion.
The authority has just run their projects as they see fit. Is it participation? What do you
think? (citizen, interview 9, June 2013).
Inclusion
Moreover, as most elected representatives are not well educated, they are unaware of the benefits of
engaging citizens and welcoming their contribution to the development process. Their opinions are also
often contradictory in this regard. One representative asserted that:
We plan the development projects at the paurashava meetings in the presence of citizens.
We always try to ensure citizen participation through the lifecycle of a project (elected
male representative, interview 13, June 2013).
Nevertheless, elected representatives also think that the opportunity for citizens to participate in local
government activities flows through them. This suggests that they do not value citizen participation. As
another representative said:
Local people are participating in local programmes through their elected representatives
(elected male representative, interview 12, June 2013).
The above statement is supported by findings from the female elected representatives, as paurashava
activities are dominated by male representatives. One female representative stated that:
I am a public representative. Most of the time I don’t know how or where annual
development projects are prepared. We are not consulted. How can citizen consultation
be expected? (elected female representative, interview 14, June 2013).
Most female elected representatives in the paurashava face obstacles to participation because of male
domination. They are not treated equally and their views are not taken into account. One female
representative commented:
Equal opportunity, what do you mean? We are like a showpiece. Our views are not valued.
Sometimes we are not informed about meetings, but we have to attach our signature in the
registrar book later. We are just for formalities. We don’t want this (elected female
representative, interview 17, June 2013).
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Another said:
We are women. We have no power. We are unable to express our opinion in a decision-
making meeting independently or, if we express our opinion, it is never taken into account.
We feel shame due to these sorts of behaviours. That is our main problem (elected female
representative, interview 18, June 2013).
In addition, participation arrangements are made by the male representatives, and they tend to invite
those citizens with whom they have close ties and who are influential. Consequently the poor, women
and people with little education are rarely included. Even one official alluded to this:
We have a strong citizen participation mechanism in the paurashava’s development

programmes. But sometimes the practice of citizen participation is found to be
manipulated by the local political leaders (government official, interview 11, June 2013).
Conclusion
Citizen participation is a mechanism for local government democratisation. The quality of democracy
depends on how far people can participate in and influence the governance process. As local
government is an important democratic force at grassroots level, facilitating citizen participation will
strengthen democracy. Initiatives therefore need to be taken to engage citizens in the governance
process. However, these initiatives tend to be limited due to a lack of commitment from elected
representatives, citizens’ capacity, and resource availability and allotment.
In Kanaighat Paurashava it was found that citizen participation is hampered by a number of factors.
Firstly, elected representatives are not committed to participation. They are unwilling to provide
information to people on its scope, and in some cases they involve only those citizens who are influential
and have a close tie with them. They also lack knowledge on the legal and instrumental aspects of
citizen participation in urban local government. There do exist institutional frameworks for engaging
citizens in Kanaighat Paurashava’s activities, but these are typically not successful due to elected
representatives’ lack of interest. Secondly, citizens’ lack of capacity has a great impact on participation.
Citizens are deterred from participation due to their socioeconomic vulnerability and lack of political
power, and in particular the mindset of male representatives towards women is hampering equal
opportunity for participation. Finally, availability of resources is an important determinant of
participation in local government. Unfortunately in the case of Kanaighat Paurashava there is no
resource allocation in this respect.
As citizen participation is critical for democratic decision-making and ensuring transparency and
accountability, the factors mentioned above need to be addressed in a planned manner to achieve these
outcomes. Leadership training is important to change mindsets and develop positive attitudes and skills
among elected representatives. In addition, citizens’ capacity can be increased through building
awareness and changing orientation toward local government to encourage spontaneous participation.
Last but not least, proper allocation and use of resources are also crucial for the successful
implementation of participatory mechanisms.
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10
Network governance and capacity
of local governments to deliver
LED in Uganda
Rose B Namara
Uganda Management Institute
Uganda
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Gerald Kagambirwe Karyeija
Uganda Management Institute
Uganda
Betty C Mubangizi
School of Management, IT and Governance
University of KwaZulu Natal
South Africa
Abstract
This paper discusses network governance and its contribution to the capacity of local governments
(LGs) to deliver local economic development (LED) in Uganda. Although a formal LED policy was
only established in Uganda in February 2014, there have been LED-inspired practices in the past
decade. Various scholars and practitioners have observed that the autonomy and capacity of LGs to
deliver LED is limited, but have been hopeful that new governance strategies like network governance
would increase the capacities of LGs. However, neither network governance arrangements among
LGs, nor their potential to improve governance capacity, have been documented. In a case study of
Kyenjojo District, this paper finds that existing network governance arrangements have been
fundamental in improving financial autonomy at this LG, delivering some income to invest in LED
activities, although no evidence was found of reduced transaction costs in transforming local
economies. The study further reveals that network governance arrangements have not led to the
development of specialised skills in regulation or law enforcement, and capacity gaps are evident
amongst staff and members in understanding the private sector and how it works. On a positive note,
there is clear evidence of attempts by the LG to be innovative. Based on these findings, this study
recommends that LGs need to consider a multi-pronged or multi-network governance approach to
LED, which in turn will require a refocusing of governance mechanisms to become more dynamic and
responsive, and offer incentives to the various actors in the development sector.
Keywords: Network governance, local government capacity, local economic development, Uganda
Introduction
Within a decentralised governance framework, local economic development (LED) is perceived as the
responsibility of local governments (LGs). For example, at the Kampala Commonwealth Local
Government Conference in 2013, LGs were declared to be central to the development process, with a
role to promote:
 local democratic governance that is inclusive, transparent and participatory;
 democratic development and public participation;
 innovative, sustainable, people-sensitive local economic growth and social development;
 integration and coordination of development activities between public and non-state agents;
 human rights, gender equality, cultural diversity and non- discrimination;
 the building of social capital, peace and stability, and dialogue (CLGF 2013, p. 21).
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LGs are thus seen as catalysts and accelerators of LED. According to Rogerson (2010, p. 485) they
have: a political role in democratically determining what is suitable for their localities; social
responsibility for ensuring local development is inclusive and fair; and a responsibility to ensure that
public, private and community actors in LED are coordinated and their interests are met. Similarly,
the International Labour Organization (2006, p. 2) sees LED as a participatory process that
encourages partnership arrangements between the private and public stakeholders of a defined
territory, enabling joint design and implementation of a common development strategy by making use
of local resources and competitive advantage in a global context, with the final objective of creating
decent jobs and stimulating economic activity.
In Africa, the persistent challenges facing decentralisation and local governance have necessitated a
refocusing of LED efforts. These challenges include: inadequate local revenues and business
development support; an unfavourable business environment; inadequate management information
systems, and insufficiently business-like approaches to service delivery (Huntington and Wibbels
2014, p. 632; Rees and Hossain 2010, p. 584). It is envisaged that LED will “encourage and support
networking and collaboration between businesses and public and private and community
partnerships, facilitate workforce development and education, focus inward investment to support
cluster growth and support quality of life improvements” (Ruecker and Trah 2007, p. 13). Thus LED
is understood as being generated by the efforts of many actors.
According to new public management (NPM) theory, many actors contribute to the achievement of
governance objectives, but these must find ways to interact that increase effectiveness in
implementing policies and programmes (Mubangizi et al. 2013). This interaction highlights both
intra- and inter-relational issues. In the case of intergovernmental relations, the relationship between
Network governance and capacity of local governments to deliver LED in Uganda 165
local and central government is broadly defined by legislation, but needs facilitating initiatives to
work effectively.
There is also growing scrutiny of how the private sector and other actors, relate to LGs. The private
sector is seen to be critical to local development since it tends to drive growth. In Uganda, for
instance, the private sector contributes about 80% of economic growth (Read and Parton 2009, p.
579), particularly small and medium-sized enterprises such as smallholder farms, retail and agro-
processing businesses, and providers of health, education and financial services. A strong local
private sector and/or strong economic growth in a country can then attract foreign investment
(Choong and Lam 2010, p. 184). For this reason governments are devising new governance
approaches, such as network governance and public–private partnerships, to include other players in
delivering public services. These horizontal relationships, and public/private/community coordination,
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are increasingly the subject of academic focus.
Network governance (cooperation between government agencies) and collaborative governance

(cooperation with external agencies e.g. through public–private partnerships) are being encouraged as
examples of innovative public sector management (Park and Park 2009, p. 92). The idea of a
‘network’ implies interaction between various actors on the basis of trust, with the aim of solving a
policy problem, rather than relying on systems of operation.
Network governance can create a sense of collective action and mutual support, to harness the
network of resources more efficiently and effectively. Network governance is expected to transform
local governance by stimulating the local economy to grow, compete and create jobs, and make better
use of local resources (Trah 2004). Network governance can improve inter- and intra-government
relationships as it enhances team spirit, mutual accountability and coordination. For instance,
Mubangizi et al. (2013) conclude that the successful implementation of the KwaNaLoGA Games and
the Uganda Nutritional and Early Childhood Development Programme are two good examples of
coordination, communication and relationships within a network of actors.
Mubangizi et al. further note that network governance has inherent capacity-building and knowledge
exchange benefits. Actors can adapt and innovate, exchange ideas or even increase the numbers of
skilled personnel to undertake an activity (although this paper does not look at specific sectors).
Network governance thus departs from debates on governance, e.g. local governance, multi-level
governance or ‘good governance’, by considering (1) patterns of interaction in exchange and
relationships; and (2) flows of resources between independent units (Wilikilagi 2009).
For example in LED, Koppenjan and Klijn (2004) claim that common policy problems faced by local
governments can be addressed by network coordination of resources, skills and strategies. In contrast,
de Vries and Nemec (2012, p. 4) state that focusing on whole-government issues and horizontal
coordination have affected the autonomy of public organisations, though they do not elaborate how.
However, the more the interaction is brokered, the more centralised it appears. Awortwi (2003) shows
that, during partnerships in service delivery, agents – in this case civil society organisations and
private companies – innovate to save costs, and thus develop capacity for future sub-contracting and
increase their entrepreneurial confidence; at the same time, the image of local government improves.
Awortwi (2003) emphasised the range of skills that LGs need to improve governance of multiple
forms of service delivery, e.g. equipping staff with skills to manage contracts, monitoring progress
indicators, implement by-laws and sanctions, and improve negotiation skills so as to achieve better
terms and build consensus.
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This paper, therefore, asks the following question: does network governance contribute to the capacity
of LGs to deliver local economic development? More specifically:
1. Does network governance contribute to the financial autonomy of LGs?

2. Does network governance contribute to the functional/human capacity of LGs?
3. Does network governance increase innovation and recognition of local opportunities by
LGs?
Local economic development strategies

In order to address the above questions, a clear understanding of local economic development (LED)
strategies is needed, especially as they are understood and used in this study. This section therefore
seeks to provide a discussion and explanation of LED.
LED is “a process of stimulating the local economy to grow, compete and create more jobs, in
particular making better use of locally available resources” (Trah 2004, cited in Rogerson and
Rogerson 2010). This process is driven by all sectors in development, and the Government of Uganda
defines LED as “a process where the tripartite partnership between local governments, private sector
and community are jointly and collectively engaged in identification, mobilisation, management and
initiation of resources at the local levels” (MoLG 2013). LED is commonly characterised by the
following attributes: participation and social dialogue; territorial focus; mobilisation and use of local
resources; building of competitive advantage; local ownership and management; and multiple
stakeholder involvement (MoLG 2013; MoLG 2014). Ateljevic et al. (2013, p. 282) emphasise that it
is about building the economic capacity of a local area to improve its economic future and the quality
of life for all. It is a process by which the public, business and NGO sectors work collectively to
create better conditions for employment generation. LED performance and sustainability depend on
the active engagement of the private, public and third sectors, and of communities.
Often LED appears fragmented, featuring autonomous individuals, agencies and institutions whose
relationships are characterised by uncoordinated service delivery, unclear jurisdiction, and some
manipulation. However, LED also brings together many different types of enterprises, such as shops,
market stalls, hotels, agribusinesses, property companies, shopping malls, leisure parks and food
processing plants. Tourism sites, for example, may be started, operated and maintained by individuals
or private companies, who may own, rent, or lease such enterprises. Not all enterprises are known to,
or registered with, local authorities.
NGOs contributing to LED operate in different ways in different localities, and may not declare their
work plans and budgets to LGs. Thus their budgets are not usually reflected in district plans, nor are
they taxed, making it difficult to gauge their contribution to LED. Where NGOs support the budgets
of LGs, either in cash or kind (e.g. vehicles, computers, construction of health centres or schools, their
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contribution to local economies is more easily tracked. This fragmentation, in which different actors
have different agendas, makes governance, planning, monitoring, control and evaluation of LED
difficult. Appropriate governance and oversight is thus urgently needed.
Mubangizi et al. (2013, p. 777) conclude that “in a decentralized system, network governance can
indeed contribute to service delivery amidst resource-poor units of LG, especially if there is strong
and effective collaboration across the different spheres of government, private sector and civil
society”. Several scholars (eg Bogason and Musso 2006) agree that network governance is a useful
local and, as development becomes more complex, and government depends more on other actors to
solve problems, network governance offers an overarching strategy for facilitating ordered and
collective action (Giest and Howlett 2013). The need for coordinated effort among interdependent
entities, for collective solutions to public issues, and for recognition of the importance of a range of
actors in development, is at the heart of network and collective governance. As a result, governments
are employing “looser forms of governance where private actors such as business and NGOs
increasingly participate in policy-making” (Khan 2013, p. 134) – such actors are thus involved in
policy implementation, unlike governance by hierarchical structures (where rule is based on rigidly
structured command structures) or markets (based on demand and supply) (Khan 2013; Parag et al.
2013).
Turnbull (2007) and Khan (2013) list some useful distinguishing characteristics of network
governance and their relevance to LED processes. Turnbull (2007) emphasises that in networks actors
are interdependent, they cooperate with and trust each other, and most importantly stakeholders work
in an organised manner towards a common solution.
This process is explained below:
 The network comprises autonomous organisations with interdependent centres of power. This
division of power can be used to introduce checks and balances in a network, although
networks have been criticised for maintaining power imbalances (Khan 2013).
 There is proper coordination and communication among players, i.e. “politically independent
feedback and feed-forward communication and control channels” (Turnbull 2007, p. 1080).
This can create competition for both information and power and improve performance.
 Stakeholders affected by a problem – for example employees, customers and suppliers –
participate in its resolution. This provides a check on excessive bureaucratic powers. At the
same time, networks typically include ‘gatekeeper’, ‘pulse-taker’ and ‘innovator’ roles, whose
presence stimulates action and sharing of skills and resources.
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Thus network governance “introduces distributed communications, intelligence, decision- making and
control, which reduce centralized powers and promote democracy” (Turnbull 2007, p. 1080) and
increases connectivity. Network governance also facilitates access to essential information and
resources; increases the influence of actors; increases access to resources; and reduces transaction
costs. Networking can also help solve complex problems by allowing exchange of capabilities and
markets, and by combining different types of knowledge (Parag et al. 2013; Giest and Howlett 2013).
Network governance happens within both formal and informal arrangements. Khan notes (2013, p.
134) that network governance covers a broad range of organisational forms from public–private
partnerships and stakeholder participation to informal personal interactions between individuals.
These interactions and organisational arrangements are dictated by “various motives for joining the
network and differing opinions on the preferred outcome” (Green, 2003).
Incentives are also needed to promote cooperation (Provan and Kenis 2008; Giest and Howlett 2013).
For some actors the incentive may be a situation that is too complex for them to handle – as evidenced
by Bodolica and Spraggon (2009, p. 114), who suggest that failing businesses may seek mergers and
collaborations to survive or grow, although such collaboration may be ad hoc and unsustainable.
Other incentives may come when government provides a funding inducement or opportunity which
persuades other actors to cooperate. For example, in Uganda, the Presidential Initiative Fund offers
funding to local entrepreneurs who devise value-adding innovations. Sometimes, governments may
introduce incentives as sanctions – e.g. a tax to increase costs for firms which do not collaborate in a
programme. However, for network governance to succeed trust is a core element (Park and Park
2009, p. 103).
Based on cluster network analysis of LED in 2,904 municipalities in the United States, Reese (2006)
found three major development approaches adopted by cities to develop their localities:
a) combining infrastructure investment and financial incentives;
b) using all possible techniques (e.g. tax holidays, marketing, land-based incentives, business
assistance etc); and
c) a passive strategy in which little is done (which the author found in 210 cities).
Reese concludes that the lack of clear strategies for LED in cities calls into question not only how far
local government is seen as the driver of LED, but also the capacity of local governments to pursue
LED. Although the present paper does not question the primacy of LGs to spearhead LED, it does
explore whether network governance affects the capacity of LGs to deliver LED.
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Awortwi (2003) has studied public–private partnerships in their role as one of the planned network
governance arrangements often chosen for the delivery of public services. Public–private partnerships
constitute a contractual arrangement between LGs and agents (private actors) involving transfer of
responsibilities, opportunities and risks (capital, ownership and management). Awortwi showed that
public–private partnership contracts can operate within a range of governance structures, namely:
 Contracting-out: the LG hires an agent to carry out specified tasks for a period of time. The
LG pays for service delivery, sets performance expectations, clarifies delivery parameters,
and monitors and deals with the service provider directly. The LG has a limited relationship
with service users.
 Franchising: the LG gives exclusive rights or a geographical monopoly to a private firm to
deliver services to and collect fees directly from beneficiaries, while the LG taxes the firm
through surcharges.
 Open competition: the LG allows registered firms to make private arrangements with users to
deliver a service. The firms compete for clients in the market. The role of the LG is to
license, monitor and regulate the firms.
 Leasing: private operators rent the assets of an LG to deliver a service for a certain period of
time. The private operator assumes all commercial risks involved in operating, maintaining
and managing the asset, and pays a rental fee to the LG.
 Granting of concessions: the LG gives a private company full responsibility for delivery of
specified infrastructure services. The private company is responsible for capital development
required to build, upgrade or expand the system. Users pay tariffs and the LG is responsible
for establishing performance standards and ensuring that the concessionaire meets them. In
some cases, the concessionaire may maintain indefinite ownership (the ‘build, operate and
own’ model), while in others the assets may be transferred to the LG after a period of time.
However, Awortwi noted that whichever type of governance through contracting is chosen, the LG
needs the capacity to contract well and efficiently, or public trust and confidence in the government
itself may be undermined. Creating ‘smarter’ LGs remains a very critical requirement for achieving a
meaningful LED strategy for Uganda.
Capacity of local governments to offer LED

