Quad Jpeg

JPEG: the quadruple object
Paul Lomax Caplan
School of Media and Cultural Studies

Birkbeck, University of London
Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

University of London
July, 2012
I declare that the contents of this thesis are my

own work.
_______________________________
Paul Lomax Caplan
2
Abstract
The thesis, together with its practice-research works, presents an object-
oriented perspective on the JPEG standard. Using the object-oriented
philosophy of Graham Harman as a theoretical and also practical starting
point, the thesis looks to provide an account of the JPEG digital object and
its enfolding within the governmental scopic regime. The thesis looks to
move beyond accounts of digital objects and protocols within software
studies that position the object in terms of issues of relationality,
processuality and potentiality. From an object-oriented point of view, the
digital object must be seen as exceeding its relations, as actual, present and
holding nothing in reserve. The thesis presents an account of JPEG starting
from that position as well as an object-oriented account of JPEG’s position
within the distributed, governmental scopic regime via an analysis of
Facebook’s Timeline, tagging and Haystack systems.
As part of a practice-research project, the author looked to use that

perspective within photographic and broader imaging practices as a spur to
new work and also as a “laboratory” to explore Harman’s framework. The
thesis presents the findings of those “experiments” in the form of a report
alongside practice-research eBooks. These works were not designed to be
illustrations of the theory, nor works to be “analysed”. Rather, following the
lead of Ian Bogost and Mark Amerika, they were designed to be
“philosophical works” in the sense of works that “did” philosophy.
3
Acknowledgments
A lot of human and unhuman objects connected in this project. Thanks
are due first to the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) for
funding the research and Birkbeck, University of London for awarding me
the studentship. More recently, thanks to my employer, Winchester School of
Art, University of Southampton for freeing up my time to meet my deadline.
Without these connections this mesh would never have appeared.
I have been fortunate throughout this process to connect with some of the
people I have written about. Thanks to Graham Harman for a chat at
Paddington Station and emails letting me know I was accessing the right
qualities. Thanks too to Jane Bennett, Timothy Morton and Levi Bryant for
their support and interest in how my work connected with theirs. Particular
thanks to Ian Bogost for an early connection with Alien Phenomenology and
just the right word for the methodology I was struggling towards.
Thanks also to the organisers of the conferences where I have presented

early objects and the delegates who responded to my work. Unhuman
objects such as ASCA in Amsterdam, Platform Politics in Cambridge and
Perceptions of Practice in Nottingham as well as human objects such as Lara
Mazurski, Robert Jackson and David Reid - molten cores where this object
began to connect.
This object would not have the form it does without my supervisors.
Thanks to Tim Markham for ruthlessly ensuring the sensual dimensions did
not overwhelm any real qualities my work might have. Particular thanks to
Jussi Parikka who has been more than an academic supervisor. Generous
with his time, challenging with his feedback and personally supportive when
the object withdrew from all access - whatever value there is in this object is
credit to him.
Finally thanks to those human objects who have made my mesh what it is:
Sean Brierley, Niall Martin, the Wils, the Bug and the Bird, for seeing me
through the process and reminding me of the importance of the real.
4
Table of Contents
Introduction! 8
The Digital Imaging Pipeline! 16
Interlude: Eugene Atget! 25
The JPEG object in the literature! 28

The relational object 28
The processural object 43
The potential object 48
The protocol object 55
Conclusion 68
Interlude: Sally Mann! 69
The JPEG object in theory! 72

JPEG as an object 72
Overmining and undermining 76
The sensual object 81
The real object 84
Fusion and fission 87
The connection 92
I object: relationality 95
I object: processuality 96
I object: potentiality 100
I object: formalism 104
I object materialism 108
Interlude: William Eggleston! 114
The JPEG object in practice! 117
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Object-oriented photography (OOPh) 117
JPEG imaging 122
Why practice? 129
Carpentry and remix 131
Focus and practice 134
The report! 137

JPEG as an object 137
The sensual JPEG 137
The real JPEG 138
JPEG’s qualities 140
JPEG and time 140
JPEG and space 142
JPEG: eidos and essence 144
JPEG: fusion and fission 146
JPEG and connections 147
JPEG and materiality 149
Conclusion 150
Interlude: Robert Frank! 152
JPEG: the governmental object! 155

Facebook and photography 155
Facebook, photography and governmentality 158
Facebook and software governmentality 160
Facebook and machinic governmentality 164
Facebook and scopic governmentality 166
Reading the relationship engine in terms of objects 171
Facebook, photography and protocol 173
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Conclusion 175
Conclusion: by way of an Exploit! 177
Epilogue! 181
Appendix: the memory card! 182

the eBooks 182
The eBook document (iBook and Kindle) 183
Kindle (quadJPEG.mobi) 184
iPad (quadJPEG.ibooks) 185
The Facebook Timeline “book” 186
The database “book” 186
The HTML webpage “book” 187
A word about design 187
A word about photography 187
Reading the eBooks 188
Bibliography! 191
Also included:
• One 4GB SD memory card
• One 35mm stereo slide
7
Introduction
When confronted with photography, Roland Barthes suddenly becomes
poetic. In Camera Lucida, he struggles for the right language:
One day, quite some time ago, I happened on a photograph

of Napoleon’s youngest brother, Jerome, taken in 1852. And
I realized then, with an amazement I have not been able to
lessen since: ‘I am looking at eyes that looked at the
Emperor.’ Sometime I would mention this amazement, but
since no one seemed to share it, nor even to understand it
(life consists of these little touches of solitude), I forgot about
it... I was overcome by an a ‘ontological’ desire: I wanted to
learn at all costs what Photography was ‘in itself,’ by what
essential feature it was to be distinguished from the
community of images. Such a desire really meant that
beyond the evidence provided by technology and usage,
and despite its tremendous contemporary expansion, I
wasn’t sure that Photography existed, that it had a ‘genius’ of
its own (1990, p. 3).
As Geoffrey Batchen discusses (2009, p. 9), Camera Lucida was a self-

consciously tentative, even modest project, written - in a way reminiscent of
Walter Benjamin’s Arcades Project (2002) - on index cards, with the subtitle
Note sur la photographie.
As a photographer, I too sometimes find the language of analysis

inadequate. It cannot quite cover the totality, the reality of photographic
practice particularly in the digital space. Sometime the question of what
photography is, and particularly is now, demands a different register.
I remember making a print. It was always called that: prints were “made”.
I put the negative in the enlarger, projected it onto the easel for a specified
number of seconds, my hands made shadows to “dodge” parts of the image,
hold light back from hitting the paper. My hands then made a narrow
aperture, “burning” more light into particular sections of the print. I slid the
piece of paper into the dish and gently agitated the clear liquid over its
surface. An image gradually appeared. If all went well, the blacks deepened
while the whites remained clear and the greys neatly spaced out between. If
not, I would take the paper out of the dish and breathe on an area of the
8
emerging image. The heat of my breath would speed up the chemical

reactions darkening the area. This was the last step in a series of rituals and
crafts: measuring the light; choosing the aperture and shutter combination
that, following Ansel Adams’ “zone system”, gave me the tonal range I saw;
the chemical manipulation of silver halides and the emergence of the
negative from the tank; holding the 36 exposure length of gelatin and silver
up to the light. I remember photography as a complex mesh of human and
unhuman objects:1 the photographer; the camera; film and its silver mined,
bought, sold and traded; lightmeters and enlargers; gelatin and chemicals
bearing the traces of life, paper and forests; media industries, clients,
contracts and postmen delivering slides.
With the advent of digital imaging,2 everything changed and nothing

changed. Photography is still a mesh of objects. The smell of the chemicals,
1. I use the term “mesh” in preference to the more common “assemblage”. Timothy
Morton uses the term in his discussion of the ecological thought. He says, “mesh doesn’t
suggest a clear starting point” (2010a, p. 29) and “[t]he mesh is made of insubstantial
stuff, and its structure is very strange” (ibid p. 35). The term is particularly useful when
looking to develop an object-oriented account. As Morton continues, “the mesh isn’t
bigger than the sum of its parts” (ibid p. 35). Such a term therefore keeps the focus on
objects not some meta context or field and does not preclude an account of nested
objects.
It is important to note, that Morton’s “mesh” is not an holistic term. When he talks of
everything connected within a mesh, each of the objects has its own specificity and
reality. This is a flat ontology, not a holistic whole. Drawing on the image of Indra’s net
and its jewels reflecting in jewels, He says, “[t]otal interconnectedness isn’t holistic....
Indra’s net implies that large and small things, near and far things are all ‘near’” (ibid p.
40).
Manuel De Landa also uses the term “mesh” notably in A New Philosophy of Society
where he compares assemblages and totalities (2006, pp. 8-25), even going as far as to
speak of a flat ontology (ibid p. 28). Graham Harman says that De Landa’s ontology is “a
good ontology” (2010, p. 170). But, while applauding what he see as De Landa’s
“realism”, Harman fears that for De Landa, “realities are never fully actualized even in the
physical realm, let alone in our minds” (2010f, p. 171). Assemblages are an emergence
(ibid, p. 184). I will come on to address Harman’s insistence on actualism (in comparison
to Levi Bryant’s object-oriented ontology, in my discussion of potentiality.
2. I use the term “imaging” throughout this work to draw attention to a wider field of
picturing of which “photography” is now a part. Such imaging includes montages and
remixes in Photoshop; mechanic images captured by CCTV; visualisations and
infographics; and, as I shall discuss, mash-ups. For discussion of the changing nature of
the “visibility economy”, see Kember (2008) in terms of issues of “becoming”; Murray
(2008) on “everyday aesthetics”; Jackson (2009) on young people and visual new media
cultures; Palmer (2010) on archives and neo-liberalism and Schwarz (2011) on “the
negotiated panopticon”. More generally on the growth of “ubiquitous media”, see
Featherstone (2009); Schick & Malmborg (2010) and Deuze (2011). For a broader
discussion of “personal media”, see Lüders (2008).
9
the orange safelight and the paper have gone but there is, for me as
photographer, still ritual, craft. I still read the light and chose my exposure. I
still see in terms of Adams’ zones, now as histograms. I’m still part of a mesh
of human and unhuman objects. I still chose the decisive or indecisive
moment. Light still becomes information, a RAW “negative” that Adams
used to refer to as a musical score, waiting to be performed in the darkroom.
I load a disc into my iPad rather than a film strip into my enlarger but my
fingers still dance, dodge and burn areas on the haptic interface rather than
over the paper.3
But there is still something inaccessible going on. Somewhere “in” my

camera and computer something happens to turn the light I see into an
image that circulates online, that can be seen and embedded, searched,
tagged and linked, that makes my photograph inevitably social. Information
still becomes image becomes representation and then becomes social as it
joins the panoply of images, imagings or even imaginings (what we might
call imag(in)ings) circulating online. My images may no longer hold the
privileged position that my NUJ card-stamped photos once had. They may
now be one among many, but imaging, like photography before it,4 still
poses Barthes’ question: what is it “in itself”?
There is still a mesh of actant-objects in play within photography. The cast

list still includes Olympus and Fuji (if no longer Kodak) but now includes
Apple and Google. Metals and plastics, toxins and discourses of
professionalism are still in play but there is also a new player: software.5
3. Jenni Mäenpää and Janne Seppänen call this digital photo editing space an
“imaginary darkroom” (2010, p. 454). I will come on to argue that while it is certainly a
space of imaging and imagining, it is also real and material.
4. It is important to note that there is no simple linear teleology in play here. The
contemporary digital imaging scopic regime must be seen in complex relations with that
of the sort of “Decisive Moment” photography that Henri Cartier-Bresson practised
(1999) or any other “way of seeing”. There are continuities and discontinuities.
5. I am of course exercising a bit of poetic licence here. Although as an analogue

photographer, I used purely mechanical Leica and Bronica cameras, I also used an
electronic light meter as well as analog Nikon cameras with electronic (and therefore
software) shutters and meters. What is different about the digital/software imaging mesh
is the centrality and pervasive position of that software. If the Nikon software failed I
could always use the Leica. If the light meter ran out of power, I could always guess the
exposure. If my iPhone runs out of power or crashes... so does my imaging.
10
This project is about that new player, in particular one aspect of software:
the software standards that enable that technosocial mesh. At the moment of
taking and sharing something happens to turn light into data and more
significantly social data. To rewrite Kodak’s slogan, when I press the button,
software does the rest. JPEG photography is a complex ecology of human
and unhuman objects connecting the photographer, the camera, the silicon
and battery, the factories and poisoned workers, the card and the router,
Web 2.0 businesses, servers and the power that runs them, the carbon burnt
to keep those searchable archives running, the “friend” and searcher, the IP
lawyer and countless other actants. This project is about those objects 6 and
the complex, inaccessible relations and connections that make up digital
imag(in)ing.
I am a JPEG photographer. I photograph with, through and against JPEG. I

photograph, encode light as data, compress it as JPEG JFIF files and upload
them and allow them to circulate as social photographs. JPEG, as one of the
objects in my imaging apparatus7 and practice makes sure people can search
for them, see them, download them, share them, embed and mash them
with other data. My photographs are standards-compliant because they were
created with standards. That standards component in my photographic
6. Along with Harman (and Bruno Latour), I use the term “object” rather than “thing”.
Harman discusses how Heidegger (1975) distinguishes between the Thing which
“things” i.e. does something, “stands independently in itself”, and the ‘”object” which is
what we represent to ourselves (2010a, p. 24). For Heidegger, “’[o]bject’ is a negative
term, used to describe entities only in their presence-at-hand. But thing’ is a positive
term referring to entities in their proper reality” (Harman, 2007, p. 129). Harman stresses
that these are not to be seen as separate objects but rather dimensions of an object
(something I pick up when discussing “sensual” and “real” objects). Harman’s point
which he develops in The Quadruple Object (2011g), when he brings Heidegger and
Husserl together in his own fourfold, is that the thing/object has both dimensions. His
use of the term object is meant to cover both. For other accounts of Things, see Brown
(2001; 2004).
7. I use the term “apparatus” rather than “camera” so as to include my “mash-up” and
screengrab works but also to bring in the sense of “dispositif” used by Foucault (1980)
and Giorgio Agamben. Agamben says, “[f]urther expanding the already large class of
Foucauldian apparatuses, I shall call an apparatus literally anything that has in some
way the capacity to capture, orient, determine, intercept, model, control, or secure the
gestures, behaviors, opinions. or discourses of living beings” (2009, p. 14). For a
discussion of text-as-apparatus, see Weight (2006).
11
apparatus and practice is “weird”.8 It is real. It does things, but we can’t see
it or touch it. Its traces and connections are everywhere: in dot JPEG image
files, in social media archives and search engine and hard drive caches, in
data-mining strategies and surveillance practices, in business models. But
like Keyser Söze, the mysterious figure in Bryan Singer’s film The Usual
Suspects (1995), JPEG just slips out of sight. It withdraws.9
This work sets out to address JPEG as a standard enfolded in software and
hardware meshes at play in contemporary imaging, as an imag(in)ing
protocol which like transmission protocols enable network effects.10 More
than that however, it seeks to explore how JPEG plays its part in the regime
of governmentality with which the social, distributed imaging in spaces such
as Facebook, are implicated. I come on to explore how JPEG is enfolded in
Facebook’s tagging and Open Graph technologies, its datamining strategies
and working as a governmental “relationship engine”. I set out to understand
that weird object, its nature, its workings and its relationship to dimensions
of contemporary governmentality, the practices of governmental rationality,
ordering, “conduct of conduct” and the relationship of self to self that
characterise contemporary regimes of power.11 These were my research
questions.
My way into these questions is to approach JPEG as an “object” in the

sense in which object-oriented philosophers such as Timothy Morton, Levi
8. I use the term “weird” in the same sense in which Jussi Parikka discusses the “weird
objects of network culture” (2011a, p. 268 see also Hertz & Parikka (2010)). the term is
also used by Douglas Hoftstadter in his discussion of Artificial Intelligence. He says, “we
will have a very hard time deciding when and if we are dealing with an AI program, or
just a ‘weird’ program” (1999, p. 680).
9. A character in the film, Roger “Verbal” Kint, says “the greatest trick the Devil ever
pulled was convincing the world he didn’t exist”.
10. Technically JPEG is a compression standard, rather than a protocol which usually
refers to common rules enabling network transmission. JPEG could perhaps be seen as
as social or imag(in)ing protocol, a common standard enabling the networking of images
and abiding by (or in OOP terms, connecting with) the transmission protocols of the
Internet. Throughout this work I use the term “protocol” in that wider sense of a technical
standard of compression written into software and hardware meshes but also a
networking standard enabling (social) imag(in)ing and as we shall see scopic
governmentality.
11. These issues, derived from the work of Michel Foucault, are discussed in more detail
in the JPEG: the governmental object chapter.
12
Bryant and in particular Graham Harman use the term. As I discuss, I use
this framework as not just an ontological starting point but also a
methodology. While I do not position this as a philosophical work, I do
argue that object-oriented ontology offers a powerful way of addressing
weird objects such as JPEG.
This is a practice-research project, I use practice to answer my questions

about JPEG. This document is a report on that practice, an account and an
analysis of using, refusing and even abusing JPEG and what doing so has
taught me about the nature and working of JPEG as an object and the ways it
connects with the panoply of other photography objects at work in
contemporary social imaging. As I discuss, I developed a practice designed
to explore JPEG through imaging. I designed and used a number of scopic
apparatuses or imaging devices as a way of exploring the implications of
treating JPEG as what Graham Harman calls a “quadruple object”. This
practice forms the basis for this report.
The practice-research on which I report is a development of my

photographic/imaging practice, an object-oriented imaging project around
the site of the London 2012 Olympics near my home. As I discuss, the
specific object-oriented practice-research “experiments” I developed built
on my existing project looking at, for and through the objects in the liminal
spaces around the Fence surrounding the site. It is important to note that
while 2012 was the site and object of my original photographic project it is
not the subject of this project. I am exploring JPEG not 2012 or even the
imaging of 2012.
This report is structured as follows. I approach JPEG as an object and so

my way of approaching the relevant literature is to trace how the digital
object and the scopic apparatus have been seen through the literature. In
The JPEG object in the literature chapter, I argue that existing accounts of
digital objects have been dominated by issues of relationality, processuality
and potentiality - perspectives that fail to deal adequately with the nature,
character and workings of “weird” objects such as protocol.
13
In my second chapter, The JPEG object in theory, I present an object-

oriented account of JPEG.12 Following Harman’s framework of the
“quadruple object” I map JPEG as a real and a sensual object. This allows
me to map JPEG’s relation to matters of time, space, eidos and essence. This
in turn allows me to locate JPEG within an object-oriented set of relations
where objects connect within the molten core of other objects, rather than
as secondary to some broader field of relations, processes or potential. I also
discuss a range of critiques that can be aimed at such object-oriented
accounts.
The JPEG object in practice discusses my imaging experiments with JPEG.

I explain and explore my practice research whereby I developed object-
oriented scopic apparatuses and practices in order to understand the nature
of JPEG, in particular Harman’s account of the “fission” and “fusion” that
characterise the sorts of object relations that I argue are at the heart of the
JPEG scopic/governmental regime. I look to move beyond a purely
theoretical account of JPEG imaging to explore that framework in practice.13
I then present a Report of my findings where I explore the ways in which

an object-oriented account of JPEG appeared in my practice.
In JPEG: the governmental object, I use this account of the quadruple

object and its relations to explore the distributed imaging regime and its
governmental implications as encountered in the digital detritus of Google,
Facebook and Flickr’s infinite archive: the spaces of imagining 2012.
Through a discussion of Facebook’s photo storage system Haystack and the
patented technologies that underpin its Open Graph, I look to again provide
an object-oriented account of the social imaging mesh through theory and
my practice.
12. There is some disagreement around the best term for perspectives that start from
and work with objects. Harman prefers the term “object-oriented philosophy” while Levi
Bryant, Timothy Morton and Ian Bogost prefer “object-oriented ontology”. Following my
use of Harman’s quadruple structure I choose to use his terminology, hereafter
abbreviated to OOP.
13. As I discuss in this chapter and the next, I am not looking to develop a philosophical
work or account of JPEG. Rather I position OOP as not just an ontology but also a
method. Rather than engaging in debates about whether OOP is valid as philosophy, I
look to ask whether it has anything to offer to software studies and to practice.
14
In addition, the text is interspersed with considerations of object-oriented

photographers, or more correctly object-oriented considerations of
photographers, as the photographers considered would probably not
consider themselves working within what I call object-oriented photography.
These interventions in the text are part of the e-Books that I have created as
part of this project. These objects are also included here as a way of
grounding the theory in a wider object-field as well as exploring what
happens when disparate written objects are made to collide and connect
within this PhD-object.14
Like Camera Lucida there is something very personal about this work. It
arises from and works through my practice as a photographer. Its object is
clear: JPEG, yet that object, like Barthes’ photo of his mother has a complex
form, character and power. The central question is simple: “what is JPEG?”
like Barthes’ “what is Photography?”. Yet both questions open up a complex
mesh of connections, relations and actants in play. Barthes’ mission took
him outside his comfort zone of language. Mine has taken me outside the
comfort zone of both “pure” practice and “pure research”. Finally, like
Camera Lucida this work is modest and tentative: Note sur le protocole.
14. In my conclusion I talk of how the form of this project and report are themselves
object-oriented and how I created the work in that way in order to explore the critical
potential of object-oriented approaches to academic writing and publishing.
15
The Digital Imaging Pipeline

This project seeks to understand, and also takes place in, the “digital
imaging pipeline”,15 that space of objects and object connections within
hardware and software scopic apparatuses and imag(in)ing meshes where
light-becomes-data-becomes-image. Although the term “pipeline” would
tend to connote process and movement and linear relations, I will come on
to draw it in terms of objects. To provide a grounding for these discussions it
is necessary to lay out the technical form of that pipeline in order to
establish the range of objects we are dealing with.16
One way to understand the “digital imaging pipeline” is via its chemical
equivalent. I use the term “chemical” rather than “analogue” because I want
to avoid debates about a digital-analogue divide. The issue here is not
whether one deals in discrete one and zero steps and the other a smooth
curve, but rather the way in which encoding works. The issue within which
JPEG is important is the difference between action of light on silver halides
within a chemical process, and light on silicon within a digital process.
In “chemical photography” photographic film carries an emulsion binding

silver halide crystals to a gelatin base. Silver halide consists of silver
combined with a halogen element, such as chlorine, bromine or iodine.
These crystals react to the light that hits them, forming a latent image which
is amplified during development to form a visible, black image where light
has struck the emulsion. When the film is “fixed” the remaining unexposed
crystals are removed, leaving a negative image on film. Vastly simplified, the
chemical imaging pipeline can be characterised as: light hits silver creating
latent image; development amplifies latent image creating final image.
Of course photography adds other stages and technologies to the process.

Most photographers want to turn the negative into a positive. By shining light
15. This term “pipeline” is not simply a metaphor. Rather it is the recognised technical
term for addressing the ways in which digital imaging works and, as I understand it, the
way the various objects connect. See for example Ramanath, Snyder, Yoo & Drew (2005)
and Gonzalez & Woods, (1992).
16. For the recognised FAQs around JPEG, see Lane (1999a; 1999b).
16
through the negative onto a paper coated with a similar silver halide
emulsion, the exposed areas (black in the negative) stop light hitting the
paper, while unexposed areas (clear in the negative) let light hit the
crystals.17 What was light in the scene and black in the negative become
light in the print and vice versus. There are other technologies (or objects as I
would refer to them) in play. Lenses (or in my case pinholes); camera
apparatuses including the shutter and aperture assembly; enlargers; film and
paper as well as corporate objects such as Kodak as well as their failed
business strategy.18 Some of these of course are also in play in digital
photography. What is different is the encoding - the journey of light through
latent image or data to visible image.
Many things are similar, metaphorically and literally. Concentrating just

on the encoding, light hits a sensor (silicon rather than silver halide). This
generates data (electronic information rather a latent image in silver) that
becomes an image (through software processing rather than through
chemical development). But there are important differences that impact on
how JPEG, as my main focus, works within imaging and to create images.
To work with objects: the first object in the digital imaging pipeline is the
sensor. In digital photography these are two main types: CCD (charge-
coupled device) and CMOS (complimentary metal-oxide semiconductor)
sensors.19 Sensors are effectively an array of silicon, solar or photovoltaic
cells. When light hits one of these cells, some of its energy is absorbed by
the silicon, knocking electrons loose which are forced to flow in a particular
direction creating a current: photons become electrons, light become
electricity.
17. For the sake of clarity I focus on basic black and white photography rather than
colour imaging or reversal (slide) photography.
18. As I shall argue, just because an object or an object connection “fails” does not
mean it is not an object. The collapse of Kodak in 2012 can be understood in object-
oriented terms as its business strategy object failing to connect with other objects in the
imaging mesh. Latour famously explores such “failed” object relations in Aramis (1996).
19. There are other types of sensor such as the Olympus Live MOS sensor and the
Sigma Foveon DP sensor discussed by Bogost (2012a, pp. 69-71) see pp. 65-66.
17
CCD and CMOS sensors have either a red, green or blue filter over each
cell, essentially making the cell only sensitive to red, green or blue light.
These are arranged in a Bayer mosaic pattern consisting of two green, one
red and one blue filter - designed to match the bias of human perception of
colours.
The sensor reads the amount of charge from each cell (what comes to be
known as pixels). These electrical charges need to be collected and
organised before they can be processed by other software objects. A CCD
sensor handles this differently than a CMOS sensor. In a CCD sensor, a
control circuit causes each capacitor to transfer its contents to its neighbour
with the final output read at one corner of the array. In a CMOS sensor, each
pixel/cell is accompanied by several transistors that amplify and move the
charge using more traditional wires. Thus each pixel can be read
individually.20
At this point the light-as-electricity is still “analogue”. In order for the

software (including JPEG) to be able to work with it, it needs to become
digital. Here we come to our second object:21 the analog-to-digital converter
(ADC). An ADC is an integrated circuit that samples the analogue feed from
the sensor into a number of discrete levels of brightness. Most cameras use
8bit ADCs which allow 256 distinct values for the brightness of each pixel.22
This digital information simply records the luminescence at each location on
the sensor. This is greyscale data. The ADC adds extra information to its
output: information about a pixel’s location (and hence whether it was
“under” a red, green or blue filter) as well as metadata about the sensor’s
colour space; and the camera’s white balance setting. This digital
20. CCD sensors are generally seen as more expensive and power hungry but also
having higher sensitivity and being capable of delivering higher quality. CMOS sensors
tend to be found in mobile phone cameras
21. Of course OOPs would be clear that we have already been dealing with a whole
series of nested objects in terms of the sensor, but for clarity’s sake I outline the key
actants.
22. A bit in computer terms has a value of on or off, one or zero. A two-bit ADC would
divide the information from the sensor into levels 00, 01, 10 and 11. An 8-bit sensor can
divide it into 256 levels from 00000000 to 11111111.
18
information becomes the RAW data file that is written to the camera’s
storage medium.23
Because each pixel/cell only senses one wavelength of light (red, green or
blue), the information making up the “latent image” needs to be interpolated
so that the image can represent the amount of red across the whole image
not just on those bits where the filter measured the red light. To do this a
“demosaicing algorithm” averages the values from the closest surrounding
pixels to assign a “true colour” to each pixel. This data can be encoded as a
visible colour image file. It is here where JPEG comes in.24
The demosaicing algorithm outputs three 8-bit colour channels of data as

opposed to the one 12-bit RAW channel. These three channels are then
encoded in particular formats: usually either a 24-bit TIFF or a 24-bit JPEG/
JFIF or JPEG/EXIF file.
To concentrate just on the JPEG processing of that RAW feed of data, the
digital imaging pipeline continues in four steps: Sampling, Discrete Cosine
Transform (Cabeen & Gent, 1998), Quantization and Huffman Coding
(Miano, 1999, p. 44; Haas, 2008). At the end, the light-as-data is a JFIF
image, commonly know as a “jpeg photograph”.
The pixel data is first converted from RGB to YCbCr colorspace. The JPEG
standard is principally about compression. Its role in the imaging pipeline is
to reduce the amount of data in the file - hence its importance in the early
days of the Internet when bandwidth was at a premium. Part of the work of
compression is the move from RGB to YCbCr. Storing image data in both
RGB and YCbCr colorspaces demands three channels of information - in
RGB: red, green and blue; in YCbCr: luminance and two chrominance, blue
and red (Miano, 1999, p. 6). Both allow a full range of colours but in RGB,
23. This RAW data/file is not “pure”. Each camera has its own way of writing the RAW
data, its own format. RAW converters (the part of software that interprets and renders
that data as image within other software) have to know the various formats Olympus,
Nikon, Canon etc use in order to “make sense” of that data, see Fraser (2004). The
evocatively named “digital negative” DNG standard was developed to solve
incompatibility problems and also provide a standard that retained all the RAW data in a
standard format that could form the basis of archives.
24. For accounts of the history and development of JPEG, see Palmer (2011) and
Wallace (1992).
19
each channel is sampled at the same frequency while in YCbCr, this can be
varied. The Y component contributes most information to the visible image
and JPEG therefore assigns more weight to that component and reduces the
amount of information in the Cb and Cr channels, thus reducing the amount
of information and so the file size. As John Miano explains:
“By adjusting the sampling frequencies you could include

each pixel’s Y component value in the compressed data and
1 value for every 4 pixels from the other components.
Instead of storing 12 values for every 4 pixels, you would be
storing 6 - a 50% reduction” (1999, p. 41).
The next step in JPEG encoding is “Discrete Cosine Transform” (DCT). First
the YCbCr image data is divided into 8x8 blocks called data units.25 DCT
does not actually compress or throw information away, it merely readies the
data/information for that to happen in the next step by sorting the
information which can safely be discarded. Rather than record the individual
values of each Y, Cb and Cr component over an 8x8 block, we can average
the values for each block and record how each pixel differs from that
average value. DCT takes the set of values in each data unit and transforms it
into a set of coefficients to cosine functions with increasing frequencies
(Miano, 1999, pp. 77-90). In effect DCT arranges the digital information
ready for compression by finding the frequency of each value - in lay terms
the most frequent tone or colour values.
JPEG compression depends on the fact that human perception is not

perfect. A lot of information can be thrown away and, effectively we fill in
the gaps in a similar way to the way the demosaicing algorithm does. The
next step takes the sorted data from the DCT and discards those coefficients
that contribute less information to the image.26 This is the quantization step.
Quantization is a “fancy name for division. To quantize the DCT coefficients
we simply divide them by another value and round to the nearest
25. JPEG works with 8-bit data.
26. This is why JPEG compression is referred to as “lossy compression” because data is
lost.
20
integer” (Miano, 1999, p. 88).27 This rounding process effectively discards

some of the coefficients and so information. The JPEG standard does not
specify the value to be used in quantization. It leaves that up to the
application using JPEG. Rather it provides 8x8 quantization tables that map
onto the 8x8 data units. We normally come across these tables when we
choose the “quality” setting for JPEG compression in end-user software such
as Photoshop or select Fine, HQ or SHQ quality settings in a camera.
Having discarded data from the RAW data file, JPEG’s final step is to
create a visible (JFIF) file. This is achieved through Huffman coding. Like
DCT, Huffman coding takes the set of values in each data unit and
transforms it into another set of values. Unlike the DCT, Huffman coding is
lossless - no further information is discarded. Rather this process saves
further space by assigning shorter codes to the most frequently used values.
Like Morse code, Huffman Coding assigns shorter codes to the most
frequently occurring values (vowels have shorter Morse code symbols than x
or z) according to a Huffman table. As Calvin Haas explains:
Creating these tables generally involves counting how

frequently each symbol (DCT code word) appears in an
image, and allocating the bit strings accordingly. But, most
JPEG encoders simply use the Huffman tables presented in
the JPEG standard (2008, n.p.).
Having mapped the data to new (shorter) values according to a Huffman

table, the resultant file must include that table (or reference the standard
table) to enable other software to decode the data as a visible image.
Having started as light photons, being turned into electrical charge and
from there into data, the resultant information has been sorted and
compressed by JPEG into a file ready to be written (potentially alongside a
RAW file) to the camera’s memory. JPEG wraps the compressed data within a
27. Jesse D. Kornblum identifies how quantization tables can be used for image source
identification within digital forensics (2008). While issues of JPEG and digital forensics as
well as “steganography” (the potential to hide data within JPEG-encoded images) are
dimensions of JPEG’s relation to broader regimes of power and governmentality, they are
not the focus of this work which aims to look at the more prosaic position of JPEG as
standard within imaging, its standard connection with other digital and governmental
objects. For accounts of steganography, see Johnson & Jajodia (1998); Provos &
Honeyman (2001); Fridrich (2004) and Fridrich, Pevný & Kodovský (2007).
21
format that includes the Huffman and quantization tables necessary to

decode the compressed data, the data itself and a series of markers that
break the stream of encoded data into its component structures. These
markers are 2 bytes length with the second byte denoting the type of marker.
One such marker is the APP marker which hold application-specific data.
These are used by software or applications to add additional information
beyond what is demanded by JPEG. An encoder that uses JPEG can specify
particular information within an APP marker. This is important when it
comes to the two most widely used JPEG-encoded file formats.
JPEG does not define a file format. As Miano says, “it says nothing about
how colors are represented, but deals only with how component values are
stored” (1999, p. 40). Other file formats such as TIFF can compress using
JPEG. JPEG can therefore write more than one sort of data/image file. The
two most common follow the JFIF (JPEG File Interchange Format) (Hamilton,
1992) and the EXIF (Exchangeable Image File Format) (CIPA, 2011)
standards. The two standards are very similar with EXIF allowing the addition
of specific metadata tags but not allowing colour profiles. Most cameras
encode to an EXIF file while imaging applications use JFIF. Technically JFIF
and EXIF use different APP markers (APP0 and APP1). In practice most photo
applications use JFIF and include the metadata from the APP1 marker.28
Other markers provide space in the file for comments, details of the width
and height and number of components in the image as well as the Huffman
and quantization tables.
As I shall discuss in The JPEG object in theory and The JPEG object in
practice chapters, this “family of compression algorithms” (Lane, 1999a,
n.p.) can be addressed as an object in Harman’s terms not only in terms of
its existence in paper standards documents but also in terms of its “weird”
quadruple existence within the digital imaging pipeline. Clearly however, it
is possible to address this whole pipeline (or indeed the chemical imaging
pipeline) through OOP.
28. Strictly speaking this goes against the standard with both JFIF and EXIF demanding
that their marker is first in the data-stream. As with much software, this demand is
fudged.
22
OOP enables, even forces, us to see a panoply of objects in play in any

situation or mesh. Human and unhuman, material and virtual, even real and
imaginary actants (in Latour’s terms) connect and reconnect in ways that we
experience as processes or pipelines. In terms of chemical photography, the
photographer, lens, shutter blades, gelatin, silver and sodium thiosulfate
(fixer) all have their own presence and material actuality. They all do things
as individual objects as they connect and reconnect with each other. But
they also form components of other objects: the camera, Bourdieu’s
photographic society (1990), Snappy Snaps, Kodak. It is objects all the way
down.
Similarly in the digital imaging pipeline hardware and software objects,

mathematical algorithms and tables, silicon and electrical charges, Adobe,
the photographer and photons are all in play. They all have their specificity
and their connections. Some are material, others immaterial. Some we can
distinguish. Others, like an algorithm, have a weird presence and actuality.
Some are often characterised as systems or contexts, but they too are objects
just at a different scale. We may experience the pipeline as a process but
what we are really faced with is a network of objects connecting and
reconnecting with and within other objects.
What OOP (at least in the Harman version I explore) offers is firstly a
refusal to leave that focus on objects - to refuse to talk of systems,
assemblages, meshes or contexts as anything other than objects. Secondly
Harman’s OOP refuses to characterise those objects as defined by their
relations. Rather they have an existence and, in Jane Bennett’s terms a
“vitality”, that exceeds their relations (2010a). Thirdly, those objects are not
processes. They are not in flux. Rather, change is matter of new objects
formed in new object connections. Finally, from an OOP perspective, the
objects in play in the digital imaging pipeline do not hold anything back.
They do not harbour potential. They are fully present in their connections
not harbouring potential, or somehow waiting to “become”.
23
It is these refusals and positive claims that I explore in my practice-

research. But in the next chapter I show how this perspective on objects runs
counter to much discussion about digital/software objects and protocols.
24
Interlude: Eugene Atget

