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    Brief Analysis of Stephane

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    Lefebvre discusses the importance and challenges of intelligence analysis in his 2004 article. He argues that while technology can process large amounts of data, human judgment is still needed to interpret information and assess threats. Lefebvre also notes that cognitive biases can negatively impact analysts' judgments and that initial training is insufficient - analysts need ongoing, hands-on experience to develop their skills. A core problem in intelligence analysis is the psychological difficulties analysts face in dealing with uncertainty.

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    Brief Analysis of Stephane

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    Mike
    75 views5 pages
    Lefebvre discusses the importance and challenges of intelligence analysis in his 2004 article. He argues that while technology can process large amounts of data, human judgment is still needed to interpret information and assess threats. Lefebvre also notes that cognitive biases can negatively impact analysts' judgments and that initial training is insufficient - analysts need ongoing, hands-on experience to develop their skills. A core problem in intelligence analysis is the psychological difficulties analysts face in dealing with uncertainty.

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    Lefebvre discusses the importance and challenges of intelligence analysis in his 2004 article. He argues that while technology can process large amounts of data, human judgment is still needed to interpret information and assess threats. Lefebvre also notes that cognitive biases can negatively impact analysts' judgments and that initial training is insufficient - analysts need ongoing, hands-on experience to develop their skills. A core problem in intelligence analysis is the psychological difficulties analysts face in dealing with uncertainty.

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    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as pdf or txt
    75 views5 pages

    Brief Analysis of Stephane

    Uploaded by

    Mike
    Lefebvre discusses the importance and challenges of intelligence analysis in his 2004 article. He argues that while technology can process large amounts of data, human judgment is still needed to interpret information and assess threats. Lefebvre also notes that cognitive biases can negatively impact analysts' judgments and that initial training is insufficient - analysts need ongoing, hands-on experience to develop their skills. A core problem in intelligence analysis is the psychological difficulties analysts face in dealing with uncertainty.

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    of 5

    Michael Grieves

    Student number: 179049355

    A brief analysis of Stephane Lefebvre, 'A Look at

    Intelligence Analysis', International Journal of Intelligence

    and Counterintelligence, 17/2 (2004)

    Submission Date: 24 OCTOBER 2018

    Word Count: 533

    (Excluding title and bibliography)


    Lefebvre discusses the importance of intelligence analysis, along with its negative and

    positives attributes. Numerous failures include intelligence reporting being disregarded or

    misinterpreted, faults in analysis, lack of collection by the intelligence agencies, and poor

    management. The process of intelligence analysis is a discipline, comprising of judgments,

    reality, and factual error. Scholars argue that failures in intelligence are inevitable (e.g. Froscher,

    2010; Betts, 1978). This supports Lefebvre’s view, in regard to factual error, as if there are any

    incorrect elements in predictions, the analytical assessment would be flawed (Lefebvre, 2004)

    and an intelligence failure may occur.

    Lefebvre considers how intelligence analysis uses and has become dependent on

    technology and how alluring analysing freely obtainable big data has become. The Chief

    Technology Officer of the CIA strongly supports the use of big data (Hunt, 2018). Many

    agencies like the CIA, NSA and GCHQ have established big data teams devoted to analytics,

    research and development. Lefebvre argues analysts must be skilled in their use of technology as

    analysis “involves assessing the reliability and credibility of the data, and comparing it with the

    knowledge base available” (Lefebvre, 2004). Technology such as algorithms can strip out a

    considerable amount of information however, human judgment is needed to increase value.

    Information gathered concerning the intentions of foreign leaders, remain best identified by

    humans. Lefebvre is against the collection of data, which is not used (Lefebvre, 2004). The

    National Academies, (2015) agree with Lefebvre that a substantial percentage of data collected is

    extraneous or is considered bulk. It is impossible for analysts to keep up with the vast quantity of

    incoming data regarding threats, which needs consideration before recommendations are made.