There is no doubt that building local economies’ capacity to create wealth and wellbeing for local
residents requires functional capacity from both private and public actors. President Kagame of
Rwanda summed it up well when he said: “We believe that effective decentralization does not only
require the autonomy of LG institutions, but most importantly the requisite capacities to deliver on
their mandate, as well as continued support from, and coordination with, the central government”
(Kagame 2013, p. 13). In a decentralised setting LGs are supposedly in charge, autonomous and
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capable of promoting growth and development within their localities. An effective LG needs to have
both the autonomy and ability to coordinate – horizontally or vertically – other players in meeting
local priorities, and the insight to identify and exploit local opportunities to expand the local economy.
LGs can steer development if they seize these local opportunities and encourage community
participation (CLGF 2013). Therefore ‘capacity’ for LGs includes autonomy to operate; a mandate to
regulate, plan, implement or facilitate service delivery; and powers and skills to monitor LED
interventions.
Autonomy of LGs
The autonomy of LGs as key actors in LED is important because it determines how they become
entitled to participate in networks, the role they play in defining public interest, whether they take a
leadership or ‘led’ role, their place with regard to funding, and whose interests they represent. From a
political economy perspective, autonomy in public administration and governance defines
jurisdiction, the power of local actors, dominance, legitimacy and discretionary authority
(Swianiewicz 2014, p. 293). Legislative frameworks that promote decentralisation recognise LGs as
autonomous and powerful institutions in local economies. However, when actors like NGOs become
involved in provision of public services, to supplement government efforts, they become more
powerful at local levels and their role goes beyond mere service provision. For instance, they are able
to determine the absence or presence of a service, and this “has implications for the degree to which
local government maintains its control over service provision and the accountability of providers to
citizens and their elected representatives” (Bar-Nir and Gal 2010). In such situations it is crucial to
clarify the roles and responsibilities of both NGOs and LGs, as LGs may otherwise be perceived to
have made decisions affecting the wellbeing of citizens in ways that are contentious, when in fact
their actions may not be completely autonomous (Hansen and Klausen 2002, p. 49; Grant and Dollery
2012, p. 401).
Previous work on the autonomy of LGs (eg Jones and Stewart 2012) has mainly focused on the
relationship with central government. Such studies have claimed that LGs are not truly autonomous
because they are controlled by central government, which funds most activities, sets policies and
determines structures of operation. Jones and Stewart claim that failure by LGs is often embedded in
central government systems, e.g. when allocated funding that propels and sustains localism is not
provided. LGs are seen simply as extensions of central governments and conduits of funding to civil
society organisations which implement local public services. A recent study by Palermo (2015, p.
246) focuses on four variables to understand the autonomy of LGs: function, structure, administration
and finance. One of its conclusions is that structure and administration are largely dictated by legal
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provisions, meaning that governance models like network governance cannot significantly influence
these variables. This seems to be borne out in Uganda, where recently a number of functions –
structure, administration and even finance – have been re-centralised (Lewis 2014, p. 584; Karyeija
and Kyohairwe 2012; Nabukeera et al. 2015). It is clear there are a number of empirical convergences
between the Italian and Ugandan experiences, though they may differ in degree of and motive for re-
centralisation. This paper focuses on the effect of network governance on the financial, functional and
innovative autonomy of local governments.
Financial autonomy
Imhanlahimi and Ikeanyibe (2009) found LG autonomy in Nigeria was weak, characterised by
inadequate finances, weak intergovernmental relations, precarious democracy and corruption on a
grand scale. Similarly Kiwanuka (2014) maintains that LG autonomy is very difficult to achieve
without a sound local revenue base and an efficient tax collection system. In Uganda, although LGs
do have powers to raise funds from services such as property rates, land, licences etc, or to set their
own rates and enact laws to reduce tax evasion, there is still limited participation of the private sector
in planned LED, businesses are largely informal and the capacity of local economies to provide
infrastructure to spur LED is inadequate (MoLG 2013). There is no doubt that lack of financial
autonomy may constrain LGs from implementing development initiatives. However, literature on
network governance does not document how different network arrangements enable LGs to increase
their capacity to generate and spend their own income on LED priorities; although there are clearly
capacity gaps in supporting the development activities implemented by private actors.
In a discussion about LGs’ capacity to support other actors under LG jurisdiction, Awortwi (2003, p.
260) investigated examples of governance of basic service delivery in Ghana. He concluded that LG
bureaucrats did not have suitable systems to facilitate and incorporate even the activities of
community-based organisations (CBOs) in their budgets and financial allocations. He noted that
bureaucrats even asked for monetary incentives such as sitting allowances in order to attend CBO
meetings – which undermines the idea of cooperation and networking. In joint undertakings, he found
that LGs did not honour their financial obligations over development interventions, even when these
were handed over to them. In the case of a joint sewage scheme in Ghana, Awortwi (2003, p. 260)
noted it was abandoned a few months after inauguration. He concluded that LGs had not yet taken
conscious and consistent steps to enable CBOs to access financial resources, or to harness stakeholder
participation.
Turning to Uganda, are LGs here able to honour their financial obligations to networks? The Ministry
of Local Government in Uganda (MoLG 2014) conducted a review of district development plans in
Uganda and concluded that there was ‘a weak focus to private sector development’ but that there
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existed more detailed plans, programmes, targets and monitoring arrangements for public sector
performance. There were no specific plans for developing partnerships with the private sector.
Limited attention and resources are focused on private sector development by LGs – and yet the
private sector is an engine of LED. Strategies need to be available to LGs in Uganda to engage
private actors in LED, as well as to increase the financial autonomy of local governments.
Functional capacity
It is worth investigating whether LGs actually have the functional capacity to discharge their
mandates to regulate, plan, implement or facilitate implementers, and monitor network governance.
LGs need to be able to effectively manage different modes of partnership in service delivery
(Awortwi 2003). One critical capacity is the ability to regulate agents: paying them when services are
delivered and monitoring and sanctioning them if they are at fault. Awortwi emphasised that in cases
where, for example, social services are implemented under commercial or market-oriented principles,
LGs have to reorganise to manage two key risks: the risk of poor service delivery, and the risk of non-
compliance with LG regulations. Only if these risks are successfully managed will they obtain
substantial gains from the partnership, such as increased coverage and greater efficiency in service
delivery. Additionally, although ‘reorganisation’ is often synonymous with ‘restructuring’ in
organisational development literature, this paper argues that what is needed here is the reorientation of
LG capabilities and development of skills. Necessary skills for LGs will include contract
management, monitoring and evaluation. However, Awortwi concluded that none of the LGs he
studied had the capacity to govern such partnerships sufficiently to ensure value for money. He
attributed this poor performance to poor decentralisation policies and inadequate fiscal, human and
political autonomy among LGs.
In this paper functional capacity is analysed by looking at human resources capacity to undertake
LED using looser forms of governance.
Bayar and Mayer (1994, pp. 153–154), cited in Tshikwatamba (2012), over 20 years ago argued for a
paradigm shift of governance towards expertise, power-sharing, two-way information flows, and
collective leadership and management styles. They argued that this paradigm shift demands a
reorientation of capacities. This orientation is important because in earlier models of governance
governments employed people to deliver services, but not to manage contracts. Redman et al. (2007,
p. 1489) note a shift in the human resource needs of government from a supply perspective to a
demand and/or needs-driven perspective. This demand-driven side requires specialised regulation,
facilitation and monitoring skills, and the ability to balance vertical and horizontal interactions.
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In addition to technical abilities, network leaders must be able to balance horizontal and vertical
relationships in such a way as to create trust and reciprocity within the network. They must
communicate well, persuade stakeholders to continuously interact and exchange knowledge, and
direct network management activities. Cristofoli et al. (2014) insist that for networks to successfully
perform they “must be able to rely on formalised mechanisms and a pool of ‘network administrators’
responsible for their governance”. Giest and Howlett (2013) argue that good network leaders can
attract new members to the network, build long-term networking structures and also attract funding
opportunities. Does network governance facilitate the growth of such human capacity in LGs in
Uganda?
Innovative capacity of LGs

Long-term changes in localities require managers of LGs to come up with innovative ideas. Grydehøj
(2013) argues that innovative governance practices can promote economic development in LGs, to an
extent, nurturing a small jurisdiction’s core competencies and making government policy more
effective (Grydehøj 2013). Using the example of Shetland, UK (a sub-national jurisdiction in the EU),
Grydehøj shows how the creation of a parallel structure to a local government, the Shetland
Charitable Trust, gave more autonomy and capacity to LGs to manage their local economy. Upon the
discovery of new oil resources, Shetland Council created the Trust to manage the oil reserve fund.
The Trust managed taxes and contracts with oil companies, and had authority to offer grants and
credit to Shetland inhabitants. Although the Trust managed an LG fund, it did not mirror LG
structures. The fund grew in size and boosted businesses in Shetland. Innovative governance in an LG
may be constrained by central government regulations, because politicians are not always eager to
empower LGs, but the Shetland experience indicates that a strong sense of identity and support from
citizens may make innovations at LG level work. One of the major reasons for the emergence of
networks has been to find innovative solutions to complex policy problems that are commonly
experienced and which cannot be solved by a single actor. Nonetheless, concern remains as to how
network governance can enable LGs to be innovative (ie to develop and implement ideas).
In the sections that follow, this paper documents a case study of how and to what extent network
governance affects the capacity of an LG in Uganda – namely Kyenjojo District. First, it examines
the network arrangements promoting LED in Kyenjojo. Second, it explains the methodology used for
this study. Third, the major findings are presented and analysed. Lastly the findings are discussed and
conclusions are drawn.
LED in Uganda
Uganda’s national economy has been growing stronger, with an impressive growth rate of 6.7% in the
financial year 2010/11, against 5.9% in previous years (MoLG 2014). This growth is mainly attributed
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to the mining, construction and telecommunications sectors, and to heavy investment in infrastructure
development – including roads, water and sanitation, air and railways, energy and information
technology. The government has invested in national ‘backbone’ data transmission infrastructure and
e-government infrastructure to encourage e-governance, e-marketing and e-procurement. Mobile
phone technology has encouraged the growth of businesses such as mobile money transfer kiosks. The
liberalisation of radio and TV broadcasting has increased information-sharing and the participation of
citizens in local development. Rural electrification has aided the growth of rural businesses, while
investment in the rural road network has facilitated trade, marketing and the transfer of perishables
such as flowers and vegetables to market.
Decentralisation and the creation of many LG units has seen some commendable successes such as
stabilising local governance by widening involvement, encouraging citizen participation in local
decision-making, and improving service delivery to a degree. However, there have also been
challenges, such as: inadequate local revenues (averaging just 3% of total local government annual
budgets); unhelpful business practices such as long registration procedures; inadequate business
development services; an insufficiently business-like approach to service delivery by bureaucrats; the
informal nature of most businesses; and procurement laws that sometimes hamper effective public–
private partnerships (MoLG 2014).
Recognition that the private sector in recent years is a key mover of the Ugandan economy has
resulted in 20% annual growth of this sector (MoLG 2014), and in fact the sector has seen steady
average annual growth of 5.5% over the last 15 years (2000/01 to 2014/15) (Ministry of Finance,
Planning and Economic Development 2015, p. 3). The sector is dominated by micro enterprises, but
also includes agro-processing (fruit, juice), eco-tourism, mining and locally-based small businesses.
The continued growth of a vibrant private sector is envisaged right across the Ugandan economy and
is expected to boost LED through the trickle-down effect. However, the private sector still faces
several challenges, including: limited access to financial services; limited financial literacy; the high
cost of doing business; the poor quality of local products, which prevents them from competing
favourably; inadequate investment in research; and generally a limited focus on the private sector by
LGs. This is seen in a recent review of LGs’ development plans, which found that there are no
specific plans for developing partnerships with the private sector, since plans are geared towards
meeting constituents’ demands (MoLG 2013). Local-level private sector lobby groups are also weak
or non-existent in Uganda.
LED, particularly the development of an effective private sector, requires policies and plans that can
balance both private and public interests. Documented cases of such public–private partnerships do
exist in Uganda. For instance, Entebbe town through a public–private partnership has built a leisure
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park which generates income not only for the owners but also for local communities, by providing
employment and a market for their produce. It also helps the LG beautify the town, and protects the
environment through tree-planting and waste management. In Jinja town, the LG joined with local
business owners to paint buildings, refurbish and improve dilapidated streets, develop open spaces for
recreation, and improve public sanitation, street lighting and roads. In ‘City Bright’ campaigns,
communities work alongside LGs to beautify their cities (CLGF 2013). However, the participation
and collaboration of actors in LED is governed by both positive and negative incentives embedded in
policies, plans and practices. Although Uganda’s LED strategy was adopted by all LG leaders during
their joint annual review of decentralisation in 2007 (Bitarabeho 2008, p. 6), Uganda did not have a
national LED policy until February 2014. Significantly, this policy, together with Uganda’s
Decentralisation Policy Strategic Framework (2013–2023), provides a framework for partnerships and
aims to accelerate and galvanise social and economic actors to effectively address LED.
Network governance arrangements promoting LED in Kyenjojo District