It has justly been said of him that he photographed them like
scenes of crimes. A crime scene, too, is deserted; it is
photographed for the purpose of establishing evidence. With
Atget, photographic records begin to be evidence in the
historical trial [Prozess]. This constitutes their hidden
political significance. They demand a specific kind of
reception. Free-floating contemplation is no longer
appropriate to them. They unsettle the viewer; he feels
challenged to find a particular way to approach them
(Benjamin, 2008, p. 27).29
Atget walked the streets of Paris from 1897 until his death in 1927 with
his view camera and a particular sensibility. He was a working hack. He
took pictures to sell as “documents for artists” in the nearby town of
Montparnasse. At the same time as Russian constructivists and Italian
Futurists were feting speed as technique, source material and inspiration,
Atget plodded around Paris like the fabled flâneur and his turtle,30 unfurling
his equipment, waiting as the light encoded Paris as information and then
waiting while light encoded it again as an Albumen print.
The long exposures meant the pictures were often devoid of people but
that is not what makes his sensibility object-oriented. Rather it is the ghostly
traces of humans occasionally caught in the doorways, on street corners or
reflected in windows alongside the rags ‘n refuse31 of Paris that make Atget
object-oriented.
His object-oriented sensibility (his “eye” as photographers might call it) is

democratic, in the sense in which Levi Bryant uses the term.32 His litany
includes gargoyles and statues, steps and railings, beds and bottles, hats and
29. For discussion of Benjamin and Atget, see Dennis (2009).
30. For discussion of the flâneur and online media, see Featherstone (1998) and
Atkinson & Willis (2007).
31. The term comes from Walter Benjamin’s account of the fragments collected in The
Arcades Project (2002, pp. N1a,8). This is discussed further in my conclusion.
32. For Bryant “[t]he democracy of objects is not a political thesis to the effect that all
objects ought to be treated equally or that all objects ought to participate in human
affairs. The democracy of objects is the ontological thesis that all objects, as Bogost has
so nicely put it, equally exist while they do not exist equally” (2011a, p. 19).
25
mannequins, toys and fruit, traders and trees. Like an istockphoto

freelancer33 compulsively imag(in)ing in the belief that someone, somewhere
needs a picture of X, Atget documented. But here there is no “decisive
moment” or even privileged access. His scopic flânerie was extensive but
not comprehensive. He selected particular objects to make into objects but
there was no hierarchy of Parisian reality. No Eiffel Tower at the top and a
particular staircase at the bottom nor vice versus. His was not a humanist
imaging nor an anti-humanist one. He simply didn’t care or maybe even see
the distinctions.
For Atget, as for anyone walking the city, Paris withdrew. Yet he
encountered it. There was a sensual dimension to Paris that Atget and his
camera connected with and it was the withdrawn reality that made the
sensual so powerful. His images are a trace of those encounters. Our
encounter with them echoes that withdrawal/access tension as we enjoy the
coffee table book or search online, as the images resonate or evoke and yet
something, somewhere withdraws.
In The Genius of Photography TV series, photographer Joel Meyerowitz

makes strange Atget’s Coin du Quai Voltaire of 1916 by turning it upside
down (Kirby, 1996a). When he has defamiliarised the image of the Paris
street with its Colonne Morris, streetlamp, trees and cobblestones, he sees
Atget’s object: “[a] white zipper. Zip! Running right up the middle of the
building” (op cit.). For Meyerowitz, this is a “punctum” (Barthes, 1990). This
pricks him as he argues it must have Atget. But the cemented-up chimney
flue can also be seen as a street object, alongside, not above or underneath
the Morris column or the window, just another object connecting with the
wall and the tree and the light and the photographer and his stall of images
for sale and... Trees and a cathedral share the frame in Notre-Dame, 1922 as
well as the ontological space. Like the cluttered Collector’s Room (1910) or
the barrels and gramophones in the Grocer and wine merchant (1912)
everything and nothing is punctum.
33. istockphoto is a “crowdsourcing” website/photo library allowing aspiring professional

photographers to sell images (Brabham, 2008).
26
When Atget wrote “Va Disparaitre” on the back of 41 Rue Broca in 1912,
it was a note to himself and us that the building would soon disappear.
Literally it would suffer the fate of La maison no 5 de la rue Thouin on the
10th August 1910. It would soon have its day of demolition with its new
rubble objects nestling next to a blurred ghostly figure and a boy who seems
to have stepped out of a Diane Arbus picture. But Atget is not nostalgic. Nor
is he simply a recorder of passing time. His object-oriented sensibility knows
that 41 Rue Broca disappears in another sense. As an object it disappears
from access at the moment of taking and viewing in 1912 as much as it does
a century later. Just as Atget knew it was sensually present for him and for us
then and now, it was also out of reach. It had already, inevitably and
irrevocably disappeared. It had withdrawn.
Atget’s Paris, often the name for the books published about him, as an
object then and now for the Paris tourist board, Eurostar, Woody Allen, my
iPhone and the wheel of Mark Cavendish’s bike is never fully there. It is not
just a brand, an ideology, a metaphor or a sign, but it is also never fully
accessible as a real object. Those objects encounter its sensual dimensions
as did Atget, his camera and the light that fell on the Door knocker (1909) or
the House of pleasure (1921) and rendered his albumen prints. Atget’s
object-oriented sensibility emerges from his willingness to sink into that
mesh of objects and sensual/real connections, to refuse the correlationist
agenda offering him a subject as opposed to object position or some
privileged access to Paris’ objects.34
34. The term “correlationist” is Quentin Meillassoux’s (2009) and is discussed in The
JPEG Object in Theory chapter.
27
The JPEG object in the literature

The relational object
For software and critical code studies,35 locating the digital or code object
within a field of relations has been a powerful axiom. As part of a broader
hegemonic struggle within media and cultural studies, exploring protocols,
interfaces, languages and algorithms as powerful because of the way they
relate to other actors in the network,36 has allowed software studies to
establish a critical praxis while also arguing for software’s pervasiveness and
enfolding within the complex meshes of contemporary technocapitalism and
technoculture.
As an example, David M Berry’s discussion of the “computational

knowledge society” (2011b, p. 3), as well as remaining focused on the
specifics of code, draws a relational map of software’s entanglements. When
he says, “[s]oftware is a tangle, a knot, which ties together the physical and
the ephemeral, the material and the ethereal, into a multi-linear ensemble
that can be controlled and directed” (ibid p. 3), those relations allow him to
unpack military hardware, trading and shopping systems and the
institutional and structural powers that they support.37 He says,
“[c]omputation reveals a particularly rich set of active relations, between
human and non-human actors, both collective and individual” (ibid p. 124).
Software and critical code studies’ willingness to remain concretely focused
yet relationally oriented has opened up such macro-micro analyses.
As I will come on to argue, OOP is not opposed to an idea of relations.

Nor is it against an account of the network. Indeed, as Harman’s feting of
35. The term is Mark Marino’s (2006). Later he says, “Critical Code Studies names the
practice of explicating the extra-functional significance of source code. Rather than one
specific approach or theories, CCS names a growing set of methodologies that help
unpack the symbols that make up software” (2011, n.p.). See also Mackenzie &
Vurdubakis (2011)
36. I use the term “network” in a Latourian rather than a technical sense. For studies of
interfaces, see Bratton (2008) and Chun (2008).
37. For an alternative account of the materiality of finance systems, see Miyazaki (2005)
and on algorithms and trading, see Lenglet (2011). For a discussion of the relation
between “data derivatives” and risk within the context of border security systems, see
Amoore (2011).
28
Latour in the first part of Prince of Networks (2009c) makes clear, actants in
networks is a powerful model: objects connect. Where OOP differs is in
demanding that objects are not defined by their relations and that relations
are matters of objects not of exterior context. Objects’ character and power
exceeds their relations and the networks or meshes within which they are
enfolded. As my own work will show, exploring JPEG as having an
existence, character and power beyond its relations allows us to see how
governmental issues of data-mining are best addressed as a matter of the
JPEG-object connecting with a search algorithm-object within another,
specific object. Objects relate within objects not within contexts or fields.
This is the heart of “object-orientation”, a refusal to leave an account of
specific objects even when building a critique of networks. It is this refusal
(or perhaps more positively, focus) that enabled me to engage in my
particular imaging and build my particular critique.
For some seminal work in software studies, including the first discussions
of protocol, this is not the case. Objects are best addressed in terms of
relationality.
Lev Manovich’s The Language of New Media in 2001 is credited with

introducing the idea of “software studies”.38 Coming as it did after the
dotcom bubble burst, Manovich’s book was hailed as giving software/digital
scholars concepts and a framework they could use to establish their own
specificity or as Sean Cubitt said in his Leonardo review (quoted on the back
cover): “we can argue on our own terrain”.
Right at the start of the book, Manovich brings in the object:
A new media object may be a still digital image, a digitally

composited film, a virtual 3D environment, a computer
game, a self-contained hypermedia DVD, a hypermedia Web
site, or the Web as a whole. The term thus fits with my aim
38. Of course there is more to Manovich’s work than this text and indeed more to The
Language of New Media than his account of the object, notably his discussions of
representation, cinema and realism. My concern is not to provide a full account of these
arguments but to draw out Manovich’s particular, and influential take on the object. For
his broader argument on the focus of software studies, see (2008; 2011b) In terms of
particular software, see (2005a; 2006; 2011a). On cinema, see (2000) and Manovich &
Kratky (2005). For his work on data visualisation, see (2010) and Manovich & Douglass
(2009).
29
of describing the general principles of new media which

would hold true across all media types, all forms of
organization and all scales. I also use ‘object’ to emphasize
that my concern is with the culture at large rather than with
new media art alone (2001, p. 14).39
He draws attention to the term’s use in computer science and industry and
how that aids in a discussion of “computerized culture”. Objects for
Manovich are products. They are the discs, films, data files, software
environments, interfaces,40 webpages and sites, even networks and digital
images,41 Manovich adds real value by understanding these as material.42
He says:
Rather than imposing some a priori theory from above, I

build a theory of new media from the ground up. I scrutinize
the principles of computer hardware and software, and the
operations involved in creating cultural objects on a
computer, in order to uncover a new cultural logic at work
(ibid p. 10).43
39. Other critics have looked at concrete non-art digital objects such as gadgets and
even digital fetishes particularly in terms of mobile. See for instance Itō, Okabe &
Matsuda (2005); Richardson (2005); Goggin (2006); Levy (2006); Hawk, Rieder &
Oviedo (2008); Ling (2008); Green & Haddon (2009) and Reading (2009).
40. An issue he had addressed as early as 1995 when “virtual reality” (VR) was all the
rage. In (1995a) he sought to find a way to address the specificity of that object through
an analysis of the “screen” through which it worked. For a more media archaeological
account of the screen, see Gere (2006).
41. In (1992) Manovich had discussed the question of “what is a picture?” including the
computational picture in his review of pictorial semiotics. He concluded that “the study of
the mechanism of pictorial signification and the understanding of social forces
responsible for these mechanisms should constitute a joint project”. Here is an early sign
not only of Manovich’s interest in the specificity of the object but also his location of that
object within its relations and context.
42. Lisa Gitelman questions whether Manovich is truly comfortable with the idea of
materiality: “Even the most astute and exacting critics of cyberculture tend to signal a
certain ambivalence about the bodies that electronic texts have, judging at least from
the frequency with which the word material appears between scare quotes. Lev
Manovich (2001, pp. 45, 48) writes that the ‘basic, “material” principles of new media
[are] numeric coding and modular organization,’ and that hardware and software have
“material” as well as “logical principles.”” (Gitelman, 2008, p. 96).
43. Manovich’s articulation of a form of “grounded theory”, a methodological approach

derived from the work of Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss (1967), is of course open to
the same criticisms, notably what does one count as “ground”. This is particularly
relevant when one is dealing with the sort of “weird” digital objects where ground could
be the software, the source code, the electrical charges or anywhere in between. For
critiques of “grounded theory” see Thomas & James (2006).
30
That materiality however is in the service of something more - the cultural

logic, the field of new media relations. When he says that his method could
be called ”digital materialism” (op cit.), this is in a wholly different way from
an object-oriented materialism that treats objects (whether real or virtual,
human or unhuman) as specific, vibrant actants that exceed that broader
frame and those relations. It is not just that Manovich concentrates on new
media “works” (specific products, actual games), nor that he approaches it
through an established discipline of film studies,44 it is that that specificity
and actuality are drawn in terms of a problematic definition of the object.
This sense of relationality as a defining theme can be seen in Manovich’s

formalist “principles of new media” (ibid pp. 27-48), the “general tendencies
of a culture undergoing computerization” (ibid p. 27). His final principle,
“transcoding” captures this sense of objects-in-relations. “Transcoding” is
“the most substantial consequence of media’s computerization...
computerization turns media into computer data” (ibid p. 45).45 Here the
focus is on “computerization”, data as related information. He argues that a
44. He says: “The theory and history of cinema serve as the key conceptual ‘lens’
though which I look at new media” (2001, p. 9).
45. In (1997, n.p.) Manovich had said, “[a]ll information becomes encoded in one code;
all cultural objects become computer programs, something which is not only seen,
heard or read, but first of all stored and transmitted, compiled and executed”.
Wendy Hui Kyong Chun has problems with this stress on computerisation. She argues
that the “problem with ‘software studies’ or transcoding, however, is this privileging of
software as readable text; it ignores the significance of hardware and extramedia
representation because it only moves between software and interface. Also, this notion
of transcoding perpetuates the idea that software merely translates between what you
see and what you cannot see, effectively erasing the many ways in which they do not
correspond” (2006, p. 18).
For Chun computation makes differences rather than simply registering them. Simply
opening a file can change it (see (Parikka & Sampson, 2009)). For Chun, “[t]he problem
with Manovich’s notion of transcoding is that it focuses on static data and treats
computation as a mere translation. Programmability does not only mean that images are
manipulable in new ways but also that one’s computer constantly acts in ways beyond
one’s control. To see software as merely “transcoding” erases the computation
necessary for computers to run” (Chun, 2005, p. 46).
She also criticises his account of new media spaces as ones of navigation arguing that
such spaces are unnavigable insofar as users have no control over the path their (or
anyone’s data) takes (2006, p. 46). In her most recent work she says the notion of
transcoding treats computation as “a mere translation” and focuses on static data rather
than issues of programmability and computation (2011, p. 91).
31
new media object is defined at a formal level by its relationship to the

computer, its database, its formal logics and structures.46
Even if we extend Manovich’s list of objects beyond discs, games and

films to include protocols and standards, human actants such as engineers or
photographers, unhuman actants such as what Bruce Sterling has called
“spimes” (2005) and Julian Bleecker has called “blogjects” (2009) as well as
the Apple App Store or Facebook’s datamining strategy; even if we take his
formalist principles and apply them to these new objects, we are still left
with an account of the object that requires something outside - structural
principles (the language) of new media, a contextual logic,47 a picture of
objects-in-relations.
Manovich says that “the new qualities of ‘digital media’ are not situated
‘inside’ the media objects. Rather, they all exist “outside” - as commands
and techniques of media viewers, email clients, animation, compositing,
and editing applications, game engines, and all other software
‘species’” (2011b, n.p.). When Manovich talks of the inside and and outside
of media objects, he is using the terms in a different way to Harman. Here
he is drawing attention to what he sees as a field of relations external to
objects enabled by software inside those objects. For an object-oriented
perspective, as we shall see, this is to move beyond objects and also to fail
to account for software itself as an object. The objects Manovich raises as
worthy of his formalist analysis derive their interest and their power from
46. In an earlier article, Manovich discusses databases as a symbolic form (1999) (a

theme taken up later by contributors to Vesna (2007)). The database, as what Tiziana
Terranova calls Manovich’s “arch-model of the new media” (2004, p. 35), positions the
new media object as a matter of relations. It is this sense that allows Terranova to
criticise Manovich for not developing that (software) object-in-relations account with
sufficient notice of power, a theme picked up in Chun’s account of databases and
control (2006).
47. It is perhaps interesting to see Manovich’s latest work around data visualisation as a
willingness to engage more fully with a wider field of objects. In (2002, n.p.) he wrote:
“Along with a Graphical User Interface, a database, navigable space, and simulation,
dynamic data visualization is one of the genuinely new cultural forms enabled by
computing”. He has since extended beyond considering visualisations as just cultural
forms to approaching them as something more problematic. In (2010, n.p.) he
suggested we “define information visualization as a mapping between discrete data and
a visual representation”. Here the visualisation is not a cultural form but a mapping,
something beyond both data and representation - a weird object perhaps.
32
their relations within software, within databases or within a new media

culture.
It is not, as N. Katherine Hayles says, that Manovich (and Kittler) “regard

the computer as the ultimate solvent that is dissolving all other media into
itself... This claim has the effect of flattening into a single causal line - the
convergence of all media into one - social and cultural processes that are in
fact much more complex” (2005, p. 31).48 Rather, from an object-oriented
point of view, the issue with Manovich’s identification of the importance of
the object is that he does not take it far enough not only in terms of what
counts as an object, but also how the object is understood. He presents a flat
media but not a flat ontology. Bogost argues that “object-orientation and
remapping are much subtler than Kittler and Manovich would lead us to
believe” (2006, p. 40). The problem is that by defining objects as objects-in-
relations (as Latour does in terms of his actants), one deals with actor
networks or software rather than the specifics of the sort of weird objects,
like protocol that I, and Alexander R. Galloway, argue are particularly
powerful.
Galloway’s is a particular articulation of software studies. He focuses on a

specific software component, protocol, rather than software packages or
software practices. He also positions software within broader semiotic,
material and historical frames notably in his later work with Eugene Thacker
on DNA codes and codecs (2007). What is particular about Galloway and
most notable in Protocol: How Control Exists after Decentralization (2004),
is his focus on the “object”, a concern he returns to in his contribution to
48. Mark B. N. Hansen makes a similar critique when he says: “As I see it, digitization
requires us to reconceive the correlation between the user’s body and the image in an
even more profound manner. It is not simply that the image provides a tool for the user to
control the ‘infoscape’ of contemporary material culture, as Manovich suggests, but
rather that the ‘image’ has itself become a process and, as such, has become
irreducibly bound up with the activity of the body” (2004, p. 10). More generally on
convergence and media, see Jenkins (2006); Jenkins & Deuze (2008) and specifically in
terms of convergence and media work, Deuze (2009).
33
The Object Reader (2009b).49 His broader aim of showing how networks are
sites of particular control and governmental discipline, enabled by particular
configurations of software, depends on tracing the protocol-object as a key
player in (as well as evidence of) those relations. Galloway needs protocol to
be an “object” in order to be able to show that protocol does things in the
world. Furthermore his perspective demands that object to be an object-in-
relations in order to explore his real target, the “control society” as outlined
by Gilles Deleuze (1992).50
Refusing to see the digital object as a digitisation of the Marxist

commodity or semiotic sign, Galloway expands on Manovich’s typology of
objects (Manovich, 2001, p. 14) to include “any positive content-unit or
content-description: text, image, MIDI data, VRML world, texture,
movement, behavior, transformation” (2004, p. 74). Where he builds on
Manovich is not only in his willingness to expand the definition of what
counts as an object but also by giving the digital and in particular software
object a form of autonomy - alongside Manovich’s specificity - an
“objectness”. They are “radically independent from context” (op cit.). That
autonomy however is drawn in terms of a network of relations within the
machine. In the next section he says:
“Protocol is a language that regulates flow, directs netspace,

codes relationships, and connects life-forms. Protocol does
not produce or causally effect objects, but rather is a
structuring agent that appears as the result of a set of object
dispositions. Protocol is the reason that the Internet works
and performs work” (ibid pp. 74-75 emphasis in original).
49. This object-focus can be contrasted with accounts of the values and power relations
apparent in the Internet’s technical working explored by those looking at technical code.
Andrew J. Flanagin, Craig Flanagin and Jon Flanagin say: “A technical code analysis,
therefore, reveals the underlying assumptions and choices that become built into
technologies, which would otherwise remain largely obscure” (2010, p. 180). Here the
focus is on the broader system.
50. See Best (2010) for a discussion of perceptions of the “control society”. For a
different account of the relation between “disciplined subjects” and interactive media,
see Barry (2001). As I will argue, an object-oriented approach does not deny relations
and can add real value to to a discussion of governmentality. The difference is that for
OOP those relations do not define the object.
34
Here objects are drawn in terms of their relationality. Protocol, he says is

“a technique [like the rules of the road] for achieving voluntary regulation
within a contingent environment” (Galloway, 2005, p. 22). Protocol is a set
of rules, a language that, as the structuralists taught us, is a field of relations.
While in 2006 he loosens the language slightly by talking of protocol as “set
of recommendations” (2006d, p. 319), he often frames protocol in terms of
language. This textualist conception of protocol, characterising protocol as a
language,51 locates the protocol object as an object-in-relations as well as in
a privileged, foundational position with regard to other objects. There is no
flat ontology in Galloway. Although he says that “[p]rotocol functions largely
without relying on hierarchical, pyramidal or centralized mechanisms; it is
flat and smooth; it is universal, flexible and robust” (ibid p. 317), this flatness
refers to protocol not to the realm of objects as a whole. Galloway’s
argument is that protocol as a digital object must, as a universal standard,
lack depth. However, the control society within which it is enfolded, has
structural relations that appear as layers with protocol acting as the logic of a
particular conjuncture.
51. The relation between code and language (and ideology) has been a consistent
theme within software studies. Matthew Fuller and Andrew Goffey talk about the “logic of
programmed hardware and software... as something that more closely approximates the
order of language” (2009, p. 142) while Adrian Mackenzie insists that “[o]ne way to resist
an abstracting turn away from software is to attend to its code-like structure” (2006, p.
3). Michael Mateas’ discussion of “weird languages” which “tease apart phenomena
present in all coding activity” (2006 p. 274) and Nick Montfort’s discussion of
programming languages (2006) are further examples. Others have sought to address
the form and ideology of that linguistic form. Hayles stresses performativity: “Code that
runs on a machine is performative in a much stronger sense than that attributed to
language. When language is said to be performative, the kinds of actions it ‘performs’
happen in the minds of humans, as when someone says ‘I declare this legislative
session open’ or ‘I pronounce you husband and wife’. Granted, these changes in minds
can and do result in behavioral effects, but the performative force of language is
nonetheless tied to the external changes through complex chains of mediation. By
contrast, code running in a digital computer causes changes in machine behavior and,
through networked ports and other interfaces, may initiate other changes, all
implemented through transmission and execution of code” (2005, p. 50).
Galloway (2006b) and Chun (2005) have discussed the relationship between code and
ideology with Galloway arguing that “software is not merely a vehicle for ideology;
instead, the ideological contradictions of technical transcoding and fetishistic
abstraction are enacted and ‘resolved’ within the very form of software itself” (ibid p.
319).
It is not my intention to enter these broader debates about software and ideology or even
code and language but merely identify the particular way in which Galloway articulates
protocol as language, as a special kind of machinic language not in terms of its internal
structure but rather its workings and role.
35
Galloway argues that protocols such as TCP/IP and DNS act as a “political
technology” (2004, p. 115) which encapsulate the complex enfolded
relationships between protocol and what Deleuze (1992) and Michael Hardt
and Antonio Negri (2000) identify as control societies.52 Where one (TCP/IP)
is to do with distribution, connection and decentralisation, the other (DNS)
is built around centralisation and control.53 For Galloway this dialectic is
productive in allowing him to characterise the Internet as distributed, not
decentralised but at the same time a space of control. In order to hold this
tension, Galloway positions the protocol object (as rules and language) as
the foundation of that control. He says his book “aims to flesh out the
specificity of this third historical wave [Deleuze’s control society] by
focusing on the controlling computer technologies native to it” (2004, p. 3).
Drawing a parallel between the panopticon and protocol, he continues,
“[p]rotocol is to control societies as the panopticon is to disciplinary
societies” (ibid p. 13).
For Galloway, protocol must not be read as a tool of power or a simple

manifestation of it, as we will see when discussing “the Exploit”. “The
concept of protocol does not, therefore, describe one all-encompassing
network of power - there is not one Internet but many internets” (Galloway
& Thacker, 2004 p. 10). In an almost Actor Network Theory (ANT) sense he
52. For Galloway an analysis of protocol is a way of opening up the study of networks to
reclaim the issue of power from an account of networks that have vied between what he
calls gee-whizz accounts of progress (2004, p. 18) and descriptions of networks as
cyberutopian arenas of anarchist freedom. Chun of course argues that “control and
freedom are not opposites but different sides of the same coin” (2006, p. 71). As noted
above, my concern here is not to engage with debates about networks but it is important
to acknowledge that the network is Galloway (and Thacker’s) object of investigation.
Although Galloway is keen to move from “traditional” graph theory models of networks,
he still draws heavily on the pervasive metaphor of the rhizome, drawn from Deleuze and
Guattari (2004) (Galloway & Thacker, 2007, p. 29).
David Berry criticises Galloway and Thacker’s extended use of network as a metaphor
(2008b, p. 367), a criticism echoed by Greg Boirarsky (2006, p. 108). The rhizomamatic
metaphor is also criticised by Conley (2009) and Buchanan (2009).
Given that, in Protocol at least, Galloway is talking of technological systems this is
perhaps unfair. But even when dealing with the technosocial systems that are the focus
of The Exploit, it is the very independent nature (in Galloway’s terms, the rule-based
nature) of protocol that allows for exploit.
53. Recent attempts by the US Government to tackle Internet “piracy” have focused on
using DNS as away of blocking sites that media owners complain are facilitating illegal
media sharing (Lee, 2012).
36
draws attention to the authorship of protocols within “a self-selected

oligarchy of scientists consisting largely of electrical engineers and computer
specialists” (2005, p. 22).54 Protocol is enfolded in powerful networks of
individual and institutional actants through which power circulates.
Galloway draws a control matrix with Feudal, Modern, Postmodern and

Future eras drawn alongside modes of energy, discipline and control with
Protocol as the “control diagram” of the postmodern/Empire era whose
energy mode is information, disciplinary mode is debugging and machine is
computers (2004, pp. 114-115). Tracing the modes of this operation through
processes of aestheticization, Galloway positions protocol as the latest in a
long line of control diagrams from “violence” in the feudal era, through
“bureaucracy” in the modern and on into “physics” in the future, a theme he
picks up and develops with Eugene Thacker in his later work The Exploit
(2007).
Protocol’s work within collaborative filtering software for example

organises “real human people” (2004, p. 114) within hegemonic patterns.
The biopower in operation works through objects-in-relations, protocols and
other control technological objects connecting within “diagrams” or
governmental regimes. He argues that “protocological analysis must focus
on the possible and the impossible (the envelope of possibility), not a
demystification of some inner meaning or ‘rational kernel’ within
technology. Protocol is a circuit, not a sentence” (op cit. emphasis in
original). It is this “envelope of possibility”, protocol as a “unique governing
principle” (op cit.), a textualist picture of protocol as an object-in-relation to
other aptly named “layers” of the Internet architecture, that is his focus. It is
this structuring, relational nature of objects that structures and empowers
control societies.
It is not that Galloway positions the protocol language in some abstract

realm. Quite the contrary, for him these rules are enfolded in the real world,
54. Later in his discussion of “protocological institutionalization”, Galloway claims that

“[l]ike the philosophy of protocol itself, membership in this technocratic ruling class is
open” (2006c, p. 187) although admitting this depends on a certain level of technical
literacy. For other perspectives on authorship and code, see Huber (2008) and Douglas
(2008).
37
they are deeply social. “By formal apparatus I mean the totality of
techniques and conventions that affect protocol at a social level, not simply
a technical one” (ibid p. 55). That social enfolding however is drawn in
terms of a formalist analysis. He says: “I move beyond the hard science of
protocol and begin to consider it from the perspective of form. That is: How
does protocol function, not as a material machine, but as an entire formal
apparatus? What techniques are used by and through protocol to create
various cultural objects? How can one define protocol in its most abstract
sense?” (ibid p. 53). My argument is that by moving “beyond the hard
science”, leaving the technical and particular realm of the object, one fails
to address the specificity of the object and also the particular material and
machinic ways these governmental relations are built.
This positioning of the protocol object in terms of relationality, connecting

and enabling connecting between other digital and governmental objects,
allows him and Eugene Thacker to develop their concept of the “exploit”, a
form of counter-protocological struggle based on the idea of the protocol
object as relational, located in a field or control society of relations (2007).
Galloway and Thacker see contemporary struggles whether political, military
or “terrorist” as symmetrical, networks fighting networks.55 Their project is to
find a new asymmetrical “topology of resistance” - an “exploit”. The
protocol-object conceived in terms of relations is the key.
As objects-in-relations, protocols enable networks. With protocol seen as

at the heart of networks, a depth ontology necessitated by a focus on
relations and processes; resistance, change and struggle take place at the
55. For an interesting fictional exploration of such network struggle, see Roberts (2011).
38
“level” of protocol.56 The challenge is to reconfigure it via “exploits”. They

write:
[W]ithin protocological networks, political acts generally

happen not by shifting power from one place to another but
by exploiting power differentials already existing in the
system... [by] discovering holes in existent technologies and
projecting potential change through those holes. Hackers
call these holes ‘exploits’ (Galloway & Thacker, 2007, p.
81).57
Galloway’s view of the protocol-object as language enables him, like any

scholar of language or ideology as a site of struggle, to see protocol as open
to reconfiguration.58 As I will come on to explore in my practice, that
reconfiguration is possible, indeed more powerful, when objects are
addressed in their specificity.
Galloway and Thacker use the example of the virus59 as an example of

counter-protocological struggle, an object that uses its relationality as its
56. Galloway argues that protocol allows new forms of politics and political struggle. His
is not the only framework to explore the connections between politics and technology,
Joss Hands for instance sees the digital as a space of resistance (2010) while Jodi Dean
argues that the digital is such a “noisy” space that it “hinders the formation of strong
counter-hegemonies” (2005, p. 53). What is particular about Galloway and Thacker’s
account is that they start from the object. The issue is however whether that object
remains the point of focus or merely the way into a broader field of relations, the control
society that it somehow fuels. An object-oriented account would look across the techno-
politcial space and its flat realm of objects, seeking to reconfigure object connections
including ”noise”, rather than looking for a particular key determinant or a power full
object to resist. I open up these questions in my conclusion.
57. In his analysis of the TV series 24, Galloway discusses the show’s theme of “the
circumvention of protocol,” or hacking. “In the control society informatic systems are
always in a state of ‘self-exploitation’ and are defined not as an integral object but as a
flexible network of command and control, which only becomes realized through its own
transgression by another informatic force” (2007a, p. 19). Here again a protocological
system carries within itself the potential for its unpicking. Earlier, Galloway had said
“resistance during the post-modern age forms around the protocological control forces
existent in networks” (2004, p. 160) and again, “techno-resistance is not outside protocol
but at its center” (ibid p. 176).
58. This theme of sites of struggle and the possibility for critique and intervention
appears in Galloway’s praise for Mehdi Belhaj Kacem as an intellectual willing to extend
the boundaries of critique, to be “a self-styled outsider, a trickster, an autodidact, or, in
his own words, an ‘anti-scholastic,’ an ‘anti-philosopher’” (2009c, n.p.).
59. Galloway had previously discussed the virus in (2005, p. 24-27). Thacker had also
previously addressed the relationship between computation and biology (2004). For a
wide discussion of new biologies and their relation to economics and power, see papers
collected in Zylinska (2011).
39
weapon. They position the biological/computer virus as using the monopoly

position of a control network such as Microsoft against itself.60 It is the
nature of the network that allows a virus to “resonate far and wide with
relative ease. Networks are, in this sense, a type of massive amplifier for
action” (2007, p. 84). Viruses “exploit the network” (ibid p. 85). They use the
layers, movement and flexibility that protocol gives to networks against itself.
They “piggyback on the global standards of TCP/IP and other Internet
protocols” (ibid p. 96). “It is through protocol that one must guide one’s
efforts, not against it” (Galloway, 2004, p. 17 emphasis in original). For
Galloway and Thacker, counter-protocological struggle “must not be
anthropomorphic (the gesture, the strike); it must be unhuman (the swarm,
the flood)” (2007, p. 98).61 A virus does not fight the system, it overwhelms
it.62 That struggle must be seen not as resistance but as “hypertrophy” - a
desire for pushing beyond.63 Viruses do not resist software they push it until
it breaks. “We must scale up, not unplug” (Galloway & Thacker, 2004, p.
25). They clog up the server with too many requests. That critical power
60. Parikka provides an archaeological (as opposed to simply historical) account of

computer viruses where they are characterised as “monsters”, “quasi-natural
entities” (2007, p. 10) or as he goes onto address them: “anomalous objects” (Parikka &
Sampson, 2009). Here viruses are more clearly object-actants in meshes, addressed in
their specificity rather than positioned as a counter-protocological instantiation, a
reworking of the protocol language. Such a focus allows Parikka to talk of the
“micropolitics of code” and a form of struggle similar to the Exploit: “Tactical an-
archaeology might then mean [...] not targeting operating systems or certain
corporations as such but exposing the principle of how digital culture is framed through
micropolitics of code” (2009, p. 119). This concept of framing is also taken up by Bogost
(2006, p. 40).
61. This perspective can be read alongside McKenzie Wark’s positioning of the hacker
as one who takes a system’s tools and turns it against power (2004; 2006).
62. Tiziana Terranova Criticises Galloway and Thacker’s terminology drawing on Sadie
Plant (1997) to argue for a less masculinist language. “In the case of network conflict,
what seems important to the authors is not so much resistance as ‘impulsion’, ‘a thrust’
and even a ‘hypertrophy’. And yet if the ontology of networks is that of relations - that is,
as Sadie Plant has argued, a feminist ontology - why centre its political tactics around
such masculine ‘thrust’? What about those processes of topological and ethical
‘invagination’, which also seem necessary for the purposes of collecting, nurturing and
consolidating antagonistic network forces” (2009, p. 49).
63. Galloway had made a similar point in an earlier article: “The goal, then, is not to
destroy technology in some neo-Luddite delusion, but to push it into a state of
hypertrophy, further than it is meant to go. Then, in its injured, sore, and unguarded
condition, technology may be sculpted anew into something better, something in closer
agreement with the real wants and desires of its users” (2005, p. 30).
40
happens because the protocol object is drawn in terms of relations. Struggle

happens in the spaces between the nodes,64 in the relations, and the
protocol-object’s nature as enfolded in relations offers the way in. A virus or
a distributed denial of service (DDOS) attack’s power arises from the
relations it enables, the overloads, the spam, the new configurations.65
Protocol’s language form, its rules nature enable the discourses and
discursive practices in computational control societies to be reconfigured or
overwhelmed, rendered meaningless. As an object that enables other objects
and crucially software and governmental relations to work, to reconfigure
protocol is to potentially reconfigure, perhaps “play with” the broader
mesh.66 I will come on to argue that to address objects as exceeding their
relations, far from weakening their power as exploit, actually opens the
network/control society up because governmentality becomes a matter of
concrete (exploitable) things rather than diffuse or abstract relations or
processes.
64. Galloway and Thacker discuss the model of networks built around “edges and
nodes” as it developed from mathematical graph theory (2007, pp. 31-35). Morton offer
a different perspective on edges and nodes in his view of the mesh: “Each point of the
mesh is both the center and edge of a system of points, so there is no absolute center or
edge” (2010a, p. 29).
65. In his discussion of interfaces, Galloway uses the language of exploits to explore
political art making. He discusses World of Warcraft’s interface as “awash in
information” (2009d, p. 945) overwhelming an aesthetic of the window or door. Galloway
connects this to the idea of “incoherent politics”, the deterritorialization of Deleuze:
“[T]he game displays an aesthetic of incoherence in that it foregrounds the apparatus
(statistical data, machinic functions, respawn loops, object interfaces, multithreading,
and so on), while all the time promoting a particularly coherent politics (protocological
organization, networked integration, alienation from the traditional social order, new
informatic labor practices, computer-mediated group interaction, neoliberal markets,
game theory, and so forth)” (ibid p. 951). On spam, see also Parikka (2007).
66. In a discussion of the later Baudrillard’s interest in games and play, Galloway writes
of how for the French theorist, “both sovereignty and resistance are gamic” (2007b, p.
377). It is not surprising that, with his interest in gaming (2006a), Galloway should draw
connections between his concept of the exploit and the metaphor of play, going as far
as to identify our contemporary moment as one of “ludic capitalism” (Galloway, 2009d,
p. 932).
It is also interesting that Galloway chooses a verb for the title of his study rather than the
more usual noun “games” (Wardrip-Fruin, 2009; Tanenbaum & Tanenbaum, 2010) or
even the journal Games and Culture. This focus on the process and practice rather than
the object of the game may seem to go against my argument that Galloway is a theorist
of the object but, just as protocol is for him important in terms of its object-work, so
games are important in terms of how and where they function as particular forms.
See also Galloway’s discussion of Guy Debord’s game Djambi (2009a).
41
Chun appears to be searching for a similar opening in her conclusion to

