49.Bagunu v. Sps.

Aggabao

G.R. No. 186487               August 15, 2011

ROSITO BAGUNU, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES FRANCISCO AGGABAO & ROSENDA ACERIT, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the motion for reconsideration1 filed by Rosito Bagunu (petitioner) to reverse our April 13,
2009 Resolution2 which denied his petition for review on certiorari for lack of merit.

FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

R.L.O. Claim No. 937/DENR Case No. 5177

The present controversy stemmed from a protest filed by the spouses Francisco Aggabao and
Rosenda Acerit (respondents) against the petitioner’s free patent application over a parcel of
unregistered land located in Caniogan, Sto. Tomas, Isabela (subject land), pending before the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Region II, Tuguegarao City, Cagayan (DENR
Regional Office).

The subject land was previously owned by Marcos Binag, who later sold it (first sale) to Felicisimo
Bautista (Bautista). In 1959, Bautista, in turn, sold the subject land (second sale) to Atty. Samson
Binag.

On December 12, 1961, Atty. Binag applied for a free patent3 over the subject land with the Bureau
of Lands (now Lands Management Bureau).4 On November 24, 1987, Atty. Binag sold the subject
land (third sale) to the petitioner,5 who substituted for Atty. Binag as the free patent applicant. The
parties’ deed of sale states that the land sold to the petitioner is the same lot subject of Atty. Binag’s
pending free patent application.6

The deeds evidencing the successive sale of the subject land, the Bureau of Lands’ survey,7 and the
free patent applications uniformly identified the subject land as Lot 322. The deeds covering the
second and third sale also uniformly identified the boundaries of the subject land.8

On December 28, 1992, the respondents filed a protest against the petitioner’s free patent
application. The respondents asserted ownership over Lot 322 based on the Deeds of Extrajudicial
Settlement with Sale, dated June 23, 1971 and April 15, 1979, executed in their favor by the heirs of
one Rafael Bautista.9

The Office of the Regional Executive Director of the DENR conducted an ocular inspection and
formal investigation. The DENR Regional Office found out that the petitioner actually occupies and
cultivates "the area in dispute including the area purchased by [the respondents]."10

On July 10, 1998, the DENR Regional Office ruled that the petitioner wrongfully included Lot 322 in
his free patent application since this lot belongs to the respondents. The DENR Regional Office
ordered:
49.Bagunu v. Sps. Aggabao

1. [The respondents to] file their appropriate public land application covering Lot No. 322,
Pls-541-D xxx;

2. [The petitioner’s free patent application] be amended by excluding Lot No. 322, Pls-541-D,
as included in Lot No. 258;

3. [A] relocation survey xxx to determine the exact area as indicated in [the parties’]
respective technical description of x x x Lot Nos. 258 and 322, Pls-541-D.11

The petitioner moved for reconsideration. The DENR Regional Office denied the motion ruling that in
determining the identity of a lot, the boundaries – and not the lot number assigned to it - are
controlling. Since the boundaries indicated in the deed of sale in the petitioner’s favor correspond to
the boundaries of Lot 258, what the petitioner acquired was Lot 258, notwithstanding the erroneous
description of the lot sold as Lot 322.12

On appeal, the DENR Secretary affirmed13 the ruling of the DENR Regional Office. After noting the
differences in the boundaries stated in the parties’ respective Deeds of Sale, the DENR Secretary
concluded that the land claimed by the petitioner is, in fact, distinct from that claimed by the
respondents. The DENR Secretary ruled that based on the parties’ respective deeds of sale, the
Subdivision Plan of the lot sold to the petitioner and Atty. Binag’s affidavit - claiming that the
designation of Lot 322 in the Deed of Sale in the petitioner’s favor is erroneous - what the petitioner
really acquired was Lot 258 and not Lot 322.14 The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA).

COURT OF APPEALS’ RULING

The CA affirmed the ruling of the DENR Secretary. Applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the
CA ruled that since questions on the identity of a land require a technical determination by the
appropriate administrative body, the findings of fact of the DENR Regional Office, as affirmed by the
DENR Secretary, are entitled to great respect, if not finality.15 The petitioner assails this ruling before
the Court.