The current structure of LGs in Uganda is comparatively favourable to both horizontal and vertical
coordination of local priorities. Network governance strategies offer scope to build the capabilities of
LGs, private sector institutions and communities to sustain many viable initiatives. Kyenjojo District
does not have a specific LED strategy, but manages to implement strategies which broadly fit within
the Ugandan national policy on LED of 2014. Kyenjojo District was selected for this study because it
is a typical rural LG with a mix of small and large private companies and NGOs operating in the area,
so it was felt that an analysis of its network governance would be informative in a wider context.
Kyenjojo District is located in western Uganda. It is bordered by Kibale District to the north,
Kyegegwa District to the east, Kamwenge District to the south and Kabarole District to the west. The
district headquarters are approximately 274 km from Kampala City by road. Like all LGs, Kyenjojo is
mandated to provide services for local citizens and promote LED.
Methodology
This study uses an exploratory case study design to explore, describe and explain the connection
between how localised network governance is implemented and how localities are transformed in
Uganda. Qualitative interviews were conducted with both Kyenjojo LG officials (district planning,
human resources, finance, and community development departments) and local business owners
(shopkeepers, roadside stall owners, market stall owners, hotel managers and officials from tea
companies). Businesses chosen had all operated in the district for at least five years, meaning they had
significant experience of working with LG officials, and had witnessed changes in the local economy.
A total of 30 respondents, selected purposively and for convenience, participated in the interviews.
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Information was collected on: the nature of cooperation and coordination; the kind of issues on which
the LG engaged local businesses; LG actors and their approach to network governance; the capacities
of LG staff; and the effects network governance had on LGs’ autonomy and innovation in their
delivery of LED. As the data was qualitative rather than quantitative, thematic analysis was used to
identify patterns and understand the key findings. The data is presented in the voices of the
participants, followed by analysis by the authors.
Findings
Three major strategies (infrastructure development, contracting out, and taxation) were identified
within which to analyse the financial autonomy, human resources capacity, and innovative abilities of
the LG.
Infrastructure development
This strategy included construction of roads and health centres, and encouragement to the banking
sector to open branches or offer mobile banking services. Kyenjojo LG has approached work on roads
in two ways: a) a joint undertaking, in the case of one road project and b) contracting out the building
of a road to private contractors in another. Here the aim was to encourage small business
development along the roads. Collaboration to construct roads has increased joint resource utilisation
and mutual support and accountability. As one district official said:
In Kyenjojo we have tea-growing companies. Often we have asked these companies to

work on the roads that traverse their farms to the neighbouring villages. We sometimes
write to them or some of our politicians go physically to such companies, to request for
assistance. For us as a district, we can offer a tractor/caterpillar/grader, our road
engineer supervises the construction, while tea companies contribute fuel for running
these machines and participate in monitoring the construction, so that the road comes
out to a level that serves their interests. Roads have encouraged growth of businesses in
the villages like food-selling points, and it is nowadays easy to transport produce to
weekly or town markets. (District official 1)
Discussion with tea company owners indicated that their collaboration on infrastructure development
reflected their desire to promote commercial farming, ease access to services and create more
employment opportunities in the district. The attraction of network governance is largely due to the
mutual benefit obtained. While the LG improves the roads to discharge its service delivery
responsibilities, the tea companies want to be able to move their tea from the plantations to the
factories more easily. As a staff member of the Mabale tea factory noted:
When we partner up with government to open up roads that link the factory to different
villages, in a way we ease access to out-growers. As you know we are a cooperative and
our vehicles traverse all these areas on a daily basis to collect tea leaves to deliver to the
factory. It is important to work with government on the road network in a way that
supports us, but we also support out-growers to sell their produce. These out-growers
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also support a number of workers and families. (Mabale company official)
These findings indicate that LGs initiate infrastructure collaboration with local commercial companies
based on clear responsibilities as well as some incentives for local businesses and anticipated local
economic benefits. In this case the LG and local companies agreed on the road standards, and the
companies also monitored construction, providing immediate accountability. The road is used by the
commercial companies to transport their produce to factories and markets, but it also serves local
communities, such as out-growers transporting their produce to factories, and generally makes the
rural areas more accessible and develops local businesses.
It was also observed that most interactions which yield such collaborations are brokered at the local
level. It is when individual LG workers and tea company officials meet – in informal arenas like the
Rotary Fellowship, Church, Lions Club or other social areas – that these contacts are initiated, and
later formalised to comply with regulation and procedures.
Evidently, local politicians and technical engineers at LGs play a key role in successfully
implementing road construction. However, the success of infrastructure development as a strategy
seems to depend on a number of factors, including the social responsibility policies of companies and
the incentives for individual companies. As a district official said:
We always go to these companies to ask them to make a contribution; sometimes we

succeed and sometimes we don’t. Sometimes maybe their businesses are not doing well
or they may not have budgeted for such contribution. However, companies have a social
responsibility budget and it is where such contribution on roads is often drawn from.
(District official 1)
Companies have corporate social responsibility policies and budgets to promote their public image
and maintain their customer base. As one officer noted, “We know that consumers buy from those
companies that identify with them. It is one way of giving back to the consumers of our tea”
(MTFO2). Therefore construction of a road helps companies to attract more consumers and maintain
their market share. This was also confirmed with discussion with shopkeepers:
Mabale tea is consumed more by people in this town because it is good-quality tea.
People also like the company because supply is reliable and it is a ‘people’s factory’. It
is not run by individuals but by the farmers themselves. Also the company has done a lot
in the district. For instance I have seen them support school competitions and sports
days. (Shopkeeper 1)
These views indicate that people are willing to be involved. The primary interest in the network is to
satisfy individual interests, e.g. for the tea company to ease movement of goods and please clients,
and for the LG to be seen to be meeting its responsibilities, with LED following as a consequence.
This points to the need for equitable cost-sharing to reflect the advantages gained by each actor in the
network, as each will act to maximise their own interest.
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Another factor for successful collaboration on infrastructure development has been the ability of
politicians to convince companies to provide support and involve them in the LG planning process:
Usually the will for companies to make a contribution is there. My thinking is that we
need to involve them in developing the district plans. This will enable them to include
some of our expectations in their plans and then thereafter we can go to them to ask for a
contribution. But also it depends on who is asking for support, some local politicians are
not good at convincing companies and some are not trustworthy. But if we take up the
issue of working with companies very seriously we can easily get money from them.
Private companies are seen as willing actors in network governance, who can easily supplement
government budgets and efforts in transforming localities. Both formal and informal ties seem to be
useful in initiating collaborative governance strategies. However, work with tea companies in
Kyenjojo District seem to be ad hoc rather than pre-planned, and depends on trust and the resource
mobilisation skills of LG officials. There is no systematic localised process to work with private
companies to undertake development activities. However, it is worth noting that both elected and
appointed officials in the district try to ensure goal congruence, and encourage business entities to be
involved in oversight to a limited extent. However, coordination is fragmented and accountability is
largely managerial, directed towards the LG and the contributing business owners rather than to the
public. There may be a need for better leadership to improve the direction of the overall efforts of the
network.
Taxation
Another strategy used by Kyenjojo is open or unregulated competitions where private companies are
allowed to do business and government taxes them. Kyenjojo LG levies taxes on business entities
such as hotels, shops and markets, and charges withholding taxes to contractors. Taxes are based on
the size and nature of the business, and are usually in the form of licences.
As one district official said:
We have small and big hotels like that of Mr Andrew; these are registered operators and
they pay taxes by us giving them licences to operate. Some shops like supermarkets and
others like abattoirs also acquire licences. However, we have a challenge of small
businesses both in towns and in villages where owners do not want to register, they
operate illegally and it becomes difficult to tax them. Even then, some operate like for a
week and stop operations or they shift to new locations. The death rate of businesses
here is too high. Those in rural areas are even worse, they operate in one’s home where
you cannot tell whether it is a shop or not. In such cases, people do not open their shops
every day or sometimes open after work. (District official 2).
While formal businesses like hotels and supermarkets readily pay for licences to operate, thereby
boosting LG income, the shops, kiosks and roadside stalls which are in the majority are likely to
operate illegally and are therefore difficult to tax. In rural areas it is even harder to collect taxes
because such businesses operate in people’s compounds and homes. Licences are also an uncertain
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funding stream, as many businesses close after a few years or months, or shift location to new areas.
Another government official said:
Yes, businesses die out, but licences are still the only reliable source of local government
finances. The majority of the private operators know that it is illegal to start a business
without paying for a licence or a receipt of any kind. Even those who just bring their
produce to the market once in a while, they have to pay market dues. (District official 3)
There is no doubt that taxing local businesses contributes to LG revenues, though the tax base is said
to be low. Taxing an unwilling population is also difficult, which can make the cost of collecting
taxes exceed the taxes collected. Businesses devise different strategies to dodge paying taxes,
including bribing local officials:
Sometimes the owners of retail shops just keep dodging taxes. When we send our boys
there to go and collect taxes, they come back empty-handed. Sometimes if a retail shop
was supposed to pay 30,000/= the boys will be given 1,000/= and told to collect next
time. You find that the cost of collecting taxes from these shops is high compared to what
we get. (District official 2)
Discussions with local businesses indicate that some dodge paying taxes because they do not relate
taxation to service delivery: their capital is limited and they consider government does not give them
any financial or technical support. As noted by a shopkeeper:
Government is just bent to tax businesses rather than supporting businesses to grow. I
pay for everything: I pay rent, and utilities and garbage collection. So why does
government take our taxes? I’m telling you if you are just starting and you begin by
paying taxes you will just collapse. Taxes are very expensive. (Shopkeeper 5)
Discussion with district officials confirmed the view that people do not relate taxation to service
delivery or appreciate what government is doing to create an enabling environment.
As one of the officers noted:
People do not link everything government has done to business. For instance government
has tarmacked the roads, extended electricity, extended mobile phone transmission
gadgets to remote areas. Nowadays producers, wholesalers or even retailers just make
mobile transactions. Government uses taxes to do these major investments. You ask them,
if government did not do these investments, would they do them by themselves? (District
official 5)
The interviews above suggest that taxpayers are always interested in the instrumental value of the
taxes they pay: ie the direct benefit in terms of services. LED has to be understood in a wide context
as involving not only local but also central government investments, because in Uganda funding to
LGs from central government is subject to conditions and there is minimal funding for capital
investment. Thus many local services important to businesses are provided by central government
agencies.
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Furthermore, tax collection is difficult in agricultural businesses –in this case tea companies – because
of a political decision that agricultural produce need not be taxed. As one respondent said:
Another big issue we have in this district is that of tea plantations. As a district we had to
think of how to increase our tax base and we made an ordinance here that these tea
companies have to pay taxes. It was approved by council and by the Ministry of Local
Government, but you know what, the President of Uganda pronounced that taxes should
not be levied on agricultural produce. Now we have the ordinance but we cannot use it to
get local revenues from these tea companies. They are protected; you cannot get money
from them through taxation. (District official 2)
Discussion with Mabale tea company officials indicated that companies do pay numerous indirect
taxes but these mainly go to central government, apart from the local income tax paid by workers,
which is retained by local government. As noted by a Mabale company official:
Local governments access our payroll: each worker pays local income tax from their
salary and we transfer this to Kyenjojo District. (Mabale company official)
Another issue is the national legal framework for taxation, which allows the Uganda Revenue
Authority (URA) to tax businesses within the jurisdiction of LGs. As one official said:
The issue we have in taxation is that of the URA. For instance we give contracts to
companies to undertake certain projects. We tax them 6% withholding tax, but we have
to remit that to the URA as clean money. This money should be left at the districts. By
taking withholding money it is as if URA is taxing districts. URA takes avenues of taxes
that are easy to collect and they give LGs responsibility to collect those that are hard to
get from people. It is costly to chase shopkeepers with law enforcers for 30,000/= only.
In fact for us in LG, we think if URA is a good tax collector, it should collect all and then
give us the money. (District official 1)
URA is thus seen as a hindrance to local revenue generation, not only in Kyenjojo District but in all
LGs. This conflict is also likely to be one cause of laxity in collecting taxes at LG level. But, more
fundamentally, most of the ‘easy to collect’ and ‘most voluminous’ taxes are collected by the centre,
not by LGs.
This study did find that a taxation strategy increased LG resources. However, the strategy is hampered
in many ways: unwillingness of business owners to pay taxes; political decisions which counteract LG
ordinances or by-laws; failure to register micro enterprises; high failure rates among small businesses;
and the diverting of some taxes paid by local businesses to central government.
Contracting out
Kyenjojo District contracts out service delivery to private companies and individuals largely
according to public procurement laws and guidelines. Most LGs in Uganda employ trained
procurement officers who manage all procurements. Contracting takes several forms in Kyenjojo
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District. The first is where services are tendered out, private companies provide the service to the
population, and government pays for the service delivery. As noted by an LG official:
I will give you an example of road construction. We use public procurement guidelines to
tender out roads, private companies compete, they undertake the construction and LG
pays them for the work done. (District official 3)
Under such arrangements LGs pay for the services rendered and the private sector sees it as an
opportunity to earn money through contracting:
Government is one of the entities that undertake more investments like construction of
roads, schools, hospitals compared to individual businesses. To me it is one source of big
business; at least if I take two tenders from government on an annual basis then I can
sustain my company. (Road contractor 2)
Thus, through contracting, local business companies earn income and sustain their businesses.
Government officials also confirmed that contracting out is strongly promoted by government policy,
since LGs have limited staffing and so private service providers are necessary. As noted by an LG
official:
In Kyenjojo here we offer contracts to private service providers almost in all fields, eg
garbage collection, beautification of the towns, road construction, markets, as well as
taxi and bus parks. This is because in the past years there has been this thinking that
government does not know how to do business and therefore we had to give everything to
the private service provider and remain with the role of monitoring. Again you could be
knowing that LGs are not fully staffed, we operate at staffing levels of about 40-50%;
therefore service providers fill that capacity gap. (District official 4)
These two aspects – a wish to minimise direct government provision of services combined with
limited staffing levels – have influenced LG contracting out practices. Contracting out both helps to
bridge capacity gaps and enhances the monitoring role of government, according to one government
official:
Our role in road construction is to supervise through the technical officers, especially
the road engineers. We also work with communities to negotiate boundaries, settle
conflicts and ask them to supervise contractors on a daily basis. We hold site meetings
with communities to hear their issues through the community development officers.
The success of contracted out services relies on the participation of stakeholders and the ability of the
LG to monitor and supervise and to ensure quality service delivery. This study found that it is
technical departments which carry out supervision and manage the relationships between actors.
Contracting out also may take a second form, leasing, where the supervision input from the LG is less,
because in this case the contractor is also responsible for supervision. In this case the LG earns money
from the contractor, as one official explained:
Another example is that of markets and taxi and bus parks. We tender out these places
all over the district. The contractor pays the contract sum and thereafter collects taxes
from the users, and maintains the cleanliness of these places. Our role as LG is to ensure
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that the contractor does not for instance mistreat market vendors and maintains
acceptable levels of hygiene of the market. These are reliable sources of LG funding
because we just sign a contract and all we want is our payment of the agreed upon
amount as the rest is handled by the contractor. (District official 1)
The leasing of markets or taxi ranks and bus parks is seen as a reliable source of LG income because
the business owner assumes the commercial risks involved in operations, maintenance and
management of these services while also paying rental fees to LGs. The role of the LG here is to
enforce standards and safeguard consumer rights.
While leasing out assets like markets and taxi ranks is a good source of LG income, it is sometimes
seen as curtailing business:
The challenge is that such avenues are few. We have few markets, taxi and bus parks in
the district to tender out. In addition to that there is what we call business curtailing: the
private companies know each other and they connive and agree to offer little contract
value to the district despite the research we do before setting the reserve price. For
instance the taxi and bus parks in this town can fetch like 100 million per year each,
which is really little money. Sometimes we have reacted by undertaking the collection of
taxes ourselves, but the challenge has been, our tax collectors will fail to even get a
quarter of the taxes. They will tell you that people are difficult. (District official 3)
Business curtailing decreases income from this kind of contracting, and even efforts by LGs to collect
taxes themselves do not seem to make much difference. It is also not clear that this form of
contracting improves the local economy. Discussions with market vendors and taxi drivers indicate
that contracting out markets and taxi ranks to individual contractors may relieve government of day-
to-day management hassles, but the tax burden borne by market vendors and taxi drivers is transferred
on to local consumers.
Discussion of findings
LED in Kyenjojo District is implemented using three major network governance strategies which
provide incentives for private actors to participate in developing their localities. The strategies are
infrastructure development, taxation and contracting out. Although Kyenjojo District does not have a
LED policy, it broadly follows national policy, and as such the three network governance
arrangements do influence financial autonomy, functional capacity and innovative capacity of the
district.
LG financial autonomy
Infrastructure development, taxation of hotels and supermarkets, and contracting out the management
of markets, taxi ranks and bus parks are strategies likely to earn income for LGs to invest in LED.
Although infrastructure development partnerships with tea plantations do not bring in cash, they bring
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resources in kind which supplement LG resources in complex situations. This finding is consistent
with Parag et al. (2013) and Giest and Howlett (2013), who claim that network governance increases
access to resources. However, there was no evidence in this study that network governance reduced
the LG’s transaction costs in transforming the local economy. This is because Kyenjojo’s potential
sources of income, especially taxation, were seen as difficult to access and unresponsive to network
governance arrangements. The unwillingness to pay taxes, especially by small enterprises, was
attributed to a lack of strong incentives, inadequate enforcement, and the high failure rate of small
businesses.
Even in a horizontal network arrangement where, for instance, the LG is collaborating with private
actors to develop local economies, intergovernmental relationships still seem to be influential,
especially through regulations and political pronouncements. In organising contracting out, Kyenjojo
LG uses national procurement policies and regulations. In setting taxation, some taxes which the LG
would like to keep must by law be passed to central government, while other sources of income, for
instance taxation of agricultural produce, are prohibited by presidential pronouncements even though
Kyenjojo is an agriculture-based economy. These factors mean that the LG is hampered both in
increasing income from local avenues and in deciding how to use this income.
LG functional capacity
Analysis of the three network governance arrangements employed by Kyenjojo District show that LG
technical staff and politicians play a key role in initiating, supervising and monitoring network
activities. In infrastructure development arrangements, district engineers and community development
officers provide technical oversight. In contracting out, procurement officers use procurement
guidelines to initiate and manage contracts. Although government staff would traditionally be the
implementers, roles seem to have changed and there is no evidence that these network governance
arrangements have led to the development of specialised skills in, for instance, regulation or law
enforcement. Capacity gaps are evident in understanding the private sector and how it works.
Kyenjojo LG has no clear plan on how to work with private actors; private actors are engaged on ad
hoc basis; and there are no innovative strategies for raising taxes from small-scale enterprises or even
curtailing business collusion. Thus even with network governance there is a growing sense among
LGs that working with the private sector is hard. Just as Provan and Kenis (2008) and Giest and
Howlett (2013) argue, willingness to cooperate depends on the incentives available, and these are
lacking in LGs.
Some researchers have observed that network governance leads to loss of oversight by the state over
public goods and services (Carlsson and Sandstrom 2008), when services traditionally provided by the
public sector, such as roads, switch to being offered by the private sector. However, this study found
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the functional capacity of Kyenjojo LG to maintain regular oversight, coordination and steering was
in place, although some respondents suggested that it had been undermined.
LGs’ capacity for innovation