Programming Visions where she asks whether software’s anomalous position
and nature can “enable freedom and movement” (2011, p. 177). At first sight
Chun’s account of “programmability” and “software as a metaphor for
metaphor” would appear to provide an object-oriented approach to code
objects. She stresses software’s materiality as always embodied and not
simply the fabled matter of ones and zeroes. She is also clear about the
nature of software as object: “[S]oftware as thing cannot be reduced to
software as a commodity” (ibid p. 6). Software is more than a particular
programme or proprietorial or even open-source standard. Of course it can
be bought, sold and fought over in the courts but there is a “vapory
materialization” in play (ibid p. 2). Software has a “fundamentally
ephemeral” nature (ibid p. 3). Chun traces how software has become thing
(2011, p. 41), has “hardened”, becoming an object of legal and
governmental fixity in distinction to hardware. Like Galloway, Chun looks to
trace the governmental enfoldings of software in terms of content but also in
terms of logic (ibid p. 128). It is the nature of software Graphical User
Interfaces (GUIs) that are governmental as much as the content. The way
AJAX allows a web page to dynamically update, seemingly at the will of the
user (Garrett 2005), creates what Tara McPherson calls “volitional mobility”,
the feeling of liveness, choice and freedom (2002). Regardless of what is on
a webpage, the very ways that software, protocols and standards structure
the user experience, hails them into a particular position and manages their
interaction, generating fetishes and illusions of control and freedom that are
deeply ideological.
The issue, from an object-oriented point of view, is that the object is once
again drawn in terms of relations. Echoing Adrian Mackenzie’s account of
software as a “neighbourhood of relations” (2006, p. 169) and his
exploration of wirelessness through a Jamesian focus on network as “nothing
but concatenated conjunctive relations” (2010, p. 121),67 Chun says:
“Treating software as as a thing means treating it, again, as a neighborhood,
67. James argues that, “what really exists is not things made but things in the
making” (1996, p. 263) .
42
as an amalgamation” (2011, p. 6). “[A]malgamation”, “assemblage”,

“ecology”, “actor network”: the “simultaneous ambiguity and
specificity” (ibid p. 6) of software is best drawn in terms of position in a field
of relations. Software is “in media res - in the middle of things” (ibid p. 175).
Such a position certainly inserts software and code into the techno-social/
governmental mesh. It locates the digital object and undermines any claim
to neutrality or apoliticism. What it also does however is remove us from
particular software or digital specificity. We address “neighborhoods”, the
“infrastructure of experience” (Dourish & Bell, 2007) and metaphor, the
relations not the objects that configure those relations.
For Chun, software has a second characteristic in addition to its

relationality. Software has become memory as it “not only embodies the
always already there, [but] also grounds it [...] It creates an enduring
ephemeral that promises to last forever” (2011, p. 137). This software-
memory “is not a static but rather an active process” (ibid p. 167).68 “If our
machines’ memories are more permanent, if they enable a permanence that
we seem to lack, it is because they are constantly refreshed” (ibid p. 170).
Screens are redrawn, page components asynchronously refreshed, data
compressed, images rendered on the fly, searches updated and data trails
remarked. Software works and that working, software as process needs to be
accounted for. This sense of the processural is our second theme.
The processural object

If relationality has opened doors for software studies in constructing a
technologically informed and yet comprehensive account of technoculture
and techno-governmentality, a second theme has helped ensure the
technical specifics do not drag the account down to a static or determinist
reductionism. The idea that software is dynamic, that it sets new relations in
motion as it runs, that its character is change and becoming has allowed
software studies to understand the relations between what appears to be a
static component of software and a dynamic field of culture and power.
68. Chun discusses Brenda Laurel’s (1993) work where human computer activity is
understood as a “designed experience” akin to theatre. Here software can be seen as
“characters’” defined by their action.
43
As an example, Mark B. N. Hansen frames the digital image as

processual. His argument that “the digital image demarcates an embodied
processing of information” (2004, p. 12) allows him to explore how the
image-object is framed by and through the body.69 It is only by seeing a
dynamism to the digital object, only by addressing it as process and change
that its power and affectivity can be understood. Assigning movement to our
picture of data and code allows us to understand its embodied as well as
enfolded workings. A view of static, unchanging data, code or protocols
cannot account for our phenomenological, psychoanalytic or even
neurological relationship to computation (Berry, 2011b, pp. 119-141; Turkle
& Sherry, 2004; Munster, 2011) nor the realtime stream of data and
imag(in)ings (Berry, 2011a). This is a flux of code-data-subjectivity that we
experience as the technosocial mesh at a bodily and material level. Those
digital objects change as they are reinserted and revisited through the body
and the body politic. They add and remove new dimensions and relations as
they process and are processed.70
It is important to stress that OOP does not reject change. It is not a

philosophy of static objects. When it argues for objects connecting within
objects, that movement is as dynamic as any complex adaptive system.
Where OOP disagrees with the idea of the processural object in flux is in the
idea that an object adds and removes dimensions. Rather, for Harman
“[b]ecoming does occur: but in sudden jumps and jolts, not through a
meaningless accretion of any-instants-whatever that float away in the canal
69. In a catalogue essay accompanying a German photography exhibition Manovich

also discusses imaging as process. He says: “All of these and many other recently
emerged technologies of image-making, image manipulation, and vision depend on
digital computers. All of them, as a whole, allow photographs to perform new,
unprecedented, and still poorly understood functions. All of them radically change what
a photograph is” (1995, n.p.).
70. Galloway echoes this stress on process when he says: “[O]bjects are always derived
from a preexisting copy (loaded) using various kinds of mediative machinery (disk
drives, network transfers). They are displayed using various kinds of virtuation
apparatuses (computer monitors, displays, virtual reality hardware). They are cached.
And finally, objects always disappear. Objects exist only upon use. They are assembled
from scratch each time and are simply a coalescing (of their own objectness)” (2004, p.
74).
44
of fluxions” (2011i, p. 301).71 This perspective runs counter to much of

software studies.
Like Chun, Matthew Fuller explores the object in terms of its working. He
begins his account of media ecologies by asserting that objects should be
“understood to mean processes embodied as objects, as elements in a
composition” (2007, p. 1). Here relationality is reframed in terms of
processuality. Like Chun, Fuller is keen to problematise the “form–content
dichotomy and places objects and processes in a constellation of
interrelations” (ibid p. 46). The ecologies such as pirate radio and digital
artworks that Fuller investigates are matters of objects in relations but those
objects are characterised as dynamic, as processural.
Discussing the Cctv - world wide watch artwork,72 Fuller says: “In the
comprehension of the image as an image in real time comes also that of the
image as a process. Digital images - especially in such a visibly raw, low-
bandwidth state - demand to be understood as a computational and
algorithmic process” (ibid p. 156). This is not just that the image is the
outcome of a process. Rather it is a process. The object, whether the image,
the image file or even the imaging standard are moments of becoming - the
rendering, the writing to disc, the encoding. As with Hansen’s account, the
image object is in movement as the code runs and renders and as the data is
read by humans or software. The computational and algorithmic process is
one of flux, with the object shifting and changing as it relates and works. Just
as the code runs, so does the image. The objects share a processuality.
This stress on the process nature of software and software objects appears
in Fuller’s earlier work on Microsoft Word (2003). What was innovative
about this work (and his role in developing software artworks with I/O/D and
Mongrel (1998)) was the move from dealing with Word just as a commodity
to the software as processural, as setting in motion practices, subject
71. This is discussed further in The JPEG object in theory chapter.
72. http://www.irational.org/cctv
45
positions and new relations.73 Here software became, took on new forms as
it worked (as a machine) and as a cultural, political, artistic and ideological
practice. When Fuller programmed the “Web Stalker” he was using code’s
processural nature to reconfigure the mesh: “A processual opening up of the
web that whilst it deals at every link with a determinate arrangement has no
cut-off point other than infinity” (1998, n.p.).
Later when Fuller edits Software Studies: A Lexicon, which can be read in
part as a collection of papers on software objects, the “stuff of
software” (2008, p. 1), he presents the collection’s analytical and political
power as “not to stage some revelation of a supposed hidden technical truth
of software, to unmask its esoteric reality, but to see what it is, what it does
and what it can be coupled with” (ibid p. 5). Here “what it is” and “what it
does” are intrinsically linked. This arises not just from his stress on the
importance of understanding (and even practicing) programming (ibid p. 10)
but from the nature of the code-object itself as processural.
When Fuller turns to what he calls “metaobjects” (2007, p. 95),

expanding Alfred North Whitehead’s concept of the “standard
object” (1989, p. 58) 74 to address the freight container and the technology of
digital packet-switching, he argues that standard objects “have become
crucial to the generation of media and communications networks and the
organizations that handle them” (2007, p. 93). For Fuller these objects are
constellations. “A constellation is a nameable ‘thing,’ but it is not simply a
‘cause.’ It is also a process of multiply interrelated movement through which
emerges the apparently stable pattern by which we are able to understand it
as a constellation - it must be understood as a process” (ibid p. 73).
Noah Wardrip-Fruin also explicitly locates software in terms of

processuality. This drives his media archaeological work where he asks:
“How do we engage a work’s processes?” (2011, p. 302) but most
73. Manovich takes a similar approach to another software package, Adobe Photoshop,
seeking to “understand how software applications shape our worlds and our
imaginations” (2011a). In a similar vein Paul Brafield discusses the relation between a
software package (Adobe After Effects) and a cultural habitus (2010).
74. Galloway and Thacker also reference Whitehead when they say that “networks exist
through process” (2007, p. 62).
46
specifically in his broader study of digital fictions and games (2009) where
he looks to understand the Tale-Spin/Mumble text/game/story-generation
system through studying processes in play. He says: “Studying processes [...]
focuses on the design and operation of the parts of the mechanism” (ibid p.
164). The focus is on the objects, the parts of the mechanism but those need
to be understood as things that are designed but also, always in operation.
Wardrip-Fruin opens up the game and gaming mesh as well as broader
technosocial relations of surveillance and governmentality (ibid pp.
200-203) by working with objects, but objects as processes - or perhaps
processes as objects.
Far from focusing on the specifics of the “design and operation” of objects
as Platform Studies does,75 studying processes shifts the emphasis to both
relations and one dimension of those objects, their operation. This neglects
the work of the object when it is not running or when it fails to run.
When Wardrip-Fruin says that “the internal processes of digital media are
designed artifacts, like buildings, transportation systems or music
players” (ibid p. 156), he is drawing attention to this dual nature of his
object, the continual binary oscillation of process-object.76 The processes-as-
objects Wardrip-Fruin calls “operational logics”, are not just the instances of
software running but the components of the computational mesh itself. They
are “distinctive”, “’operationalized’ models” of other forces and practices
such as human language or motivation (ibid p. 4). This idea of processes-as-
objects or oscillation fudges the question, neither dealing with the specifics
of JPEG compression through objects such as the Huffman table, nor the
particularities of JPEG as object, an actant that is powerful beyond its work
as process.
A stress on the digital or software object as a matter of process takes us

some way towards addressing its relations to the computational mesh. It
ensures a focus on software’s position within increasingly complex
75. A term coined and a book series edited by Nick Montfort and Ian Bogost (2009). See
also Gillespie (2010).
76. Matthew Kirschenbaum makes a similar point when he discusses the “duality” at the
heart of digital mechanisms: product and process (2008, p. 15).
47
computational trading, navigation, supply-chain and other governmental

systems and as an engine of relations and governmental positions. In terms
of JPEG in particular it opens up the protocol-object as active, a matter of
compression - doing things in the pipeline. What it also does however is
only account for that object’s position and power when running or as part of
a mechanism. Objects lose their specificity and ontological position. What is
more, in terms of my practice, they cease to have a particular position and
power as specific objects in my apparatus/assemblages, they are subsumed
within something more - the assemblage, the system, the processes at work.
As I will discuss in terms of my practice, when objects are addressed as
having a position independent of process, one can image with and through
them and use that imaging as a way of exploring their nature and their
relation to issues and relations of governmentality.
The potential object

Closely related to this conception of processuality and a flux of becoming
is that of potentiality. Again this theme has served software studies well. By
positioning the digital object as harbouring a potential, software studies
once again enfolds the object into the mesh, positioning it as empowering
subjectivities relations and processes, setting in motion new formations. The
flexibility, interoperability and dynamic nature of the digital object makes it
the ideal vehicle for critical or disciplinary potential.
It is not just Galloway and Thacker who have used this potentiality as a
way of positioning the object as critical tool. Although perhaps not a
“software studies” scholar, Vito Campanelli uses the idea that digital objects
harbour a potentiality to explore the DivX and MP3 experience (2010).77
Here the particular codecs set in motion particular aesthetic (as well as
socio-political) experiences as legitimate or “pirated” media is encoded,
decoded, streamed or downloaded. His broader target of the web aesthetic
77. For a discussion of the MP3 protocol from an industrial (rather than technical/
material) and psychoanalytic perspective, see Sterne (2006).
48
experience,78 is an experience of hardware and software objects which

harbour a dynamic potential to structure and restructure experience.
Directors use that potential as do p2p media sharers. The digital object’s
potentiality is actualised in particular ways in particular configurations at
particular moments.
Such a perspective clearly adds value in avoiding an over-simplistic

essentialism - particularly when it comes to aesthetics. As with processuality,
it draws attention to the seemingly paradoxical dynamism at work in what
appears to be stable, defined and delimited code. Some within the object-
oriented movement would agree. In particular, as I shall discuss, Levi Bryant
has argued strongly for the power of seeing objects as harbouring potential
arguing that “the domain of power possessed by an object is always greater
than any local manifestation or actualization of an object” (2011, p. 89
emphasis in original). Harman however disagrees. For him objects do not
hold anything back. They are always fully present and actual.79 But to refuse
to assign a potential power to objects is again to run counter to a dominant
concern in software studies.
To speak of potentiality in software is not just to engage with its uses - the
sort of potential of, and struggles around, free/libre and open source software
(FLOSS) or creative commons licenses to destabilise political and economic
relations (Lessig, 2002; Berry, 2004; Zittrain, 2004; Weber, 2005; May, 2006;
Berry, 2008a; Chopra & Dexter, 2008; Kelty, 2008; Garcelon, 2009; Milberry
& Anderson, 2009) as well as the potential of networks to rewire societies
and markets (Benkler, 2002a; 2002b; 2004; 2007). Rather it is to approach
potentiality as an ontological issue. From this perspective, the software
object (as a process enfolded in relations) harbours a potentiality as part of
78. This specifically network aesthetic is different in focus to the digital aesthetic sought
and discussed by Sean Cubitt (1998). For an historical perspective on new media
aesthetics see Aristarkhova (2007); as a site of struggle, see Blackwell & Dodgson
(2010) and in terms of aesthetics and user experience, see Engholm (2010). Specifically
on code and aesthetics, see Cox, McLean & Ward (2001). In terms of digital aesthetics
and affect, see Parisi & Terranova (2001). For a discussion of aesthetics and HD (High
Definition) technologies in video as an issue of materiality, see Flaxton (2011). For a
practice-research discussion of mobile aesthetics, see Baker, Schleser & Molga (2009).
79 As I will discuss, although they may be actual and present that does not mean that
every dimension is accessible.
49
its nature. This is somehow realised, rendered powerful in a moment of

becoming - at its running, at the moment of experience.
Mackenzie’s “radical empiricism” locates digital (including software and

protocol) objects as matters of relations and process but also as holding
back, as having “more to come”. He speaks of a complex network of
relations whereby “[w]irelessness is thoroughly entangled with products and
promises of economic value” (2010, p. 145). At the same time he uses
William James’ idea of conjunctive relations to add dynamism to the picture.
James’ account is one that emphasises movement and transition and the
“practical inseparability of thinking and things” (2010, p. 14). For James
philosophy needs to speak the language of “conjunctive
relations” (characterised by words such as with, near, next, like, from,
towards, against, because, for, through, my (James, 2010, p. 600)), the
language of movement and transition, the “more to come” (ibid p. 2476).
This focus on process, movement and the “more to come” is an antidote to
“most social and cultural theories that tend to cut realities into things, selves,
locations and relations” (Mackenzie, 2010, p. 39).
In terms of specific software objects he says that the Digital Signal

Processing (DSP) algorithms, “[i]f acknowledged at all, [...] are treated as the
most abstract aspect of electronic media and communication technologies,
the part that lies closest to mathematics. We need a much more sensitive
treatment of their becomings. They transduce realities” (ibid pp. 66-67). His
use of the verb “transduce” is significant. In his earlier work (2002),
Mackenzie draws on Gilbert Simondon’s concept of technicity which
Mackenzie reads as “a side of collectives which is not fully lived,
represented or symbolized, yet which remains fundamental to their
grounding, their situation and the constitution of their limits” (ibid p. 11).
Technicity in Simondon “refers mainly to the systematic study of the
transformations and correlations that characterize technical objects” (ibid p.
25 n. 3). The concept allows Mackenzie to deal with software objects as
having a side that is not fully realised, that is open to issues of transfer,
transformation, becoming, releasing or realising. He argues that algorithms
are “relational situations concerned with transitions between states [...] They
50
connect movements to each other” (Mackenzie, 2010, p. 67). What is

important is less his reluctance to use the term “object” but more his
location of algorithm as a “situation”, a weird player with the potential to
form multiple relations and take multiple positions. An object-oriented
perspective would not have problems with this weirdness. What it would
challenge is the idea of an object with “more to come”, with not being “fully
lived”. From an OOP standpoint, objects are always fully present. Following
Heidegger, Harman argue that dimensions of the object withdraw from all
access but the object is present (if inaccessible) in the world.
This view of objects as harbouring a potentiality that is realised or made

actual in material forms, technologies and regimes of power has been used
to explore the relationship between visuality and discipline through scopic
apparatuses and within particular (governmental) scopic regimes.80 Writers
such as Martin Jay have developed a historicised account of these regimes
(paralleling in some ways Galloway’s “diagrams”). His account of “several,
perhaps competing” scopic regimes of modernity (1988, p. 3) was designed,
again like Galloway’s, to open the potential for new practices. He hopes “we
may learn to wean ourselves from the fiction of a ‘true’ vision and revel
instead in the possibilities opened up by the scopic regimes we have already
invented and the ones, now so hard to envision, that are doubtless to
come” (ibid p. 20). The regimes he maps constitute a field of potentialities
for the development of imaging discourses and apparatuses. It is this field
that is Jay’s focus.
He asks: “Is there a common denominator running through such

seemingly disparate investigations of theories about vision, general visual
cultures, specific visual artifacts like movies, and the role of visual
metaphors in written texts?” (1996, p. 9). He concludes that there isn’t, but
80. Christian Metz is usually credited with first using the concept “scopic regime” (1981).
Of course the term “scopic” has a different genealogy, taking in Lacan’s “scopic field”
and the split between the eye and the gaze in The Four Fundamental Concepts of
Psychoanalysis (1986, pp. 67-78), through feminist film theory (Mulvey, 2009) and on to
Slavoj Žižek’s exploration of the gaze of the object and his realisation that “I can never
see the picture from the point that it is gazing at me” (1989, p. 8) (an idea picked up by
W. J. Mitchell in What do Pictures Want (2007)). It was Metz however who, while not
rejecting the psychoanalytic basis of the concept, arguably broadened its reach, from
the “scopic field” to the “scopic regime”.
51
what is interesting is what is missing from the list of themes he identifies -

the technological. Here the focus is on the movie artifact rather than the
film, projector, colorspace, codecs or protocols. It is not that Jay disregards
the technological. He observes: “Insofar as we live in a culture whose
technological advances abet the production and dissemination of such
images at a hitherto unimagined level, it is necessary to focus on how they
work and what they do, rather than move past them too quickly to the ideas
they represent or the reality they purport to depict” (Smith, 2008, pp.
183-184). Rather the technological is positioned as the background. The
focus is on the “work”, the practices, the gaze. Jay’s is a story of how
technologies form “enhancements of the ability to see” (1993, p. 587 my
emphasis), of how “vision, aided by new technologies, became the
dominant sense in the modern world, even as it came to serve new
masters” (ibid p. 45 my emphasis), the “extraordinary changes in our
capacity to see wrought by technology” (ibid p. 113 my emphasis).
If Jay can be seen as highlighting the potential in the object relations at

work within the scopic regime, Jonathan Crary, can be seen as doing the
same for the scopic apparatus. His aim is to account for how the “camera
obscura model of vision [...] collapsed in the early nineteenth century when
it was replaced by radically different notions of what an observer was and of
what constituted vision” (1988, p. 30). It is this powerful network of relations
of observer, discourses of vision and scopic technologies which is his
target.81 Crary characterises his work as around the “problem of the observer
[which] is the field on which vision in history can be said to materialize, to
become itself visible” (1990, p. 5). He maps this field of relations in terms of
the apparatuses that the subject uses and is, to some extent, constructed by.
Crary is keen to avoid “mystifying [the visual] by recourse to technological
81. For Crary the scopic and the scopic apparatus are only one dimension of the
workings of power. The “scopic” just as “technology” must not be allowed to be the only
actant on the stage. “I do not believe that exclusively visual concepts such as ‘the gaze’
or ‘beholding; are in themselves valuable objects of historical explanation” Crary argues
(2001, p. 3). In this later book he uses the term “perception” as a way of exploring how a
subject has come to be defined “in more than the single-sense modality of sight, in
terms also of hearing and touch and, most importantly, of irreducibly mixed modalities
which, inevitably, get little or no analysis within ‘visual studies’” (op cit.).
52
explanations” (ibid p. 2) but without an exploration of the instantiation of

material apparatuses in specific historical conjunctures, he argues, that
problem of the observer cannot be traced. Crary discusses the Camera
Obscura, the Zootrope, the Phenakistiscope, the Magic Lantern and the
Kaleidoscope82 not for their own sake but because of how this “constellation
of objects” (2001, p. 5) was enfolded in and constitutive of the sort of
governmental scopic relations that John Tagg also explored in terms of
photography (1988; 1992; 2009). Those technological objects carried a
potentiality that was actualised or realised in those governmental regimes.
“[W]hat determines vision at any given historical moment,” Crary says, “is
not some deep structure, economic base, or worldview, but rather the
functioning of a collective assemblage of disparate parts on a single social
surface. It may even be necessary to consider the observer as a distribution
of events located in different places” (1990, p. 6) .83 It is this mesh, the
complex enfolding of subjectivity and technology, that he is looking to
unpack. His history is not one of “the observer” as opposed to “technology”
but rather observer-technologies. Those observer-technological objects carry
their potential disciplinary power into a field of relations actualised and
articulated in different ways in different historical moments.
This concern for a layered picture of objects-in-relations, saturated with a

governmental potentiality can be seen in the wider “media archaeological”
project where “[d]ead ends, losers, and inventions that never made it into
material product have important stories to tell” (Huhtamo & Parikka, 2011,
p. 3). For the loose collective of authors concerned, following Benjamin in
terms of writing media history in new ways, these objects whether material
or immaterial84 are enfolded in powerful relations but carry a form of
potentiality.
82. For another media archaeological account of the kaleidoscope, see Christie (2007).
83 This stress on the “event” is echoed in Massumi (2011).
84. See for example Erkki Huhtamo’s account of media archaeological topoi, the
“temporary manifestation of a persisting cultural tradition” (2011, p. 41).
53
Siegfried Zielinski’s exploration of “hearing and seeing” through an

archaeology of scopic and sonic apparatuses (2006) includes the sort of
engravings and diagrams of gadgets and devices that pepper Crary and Jay’s
work. Those objects are framed through relations and are present because of
their potential. In his final chapter Zielinski draws “cartographies”, maps
(like Galloway’s diagrams - visualised metaphors) of how seeing and hearing
meshes have connected across the globe and time (ibid p. 262). Through a
series of figures he literally maps out his story. Here geographies are overlaid
with biographies. The object-actants on the network map are names:
Empedocles, Eisenstein, Lombroso and Bruce Sterling, as labels on
territories: Messina, Riga, Turin and Texas. The diagrams’ lines link the
“people and places”. These lines are deliberately not arrows, not even
double-headed arrows. They are more like synaptic connections. Trails and
traces of influence, congruence and even coincidence. It is within and
across these network relations that the scopic and sonic regimes, and their
attendant governmental relations, emerge. The objects’ potential are
actualised in relations.
Others working within the field of media archaeology trace the

potentiality within more particular software objects. Casey Alt explores how
object-oriented programming languages “made computers a
medium” (2011) arguing that the potentiality within the code and coding-
objects was realised in new forms as well as practices of computing. The
concepts of medium and interface were “embedded in computation at the
material level of the programming language itself” (ibid p. 279). These
objects (remember in OOP, concepts can be objects just as much as tables,
chairs and code) became computational, changing the nature of the
technology, space and now medium.
The potentiality that Wardrip-Fruin explores through his media

archaeology of a 1952 software work of digital literature (2011) is not simply
the potential of Christopher Strachey’s “Love Letter Generator” to create
texts, but the potentiality latent within the code to generate effects and
affects, to become a particular instantiation of computation with all the
attendant power relations that sets in motion. The potentiality is not just
54
realised in the text but in a new actant network, the technosocial space or
mesh where Alan Turing and Strachey worked, struggled with their gay
identities and marked out the fields of computation. Wardrip-Fruin looks
towards processes as active players because they harbour potential, become
in specific historic conjunctures.
The issue for these media archaeologists is not simply to historicise media
or media studies but to address the potentiality within historically located
media objects as realised in particular meshes. For Harman however such a
pictures of objects as holding something back is to move away from
“actuality”. For Harman conceiving of objects as always, inevitably fully
present and actualised allows for an expanded, multi-faceted account of the
object and its relations.
The protocol object

Aside from Galloway and Mackenzie, few leading figures in software
studies have addressed the specificity of protocol and standards.85 Although
Joel Slayton, in the forward to Fuller’s Media Ecologies, talks of “the limits
and excess of protocol” (Fuller, 2007, p. ix) as a theme of the text, the book
uses artworks and pirate radio as instantiations of software, as a way into the
broader techno-social mesh. The work is at a different scale. Similarly Berry’s
work on open source (2004; 2008a; Berry & Moss, 2005) rather than moving
in the direction of how protocols and standards are a site of the same legal
and cultural battles over their role, ownership and position, as operating
systems and software packages, has moved in the direction of a broader
philosophical critique of the computational society (2011b). JPEG
specifically is even more neglected. As Daniel Palmer says: “JPEG is
strangely unknown, almost completely neglected in the critical literature
around digital photography” (2011, n.p.). There are a few exceptions to this
neglect and in many ways these accounts bring together the three themes
that I have identified as running through discussions of the digital and scopic
object.
85. Greg Elmer’s exploration of a protocol he sees at work within “techno-

governmentality”, the robots.txt which excludes some web content from search engines
(2008), is less a study of a specific technology than of a network of relations within which
it functions, in his case the Bush White House/Google axis.
55
Coming from film studies, Sean Cubitt has approached the new
distributed spaces of motion imaging such as YouTube through the H.263
codec which is enfolded with the Flash video (.flv) format. He says: “There is
no internet without the standardisation of internet protocols” (2008, p. 46).
Cubitt picks up on Mackenzie’s short account of motion imaging codecs in
Fuller’s Software Studies: A Lexicon where Mackenzie argues that: “codecs
structure contemporary media economies and cultures in important ways [...
they] catalyze new relations between people, things, spaces, and times in
events and forms” (Mackenzie 2008, p. 48). In particular Cubitt draws a
connection between video codecs’ “transform compression” and “motion
estimation”, the technique it uses to compress but also render motion, and a
“relational ordering that articulates realities together that previously lay
further apart” (2008, p. 45).86 Cubitt has continued this interest in standards,
drawing connections between colour space standards and an emergent 3D
scopic regime (2010).
While Cubitt’s demand that film studies engage with the codecs and
protocols that are now so important to the industry as well as the cultural
practices and relations that run through spaces and businesses such as
YouTube, Google and cloud computing (Cubitt, Hassan & Volkmer, 2011), is
important, those objects remain components, actants in a troupe rather than
the focus themselves. H.263 and HSV, LAB and RGB are enfolded with
corporate interests (Adobe) and telecoms and non-governmental bodies
(ITU, ISO etc.). He uses these relations as a way of mapping global and
neoliberal relations and discourses of the public sphere, at the same time
rendering those protocol objects as in an almost Latourian fashion, defined
by those relations. The determination may be more than one way but the
object does not exceed its relations.
At the same time those codecs are drawn as objects exhibiting a form of
dynamism, enabling processes of visualisation and imagining as well. They
are framed as processural in terms of how they work. Here compression
86. Fuller’s collection is interesting insofar as the series of very short chapters, all focus
on very specific, even technical aspects of “software”: the copy function; import and
export; the code library; the function; the interrupt or object orientation. Aside from
Mackenzie however, the protocols and standards are surprisingly absent.
56
protocols or standards average data, codecs reprocess light as particular

spectrums of colour. It is this standardised processing that, for Cubitt, is key
to understanding the protocol’s nature and its enfolding with capitalist and
technosocial relations, not least insofar as standard-compressed data
(including JPEG) allows management of bandwidth and security (2008, p.
48). That processuality is articulated through becoming, a potential “within”
the standard. H.263 harbours the potential to encode data as well as drive
YouTube as social space, journalism and business. As it is repositioned
within new relations it is actualised as citizen-media tool, as part of an
Apple-Adobe IP battle or as component in a video-on-demand (VoD)
business plan.
While both Cubitt and Mackenzie have certainly engaged with protocols,
they have arguably not approached those codecs and standards as specific
objects requiring an account of their position and nature as objects. Rather
they have been addressed as components in a computational, visual or
techno-social mesh. They are defined and positioned by their relations with
other objects, their becoming and their potential to realise new meshes. Just
as Galloway positions TCP/IP in terms of its relation (as rules) to control
societies, so Mackenzie locates wireless standards in terms of broader fields
of experience87 and Cubitt draws colour space standards as elements in a
politically and economically charged scopic field and the history of the
“standard observer”.
Specifically in terms of the JPEG codec, Palmer argues that: “the JPEG
format is part of the new computational logic of photography” (2011, n.p.).88
For Palmer, JPEG needs to be approached as a rhetorical form. Following
Manovich’s linguistic turn, Palmer traces the ideological workings of JPEG as
a matter of coding, with JPEG a powerful component in the processes of
encoding at play in digital imaging. For Palmer, “the JPEG is rhetorically tied
to the idea of democracy in an age of distributed imaging, in which the
87. Stephen Jones and George Thiruvathukal also discuss WiFi in terms of hardware in
their discussion of the Ninetendo Wii (2012, p. 11).
88. Technically of course JPEG is not the format but the standard that enables the JFIF
or EXIF format.
57
image has been spatialised in global databases” (op cit.). He argues that “its
persuasive power, lies in this same invisibility” (op cit.). While I would agree
(and come on to discuss, JPEG’s enfolding within governmental rhetorics), I
would argue that it is precisely JPEG’s visibility (admittedly in terms of its
sensual rather than withdrawn dimensions - see next Chapter), that is
important. JPEG’s ubiquity as object in multiple connections depends on its
sensual visibility and accessibility.89 I look to an object-oriented focus on
the object itself not its rhetorical or linguistic workings as a way into
addressing its power.
Outside accounts of codecs, Raiford Guins has addressed another

standards object (2009). Guins discusses how the V-chip is not only
embedded in US TV sets but also enfolded in governmental practices and
regimes of truth and power. Drawing on Paul Virilio’s account of “sightless
vision” (1994), Guins explores how the V-chip encapsulates “protocols of
visuality” (2009, p. 28) and “embodies many tenets of neoliberalism” (ibid p.
44). Guins also brings together the three dominant themes discussed above.
For him the V-chip object must be mapped in terms of its relations to other
digital software and hardware objects as well as governmental practices and
discourses. The control society he joins Galloway in describing, is a field of
technosocial relations. The V-chip is best thought of in terms of process. Its
processual nature, the way it changes as it is instantiated within and through
particular regimes of biopower and visuality is central. It is through seeing
the V-chip protocol (and hardware object) as an object that becomes, that
Guins can address its working - whether censoring or more importantly
setting self-censorship in motion. It is that generative power, the potential
enfolded within the object that is most potent. It is the hidden capability to
configure and reconfigure, to structure and position that renders it power-
full.
The V-chip is a technology, an object enfolding software and hardware