Civil Case No. 751

In the meantime, on November 22, 1994 (or during the pendency of the respondents’ protest), Atty.
Binag filed a complaint for reformation of instruments, covering the second and third sale, against
Bautista and the petitioner (the civil case) with the Cabagan, Isabela Regional Trial Court (RTC).
Atty. Binag alleged that while the deeds evidencing the successive sale of the subject land correctly
identified the boundaries of the land sold, the deeds, nevertheless, erroneously identified the subject
land as Lot 322, instead of Lot 258.16

On December 9, 1994, the petitioner and Bautista filed a motion to dismiss with the RTC, citing the
pendency of the land protest before the Bureau of Lands. The RTC held in abeyance its resolution
on the motion to dismiss.17

After obtaining a favorable ruling from the DENR Regional Office, the respondents joined Atty. Binag
in the civil case by filing a complaint-in-intervention against the petitioner. The complaint-in-
intervention captioned the respondents’ causes of action as one for Quieting of Title, Reivindicacion
and Damages.18 The respondents alleged that the petitioner’s claim over Lot 322 is a cloud on their
title and ownership of Lot 322. The respondents also alleged that they were in peaceful, continuous,
public and adverse possession of Lot 322 from the time they fully acquired it in 1979 until sometime
in August of 1992, when the petitioner, through stealth and strategy, ejected them from Lot 322 after
49.Bagunu v. Sps. Aggabao

transferring his possession from Lot 258.19 The respondents asked the RTC to declare them as
owners of Lot 322.

After the CA affirmed the DENR Secretary’s favorable resolution on the respondents’ protest, the
respondents asked the RTC to suspend the civil case or, alternatively, to adopt the DENR
Secretary’s ruling.20 In their prayer, the respondents asked the RTC to:

1. [Adopt] the findings of the DENR as affirmed by the Court of Appeals xxx thus, the cause
of action xxx for reformation of contracts be granted;

2. [Order the petitioner] to vacate Lot 322 xxx and his [Free Patent Application] be amended
to exclude Lot 322 xxx.

3. [Set the case] for hearing to receive evidence on the claim of the [respondents] for
damages[.]

THE PETITION

The petitioner argues that the CA erred in affirming the DENR Secretary’s jurisdiction to resolve the
parties’ conflicting claims of ownership over Lot 322, notwithstanding that the same issue is pending
with the RTC. By ruling that the petitioner bought Lot 258 (and not Lot 322) from Atty. Binag and for
adjudicating Lot 322 to the respondents, the DENR effectively reformed contracts and determined
claims of ownership over a real property – matters beyond the DENR’s competence to determine.

The petitioner faults the CA for applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction since the issue of who
has a better right over Lot 322 does not involve the "specialized technical expertise" of the DENR.
On the contrary, the issue involves interpretation of contracts, appreciation of evidence and the
application of the pertinent Civil Code provisions, which are matters within the competence of the
courts.

The petitioner claims that the DENR Secretary’s factual finding, as affirmed by the CA, is contrary to
the evidence. The petitioner asserts that the Deed of Sale in his favor clearly identified the property
sold as Lot 322, which was the same land Atty. Binag identified in his free patent application; that the
area of Lot 322, as previously determined in a survey caused by the vendor himself (Atty. Binag),
tallies with the area stated in the deed in his favor; that he has been in possession of Lot 322 since
1987, when it was sold to him; and that his present possession and cultivation of Lot 322 were
confirmed by the DENR Regional Office during its ocular investigation.

The petitioner also invites our attention to the incredulity of the respondents’ claim of ownership over
Lot 322, based on Atty. Binag’s testimony during the hearing on the respondents’ protest. According
to the petitioner, the respondents could not have expressed interest in buying Lot 322 from Atty.
Binag had they already acquired Lot 322 from the heirs of one Rafael Bautista. The petitioner adds
that as early as 1979, the respondents were already aware of Atty. Binag’s free patent application
over Lot 322. Yet, they filed their protest to the free patent application only in 1992 – when the
petitioner had already substituted Atty. Binag. The petitioner claims that the respondents’ inaction is
inconsistent with their claim of ownership.

Lastly, the petitioner contests the adjudication of Lot 322 in the respondents’ favor by claiming that
the respondents presented no sufficient evidence to prove their (or their predecessor-in-interest’s)
title.
49.Bagunu v. Sps. Aggabao

In our April 13, 2009 Resolution, we denied the petition for failure to sufficiently show any reversible
error in the assailed CA Decision and for raising substantially factual issues. The petitioner moved
for reconsideration, confining his arguments to the issue of jurisdiction and the consequent
applicability of the primary jurisdiction doctrine.