The 2013 Commonwealth Local Governance Conference emphasised that LGs can steer development
of their own localities if they seize local opportunities and encourage community participation. The
Kyenjojo case indicates that LGs do have the potential to imagine and access alternative sources of
funding and options for development. Two examples are the work with local tea companies to co-fund
and implement infrastructure development, and the creation of an ordinance to levy taxes on tea
companies as a source of income. These initiatives demonstrate how innovative LG practices can
support LED, as long as central government does not come to view LG as something essentially
different from a scaled-down version of national governance (Grydehøj 2013). Therefore, strong
networks at the local level do have the potential to promote LG innovation.
It is also apparent that the innovation capacity of LGs can arise in both informal and formal structures.
Informal social networks are based on personal relationships between actors in the LG policy
network. These can be later formalised to enable implementation of agreed actions or innovations,
because shared knowledge, information and expertise generates higher levels of trust (Voets and de
Rynck 2008). Thus relationships arising in informal networks lead to projects such as the construction
of roads within tea plantations under a unique cost-sharing arrangement: the district provides the
political support and mobilisation, and the tea companies provide the fuel and allowances for the
drivers. Infrastructure is improved in a new, non-traditional way, and civil servants are encouraged to
think ‘outside the box’.
Conclusions
Although legal frameworks seem to provide LGs with financial autonomy, there is a paradox: a
disconnect between the discretion of LGs to collect revenue and allocate budgets, and the fact that
most funds are remitted to the centre, not kept locally – hence undermining localism. The problem is
compounded by the political need for central government to exercise oversight over LGs. Though
network governance does provide opportunities to increase LGs’ financial autonomy,
intergovernmental relationships, limited involvement of private actors and national political decisions
seem to constrain the networking potential.
One of the promised benefits of networked government is that it will boost the functional capacity of
LGs. The United Nations Development Programme in 2007 noted five key functional capacities for
LGs: to engage with stakeholders; to assess a situation and define a vision and mandate; to formulate
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policies and strategies; to budget, manage and implement; and to monitor and evaluate. Public/private
sector synergies and organisational learning are not enough to enhance these capacities; deliberate and
systematic approaches and incentive systems are also needed.
Capacity for innovation is one of the key stimulants to LED. However, the challenge is to create and
sustain this capacity in LGs within the current framework. This paper has found that innovation seems
to be constrained by intergovernmental relations, especially between the centre and LGs. The freedom
to act independently and to determine local priorities should be widened and strengthened. The
mandate and jurisdiction of LGs need to be reviewed, since it appears that innovation is not easily
promoted in a constricted space.
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11
Can organisation development
principles in India’s local
governments improve governance?
Sonali Srivastava
Anode Governance Lab
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Bengaluru, India
Madhavi Rajadhyaksha
Anode Governance Lab
Bengaluru, India
Abstract
This paper examines the application of organisation development principles to rural local self-
government bodies in Karnataka, India with the objective of developing their organisational capacity
and improving their efficiency. The premise is that strong gram panchayats (village councils) can
address issues hindering service delivery and governance at the grass roots.
The paper illustrates the methodology used in the development of an innovative framework called Gram
Panchayat Organisation Development (GPOD) and its implementation in action research mode in two
village councils since 2011. It further explores the wider applicability of this framework, which has
been extended to over 50 gram panchayats (GPs) since 2014. GPOD works towards strengthening the
panchayat as an organisation in its entirety, rather than by tackling stand-alone components. It includes
building a shared vision in the panchayat, mapping and re-engineering key processes, developing
accountability and incentive structures, and supporting the village body in developing and
implementing its annual plans. The approach has evolved to its present form based on real-time change
management initiatives in GPs in which politically elected members participated in decision-making
and implementation. We argue that by following the principles of organisation development and
aligning the panchayat’s organisational components, marked improvements in local governance and
service delivery were achieved. Impact is captured in terms of systemic outputs such as annual plans,
accountability structures and activation of defunct committees, as well as improvements in services
such as health, sanitation, drinking water, etc. The paper also includes a critique of the challenges
faced as GPOD was scaled up to include new areas.
Introduction
Democratic decentralisation is woven into the historical fabric of Indian political life, and has been
enshrined in the Constitution of India for over two decades. Globally, decentralisation has been credited
for creating institutions that are more sensitised to local needs than state and national bodies by virtue
of being closer to the people, and more accountable to citizens due to multi-level checks and balances.
On the other hand, decentralisation has been criticised for facilitating the capture of resources by elites.
At the outset, this paper acknowledges that decentralisation as a formal process involving transfer of
power from the state to local bodies could differ from practice where political economy variables such
as gender, caste and class exert huge influence on how local governments actually function (Bardhan
2002; Johnson 2003).
The earliest examples of local governments in India appear to be community assemblies mentioned in
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Vedic texts. From janapadas (small republics) in areas north of the river Ganga around 600 BC, to the
Mauryan kingdoms where decisions were taken through sabhas (public gatherings), and village
councils in the Chola kingdoms of south India, local self-governments traditionally took wide and
varying forms across India. The earliest legislation backing decentralised local governance is the Bengal
Local Self Government Act 1885, which constituted district local boards across the Bengal province –
a practice subsequently replicated by other regions including Bihar, Orissa, Assam and North West
Province (Second Administrative Reforms Commission 2007).
It is important to point out that ‘local government’ is not a universal term and encompasses many diverse
organisation types. It may include municipal corporations, municipalities, town boards, district
panchayats, taluka (block) panchayats and gram panchayats, among others. This paper will use the term
to refer to gram panchayats,1 as defined by the 73rd amendment of the Constitution of India (Government
of India 1992). These village bodies govern rural citizens, who comprise 68% of India’s population
(Census of India 2011). It is also pertinent to note that there may be significant variation in the form
and functions of specific local government institutions. For example, the jurisdiction and functions of
panchayats differ across Indian states in accordance with the individual state laws which govern them
(Gabris and Golembiewski 1996).
Post-independence, democratic decentralisation was established, initially through Article 40 of the

Constitution of India which enshrines the Directive Principles of State Policy. It directs that the state
should organise and empower village panchayats to function as units of local self-government (The
Constitution of India 1949). However, the provision was largely advisory in nature, and panchayats
failed to capture public imagination as people’s bodies. A need for a clearer mandate was felt. This was
1 As per the Constitution (73rd Amendment) Act 1992, ‘panchayat’ means an institution of self-government
constituted under Article 243B of the Constitution of India for rural areas. Article 243B stipulates that there shall
be constituted in every state, panchayats at village, intermediate and district levels.
Can organisation development principles in India’s local governments improve governance? 191
achieved through a constitutional shift known as the Constitution (73rd Amendment) Act 1992 which
definitively established decentralisation, mandating 24 states to constitute three levels of panchayats in
rural areas and assign functions to them. It specified many facets of decentralised governance,
including: direct elections to all levels of panchayats, a five-year term of office, reserved seats for
women and minority communities, and devolution of funds, functions and functionaries to gram
panchayats (GPs). The Eleventh Schedule (Article 243G) added as part of this amendment elaborated
on the 29 functions that were devolved to GPs. These include, among others, crucial development
sectors such as agriculture, health, education, social justice, water and sanitation. States like Karnataka,
which will be the focus of this study, have devolved all 29 functions to the level of the GP (The
Constitution of India; Centre for Policy Research 2014).
However, despite the constitutional mandate, it became apparent that GPs remained weak organisations
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– structurally and systemically – and were unable to discharge their responsibilities. “It must be
recognised that the local governance system will not provide answers to local problems and
development imperatives unless such a system is responsive to these problems, effective and efficient in
its reach” (Aziz 2000, p. 3521).
Statement of objectives
The objective of this paper is to explore how organisation development principles can strengthen the
functioning of GPs in India.
Methods adopted in the paper

Approach
A review of secondary literature reveals a dearth of work pertaining to organisation development (OD)
in the context of local governance. This paper examines the application of OD principles to local
governments in India, through an innovative framework termed the Gram Panchayat Organisation
Development (GPOD) framework. It seeks to create a body of bottom-up evidence that will expand the
literature related to OD in governance and encourage further research on the subject.
The authors suggest that development practitioners might gain from applying OD principles to GPs, as
would commonly be done in a private sector or public sector enterprise, to ensure an integrated approach
to organisational strengthening within local governments.
The paper discusses and critiques empirical findings from an action research project which aimed to
embed the GPOD framework in two GPs in Karnataka for 2011–2013. Beyond the project, the GPs
continued to implement the framework till the end of their electoral terms in 2015.
Findings
The findings of the study reveal not only the benefits of applying OD principles in GPs, but also a need
to simultaneously differentiate and integrate different organisational components (vision, organisation
structure, incentives, resources, action plans) to maximise overall effectiveness. However, the authors
acknowledge that the scale of the study (two panchayats) is an obvious limitation, suggesting the need
for future research that replicates the current study in other panchayats before findings can be
generalised.
Context of organisation development in local governance

The GPOD project traces its roots to ASHWAS (A Survey of Household Water and Sanitation), a study
conducted by Arghyam in the period 2008–09 and covering 172 GPs across 28 rural districts of
Karnataka. The results of ASHWAS were disseminated in the form of GP-specific reports to impacted
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rural communities and it was hoped that these GPs would then act as strong catalysts for action planning
and implementation to address various water and sanitation issues emerging from ASHWAS. However,
the local reality was starkly different. ASHWAS dissemination meetings showed that most GPs did not
have the capacity to internalise the issues raised and take action (Srivastava 2014b).
It was the realisation that GPs were failing to undertake their mandated functions and duties that
triggered the authors’ interest in applying organisational change management principles and techniques
to these village bodies with the objective of improving their efficiency. This is in keeping with other
researchers’ findings that planned change is usually spurred by the failure of organisations to evolve to
meet changing requirements, or the inability of people to embrace continuous change (Weick and Quinn
1999; Greiner 1998).
In setting OD’s theoretical context as it relates to local governance, however, it is important to note a
few primary challenges. Firstly, there is a dearth of public administration literature pertaining to OD in
the context of local governance. As Fernandez and Rainey (2006) note, research and theory related to
organisation change and allied topics is more likely to find space in journals specialising in general
management than those focusing on public administration (Fernandez and Rainey 2006). Secondly, OD
literature has largely limited itself to distinguishing between public and private organisations, with a
widely acknowledged failure to address the sub-dimensions that distinguish individual organisations
within the public and private spheres (Perry and Rainey 1988; Austin and Bartunek 2003).
Local governments, however, need to be regarded as a separate category of public entity, since they
operate in distinct circumstances and conduct their affairs differently from state and federal agencies,
argue Gabris and Golembiewski (1996) in their paper ‘The Practical Application of Organization
Development to Local Governments’, adding that the design of OD interventions should be sensitive to
such nuances:
…another salient area of difference that is not necessarily captured by the public versus
private dichotomy involves differences between local government as a special form of
public organisation in contrast to other forms associated with federal and state
governments. The difference between how local governments conduct business and the
environment in which they struggle to survive, in contrast to state and federal agencies,
may be just as great and salient as public versus private sector variants. Yet the former
source of difference is rarely considered (Gabris and Golembiewski 1996, pp. 72–73).
A review of change management literature shows that there is a well-established rationale for applying
OD to local governance. Local governments are self-contained units and thus likely to offer more scope
for systemic overhaul. Their small size facilitates appropriate diagnosis, data management and
interventions with potential for meaningful change to be realised. Unlike other change management
strategies, OD has humanistic value orientations that allow members within the organisation to grow
and realise their individual potential as part of the change process towards achieving organisational
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efficiency. Additionally, given the proximity of local governments to their citizens, they are believed
to display a higher adaptability to change (Burke 1987, cited in Sminia and van Nistelrooij 2010; Cobb
and Margulies 1981; Gabris and Golembiewski 1996; Schneider et al. 1996; Srivastava 2014a).
For these reasons, this paper starts from the premise that GPs, just like corporate bodies, non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) and trusts, need to be treated as a distinct category of organisation,
which requires a holistic and tailored approach in order to fix their dysfunctionalities. Change cannot
be achieved through ad-hoc measures targeted at stand-alone components; rather it requires a systemic
approach.
OD has been variously defined and described in change management literature, but theorists often take
as a starting point Kurt Lewin’s three stages of change as fundamental to OD. Simply put, these stages
are ‘unfreeze’, ‘change’ and ‘refreeze’:
From the perspective of organisational development, change is a set of behavioural

science-based theories, values, strategies and techniques aimed at the planned change of
the organisational work setting for the purpose of enhancing individual development and
improving organisational performance, through the alteration of organisational members’
on-the-job behaviour (Porras and Robertson 1992, cited in Weick and Quinn 1999, p. 363).
For the construction of their GPOD framework, the authors were inspired by the Delores Ambrose
model (1987), with its premise that change is successful only when all the organisational components
– vision, skills, incentives, resources, action plan and results – are in alignment. Interventions
introduced to target one-off components such as decision-making processes, planning or incentives will
not result in effective change (Schneider et al. 1996; Srivastava 2014a).
Most theorists believe that the sustainability of OD interventions ultimately hinges on organisation
members themselves and their equal and active participation in the change process all the way through,
from decision-making to implementation. While interventions may be facilitated by outsiders, members
cannot be dependent on external stakeholders, as the success of a change process is ultimately
determined by whether organisation members themselves take ownership of it. Thus OD encourages an
The Delores Ambrose Model of
environment of openness, mutual learning and inclusiveness (Cobb and Margulies 1981; Gabris and
Managing
Golembiewski 1996; Scott-Villiers 2002). Complex Change
Figure 1: The Delores Ambrose model of managing complex change
VISION STRATEGY SKILLS INCENTIVES RESOURCES ACTION PLAN CHANGE
Shared Long- Who, What Structure Reward Financial Planning and CHANGE
term Vision How? and Systems Recognition Technical Implementation
Compensation Human
VISION STRATEGY SKILLS INCENTIVES RESOURCES ACTION PLAN CONFUSION
HIGH EXCITEMENT
VISION STRATEGY SKILLS INCENTIVES RESOURCES ACTION PLAN
LOW RESULTS
VISION STRATEGY SKILLS INCENTIVES RESOURCES ACTION PLAN ANXIETY
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VISION STRATEGY SKILLS INCENTIVES RESOURCES ACTION PLAN GRADUAL
CHANGE
VISION STRATEGY SKILLS INCENTIVES RESOURCES ACTION PLAN FRUSTRATION
FALSE
VISION STRATEGY SKILLS INCENTIVES RESOURCES ACTION PLAN
START
Source: Ambrose D. 1987; Managing Complex Change. Pittsburgh: The Enterprise Group Ltd.
Source: Ambrose (1987)
As Schneider, Brief and Guzzo (1986) point out in their paper ‘Creating a climate and culture for
sustainable organisation change’: “Organisations as we know them are the people in them; if the people
do not change, there is no organisational change” (Schneider et al. 1996, p. 7).
Methodology: the GPOD framework