components or objects. Detecting and responding to the rating embedded in
89. Palmer points to the fact that Chun makes a similar claim, seeing software as “a
powerful metaphor for everything invisible that generates visible effects, from genetics to
the invisible hand of the market” (Chun, 2011, p. 2).
58
a TV signal, it clearly acts as a technical, and as Guins discusses, a

governmental protocol, defining “acceptable” and “family-friendly”
standards as well as practices of viewing. It also consists of sets of connected
protocol-objects enfolded in TV standards and the software within the TV,
receiver and chip itself. Guins’ discussion of governmentality and the V-chip
does not unpick those material, technical, object-oriented issues. For him the
V-chip “manifests a new visual protocol, it makes visible the positive effects
of television that it enables: choice, self-regulation, interaction, safe images,
and security” (ibid p. 48).
While his account certainly connects technological objects with

governmentality in a direct way that, like Foucault’s panopticon, must be
seen as more than a metaphor for the operations of power, the failure to
unpick the technical enfoldings and workings of the software and hardware
objects, undermines its reach. As I discuss below, Bogost and Montfort
approach an embedded digital object - in their case the “Television Interface
Adaptor” within the Atari VCS games platform through an analysis of its
technical (object) structures and connections. The governmentality at play in
the V-chip as technology, discourse and practice, appears to analysis and
critique in the specific connections between the V-chip’s software and the
ratings encoded in the “line 21 data area” in the TV signal as well as the
debates in Congress, the media and legislation. There is a reality to the
technological object that connects with other real and unreal objects - TV
signals, moral panics, political rhetoric, TV boxes. These (and other) objects
connect within the “neo-liberal-family” object. While Guins identifies an
object at work, his unwillingness to address the technical alongside the
political and discursive object connections blinds his analysis to some of the
connections in play.
Other writers on digital objects can be seen as productively weaving the

three themes together. Parikka and Sampson’s account of “anomalous
objects” (2009) provides a similar bringing together of the three themes.
Here the digital objects under investigation are addressed through their
relations, as process more than essence and as harbouring a potential that
media archaeology serves to trace. Parikka and Sampson use the term
59
“topology” to “address the complex assemblages of network society, which

are not restricted to technological determinism, or the effects technology has
on society, but encompass the complex foldings of technological
components with other aspects of social and cultural reality” (ibid p. 5).
Here “components” - the weird digital objects the authors and their
collaborators explore - are approached via relations, enfoldings, actant-
networks. “Assemblage” and “topology” signify not a background field of
relations or context so much as as an active relationality with which objects
are inevitably and inescapably entwined.
As an example, when Parikka says that he “primarily addresses noise in

the context of telecommunications, networks, and digital culture” (2011a, p.
258), context is not some passive background or even determining space.
Rather his noise objects (the sort of glitches that Steve Goodman (2009) and
Rosa Menkman (2011a; 2011b) explore, as well as real technological noise
objects such as the telegraph and imaginary objects such as the
volcanograph)90 cannot be understood outside their relations with sonic (and
scopic) culture, shifts in capitalism and technosocial dynamics. These
relations are not where our focus should solely be, the authors argue. We
need to look at, for and through objects. But those objects cannot for Parikka
be historically or theoretically approached outside those relations. Media
archaeology’s mission to build a “nonsignifying take on media
history” (2011a, p. 257) demands that objects are more than representations.
It demands a respect for objects but objects-in-relations. In contrast, an
object-oriented media archaeology would demand an account of those
objects that did not depend on relations. Here a telegraph or an imaginary
“volcanograph”, an audio glitch or a protocol have an existence and power
beyond those relations. As I will discuss, this opens up productive ways of
addressing the weird, anomalous character of protocol.
Similarly Parikka and Sampson draw those components in terms of

process. They say: “We are not seeking out the (predefined) essence of the
anomaly (whether expressed in terms of a representational category or
90. There is an interesting parallel with Harman’s willingness to account for imaginary as
well as “real” objects.
60
intrinsic technical mechanism), but instead a process in a larger web of

connections, singularities, and transformations” (2009, pp. 5-6). The
component-object, they argue, is best seen as a process. In terms of specific
digital objects, for Parikka the “imaginary” around the Morris worm, the
metaphors and discourses in play were processural - invasion, vandalism,
disease (Parikka, 2009, p. 113) but the object itself was also processural
insofar as its position within the mesh (as well as the systems it “attacked” or
related to) was as process. It ran. It replicated. It acted. Its power lay in its
working.
Finally the anomalous object must be seen as harbouring a potentiality

that is actualised in particular historical moments, holding something in
reserve as a mesh or regime unfolds and enfolds. Media archaeology’s
mapping of truth-power or discourse networks or scopic regimes explores
that becoming. It is here where a philosophy of relations, process and
potential meets history and practice. As far as actual objects go Parikka
approaches viruses as “philosophical and artistic machines that create new
perceptions and concepts” (ibid p. 122). He discusses viruses in play in the
Biennale in Venice as well as within IBM. The potential viruses harbour is
not just for “good” or “ill”, for “anarchy” or “art” but more fundamentally an
inevitable potential to become, to be realised in different meshes and
regimes. The fact that a virus harbours a potential to create, recreate and
reposition foldings in the technosocial mesh means it generates new
commercial, security and social practices and moral panics. Parikka’s media
archaeology does more than historicise the object, it historicises the
relations, becomings and potential through which that object must be seen.
This account of the object also has practice implications. In their work on
“zombie media” and “circuit bending”, Parikka and Garnet Hertz explore
the creation of the “punctualized object”. They say:
Punctualization refers to a concept in Actor-Network Theory

to describe when components are brought together into a
single complex system that can be used as a single object.
We refer to the disassembly of these single objects as
“depunctualization” – which shows a circuit of
61
dependencies that ties the owner to the corporation that

manufactured the device (Hertz & Parikka, 2010, p. 6).
It is the position of components as elements in circuits of dependencies,

active relationality and potential that opens up a space for what Galloway
and Thacker term “exploit” and Wolfgang Ernst explores as “monumental”
history (2005, p. 589).
Their media archaeological practice-research exploring and exploiting

vibrant material undead digital objects requires that those object-
component-actants are considered as at least in part defined through
relations and process. It is only then that their potential for discipline can be
understood and their potential for reconfiguration, exploit or
depunctualization can be released. “For the arts, as a methodological rule of
thumb, objects are never inert, but consist of various temporalities, relations
and potentials that have been brought together, but can be broken apart
again” (Hertz & Parikka, 2010, p. 8).
An object-oriented perspective works towards the same understanding

and practice but remains committed to addressing objects outside of their
relations and in terms of their presence. In this account the virus or spam,
the undead technology (or even protocol) require and deserve a
philosophical framing as present, complete and multipolar objects. This is
not just for some theoretical coherency (I will come on to make that
argument), but also for practical purposes. As I will discuss, a willingness to
entertain as well as create work with objects as inevitably in relations but
not defined by them; as fully present, multidimensional but still definite; and
as holding nothing back rather than waiting to become or become
actualised, allows me to engage in and learn from forms of object-oriented
photographic practice. Without that perspective I could not have opened up
the real-sensual and fusion-fission dynamics of the object, and their
governmental implications or built my scopic apparatuses, imagined and
imaged my photographs.
Within software studies itself the three themes often appear enfolded
together. At first sight Berry’s The Philosophy Of Software (2011b) would
appear to offer an object-oriented account of software objects. After all,
62
Berry draws on Bruno Latour’s “philosophy”91 to argue for an account of

power-full code actant-objects. “Code is striking in its ability to act as both
an actor performing actions upon data, and as a vessel, holding data within
its boundaries” (ibid p. 33). These actants’ power is linked to relations. For
Berry, “no code is ‘bigger’ or ‘more important’ than another, except to the
extent that it has a larger number of connections” (ibid p. 62). His debt to
Latour extends to his method for software studies. “[W]e have to be alert to
following the code’s genealogy to see how it is developed as an historical
object and its influences on attitudes, movements and ideas” (ibid p. 33).
Furthermore, he explores code in its material specificity, moving beyond a

purely linguistic approach to embrace a phenomenological account of the
computational image, “how one know one’s way around with respect to
things in a computational image, and conversely, the computational way of
making sense of the world and how it gives expression to that
sensibility” (ibid p. 132). Whether looking at Perl poetry, Obfuscated C Code
contests or high frequency trading, the code-object is the focus even if the
technosocial mesh is the target. But again, Berry’s objects are framed
through the themes of relationality, processuality and potentiality that run
through software studies. He says:
Code must then be understood in context, as something that

is in someway potentially running for it to be code. Code is
processual, and keeping in mind its execution and agentic
form is crucial to understanding the way in which it is able
to both structure the world and continue to act upon it (ibid
p. 38 my emphases).
When he argues that “the ontology of the computational is increasingly

hegemonic in forming the background presupposition for our understanding
the world” (ibid p. 128), it is the code-object’s connections, forming a
hegemonic bloc within hardware/software meshes that is the context. It is
the relations they enact, empower and enable that form the “condition of
possibility for a device-dependent, co-constructed subjectivity” (ibid p. 160).
The agency is in the running. Google and Facebook’s data mining algorithms
91. The term is in quotes here to highlight Latour’s reluctance to be seen as developing
such a framework (Latour, Harman & Erdélyi, 2011).
63
are dynamic components in the infinite archive and its governmental

praxis.92 They and their power-full actant positions in the mesh are
actualised as they, and the databases they generate, become.
Berry’s philosophy is certainly object-centred but it is not object-oriented

in the sense in which I am seeking to use Harman’s quadruple object. For
Berry, objects do not exceed their relations. They precisely depend on them.
Objects must be seen as dynamic and holding something back within a
relational conjuncture. It is only by framing them in these terms that Berry
can explore that field of relationality as well as our or any other actant’s
phenomenological relation to it. Code must be seen as the potential process
that fuels the governmental as well as artistic praxis he investigates.
As I will come on to argue, Harman’s object-oriented philosophy, by

exploring the multidimensional nature of objects exceeding any relations
and as fully realised and present and connecting within other objects to form
new objects, allows us to remain focused on the protocol/code-object,
addressing its specificity, even weirdness as a governmental actant as well as
imaging technology.
For a more object-oriented approach to technology, we can turn to Ian

Bogost. In his work with Nick Montfort on the Atari VCS platform (2009),
Bogost takes an unashamedly technical perspective. The VCS is literally
deconstructed down to the clock cycles of the “Television Interface
Adapter” (TIA) (ibid p. 27) and the specifics of “sprite color (COLUP0/
COLUP1) and graphics (GRP0/GRP1) values between scan lines” (ibid pp.
105-6). This concretely technical focus is important for the authors because,
they argue, the power, popularity and position of the VCS system was
because of its particular technological configuration and innovations and the
92. Robert Gehl says: “the archival capacity of Web 2.0 allows for new centralizations of
power, hidden away beneath the abstractions of the smooth Web 2.0 interface” (2011, p.
1240). While I would certainly argue for the importance of addressing power and the
archive, I would contend that one needs to address decentralisation and circulation of
governmental power through objects rather than look for a central location.
64
affordances they set in motion. One cannot account for the seminal position
of VCS and VCS gaming without seeing how the objects connected.93
Bogost provides a more explicitly object-oriented account of technical

objects in Alien Phenomenology (2012a).94 Here, unpacking the Foveon DP
sensor object in Sigma cameras is not a desire for depth, to excavate some
truth or basis for the object or position it as determinant. Rather a particular,
specific understanding of the technical workings of the object (in an
engineering as well as ontological sense) is necessary if one is to understand
how the object works as actant, the “unit operations” in play. “[U]nit
operations can help us expose and interrogate the ways we engage the
world in general, not just the ways that computational systems structure or
limit that experience” (Bogost, 2006, p. 40). When Bogost looks to
understand “how the sensor sees” (2012a, pp. 67-72) he is not merely saying
that “the experience of the camera cannot be reduced to the operation of its
constituent parts” (ibid p. 68) as an ontological point. He is making a
methodological point that the sensor “does work” in the digital imaging
pipeline and so we need to account for it in its specificity, not only in terms
of how its colour balance or focussing shapes what our perceived images are
(a correlationist account whereby objects can only be understood as matters
of human access), but also in terms of its machinic position and connections
with software and hardware, human and unhuman actants. The fact that a
Foveon sensor measures all wavelengths of light at each photocell, unlike a
traditional sensor with its Bayer mosaic, means the digital imaging pipeline
functions differently not just in terms of the final image and our semiotic
93. As noted above, Galloway (2006a) has also written on games and Thacker has
published in a journal that looks at “gaming” in a wider sense (2001). Although Galloway
is once again keen to explore how games relate to broader control systems and
practices, he does this via a formalist account of the game using a film studies
methodology. The material form, platform or object remains secondary. Thacker too uses
games as way into exploring his themes of the relationship between the body and
technology. Again simulation and gaming are the focus. The material platforms,
technologies, consoles, gadgets and objects are not the focus. For a specifically media
archaeological approach see Huhtamo (2005).
94. For a more ANT-derived account of “technical objects” see Akrich (1992) where
although “technical objects [...] simultaneously embody and measure a set of relations
between heterogenous elements” (1992, p. 205) the stress is on the relations rather than
the object.
65
relation to it but also its connections with Sigma’s brand, business, Flickr
groups and social media imag(in)ing practices. A Foveon imaging pipeline
creates different images but also different networks.95
Bogost is determined to remain at the scale of the object. He says: “The

difference between a unit-operational artifact and a system-operational
artifact is far more important than the formal nature or cultural genre of the
artifact” (2006, p. 28). This flat ontology of media and technical objects or
units as he calls them opens up ways of exploring not just a particular
platform and its enfolding within the digital/media mesh, but also broader
fields of power and subjectivity. “[U]nit operations can help us expose and
interrogate the ways we engage the world in general, not just the ways that
computational systems structure or limit that experience” (ibid p. 40).
The units that concern Bogost (whether hardware or software) cannot be

understood from a purely formalist analysis.96 The task is to avoid the
“transcendental signified”, the process, context, network or sets of relations
that pull one away from the real. The movement he advocates enables a
history of platforms (Montfort & Bogost, 2009) as well as games (Bogost,
2007) that avoids a human-world correlationism and a techno-
determinism.97
95. A similar argument could be made around the emerging “light field” camera
technologies http://www.lytro.com also discussed by Bogost (2012b) as well as my
stereo photography, see Epilogue.
96. I discuss the critique of OOP as formalist in The JPEG Object in Theory chapter.
97. In their Afterword on Platform Studies (2009, pp. 145-150), the authors lay out a
vision for a discipline that takes such details seriously. Using a diagram reminiscent of
Galloway’s account of the four nested layers of the Internet suite (2004, p. 39), and
Mackenzie’s similar exploration of the ISO’s seven-layer Open Systems Interconnection
Reference Model in relation to wireless technologies (2010, pp. 99-100), Montfort and
Bogost outline “the five levels of digital media” (2009, p. 146). Platform studies positions
itself as filling a gap: “If code studies are new media’s analogue to software engineering
and computer programming, platform studies are more similar to computing systems
and computer architecture, connecting the fundamentals of digital media work to the
cultures in which that work was done and in which coding, forms, interfaces, and
eventual use are layered upon them” (2009, p. 147).
66
Bogost’s list of objects in play is, like Latour and Harman, fundamentally
inclusive:98
[U]nits encompass the material manifestations of complex,

abstract, or conceptual structures such as jealousy, racial
tension, and political advocacy.
“When thought of in this way, units not only define people,
network routers, genes, and electrical appliances, but also
emotions, cultural symbols, business processes, and
subjective experiences (Bogost, 2006, p. 5).
For Bogost systems are also units. “[A] unit is a material element, a thing.
It can be constitutive or contingent, like a building block that makes up a
system, or it can be autonomous, like a system itself. Often, systems become
units in other systems” (ibid p. 5 emphasis in original).99 Here Bogost echoes
Harman’s willingness to address even meshes at the scale of objects.
Bogost’s systems are just another form of unit. As an example, when he
discusses intellectual property (IP) and games, IP is not some context or
structure or background. It is a specific object/unit. “Like component
software, game engines are IP.100 They exist in the material world in a way
that genres, devices, and clichés do not” (ibid p. 56).101 Intellectual property
is a key component in the mesh and so is a unit in play. One cannot
understand video games, their cultural position or the workings of the
industry unless that object too is on the table. Just as I argue with respect to
imaging standards, “[g]ame engines are no more transcendental than genres,
in the sense that one cannot play a game engine but only a game that
encompasses and integrates that engine to create a work” (ibid p. 57).
98. Bogost coined the term “Latour Litany” to refer to Latour’s lists of objects. See for
instance: “Golden Mountains, phlogiston, unicorns, bald kings of France, chimeras,
spontaneous generation, black holes, cats on mats, and other black swans and white
ravens will all occupy the same space-time as Hamlet, Popeye, and Ramses II” (Latour,
1999, p. 161). For a software Latour Litany creator, see http://www.bogost.com/blog/
latour_litanizer.shtml.
99. Wardrip-Fruin draws a parallel between Bogost’s term and his own account of
“operational logics” (2009, p. 17). As I have argued however I see Wardrip-Fruin’s stress
on processuality as a move away from a more object-oriented focus.
100. For an alternative approach to software engines, see Helmond (2008).
101. Of course Harman’s OOP would admit genres, devices, and clichés to the realm of
objects.
67
Conclusion
I have sought to show that accounts of the software object and even
protocol have worked within the three themes of relationality, processuality
and potentiality. These have positioned the software, protocol or standards
object as processes enfolded within powerful meshes harbouring a potential
for critical or governmental engagement. The stress in these accounts is on
the field of becoming and relations.
Such work has brought software to the fore as an object of analysis,

critical engagement and creative practice. The willingness to engage with
specific components of software such as protocols and codecs have further
empowered the sort of specific, focused analysis and praxis that can begin
the task of mapping the way Web 2.0 and Web 3.0 technosocial meshes
enable and encode specific new forms of governmentality. My reasons for
taking a different path in analysis and practice is not because these
approaches somehow fail in these aims but rather that an object-oriented
philosophy allows a new way of viewing objects and object-relations that
opens up that governmental mesh to critique as well as opening up a
creative imaging practice. Furthermore, it opens up a practice-research
methodology that enabled me to develop ways of understanding my
research questions.
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Interlude: Sally Mann

In this confluence of past and future, reality and symbol, are
Emmett, Jessie, and Virginia. Their strength and confidence,
there to be seen in their eyes, are compelling - for nothing is
so seductive as a gift casually possessed. They are
substantial; their green present is irreducibly complex. The
withering perspective of the past, the predictable treacheries
of the future; for the moment, those familiar complications
of time all play harmlessly around them as dancing shadows
beneath the great oak (Mann, 1992, n.p.)
Part of the fuss around Sally Mann’s collection Immediate Family (1992)
was that she had turned her children into objects. In the images of their
childhood in rural Virginia, parts of their pre-pubescent bodies that should
only have been visible (a matter of concern) to their parents had been
objectified. The girl or boy, the “child” maybe “childhood” had become an
object for Mann the artist. Further, Mann’s cumbersome view camera had
become an object in their growing up, an interloper in the childhood where
it had no right to be.
In her later work What Remains (2003), Mann was again accused of
objectification. As the omniscient artist-subject she had violated another
taboo, turning decomposing corpses in an FBI scientific facility into
“bodies”, objects of her art. Once again, she as subject turned her camera
on objects.
But Mann is an object-oriented photographer in a real not a caricatured

sense. Her images are of objects connecting: the sacks next to Virginia in
Virginia Asleep, 1988; The Yard Eggs 1991; the adult earring and necklace
around Jessie’s neck in Jessie at 5, 1987 - these are are as much the “child”
as the famous naked bodies. In Mann’s object-oriented photo-philosophy,
they are players in the “childhood” and the “family” objects. Hers is a
democratic eye, but not an un-discerning one. Every object is carefully
composed and connected. But more than just a litany of objects on the
groundglass, Mann is object-oriented in her sense of her own objectness.
Her work with objects is not as a separate subject, standing outside the flux
of material things in the world. Hers is not a dispassionate eye secure in its
69
subjecthood and correlationist relationship to “the world”, “the family”, “the

South”. Sally Mann is an artist-object enfolded in the mesh of objects,
connecting within the heart of new objects: “the Mann family”, “the Civil
War”, “death”.
Mann’s object-oriented sensibility extends beyond her democratic eye.

She is fully present in her images. Immediate Family is as much a picture of
her as of her children. She is modeling just as they model. Her images of
Civil War battlefields are less of landscapes out there, than of the interior
landscape she argues Southerners carry with themselves. She says: “To
identify a person as a Southerner suggests not only that her history is
inescapable and formative but that it is also impossibly present” (2005, p. 7).
Mann knows that she is at the same ontological scale as her children, their
childhood objects, her home and history.
Mann’s use of not just ancient cameras and lenses but also antique
processes is also a part of her object-oriented sensibility. The glitches her
technologies introduce, like the cliched inclusion of the photographer’s
shadow, inscribed the technology-object across the image. The “failed”
coating of the wet collodion plate, the dust, the refracted light in the ancient
lens, are themselves objects connecting with each other, with Mann, the
thing being photographed, the gallery, the art market and... Mann is open to
those objects. More, she embraces them and their connections.
Mann the photographer is co-present as an object in the mesh of her

imaging in the shape of those glitches, faults, qualities. This is not some self-
reflexive gambit simultaneously modernist in foregrounding the medium but
also postmodern in playing with the death of the auteur-imager. Rather it is
an object-oriented sensibility, a realisation and acknowledgement of the
inevitability and power of object meshes within imaging.
In The Quality of the Affection, 2006 an image part of the Proud Flesh
series (Ravenal, 2010), Mann’s naked husband Larry is an object. Posed,
arranged, positioned he sits with his back to Mann’s camera, a parabola
intersecting with a dark shadow on which other objects - a glass, a pencil
shape rendered illegible by the camera. One encounter with the work places
70
Sally, Larry and the glass within a field of relations interwoven within the
history of nude art, gender, the body (Larry suffers from adult muscular
dystrophy) and power. But The Quality of the Affection, 2006 is an object-
work. It is created through and with objects - not in some value-laden sense
of powerful subject, powerless objects and the gaze - but as a series of
objects connections within the frame, at the moment of exposure, the
moment of viewing and the moment of analysis. Larry’s back, the lights
falling on his spine, the glass, the streaks in the collodion, the glass, the
gelatin in the print, the Aperture Foundation and the Virginia Museum of
Fine Arts, Sally, her lens... connect and reconnect within the image object,
the art object, the photographic exposure objects, the family object... This is
not a photo of objects by a subject but a photograph with objects, by an
object.
71
The JPEG object in theory

JPEG as an object
One thing all of those involved in the object-oriented ontology field, itself
a subset of the broader speculative realist movement”, would agree is on the
importance of objects. From within philosophy, Morton’s “hyperobjects”,102
Bryant’s “subjectless object” and Harman’s “quadruple object” all, in their
different ways, advocate an attention to objects and emphasise that we can
approach social reality through objects. Furthermore they open up a wider
conception of what counts as an object. Bryant neatly sums up the stance in
the title of his most recent book The Democracy of Objects (2011).103 This
call to take objects seriously and expand our definition of the object has
been taken up outside philosophy notably in the work of Jane Bennett and
her litany of “one large men’s black plastic work glove; one dense mat of
oak pollen; one unblemished dead rat; one white plastic bottle cap; one
104
smooth stick of wood” (2010a, p. 4). I will return to Bennett’s work later in
this chapter as well as when I discuss my practice. These writers would
doubtless be happy to say that JPEG can be addressed as an object but in
order to begin working (creatively) with the JPEG object, as my project
demands, it is important to explore what an understanding of JPEG as object
entails. What characterises an object? In what way is JPEG an object?
For Harman, an object is what “is or seems to be one thing” (2010d, p.

148). That addition of “seems” is important because it not only allows
Harman to deal with imaginary, virtual and, I will argue “weird”, objects like
102. Objects “such as Styrofoam and plutonium that exist on almost unthinkable
timescales” (Morton, 2010a, p. 19).
103. A title reminiscent of William Eggleston’s claim to a democratic photography

(Sussman, 2008).
104. Bennett is clear that things do not have to be impressive or somehow deserve our
attention. Anything is an object and can be lively. I would agree with Matthew Tiessen
(interestingly a practice-research artist-ontologist) who says: “[I]f nature and things have
to be exceedingly impressive to deserve our consideration we’re left repeating the
expectations that gave rise to our lack of recognition for thing-power in the first place. In
response to Bennett’s concerns about fear and respect my modest proposal is that
things be encountered from a position of responsive humility – a position that recognizes
that things are all we’ve got, whether they command respect or not” (2010, p. 234
emphasis in original).
72
unicorns, characters in books and protocol but also points to the fourfold
character of objects that allow me to develop a JPEG-based object-oriented
photography.
In his letter to a curious five-year-old, Harman gives us a series of “brief

rules about objects” (ibid pp. 147-8). We can use this as a way of mapping
the way in which JPEG can be seen as an object in Harman’s sense.
1. Relative size does not matter: an atom is no more an object than a

skyscraper.105 At one level this appears to have nothing to do with software.
Where is size in software? The number of bytes in the programme? The
number of lines of code? When it comes to JPEG are we looking for the
relative size of the code fragment governing “export to JPEG” as against the
rest of the code in Photoshop? Such investigation is possible but misses the
more important point around scale that Harman is making. All objects are
equal, on a flat ontological footing. This is important in terms of decentering
the human. As Morton says: “It’s a mistake to think that the mesh is ‘bigger
than us’” (2010a, p. 78). In terms of JPEG, it has an existence and interest as
an object regardless of its scale within software or within photography. Its
“objectness” does not depend on its scale or its relationship to something
else - Photoshop, machine code, electrical charges etc.
2. Simplicity does not matter: an electron is no more an object than a

piano. The JPEG standard is simpler than Photoshop but more complex than
the specific Huffman table it uses. As we have seen JPEG is a “family of
compression algorithms” (Lane, 1999a) each of which can be seen as an
object, simply nested further “down”. This idea of nested objects must not be
seen in either value or deterministic terms. Just because an object works at a
different scale than another does not make it any less important nor any
more powerful in determining that other object’s position or workings.
Harman agrees with Bennett who speaks of “a nested set of
microbiomes” (2010a, p. 113), and Bryant who talks of objects “nested in
105. Harman uses a curious negative way of framing his rules. One could perhaps
reframe these objects as positive statements: “an atom is as much an object as is a
skyscraper”; “an electron is as much an object as is a piano”; “a soul is as much an
object as is cotton candy”; “helium is as much an object as is plutonium” and
“mountains are as much objects as are hallucinated mountains”.
73
other objects while nonetheless remaining independent or autonomous of

those objects within which they are nested” (2011, p. 152); or again as Ray
Brassier said in one of the original speculative realism workshops: [T]here
are nothing but objects, objects nested within one another, and the really
significant metaphysical challenge is explaining their interaction” (Brasier,
Grant, Harman & Meillassoux, 2007, p. 316). A Huffman table is an object,
so is JPEG, so is a JFIF image. The thing to explore is how those objects
interact within each other and other governmental objects. JPEG’s position as
object is in its position as having “some sort of unitary reality” (Harman,
2010d, p. 147). JPEG, as an industry standard, as a selling point for cameras
and software, as something in software and hardware apparatuses or in
discourse places it within the realm of objects.
3. Durability does not matter: a soul is no more an object than cotton

candy. OOP’s willingness to extend the concept of object to short-lived,
ephemeral, even imaginary or fictional things enables it to address systems
and structures as well as cultural practices. Monetarism and Harry Potter
may not endure but in their capacity to effect and connect, they must be
seen as objects in play. The Huffman table and DCT formula are
mathematical objects, rules maybe. They also do things within the digital
imaging pipeline. For some, as we have seen, that is the JPEG process
working, realising its potential and then changing in the flux or plasma of
becoming. Arguably the Huffman table and DCT exist after the power to the
software in the camera is turned off. Perhaps at some scale JPEG continues
to “exist” when there is no electricity enabling it to work. The important
thing is that for Harman, the JPEG object connects and then reconnects with
other objects - the next stream of data from the sensor, the memory card, the
next upload or data-mining operation. The rule is that its objectness does not
depend on its durability any more than on our ability to hold it in our hand.
4. Naturalness does not matter: helium is no more an object than

plutonium. Again the democracy of objects demands that we do not divide
natural things like atoms, trees and helium from tables, weapons grade
plutonium and software. As things in the world doing things, being
presences I trip over, use, am data-mined by - all are objects and therefore
74
worthy of study and necessary to account for. This is not the simple point
that media and cultural studies made when it said that Homer was as worthy
of study as Homer or that we needed an account of tattoos as well as Titian.
Nor is it the far earlier establishment of literary or art history studies arguing
for their objects being worthy alongside the natural sciences. This is not a
flattening of hierarchies and categories for political, professional or
academic interest. It is a metaphysical statement that all objects are in play
whether we like it or not. One could debate whether cosine is a natural
“thing”, a Platonic form, but from an OOP perspective such a debate is
meaningless. The DCT demonstrably is present within JPEG and does
something in the digital imaging pipeline.
5. Reality does not matter: mountains are no more objects than

hallucinated mountains. Here of course Harman lays himself open to the
common criticism that his framework is so loose as to be useless. But, he
argues:
Imaginary things are not utter non-beings. They don’t have

independence from the one who is conceiving them as real
objects do, but they’re not just nullities or holes of
nothingness. I don’t think Raskolnikov is a real object either,
but millions of people have read Crime and Punishment and
been influenced by it. Raskolnikov needs to be accounted
for by ontology (2011f, n.p.).
This is not to say that Harman sees every object as equally real. His whole
perspective with real and sensual objects (see below) is designed to explore
these different dimensions (2012a). What Harman is looking to leave out of
analysis is the idea of any kind of “non beings”. If things are at work, then
they are objects. JPEG is not imaginary but it is certainly difficult to see or
find. It is a standard written or maybe woven into software and hardware
meshes as well as business strategies and grandmother’s doting over a new
baby. But even if JPEG was not “real”. Even if the idea that a standard that
compressed data efficiently and effectively was an elaborate Capricorn One-
like conspiracy perpetrated by mad scientists, Adobe and Google, it
wouldn’t matter. JPEG would still be worthy of study because it was still at
play in people’s photography, their photographic consumption and their
75
relation to images and imagespace, as I will come on to discuss in relation

to Facebook.
In some ways JPEG is an ideal candidate to explore these rules. It does not
really have a size; it is both simple in its role but complex in its form; it is
ephemeral in its working but durable in its enfolding within imaging; it is
unnatural and it is clearly real within the digital imaging pipeline but
simultaneously unreal in its presence within the business plans of photo-
network start-ups where it is designed to reassure venture capitalists of
interoperability and flexibility 106.
JPEG can be conceptualised as an object. My practice has shown that

JPEG has a unity, a presence and a power within imaging objects and
apparatuses. What is more, as I will discuss, my practice demonstrates
Harman’s three key themes about objects: their existence beyond relations;
their presence beyond process and their working beyond potential.
Overmining and undermining

As I have sought to show in The JPEG object in the literature, a view of the
digital object built around ideas of relationality, processuality and
potentiality has been a pervasive and, in many way, positive theme running
through the development of software and critical code studies. This project’s
practice and research takes a different starting point. Following Harman’s
model of the “quadruple object” I work with a conception of the (JPEG)
object as having a reality in and of itself,107 not dependent for its power on
its relations. It has an existence (weird though it may be) that is more subtle
yet unified than a moment of working or becoming. Despite its withdrawal
106. Instagram’s API documentation says: “You must first save your file in PNG or JPEG
(preferred) format” (Instagram, 2011). This is not just instructions to engineers, it is a
statement for the whole of the Web 2.0 community - including investors and partners,
that Instagram works with the standards users (for which read customers) use.
Facebook purchased Instagram in the lead up to its IPO in 2012 secure in the
knowledge Instagram images and imagers would connect seamlessly with its services,
technologies and I will argue governmental rationality.
107. While Harman consider his position as “realist”, Bryant prefers to characterise his
as “materialist” (2012a; 2012c), as I discuss below. In fact in a “personal”
correspondence on Facebook he told “me” (the scare quotes signify my unease about
the nature of the interaction and the correct terminology for it): “I find myself increasingly
shying away from OOO and moving into the Bennett:materialist camp sans
vitalism” (2012b, n.p.).
76
from human access, it has a fully present character within apparatuses,

imaging and imagining.
To position JPEG as an actant defined by its relations, as a process or as

awaiting realisation is to be guilty of what Harman calls “undermining” or
“overmining”. These tendencies are not only philosophically but also
practically problematic. Harman says:
The first critical response to objects asserts that they are not
fundamental. All of the dogs, candles, and snowflakes we
observe are built of something more basic, and this deeper
reality is the proper subject matter for philosophy (2011g, p.
8).
This undermining of the object can be in terms of a materialism that sees

a more basic element as the starting point or even the end point of
analysis.108 Here JPEG is just a collection of more fundamental algorithms or
even electrical fluctuations. We must keep digging. For materialists, Harman
says, “[o]nly what is basic can be real” (op cit.). The problem with this of
course is that one does not account for the specificity of so-called
aggregates, such as JPEG. If, as I argue, JPEG is a key player in governmental
mesh-objects such as the Facebook Open Graph, relations and power, then
such a reductionist argument misses a key player. Furthermore from a
practice point-of-view to deny objecthood to JPEG removes a key player
from my apparatuses and my practice of imaging and imagining the
digitisation of light as data.
A second form of undermining happens with the argument that objects

are just the crystallisation of becoming. Here the fundamental flux of
becoming, the plasma of potentiality somehow stabilises as objects,
abstractions from something deeper. From this perspective JPEG is the
abstract name we give to the moment of encoding, the flux of processes,
algorithmic workings and mathematical transforms. Again JPEG itself is
108. This form of reductive materialism must be distinguished form the vitalist or
objected-oriented materialism that I come on to discuss in relation to Bennett and
Bryant.
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missed. If, as I argue JPEG is fully present109 in governmental spaces -

businesses, surveillance and data-mining operations, patents and business
plans, then it needs to be accounted for. It cannot be bracketed in favour of
ideas of scopic becoming or regimes of control. My JPEG-imaging practice
shows that JPEG is fully present and realised within my imaging. It is not
holding anything back, becoming and perishing or accreting new features.
The specific, real and actual JPEG object is connecting and reconnecting
within specific, real and actual new objects.That is how and why the mash-
up works and parts of the eBooks “fail” to work.
Harman argues that these forms of undermining of objects is

philosophically indefensible:
All are versions of reductionism in which objects only gain

their reality from elsewhere. All are forms of critique that
view individual objects in a spirit of nihilism, destroying
them with bulldozers to make way for something more
fundamental. They view objects as too shallow to be the
fundamental reality in the universe (ibid p. 10 emphasis in
original).
JPEG has a unity, presence and power as standard, imag(in)ing protocol

and, I will argue governmental actant, outside of the particular electrical
charges or code of which it is made. It has a presence and power in my
practice and Facebook’s strategy beyond its particular moments of working.
Harman says the second tendency in the philosophy of objects is to

“overmine” them, to reduce them upwards. He says:
On this view, objects are important only insofar as they are

manifested to the mind, or are part of some concrete event
that affects other objects as well (ibid p. 11).
Empiricist overmining says that an object of experience is just a bundle of
qualities: “apple” is just a term for series of qualities we link together: red,
sweet, cold, hard, juicy. Just as the brand Apple hopes to stand for values or
qualities: trendy, user-friendly, cool etc. In both cases, the object has no
reality outside its qualities. In this view, JPEG, is best thought of as shorthand
109. JPEG’s presence in a patent and in the software programmed onto a camera chip
are different in kind of course, but from an OOP perspective they are equally important
see the discussion of Raskolnikov above.
78
for data compression, interoperable data, flexible digital information.