THE RULING

We deny the motion for reconsideration.

Questions of fact generally barred under Rule 45

The main thrust of the petitioner’s arguments refers to the alleged error of the DENR and the CA
in identifying the parcel of land that the petitioner bought – an error that adversely affected his right
to apply for a free patent over the subject land. In his motion for reconsideration, the petitioner
apparently took a cue from our April 13, 2009 Resolution, denying his petition, since his present
motion limitedly argues against the DENR’s jurisdiction and the CA’s application of the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction.

The petitioner correctly recognized the settled rule that questions of fact are generally barred under
a Rule 45 petition. In the present case, the identity of Lots 258 and 322 is a central factual issue.
The determination of the identity of these lots involves the task of delineating their actual boundaries
in accordance with the parties’ respective deeds of sale and survey plan, among others. While there
are instances where the Court departs from the general rule on the reviewable issues under Rule 45,
the petitioner did not even attempt to show that his case falls within the recognized exceptions.21 On
top of this legal reality, the findings and decision of the Director of Lands22 on questions of fact, when
approved by the DENR Secretary, are generally conclusive on the courts,23 and even on this Court,
when these factual findings are affirmed by the appellate court. We shall consequently confine our
discussions to the petitioner’s twin legal issues.

The determination of the identity of a public land is within the DENR’s exclusive jurisdiction
to manage and dispose of lands of the public domain

The petitioner insists that under the law24 actions incapable of pecuniary estimation, to which a suit
for reformation of contracts belong, and those involving ownership of real property fall within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. Since these actions are already pending before the
RTC, the DENR Secretary overstepped his authority in excluding Lot 322 from the petitioner’s free
patent application and ordering the respondents to apply for a free patent over the same lot.

In an action for reformation of contract, the court determines whether the parties’ written agreement
reflects their true intention.25 In the present case, this intention refers to the identity of the land
covered by the second and third sale. On the other hand, in a reivindicatory action, the court
resolves the issue of ownership of real property and the plaintiff’s entitlement to recover its full
possession. In this action, the plaintiff is required to prove not only his ownership, but also
the identity of the real property he seeks to recover.26

While these actions ordinarily fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC, the court’s jurisdiction
to resolve controversies involving ownership of real property extends only to private lands. In the
present case, neither party has asserted private ownership over Lot 322. The respondents
acknowledged the public character of Lot 322 by mainly relying on the administrative findings of the
DENR in their complaint-in-intervention, instead of asserting their own private ownership of the
property. For his part, the petitioner’s act of applying for a free patent with the Bureau of Lands is an
acknowledgment that the land covered by his application is a public land27 whose management and
49.Bagunu v. Sps. Aggabao

disposition belong to the DENR Secretary, with the assistance of the Bureau of Lands. Section 4,
Chapter 1, Title XIV of Executive Order No. 29228 reads:

Section 4. Powers and Functions. - The Department [of Environment and Natural Resources] shall:

xxx

(4) Exercise supervision and control over forest lands, alienable and disposable public lands, mineral
resources and, in the process of exercising such control, impose appropriate taxes, fees, charges,
rentals and any such form of levy and collect such revenues for the exploration, development,
utilization or gathering of such resources;

xxx

(15) Exercise exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of all lands of the public
domain and serve as the sole agency responsible for classification, sub-classification, surveying and
titling of lands in consultation with appropriate agencies[.] (Underscoring supplied.)

Under Section 14(f) of Executive Order No. 192,29 the Director of the Lands Management Bureau
has the duty, among others, to assist the DENR Secretary in carrying out the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 (C.A. No. 141)30 by having direct executive control of the survey,
classification, lease, sale or any other forms of concession or disposition and management of the
lands of the public domain.