Conceptual work on the GPOD framework began in 2011 with an exploratory study to ascertain the
existing status of GPs in India and map the scope of existing capacity-building programmes.
Preliminary primary research was undertaken through consultations with stakeholders familiar with
rural governance in India, while data mining provided a secondary source.2
It was found that existing capacity-building efforts could be broadly divided into four types: leadership
programmes for the adhyaksha (president) and other elected members; training initiated by government
agencies and NGOs for knowledge-building on specific government programmes; capacity-building
training as part of targeted programmes such as the Backward Region Grant Funds; and training
2 Primary consultations were undertaken with key informants including: a Member, Planning Commission; the Secretary for
Rural Development and Panchayati Raj Department, Government of Karnataka; an IAS officer and co-founder of Avantika
Foundation; an eminent retiree who was a member of several bodies such as the Administrative Reforms Commission, Institute
of Rural Management, National Dairy Development Board etc.; a trustee of Trust For Village Self Governance, and
organisations including Abdul Nazir Sab State Institute of Rural Development, Mysuru, Gram Panchayat Nademavamapura,
Gram Panchayat Vasana, Myrada, Department of Watershed, Government of Karnataka, Arghyam and Gram Panchayats of
Hebbali. A consultation was also held at the Planning Commission on 24 November 2010. Secondary data was gathered from
an analysis of 10 strong and weak gram panchayats conducted by communications, development and learning, ASHWAS
(2008–09), Promoting Effective Water Management Policies and Practices, ADB & UNESCAP, the Karnataka Panchayat Raj
Act, 1993, and other government documents (Srivastava 2014b).
undertaken by the Institutes of Rural Development which are present in every state. The researchers’
analysis indicated that training for elected representatives consisted largely of classroom-based sessions
and failed to provide GP members with the skills, information or knowhow required to handle the
enormous responsibility and functions devolved to them. Moreover, even in cases where training
programmes were effective, they imparted knowledge and skills which recipients could not use due to
lack of role clarity and/or incentives. It was also found that training often over- or under-emphasised
certain components of GPs and thus neglected a systemic approach. GPs were also found to suffer from
a lack of control over their finances, the capture of decision-making by either politically-motivated
individuals or government-appointed executive staff, and the exploitation of their resources by a select
few. Because of a lack of a strong identity and reasonable incentives, members were often rather
uninterested in the functioning of their panchayat. Given this context, there was little faith in either the
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abilities or the motivations of panchayats, and both government and NGOs often bypassed these elected
bodies and created parallel bodies to deliver core services to rural citizens (Srivastava 2014b).
It was against this backdrop that GPOD was conceived. GPOD was envisaged as a framework which
would strengthen GPs to enable them, both systemically and structurally, to undertake their mandated
duties. Based on OD principles, the GPOD framework aimed to strengthen GPs organisationally and
bring about convergence of panchayats and government agencies in order to improve governance and
service delivery for rural citizens.
It was decided to develop the framework using action research methodology. Action research, also
known as participatory research, collaborative inquiry or emancipator research, is basically ‘learning
by doing’ or participating in the change process itself (O'Brien 2001; Scott-Villiers 2002). The term
was first used by Kurt Lewin in his paper ‘Action Research and Minority Problems’, in which he
described research in the social research context as ‘social management’ or ‘social engineering’. In
other words, he believed on-the-ground action, research and training were interdependent. Just like pure
science, action research is suitable for conceptual problems that can be theoretically or statistically
analysed, and requires fact-finding in descriptive terms and field experiments to test social change
(Lewin 1946).
Action research for the GPOD project was situated in two GPs in the state of Karnataka in south India
– Oorkunte Mittur in Kolar District and Dibburhalli in Chikkaballapur district, together covering 32
villages and reaching a population of 15,220 citizens. The project was incubated in January 2011 in
Arghyam Foundation and was housed in Avantika Foundation from April 2014 till March 2015. In the
action research phase, the authors worked with two different types of GPs to enhance their learning.
For example, at Oorkunte Mittur GP all members were newly elected, whereas Dibburhalli was more
politically active and had three experienced members who were in their second or third term.
Table 1: Demographic profile of gram panchayats

Name of gram panchayat Number of villages/wards covered Population
Oorkunte Mittur, Mulbagal Taluka, Kolar District 13 7,482
Dibburhalli, Sidleghatta Taluka, Chikkaballapur 19 7,738

District
Source: Srivastava (2014a)
In keeping with the core principles of OD, elected GP representatives were primary stakeholders in the
change process and were involved in designing the GPOD, shaping the framework with their own
experiences and learnings. GP members also played a crucial role in encouraging the entire village body
to participate in the action research. This sense of equal partnership carried through to implementation
of GPOD as well, with every step ratified as a GP resolution, as per the requirements of the law.
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Given this premise, selection of the two GPs studied was a stringent process, requiring the GP to be
willing to actively engage in seeking and developing solutions. Twelve GPs were shortlisted and
evaluated on two four-point objective rating scales, comprising both qualitative and quantitative
parameters: Scale I evaluated GP interest in the project, and relationship with a local NGO and Scale II
evaluated the processes and performance of the GP, and the competencies of its members.
Scale I was important because members’ interest was crucial to a successful change process, while
Scale II was important in evaluating the GPs’ interest in good governance – the premise being that
initial good results reflected members’ intentions to work towards sustainable change. It was expected
that the GPs would show marked improvement on Scale II in the course of the action research phase.
Inspired by the Delores Ambrose model, the GPOD framework is a step-by-step framework for planned
change in the village bodies (see Figure 2). It is important to note that, rather than following the
Ambrose model exactly, the GPOD framework draws upon its principles – i.e. the need to
simultaneously differentiate and integrate different components of an organisation – in this context the
GP. Differentiation helps focus on individual systems and structures, while integration aligns different
components of the organisation to deliver its overall mandate. This approach also ensures flexibility for
the framework to change depending on the local government organisation and its needs.
While Figure 2 shows GPOD as a linear step-by-step process, the authors emphasise the need to
strengthen individual components within organisations and the links between them. The following
sections describe each of these components and their role in organisation-building in GPs.
Figure 2: Overview of GP organisation development process
B. ORGANISATION DIAGNOSIS & C. HANDHOLDING

A. PREPARATION
DESIGN IMPLEMENTATION & NEXT STEPS
B1. Vision & Mission C. Planning and Review

A. Preparation * Time taken: 3 months Processes
* Time taken: 3 months * Activities: training resource * Time taken: planning
persons; finalising GP-specific exercise after requisite inputs:
* Activities: preparation of methodologies; GP orientation; &
project scope, structure, plans vision & mission processes
2 months; review: ongoing
& budgets; mapping the * Key outputs: vision & mission * Activities:
project structure; & selection statements; resolution passed by - Planning: developing
of GPs Gram Sabha; & ward-wise list of requisite inputs; collating
* Key outputs: project quick wins information on programmes &
document; MoUs with all schemes; GP-MIS &
partners; & tripartite MoU knowledge partners; arriving
between Arghyam, NGO & GP B2. Process Mapping at long-term outcomes &
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metrics with GP; developing
*Time taken: 3 months
annual plan & budget; &
* Activities: training resource finalising annual plan &
persons; finalising GP-specific budget
methodology; consensus on
processes; process mapping - Review: GP review meetings;
workshops in each GP; validation quarterly meeting with
& consolidation standing committees & citizen
* Key outputs: process maps of 17 forums
processes * Key outputs:
- Planning: function-wise
B3. Organisation Structure
information on government
* Time taken: 3 months programmes; schemes &
* Activities: training resource funds; GP-MIS; roles & plans
persons; assessing present GP of knowledge partners;
structure; finalising recommended function-wise outcome and
GP structure; & evolving process & metrics of the GP; annual plan
criteria for selection of GP heads & budget in MIS format &
* Key outputs: drivers for GP approved plans by gram sabha
structure design; recommended GP
structure; & differential - Review: monthly update of
compensation system for GP Heads MIS; & modalities of
stregthening standing
committees & citizen forums
Vision and mission

GP vision and mission development is the cornerstone of OD exercises, as it guides future decision-
making. Vision can be defined as an articulation of the desired state of an organisation, while mission
elaborates upon the purpose of an organisation and the mechanism by which its vision would be
achieved.
In the context of GPs in India, the identity of the GP as a local self-government is weak, primarily
because the state treats GPs as extended arms for the implementation of its programmes and schemes.
This situation, coupled with low awareness of their role among elected members, leads to GPs not
functioning as governments. The goal of developing the GP vision and mission is twofold: to highlight
the identity of the GP as a self-governing unit, and to build a sense of association with and ownership
of the GP among elected members and staff. Within this context, the GPOD visioning process was
designed to help participants articulate their dreams as well as consolidate their shared values for the
institution. To achieve this, a range of participatory rural appraisal techniques such as transect walks,
social and resource mapping, wealth ranking and focus group discussions were used. The authors chose
these participatory tools because they were tools that NGOs and the community were familiar with, and
they were also easier to administer than questionnaires and other data collection techniques.
Figure 3: Illustration of vision and mission statements by Oorkunte Mittur gram panchayat
Vision Statement
Overall sustainable development through transparent and good governance
Our Values
Teamwork, Equality, Trust, Citizen Participation, Commitment, and Service Orientation
Mission
Our key stakeholders are our citizens. We will constantly strive to understand their needs and aims towards
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improvement in governance and delivery of services
To work towards this, we will strengthen the GP both physically and institutionally. The GP office will be a
citizen-friendly and beautiful place with availability of basic facilities for visiting citizens, office bearers and
members
We will display unity and decorum among members and ensure transparency and accountability in our
functioning. We will focus on financial strengthening through setting appropriate tariff rates and ensuring
collection
We will work with government officials to leverage various schemes and programmes as well as help
eligible citizens to access information and funds
Process mapping
Process mapping is an effective diagnostic tool to analyse the functioning of an organisation. GPs in
India have been given a huge mandate for delivering services to citizens. However, there is a lack of
clarity on both how these services are to be delivered and the roles of different stakeholders. The
Government of India is undertaking an activity mapping exercise to demarcate roles among three layers
of panchayat raj institutions (PRIs). However, further delineation of activities at the panchayat level is
mostly non-existent or – at best – present in national programme guidelines which are not always locally
relevant, leading to ad-hoc measures and firefighting to resolve issues at local level. The authors used
process mapping to assess the ‘as-is’ state of functioning of the panchayats under study. This involved
sequentially listing all activities performed while delivering key processes, while simultaneously
demarcating the roles of different stakeholders using an RACI3 matrix. The GP vision and mission
established above provided the list of functions and processes in which the GP wanted to improve its
delivery.
3
RACI is an established OD tool used to identify and map stakeholders according to their responsibility (R),
accountability (A), collaboration (C) and provision of information (I).
Figure 4: Illustration of process map for supply of drinking water through pipelines, delineating
activities and assigning them to different stakeholders using a RACI matrix
Committees
as per KPR
Line Depts.
Citizens &
members
St comm
Officials
GP staff
Elected
others
Act
Name of the Issues
Panchayati Raj & Engineering Dept

Process & which
Related Roles need to
be dealt
Type of with in
Function the GP
Time in a year (in days)
R-
Amenities Committee
Responsibility
Mines & Geology

A-
VWSC/VNHSC
PDO/Secretary
Ward Member
Accountability
Upadhyaksha
Contractors
C-
Adhyaksha
Waterman
Purchases
WT Workers
TP & ZP
Collaboration Plumber
Citizens
SDMC
Funds
I-Providing
S No.
Information
Drinking water Non-

through piped clarity on
water supply R&A
1. Get report on -Delay in

‘survey of response
quantity of from
water’ available depts.
- PDO/
ward
7- 8
I member
R A has to
2. Quality 8 R R A I C I make 2–3
Assessment & trips as
Monitoring official
Report may not
be
available
- MLA
support
might
help
expedite
process
As an example (see Figure 4 above), the process of supplying drinking water through pipelines was
mapped through discussions with panchayat members and a sample of citizens, and reviewed by
experienced peers from other panchayats. The process mapping exercise itself helped articulate many
issues and highlight them through the RACI matrix.
The exercise helped the authors identify operational, structural and policy-related strengths that
facilitate effective delivery of citizen services, as well as issues that hinder it. Examples include: the
need to arrange funds for petty purchases to deal with minor repairs in the panchayat (operational); lack
of clarity on the respective roles of the GP and government departments, leading to the GP not knowing
what to expect from these agencies (structural); and the inadequate incentives (monetary or non-
monetary) for elected members (policy). The participatory approach adopted towards fixing processes
significantly improved awareness of the issues among elected members, who were also able to see how
significant improvements could be achieved at panchayat level, thereby promoting ownership
(Srivastava 2014a).
The action research project mapped 12 key processes of GPs, which had been identified by elected
representatives of individual panchayats as priority areas during the vision and mission development
process. These processes included water and sanitation, nutrition and agriculture, among others, and the
process maps were subsequently overlaid with performance measures.
Some of the key insights from the process mapping exercise are listed below:
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 A GP member is or needs to be involved in myriad activities in the GP, for most of which s/he is
held either accountable, or at least responsible, by the citizens
• While expectations of what GPs should provide are laid down, there is no formal agreement
between GPs and other government agencies which stipulate specific deliverables by the latter
• Different GPs follow different processes for service delivery, which are primarily based on their
own knowledge and experience. Most of their time, however, is spent fighting crises
• Due to a lack of readily available funds, GP members often spend their own money on expenses
such as replacing street lights or broken taps, and may not be reimbursed until much later
• There are a number of issues specific to each process which need to be resolved. These include
ambiguity regarding the official list of citizens living below the poverty line (BPL), flawed
assessment processes to determine how many additional public taps are required, and the shortage
of gramthana land (land which can be allocated for housing).
Although the resolution of operational issues was a lengthy process, as it was dependent on availability
of funds and other resources, GPOD was able to address structural issues such as lack of an
accountability mechanism and non-clarity of roles. This is further explained in the next section.
Developing the panchayat organisation structure

A well-defined structure is key to achieving organisational objectives. A structure comprises a formal
allocation of roles with delineated functions for each, which is clear enough to be depicted on an
organisational chart. As a local self-government body, a GP should ideally have well-defined roles for
its members with clarity on interfaces with external stakeholders such as government departments and
block and district panchayats. However, the present research project found the current organisational
structure as mandated by the Karnataka Panchayat Raj Act 1993 to be inadequate, and that individual
roles within the panchayat were unclear and confusing.
The GP structure as defined under state law comprises an adhyaksha, upadhyaksha (panchayat vice-
president) and three standing committees responsible for different functions. Government departments
are mandated to provide technical support to members and aid implementation of rural development
programmes. The GP is accountable to mandated citizen bodies at village and panchayat levels (ward
and gram sabhas respectively, as per Sections 3 and 3A, Karnataka Panchayat Raj Act). In Karnataka
there are also some paid employees (paid either by the panchayat or by other government agencies) who
have assigned responsibilities. The authority for approving expenditure and making decisions is shared
between the adhyaksha and the key government employee, the panchayat development officer (PDO).
Elected representatives however, felt that the current structure was riddled with problems, which
hindered the functioning of the GP as a local self-government. While the citizens held the elected
members accountable for service delivery, the members did not feel empowered to perform and decide
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on key issues, due to a lack of knowledge and role clarity. The wards of weaker members suffered, as
their representatives did not have a voice in the panchayat. The standing committees, which are
theoretically accountable for specific functions and sectors, mostly exist on paper only. The adhyaksha
and upadhyaksha are nominally the heads of different standing committees, but may not have the
required expertise and knowledge to make them effective. The PDO, though in theory serving the
panchayat, is its de facto head due to his/her higher education, training and links with the block and
district panchayats. Moreover, the PDO’s salary is paid by the block panchayat, thereby ensuring that
his/her allegiance lies with higher level government agencies and not the GP. Consequently, the
researchers found that decisions were opaque and usually made by the PDO/secretary or a few strong
GP members who dominated the power structure, often side-lining other members. Operationally, due
to a lack of well-defined systems, processes and structure, GPs’ work often consisted of ‘fire fighting’
as they lurched from crisis to crisis.
An effective structure needed to utilise the potential of elected members, enable the panchayat to work
closely with government departments and leverage their financial and technical resources, and distribute
leadership so as to reduce chances of dominant member(s) usurping power. The structure also needed
to deliver the GP’s functions as per its constitutional mandate. Therefore, although the classic RACI
matrix allocates accountability to a single individual, the researchers decided to add a new tier,
comprising GP members with capabilities and inclinations focused on specific areas who would take
ownerships of an individual portfolio of functions in addition to representing their ward. Elected
members would effectively be portfolio heads, tasked with executive responsibilities and accountable
for all aspects of the functions assigned to them, from pre-planning to implementation.
When these concepts were shared with panchayat members, they suggested an alignment with the
existing standing committee structure to ensure better acceptance of the augmented structure. Thus the
portfolio head would be the executive head of the functions of existing standing committees, but
signatory powers would remain with the adhyaksha, in line with existing policy. In addition to
leveraging the potential of capable and motivated elected members, the new portfolio structure aligned
the panchayats with government departments, which are delineated by sector, and also ensured
distributed leadership within each panchayat.
In keeping with OD principles, however, this paper acknowledges that every panchayat has a unique
character and its structure should ideally be designed according to the priorities of its members. The
GPOD framework merely lays down the principles of design.
Figure 5(a): GP structure as mandated by the Karnataka Panchayat Raj Act 1993
Gram
sabha/ward
sabha
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Gram
panchayat
Dedicated
Adhyaksha/ line
upadhyaksha/ department
members structures
across Taluka
and districts
for service
Production Social Justice Amenities
Standing delivery
Standing Standing
Committee Committee Committee
GP staff
As the structure began to work, most portfolio heads thrived in their newly acquired roles and were able
to use their capabilities to bring about substantive changes in the panchayat. A member widely
acknowledged as a good farmer was selected as head of production, taking on responsibility for
functions such as agriculture and animal husbandry, National Rural Employment Guarantee Act
(NREGA), revenue generation and greening the village. The portfolio heads were accountable for the
delivery of processes/functions assigned to them, including pre-planning, planning and implementation,
and worked closely with the relevant government department, the statutory standing committees and
statutory citizen sub-committees. The relevant GP staff reported to these function/process owners, and
line departments also coordinated with them. Accountability (and leadership) was thus distributed
among the GP members identified as heads. One unexpected but welcome consequence was that there
was greater transparency in panchayat functioning.
Figure 5(b): GP augmented structure as envisaged in the GPOD framework
Gram sabha/
ward sabha
Adhyaksha and the

gram panchayat
Production Standing Social Justice Amenities Standing
Committee Standing Committee Committee
Panchayat
development Secretary
officer
Head - Production Head - Social Head - Amenities I Head - Amenities II Head - Capacity
Functions Justice Functions Functions Functions Building Functions
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* Revenue * Housing
generation * Protection of * Facilitating
* PDS * Drinking water
* Greening the common pool capacity building of
village *Food security * Cleanliness of resources heads, staff &
* Complaint roads & drains members
* Agriculture & * Education
animal husbandry handling * Preventive health * Citizen profiling
* Street light
* NREGA maintenance
Heads to be supported by GP staff, members, line department functionaries and

