Kauffman vs. PNB (GR No. 16454)
Kauffman vs. PNB (GR No. 16454)
Kauffman vs. PNB (GR No. 16454)
KAUFFMAN, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. 16454 September 29, 1921
FACTS:
George A. Kauffman, was the president of Philippine Fiber and Produce Company. The board of directors of said
company, declared a dividend of P100,000 from its surplus earnings for the year 1917, of which the plaintiff was
entitled to P98,000. George B. Wicks, treasurer of the Philippine Fiber and Produce Company, presented himself in
the exchange department of the Philippine National Bank in Manila and requested that a telegraphic transfer of
$45,000 should be made to the plaintiff in New York City. He was informed that the total cost of said transfer,
including exchange and cost of message, would be P90,355.50.
Upon receiving a telegraphic message, the bank's representative in New York replied and advised withholding this
money from Kauffman, in view of his reluctance to accept certain bills of the Philippine Fiber and Produce Company.
The PNB agreed and sent to its NY agency another message to withhold the payment as suggested.
Meanwhile Wicks, cabled to Kauffman in New York, advising him that $45,000 had been placed to his credit in the
New York agency of the Philippine National Bank. Upon advice, Kauffman presented himself at the PNB NY and
demanded the money but was refused due to the direction of the withholding of payment.
ISSUE:
Whether the plaintiff has cause of action with respect to the Negotiable Instrument Law.
HELD:
No, the plaintiff has no cause of action with respect only to the Negotiable Instrument Law. The transaction of the
Respondent and the Philippine Fiber and Produce Company is not a negotiable Instrument. The provisions of the
Negotiable Instruments Law can come into operation there must be a document in existence of the character
described in section 1 of the Law; and no rights properly speaking arise in respect to said instrument until it is
delivered. In this case there was an order, it is true, transmitted by the defendant bank to its New York branch, for
the payment of a specified sum of money to George A. Kauffman. But this order was not made payable “to order or
“to bearer,” as required in subsection (d) of that Act; and inasmuch as it never left the possession of the bank, or its
representative in New York City, there was no delivery in the sense intended in section 16 of the same Law. In this
connection it is unnecessary to point out that the official receipt delivered by the bank to the purchaser of the
telegraphic order, and already set out above, cannot itself be viewed in the light of a negotiable instrument, although
it affords complete proof of the obligation actually assumed by the bank.