Harman points out however that there is always more to objects than just the
qualities (the sensual dimension) that we encounter: the apple is not its
redness; Apple is not coolness. Redness on a corpse or coolness in Miles
Davis are different. Here JPEG is more than algorithm, compression or even
ideologies of interoperability. We and other objects encounter those qualities
but also, as I shall discuss, there are other real dimensions to the object that
are withdrawn, dimensions that make it JPEG.
A second strain of overmining comes in the form of what Quentin

Meillassoux has called “correlationism” (2009) - the folk devil that unites the
speculative realist movement. This tendency within philosophy has argued
that “we cannot think of world without humans or humans without world,
but only of a primal correlation or rapport between the two” (Harman,
2011g, p. 12). Harman calls this the “Philosophy of Human Access” (ibid pp.
110
62-68). Following the correlationist argument, to consider JPEG is to
consider a human relation to JPEG. It is inevitably human-object. We cannot
deal with JPEG, only deal with our dealings with it. The human-JPEG relation
111
is of course central to this project. JPEG imaging is a human-object thing.
But it is not the whole thing. JPEG has an existence and a reality outside of
my thinking about it, using it or having any relation with it. It exists in
software as well as Web 2.0 business plans, legal documents, marketing and
surveillance strategies, databases and family memories. But to see those
relations as defining the object is just another form of correlationism, one
that Harman calls “relationism”.112 Here he takes Whitehead and Latour
110. In The Quadruple Object and in his study of Meillassoux (2011h), Harman
discusses various forms of correlationism and why, in his view, they are philosophically
and logically indefensible. My aim here is not to enter into those subtleties but merely
highlight the more general human-object formulation as a problematic.
111. I will come on to argue this human-object, JPEG-object relation happens within
something that should also be seen as an object.
112. Relationism, the idea that objects must be understood in terms of their relation to
other objects has a long history e.g. Gottfried Leibniz’s argument contra Newton, that
time and space must be seen in relation to material events in the universe (Futch, 2008);
Georg Simmel’s “Wechselwirkung”, or the “reciprocal actions and effects” (Milà, 2005, p.
44) and Karl Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge which held that: “there are spheres of
thought in which it is impossible to conceive of absolute truth existing independently of
the values and position of the subject and unrelated to the social context” (1955, p. 79).
79
head on for arguing that an object’s power is defined by its field or network
of relations or accidents. JPEG from this perspective is power-full because it
is part of a scopic regime, apparatus or project. It is more powerful than
Google’s alternative WebP because it is in networks with Flickr, Facebook,
Adobe, Nikon, data-mining and domestic memory management. JPEG is
either an image in the mind or just its effect on other things: a bit player.
Harman argues that to follow this through means the object disappears. He
says:
If a house is encountered by three women, a child, a dog,

and a crow in the same moment, each of these perceptions
will have a very different character. And given a purely
relational definition of what objects are, it would seem
impossible to call all of them relations to the ‘same’ house.
The house itself vanishes into a mob of house-perceptions
(ibid p. 13 emphasis in original).
But that house, that JPEG, is real. There is a unity to it and not just in the
standards written and posted by its developers. It is in relations - within my
imaging and apparatuses as well as within the governmental scopic regime -
but that does not exhaust its reality, its unity. The correlationist and relationist
projects overmine the object. Empiricist or process philosophies undermine
it. Both refuse to deal with objects in their multiple dimensions,
connections, presence and reality. In terms of my project, they skip over
JPEG entirely. Harman argues that undermining and overmining are not
mutually exclusive but partners in shifting the focus from objects. “[E]very
undermining philosophy needs an overmined component as a supplement,
and vice versus” (ibid p. 14). A materialist call to find the basic building
blocks then locates those blocks (atoms, sub-atomic strings or Huffman
tables) in terms of relations or qualities - hardness, resistance, statistical
chance, probability etc. Similarly a relationist picture of flux and becoming
still demands a fundamental perceiver such as Whitehead’s God to correlate
all perceptions. In both cases “autonomous objects are [...] excluded as a
80
proper topic of philosophy” (ibid p. 15) and, I would argue, methodological

tool.113
Harman’s arguments against overmining and undermining are

philosophical and logical, mine are methodological and creative. Harman
argues that these approaches fail to ask the right questions and paint a
picture of reality that does not make sense. He reaches these conclusions
after thought. I argue that these approaches not only fail to provide a
coherent account of JPEG but also that they do not match my practical
experience of encountering and using JPEG. I reach these conclusions
through practice.
The sensual object

At the core of Harman’s conception of a unified, autonomous object is
actually the idea of two objects: the sensual and the real objects (2009c, p.
190).114 These should not be thought of as two distinct things but rather two
dimensions to the complex, powerful actant-object.115 Harman looks to
bring together Husserl’s framework of intentional objects, the objects present
to consciousness, with Heidegger’s account of real objects that withdraw
from access.
113. Harman discusses this missing piece as “the third table” alongside A.S.
Eddington’s (1928) “scientific table that is mostly empty space and made up of rushing
subatomic particles, and the table of everyday life” (2011j, n.p.; 2012c).
114. Karen Barad argues that “the primary ontological unit is not independent objects
with independently determinate boundaries and properties but rather what Bohr terms
‘phenomena’ [...] the ontological inseparability of agentially intra-acting
components” (2007, p. 33). For her, phenomena have a reality. Harman would agree.
Where he would differ is in Barad’s sense of objects needing something more. Barad
cites Judith Butler’s argument that matter is “fully sedimented with discourses” (1993, p.
29), arguing “’Things’ don’t preexist; they are agentially enacted and become
determinately bounded and propertied within phenomena. Outside of particular agential
intra-actions, ‘words’ and ‘things’ are indeterminate. Matter is therefore not to be
understood as a property of things but, like discursive practices, must be understood in
more dynamic and productive terms-in terms of intra-activity” (Barad, 2007, p. 150).
Here it is when objects are “enacted” that they become things. For Harman, there is no
necessity for anything outside the object. Objects do not lie in wait or in potentiality for
enactment.
115. Harman is clear that this real/sensual objects is not the the same as a primary/
secondary qualities distinction. He argues that what are seen as primary qualities,
physical properties such as mass, shape, position are “not deep enough to qualify for
the status of ‘primary’”. These qualities are no more “real” or basic than so-called
secondary “mere qualities, such as ‘sweet’, ‘red’, and so forth” (2009c, p. 195).
81
Husserl, whom Harman calls “an object-oriented idealist” (2011g, p. 20

emphasis in original), held that objects do not exist outside our
consciousness (2009c, p. 194). The camera on my desk, the CCD inside, the
software “inside”, exist as intentional objects within my consciousness.
When I sleep or fail to pay attention to them, in some sense they cease to
exist. Intentional objects “exist only as passive figments encountered by
something real” (ibid p. 213). It is this split and relationships between the
116
real and the sensual that Harman’s quadruple structure seeks to unpick. In
Harman’s reading of the philosopher, for Husserl:
We never see all faces of the hammer at once, but always

see it from a certain angle and distance, in a certain colour
and intensity of light, and always in a specific mood. In this
sense the hammer only appears in the form of specific
profiles or adumbrations [...] Nothing is ‘hidden’ behind the
adumbrations for Husserl; the hammer itself lies within each
adumbration, as an eidos encrusted with accidents (ibid p.
180).
For Husserl, the object present to us is always particular. It cannot be
separated from its adumbrations, its existence is tied to those specific profiles
as we (or, for Harman, any other object) encounter them. The Olympic
velodrome-object I or my camera sensor perceived (or photographed)
yesterday, perceive today and will perceive tomorrow always comes
encrusted with particular qualities or accidents. This is after all the point of
the decisive moment - not all photographic moments are the same. The
velodrome is always perceived (by human or unhuman actant-objects) in a
particular light, from a particular point-of-view or in a particular mood. In
terms of encountering JPEG, I as a photographer-object and the in-camera
116. Harman prefers to use the term “sensual” for this dimension of objects. He says:
“Husserl uses ‘intentional’ to refer only to the unified objects of consciousness, while
excluding the shifting surface qualities of things from the intentional domain. So-called
‘sense data’ are not intentional for Husserl, precisely because they are not object-
oriented. For this reason, a new unified term is needed that covers both the enduring
objects of consciousness and the overly specific facades through which they are always
manifest” (2009c, p. 136).
82
software-object “perceive”117 JPEG. That encounter happens as I press the

shutter or the Save As button or software encodes light-as-data. What the
software and I encounter is the particular qualities of JPEG, particular to the
encounter. Those qualities shift and change as a particular “quality setting” is
chosen, a particular Huffman table is accessed or a particular DCT is used.
Harman calls these adumbrations, the particular profiles, accidents, the

object’s “sensual qualities” (SQ). The sensual object (SO) that human and
unhuman actants encounter is in a relation with these shifting accidents.
These profiles are how we access the object. But Harman points out that
amid the myriad of possible views of the Velodrome or compression
configurations, we recognise the 2012 Velodrome or JPEG. This he says is
because the object has real qualities (RQ) that the sensual object forms a
relation with.118 He says that if one were to strip away all the (SQ) accidents
in a particular encounter or perception, “what remains is not merely an
‘empty pole of unity [...] a ‘bare particular,’ in the terms of analytic
philosophy. Instead, we approach what Husserl calls the eidos of an
119
object” (2011g, p. 27). There is something (the RQ) of the velodrome that
means we perceive it as the Olympic velodrome, a sensual unity, no matter
the light or the weather. These features mean we know we are dealing with
the Velodrome not the Aquatic Centre or even the National Cycling Centre
117. Inevitably when dealing with objects as actants, one slips into anthropomorphic or
worse anthropocentric discourse speaking of unhuman objects as “perceiving” when
attempting to explore the way they connect. Bennett is not ashamed of the often very
anthropomorphic language she uses. “We need to cultivate a bit of anthropomorphism -
the idea that human agency has some echoes in nonhuman nature - to counter the
narcissism of humans in charge of the world” (2010a, p. xvi). Harman echoes this when
he says that “a bit of anthropomorphism may be needed to overcome
anthropocentrism” (2011a, n.p.). Bogost explores similar issues as he discusses
“metaphorism” and the “unknowable inner lives of units” (2012a, pp. 61-84).
118. It is important to note that just as with the “distinction” between RO and SO, so
when Harman talks of real and sensual qualities, he is not saying that one is more
important, fundamental, basic or even real than the other. Rather they must be seen as
two dimensions at work within a unified object.
119. It is important to note that for Harman these real or eidetic qualities are not
universal. These are not the ‘eternal objects’ of Whitehead. Rather they are always
particular to an individual object. When I press the button and encounter the sensual
JPEG (that dimension to JPEG that I work with), I encounter a particular running of JPEG,
in a particular moment, within a particular apparatus (JPEG’s SQ). I also encounter
JPEG’s RQ, its particular digital imaging pipeline that make JPEG particular.
83
Velodrome in Manchester. It has wooden banking, with a particular

geometry, a certain length etc. In the same vein, there is something (the RQ)
of JPEG that means an object (me as the photographer, the computer chip or
software) knows it is working with JPEG. We know we are encountering
JPEG because it use DCT not the Wavelet Transform coding that JPEG2000
uses (Marcellin, Gormish, Bilgin & Boliek, 2000; Adams, 2001). The
particular Huffman tables may shift but the unity remains.
The real object

Harman’s sensual objects exist only for another object that encounters
them (2011g, p. 48). But there is a second dimension, what Harman calls
real objects (RO). These differ from sensual objects in that they are
autonomous from any object that encounters them and they withdraw from
all access, all relations and each other. Here Harman turns to Heidegger’s
tool analysis (which he explored in more detail in Tool Being (2002)).
Heidegger argues that the spectacles I use to look through my camera
viewfinder, my heart beating, the computer operating system and protocols
are “ready-to-hand” but are not present to me unless they break, stop
working or fail. Objects disappear in favour of some purpose they serve
(2011g, p. 38)... at least until they crash. These objects are real. They have an
existence beyond the phenomenal realm. In Harman’s reading, for
Heidegger:
[T]he being of any object is always deeper than how that

object appears to us [...] The hammer as a Husserlian
intentional object is always already present as soon as we
acknowledge it, and is merely encrusted with non-essential
features. By contrast, the hammer for Heidegger is a real
entity that invisibly does its work in the cosmos (2009c, pp.
180-1).
There is a real Velodrome. It exists in the world but we cannot access it

and nor can any other object. Its reality, nature, even existence is withdrawn.
We encounter its sensual dimension but unless the building collapses or the
turnstile fails to recognise our hard-won ticket, it remains out of reach.
Similarly there is a real JPEG, a unity, an object (as I have argued above) but
it too is never accessible to us. We may glimpse JPEG when the upload fails
84
or, as in my work it is made to sit alongside RAW-encoding that breaks its

transparency. The sensual instantiations we encounter do not exhaust JPEG
because they are not what “do the work”. As I shall argue, that “work of
JPEG” is deeply governmental, even disciplinary and the instantiation of
JPEG (its encoding and decoding) we or even Facebook’s data-mining
algorithm encounter are not the full story. JPEG’s “subterranean tool-being”
is weirder and more power-full than that. Real objects withdraw from our
consciousness and also from all relations. Harman talks of cats:
The real cats continue to do their work even as I sleep. These

cats are not equivalent to my conception of them, and not
even equivalent to their own self-conceptions; nor are they
exhausted by their various modifications and perturbations
of the objects they handle or damage during the night. The
cats themselves exist at a level deeper than their effects on
anything. real objects are non-relational (ibid pp. 194-5) 120 .
As with cats, so with JPEG. It exists when I sleep or when I am using a

paintbrush to image. It exists beyond its sensual presence in my or an
algorithm’s imaging or processing or beyond the relations and connections
within which it works. “Real objects exist ‘whether we like it or not’” (ibid p.
121
195).
The “real object” (RO) is “autonomous from whatever encounters

it” (Harman, 2011g, p. 48).122 There is JPEG without me, Olympus or
JavaScript (which can only encounter or touch the sensual JPEG). When I
pick up a pencil or switch the camera off, the sensual JPEG vaporises but the
120. It is important again to note that Harman (and I) are not denying relations. What he
is drawing attention to here is that those relations do not define the object.
121. Harman is at pains to distance his reading of Heidegger from what he sees as a
view that Heidegger’s withdrawn realm is a “deeper and unified system of
reference” (2011g, p. 35) which he would see as a case of “undermining”. Objects
withdraw not into some field or monastic lump of being but into themselves, into “private
interiors, barely able to relate at all” (ibid p. 36). The reason we cannot reach JPEG, the
reason it slips through our fingers and all we are left with are its traces in JFIF or EXIF
files or our sensual encounters with its instantiations, is because, as with all objects,
JPEG “does its work in the cosmos”. It has a reality beyond any relations or particular
instantiations. This reality is not located in the specifications of the Joint Photographic
Experts Group. It has a metaphysical reality: its status as object.
122. Here Harman draws on his debt to Aristotle in his debate with Plato regarding forms
and substance (Harman, 2011c).
85
real JPEG does not. It still has an ontological reality, an object status.
Although the object withdraws from access, Harman argues that the RO is in
relation (or “tension” as he calls it) with the object’s sensual and real
qualities. The shifting sensual qualities we encounter as we walk around the
Velodrome or the particular Huffman table the software encounters in a
particular imaging moment, cannot just be phenomenal. These qualities
must emerge from something real. The object may withdraw or be
inaccessible but it “emits sensual qualities into the sphere of presence,
despite being withdrawn in its own right” (ibid p. 49). There is a relation
between the RO and the object’s SQ. Similarly, the RO is not an empty unit.
It is in tension with real qualities (RQ), those essential features that make the
object what it is. As a cyclist I encounter the Velodrome. I ride a particular
geometry in a particular temperature-controlled space. Those essential
qualities define this as the Olympic Velodrome not the National Cycling
Centre Velodrome. Those qualities are connected with the withdrawn RO. If
the RO did not have those specific but real qualities, it would be
indistinguishable from any other withdrawn object. In the case of protocol,
JPEG is not an empty unit. It has real qualities Colour Transforms, Huffman
Coding, DCT, the things that make JPEG compression the object it is. The
withdrawn RO must have a relation to those qualities or JPEG would be no
different than any other standard... and it is.123
This is Harman’s fourfold: Real Object (RO), Sensual Object (SO), Real
Qualities (RQ) and Sensual Qualities (SQ). These are four poles to the
unified object, four dimensions that allow us to explore objects without
recourse to fields of relationality, potentiality or process. To map JPEG as a
quadruple object is to see:
• it as a real object present and active in the world, beyond relations,

inaccessible
123. Harman draws on Leibniz’s argument that: “monads must have qualities, otherwise
they would not even be beings” (Leibniz, 1989, p. 216). Or in other words, each monad
“needs a multitude of qualities to be what it is, to differ from other monads rather than be
interchangeable with them” (Harman, 2011g, p. 49). Harman’s whole quadruple model is
designed to show how the qualities (real or sensual) are not all there is to an object.
They are part of the picture but not the whole story.
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• it as a sensual object present to human or unhuman consciousness or

access, whenever energy is expanded on it but always through
• sensual qualities - particular instantiations, particular Huffman tables or
arrangements of coding and transformation algorithms
• having real qualities - inaccessible characteristics like Huffman Coding
that make it specifically JPEG not JPEG2000, GIF or WebP.
In addition those four poles are “connected” through four tensions.
Fusion and fission

Harman’s fourfold structure allows us to understand a number of aspects
of objects and the ways they work which are relevant not just for a
comprehensive metaphysics, but also for our understanding of and work
with JPEG. Furthermore, as I will explore in the next chapter, it offers a
framework for a practice-research methodology and creative practice.
Harman argues that the two poles and their two qualities allows an
124
understanding of time, space, essence and eidos.
“Time” is clearly important for any discussion of social imaging. As I will

discuss in terms of Facebook, the “infinite archive” of imag(in)ings is deeply
power-full. Time in the form of Facebook’s “Timeline” and “Open Graph”125
objects are integral to that practice and business, and my practice shows that
JPEG is in turn deeply enfolded with those objects. For Harman time can be
understood as a matter of the tension between the sensual object and its
sensual qualities (2011g, p. 100). The Velodrome remains the same to us as it
falls into disrepair, as the encrusted qualities or profiles shift and change. In
terms of protocol, JPEG endures. The JPEG a human or unhuman object calls
on in their camera or Photoshop or the upload to Facebook remains a
presence even as its particular instantiations shift. Encoding my light-as-data
today or yesterday, on quality setting 5 or 10 are different. We experience
those imaging moments or encounters as happening in different “times” but
124. This theme has been developed over the past few years in Harman’s work. This
chapter concentrates on that presented in The Quadruple Object but earlier workings
can be see in (2009c, pp. 214-221; 2010b; 2010d). See also Harman’s developing
thinking in (2010c).
125. As I discuss in the JPEG: the governmental object chapter, the “Open Graph” is a
term coined by Facebook for its particular implementation, and it argues, extension of
the term “social graph”, a term from graph theory designed to encapsulate the network
relations between people (Facebook, 2012).
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they can equally be seen as encountering different objects. The advantage of

seeing them in those terms is we remain focused at the scale of the object
and avoid falling into debates about the “arrow of time” or discrete
instances, process and becoming. What is more, when we work with object-
oriented imaging, we can build new (object) apparatuses that explore that
tension at work in image searches and streams.
“Space” too is important to any consideration of digital imag(in)ing. The

Open Graph’s geolocation data offers new dimensions to Facebook’s ad-
targeting business but also its generation and “ownership” of social
connections - my friends and I “checking in” and taking pictures in a
particular Starbucks, “Liking” across continents 126. For Harman, what we
understand and experience as space is really a matter of objects, specifically
the tension between real objects and their sensual qualities. Recall that the
withdrawn RO has SQ that project into the world. If it did not the object
could not be accessible to thought or action. The real 2012 Olympic
Velodrome withdraws from me. I cannot access its complete objecthood.
But I do encounter its qualities, those aspects of its nature that project into
my human or unhuman camera view as I walk around the Fence. That
relation happens in Newham. When I sit writing or thinking about the
Velodrome while I am in France, those sensual qualities are not present to
me. Other sensual qualities are present to me - perhaps memories, photos
even. What I understand and experience as a spatial difference, Newham-
France, can be understood as a difference between the Velodrome (RO),
forever withdrawn no matter where I am, and different sensual profiles.127
“Space is not the site of relation, but of both relation and non-
relation” (Harman, 2009c, p. 218). The Velodrome’s spatial location in
Newham not in France can be approached by remaining focused on objects
and their tensions. There is no need to talk of objects and space but rather a
126. Although JPEG (in its EXIF file format in particular) is related to issues of
geolocation and geolocative metadata, I chose not to focus on these issues in my
practice as I was concerned with JPEG encoding, not with the file formats and the
broader issues of metadata.
127. This is of course not to suggest that physical distance or space does not exist,
merely that thinking in terms of objects gives us a new way of understanding what that
means for us and other objects.
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spatial dimension to objects. This becomes even more apparent when

dealing with JPEG.
Traditional ways of thinking of space and spatial location do not work

with objects like protocol. Where is it? Where are they? In legal and
governmental terms, whose jurisdiction are they in? Where is that Open
Graph data point? In California on a server? In London on a computer? In
mid-Atlantic on an iPad? What seeing the spatial problems of distributed
networked media in terms of objects does is give us a way of understanding
JPEG’s seemingly strange, singular but multiple, located but multiply present
character - characteristics that the distributed web and the businesses and
governmental relations dependent on it, require. As we shall see, Facebook’s
imag(in)ing archive requires that its encoding and decoding (through JPEG)
as well as its “frictionless sharing” and Liking (again JPEG-dependent) is
stateless and pervasive. Its (governmental) Open Graph demands a different
sort of space and OOP offers us a way of mapping it.
From an OOP perspective there is one JPEG object, existing as a standard

built into software, hardware, business plans and popular culture. Contrary
to an ANT account of its genealogy, it does not exist in the documents of the
Joint Photographic Experts Group (Wallace, 1992) or the language of the
code. It can be seen as a unified object. It has a unity and power beyond
relations just as Bogost’s “jealousy” and “racial tension” and Harman’s
Raskolnikov are objects. Like these objects JPEG as protocol-object does not
have a spatial location, or more correctly, it has multiple spatial locations, as
a real object, in some sense everywhere, and as an accessible sensual profile
wherever it works - in my camera, on Facebook’s server, on the server that
screengrabs my searches in the Mash-Up etc. These can be literally miles
apart: metres from the 2012 Fence, on a server in California etc. What the
software in my camera or in Facebook’s algorithms or Photoshop connect
with are the sensual profiles in those multiple spaces, the particular
instantiations. The complex spatial dynamics (and governmental politics) of
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stateless digital objects,128 let alone protocols, can be seen as a matter of the
JPEG RO and its tensions with its particular profiles SQ.
In Harman’s model, the remaining two tensions (RO-RQ and SO-RQ)

allow him a way of talking about “essence” and “eidos”. Recall that both the
withdrawn real and the phenomenal sensual dimensions to the object are in
tension with the real qualities, the core features that make JPEG JPEG not
JPEG2000 or WebP. The tension between those withdrawn qualities (Colour
Transforms, Huffman Coding, DCT for instance)129 and the withdrawn
dimension (RO) is what we commonly call essence. That between those
qualities and the SO we access, Harman calls eidos.
The difference between the two tensions is again useful in understanding

(and using) JPEG. Harman’s Heideggarian side demands that essence is
hidden. The reality of the object is always beyond access by us and by any
other object. The real Velodrome or JPEG (RO) and its essential
characteristics that means it is a distinct object in the world (RQ) are both
forever withdrawn. The essence of JPEG, that RO-RQ tension is withdrawn.
That’s in part what makes it a “weird” object. At the same time (following
Husserl) Harman says there is a formal core to objects that can be
approached through categorical intuition. If we strip away all the particular
accidents encrusted on an object. There has to be something we perceive at
the core of the shifting profiles, something that means we recognise the
Velodrome regardless of the shifting light or point-of-view or JPEG alongside
other protocols and standards. We may never phenomenologically access
these features (hence their reality) but we can intellectually approach them.
This is the tension between the Sensual Object (the JPEG we and other
objects encounter in imaging, imaging business plans and governmental
128. Of course this idea of “stateless” does not preclude legal battles over digital
objects see for instance struggles over Wikileaks, Pirate Bay etc.
129. These real (essential) qualities are different to the sensual qualities we encounter in
particular instantiations or profiles of JPEG. A specific Huffman table is a sensual quality
an object encounters. “Huffman coding” or “Discrete Cosine Transform” as a
mathematical formula or algorithm is “real”. It cannot be encountered in its totality. While
this would seem to have Platonic formal overtones, as has been noted Harman owes far
more to Aristotle. These formulae are not in the realm of forms, or abstract or
phenomenal. They are real, present and are dealt with in terms of substance.
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relations) and the Real Qualities (the algorithms and mathematical formulae
that JPEG uses), what Husserl calls the eidos. We may never be able to fully
access the Velodrome’s geometry or Discrete Cosine Transform, as a
mathematical formula in their complete reality, as opposed to their particular
sensual instantiations for us, but we can intellectually identify them and
recognise them as distinguishing characteristics.
In terms of JPEG this framework is useful because firstly we can embrace

the concept of unreachable “essence” and intellectually approachable
“eidos” without being accused of determinism or reductionism or a
dependence on relationality as a way of working with objects. Secondly, we
can see how, despite the fact that we can intellectually find the algorithms
and compression formulae “within” JPEG (see the Digital Imaging Pipeline
chapter) that enable us to see JPEG as different to other standards (RQ) and
we encounter particular instantiations of those algorithms (SQ), the totality
of the JPEG object always eludes us. The “reality” of JPEG as an actant in
distributed digital imaging and social media businesses and governmentality
is always more than these qualities. Unlike other perspectives on digital
objects, it accepts the “weird” position of protocol.
For Harman these relations between the four different poles of the object
are in “tension”: what he calls fission and fusion. The relations between a SO
(the Velodrome or JPEG we encounter) and its particular profiles (SQ) that
we experience as time is characterised by moments of rupture (2011g, p.
103). At the moment of passing the Velodrome at dusk we realise that
unified kernel has transient sensual qualities as the light sparkles on the
wood panelling - “I never noticed that before”. At the moment of encoding
light-as-data we (or other software actants) are faced with various
compression settings, the transient qualities, profiles or instantiations. The
tension breaks: fission. The same break can happen in the tension between
the SO and its RQ (eidos). The intellectual labour of paring down JPEG to
find its real qualities. this “reverse engineering” through “theory” is a matter
of fission, breaking down JPEG (as I do in the Digital Imaging Pipeline
chapter). It is this process of fission I look to explore in my RAW/JPEG
apparatus.
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The other two relations, between the RO and its SQ (which we know as
space) and its RQ (which we know as essence) are also best understood as
tensions but this time characterised by “fusion”. Real objects and their
sensual qualities only meet when they are fused (ibid p. 105). The real,
withdrawn, inaccessible velodrome has sensual qualities in particular
locations as I circle it. Its sensual qualities fuse with it as I look or take a
photograph. Even in the non-locational space of JPEG, the SQ of JPEG that I
engage with, the particular profiles, settings or instantiations, are fused to
“JPEG” so I can image with it or write about it. Those SQ must have a
connection but that connection is made or fused (locally in my camera or
globally across the networks) with each use. Similarly, the relation between
the RO and its RQ is again a matter of fusion. This essence is “fused” as the
always withdrawn protocol/standard that we can never fully grasp is brought
together with those RQ (the mathematical laws and algorithms) that can be
intellectually grasped but never exhaust the totality of the object. That
essence is fused, for Harman, through an outside entity, a mediating term. As
we shall see, objects meet others within objects. They effect each other
within/through objects which fuse them. Huffman coding or Discrete Cosine
Transform (as JPEG’s RQ) are fused as a part of “JPEG” (the RO) by and
within the Photoshop object as it encodes the data. They are fused as part of
the JPEG standard that a Web 2.0 pitches as its new business model: “Our
social network will use JPEG so users can easily upload, share and see each
other’s images...” As we shall see, it is this process of fusion I look to explore
in my mash-up apparatus.
The connection
As I have noted, Harman’s framework of autonomous, actual objects does
not preclude the sort of actant networks that Latour talks about, and the sort
of techno-social, computational meshes addressed by software studies. In
fact the power of Harman’s quadruple object is that it offers a powerful way
of addressing the relations between human and unhuman actants, the sort of
relations within which JPEG is enfolded, that characterise scopic
governmentality and that I notice and work with within my own practice.
92
Harman is clear that these relations do not define the object. Rather his
model looks for an object-oriented account of relations.
Real objects withdraw and so cannot “touch”. “Their reality consists

solely in their being what they are, not in some sort of impact on other
things” (Harman, 2011g, p. 73). The tree, cat, velodrome, protocol or social
network business are deeper and more mysterious than another object
(whether photographer, CCD or search algorithm) can access. But objects do
connect. We know this in our experience. My JPEG apparatuses, imaging
practices as well as the governmental scopic regime demonstrate objects
connecting and reconnecting in power-full ways.
The question for Harman becomes how do those objects connect.

Following the quadruple structure, real objects cannot connect. They are
always withdrawn and can only connect through a mediating sensual
object.130 Similarly, sensual objects cannot touch each other except through
a mediating real object.131
The real human object (I as photographer) encounters the real Velodrome

object only through the mediating sensual object of the accessible digital
imaging pipeline. Remember that for OOP, pipelines or processes can be
objects. They have a unity. They have a fourfold structure and they do things
in the world. They have withdrawn dimensions and dimensions present to
experience. Similarly, the sensual JPEG (the accessible profiles or runnings)
acts as the mediator between the real light as data and the real Facebook
software and algorithms.
The point for Harman is that these encounters, connections or relations do

not happen in a field of becoming, plasma or potentiality but within another
object. Why does that matter? Because it means we can explore it, critically
(as I look to do in my account of Facebook and my Conclusion calling for an
Exploit) and creatively (as I look to do in my practice). As I explored in The
130. Harman discusses the history of the idea of a necessary mediator in terms of
“occasionalism” (2009c, pp. 112-116; 2011g, pp. 70-72). He calls Latour the first
“secular occasionalist” (2009c, p. 159).
131. It is important to re-emphasise that real and sensual objects are not separate
objects but rather different dimensions of the same object.
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JPEG object in the literature, there are other ways of approaching digital,
even “weird” objects that are productive and creative. My argument is not
that Harman is somehow more “true” than other accounts, but merely that
his framework of objects connecting with objects allows us to map network
objects-meshes like Facebook and digital imag(in)ing and its protocols in
ways that raise new questions and open new practices.
Similarly sensual objects cannot connect except through the mediation of

a real object. Harman says:
[S]ensual objects consist only in being encountered, not in

encountering. If I expend my energy in taking them
seriously, they themselves have no such energy to expend;
they are purely passive figments for an encounter of my
own. Hence they are incapable of direct interaction of any
sort, and belong to the same perceptual moment only
through the mediation of me the perceiver (2009c, p. 208).
But this mediation extends beyond just the position of the human
observer. Real unhuman objects act as the mediator. The datamining
algorithm on a Facebook server that reads the metadata or even the faces in
a JPEG-encoded image file has a sensual dimension. It is a SO insofar as it it
is present to human or unhuman consciousness or access. Similarly that data
file has a sensual dimension that can be read.132 The two connect. We know
they do because we see the ads served on our page or the Friends suggested.
That connection happens within a RO, an object that has hidden
dimensions, a deeper totality that is not available to full access. The Open
Graph is more than a Facebook marketing term or even ideology. It is an
object with a real dimension. Its reality as governmental actant (as I shall
discuss) is deeper and more inaccessible than those dimensions present to
my or any other object’s consciousness. It is this RO within which the
algorithm (SO) and the image data (SO) connect. The connection is within
objects not in some wider field, some psychological, semiotic or capitalist
132. Both actants have a real dimension too. There is always inevitably more to their
nature and power than a particular profile, instantiation or access.
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plasma, field of potential or relations.133 This asymmetrical account of

objects connecting within objects not only keeps the focus on objects and
allows the actant-network to be mapped in its specificity and presence but
also opens up a space for object-oriented practice, in my case imaging.
I object: relationality
Harman’s focus on withdrawn real objects in tension with accessible
sensual qualities is, for Steven Shaviro, incompatible with contemporary
relational culture.
We live in a world where all manners of cultural expression

are digitally transcoded and electronically disseminated,
where genetic material is freely recombined, and where
matter is becoming open to direct manipulation on the
atomic and subatomic scales. Nothing is hidden; there are
no more concealed depths [...] Our predominant aesthetic
procedures involve sampling, synthesizing, remixing, and
cutting-and-pasting. In such a world, the aesthetic problem
we face is Whitehead’s, rather than Harman’s; its (sic) a
question of beauty and ‘patterned contrasts’, rather than one
of sublimity and allure (2011, pp. 289-290).
Framed in terms of my own work. JPEG and JPEG imaging are, for Shaviro,
examples of a dynamic relational media reality. Mash-Ups, embedding,
sharing, linking, tagging and even the colour sampling in software are
relational. Flickrspace, Facebook, the Live Web, Social Media... whatever we
call the space we now image and imagine in, is a field of relations between
software, hardware, humans and unhumans. Facebook’s Open Graph as a
computational-governmental space within which JPEG is enfolded cannot be
seen through objects withdrawn from each other. Our remix practices and
Facebook’s Like economy show relations at the heart of media. Our “intense
experience” (Whitehead, 1967, p. 263) of it is one of “interwoven patterned
contrasts” (ibid p. 252). Like an ANT network, it is the interwoven relations
that give the specific elements their power. Formalist (or as Shaviro calls it
133. Harman often talks about these connections as happening within the “molten” core
of another object (2009c, p. 215). In The Quadruple Object he phrases it slightly
differently: “any relation immediately generates a new object” (2011g, p. 117 emphasis
in original). The point is the same. The “digital imaging pipeline”, “photography” or
“business plan” as objects are the site of connection. The enfoldings, relations and their
governmental implications are located at the scale of objects.
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“modernist” (2011, p. 289)) abstraction of a JPEG substance, demanding that

it withdraws not only from human access but from other actants too is, for
Shaviro, to render a static and abstract critique.
As I have said, Harman would have no problems with relations. He goes