61 A committees
Perspective and annual planning, implementation

GP planning guidance is provided by the Karnataka Panchayat Raj Act, and also in the Planning
Commission of India’s Manual for Integrated District Planning (Planning Commission 2008). This
guidance stresses that issues should be identified by ward and gram sabhas and solutions proposed by
the GP standing committees and/or working groups; followed by an iterative process of preparation and
ratification of draft plans by standing committees and the gram sabha before finalisation. However,
few GPs put these guidelines into practice. The PDO or panchayat secretary often draws up the annual
plan without consulting elected representatives. Moreover, the panchayat has a minimal role in
implementing plans, which lies in the purview of the line departments. The GP thus loses control of its
plans. At worst, plans may remain on paper; at best they may be implemented but without necessary
corrective measures based on changing priorities etc.
In this context, lack of capability of panchayat members, in relation to both functional knowledge and
knowledge of how government systems function, hinders the GP in preparing or executing effective
plans. The authors believe GPs need to play a key role in implementation as well as planning, as this
enables the local community to harness its traditional wisdom while simultaneously accessing modern
techniques. Moreover, an iterative cycle of ‘Plan–Do–Check–Act’ (the Deming PDCA cycle),
strengthens the planning and implementation process and converts it into a continuous improvement
process (Deming n.d.). Within the augmented GP organisation structure devised by this research,
portfolio heads took responsibility for discussing citizen needs during ward sabhas to prioritise activities
and draw up a draft plan, which was then presented to the GP and subsequently the gram sabha for
approval. As the portfolio heads possess the relevant capacities, and also take ownership of planning
and implementation, the discussion during both ward sabhas and the gram sabha is geared towards
problem-solving rather than hearing grievances, which have to be reported upwards to be resolved.
Acknowledging the technicalities and complexities of the planning process, the authors initiated
planning as a simple process in the first year, and fine-tuned the method in the second year. This
allowed panchayat members to develop their strategic skills. Over time, the process in the two action
research GPs has significantly evolved. In the first year, planning focused only on activities which did
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not require funds or for which panchayats could raise their own funds. In the second year, planning
acquired more nuances, encompassing activities with three different sources of funding: a range of
government schemes, government sub-committees and panchayat own revenue. A GP-specific
Management Information System (MIS) was also subsequently developed to track plans against their
implementation on a monthly basis.
The GPOD framework as established is inherently self-sustaining. Rather than creating parallel
structures to deliver services at the grassroots when GP structures have failed, it focuses on
strengthening GPs, which are constitutionally mandated to function as local bodies within the current
legal framework. Moreover, elections to panchayats are held every five years, ensuring a democratic
mandate for those people who will take up defined roles. The challenge is to continuously develop
solutions and systems which will provide and sustain an enabling environment for elected members to
discharge their functions.
Findings from GPOD implementation and critical insights

The GPOD action research spanned a two-year period 2011–2013, but the two GPs under study
continued to implement the GPOD framework until the end of their electoral term in May 2015.
The GPOD project is a step towards shifting perceptions of local government bodies in India. Rather
than being perceived and treated as ‘last tier’ implementation arms of the government, panchayats have
to build their capabilities as strong and autonomous local governments. These institutions can then
demand intergovernmental equality and negotiate their rightful authority to address issues affecting
rural citizens. The GPOD framework stresses the need for simultaneously differentiating and integrating
different components of the GP organisation. Recognising this approach, the central government
sanctioned a scale up of the concept as the country’s first Innovation Project under the Rajiv Gandhi
Panchayat Sashaktikaran Abhiyan (Village Council Strengthening Scheme). Accordingly, the Ministry
of Panchayati Raj, the Government of India and the Government of Karnataka have partnered with the
Avantika Foundation to implement the GPOD in an entire administrative block of the state. The project
spans 30 GPs (covering 389 village and 2.02 lakh citizens) in Mulbagal taluka of the Kolar district,
Karnataka for a two-year period from January 2015 to December 2016 and paves the way for future
scale-up through the government machinery. Avantika Foundation along with the state government’s
Abdul Nazir Sab State Institute of Rural Development is concurrently developing a curriculum for the
replication of the GPOD to other GPs in the state and beyond. The curriculum will be available in
Kannada and English and suitable for translation into regional languages to facilitate knowledge
sharing. Fourteen other GPs in Kolar and Chikkaballapur districts, Karnataka have also come forward
and committed to work with the framework with support from regional NGOs.
The authors envisage the principles of GPOD as replicable and scalable and we acknowledge that
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impact evaluation is an important aspect of this. Since the action research was conducted as a pilot
study we relied on a basic pre-post test design as a methodology for impact evaluation. We acknowledge
that this methodology is open to research critique over its validity in establishing a causal relationship
between the intervention and any shift in governance and service delivery, due to the lack of a control
group. As progression is made from pilot to scale, the authors are in the process of exploring the
potential of quasi-experimental methods and more rigorous random evaluation techniques to further
validate the impact of the GPOD.
Impact of GPOD
The pre-post test design of this research involved the construction of an elaborate baseline for both the
GPs under study. This was an exhaustive exercise in itself as data is scarcely available at the level of
the GP, and information that is available is rarely in formats that are amenable to analysis. The Second
Administrative Reforms Commission had suggested that development of indicators itself could be a
useful capacity-building exercise for local governments, which was corroborated in our evaluation.
Construction of the baseline was largely a participatory monitoring and evaluation exercise which
involved multiple stakeholders in the evaluation process. Designated panchayat heads collected data for
functions that fell under their portfolios and were responsible for tracking their progress on a monthly
basis (Second Administrative Reforms Commission 2007)
The baseline covered 51 indicators at the meta-level of the GP across 13 crucial developmental sectors
such as agriculture and animal husbandry, primary and secondary education, drinking water, sanitation,
and housing among others. The sectors were aligned with the functions of GPs in order to capture impact
of the GPOD intervention. A rigorous GP-MIS was then put into place to facilitate month-on-month
tracking of this data.
Table 2: Illustration of GP-MIS

Sector Broad goals Indicator Source
Sanitation Increase in toilet 1. Number of toilets constructed Gram panchayat records
construction 2. Number of information, education and from Nirmal Bharat
communication activities for spreading Abhiyan (toilet
information on the benefits of toilet construction scheme)
utilisation
The above Table 2 shows the mechanism by which the baseline captured data related to sanitation.
Sanitation is one of the 29 essential functions that have been devolved to the panchayat as per the
Eleventh Schedule of the Constitution (The Government of India 1992). The broad goal of the
panchayat is to improve the availability and usage of toilets, and this was operationalised through the
Head Amenities I who oversaw sanitation as a function. He/she also played a crucial role in activation
of the sub-committee formed by the government department responsible for drinking water and
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sanitation – Village Water and Sanitation Committee (VWSC) – which has the mandate to oversee
operations and maintenance as well as fixing and collection of water tariffs. The baseline helped gather
data on indicators such as the number of toilets in a current year as well as number of awareness
initiatives on the usage of toilets. Indicators tracked and reviewed on a monthly basis helped capture
the shift in toilet constructions, as well as usage. The source column indicates the source from which
data was collected.
A pre-post analysis thus helped highlight the impact of a stronger GP. The systemic approach taken
towards building the organisation capacity of the two GPs under study resulted in improvements in
governance (systemic shifts) as well as service delivery.
Systemic outputs realised:
 For the past three years, Oorkunte Mittur and Dibburhalli GPs have annual plans and budgets
in place and a clear accountability structure for their elected representatives.
 Mandated citizen committees such as the VWSC, Bal Vikas Samiti (Child Welfare Committee),
School Development and Monitoring Committee, which were previously defunct, have been
activated. Meetings were regularly held ensuring active citizen participation in key functions
such as child development, nutrition and schooling.
 Citizen participation in mandated ward sabhas and gram sabhas increased.
All these processes, structures, annual plans and the implementation status of the two GPs which were
instituted as part of the GPOD have been rigorously documented and details handed over by elected
representatives to the panchayat office to help the newly elected body refer to historical data, as well as
to take forward the portfolio-wise planning and implementation process.
Tangible service delivery improvements for citizens were captured by the GP-MIS and were as follows:
 Diburhalli GP was ahead of all blocks in the Chikkaballapur district in achieving its targets
against the plan as well as creation of assets under the National Rural Employment Guarantee
Scheme (NREGA) in 2013–14.
 Oorkunte Mittur had the highest coverage of individual toilets in the Mulbagal block in 2013–
2014.
 Ration (fair price) shops in both GPs started displaying details of ration supplied and daily
distribution as per government norms.
 Systems were instituted wherein complaints about defective streetlights were fixed within a 48-
hour period.
 Both GPs ensured that nearly all ration shops displayed the monthly grain stock received and
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daily stock position for all commodities, as per government norms.
 Dibburhalli GP monitored collection of water tax to the tune of Rs 1 lakh versus a targeted Rs
1.75 lakh in 2014–2015.
 In Oorkunte Mittur, GP members facilitated the formation of nearly 10 raita samparka kootas
(farmers groups) and ensured distribution of subsidised seeds to over 2,300 farmers in the last
two years.
 Water testing for chemical contamination was conducted in 20 villages and 21 watermen
trained on how to conduct these tests using water testing kits.
Given the centrality of organisation members to the GPOD process, the project also considers
testimonials of GP members about the GPOD intervention as a means of impact assessment. Widely
used as self-assessment tools, testimonials provide an opportunity to hear about the impact of a project
through the voice of its principal stakeholders (Rietbergen-McCracken and Narayan 1998). This can be
illustrated through the documented experience of GP members like Vijayamma. Many elected
representatives like her admit to now having an increased sense of confidence in their abilities, clarity
about their roles and responsibilities as elected representatives, and a sense of achievement regarding
the efficient manner in which they were able to deliver essential services to citizens. By creating
enabling environments and appropriate incentives for rural elected representatives, the GPOD project
thus helped develop the social capital at the grassroots.
The authors recognise the impatience for tangible results, but we strongly believe that the GPOD
framework will be sustainable over time only if we continue to invest in people, systems and processes
in a continuous manner. The GPOD is not a static or stand-alone framework.
The process of developing, implementing and scaling up the GPOD framework has been a process of
continuous learning fraught with several challenges. This paper offers critical insights in the belief that
the GPOD framework should continuously imbibe positive and negative feedback loops to facilitate
better replication in newer geographies and strive to convert its challenges into opportunities.
While this research has acknowledged the political economy variables in the GPOD framework, the
scope of intervention could have been widened to engage with socio-political, cultural and heritage
issues. Many of these variables such as caste divisions, gender inequality etc. proved to be a barrier to
democratic functioning of the GP. Secondly, the introduction of the portfolio-based structure in the GP
skewed our efforts towards elected representatives who took on additional responsibilities of a portfolio.
Feedback from members and citizens indicated that that this study should have dedicated more time
and resources to other members of the GP as well. Thirdly, we recognised the need for effective fiscal
decentralisation, but could not provide adequate focus on this area. Research on local government
finances is required to analyse various sources of funds that accrue to a panchayat, both internally and
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externally, as a first step to determine the ‘as-is’ state of panchayat funds and subsequently understand
the associated inefficiencies. Fourthly, the GPOD project could have also leveraged the process
mapping exercise more effectively to create guidelines and develop manpower models. The mapping
exercise also threw up many issues and possible solutions. Each re-engineered process could have been
implemented in a more structured manner and further analysed and documented in greater detail and
fed into further outputs such as operational guidelines for the GP, or manpower mapping of GPs. This
data holds significant potential to inform policy in the long run.
There are some policies, which are not in our immediate control, the election process being the topmost
on this list. We encountered our first election cycle at the GP level in June 2015 and were disappointed
to note that many of the elected representatives in the action research panchayats were unable to re-
contest elections due to the seat being reserved for a different category.4 The other prevalent reason
being the mounting, albeit illegal, electoral expenses involved. We recognise the need to engage with
the election reform processes at the policy level in the long run in order to ensure more effective
sustainability of our change efforts.
Conclusion
This paper reinforces the identity of the GP as a local self-government body. It illustrates the
panchayat’s innate potential and its ability to deliver beyond its constitutional mandate, if presented
with an enabling environment and the appropriate incentives. It thus elaborates the use of OD principles
to leverage this potential effectively.
This paper begins by providing an overview of democratic decentralisation with a specific focus on
India. Through a thorough review of change management literature, it then lays down a contextual
4
In the elections to the panchayati raj institutions, seats are reserved for a specific caste or gender, as a step
towards affirmative action.
framework for the application of organisation development to GPs. The basic premise is that GPs today
seem to lack implementation skills to undertake the wide-ranging functions that have been devolved to
them by law, and the shortfall can be attributed to their lack of organisational capacity.
The paper acknowledges the wide array of capacity-building efforts that have been applied to GPs, and
reasons as to why these strategies have largely been ad-hoc and ineffective.
We argue that GPs just like corporate bodies, NGOs or trusts are organisations in their own right and
the change process aimed at increasing their efficiency cannot address stand-alone components.
Effective change in GPs requires a systemic approach addressing several components of the
organisation, as well as recognising the potential of individually elected representatives towards
achieving organisational efficiency of the GP as an institution.
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The paper elaborates upon the methodology used to construct an innovative change management
framework for local governments – the GPOD framework – through an action research undertaken in
two GPs in Karnataka, India over a two-year period. The GPOD takes a participatory and systemic
approach by undertaking vision and mission development with the GP, mapping key processes, devising
appropriate accountability structures and incentives and handholding the panchayat towards effective
implementation.
Through a pre- and post-design study, the paper then highlights demonstrable impact in development
indicators in the two GPs where the GPOD intervention was introduced. Impact is illustrated both
through systemic outputs and service delivery. The two GPs have laid down accountability structures,
prepared three annual plans, activated defunct government-mandated committees and managed to
attract more citizens to gram and ward sabhas. At a service delivery level, they have demonstrated
marked improvements in crucial sectors such as sanitation, drinking water supply and education.
The paper acknowledges that the GPOD framework is designed to always remain a work-in-progress
and critiques gaps that were identified in the GPOD methodology and implementation as it was being
scaled up to other geographies. Suggestions have been offered to plug these lacunae.
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12
Women’s leadership in local
government in the Caribbean
Kizzann Lee Sam