As the CA correctly pointed out, the present case stemmed from the protest filed by the respondents
against the petitioner’s free patent application. In resolving this protest, the DENR, through the
Bureau of Lands, had to resolve the issue of identity of the lot claimed by both parties. This issue of
identity of the land requires a technical determination by the Bureau of Lands, as the administrative
agency with direct control over the disposition and management of lands of the public domain. The
DENR, on the other hand, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to manage and dispose of public lands,
must likewise determine the applicant’s entitlement (or lack of it) to a free patent. (Incidentally, the
DENR Regional Office still has to determine the respondents’ entitlement to the issuance of a free
patent31 in their favor since it merely ordered the exclusion of Lot 322 from the petitioner’s own
application.) Thus, it is the DENR which determines the respective rights of rival claimants to
alienable and disposable public lands; courts have no jurisdiction to intrude on matters properly
falling within the powers of the DENR Secretary and the Director of Lands,32 unless grave abuse of
discretion exists.

After the DENR assumed jurisdiction over Lot 322, pursuant to its mandate, the RTC must defer the
exercise of its jurisdiction on related issues on the same matter properly within its jurisdiction,33 such
as the distinct cause of action for reformation of contracts involving the same property. Note that the
contracts refer to the same property, identified as "Lot 322," - which the DENR Regional Office,
DENR Secretary and the CA found to actually pertain to Lot 258. When an administrative agency or
body is conferred quasi-judicial functions, all controversies relating to the subject matter pertaining to
its specialization are deemed to be included within its jurisdiction since the law does not sanction a
split of jurisdiction34 –

The argument that only courts of justice can adjudicate claims resoluble under the provisions of the
Civil Code is out of step with the fast-changing times. There are hundreds of administrative bodies
now performing this function by virtue of a valid authorization from the legislature. This quasi-judicial
function, as it is called, is exercised by them as an incident of the principal power entrusted to them
of regulating certain activities falling under their particular expertise.35
49.Bagunu v. Sps. Aggabao

The DENR has primary jurisdiction to resolve conflicting claims of title over public lands

The petitioner argues that the CA erred in applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, claiming that
the issue (of who has a better right over Lot 322) does not require the "specialized technical
expertise" of the DENR. He posits that the issue, in fact, involves interpretation of contracts,
appreciation of evidence and application of the pertinent Civil Code provisions, which are all within
the competence of regular courts.

We disagree.

Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts must refrain from determining a controversy
involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to its resolution
by the latter, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring
the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical
and intricate matters of fact36 –

In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply [the doctrine of primary jurisdiction] to
cases involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies[. It may
occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means that the
matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its determination
requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because
technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an
administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is
within the proper jurisdiction of a court. This is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.] It applies "where a
claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim
requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the
special competence of an administrative body, in such case the judicial process is suspended
pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view."37

The application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, however, does not call for the dismissal of the
case below. It need only be suspended until after the matters within the competence of [the Lands
Management Bureau] are threshed out and determined. Thereby, the principal purpose behind the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction is salutarily served.38 (Emphases added.)

The resolution of conflicting claims of ownership over real property is within the regular courts’ area
of competence and, concededly, this issue is judicial in character. However, regular courts would
have no power to conclusively resolve this issue of ownership given the public character of the land,
since under C.A. No. 141, in relation to Executive Order No. 192,39 the disposition and management
of public lands fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Director of Lands, subject to review by the
DENR Secretary.40

While the powers given to the DENR, through the Bureau of Lands, to alienate and dispose of public
land do not divest regular courts of jurisdiction over possessory actions instituted by occupants or
applicants (to protect their respective possessions and occupations),41 the respondents’ complaint-in-
intervention does not simply raise the issue of possession – whether de jure or de facto – but
likewise raised the issue of ownership as basis to recover possession. Particularly, the respondents
prayed for declaration of ownership of Lot 322.  Ineluctably, the RTC would have to defer its ruling
1avvphi1

on the respondents’ reivindicatory action pending final determination by the DENR, through the

Undoubtedly, the DENR Secretary’s exclusion of Lot 322 from the petitioner’s free patent application
and his consequent directive for the respondents to apply for the same lot are within the DENR
Secretary’s exercise of sound administrative discretion. In the oft-cited case of Vicente Villaflor, etc.
v. CA, et al,42 which involves the decisions of the Director of Lands and the then Minister of Natural
Resources, we stressed that the rationale underlying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies to
questions on the identity of the disputed public land since this matter requires a technical
determination by the Bureau of Lands. Since this issue precludes prior judicial determination, the
courts must stand aside even when they apparently have statutory power to proceed, in recognition
of the primary jurisdiction of the administrative agency.

WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the motion for reconsideration. No costs.

SO ORDERED.