    Katter, Montgomery, and Thompson (1979) reasoned that intelligence analysis is conceptually

    driven rather than data driven. Lefebvre agrees claiming qualified and competent analysts,
    linguists, and collection personnel are needed in order to exploit data.

    Lefebvre reviewed the complications inherent in producing high value intelligence,

    concluding that initial training is not enough and hands-on training was necessary to improve

    analysts’ performance. Hulnick, (1999) agrees analysts develop largely within their specialist

    job. However, this conclusion lacks practical applications since it is unlikely intelligence

    agencies can accommodate a plethora of intelligence analysts for ‘on the job’ learning.

    Lefebvre asserts that a core problem of intelligence analysis is psychological difficulties

    related to an analyst’s intellect and organisational behaviour. This is consistent with Heuer

    (1999) that humans have difficulties in dealing with inherent and induced uncertainty. Lefebvre

    argues that cognitive biases seek to confirm one’s already held beliefs, creating difficulties for

    analysts when dealing with uncertainty. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) argue cognitive biases

    can cause errors in judgment. The British intelligence community is conscious of the capacity for

    bias, as seen in regard to the Iraq war (Morrison, 2011) when Tony Blair favoured information

    confirming his own biases/hypotheses (Grieves 2018). This is particularly noticeable in analysts

    returning to a specific conflict zone after being absent for some time, utilising their previous

    beliefs to produce a hypothesis. Producing accurate intelligence estimates starts with

    understanding the analyst’s intrinsic strengths and weaknesses in processing information (Moore,

    2007). However, it is unlikely that a set of rules will influence accurate analysis of the material

    presented to analysts.

    References
    Betts, R. K. (1978) ‘Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable’,

    World Politics 31(01), pp. 61-89.

    Froscher, T. (2010) ‘Indispensable Intelligence and Inevitable Failures’, The Nonproliferation

    Review, 17(2), pp.419–424.

    Grieves, M.R. (2018) ‘How useful is the IC as a way of understanding the work of intelligence

    agencies?’ M18 PL7540: Intelligence – Key Concepts and Debates. University of

    Leicester. Unpublished essay.

    Heuer, R. J. Jr. (1999) The Psychology of Intelligence Analysis. Available at:

    https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-

    and-monographs/psychology- (Accessed: 9 October 2018)

    Hulnick, A. S. (1999) Fixing the Spy Machine: Preparing American Intelligence for the Twenty-

    First Century. Westport, CT: Praeger, pp. 13. 


    Hunt, I. J. (2018) ‘Big Data is a Big Deal at the CIA’, Central Intelligence Agency. Available at:

    https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2012-featured-story-

    archive/big-data-at-the-cia.html (Accessed: 14 October 2018).

    Katter, R. V., Montgomery, C. A. & Thompson, J. R. (1979) ‘Human processes in intelligence

    analysis: phase 1 overview’, U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioural and Social

    Sciences, pp. 74. Available at: http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a086503.pdf

    (Accessed: 14 October 2018)

    Lefebvre, S. (2004) ‘A Look at Intelligence Analysis’, International Journal of Intelligence and

    CounterIntelligence, 17(2), pp. 231–264.


    Moore, D. T. (2007) ‘Critical Thinking and Intelligence Analysis’, Defence Technical

    Information Center. Available at: http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a481702.pdf

    (Accessed: 23 October 2018).

    Morrison, J. N. (2011) ‘British Intelligence Failures in Iraq’, Intelligence and National Security,

    26(4), pp. 509–520.

    National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine (2015) ‘New Report Says No

    Technological Replacement Exists for Bulk Data Collection’, 15 January. Available at:

    http://www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/newsitem.aspx?recordid=19414&_ga=2.18

    6597994.2128444316.1540283483-1776903076.1540283483 (Accessed: 23 October

    2018).

    Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. (1974) ‘Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases’,

    Science, 185(4157), pp. 1124-1131.

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