as far as to assert “the whole purpose of my philosophy is to show how
relations happen, despite their apparent impossibility” (2011i, p. 295).
Objects are withdrawn but they also connect - hence his feting of the early
Latour. Where he differs is in how that mesh of relations is drawn. For him it
is a matter of objects. It is in fact only through addressing the fusion between
a withdrawn, weird object like a remix or sample-object, and their
accessible surface qualities that we can understand relations.134 To re-
emphasise, Harman does not reject relations, merely redraws them as
matters of substances. As I shall report, such a perspective matches the
operations and relational connections of the very objects Shaviro talks of.
The advantage of making objects the focus and mapping the governmental
implications of JPEG’s relations through objects is that one is driven towards
addressing the Open Graph or Haystack135 in their specificity. They are never
subsumed under some broader field or context and nor are they dependent
for their power on their relations. Their governmental power arises from the
relations and connections they are enfolded with, but those relations and
connections are at the scale of objects - the tensions between the four poles.
By seeing them as such one is driven to an account (and a practice) that
works with specific objects. The particular objects which the Facebook-mesh
encompasses exist and must be the target of our analysis and critical
intervention.
I object: processuality
Shaviro’s reading of Whitehead also demands a focus on processuality. He
holds that “Becoming is the deepest dimension of Being” (2009, p. 17) and
argues that Harman’s focus on actuality leads not only to an analysis devoid
of relations but also of change. Without an account of objects as matters of
134. Here he differs from Manuel De Landa who speaks of the exteriority of relations
(2006) where relations are exterior to the terms they connect.
135. Facebook’s photo storage system, see the JPEG: the governmental object chapter.
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process, becoming actualised in particular moments and relations, one is not

only left in a static universe, but also unable to deal with a media and
cultural, technosocial reality clearly in almost perpetual motion.
This stress is echoed in Massumi’s “activist” philosophy (2011). Drawing,

as Mackenzie does, on William James’ “conjunctive relations” as well as
Whitehead and Deleuze,136 Massumi’s event-oriented ontology is distinctly
anti-object (oriented). He says: “Activist philosophy’s emphasis on the
occurrent makes it a fundamentally nonobject philosophy” (ibid p. 6
emphasis in original). He cites Deleuze: “[T]he event of alteration [is] one
with the essence or the substance of a thing” (Deleuze, 1988, p. 32),
claiming “[t]his is another way of saying there is no essence or substance to
things other than the novelty of their occurrence” (Massumi, 2011, p. 6). He
also enlists Whitehead: “Wherever and whenever something is going on,
there is an event” (Whitehead, 1964, p. 78). Massumi concludes:
The world is not an aggregate of objects. To see it that way is

to have participated in an abstraction reductive of the
complexity of nature as passage (Whitehead, 1964, pp.
74-98) [...] The reality of the world exceeds that of objects,
for the simple reason that where objects are, there has also
been their becoming. And where becoming has been, there
is already more to come. The being of an object is an
abstraction from its becoming. The world is not a grab-bag of
things. It’s an always-in-germ. To perceive the world in an
object frame is to neglect the wider range of its germinal
reality (ibid p. 6).137
To frame it in terms of JPEG, the important aspect for Massumi is that it
occurs. It is an event. JPEG, the argument goes is proof positive of the
importance of process. It is a process. Where or what is it and its power if
not as something becoming and enabling becoming? In its encoding and
decoding; its work turning light into data; its rendering of images (and so
136. It is important to note that not everyone would agree that Deleuze is a “process
philosopher”. My aim here is not to engage with Massumi’s reading of Deleuze but rather
consider his implicit critique of OOP.
137. Shaviro too critiques OOP for what he sees as its failure to deal with change:
“Harman tends to underestimate the importance of change over the course of time, just
as he underestimates the vividness and the extent of relations among entities” (2011, p.
285).
97
data) within a Timeline, it is in movement. Abstracting a JPEG-object from

that flux of becoming, is less a matter of pinning a butterfly to the page so
much as a blancmange to the ceiling. Where JPEG is, there has also been its
becoming. Any particular JPEG-encoding is an abstraction from its
becoming. It is always-in-germ by its very nature as a process, bringing
Huffman coding and transforms together in a particular moment to become
data. If we are going to understand protocol we not only need to see it in a
field of relations but as dynamic.
Harman is not denying process or change. For him, “object- oriented

ontology (OOO) is the true philosophy of becoming and events” (2011i, p.
300). He goes as far as to say that “Whitehead (like Bruno Latour) should be
seen not as a philosopher of becoming, but of concrete, individual
entities” (ibid p. 291 emphasis in original).138 For Harman, Whitehead and
Latour are object-oriented philosophers insofar as they see objects doing
things in the world. The problem comes for Harman in that they do not go
far enough. For Latour objects derive their power and presence from their
relations or alliances. For Whitehead they are moments of becoming. This is
primary, entities are secondary.
For Harman a position derived from Whitehead and even from Latour
alone cannot account for objects and change. Whereas Shaviro accuses
OOP of denying relations and the possibility of change, Harman argues that
an account of objects as constituted by their relations actually prevents an
account of change. If there is nothing beyond relations, there is no “surplus”.
138. Harman reads Whitehead’s “occasions” as a way of understanding the object, not
rejecting the idea of entity. Where they differ, he says, is that Whitehead sees those
entities as clusters of relations whereas Harman works toward a non-relational model of
objects. He says: “The reason they can be called ‘occasions’ is because ‘the notion of
an unchanging subject of change is completely abandoned’. An entity is not a durable
substance undergoing accidental adventures in time and space: instead, ‘actual entities
“perpetually perish”’. They do not lie behind their accidents, qualities, and relations like
dormant substrata, but are ‘devoid of all indetermination’ (Whitehead, 1978, p. 29).
Actual entities are fully deployed in every instant and then instantly perish, attaining
‘objective immortality’ not by persisting over time (impossible for Whitehead) but by
giving way to closely related yet new actual entities. In Prince of Networks I showed that
the same holds for Latour” (2011i, p. 294 emphasis in original). Clearly this is a particular
reading of Whitehead, one that Shaviro and many others would disagree with. My aim
here is not to discuss the validity of that reading, but rather use it as a way of clarifying
Harman’s own position with respect to objects and change.
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“Every object would be exhausted by its current dealings with all other
things” (ibid p. 295). But objects do have more. There are dimensions that
are hidden, withdrawn. Where Latour and Whitehead may argue that change
is possible as objects become and perish (Whitehead) or enter new alliances
(Latour), this demands that change is a series of discrete steps - new
occasions or new configurations. For Harman this moves away from a strict
actualist focus on the object to either advocating a second realm of objects -
the “eternal objects” of Whitehead (1978, p. 61)) or a realm of potentiality
beneath objects (the “plasma” of Latour (2005, p. 244). Harman refuses to
imag(in)e anything beyond the actual object. For him an object, if conceived
as deeper than its relations, can account for change and networks without
recourse to something else.
Again, it is not that Harman rejects “becoming”. Rather, he says:
I contend that becoming happens only by way of some non-

relational reality. An object needs to form a new connection
in order to change, and this entails that an object must
disengage from its current state and somehow make contact
with something with which it was not previously in direct
contact. My entire philosophical position, in fact, is
designed to explain how such happenings are possible
(2011i, p. 300).
Again in terms of JPEG, the process is a matter of objects connecting,
disconnecting and reconnecting as the pipeline works or as the upload and
datamining within Facebook operate. Harman rejects Shaviro’s charge that
OOP implies stasis when it rejects Whitehead’s “perpetual perishing” of
entities. Rather he argues that a Whiteheadian account is one of stasis. In
Harman’s reading, Whitehead’s stream of new entities is not a philosophy of
change but of “frozen statues, which give the illusion of continuous
alteration as we flip through them as if through those novelty card decks that
allow children to watch moving cartoons” (op cit.). Change, process,
becoming are not a matter of new objects or new networks but rather new
object-connections-within-objects. Where Whitehead sees becoming as a
series of discrete instants and Latour as a series of discrete alliances - both
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alliances outside the actuality of objects, Harman argues that potentiality is

only possible when the object and the object alone are the focus.
Clearly JPEG compression is a computational process but that can be

understood as a matter of quadruple objects connecting within objects. New
connections between particular profiles within particular imaging objects.
The advantage of this view is once again that we remain focused on the
particular and are forced to address the specificity of JPEG now, now and
now - in that upload, in that failed “Like”, in that particular data point. One
is left at the scale of particular encounters and connections. One cannot
escape that particularity by reference to a flux of becoming. Similarly
Harman does not deny change. Change for him is a matter of new tensions
(see above). When he says: “In order for something to change in the status
quo, the bond between object and quality must be dissolved and a new one
produced” (2011g, p. 102 emphasis in original) he draws attention to how
change occurs as a matter of objects and their fusion and fission. This is not
new objects being produced (as he reads Whitehead) but new object
dynamics, the power of the “surplus” that the quadruple structure draws
attention to. Such an account once again has the advantage of forcing an
account of the particularity of objects in particular situations, configurations
and connections. Change as a dimension of the Open Graph (object) is
matter of particular object connections. JPEG changes as its sensual and real
dimensions connect and reconnect with those of other specific different
hardware and software, human and unhuman actant-objects, mediated by
other objects in particular moments and spaces. The governmental mesh
enfolds specific and particular Open Graph objects as they are made and
remade in different object relations. Again we cannot escape particularity
and specificity when mapping governmentality.
I object: potentiality
Levi Bryant, a strong advocate of objects as the starting point for
philosophy has questioned Harman’s rejection of potential, his insistence
that objects hold nothing back. He says:
[I]t would be a mistake to conflate [..] potentiality with the

concept of a potential object. A potential object is an object
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that does not exist but which could come to exist. By

contrast, the virtual is strictly a part of a real and existing
object. The virtual consists of the volcanic powers coiled
within an object. It is that substantiality, that structure and
those singularities that endure as the object undergoes
qualitative transformations at the level of local
manifestations (2011a, p. 95 emphasis in original).
Objects do not somehow already contain what they will become but they

do contain powers that can be actualised. He frames this in terms of a
split139 within objects which is very different to that of Harman, one that
relies on a Deleuzian account of the “virtual”140. Bryant’s split is between
“their powers or capacities and their actuality [...] objects always have the
power to manifest other actualities that aren’t manifested at the moment
when entering into diffferent (sic) circumstances” (Bryant, 2010, n.p.). It is
here where Bryant diverges from and critiques Harman. For Bryant the idea
that objects harbour potential to be actualised, rather than being already
actual, is necessary to OOP (or “object-oriented onticology” as Bryant calls
it) because it allows an object-oriented account of relations and of change.
Actuality is not a given (as Bryant believes that Harman holds) but rather a
product of relations. Bryant says: “the process of actualization requires the
navigation and translation of exo-relations to other objects, creating a new
product as a result. In short, the actuality is not there at the outset but
139. Bryant explicitly connects this idea of the split to Lacanian thought (2011, p. 131).
140. Bryant is more comfortable with Deleuze than Harman, arguing “[n]o one has
explored this anterior side of substance - in the transcendental, not the temporal, sense -
more profoundly than Gilles Deleuze” (2011a, p. 94). Harman, meanwhile argues that
objects prior to their relations are not “virtual”. Rather they have a definite character prior
to entering relations. That character can be described as a matter of objects and
qualities. He says: “The much-discussed difference between potential and virtual, so
often wielded like a billy club in our time by Deleuzian hooligans, is irrelevant here - both
terms fail Latour’s standard of concreteness in exactly the same way” (2009c, p. 101). It
is not my concern here to engage with their respective readings of Deleuze and debates
around the potential and the virtual (Bryant, 2011a, pp. 94-104; 2011b; Harman, 2010f)
but rather to address Bryant’s argument that the rejection of potential undermines
Harman’s account of the actual. Bryant is not uncritical of Deleuze. He says: “What we
thus get in Deleuze’s thought is a sort of vertical ontology of the depths. Rather than
entities or substances interacting with each other laterally or horizontally, we instead get
an ontology where difference arises vertically from the depths of the virtual” (2011a, p.
100). As with all object-oriented approaches, any tendency towards depth, foundations
or context is a move away from objects.
101
requires a whole series of mediations to come to be” (op cit.).141 Agreeing

with Harman that objects are actual, real and specific, he argues however
that this actuality appears as relations unfold and those relations unfold
because objects have powers “coiled within”, a virtual dimension which
“always belongs to a substance, not the reverse. Moreover, the virtual is
always the potential harbored or carried by a discrete or individual
being” (2011a, p. 105). This is an object-oriented potential. The potentiality
is not outside or somehow contextual but built into the heart of objects,
allowing new relations and so change. Harman’s refusal to entertain
potential, Bryant argues, can’t account for change (ibid p. 68). Here he is not
joining the Whitehead-derived perspective presented above where change is
a matter of “becoming” or fluxion. Rather for Bryant change is a matter of
objects. It can be addressed at the scale of objects but only if those objects
carry within themselves a potentiality.142 This is not the fabled acorn
containing the oak tree. Bryant says:
[T]here is no resemblance between a power, potentiality, or

potency, and the actuality that it comes to actualize.
Potentiality, power, potency is pure capacity, pure “can-do”,
pure ability. As such, it tells us nothing of the form that the
actualized power will take when it becomes a quality or
what I call a local manifestation (2011, n.p. emphasis in
original).
Harman however, says he is an “unapologetic ‘actualist’” (2011b, n.p.).143
“Entities are nothing more than what they are right now” (2011e, n.p.). He
reads any attempt to introduce a virtual dimension, a “coiled within”
141. Bryant separates “endo-relations” from “exo-relations” (2011, p. 68) as he does

“endo-qualities” and “exo-qualities” (2011a, p. 120). The former are to do with the
internal structure of objects, the latter refer to relations that objects enter into with other
objects or qualities that exist in and through other objects.
142. Bryant also uses the terms “susceptibility” to translation using Latour’s idea of the
network relations that objects undergo (2011a, pp. 115-116)
143. He would perhaps appreciate Morton’s feting of John Clare’s “absolute ‘therenes’”
in his poem Mouse’s Nest (Morton, 2010a, p. 50) but perhaps not Gertrude Stein’s
comment about Oakland: “there’s no there there” (1971, p. 239).
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potentiality as a retreat from the scale of objects.144 For him, “[t]he recourse
to potentiality is a dodge that leaves actuality undetermined and finally un-
interesting; it reduces what is currently actual to the transient costume of an
emergent process across time, and makes the real work happen outside
actuality itself” (2009c, p. 129). For Harman nothing must replace the actual
and the concrete. There are no ”hidden overlords: whether they be potential,
virtual, veiled, topological, fluxional, or any adjective that tries to escape
from what is actually here right now” (op cit.).
Bryant’s object-oriented potentiality offers a lot to our understanding of

JPEG. Bryant would argue that by seeing protocol as fully real and specific
but also carrying potentiality coiled within enables us to see clearly how a
standard achieves a form of “lock-in” (Liebowitz & Margolis, 1995; Arthur,
1989). JPEG’s hegemony within distributed imaging can be seen as a result
of a potential to connect, to relate, to set new practices, business and
technologies in motion. Acting almost as an API,145 JPEG’s coiled potential
as a governmental and imag(in)ing actant within its specific substance was
actualised as Facebook and browsers and apps developed on and with it.
That governmental potential was always there, but not as the fabled oak tree
within the acorn, as fixed, determined thing.
144. This goes to a broader Bryant-Harman argument around how objects touch. For
Bryant objects can and do touch and that is how they “unleash the forces of another
object” (2011a, p. 71). The acorn’s coiled, potential to become an oak tree, a missile,
food or an artwork are unleashed as it touches the soil, a child’s catapult, a squirrel or a
canvas. JPEG’s coiled, potential to become an imaging standard, a data-mining tool or a
social convention are unleashed as it touches in-camera software, a Facebook algorithm
or an Instagram API. Harman is not against connection, let alone power-relations. What
he says however is that objects cannot touch. Because they have a “real” dimension that
withdraws form all access, they cannot touch except within objects, through a mediating
object (RO with RO through a SO; SO and SO though RO). The acorn and the catapult
connect in a weapon object. JPEG and the software within a Open Graph object. Each
connection is different, actual, specific and now. For Harman, if objects could touch
there would be no need for mediating objects or what Latour calls “translation”. For
Harman this is philosophically difficult, not taking Heidegger seriously enough. In terms
of my project, it is difficult because it fails to adequately account for mediating objects
such as the Open Graph.
145. Application Programming Interface. A specification released by a service that

enables other developers to build software services or products on top of the platform.
Daniel Jacobson, Greg & Dan Woods describe it as “essentially a contract. Once such a
contract is in place, developers are enticed to use the API because they know they can
rely on it. The contract increases confidence, which increases use” (2011, p. 4). A form
of lock-in.
103
Harman’s framework however still allows for a mapping of that lock-in

and governmental mesh but arguably demands that we address JPEG as it
exists and works here right now (and here right now, and here right now).146
The connection between JPEG and the Open Graph is not a once-and-for-all
thing. It is continually remade as new tensions are fused and broken, new
objects (Likes, Open Graph connections, new software services on top of an
API, new state searches etc.) become the site of those connections. Harman’s
perspective not only forces that particularity but also draws attention to
those new objects.
As well as critiques specifically around relationality, processuality and

potentiality, there are two other points that OOP could be asked to address.
Firstly the charge of formalism and secondly the question of whether it is
material enough.
I object: formalism
Victor Burgin identifies two “pitfalls awaiting the art theorist with no grasp
of semiology, ‘the temptation to treat the work of art as a purely formal
construction’ [... and a] focus [..] on the internal life of the autonomous
object” (1986, p. 1). Burgin picks up on a powerful tradition of anti-
formalism within media and cultural studies that arguably has a new
relevance when object-oriented approaches demand that everything starts
from (and in Harman’s case perhaps) finishes with objects.
Raymond Williams was clear. For him formalism’s “predominant emphasis

was on the specific, intrinsic characteristics of a literary work, which
required analysis ‘in its own terms’ before any other kind of discussion, and
especially social or ideological analysis, was relevant or even
146. Harman would of course say that “exists” and “works” are two different things,
objects exist regardless of whether or how they work, I include both here because my
concern in this work is with the relations (work) of JPEG which arises from its ontological
existence.
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possible” (1976, p. 138).147 Had OOP been around in the early days of
media and cultural studies148 it would doubtless have faced charges of
formalist fetishization of the object. How, therefore does OOP stand against
the charge of formalism? Firstly one must show that OOP is formalist and
then that formalism is, in itself a bad thing.
OOP demands that the object is the core focus of analysis and
interpretation. Particularly in Harman’s case, there is never any need to leave
the object and look to a wider field, plasma, process or realm of becoming.
The famous Latour litanies with which OOP is littered are testament to the
belief that we can do philosophy and media analysis by concentrating on
objects. Formalist approaches to literary texts began with a similar focus on
objects, rather than the later preoccupation with systems. “The Formalists
started out by seeing the literary work as a more or less arbitrary assemblage
of ‘devices’, and only later came to see these devices as interrelated
elements or ‘functions’ within a total textual system” (Eagleton, 1996, p. 3).
These devices, discrete, particular formal components were the target of
analysis because it was such elements (sound, imagery, rhythm, syntax,
metre, rhyme, narrative techniques etc.) that did the work, turning ordinary
language into literary language with all its effects.149 “’[L]iterariness’ was a
function of the differential relations between one sort of discourse and
another; it was not an eternally given property” (Eagleton, 1996, p. 5
emphasis in original). It was this argument that powered the development of
structuralism’s focus on systems where, by looking at how the system was
put together, one could address its workings and power relations.
147. Williams famously critiqued Marshall McLuhan along these lines. In Television:
Technology and Cultural Form, he said: “The work of McLuhan was a particular
culmination of an aesthetic theory which became, negatively, a social theory: a
development and elaboration of formalism which can be seen in many fields, from
literary criticism and linguistics to psychology and anthropology, but which acquired its
most significant popular influence in an isolating theory of ‘the media’” (2003, p. 129). Of
course Harman would be happy to be associated with McLuhanism. He says: “[N]o one
in the twentieth century, not even Heidegger, does as much as the McLuhans to retrieve
the metaphysics of objects as a viable medium” (2009a, p. 122),
148. Let’s leave aside Harman’s claims that OOP can be traced back throughout the
history of Western and Eastern philosophy.
149. For an account of narrative in new media see Murray (1998) and Bassett (2008).
105
There are clear parallels with OOP. The focus on “devices” and specific
components mirrors OOP’s single-minded commitment to objects. Here
ecosystems, computer games, indeed the whole universe is made up of
objects connecting between or within objects. What we perceive as systems,
meshes or assemblages are really just components clashing, connecting or
relating. Just as language is not an eternal given property neither is the mesh,
or, in my case the governmental scopic regime. In both frameworks the gap
between objects is important. For Harman it is the sensual-real difference
and the way the fourfold allows differential connection (what he calls
“vicarious causation” (2009b; 2009c, pp. 146-147)) that characterises the
mesh of objects. Sensual can only connect with real, real only with sensual.
Objects withdraw from us and from each other.150 That is what drives the
mesh, creates new objects and new relations. It is the making strange of
language in literature, the gap between everyday discourse and that of the
novel, the withdrawal that creates art and culture. And by focussing on the
technical devices, one can see that, unpick it, critique it and create it.
My OOP account of imaging and of JPEG can be seen as formalist. I look

to understand the whole through the parts. Social imaging, the new scopic
regime, the scopic mesh - however it is defined as a discourse - is different
to “traditional” imaging, “top-down” media regimes because it uses different
devices/objects. Hardware and software actants, protocols and algorithms
have turned seeing into social seeing, photography into imaging. My OOP
account looks to identify those objects and when I have found one of them
(JPEG) I make the same formalist move. JPEG is different than WebP or GIF.
Its position as an imaging form or practice, a “literature”, arises from its
formal structure. The Huffman tables, the DCT transforms are devices it uses
to do its particular creative and productive work.
My desire to understand my own imaging and that scopic and

governmental regime within which it now works leads me to bracket the
150. This parallel is perhaps unsurprising bearing in mind Husserl’s influence on the
Russian Formalists (Eagleton, 1996, p. 51).
106
referent151 and concentrate on the device-objects. My imaging and that of

the Open Graph, like a poem is a matter of objects connecting, like metre
and rhyme forms arranged in a particular way. And what is more, arguably,
my OOP account of JPEG becomes even more structuralist. It’s not that I
ignore the wider system. I am looking to understand and perhaps even
critique the Open Graph, the infinite archive, governmentality and techno-
capitalism. I am looking through JPEG to those structures but from an OOP
perspective I see them not as a context, a background or even a media
ecology or actant-network within which objects fit or on which they play out
their powers. Rather that structure is nothing more nor less than objects
connecting within objects. The structure is objects. Like Claude Lévi Strauss
approaching his tribe (1994) or Michel Foucault reading his “certain Chinese
encyclopaedia” (1989, p. xv), I see an order of objects.
The critiques of formalism and structuralism are legion. It is not my

concern here to engage in a defence of formalism or structuralism. From
Mikhail Bakhtin onwards this focus on objects has been seen as technicist,
reductionist, determinist and apolitical. Surely to collapse the complexities,
political-economic and technosocial relations of advanced capitalist culture
into a matter of protocols or even an assemblage of objects is to lose a
macro focus, a sense of process and relationality that make sense of how
and why that mesh works the way it does, and how it can be changed. My
aim here is not to rehearse those debates but to reframe the question. To
what extent does an object-focus (whether or not we call it formalist or
structuralist) allow a coherent and critical account of the techno-social
mesh, info-capitalism and scopic governmentally? Does a refusal to leave
the scale of the object impoverish that critique or does it allow a new way of
seeing complex realities and intervening in their power relations? My way of
answering these questions, as I discuss in the next chapter, is through my
practice.
151. I would of course say that while I dismiss the idea of a “referent” external to the
object, I hold to the fact that those objects have real dimensions and qualities.
107
I object materialism
While I find an OOP account of JPEG a persuasive and stimulating one in
terms of its capacity to remain actual, specific and particular while still
mapping the complex computational and governmental networks within
which JPEG operates, it is possible to see OOP as having a mystical
dimension that undermines a materialist critique. It is important to re-
emphasise that when I say “materialist” I am not referring to the
undermining philosophy that Harman criticises, one that looks for something
more basic and fundamental than objects, but rather a sensibility within an
ontology to the world of material things.152 My project and the distributed
imag(in)ing regime and mesh that it seeks to explore is deeply material. From
the digital rubbish that Jennifer Gabrys (2011) and Ned Rossiter (2009;
2011) discuss, through the carbon footprint of cloud computing (Cubitt,
Hassan & Volkmer, 2011) to the digital detritus stockpiled, as we shall see, in
Facebook’s Haystack, there is nothing immaterial about the digital mesh.153
While OOP provides a provocative way of mapping the nature of the objects
in play, the way they are accessible and inaccessible and the ways they
connect, it arguably underplays a very real materiality at play in both the
sensual dimension we encounter and the real dimension forever withdrawn.
Jane Bennett has sought to rebalance an object-oriented approach in her

exploration of Vibrant Matter (2010a) as part of what has become known as
152. Bryant refers to his own work as “object-oriented materialism”, saying: “The
materialist need only claim that all entities are materially embodied, not that all entities
are reducible to elementary parts” (2012c emphasis in original) See also n. 107 above.
His debate with Harman is less to do with rebalancing OOP/OOO to focus on material
objects than it is to do with their broader debate about potentiality (see above). As I shall
discuss, Janee Bennett is aware of the issues around “materialism” and undermining
that Harman identifies. When questioned on her relation to other forms of materialism in
her interview with Gulshan Kahn she says: “Mechanistic materialism does not attract me;
it implicitly returns us to the status of consummate agents who run the machine” (Khan,
2009, n.p.)
153. This of course does not even touch on the materiality of scopic and computational
apparatuses discussed by Crary, Jay and those working in media archaeology (see
above). For discussion of materiality and the digital image, see Sassoon (2004) and on
materiality and technology, see Küchler (2008). I come on to discuss the seemingly
immaterial software objects as in some sense “material” below.
108
“New Materialism”.154 Bennett identifies an agentic capacity in material

objects. When she starts from “one large men’s black plastic work glove; one
dense mat of oak pollen; one unblemished dead rat; one white plastic bottle
cap; one smooth stick of wood” in a gutter (2010a, p. 4) and moves on to
the “quirky electron flow and a spontaneous fire to members of Congress
who have a neoliberal faith in market self-regulation” at play in an electricity
blackout (ibid p. 28),155 Bennett’s litany of objects echoes Harman: “Instead
of an objective nature filled with genuine realities and a subjective cultural
sphere filled with fabricated fictions, there is a single plane of actors that
encompasses neutrinos, stars, palm trees, rivers, cats, armies, nations,
superheroes, unicorns, and square circles” (2009c, pp. 188-189).156 For
154. A loose collection of authors who share a concern for expanding the conception of
the material to explore issues of agency (see the papers collected in Coole & Frost
(2010b) and Miller (2005a) as well as Parikka (2011b). For an overview, see Packer &
Wiley (2012) and for a feminist perspective, see Van der Tuin & Dolphijn (2010). Diana
Coole and Samantha Frost even make a point of talking of new materialisms in the plural
(2010a). See also the work of Karen Barad who says: “Language matters. Discourse
matters. Culture matters. There is an important sense in which the only thing that doesn’t
seem to matter anymore is matter”. (2007, p. 132). For a Latourian approach to
materialism, see Bencherki (2012). For one drawing, as does Harman, on Alfonso Lingis,
see Introna (2009). It is not my intention to explore the different ontological positions, let
alone the specific case studies, that have emerged under the label “new materialist” but
rather to explore the connections between a particular politics-based articulation of that
concern. It is important to note that as with speculative realism, there is a concern
among its proponents that “new materialism” does not simply substitute one orthodoxy
or hierarchy with another. As Daniel Miller says: “Having dethroned the emperor’s
culture, society, and representation, there is no virtue in enthroning objects and
materialism in their place. The goal of this revolution is to promote equality, a dialectical
republic in which persons and things exist in mutual self-construction and respect for
their mutual origin and mutual dependency” (2005b, p. 34). This concern for moving
beyond representation can also be seen in the work of Nigel Thrift (2008), Brain
Massumi (2002) and Rosi Braidotti (2002) among others. There are of course other
strands to “new materialism” particularly as it appliers to media. Parikka (2012) for
instance traces the links to “German Media Theory” (See also Siegert (2007)). My
decision to focus on Bennett is because of her ontological project to redraw our
conception of the object as material. While many have taken a materialist look at media,
there are few who have take a materialist and object-oriented approach to ontology.
155. Needless to say, some would query whether one can address “electron flow” and
“neoliberal faith” as objects. As I have argued, following Bogost and Harman, one can.
Furthermore the question should perhaps be not whether we can but what happens
when we do.
156. Miller is also fond of the Latour Litany: “We start with the need for a theory of stuff
as material culture [...] that can account for every kind of stuff: bodies, streaming videos,
a dream, a city, a sensation, a derivative, an ideology, a landscape, a decay, a
philosophy” (2010, p. 54). More broadly on approaches to “material culture”, see Hicks
& Beaudry (2010)
109
both, objects are the focus. Like Harman she rejects the idea of objects as
signs and demands an account of objects as more than the human object
correlation. But Bennett adds a particular concern for the material that is
underplayed in Harman’s more philosophical account.
Bennett echoes Daniel Miller’s argument that semiotics can be “as much a
limitation as an asset” (Miller, 2010, p. 12) when looking at “the minutiae of
the intimate” (ibid p. 41), the “stuff” or things people have, use and (in
object-oriented terms) connect with (Miller, 2008).157 The objects in her
gutter are not some instantiation of an industrial process or structure. Of
course the glove was made in particular social and economic system under
particular modes of production. Its story can be read as one of globalisation
and capitalism. It can be read as the trace or representation of those
historical processes. But Bennett argues that the discourse of representation,
of tracing the power and meaning of things as signs, falls short of what is
needed. She says:
I caught a glimpse of an energetic vitality inside each of

these things, things that I generally conceived as inert. In this
mesh, objects appeared as things, that is as vivid entities not
entirely reducible to the context in which (human) subjects
set them, never entirely exhausted by their semiotics
(Bennett, 2010a, p. 5 emphasis in original).
Just as for Harman, objects are never exhausted by their relations,
qualities or accidents, so Bennett’s objets trouvé are more than their relations
to systems of meaning or signs of something outside themselves.
For Bennett, like Harman, there is also more to objects than the human-
object correlation. Objects are material. But that materiality is lively and
157. A similar nuanced account of things can be seen in Sherry Turkle’s account of
“evocative objects” (2007) discussed by Harman (2008b). A concern for things could
also be traced back through Arjun Appadurai’s exploration of how things “move in and
out of the commodity state”(1986, p. 13) and Pierre Bourdieu’s account of the role of
everyday things in socialization (2008). Similarly Alfred Gell sought to move beyond
semiotics in account of how artworks “appear as, or ‘do duty as’, persons” (1998, p. 9).
110
active.158 Bennett’s objects are real and located. They are presences in the
world but they “call to us” and have a form of agency, “agentic capacity”,159
a “thing-power” that animates the seemingly inert. Bennett draws on a
history of vitalism (Fraser, Kember & Lury, 2005; Greco, 2005) in particular
the work of Hans Driesch, a early twentieth century vitalist.160 Driesch
developed the concept of “entelechy” as a similar animator to explain what
he saw as the question of the enfolded character of nature.161 Bennett says:
“Entelechy is born in the negative spaces of the machine model of nature, in
the ‘gaps’ in the ‘chain of strictly physico-chemical or mechanical
events’” (2010a, p. 70). She is keen to stress that Driesch does not see this
animating force in terms of a soul or even simply a “vital energy”. Rather it is
located within materiality and its possibilities. Where Bennett moves beyond
Driesch is in refusing to see matter as “so passive and dull that it could not
possibly have done the tricky work of organizing and maintaining morphing
wholes. [For Driesch] sometimes this matter is infused with entelechy and
becomes life, and sometimes it is not and coagulates into inorganic
158. Shaviro draws attention to a similar idea of liveliness in his discussion of Gwyneth
Jones’ novel The Universe of Things (2010). He says: “[I]f we are to accept the
ontological dignity of things, and do not reduce them to being just the illusory effects of
quantum fields, then I think that we need to accept some sort of non-dualistic neo-
vitalism, or what Jane Bennett calls vital materialism: the idea that ‘every thing is
entelechial, life-ly, vitalistic’ (Bennett, 2010a, p. 89)” (2010, p. 15 emphasis in original).
159. See also the work of Barad around materialism (2003) and “agential
realism” (2007).
160. Bennett discusses Driesch and later Henri Bergson in terms of Kant’s insistence on
the “unbridgeable chasm between life and ‘crude matter’” in the Critique of Judgement
(Kant, 1987, sec. 81, #424) and his invoking of a “formative drive” or Bildungstrieb
(2010a, p. 65). She argues that Driesch and Bergson extend this idea by allowing the
agentic force to be present in matter not just in organisms. This point is echoed by
Morton who argues that we should “abandon all variation of Romantic vitalism - that is,
believing in a vital spark separate from the material organization of life forms” (2010a, p.
68).
161. Driesch, whose work began with scientific experimentation, can perhaps be seen
as engaging in practice-research.
111
machine” (ibid p. 75). For Bennett, matter is always “vital”162 and that vitality
lies outside the human-object correlate.
One might criticise Bennett for mystical language (a similar charge could
be addressed towards Harman’s talk of sensual and withdrawn dimensions).
Peter Gratton has said: “Bennett’s position would seem to leave us bereft of
any politics worthy of the name, and the reader may worry Bennett has
brought us either to the edge of some pan-psychic New Age philosophy, or
worse, to a nihilism that renders meaningless all human actions and
common praxis” (2010b, p. 159).163 But beneath Bennett’s language is
exactly the sort of reality and material concern that a purely philosophical
account lacks. While both Harman and Bennett would talk of trees, gloves,
servers, CCDs and JPEG, Bennett is more likely to argue that we need to take
particular account of their concrete as well as ontological existence.
Bennett’s stress on how the quadruple object erupts into the world, how its
sensual and real dimensions and qualities connect in material as well as
ontological terms, challenges us to look at the CCD object as metaphysically
fourfold but also material. What is more, Bennett’s willingness to see vibrant
materiality across the object spectrum means we can address objects like
JPEG which, as we have seen, while seemingly abstract, virtual and unreal,
are clearly actants and objects in material conditions of connection with
software, the State, my camera and me as photographer. Harman is clearly a
realist, Bennett adds a form of object-oriented materialism to that account of
the real.
Harman, while embracing the commonalities between his position and