Federation of Canadian Municipalities
Caribbean Local Economic Development Project
Abstract
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Women and men are traditionally cast in different roles, with males being leaders in the workplace,
home and government. In contrast, communities promote women as caregivers who support male
leaders and shape future generations as mothers, mentors and teachers. In recognition of this societal
view of women that often led to inequality and inequity, the UNDP listed Gender Equality and
empowering women as one of eight Millennium Development Goals. The post-2015 Sustainable
Development Goals, adopted by the United Nations in autumn 2015, also included gender equality
and empowering women as Goal 5.
In its work in the Caribbean, the Caribbean Local Economic Development Project (CARILED)
examined gender as it relates to micro, small and medium enterprise (MSME) development in six
Caribbean countries. The findings of this study showed gender gaps for both male and female
entrepreneurs in different areas of development. Traditionally gendered roles for MSME sectors,
access to financing and lack of adequate guidance or community support were some areas that
affected men and women differently in the region.
The study outlines ways in which male and female leaders can address traditional gender roles by
identifying priority areas for development, creating an enabling environment for start-ups and
expansion, and fostering a policy and legislative base that facilitates ease of doing business. The
recommendations further describe the public–private partnerships needed to successfully meet gender
gaps, and the importance of both elected officials and technocrats in inter alia community
engagement and advocacy towards local economic development.
The importance of gender equality among elected officials and technocrats, and the influence gender
has on determining priority areas of focus within local government strategic plans for communities
are also set out within this paper.
Introduction
The Caribbean Local Economic Development Project (CARILED) is a six-year multilateral
programme that contributes to sustainable economic growth in the Caribbean. CARILED supports
growth through community specific local economic development programmes and approaches in
partnership with local governments and local governance authorities in twenty-three1 communities in
seven countries (CARILED 2015).
CARILED defines local economic development as a process by which public sector, business and
civil society work collectively to create better conditions for economic growth and employment
generation (CARILED 2015). This definition is similar to approaches adopted by the Federation of
Canadian Municipalities, the World Bank, the United Nations and the Commonwealth Local
Government Forum. Successful local economic development (LED) initiatives are participatory and
WT
inclusive, guided by local leadership, and geared at job creation or expansion, enhanced community
competitiveness and investments and increased economic growth that is also sustainable (CARILED
2015).
An evaluation of the adoption and adaptation of LED initiatives in Caribbean communities is

currently underway within the CARILED programme. Further to the initial launch in 2012,
CARILED partnered with ministries of local government, or those with responsibility for local
government, local government associations, the private sector and civil society organisations, to
introduce LED structures, planning approaches and programme implementation techniques within a
results-based management framework. In undertaking this regional programme, CARILED
incorporates gender as a cross-cutting theme, and in this context, led the review of gender related
issues that affected the ‘Ease of Doing Business’2 for men and women in 22 communities of focus.
The CARILED 2014 reviews of gender-related challenges affecting local government and micro,
small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) paid particular attention to differences men and women face
in two areas of business regulation: (i) starting a business; and (ii) getting credit (Anthony et al. 2014;
Budhu et al. 2014a; Budhu et al. 2014b; Hesse-Bayne et al. 2014; Budhu and Sheerattan-Bisnauth
2014; Budhu and Watson-Williams 2014). The studies also examined the role of local government in
supporting new and existing businesses in local economies.
1
CARILED worked with 25 communities in 2014, but the programme no longer works in Belize River Valley,
Belize. Carriacou and Petite Martinique in Grenada are categorised as one community under the programme.
2
The ‘Ease of Doing Business’ index assigns rankings to 11 areas of business regulation with a rating between 1
and 189 for each indicator, with higher rankings having lower numbers (World Bank 2014).
Women’s leadership in local government in the Caribbean 213
CARILED’s approach allowed it to work directly with six Caribbean countries 3 and with a
distribution of communities that varied from rural, sub-urban, urban and inner-city. This paper will
present summary findings of six country studies 4 undertaken by CARILED in 2014. The paper will
examine gender definitions and statistics related to local government, and later determines the
influence of male or female leaders on identifying priorities, encouraging community engagement and
influencing business development in local communities.
Methodology
The methodology examined the results of findings emerging from the six gender and MSME country
studies, related to: (i) local authorities and MSMEs; (ii) credit programmes and financial services; (iii)
business development programmes and services; and (iv) community and family support. The gender
and MSME studies incorporated literature reviews, focus groups and interviews with local
WT
government and LED stakeholders. The paper interprets the findings related to local authorities and
MSMEs by introducing additional desk research and webinar based feedback from six country
reports.
The desk research references articles and studies across the Commonwealth and from various
governmental and non-governmental organisations. Although CARILED has not yet conducted a
similar study on gender, local government and MSMEs for the Commonwealth of Dominica, the
paper does cite statistical information obtained from literary reviews.
Defining gender and the economy

Khosla and Barth (2008, p. 17) defines gender as an analytical concept related to “social
interpretations and values assigned to being a woman, a man, a boy or a girl … not based on the sex
of the individual.” Perceived social interpretations cast men and women in different roles, as
caregivers, breadwinners or leaders. In the Caribbean, traditional customs promote gender roles for
children, with boys and young males being responsible for outdoor tasks (gardening, car maintenance,
caring for animals), and girls and young females being given household tasks (cooking, cleaning,
caring for siblings or the elderly). The multi-cultural background consisting of indigenous people,
and European, Indian, African, Middle Eastern and Asian-Pacific immigrants did not take away from
the perceived gender roles.
The global discussion on the role of male and female leaders intensified in the late 1980s and 1990s.
By 1990, the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) passed a resolution recommending that
3
The six countries in the study were Belize, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Lucia and Trinidad and Tobago.
4
The results of the studies were published in six reports “A review of gender-related challenges affecting local
government and MSMEs in …” in 2014.
governments should aim for a target of 30% female leaders by 1995 and 50% female leaders by
2000. The Fourth World Conference on the Beijing Declaration (1995) agreed that:
….eradication of poverty based on sustained economic growth, social development,
environmental protection and social justice requires the involvement of women in
economic and social development, equal opportunities and the full and equal
participation of women and men as agents and beneficiaries of people-centred
sustainable development (United Nations 1995, p. 9).
In recognition of the societal view that women are often more inclined to share resources within
families, the United Nations listed gender equality and empowering women as one of eight
Millennium Development Goals (United Nations 2013). The adoption of gender equality and
empowering women as Goal 3 along with seven other anti-poverty goals at the 2010 United Nations
Summit on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) further reiterated the global and national
commitments to gender equality as a key element in poverty alleviation. Goal 3 focused on reducing
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gaps in gender equality linked to employment, education and political representation. The increased
share of women with access to additional resources was the primary objective of Goal 3.
The development lens across the globe shifted in 2008–2009 with the onset of the global financial
crisis. As developed nations battled with increased unemployment, inflation and reduced disposable
incomes, developing countries faced a new challenge. For the Caribbean, the external shocks led to
dips in tourism numbers, and many stable jobs were lost in the private and public sector. The global
economic shock created a ripple effect, and led to countries promoting MSME growth and
development, alongside Science, Technology, Engineering and Maths (STEM) as a foundation for
innovation. Countries also recognised the need for more grassroots engagement, community-led
economic growth and investment promotion.
The role of men and women in the shifting national focus on local development was not examined in
detail by countries. However, in 2011, the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)
published a report on ‘Men in Families and Family Policy in a Changing World’ (United Nations
2011). The report highlighted several concerns facing families across the globe, as more communities
saw increases in female-headed and often single-parent households. In the English-speaking
Caribbean, female-headed households accounted for 37%–49% of homes (Alatorre 2002, cited in
United Nations 2011, p. 17). The cause of this increase was a “high rate of migration of men and by a
matrifocal family structure” with women emerging both as working professionals and care givers. As
jobs became rarer in traditional communities, male migration peaked, leading to communities losing
male role models within the home, and creating mentorship gaps among young males and boys. The
United Nations report (2011) also found that stable employment was a societal requirement for
young men to be recognised as adult men. While young women were viewed as adults after having
children or entering part-time or full employment, young men faced additional requirements related to
job stability and asset accumulation as indicators of masculinity within the gender construct.
The examination of societal requirements for defining gender in the Caribbean was not examined at
the local level by local government or local governing authorities.
Gender and government

The global statistics that track gender distributions among local government leadership is a newly
emerging trend among countries. Several countries published their progress against the United
Nations (UN) target of 50% female leaders by 2000.
The United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG) reported on the limited progress for the inclusion
of women in decision-making or senior roles in either central or local government. Chattopadhyay
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and Duflo (2004, p.1) stated that “in 2000 women represented 13.8% of all parliament members in the
world, up from 9% in 1987” but by 2015, the UCLG (2015, para 3) noted that “just 16% of mayors of
capital cities are women, and a mere 7.8% of government leadership positions are held by women”.
In the United Kingdom, by 2009, “13% of local authority leaders in England were women” with
“women most likely to lead unitary authorities (18%) or shire districts (15%), and least likely to lead
metropolitan authorities (3%)” (Centre for Women and Democracy 2009, p. 4). In the same year
(2009), Australia reported less than “10% of council CEO’s were women, and only 20% of senior
managers” and by 2011, “only 30% of elected representatives are women and only 20% of mayors”
(Australian Local Government Association 2011, p. 1).
Equitable male/female distributions in leadership and decision-making positions affect the way that
communities prioritise development activities. In a study of West Bengal, India, it was discovered
that “women leaders provide more public goods, of equal quality, at a lower effective price” and that
“female leaders invest more in women-preferred goods” (Beaman et al. 2009, p. 25). This finding
feeds into the UCLG (2015) recommendation that encourages women to participate in local decision-
making. While communities and local government leaders should be wary of a bias in favour of male
or female dominated priorities, there should be an understanding that equality of voices in the
decision making process will lead to better strategic planning, more sustainable, community led goals,
and equitable prioritisation of activities to promote social stability and economic growth and
investment.
Local government leaders should also understand that there is no causality linking national economic
development with female leadership (Pande and Ford 2011). Pande and Ford (2011) found that there
were no long term causal effects on economic performance as a result of meeting or not fulfilling
gender quotas among elected officials. Female leaders in developed countries often accounted for a
smaller percentage of elected officials compared to ratios of male to female representatives in lower
and upper houses of government in developing countries. One can compare the number of female
representatives in the Lower or Single House in the United States of America (19.4%) to those in
Rwanda (63%) (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2015, Table 1). The higher number of female
representatives in Rwanda cannot be linked to a lower gross domestic product (GDP), with the 2014
GDP for Rwanda recorded at 7.89 billion USD against 17.42 trillion USD in the same year for the
United States of America (World Bank 2015). Similarly, larger numbers of female elected officials
did not equate poor macro-economic performance. An examination of developed country Sweden,
shows a GDP of $570.6 billion in 2014 (World Bank 2015) and a 43.6% female representation in the
Lower House (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2015; Table 1). In short, there is no evidence that gender
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quotas are linked to, or can impact, national economic performance.
Equitable representation among male and female elected officials influences local economic
development. While Pande and Ford (2011) found no long term causal effect on national economic
performance, gender quotas may influence short- to medium-term growth at the local level. This
premise could be further explored by municipalities, national governments, and regional projects,
such as the Caribbean Local Economic Development Project (CARILED). While countries in the
Caribbean are making a more concerted effort to promote and adopt equitable gender systems at the
national level, similar systems to promote engagement and equitable representation at the local level
are not evident in the sample countries.
To begin an examination of the disparities at the local level, Table 1 shows the breakdown of female
elected leaders in national government within CARILED’s current scope of operations. Of the top
three countries with high percentages of female representatives in government, only one, Trinidad and
Tobago, has a functional local government structure with regular elections. Grenada does not have an
existing elected local government structure (Commonwealth Local Government Forum 2013, p. 64)
and Guyana last held local government elections in 1994 (Commonwealth Local Government Forum
2013, p. 65). The section of this paper on gender and the local government leader will examine the
disaggregated data for Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago at the municipal level, given that
these three countries have elected local government structures.
Table 1: Women in national parliaments

Lower or Single House Upper House or Senate
Rank Country
Elections Seats* Women %W Elections Seats* Women % W
25 Grenada 2 2013 15 5 33.3% 3 2013 13 2 15.4%
30 Guyana 11 2011 67 21 31.3% --- --- --- ---
36 Trinidad and Tobago 5 2010 42 12 28.6% 6 2010 31 6 19.4%
61 Dominica 12 2014 32 7 21.9% --- --- --- ---
83 Saint Lucia 11 2011 18 3 16.7% 1 2012 11 3 27.3%
102 Jamaica 12 2011 63 8 12.7% 9 2007 21 6 28.6%
133 Belize 3 2012 32 1 3.1% 3 2012 13 5 38.5%
Source: Inter-parliamentary Union (2015)
The appearance of equitable decision-making by having male and female elected officials in
government can influence citizens and improve aspirations. Pande and Ford (2011) described the
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influence of female leaders on the citizenry as the role model effect, wherein female leaders served as
role models for other women. Role models reinforce the societal recognition of leadership in
communities and can inspire individuals to become more active in politics or community work,
pursue self-employment or enter the workforce. Pande and Ford (2011, p. 13) also found that female
leadership in government and the private sector improved investments in women, as “Women may
underinvest in their own human capital if they believe leadership opportunities are unavailable”. The
role of an elected official, therefore, is not only to lead in decision-making regarding infrastructure,
policies or planning, but to serve as a role model for men and women in the community under a
shared community vision.
Gender and local government leadership

The changing role of local government as leaders, role models and enablers of local economic
development is core to the mandate of CARILED. Since 2012, CARILED supported local economic
development initiatives to support the changing role of local government, in the promotion of
improved livelihoods, local economic growth, investments, and specifically, the start-up and
expansion of MSMEs.
The CARILED 2014 Reviews of Gender Related Challenges affecting Local Government and MSMEs
(Anthony et al. 2014; Budhu et al. 2014a; Budhu et al 2014b; Hesse-Bayne et al. 2014; Budhu and
Sheerattan-Bisnauth 2014; Budhu and Watson-Williams 2014) examined the differences that male
and female entrepreneurs faced in starting or expanding a business, as well as accessing support from
local leaders. Each country study also explored the extent to which women’s economic empowerment
is affected by a) the proportion of women in decision-making roles in local government and/or b) the
extent to which local authorities adopt an active role in the socio-economic advancement of women.
The methodology applied for each country study incorporated desk and field research, including
interviews and focus group sessions with local government officials and staff, business owners, civil
society organisations and business support organisations. The sample of interviewees was limited to
individuals and businesses working within the 22 CARILED partner communities.5 Each research
team was made up of a Canadian researcher, a regional (Caribbean) researcher and a country specific
researcher. The final reports were edited in collaboration with CARILED staff.
The findings of the CARILED study do show some correlation between the composition of men and
women in local government and the success of local economic interventions. The concern about
patriarchal dominance, reduced female empowerment for self-improvement, and gender-based power
relations can be examined under the role model effect (Pande and Ford 2011). Women in local
government serve as an inspiration to other women, both in and out of the political sphere. Female
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leaders appear to have a domino effect in overall empowerment of women. In contrast, societal
restrictions tied to stable employment as an indicator of adulthood in males, the growing competition
from females in administrative and technical positions, and the social risks attached to business start-
up and possible business failure may be contributing to the growing marginalisation of young males,
seen in findings from the Belize (Budhu et al. 2014b) and Jamaica (Budhu and Watson-Williams
2014) studies.
To further understand the dichotomy facing men and women in Caribbean communities, one can
examine the distribution of males and females among local government. The literary review of this
paper contrasted national statistics of elected local government officials from Guyana, Jamaica, and
Trinidad and Tobago (Figure 1). These three Caribbean countries have local government structures,
and represent three types of States:
- Guyana – low income small island developing state with small population (including
indigenous population) and land and sea borders in Caribbean;
- Jamaica – lower middle income small island developing state with large population and sea
borders in Caribbean;
- Trinidad and Tobago – twin island middle income small island developing state with medium
population and sea borders in Caribbean.
5
The gender studies did not include data from Belize River Valley, Belize, and two communities (Soufriere-
Scotts Head-Gallion, and Woodford Hill) in Dominica.
Figure 1: Local government leadership
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The analysis shows that women were more likely to be Administrators (Secretary Managers/Chief
Executive Officers) than elected leaders (Mayors or Chairpersons). A further breakdown of data from
24 CARILED partner municipalities in seven countries,6 shows that 86% of the Mayors/Chairpersons
were male, and 14% were female (Figure 2). Disaggregated data for councillors was not readily
available for this paper, but it is recommended that an analysis should be done towards furthering
understanding of gender distributions.
Figure 2: Municipal leaders (mayors/chairpersons)
The existence of female leaders, either as elected officials or senior municipal staff, can play a major
role in the development of local economic strategic plans, priorities and support structures. Although
the Caribbean has a high percentage of senior female municipal staff, the number of female elected
officials could become a deterrent to women entrepreneurs seeking guidance from local municipal
leaders.
6
Number of communities listed excludes the community of Belize River Valley in Belize.
Table 2: Gender distribution local government – CARILED Partner Municipalities

Mayor/ Chairperson Secretary Manager/CEO
Country Male Female Male Female
Belize 3 0 1 2
Dominica 2 0 - -
Guyana 4 0 4 0
Grenada - - 0 1
Jamaica 4 2 5 1
Saint Lucia 1 1 - -
Trinidad and Tobago 4 0 3 1
Total 18 3 13 5
Notes: No elected officials in Grenada. No Secretary Managers in Dominica and Saint Lucia.
Belize data does not include Belize River Valley.
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The need for gender quotas at the local level should be discussed by local and national governments
seeking to move forward and stimulate economic growth through MSME development.
Findings of the CARILED Gender and MSME Study