Bennett’s remains suspicious of “materialism”. He says:
Bennett uses materialism in a way that could easily apply

both to object-oriented philosophy and to the closely related
writings of Latour. She takes materialism to be a suitable
162. Bennett also draws on Hernri Bergson’s “élan vital”, a force, an “inner directing
principle” (Bergson, 1998, p. 76) that underlies his idea of how life and matter are not
fixed categories but tendencies of a cosmic flow. There is perhaps an interesting parallel
with the idea of active and reactive forces discussed by Deleuze in his book on
Nietzsche (1986, pp. 39-71).
163. For a broader discussion of pansychism see Skrbina (2005).
112
name for any philosophy that dissolves the usual strict

opposition between free human subjects and inert material
slabs. Naturally, I am all in favor of this dissolution; I simply
doubt that ‘materialism’ is the best name for it (2010g, p.
774).
In his review of Vibrant Matter, Harman positions Bennet as remaining too

close to Deleuze and what he sees as the latter’s tendency to collapse
objects into a “field”. He reads her objects as “a pluriverse not of many
things, but of ‘one matter-energy’ that is ‘traversed by
heterogeneities’” (2011d, p. 130).164 I would argue however that Bennett’s
deliberate focus on specific objects (in her gutter) that, while all displaying
matter energy, have very particular and specific positions, relations and
strifes does not stray away from a concern with the object to that of an
abstract field. Rather just as Harman’s critical reworking of relationality,
processuality and potentiality has demanded a focus on the particular, so
Bennett’s demand that we take account of material and the materiality of
(quadruple) objects rebalances OOP as a philosophy and (as I discuss in the
next chapter, a practice) of real material things.
164. In her turn, Bennett argues that Harman too readily associates “lump ontology” with
Deleuze (Gratton, 2010a). As I discuss, others within object-oriented philosophy, notably
Bryant, are, like Bennett, willing to read Deleuze as concerned with objects that are not
exhausted by their relations, as a philosopher of objects not just fields. Bryant who
unpicks what he sees as Deleuze’s “schizophrenia: between monism and
pluralism” (2011a, pp. 94-104), even goes as far as to list Deleuze as one of the “heroes
of onticology” alongside Harman (2011a, p. 27). Bryant argues that “Deleuze’s concept
of the virtual provides us with the means of thinking substance as structured without
being qualitative” (2011a, p. 31). For Deleuze as for Harman, substance is a proper
subject for philosophy and, what is more, again like Harman, there is more to an object
than its qualities.
For Harman however - as in his debate with Bryant - this is not enough. One needs to
reject potentiality in order to remain at the scale of the object. He says: “Contra Deleuze
we must champion individual, actual things as the protagonists of philosophy” (2011i, p.
292).
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Interlude: William Eggleston

Bill at one time said to his great, highly-respected friend:
‘Well what am I gonna photograph? Everything around here
is so ugly.’ And our friend said: ‘photograph the ugly stuff’
Rosa Eggleston (Wife) in Holzeimer (2008).
I’ve seen him stare for hours at a china set. And not a
particularly valuable china set Andra Eggleston (daughter) in
(op cit.).
In 1976 New York Times critic Hilton Kramer and MoMA curator John
Szarkowski famously agreed that William Eggleston’s style was “perfect”. For
the curator, Eggleston’s saturated colour was a “snapshot aesthetic” taken to
an extreme, perfectly attuned to a saturated imagespace and postmodern
sensibility. To the critic, the images were indeed perfect: “[P]erfectly banal,
perhaps. Perfectly boring, certainly” (Kramer, 1976). The important point
about their reading of the show was that point of agreement, “perfectly
banal”. Eggleston embraces the banal by working with and through objects.
His modestly entitled Guide (2002) is no catalogue to the exhibition,
monograph of an oeuvre or photobook. More like a child’s I Spy book or a
throwaway pamphlet sold with an admission ticket, the Guide makes no
pretence to be anything other than a tour of objects in Eggleston’s South.
An unfinished jigsaw in Tallahatchie County, Mississippi; a creek in

Sumner, Mississippi, Cassidy Bayou in background; a shower or a child’s
tricycle in Memphis - objects on Eggleston’s tour. The bus stops, and on your
left...
The objects’ banality is not a value judgement so much as an ontological

statement and a methodological or creative move. The Guide is not random.
Eggleston selects the objects carefully, but without prejudice. The Guide is
democratic165 but never fully comprehensive. The objects admitted, drawn to
the attention of the scopic tourist share an ontological banality but presence.
Real but really withdrawn; sensual but never fully accessible.
165. The loaded terms keeps cropping up in the work of Eggleston. One of his
collections was called The Democratic Forest, (1989) another (and the title of his
retrospective at the Whitney Museum in 2008-9 was The Democratic Camera (Sussman,
2008).
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Eggleston famously refuses discourses of interpretation or to answer

questions. When someone says “you often photograph food. What does food
say to you?” he replies: “Food does exist sort of like cars exist” (Kirby,
1996b). His is the photography of “if you meet the Buddha on the road, kill
him”. If he refuses or is unable to find the depth within his work, so are his
objects. The green shower tiles and nozzles in Memphis may evoke Psycho
or Auschwitz but they are not about Hitchcock, the gaze, evil. They are
tiles... in a bathroom... in Memphis. They get wet. The flashlight reflects off
them. As dye, ink or pixel traces in an image they may re-present but that is
not their totality. They may connect with memory-objects, undergraduate
Film Studies essay-objects or MoMA brand objects but those connections
forged in the molten core of objects cannot exhaust the tiles or the image of
the tiles. Eggleston’s grumpiness is an ontological statement - needless to say,
were I to present that thesis to him, he would quite rightly dismiss it.
When one sees Eggleston work (admittedly in the presence of another

scopic apparatus) (Holzeimer, 2008), it is suffused with the everyday. Here
there are no decisive moments snatched from the flow of time, no stalking
and waiting nor even flânerie and chance encounters. Eggleston gets out of
his car, stops, raises his camera before another object, clicks and walks
quietly on. It is not just his age that means he moves and images slowly,
elegantly, undramatically. When he says to the filmmaker “Grab any
masterpieces yet?” before bending slightly to imag(in)e under a truck, it is
another sly Eggleston dig. There are no masterpieces distinct from the banal.
There are no decisive moments or perfect compositions to be captured or
created. There is is just this... and this... and this.
His refusal to title or date his images is more than just a Zen refusal of
labels - fingers pointing at the moon. It is a sensibility towards the “this”, a
willingness towards objects, a positive statement about their withdrawal yet
very real accessibility as sensual presences, understood in terms of objects
not fields of relations or time. When he rounds a corner and something
catches his eye he does not dance around looking for the perfect position to
take the image or shoot different frames or compositions. He raises his
camera and... He says:
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I do have a personal discipline. I’ve only taken one picture

of one thing. Not two. I would take more than one and get
so confused later when I was trying to figure out which was
the best frame, I said: ‘this is ridiculous, I’m just gonna take
one that’s gonna be...’ (Holzeimer, 2008).
Photographer Martin Parr says Eggleston’s vision is “about photographing

democratically and photographing nothing and making it
interesting” (Cocker & Holzeimer, 2009). I would agree with the first part but
argue with the second. Eggleston is not in the business of making nothing
interesting. For him there is no “nothing” only “something(s)” and they are
already interesting.
116
The JPEG object in practice

Object-oriented photography (OOPh)
The practice upon which I built this practice research is object-oriented.
My work seeks to use photography and writing as a way of exploring
objects.166 My object-oriented photography (OOPh), as I call it,167 is
informed by the work of Harman and Bennett. Firstly, it works with and
within a flat ontology of objects. The objects I photograph, the apparatuses I
use to photograph them, the spaces within which I publish them are all
objects. Secondly, that ontology seeks to escape correlationism.168 I am an
object in my imaging mesh but not a privileged one. The litany of objects in
play connect, reconnect, exist and work outside of a human-world relation.
Thirdly I look to my images and imaginings as more than signs. Of course
they have semiotic dimensions but the images and the imaging practices
exist and do work outside of signification, at a technical or machinic scale.
They cannot be reduced to signification. Finally I look to engage and work
166. This report focuses on my photographic practice but I have also explored what
Kenneth Goldsmith has called “uncreative writing” (2011) including Tweeting and
Facebook posting James Joyce’s Finnegan’s Wake backwards, 140 characters at a time
allowing it to interweave or entangle with other status and link objects. A second project
involved feeding algorithmically generated advertising copy as status-objects back into
Facebook’s Wall and so the Open Graph where it would form the source material for new
algorithmically generated ad-objects.
167. I make no claim for the originality of OOPh. Bogost has argued that Gary
Winogrand can be read as object-oriented: “Garry Winogrand made photographs of the
things themselves. Lots of them [...] His works are not commentaries, they are precisely
the opposite. Garry Winogrand makes photographs not to capture what he sees, but to
see what he will have captured. That’s what it means to take photographs to see what
the world looks like in photographs [...] It’s too hard for most viewers to take Winogrand’s
project seriously, because they’re too busy looking for social commentary in his
photographs to see them for what they are: pictures that help their viewers see things in
pictures. The object-oriented ontology project is just as simple, yet still just as hard: to
see things in pictures and everywhere else too. To see the world of things as things in a
world, rather than our world, with things in it” (2011, n.p.). My photo interludes in this
work are a similar project.
168. In a sense photography is inevitably correlationist insofar it involves human access

(unless we are talking of computer imaging). The key thing OOPh seeks to bring to that
issue is not to refuse the human but refuse the human Subject. In OOPh as in OOP, the
human is just another object.
117
with the vibrant materiality of the objects I photograph, photograph with and
through.169
There are two strands to my OOPh practice. The first (upon which the
project I discuss here - an exploration of using Harman’s quadruple
framework as analytical and creative method - is built), is about
photographing objects in “meshes” not in the sense of objects in context or
with other objects as a background but in terms of how what are sometimes
seen as a hierarchy of objects are best seen, and photographed as flat.
As an example I photograph discarded or forgotten human-made objects.

I do not approach this as “litter”; an invasion in a natural landscape or a
correlationist human intervention in a separate ecology; or as a sign of some
wider process or history. The broken biro on the tarmac or the Kinder Egg toy
my children played with then forgot, carry a history. They were made in a
factory, in a country, in a system. They have carbon footprints, chemical
presences and half-lives. But they also have a presence and actuality as I
encounter them.170 At the subatomic level, the object is in motion. Its
relation to the tarmac or the toy box (within its own history) is dynamic as
molecules react and inter-react. The pen and the pen/tarmac, the toy and the
carpet mesh (itself an object) has an agentic capacity. It does things in the
world semiotically perhaps but also materially. It changes the world, the
chemical balance of the environment, perhaps the psychological or aesthetic
balance of the pedestrian or the parent. As the photographer object in that
encounter I am inevitably in object-connections with the biro, the tarmac,
the toy, the light and a myriad of other objects.
Often I photograph human-created objects literally entangled with

“natural” objects. Again this is not as a way exploring or representing
ecology or relations of production. The disused mooring ring on the canal
path near the 2012 fence can “signify” old East-End industry replaced by
169. OOPh as a practice concerned with materiality and actuality can be seen as
engaging with Morton’s broader conception of ecology. As he says: “Art is ecological
insofar as it is made from materials and exists in the world” (2010a, p. 11).
170. I will come on to outline a more specifically quadruple OO exploration of my

imaging - the encounter with sensual and real dimensions and qualities etc. At this stage
I merely wish to establish the relation between my imaging and objects.
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Olympic brands, security and “legacy”. But the ring is not just a sign of
something more. Nor is it just the trace of historical and political economic
processes or human impact on “the environment”. There is no background
or context here. The ring does things in the world at an ideological scale but
also at a material scale. It rusts or leaks chemicals into the soil (alongside the
toxins released by 2012 excavations (Wells, 2009; Chapman & Wells,
2010)). But when the ring-object is addressed in a flat ontology with the
grass, the long-forgotten ironworks, the canalboat, its moorings licence,
British Waterways and its internal memos proposing changes to the rules for
the Olympics (Griffiths, 2011) - that network of human and unhuman
actants is real, present, actual, power-full and governmental.171
Finally I photograph the encounter between natural objects. Here there is

even more pressure to address the object-connections as a network, an
ecological mesh of objects. The leaf from one plant fallen on another can be
read (in reality or in my image) as both a sign of, but also an example of, an
eco-network, nature, Gaia. From an OOPh position however, whether seen
as I walk along the path, seen in an image or never seen, the two objects
connect within an object Here the ecosystem is not the field within which
objects connect but an object within which they connect. The system is just
a special kind of object.
The second OOPh practice is based around remixing objects 172. Here I
use my mobile phone screen as an imaging apparatus remixing data objects
with the “view” or image on the screen. I use an augmented reality app that
overlays data from web searches and databases across a camera view as an
imag(in)ing apparatus, screengrabbing the view as an image (encoded by the
iPhone using the PNG standard, but re-encoded through JPEG when
171. The key distinction here between OOP and classical ANT is that for Harman these
“separate” objects exceed their relations. They have an actuality beyond the network.
Their power is not dependent on the network or their relations. Morton also draws
attention to the importance of actuality within object-oriented creative practice when he
draws on Giorgio Agamben’s phrase (2007, p. 49) to position “ecological art” as an art
of “whateverness” (2010a, p. 105).
172. I come on to discuss Mark Amerika’s account of remixology as a methodology but

for broader accounts of remix as cultural practice, legal issue and aesthetic, see
Manovich (n.d.; 2005b; 2007); Lessig (2009); Tofts & McCrea (2009); Sonvilla-Weiss
(2010); Amerika (2011a).
119
uploaded to Facebook). In a similar vein I conducted geolocative web

searches for images as I walked around the 2012 Fence, again
screengrabbing and uploading the results. In a third strand, I remix mobile
phone photographs or screengrab imag(in)ings with the other data objects
that my phone connects with every day - emails, notifications, alerts, news,
webpages etc. I approach each of these remixes from an object-oriented
point of view. The images, files, screengrabs, stream objects, protocols and
apps I use are objects. My remix is a matter of connecting the various poles
of the objects within new objects. Here I look to treat all the objects in my
mobile phone use (the camera lens, the screen, the software, the touch
interface, data packets, pixels and people) within a flat ontological
framework again looking to move beyond a Subject-centred correlationism
and a discourse or practice of signification.173
I see the practice of OOPh as exceeding imaging. OOPh is more a

sensibility towards objects it does not demand an (in)decisive moment of
imaging or even an imager.174 None of the objects and object-connections,
networks or meshes I photograph require my presence as photographer. But
as photographer-object I am present. My object presence changes the
character of the mesh as does the object presence of my camera, its
hardware and software or the Open Graph “onto” which I upload my
images. That is true whether I press the button and take a picture or not,
whether the mash-up conducts and encodes a web search or not; whether
the mesh before the lens ever becomes an image (online or off) or not. Each
of those possibilities are potential new objects, the site of new connections.
173. While this practice features in my mash-up apparatus, in terms of this project and
its research aim of addressing JPEG, I concentrate primarily on my use of a (pinhole)
camera to engage with the first form of OOPh. I chose to do this because, as I discuss, I
was able to narrow down the range of object-actants in play. The latter practice was
premised on multiplying the number of actant-objects at work.
174. This allows it to extend into the field of machinic vision as I explore in terms of my
mash-up apparatus’ imaging whether a human is involved or not.
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OOPh is merely the sensibility to those connections and objects.175 What is

important is that that sensibility positions the photographer object at the
same scale as any other object.
As well as deconstructing the privileged position of the photographer

within imaging, OOPh seeks to undo that of the photograph.176 The image
could be seen as a report on my (and other photography objects’) encounter
with the objects before the lens. But the image is not the important thing. In
fact it is not necessary. OOPh is a sensibility to encounters. If that becomes
an image through the connection of other objects, so be it, but the
photography is in the photographic encounter. As I will discuss, if that
encounter is encoded in an inaccessible form (RAW) or by software
machinic screengrabbing on a distant server “out of sight”, it is no less an
OOPh encounter.
My photography is object-oriented not merely because at the moment of

taking I refuse the discourse of representation or a hierarchy of objects but
because I refuse correlationism. I as photographer am object not Subject. I
am implicated in that encounter. I connect (with) my objects within my
photographic practice and ultimately within my photograph object. I cannot
stop being human but I can stop privileging that position and rather address
it as human-object. Within any photography practice or photograph object
there are objects, object connections and objects connecting: the things
before the lens and the things behind. While of course I am active in
choosing what to photograph, where, when and how, all the other actants
175. Morton discusses “the environmental thought” in terms of it being a sensibility, a

“kind of thinking [where]... the form of the ecological thought is at least as important as
its content. It’s not simply a matter of what you’re thinking about. It’s also a matter of how
you think” (2010a, p. 4 emphasis in original). For him the ecological thought is a matter
of “intimacy with the strange stranger” (2010a, p. 46; 2010b), his term for life form
objects we can never fully grasp.
176. Bryant discusses the deconstructive power of object-oriented approaches when he

says: “[O]nticology and object-oriented philosophy are both metaphysics or ontologies
that thoroughly escape what Derrida refers to as ontotheology and the metaphysics of
presence. Far from being a signifier that denotes presence or the fullness of being, the
very essence of substance is to withdraw from presence and to be in excess of all
actuality. However, this overturning of the metaphysics of presence occurs not through a
demonstration of the manner in which being always harbors deferral and difference for
us such that presence is forever unobtainable, but rather by showing that being as such,
being in itself, withdraws in this way” (2011a, p. 86).
121
have an agentic capacity as they connect and reconnect. They are not
passive tools of a photographic overlord but vital players in an imaging
encounter. The human photographer is one object but so are other hardware
and software objects... including JPEG.
JPEG imaging
The particular practice I discuss here emerges from that broader OOPh
practice. It focuses on using OOPh to explore one of the objects in play,
JPEG. The practices or works I discuss were designed to explore JPEG and
also OOP as a method for investigating digital objects. I crafted the works
(picking up on the language Bogost uses for his own practice-research, see
below) to allow me to understand JPEG’s existence and working (remember
that for OOP, these are different), to expose and explore its quadruple form.
In order to do this, I took photographs with a digital pinhole camera and a
network, mash-up apparatus. I processed the data in a digital darkroom and
produced a series of Photo eBooks.
My first apparatus was a digital pinhole camera.177 My decision to use

digital pinhole was part historical, part philosophical and part aesthetic.
Pinhole has a long history in imaging. Eric Renner traces it back long before
the image could be “fixed” photographically to naturally occurring apertures
in nature and a fourth Century BC reference in China to “Aristotle’s Problem”
the question the philosopher raises in Problems XV about light shining
through a rectangular peephole appearing circular (Aristotle, 1936, pp.
333-35; Renner, 1999). On through the history of scopic apparatuses and
discourses discussed by Jay, Crary, Anne Friedberg (2006) and others,
pinhole - the physics of light and aperture as an imag(in)ing technology has
been an important scopic technology. It is important to note however that
pinhole has never been a “pure” form of imaging, somehow more basic,
objective even neutral. Far from it. What it has always done is highlight the
very enfolded and necessarily powerful nature of imaging and imaging
technologies. As discussions of scopic apparatuses have shown, the pinhole
process has not somehow been outside scopic power and the gaze. Right
177. An Olympus E420 DSLR with the lens removed and a home-made pinhole body
cap.
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through to eBay listings for pinhole surveillance cameras, the simple action
of light and aperture has never been outside power. Even when particular
technologies, devices and brands are stripped away, leaving just a light and a
hole, imaging is still scopic and therefore powerful. To imag(in)e with
pinhole is to remain part of that historical enfolding, to foreground the
connection to optics, optical toys and scopic problematics.
To marry that history to contemporary digital technologies is to perhaps

engage in the sort of “circuit bending” that Parikka and Hertz talk about
(Hertz & Parikka, 2010). For them literally deconstructing devices is to
problematise the historical and the new, to engage in a practical media
archaeology and enfold the old in the new. To remove the (very expensive)
lens from my camera and replace it with a pinhole is not simply to
problematise the consumerist megapixel arms race and built-in
obsolescence of imaging technologies or even simply to bring historic
techniques into the present but to connect the past and the present within an
imaging-object.
I look to carry my object-oriented philosophy through not only the things I

photograph but the way I photograph. Any photographic practice involves
using a mesh, an object apparatus including hardware, software (or
chemical), human and unhuman objects. Digital pinhole imaging enabled
me to acknowledge that by bracketing out some of the actant-objects and
foregrounding others. By refusing to use the camera’s electronic/software
meter and timed shutter, preferring instead to simply use my experience to
assess the light and opening and closing the shutter manually178 , I bracketed
other software in play aside from that dedicated to encoding light-as-data.
By handholding the camera and, because of the long exposures necessarily
introducing camera shake, I brought the Photographer-object into full view.
My breathing and so moving of the camera were written into the images as
clearly as they are written into the mesh.
178. As noted above (n. 5) my digital camera used an electronic, rather than a
mechanical shutter.
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My final reason for working with digital pinhole is aesthetic. As I discuss

in relation to other object-oriented photographers such as Sally Mann179, I
see “imperfections”, “ambiguity” and “accident” as not only visually
pleasing but more in keeping with the themes of my work: objects,
connections, enfoldings, memory and ecology.180 Again there is a desire to
get away form the hyper-sharp and mega-detailed imag(in)ings sold to us by
some players in digital imaging. This is not a negative reaction against, so
much as a positive move towards the potential of a more ambiguous,
mysterious, “weird” digital aesthetic - an exploration of the potential of ones
and zeros to be less distinct.181
My first “apparatus”182 used the digital pinhole camera to explore the

limits of JPEG by using it alongside another standard. My digital pinhole
camera could encode light-as-data using both JPEG and RAW standards at
the same time. The results of these simultaneous encodings were written to
the card in my camera and from there to the project “memory” card as well
as Facebook and Evernote’s web servers as part of my eBooks. Here the
newly encoded objects were available for new object connections: with
browser software, upload and download protocols and device hardware and
software. As I shall explore, those connections (and the objects within which
179. Anne Wilkes-Tucker reports Mann as saying of digital: “There is nothing whimsical
about digital. No ‘gifts’ occur. It’s too predictable” (2009, p. 175). I would respectfully
disagree. I looked to be open to those gifts by embracing the accident through
handholding the camera as well as the broader vagaries of dust on the sensor. A
commercial vendor of pinholes for DSLRs says: “If you have a Digital Single Lens Reflex
camera, you should use a ‘No Dust’ pinhole or zone plate body cap. ‘No Dust’ means
the pinhole or zone plate is surrounded by a very opaque black area on film; the pinhole
or zone plate area is clear on the film. No dust can enter the camera -- dust on the
sensors can be a problem with digital photography” (pinholeresource, 2011). As well as
the desire to put nothing between the light and the sensor, it was that “problem” I looked
to embrace.
180. For another photographer who sees the pinhole aesthetic as offering a way into
exploring memory, see Ess (2001).
181. Such a concern is apparent in recent work in sound and visual art around “the
glitch” (Menkman, 2011a; 2011b). See also the work of Phillip Stearns (2012) and
Amerika’s Museum of Glitch Aesthetics (http://glitchmuseum.com/).
182. I use the term apparatus to refer not just to the material device but the scopic mesh
or actant-network. See my discussion of the work of Crary. The “apparatus” is more than
the camera. It is the scopic mesh of human and unhuman, hardware and software
actants.
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they happened) were different and differently powerful depending on

whether JPEG had been involved or not. In short the RAW-encoded light-as-
data was unvisible,183 the JPEG-encoded light-as-data was visible, networked
and flexible.
My second apparatus was a software/machinic apparatus. I built a “mash-

up” that brought the JPEG object together with other software objects such
as JavaScript, HTML, web browsers, network protocols and search
algorithms; hardware objects such as mobile phone screens, monitors and
tablet touchscreens; human objects such as myself and other photographers;
unhuman objects such as Apple, Google, Microsoft and Yahoo. Needless to
say this litany does not cover all the objects in play, nor could any list. The
apparatus consists of a webpage. When the page is loaded a JavaScript on
the page calls on/connects with a service (artviper.net) that screengrabs a
webpage of a real-time search for 2012 images on Google, Flickr, Yahoo and
Bing as well as my own images on my server. The service then JPEG-encodes
that screengrab as a JFIF file and serves it back to the webpage as a
background image.184
More than an installation, this apparatuses was designed to be an imaging

device itself, allowing me or any other imager to “take a picture”. The
“camera”/webpage encourages the viewer to screengrab an image (encoded
depending on their system as PNG or JFIF files) which the viewer/user/
imager can then upload to the Web where they would be re-encoded if
183. I use the term “unvisible” rather than “invisible” to draw attention to the fact that it
was not that they could not be seen but rather that they were seen differently, outside the
mesh of social imaging connections. RAW-encoded files appear as a broken icon or as
a failed action. For discussion of the “invisible”, see Birchall (2011).
184. A second version of the apparatus used a similar arrangement of JavaScript, HTML
and API objects to pull my JPEG-encoded project images from Flickr and load them
alongside other JPEG-encoded “2012 images” in a Webpage (and the browser’s cache).
The user could then swap the images and create different juxtapositions, or dialectic
images as Benjamin might call them.
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necessary through JPEG ready to be found by the search engines and ready
to appear in the screengrabs.185
The final apparatus I developed was a series of eBooks (in different

formats, or encoded through different standards if you will) that attempted to
bring together my images, my mash-ups and the object-oriented
photographer interludes from this work.186 I refer to the eBook as an
apparatus because like the mash-up or my digital pinhole camera screen, the
book (in its material instantiation on/in/through a device) offers a way of
seeing whether through JPEG or through other standards. I crafted (as Bogost
might refer to it) a series of five eBooks: an Apple iBook, a Kindle book, an
Evernote “notebook”, a Facebook album “book” and a webpage “book”. I
sought to create the same ePhotobook in each of these spaces. The aim was
to create an eBook that included individual images/image files (encoded
185. This use of screengrabs as a form of imaging developed from earlier experiments
with screengrabs and searches. While this apparatus raises issues of copyright,
caching, search data trails and privacy, specifically around protocol, these are not the
concerns of this project. Rather I look to use it to explore the quadruple structure of the
JPEG object and its workings.
186. While my experiments have concentrating on JPEG’s position within photographic

capture and viewing, it can be used to encode any visual data including text and text/
graphic layouts. Adobe Illustrator, InDesign and Microsoft Office export via JPEG to
JFIF/EXIF files. Indeed services I use as one of my eBooks, Evernote
(www.evernote.com), blurs the distinction between visual and text. Any image uploaded
to its cloud notebook service is run through an optical character recognition (OCR)
algorithm, making any text in the image searchable. Like the other two apparatuses, this
was scopic insofar as it offered a way of seeing through JPEG and failing to see through
RAW and WebP.
126
through JPEG, RAW and WebP187 standards); the interlude pages encoded
through JPEG, DNG and WebP188 as images/image files; and the “live”
mash-ups. The “books” I created were different in terms of their affordances
as they were read and potentially read/written on different devices and in
different spaces. What is important in terms of my practice-research was that
they connected or failed to connect with the protocol-objects in different
ways. Those images or live mash-up images encoded through JPEG were
visible, and usable, even shareable and embeddable - inter-operative and
flexible across all the eBooks.189 JPEG had connected and enabled object
connections. Those encoded through RAW or WebP were not.190 The formats
could not connect with these images, rendering gaps in the Book, fails,
broken icons etc. The reader, her devices, social spaces etc could not
connect.
187. WebP is a direct competitor to JPEG developed by Google. To investigate WebP

would be a completely separate project. Suffice it to say that Google developed the
WebP standard for encoding and decoding image data as an alternative to JPEG.
Google argues that WebP is more efficient at compressing data and can “create smaller
and better looking images that can help make the web faster” (2011, n.p.). Google has
even gone as far as to offer a user-friendly pronunciation: “weppy”. What is particularly
important is that images encoded through WebP are visible in Google’s own browser
(Chrome), email system (Gmail), photo-management software (Picasa Web Albums) and
search engine but not other leading browsers or photo management systems such as
Firefox, Safari, Internet Explorer, Aperture or Lightroom. WebP is supported by
Pixelmator, ImageMagick and Konvertor natively while plugins are available for Adobe
Photoshop, Windows Photo Viewer, Microsoft Office 2010, and any other application that
uses Windows Imaging Component. A JPEG-encoded “publication” is visible on
computers, tablets, phones and e-readers, a WebP-encoded publication is as unvisible
as RAW-encoded light-as-data - unless you are using Google objects.
WebP is an open standard (anyone is free to work with and use it) but it is also
proprietary insofar as it can be read as part of Google’s larger (governmental) project to
define and mine the Web. To encode the pages of my thesis as .jpg and .webp files is to
render them both visible and unvisible, to join the whole Web or just Google’s part of it.
188. While I could have encoded the interlude pages with the Olympus version of the
RAW standard I used in my camera by photographing each layout and saving as a
RAW-encoded .orf file, I chose to use a different RAW standard to save the text images
as DNG files. See n. 23 above.
189. As I discuss in the Appendix, the JavaScript necessary for the mash-ups to work/
connect meant that Kindle eBook could not access the JPEG-encoded images pulled in
through the mash-ups.
190. As I discuss in the next chapter, Facebook attempts to re-encode image files
uploaded to its service with JPEG. It can (or chooses to) do this with certain format files
but not others and of course it cannot do it with “live” images such as my mash-ups.
127
My decision to “publish’ my work as an eBook in social media space

(Facebook and Evernote) as well as within particular proprietary and open
digital ecosystems/meshes (Apple, Amazon, the Web 191) was similarly
historical, philosophical and also political. There is a long tradition of
photobook publishing which like pinhole is enfolded in aesthetic,
technological, political and media meshes and ecologies (Manghani, 2003;
Parr & Badger, 2004a; 2004b; Baetens & Bleyen, 2010; Miles, 2010).192
Whether it is Nazi Germany or Soviet Russia’s use of the form for
propaganda or contemporary media’s exploration of iPad apps, the interplay
of image and design has been a part of photography’s history. As I discuss,
Robert Frank’s The Americans is more than a collection of photographs, it is
as Iain Sinclair says “a paper movie” (Kirby, 1996b). The book object is an
integral part of Frank’s work. When The Guardian launched its iPad app in
October 2011, it reserved a section for “Pictures” laying out photographs in
the same modernist block format as the news content, a change from the
fullscreen images of its first iPad app, evocatively titled Eyewitness. Here the
design - as well as the haptic practice of viewing - are integral to the image-
object consumption experience (Brockie, 2011). As photographer Ralph Pins
reportedly said in conversation with Cas Oorthuys in 1969:
A photobook is an autonomous art form, comparable with a

piece of sculpture, a play or a film. The photographs lose
their own photographic character as things ‘in themselves’
and become parts, translated into printing ink, of a dramatic
event called a book (Boom & Suermondt, 1989, p. 12) cited
in Parr & Badger (2004a, p. 7).
This sense of nested objects, with photo-objects connecting within

another object clearly resonates with my broader object-oriented
philosophy. Working with the photobook form allows an exploration of
OOP’s stress on the paradoxical autonomy but connectedness of objects
191. Of course the Web is arguably not open in terms of issues of access, digital divides
and the necessity of proprietary technologies to access even open and creative-
commons content. See also Jonathan Zittrain’s discussion of “appliancized proprietary
networks” (2008, p. 25) and Eli Paris’ work on the “filter bubble” (2011)
192. More generally on eBooks, see Eraso, Ludovico & Krekovic (2006) and Ludovico &
Muller (2007; 2008).
128
within objects. While of course an exhibition or installation193 bringing

images together can, and should be seen as objects, the bound (even
electronically) and definite character of the photobook as an object-work
foregrounds OOPh’s object focus.
There is also a “political”194 dimension to working with ePublishing.

Following the lead of Bogost and Montfort’s “platform studies”, eBook
publishing whether using ePub, HTML5, azw, mobi, PDF, iBooks or JPEG is
a matter of platforms, protocols and standards that are inevitably and
indelibly powerful.195 Choosing to create and publish my OOPh as a book-
object demanded an engagement with those platforms and powers. In the
App Store or outside, through Amazon or on my website, on a particular
device to a particular screen size or not - these decisions and practices
create different objects (accessible or inaccessible, open or closed). They
foreground the politics of objects and object relations. These are at one level
protocol issues. It is important to note that my concern in this project is not
with exploring them or even approaching them through OOP. Rather my
aim is to explore how the JPEG object connects or fails to connect with
those objects.
The three apparatuses can be seen as objects connecting within a single

but multidimensional practice object.
Why practice?
Before exploring how I used this practice as a basis for exploring JPEG
and governmentality and what I found about the nature of the quadruple
JPEG object it is important to address why I approached my questions about
the nature and workings of JPEG through practice. I chose not to approach
193. My mash-up can of course be seen as just such an installation object, or a

publication or perhaps even a performance.
194. I am conscious of the loaded nature of this term. My decision to use it here is not to
engage with debates about the nature of the political or even the politics of software or
publishing but merely to draw attention to my desire to acknowledge and work with and
through the real-world powerful nature of eBook platforms.
195. When Apple released their new iBooks format and iBooks Author software, there
was considerable controversy over the End User License Agreement which, in its first
iteration, said that any eBook created by the software regardless of final format could
only be sold through Apple’s iStore (Foresman 2012).
129
my subject via traditional social science methodologies. I could have

engaged in qualitative or quantitive research with photographers to establish
how they used JPEG or used surveys, interviews or discourse analysis to
trace the changing way photographers (amateur, professional or somewhere
in the middle) understand what it is they are doing now. Even given the sort
of more modest approach that John Law (2004) calls for, such a method
would be open to the standard criticisms of such work: questions of my
position as researcher, the extent to which my research and research practice
structures the network which I am exploring etc. I chose not to take these
questions on by using an actor-network theory model. Following Bruno
Latour’s call to simply describe,196 I could have sought to map the shifts and
new understandings through an ethnographic account of all the actants
(Coleman, 2010), not just interviewing the photographers but also
interrogating the documents and technologies, the developers of the JPEG
standard, the bodies, organisations and companies involved in its
hegemonic struggles in a similar way to how Latour “describes” the
development of the Aramis transport system (1996).197 Such an approach
would certainly have allowed me to amass evidence of the connections and
processes in play, the way JPEG achieved a form of hegemony, the way
photographers are enfolded with their technologies - hardware and software,
as well as adding a diachronic account of networks and objects in process.
What it would also have done however is locate those objects in terms of
their relations, in terms of the network. The object would have become if not
secondary to, at least dependent on its relations, the context or some meta-
framework which was the target of analysis. Rather than studying JPEG, I
would have been left studying “digital imaging”. Such was not my target. I
needed to remain focused on the object if I was to render it visible, open to
practice and potentially to Exploit.
196. In the guise of a long-suffering PhD supervisor Bruno Latour tells his rhetorical
student: “If I were you, I would abstain from frameworks altogether. Just describe the
state of affairs at hand” (2004, p. 64).
197. For such an account of imaging and Flickr, see Cox (2008).
130
I also chose not to leave my discussion of JPEG-as-quadruple-object at the

purely theoretical account of the previous chapter.198 To simply describe
JPEG using the vocabulary of OOP is important in terms of testing Harman’s
theory by asking it to account for protocol. As the previous chapter shows,
OOP offers a coherent and stimulating way of explaining JPEG. As the next
chapter shows, this enable us to map the contemporary governmental scopic
regime in new ways. Such is the power of Object-Oriented Philosophy. What
such a theory/philosophy-only account does not do however is test that
perspective - the Real/Sensual poles and their relations of fusion and fission -
in practice. Nor does it open up new object-oriented imaging practices.
It was only through the practice of using JPEG that its nature and workings
could become “visible”. Even exploring other photographers’ work would
not have given me access to all the objects in play within the “cameras” and
processes and practices of photography. It would not have allowed me to
assess to what extent Real-Sensual poles and relations of fusion and fission
are really at the heart (sic) of JPEG and JPEG imaging. By making my own
practice my laboratory, I had access to the full panoply of objects (including
myself as imager) as well as the full sets of connections.
Carpentry and remix

The term “practice-research” has attracted a particular set of metaphors.
Graeme Sullivan visualises a series of interlocking pieces, a “braid, with its
infolding and unfurling form that disengages and reconnects with core
themes while continually moving into new spaces” (2010, p. 112 fig. 4.4).
For Sullivan the link between art practice and research is literally drawn as a
fractal-like, 3d, dynamic visualisation where, “[i]rrespective of where visual
arts research happens, the structure has similar qualities - it is simple,
198. I am conscious of the problem of using the term “purely” as if such an abstract,
neutral, object thing was possible. I use the term here to imagine a position where the
research question were addressed using theory alone.
131
complex, and dynamic all at the same time” (ibid p. 113 fig. 4.5).199 For
Sullivan, practice-research is best understood using both visual and
conceptual metaphors. It is a dynamic jigsaw and the sort of “complex
adaptive system” scientists use to talk of non-linear dynamics in natural
systems and social scientists and cultural historians have used to both
picture and also account for processes in social systems.200 For Hazel Smith
and Roger Dean the metaphor is one of a circle and a web (2009). Where
Sullivan pictures a folding/unfolding movement, here the image is one of an
“iterative cyclic web” with a “research phase” and a “practice phase”
connected, repeated and ratcheting each other up as a project moves
forward.201
Bogost too uses a metaphor in his call for new ways of doing, what is for
him object-oriented, research. He discusses the “practice of constructing
199. Sullivan can be seen as located within the same discourse as Victor Burgin (2006)
and Desmond Bell (2008) in seeing practice-research as a political struggle for arts’
legitimacy. For Burgin practice-research emerged within an institutional and historical
frame. Sullivan starts with an historical account of how art has always created new
knowledge (ibid pp. 3-31) and when he gets onto the issue of contemporary discussions
of practice-based and practice-led research, this is located in terms of responses to the
OECD’s Frascati Manual an internationally recognised guide for standards in research
and development used to help develop policies and practices which includes a
framework for defining research activity (ibid p. 74). He continues this contextualisation
by discussing the “academic art world” (ibid pp. 79-82) before presenting his own
model. That model emerges from an account of practice-research as a political-
economic and historical form located in particular material and professional relations.
200. Within complexity theory complex adaptive systems are poised on the edge of non-
linear chaos. The arguments is that the whole is more than the sum of its components. At
large and small scales, systems have characteristics that are the same. They are “scale
free”, “self similar” or fractal. Within complex systems, small units, or “actants” (whether
atoms, neurones, ants, populations, share dealings, bits within a computer etc) interact
in complex ways and generate particular states. These states or “attractors” are poised
on the “edge of chaos”. The system settles but only temporarily around an attractor only
to be moved on to another (not necessarily higher) level of organisation. “Attractors” act
to stabilise these systems at particular moments which are never fixed but always in
process. For introductions see Holland (1995); Urry (2005) and Johnson (2009). For its
use in cultural analysis, see for instance De Landa’s attempt to write a non-linear history
(2000) where social structures (whether material or non-material, human or not) emerge
from complex historical processes that cannot be traced to a founding essence or
dynamic. Rather De Landa argues, ideas of social causality must include an
understanding of the sort of feedback mechanisms that scientists find at work in chaotic
and complex adaptive systems.
201. Smith and Dean position their metaphor in relation to Deleuze and Guattari’s
rhizome (2004) “in which any point can be linked to any other and there are ‘multiple
entryways and exits’” (2009, p. 21).
132
artifacts as a philosophical practice” which he calls “carpentry” (2012a, p.