Local authorities are “ideally positioned to play significant roles in addressing gender constraints to
socio-economic advancement” (Budhu 2014, p. 4). This is the primary universal finding of the
CARILED Gender and MSME 2014 studies.7 The findings saw a predominance of ‘gender neutral’
services, and attributed constraints in mandate, financial and human capacity and, in some instances,
legitimacy of local government, as significant barriers to local authorities seeking to enable local
economic development through MSME support. The studies also saw an “absence of gender policy
or guidelines, adequate programmes and services, and inadequate gender sensitisation” (Budhu
2014, p. 4) at the local level as further barriers that prohibited gender sensitive approaches to MSME
support. It was argued that the gender disparities in leadership and decision-making roles within local
authorities were resulting in patriarchal biases in decision-making, priorities, and services for
Caribbean communities (Budhu 2014).
The studies noted that local authorities were unaware of the shifting role of women and men in
communities. The diminishing role of men as primary earners did not result in an increase in shared
responsibility for household or child care. As a consequence, women adopted a triple burden as
caregivers, home managers and salaried or self-employed workers. Local authorities were not
meeting the needs of the changing economic landscape. One area, affordable childcare, was viewed
as “essential to women’s ability to alleviate the heavy burdens placed on them, and limiting their
7
The studies were undertaken in six countries: Belize (Budhu et al. 2014b), Grenada (Budhu et al. 2014a),
Guyana (Budhu and Sheerattan-Bisnauth 2014), Jamaica, (Budhu and Watson-Williams 2014), Saint Lucia
(Anthony et al. 2014) and Trinidad and Tobago (Hesse-Bayne et al. 2014).
engagement in local economic development initiatives” (Budhu 2014, pp. 4–5). Gender sensitive
training to promote greater community support for male or female led businesses, was viewed as
essential to stimulating LED. The studies further found that local authorities were viewed by
stakeholders as facilitators and enablers of a supportive community environment, with support
networks that reduced the barriers faced by men and women in business.
Men and women have different motivations for starting or growing a business. The studies found that
men become entrepreneurs to become financially successful, while women were motivated by
financial survival or family care. Upon entry into the business world, women often allocated most of
their income to family maintenance, created by inter alia “little control over family resources and
decision-making, low educational level, lack of socialization in business circles; and lack of training
and support services” (Budhu 2014, p. 6). Women and men in rural and semi-urban areas were more
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likely to face this difference in income allocation.
Access to capital was another challenge faced by men and women in the Caribbean. Although both
men and women face challenges with credit, collateral, or other loan security requirements, it was
noted that some credit institutions in Guyana still prefer that men are listed as guarantors on loans
(Budhu and Sheerattan-Bisnauth, 2014). In some instances, this requirement was linked to the
tradition of men working in remote areas and providing remittances to wives or partners. Credit
institutions, recognising this practice, may still view males as the primary earners in the relationship,
and as such, the natural guarantor on loan applications. However, lack of credit restricts women from
moving from micro to small, or small to medium enterprises. The study also found that while credit
institutions are aware of barriers faced by women, many have not introduced gender specific policies
or practices, opting instead for a ‘gender neutral’ approach.
Equal access credit and financial services is a priority for some Caribbean countries. One example is
in Guyana, where public private partnerships were put in place between the government, private
sector and non-governmental organisations, to develop and launch several gender sensitive micro-
financing schemes (Budhu and Sheerattan-Bisnauth, 2014).
Women, particularly rural women, are more likely than men to pursue skills development, networking
or business training. Training and development programmes are often costly, and limited to persons
in and around urban or city areas. The investment of both time and money to access training is a
deterrent for women who do not see the value of self-investment as a priority over immediate family
or household responsibilities. Business networks, incubators, and shared mentorship are important for
growth and sustainability in this sector. The study found that “women interviewed placed high value
on the psychosocial support they receive from being part of a network of like-minded female
entrepreneurs; the sharing of personal challenges, encouragement received, practical advice offered
and the need for women to have a ‘safe’ place for sharing” (Budhu 2014, p. 7).
The final focus of the study was the role of family and community in contributing to the success of
men and women entrepreneurs. The study found that community and/or family support was the key
to the success of an entrepreneur. However, gender-based power relations can restrict women seeking
to pursue business opportunities outside of the home or community. Gender-based abuse and
violence, noted across class, ethnicity and age, also significantly influences the ability of women more
than men, to participate in local economic development initiatives.
Summary
In summary, the findings of the CARILED studies showed that local government gender distribution
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may influence community priorities, business growth and development, and overall local economic
development. Representatives on local government councils should promote the identification of
priority areas that give consideration to differences in the needs of males and females. Male and
female role models promote female empowerment and support socially accepted redefinitions of
employed males. This could be the first step in creating an enabling environment for start-ups and
expansion of existing businesses.
Gender sensitisation among local government officials and staff will foster dialogue and a policy and
legislative base towards facilitating the ease of doing business for entrepreneurs and investors.
There is a need for public–private partnerships to develop and implement creative solutions to fill
gender gaps, such as access to finance, which will also promote business growth. Finally, the support
of entrepreneurs by members of a gender aware and gender equitable local government body should
reshape the social expectations of men and women in leadership, governance and business.
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Permissions
All chapters in this book were first published in CJLG, by UTS ePRESS; hereby published with
permission under the Creative Commons Attribution License or equivalent. Every chapter published
in this book has been scrutinized by our experts. Their significance has been extensively debated. The
topics covered herein carry significant findings which will fuel the growth of the discipline. They may
even be implemented as practical applications or may be referred to as a beginning point for another
development.
The contributors of this book come from diverse backgrounds, making this book a truly international
effort. This book will bring forth new frontiers with its revolutionizing research information and detailed
analysis of the nascent developments around the world.
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We would like to thank all the contributing authors for lending their expertise to make the book truly
unique. They have played a crucial role in the development of this book. Without their invaluable
contributions this book wouldn’t have been possible. They have made vital efforts to compile up to date
information on the varied aspects of this subject to make this book a valuable addition to the collection
of many professionals and students.
This book was conceptualized with the vision of imparting up-to-date information and advanced data
in this field. To ensure the same, a matchless editorial board was set up. Every individual on the board
went through rigorous rounds of assessment to prove their worth. After which they invested a large
part of their time researching and compiling the most relevant data for our readers.
The editorial board has been involved in producing this book since its inception. They have spent rigorous
hours researching and exploring the diverse topics which have resulted in the successful publishing
of this book. They have passed on their knowledge of decades through this book. To expedite this
challenging task, the publisher supported the team at every step. A small team of assistant editors was
also appointed to further simplify the editing procedure and attain best results for the readers.
Apart from the editorial board, the designing team has also invested a significant amount of their time
in understanding the subject and creating the most relevant covers. They scrutinized every image to
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The publishing team has been an ardent support to the editorial, designing and production team. Their
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are a veteran in the field of academics and their pool of knowledge is as vast as their experience in
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standards have made this book an exceptional effort. Their encouragement from time to time has been
an inspiration for everyone.
The publisher and the editorial board hope that this book will prove to be a valuable piece of knowledge
for researchers, students, practitioners and scholars across the globe.
List of Contributors
Eris D Schoburgh Ozohu-Suleiman Abdulhamid and Paul Chima
University of the West Indies Mona Campus Department of Public Administration Faculty of
Management Sciences University of Abuja, Nigeria
Ronald Woods
Teaching and Research Centre for Local Government Su Fei Tan, Alan Morris and Bligh Grant
University of Technology Sydney University of Technology Sydney Australia
Sarah Artist Tooran Alizadeh

Manager Learning Solutions Local Government School of Environment Griffith University, Australia
NSW
Heather Shearer
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Geraldine O’Connor Cities Research Institute Griffith University,
Senior Programmes Officer Centre for Local Australia
Government University of Technology Sydney
Terry Parker
Sylvester Kugonza Commonwealth Local Government Forum Former
Uganda Management Institute (UMI) Kampala, Regional Adviser CLGF Southern Africa Programme
Uganda
Mohammad Shahjahan Chowdhury and
Robert Mukobi Muhammad Aktaruzzaman
Secretariat for Accountability Sector Ministry of Department of Public Administration Shahjalal
Finance, Planning and Economic Development University of Science and Technology Bangladesh
Kampala, Uganda
Rose B Namara Gerald and Kagambirwe Karyeija
Issah Justice Musah-Surugu Uganda Management Institute Uganda
Public Administration & Policy Management
Department of Public Administration & Health Betty C Mubangizi
Services Management University of Ghana Business School of Management, IT and Governance
School, Ghana University of KwaZulu Natal South Africa
Emmanuel Yeboah-Assiamah Sonali Srivastava and Madhavi Rajadhyaksha

Public Management & Development Planning Anode Governance Lab Bengaluru, India
School of Public Leadership Stellenbosch University,
Kizzann Lee Sam
South Africa
Federation of Canadian Municipalities Caribbean
Local Economic Development Project
Index
A Empowering Women, 211, 214
Academic Focus, 165 Empowerment, 59, 99, 136-137, 139, 141, 148, 217-218,
Accountability, 40-41, 44, 47, 51-59, 67, 75,, 101, 119, 222
128, 136, 148, 153, 160-161, 165,, 170, 176-178, 187, Environmental Protection, 22, 214
189, 198, 200-202, 206,, 209-210
Exhaustive, 148, 205
Adequate Guidance, 211
Administration, 13, 15, 18, 20, 24, 29-30, 32,, 38, 60, 68, F
81, 83-87, 90-95, 98,, 100-102, 107, 113-115, 131, 133, Facilitator, 1, 3, 14, 18
136, 142, 147, 162, 171, 185-187, 192, 210
Federation, 1, 21, 80, 82, 84-88, 91-92, 113-114, 211
Administrative Leadership, 1, 13, 15, 18 212
Female Entrepreneurs, 211, 217
B
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Formal Community Impact, 1
Bottom-up Evidence, 191
Business Environment, 99, 143, 164
G
Gender Equality, 161, 164, 211, 214, 223
C Government, 1-3, 5-7, 10, 12-13, 15-29, 32-42, 44-69,
Chronic Unemployment, 135
71-76, 78-98, 100-109, 111-122, 124, 127-140, 142-147,
Citizen Participation, 49, 56-58, 110, 147-154, 157-162, 149-161,
174, 198, 206
163-174, 177-187, 190, 193-213, 215-223
Citizens’ Capacity, 147-149, 151-152, 156-157, 159-160
Gram Panchayats, 189-191, 194, 196
Conflicts, 60-63, 65, 70, 74-78, 105, 182
Growing Scrutiny, 165
Constitution, 41, 49, 56-57, 60, 62, 64-65, 67, 69, 73, 79-
80, 82-90, 92-93, 135, 137-138, 146, 190-191, 206, 210
H
Constitutional Gaps, 80 High-speed Broadband, 121-122, 124-126, 130
Contemporary Period, 96 Holistic Approach, 4, 147, 150
Costly Infrastructure, 40, 49, 51
Councillor Roles, 95, 105 I
Improved Skills, 135
D Incentive Structures, 189
Decentralisation, 20, 40-41, 49, 55-56, 60, 63-64, 78, 99, Indigenous People, 23, 121, 213
136-138, 144, 164, 170, 172, 174-175, 185, 187, 190-
Information Sharing, 40, 69, 135, 138
191, 208-210
Inherent Weakness, 80
Decision-making, 12, 23, 48, 50, 54, 57, 72, 76, 85, 99,
101, 105-107, 109-111, 116, 118, 128, 148, 150-153, Institutional Continuum, 148
156, 158, 160, 174, 189, 193, 195, 215, 217, 221
Defunct Committees, 189 J
Joint Design, 164
Democratic Right, 40
District Assemblies, 60-61, 63, 68, 76
L
District Chief Executive, 60-61, 71, 73 Leadership, 1, 7, 13, 15, 19, 21, 36, 60, 63, 76, 78, 87,
93-96, 99, 102, 106, 112-114, 129, 138, 149, 160, 170,
E 173, 178, 188, 194, 202, 212, 215, 217, 220, 223
Economic Development, 1-3, 6-7, 17-19, 40, 60-61, 76, Learning, 1, 6-7, 15, 21, 25-30, 32-39, 61, 79, 132, 139,
79, 93, 117, 119, 122, 125, 127, 130-131, 134, 141, 164, 145, 162, 185, 194-195, 207, 210
166, 174, 185-187, 212, 215-217, 220-223
Led, 1, 3, 5-7, 9, 17-19, 33, 72, 84, 134-145, 163-167,
Efficient Management, 135 169-176, 178, 180, 183-185, 211-215, 221
Elected Representative, 96, 147 Limited Revenue, 96
228 Index
Local Government, 1, 3, 7, 13, 29, 42, 45, 52, 54, 57, 65, R
71, 74, 76, 98, 109, 117, 122, 128, 132, 139, 147, 166, Reform, 3, 7, 15, 21-22, 37, 58, 79-86, 88, 90, 94-95, 97-
170, 174, 180, 187, 190, 193, 196, 208, 213, 220, 223 101, 103, 105-107, 112-114, 160, 186, 208
Local Government Leadership, 95, 215, 217, 219 Resource Scarcity, 21
Local Government Reform, 3, 15, 86, 88, 95, 97, 100, Responsiveness, 9, 12, 56, 105, 136, 162
103, 106, 112-114, 160, 186
Local Planning, 1, 40, 42, 116-118, 120, 123, 129-130 S
Local Representation, 90, 95, 104-105, 108-109, 111- Sector Consultation Process, 21
112, 115 Self-government, 160, 190, 197, 200-201, 208
Service Delivery, 7, 10, 17, 32, 41, 46, 50, 55, 57, 78, 81,
M 100, 111, 119, 125, 128, 136, 139, 143, 146, 164, 167,
Maximise Overall Effectiveness, 192 172, 177, 179, 182, 185, 187, 189, 195, 201, 207, 209
Mutual Support, 165, 176 Service Provision, 9-10, 22, 41, 96, 131, 170
Services Delivery Projects, 40
N
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Silent Pistol, 60, 76
National Broadband Network, 116, 118, 130-131
Social Interpretations, 213
National Fibre Project, 117-118
Socio-economic Development, 61, 79, 117, 119, 122,
Network Governance, 163, 165-169, 171-178, 183-188 125, 127, 130
New Public Management (NPM), 95, 97-98, 164 Spatial Planning, 117, 119-120, 130
State Jurisdiction, 21
O
Strategic Role, 95, 107
Organisation Development, 189, 191-192, 197, 209-210
Sustainable Economic Growth, 1, 3, 212
Organisational Capacity, 1, 7, 135, 189, 209
P T
Tailored Education, 21
Partnership Relationship, 60
Telecommunication, 116-120, 123-124, 126, 128, 130,
Pearson Correlation Coefficient, 40, 45
132
Policy-making, 41, 102, 161, 167
Telecommunication Infrastructure, 116-120, 123, 126,
Political Contexts, 147-148 130
Politics, 4, 20, 78-80, 85, 87, 94, 105, 111, 114, 152, 156, Transparency, 41, 48-49, 51, 55, 59, 67, 75, 136, 148,
160-161, 210, 217 153, 160, 198, 202
Presiding Member, 60-61, 68, 74
Professional Development, 21, 26, 28-33, 35-37 W
Public Participation, 40-42, 44-45, 48-51, 53-55, 57-58, Weak Organisations, 191
131, 161, 164 Women’s Leadership, 211
Public Stakeholders, 164 Workforce Development, 21, 27-28, 32-34, 36, 38, 164

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Public Administration

Copyright © 2019 The English Press

Public administration and governance / edited by Esther Randall.

Chapter 2 Learning in Australian local government: A roadmap for improving education

Chapter 4 The ‘silent pistol’ in Ghana’s local government system: presiding

Chapter 5 Local government administration in Nigeria: the search for relevance............................................. 80

Chapter 7 Australian local governments and the early national broadband

Chapter 8 Supporting local governance and local economic development – some

Chapter 9 Citizen participation in urban local government: a case study of Kanaighat

Chapter 10 Network governance and capacity of local governments to deliver LED

Chapter 11 Can organisation development principles in India’s local governments improve

Chapter 12 Women’s leadership in local government in the Caribbean.............................................................. 211

Development context and the search for a new paradigm

The World Bank's 2009 World Development Report:ReshapingEconomic Geographyalso makes a

From project to policy: capacitating developmental local government

Assessing local government capacity

Research and information provision

Dictated by law and other

Does mandate reflect

C ons ultations /c ommunity

a. Direc t reques t from res idents ;

Marketing and coordination

Figure 4: Existence of monitoring mechanisms

How often are

CM = community meetings/consultations; RK = residual knowledge; Cllr = councilor; Enf=

Figure 7: Staff establishment

S taff E s tablis hment (Mean S c ores )

The results are that:

Learning and innovation

Summary and analysis

Keywords: Local government, workforce, education and professional development, Australia

Functions of Australian local government

Local governments in Australia have an increasingly important role in environmental and

 property, including solid waste and recycling;

(Productivity Commission 2008, p. xx)

Workforce characteristics and challenges

(LGMA and ACELG 2013, pp. 24–25)

Teaching and learning environment for Australian local government

Methods and data

Data-gathering methods for the ‘Learning in Local Government’ study comprised:

 an online survey, distributed to councils and professional and training organisations

Findings from these several sources are discussed next.

Table 3: University qualifications

Figure 2: Major barriers to accessing education and professional development

The place of e-learning and distance learning

qualifications; webinars (web-based seminars), ie live lectures, workshops or presentations

Workforce development and planning

Workforce shortages in key skills areas

Conclusions and implications

 collaborative programmes across jurisdictions and between providers;

 the facilitation of pathways between vocational and higher education;

 training to support better workforce planning within councils;

 priority for initiatives in skills shortage areas.

Available at: http://www.acelg.org.au/sites/default/files/MetroWorkingPaper2012.pdf [Accessed 4

Keywords: Participation, service delivery projects, information sharing, accountability, Uganda

Theorising and justifying local participation

According to Mathbor (2008), community participation undergoes four stages:

2) Control: this encompasses implementation, co-ordination and monitoring (ICM). In this

Figure 1: An Effective Community Participation Model for Development Projects