92).202 This is not creating interactive works, games (Bogost, 2007; Bogost,
Ferrari & Schweizer, 2010; Tanz, 2011) or poems (Bogost, 2010) as an
illustration of a philosophical concept, point or argument. The work itself is
philosophical. He writes:
Carpentry entails making things that explain how things

make their world. Like scientific experiments and
engineering prototypes, the stuffs produced by carpentry are
not mere accidents, waypoints on the way to something else.
Instead, they are themselves earnest entries into
philosophical discourse (2012a, p. 93).
For Bogost, this philosophical product is of course object-oriented:
Carpentry might offer a more rigorous kind of philosophical

creativity, precisely because it rejects the correlationist
agenda by definition, refusing to address only the human
reader’s ability to pass eyeballs over words and intellect over
notions they contain (ibid pp. 92-93).
Here the software, games and game poems that Bogost creates do
(philosophical) work in the world - as objects. They do not rely on the
human world correlate. The form is as philosophical as the content.
Mark Amerika too “practices” philosophy. His “remix the book” project
(2011b) consists of a book but also an “open content platform”, a space for
“digital remixes of many of the theories generated in the print book [it]
features the work of artists, creative writers and scholars for whom the
practice and theory of remix art is central to their research interests” (2011c,
n.p.). Again these remixes are not, for Amerika, illustrations or even
responses to his philosophy. They are not even distinct philosophical
statements themselves. As objects his book (itself a collection of fragment-
objects) and the remixes connect and reconnect within new objects. He
talks of “artwork as a spontaneous and continuous theory-to-be” (op cit.
emphasis in original).
202. Bogost acknowledges his debt to Harman’s “the carpentry of things” (2005) an idea
Harman borrowed in turn from Alphonso Lingis (1998).
133
My own practice draws on both Bogost and Amerika’s methodology and

also their practices. Games for Bogost and remix for Amerika are not simply
arenas for philosophy let alone ways of making it accessible or visible, they
are philosophy. Theories and software, concepts and content connect within
the molten core of the object. In a similar vein, my imaging practices and
experiments are objects within which object-oriented ontology and protocol
connect. My mash-up apparatus is a form of live imaging practice, a sort of
photographic VJing or remix as well as a software work.203 My eBooks are
live imaging practices and philosophical experiments as much as collections
of images. In addition, as I have argued, for me OOPh is about imaging as
well as images. The OOPh sensibility at work in my RAW/JPEG apparatus-
object, like carpentry or remixology is about the practice and the practice-
object.
Focus and practice

The specific OOPh project I used as the basis for my practice-research
was around the liminal spaces around the 2012 Olympic site in East
London. I had already been engaging in imaging around the Fence using
mobile, geolocative and augmented reality technologies (Karppi, 2011;
Uricchio, 2011) as well as having explored some of the implications of
social imaging and protocol in an early paper (Caplan, 2010).204 It is
important to note that even in these early practices, I was not attempting to
explore The Olympics but rather the liminal Olympics spaces around the
Fence205 as a site of objects, object connections and meshes.206 What I was
interested in was how Olympics and non-Olympics objects connected - the
Fence and the plants, the light and the litter. I could have chosen any space
to explore. With that said, the Olympics site and liminal spaces offered a
203. In a sense it is also live coding (Brown, 2007) insofar as the mash-up is continually
remade as new screengrabs are pulled in.
204. At this stage of my research I had yet to encounter Harman’s work which, as I have
discussed stimulated a particular theoretical and practical approach.
205. For a discussion of fences as artefacts of globalization, see Feigenbaum (2010).
206. I narrowed the focus even further, as far as my own imaging went, by working in a
particular liminal space, the Greenway, a footpath and cycleway on the embankment
containing the Northern Outfall Sewer and being remade as a pathway to the Olympic
site as well as part of the Crossrail developments.
134
number of interesting objects and object meshes. Here was a concentrated

spatial and temporal mesh - the Big Build, the secure site, the “Grand
Project” as Iain Sinclair calls it (2012). Here were human and unhuman
objects present by accidents and by design - Hi-Viz jackets and tabloid
newspapers dropped by workers or security objects located by planners.
Here were natural and unnatural objects brought together for a specific
moment. The Fence would be taken down, plants would creep back. As I
looked for a project to base my JPEG experiments on, 2012 again offered
many advantages. Here was a specific space of human and unhuman
imaging - tourists and sports fans with JPEG-ready mobile phones under the
gaze of unhuman surveillance cameras and drones as well as human snipers
(Taylor, 2012; Hopkins, 2012).207 2012 offered a moment and space of
distributed imag(in)ing. My mash-up apparatus could be set to manage (if
not control) the range of those imag(in)ings through temporal and spatial
metadata embedded in the image files.208
As I looked to explore JPEG as a quadruple object, and developed my

apparatuses as a form of “carpentry”, I built on my existing 2012 OOPh
project. I walked the liminal spaces around the 2012 site encountering (and
imaging) objects and object-meshes. I photographed the natural-artificial,
natural-natural and human-natural object connections before the lens with
my digital pinhole apparatus. I created a mash-up imag(in)ing apparatus that
brought my images into connection with the distributed web of social
207. For broader discussions of surveillance and the militarisation of urban spaces, see
Graham (2011). In terms of the militarisation of online space, see Deibert (2003). For a
different account of the machinic and the urban see Amin & Thrift (2002). Specifically
around the digital and the urban, see Featherstone (1998) on mutable spaces and
flânerie; Atkinson & Willis (2007) on overlapping realities; de Souza e Silva (2007) on
mobile hybrid spaces; McQuire (2008) on architecture and contributions to Sutko & de
Souza e Silva (2009) on urban location and gaming. For accounts of urban development
around 2012, see Gold & Gold (2007) and Pointer (2009). For photographic explorations
of urban space, see Burgin (1996); Atkins and Sinclair (1999) and the work of Stephen
Gill (2004; 2007a; 2007b). For an historical account of visualising urban space and time
see Clarke & Doel (2007). In terms of the gaze and modern urban imaginaries, see
Jansson & Lagerkvist (2009). For a history of the rhetorics around surveillance, see
Levin, Frohne & Weibel (2002).
208. As I discuss (Caplan, 2010), such metadata can of course be “fooled”, manipulated
or otherwise Exploit-ed. As noted above (n. 126) my concern in this project was not with
the geolocative metadata capabilities and implications of JPEG. Their use here was
simply to define searches.
135
imag(in)ings organised by search engines and social media spaces. I finally

created a series of eBook/PhotoWorks some of which could act as “imaging
apparatuses” themselves as they housed the mash-ups, some of which were
mobile book/cameras that could be taken into the Olympic site (Cheesman,
2012).
These experiments, works and PhotoWorks were my philosophical

practice, the way I explored OOP, OOPh and JPEG. Furthermore they
remain philosophical works for others to use to explore OOP, OOPh or
JPEG... Or indeed other objects or issues of distributed imag(in)ing.
136
The report
JPEG as an object
My practice-research indicates that JPEG can be seen as an object.209
JPEG has a unity. This can be seen in its technical structure (as outlined in
the Digital Imaging Pipeline chapter), in the documents and RFCs online but
also in my practice. As I built my mash-up or eBook I could “call on” a
unified JPEG to encode screengrabs and render them visible. Regardless of
whether that encoding issued as a JFIF/EXIF image file, was accessed by me
or other software, there was unified JPEG-object-actant in play. I will come
on to address the relations within which I found it at work, but my practice
indicated that a unified JPEG had an existence outside those relations.
Regardless of whether JPEG is ever called (within Photoshop, my camera or
my mash-up) it has a presence and existence. If it did not, I could not have
built my apparatuses. Following Harman’s Latourian stress on objects as
actants, doing things in the world, again JPEG can be seen as an object.
JPEG does things. It encodes light as data, data as accessible data. What is
more, as I come on to discuss in the next chapter, JPEG does governmental
work. It enables image data to be viewable, shareable, linkable and
efficiently archived as part of Facebook’s Open Graph. My attempt to use the
RAW standard to do the same work indicates that standard-protocols such as
JPEG are active creators of Open Graph-friendly data and data points. One
could of course argue that JPEG is not the only object-actant doing that
governmental work. Other protocols, hardware and software objects are also
in play and necessary for the digital imaging pipeline to work. All my
practice shows is that JPEG is a player in that mesh and is unified and
exceeds any relations.
The sensual JPEG

My practice-research indicates that JPEG has a sensual dimension. A
dimension of the unitary object which is accessible to me and to other
209. This does not of course exhaust the ways in in which JPEG can be understood (or
possibly imag(in)ed). My project is not claiming that objects is the only way of
understanding protocols and standards, merely that it is an under-developed way of
seeing such digital objects.
137
actants in the mesh. As I planned and built the various apparatuses, I had to
work with specific accessible instantiations and adumbrations, different
profiles.210 In order that the mash-up could sample the distributed
imaginings, my own photography could place the RAW and JPEG objects
next to each other and collide my eBook formats, I needed to access
dimensions of the JPEG standard (not just the JPEG/JFIF images) present to
me, my camera, my browser. Specifically the plans I made and the devices I
constructed were premised on access. As those plans were realised and the
apparatuses worked, that sensual dimension became apparent. These
encounters did not access the totality of JPEG, merely an instantiation,
particular configurations of the transforms, codings and tables that form
JPEG. I experienced these sensual dimensions as there as surely as I knew
that the totality of JPEG lay beyond my and my other actants’ access.
Specifically, as I set up my digital pinhole camera to encode my 2012

light as data using RAW and JPEG simultaneously, I depended on access not
to a stable, total reality but to a particular profile. I chose the settings in
camera.211 Just as when encoding the pages for the eBooks I accessed the
“quality” settings - the everyday term for the particular transforms, coding
and tables used in compression. This was a particular accessible profile, the
sensual dimension to JPEG. As a second clear experience of that sensual
dimension, depending on the balance of light and shade in the scene I
captured, JPEG compressed differently - balancing the colour and the tonal
range according to a different profile. This was apparent as I looked at the
JPEG preview on the camera screen, on the iPad and in the save as dialog
box in Photoshop or Aperture. It was not that there was different JPEGs but
certainly different profiles.
The real JPEG

My practice-research indicates that JPEG has a real dimension. Although
my imaging and apparatuses show a sensual dimension, there is always
210. Interestingly, this term is used in imaging software and digital photography to refer
to different colour spaces configured for different screens and devices.
211. Another interesting legal-governmental phrase highlighting the hidden but powerful
operations in play.
138
more to JPEG, withdrawn dimensions inaccessible to me or any other actant-

object. As John Miano puts it, “the inner workings of JPEG compression
remain something of a black art” (1999, p. 35).212 His choice of words is
instructive. He talks of “JPEG compression” not “JPEG”. The thing itself
withdraws.
If there was more to JPEG than the sensual accidents and profile that I and
other objects encountered, then it must have a presence and existence when
I (or any other object) stopped paying attention to it. My practices shows that
the unitary JPEG had that existence.213 This was most apparent in my mash-
up apparatus. The service I used to screengrab image searches and encode
them as image files to be sent back to my installation existed regardless of
whether I or anyone or anything else called it to run. The JPEG object
remained enfolded in that software service regardless of whether my
JavaScript called it or not. Similarly the JPEG decoding object had a
presence within the browser and eBook reading software regardless of
whether it was in use. This was not some potentiality. It was not waiting to
be realised, somehow non-present or unreal. It was actually built into
software and systems but accessible only as instantiations or profiles.
Similarly Save As in Photoshop or the in-camera software before or after I
pressed the button had the JPEG on hand (present at hand). Whether I or any
other object boot up those systems and access the sensual JPEG is a separate
issue. My apparatuses and my practices depend on something real, if forever
withdrawn. What became particularly apparent as I imaged was that JPEG
not only withdrew from me but from other objects in my apparatuses. When
I pressed the shutter button and set the digital imaging pipeline in play or
212. Miano’s evocative if problematic language is instructive, particularly when read in

terms of Morton’s ideas of “dark ecology” (2010a, p. 16) which he likens to noir film
where the narrator finds she is implicated in the narrative. Morton argues that “[a] more
honest ecological art would linger in the shadowy world of irony and difference” (ibid p.
17). I aim to explore the shadowy world of JPEG through a form of object-oriented or noir
photography.
213. One is of course in danger here of metaphysical speculation, the uncertainty

principle and thinking of cats in boxes. One might discuss whether it is possible to prove
something is withdrawn. My aim is not to enter those debates but merely show that there
is more to JPEG than the (sensual) dimensions that are accessible when one uses or
encounters the object, that JPEG exists even when the camera, the server or the human
is switched off.
139
loaded my webpage I did not reach the totality of JPEG, but neither did any
of the other objects. The silicon chip in the camera or the hard drive on
which Photoshop ran, the JavaScript call or the Google algorithm accessed a
dimension of JPEG - all that was needed to do their work. They had to
encounter an instantiation in order to render search results. They had to
encounter a profile in order to be able to render a file.
JPEG’s qualities
My practice-research also indicated that JPEG was in tension with real and
sensual qualities. As I worked as programmer, imager or reader, JPEG
withdrew but it did not dissolve into a indistinguishable mass. It had real
qualities. It was different from other real objects and protocols. It used
Huffman Coding, DCT etc. These algorithms and mathematical formulae,
whole inaccessible (except through intellectual work) were there in my
work. If they were not I could not have developed a RAW/JPEG parallel
imaging apparatus, there would have been no distinction to highlight.
Similarly my practice indicated that JPEG emitted sensual qualities “into

the sphere of presence” (Harman, 2011g, p. 49). The instantiations and
profile I experience in my practice were not phenomenal. The specific
tables, codings, transforms and colorspaces I encountered were more than
experiences. They were rooted in a real protocol. The unity of withdrawn
qualities and dimensions, those mathematical laws and hidden dimensions
were in tension with their particular instantiations, tables, settings etc. Again
the fact that my apparatuses worked, the fact they did compress data showed
accessible qualities (particular tables and transforms) in operation. JPEG
compression does not work by Huffman Coding in general or abstract but by
using a particular sensual profile, a particular table. The reality of my
imaging apparatuses and images indicate that there was a reality in play.
JPEG and time

If my practice showed that the JPEG object had a quadruple nature, it also
showed that time and space in my imaging were matters of objects and that
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quadruple nature.214 I have already discussed how “time” is important for

any discussion of social imaging. What I want to add here is an account of
specific examples of that object-based time (as a tension between SO and
SQ) that appeared in my practice.
There was no “arrow of time” in my mash-up or my eBook publishing. Of

course images and imaging moments (taking/encoding, uploading, viewing/
decoding) were timestamped. But even without hacking that metadata,215
the “time” I and Facebook’s Open Graph were working with was flexible.
JPEG’s particular instantiations at the moment of encoding or decoding, or at
the moment of calling within a mash-up or Timeline appeared as not a
moment from a linear flow of time but rather a tension between a sensual
profile (the accessible dimension), in a specific moment and particular
qualities or settings set by me, server software, in-camera or iPad apps etc.
“Moments” (decisive or otherwise) were a matter of objects and their
qualities. When my mash-up seemed to collapse and telescope different
times from and for different imagers, what appeared as a stream of images, a
cinema-style linear trail of frames, was in reality a Benjamin-style montage
of instantiations, not abstracted from a linear flow of stable “time” but rather
a series of object tensions - particular and specific. The sensual object JPEG
“within” my app/eBook called particular qualities (particular, specific
settings of JPEG compression) to render particular image moments on the
page. What is clear from my practice is that JPEG is about specific and
particular profiles and compressions. Each instantiation in encoding or
decoding are actual and particular. Each SO and SO/SQ tension is specific
as the object within which JPEG works is encountered by me, by the eBook
or an other object. Here the tension between the SO and SQ of JPEG
214. For a different account of time and software, explored through artworks see Raley
(2008). On distraction and experience of time, see Cubitt (2007) and more broadly on
time and new media, see Lee & Liebenau (2000) and Leong, Mitew, Celletti & Pearson
(2009). For an exploration of time compression and visuality, through the work of Virilio,
see Bartram (2004) and more generally on mobility and time and space, see Green
(2002).
215. The timestamp-object is not fixed or necessarily “true”. That EXIF metadata can be
edited. The time of the image or the geolocation can be changed. Of course forensic
methods can be used to show that such changes have been made but that does not
change the fact that the time-object is not related to some fixed temporality.
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appeared as different moments in time, as a flow of (in)decisive imag(in)ing

moments but on closer inspection could be addressed as a matter of tensions
within a unified JPEG object.216
This is not to suggest that there is no such thing as “time” or that it is no

more than an illusion caused by objects. Rather it is to suggest that my
practice with JPEG indicates that our experience of JPEG imaging time arises
from the tensions within that object.217
JPEG and space

My practice also highlighted the way in which “space” can be seen as
object-oriented, for Harman a matter of the tension between RO and SQ.218
Again, I have discussed this perspective in theoretical terms but I turn here to
examples of where I found that object-oriented sense of space in my
practice.
As noted above, my practice highlighted JPEG’s sensual qualities, the

particular instantiations and profiles I and other objects encountered. My
aim again here is to present an account of where that object-oriented sense
of space appeared in my practice.
When a reader opens my eBook and turns 219 to a page with a live feed,
she experiences a window into multiple spaces (just as if I had embedded a
216. This is not to suggest that this is the only object tension in play or setting
experiences of time in motion. Other imaging objects were similarly split and so enfolded
in those experiences.
217. This is not to institute a correlationist agenda, privileging human relation to time.
Object-oriented approaches do not deny the human and her experience (in relation to
time), they simply refuse to privilege it.
218. For a different account of space and software, see Kitchin & Dodge (2011) who
identify new flow spaces enfolded with and in many ways dependent on, information and
software. For another account of flow and new media, see Hepp, Krotz, Moores & Winter
(2008). For work around locative media and visualisation of space, see Tuters & Varnelis
(2006). See also Zook & Graham (2007) on the relationship between code and place;
Stromer-Galley & Martey (2009) on the relationship between online space and offline
norms; McGarrigle (2010) on the influence of situationism in locative media and art, and
Lapenta (2011) on locative and augmented reality “geomedia” and collective image
production as commodified objects of exchange. As noted above in terms of time, such
discussions are, from an object-oriented perspective, built around a correlationist
agenda, discussing as they do our (human) reframing of space in and through code.
219. An interesting term in terms of my iPad and Kindle’s different haptic interface
(whether serving eBooks or Evernote/Facebook app-books) in contrast to those eBooks
on the Web.
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live CCTV camera or webcam, but with the added complexities of the times
discussed above).220 In terms of the mobile eBooks, these spaces are further
overlaid (or underlaid or inlaid) by the spaces of reading - in the Olympic
stadium, in France, in the office of my examiner etc. Like a form of
augmented reality, multiple reading and writing spaces appear. The
experience of space set in motion by my apparatuses is not simple, or stable.
JPEG plays a crucial role in that spatial experience, rendering window views
visible, rather than the broken unvisible, perhaps opaque view of a RAW-
encoded window. The same experience of multiple spaces occurs when I
scroll back through the images on my camera screen.221 It is not just
different times I encounter but also different spaces, not just where the
image was taken but, when viewing on my phone’s Facebook app, the server
space in the US or wherever the Haystack server is, in whoever’s jurisdiction
and tax regime it sits.
These complex spatial dynamics and spaces are not just a matter of
different geolocations where images were taken but also where that data is
held, cached and read, where it is encoded and decoded potentially in
multiple spaces simultaneously. These dynamics, for Harman, are the result
of the tension between a withdrawn standard (RO) which is some sense
locationless (”in” the US, UK, the Web, the standards body) and those
profiles which I and other objects encounter as pages are turned, image-data
accessed/decoded, screengrabs encoded, Timeline’s rendered. The tension
between the withdrawn JPEG (RO) - that object that always exceeds our
access and its relations, the unfathomable object always just out of reach in
my apparatuses but ensuring that they work - and the (SQ) the particular
Huffman table or settings accessible to me and other objects, sets up those
220. For discussion of the “window” and discourses of space, see Friedberg (2006). For
an account of the relationships between screens and space/experience, see Cubitt
(2010). For a materialist exploration of the screen, see Patterson (2010).
221. The fact that I can scroll back through and see RAW-encoded data and so
encounter particular spaces is purely because my camera embeds a visible JPEG -
encoded preview into the RAW data. The RAW-encoded data remains unvisible, the
window opaque. Pavel Büchler discusses the implication of the camera’s “real-time Live
View” on the rear screen for our understanding of time and space, concluding “the
uninterrupted flow of information on the ‘live’ preview screen blocks the view of the
moment ‘out there’” (2010, p. 17).
143
spaces. That tension renders the multiple spaces and disconcerting

experiences of spaces as JPEG as a unity does its work and the particular
qualities I experience are fused. Here we are not faced with different spaces
so much as different experiences of space in particular, actual object
meshes. This is not to say that there is not real space - geographically distinct
and politico-legally defined bordered spaces but simply to argue that the
complexities of how that is enfolded in the digital can be seen through
objects and that my apparatuses show that the experience of space in digital
imag(in)ing can be understood as a matter of objects.
If my practice showed a quadruple form to JPEG and the spatial and

temporal dynamics of distributed imag(in)ing appeared as a matter of
objects, the next question become: to what extent did I find evidence of an
eidos and essence to JPEG through my practice?
JPEG: eidos and essence

Recall that, for Harman, following Husserl, the eidos of an object is
intellectually accessible and is the result of the tension between the sensual
object and the real qualities that delimit it. In contrast the essence of an
object remains inaccessible, the result of a tension between the withdrawn
real object and its withdrawn real qualities. Such an intellectual eidos and
mysterious essence can be argued theoretically, but my practice offers
evidence of their presence within objects.
I and other objects intellectually approached JPEG as the apparatuses

worked. This is not to anthropomorphise the way objects work 222 nor yet to
engage in a correlationist account of human privilege and intellectual
access. When OOP says “intellectually accessible” it merely means that an
object can be aware of qualities that cannot be reached. I as apparatus
programmer can be aware of JPEG’s RQ such as Huffman Coding or DCT.
Similarly a browser can “know” that those qualities are present and can be
depended on to deliver data in a usable way. But that (intellectual) or eidetic
knowledge does not take me or the browser to the essence of JPEG. In one
sense we do not need to. Both I and the browser only need to encounter
222. See n. 117 above.
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specific dimensions and particular profiles in order for the (governmental)

connections to work.
Such a distinction was obviously very clear as I planned and built my

apparatuses. I worked with real qualities and accessed the sensual object - I
used the eidos of JPEG as the basis for the apparatuses and this report. But I
also failed to work with the essence of JPEG. There was always something
more, more withdrawn, more inaccessible. There was always more to JPEG
than Huffman Coding and DCT (let alone specific tables and settings). JPEG’s
existence in scopic and governmental meshes was always more than a
matter of algorithmic compression or even software. Its power and position
as actant as well as object was always extra, always withdrawn. This became
particularly apparent as I explored the governmental implications of my
practice through my Facebook eBook, as I shall discuss.
This sense of an eidos and essence to JPEG was not only apparent to me.
It also appeared for other objects in my apparatuses which worked by and
through a series of dependencies. The browser object depended on JPEG-
encoded data to create a visual page and RAW-encoded data for an
unvisible one. Facebook’s algorithms depended on JPEG’s compression
working to make the millions of uploaded pictures manageable (as I discuss
in the next chapter). These unhuman actant-objects were created with the
knowledge that Huffman Coding and DCT were at work, just as they were
built in the knowledge that an iPad user would see and interact with them in
a particular way. The engineer and designers’ categorical intuition was built
into those objects. They “knew” the eidos of JPEG. But just as those
engineers did not, could not and did not need to know the full essence of
JPEG - the governmental implications and powers - so those unhuman
objects too remained unaware of that hidden essence.
For Harman the tension between the poles within the quadruple object
are matters of union and/or fracture. As I have said above, I find his account
theoretically convincing but I needed to see if that framework fitted with my
imaging practice.
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JPEG: fusion and fission

For Harman, space and essence are issues of fusion and time and eidos
matters of fission. The former occur as the tensions are held together, the
latter as they break. These are matters of practice and I looked to my imaging
practice as a way of exploring their dynamics and seeing them in operation.
What Harman discusses as relations of fusion between the withdrawn real

objects and its sensual and real qualities, what we understand as space and
essence, appeared in my JPEG and RAW/WebP imaging. While my imaging
with JPEG and other standards displayed the withdrawn character of the
protocol object, it also highlighted the particular profiles (SQ) and
fundamental characteristics (RQ) of the object. These had to be fused. If they
were not kept together then my imaging would not work. If these tensions
were not kept in operation - if DCT or a Huffman table failed to be a part of
the object, the compression would not work, the data would be unvisible,
the governmental Social Graph disrupted. It was just such a breakdown in
the fusion that introducing the RAW standard into the social imaging
apparatus achieved. The essence of JPEG appeared in my practice as those
real qualities and particular profiles were fused. Similarly the complex
spaces apparent in my imaging and eBooks were a matter of the
fundamental characteristics (DCT, Huffman coding) being fused with a
particular profile (a particular transform or table), rendering the imag(in)ings
visible and social.
Similarly, the relations of fission between the sensual object we encounter

and its sensual and real qualities, what we know as time and eidos,
appeared in my mash-up and eBook imaging. The social stream of
imag(in)ings in the mash-up and my own pictures in the eBooks (with their
temporal complexities) was achieved through particular profiles (SQ) and
specific fundamental characteristics (RQ). Each encoding (and decoding)
that we or other objects encountered was according to a particular profile
dependent on withdrawn characteristics. But each accessible object
(whether image or JPEG-encoding) demanded an actual, specific, particular
arrangement. It demanded fission, breaks. There was no stability or
continuity here. Each rendering or mashing of data was particular, a moment
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of breakage between an overall sensual dimension and particular

instantiations or configurations of qualities. If there had not been those
breaks or fissures there would not have been particular dialectical images (as
Benjamin would talk about them),223 particular image montages or page
layouts.
JPEG and connections

In the next chapter I come on to explore the governmental implications of
the JPEG object, how it is enfolded in the governmental work of Facebook’s
Open Graph. I trace this as a matter of objects connecting within objects.
Before moving on to those discussions however it is important to report on
how my practice displayed objects connecting, as OOP argues, within
objects.
The first thing to note is that I designed my apparatuses from an OOP

perspective. I looked to identify and then connect objects together. When I
built my mash-up and eBook using JavaScript, HTML, CSS, JPEG etc, I
connected them within a mash-up/eBook object. I designed or crafted those
objects to connect with other objects: Facebook’s server software, Google
algorithms, Evernote database objects, the iPad haptic interface. Those
connections were designed to happen within the governmental objects I was
interested in: the Social Graph etc. At one level then, those nested
connections were apparent because I had built them in from the beginning.
The question is whether that was the nature of object connections regardless
of my design intentions. My practice suggests it was. Even those parts of my
practices that were beyond my control and design (the encoding of the
screengrabs on the server, the creation of the Timeline and its interface on
Facebook, the database of Evernote notes as well as the in-camera digital
imaging pipeline) were nested objects. The CSS and MySQL database entries
connected within a webpage object not in some fluxus or plasma but in an
object. The eBook connected with the reader or the datamining algorithm
within a specific and particular interface object. Wherever one looks in the
223. This is discussed further in my Conclusion.
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digital imaging pipeline one sees objects and objects nested within objects
as their different dimensions connected.
What is also apparent from my practice is that the mediating object within
which those connections happen follows Harman’s logic. As noted above,
he argues that: “[r]eal objects can touch only through the medium of an
intentional object, and intentional objects can touch only through the
medium of a real one” (2009c, p. 208). My research indicated that this
asymmetrical relation appears in practice. The real, withdrawn dimensions
of the JPEG object and the real browser software object could not touch.
There was always an excess, something held back. There were dimensions of
each object that were not accessible to each other: JPEG’s governmental
nature (as I discuss below), the browser’s position as a software assemblage
with legal, political, IP and disciplinary implications for instance around
cookies and datatracking (Elmer, 2002). These dimensions were never fully
present or accessible not because they were in someway hidden by design
so much as withdrawn by nature. But JPEG and the browser clearly did
connect. What became clear was that they were mediated by a sensual
object, an accessible browser interface object, the “window” on my iPad or
in my eBook. It was this sensual object that served as the object and plane of
connection. Similarly with JPEG’s sensual dimension, a particular
instantiation connected with a particular profile of the camera hardware, a
particular material dimension of the chip and sensor accessible to electrical
charges and data as information. This encounter was mediated through a real
object, the camera’s hardware. This object had hidden depths, withdrawn
dimensions which these objects could not and need not access but that real
object served as the asymmetrical plane of connection for the accessible
sensual objects.
While my practice-research shows a Latourian actor network in operation

as JPEG circulates within industry groups, businesses and photography,
governmental and disciplinary networks, it also shows that the specific and
particular connections happen not in some field of becoming, potentiality or
relationality (ANT’s network) but within other objects.
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JPEG and materiality

The final theme of an object-oriented account of JPEG on which to report
from my practice is that of materiality. As I argue above, perhaps Harman’s
theoretical framework can be usefully expanded when dealing with digital
objects through the work of Jane Bennett. The question then become to what
extend did a material dimension to the quadruple JPEG object appear in my
practice?
It may seem odd to argue that my practice bore out my argument for a
materialist strain of OOP. After all, I was looking at and working with
immaterial protocols and standards, developing immaterial eBooks and
image works and even building cameras from immaterial software
apparatuses (such as screengrabbing). With all those seemingly immaterial,
digital and machinic objects, where was the materiality? My practice
indicated that those objects had and have a form of materiality through
which their vibrant agentic capacity worked. The first and most obvious
sense in which that appeared was in the carbon footprints of those
technologies and the material traces of their manufacture. JPEG, JavaScript,
Facebook’s Social Graph are not carbon-neutral. They can never be fully
immaterial. They are always enfolded within devices, technologies and
chemicals, just as they are always enfolded in labour relations and
globalisation. But in a second sense the objects I used in my work had a
materiality. That materiality was different than Bennett’s discarded glove or
my iPad but the light-as-data-as-information flowing through my apparatuses
and the global network was real and material like the photons that
transgressed the Olympic Fence.224 That data excited sensors. That
information excited algorithms. That information was bought and sold in
marketplaces225. It was “farmed” and stockpiled in archives. This is not just
an extended metaphor. The information, the software standards I was
224. In a number of images, I simply opened the pinhole to the sky over the Fence. For a
discussion of photography and the sky, see Beck (2011).
225. Had I chosen to sell my Kindle and iBooks publications, that data and JPEG-
encoded data would have had a material position within the information economy. Even
as a “free” Book, that information had a position within that economy, not least in terms
of its position within my PhD, my career and my University department’s REF.
149
working with had a material charge as they worked and connected. Their
agentic capacity and quadruple form was enfolded with the material
technologies of distributed imaging but also the material physics of
information and data.
Conclusion
By approaching JPEG as an object and then building and using
apparatuses through objects, I found that objects, even “weird” ones like
JPEG, did have real and sensual dimensions, that the relations between those
dimensions were tensions characterised by fission and fusion and that while
particular and discreet, objects did connect, relate if you will, but within
other objects. While I hold that an object-oriented, quadruple account of
JPEG provides not only an imaging but also an analytical methodology, it is
important to show how an account of JPEG based around relationality,
processuality and potentiality fails to account for my experience in practice.
I certainly found evidence of relations. Wherever I worked with JPEG I

found the sort of connections that ANT draws attention to. Black boxes
opened, relations expanded across the technosocial mesh of social imaging.
What I did not find was these relations as outside objects. My apparatuses,
the space of Facebook, my iPad were the sites of those relations and
connections but they too were objects. They had a unity a multi-dimensional
character, withdrawn and sensual dimensions. In Morton’s terms they too
were “strange strangers” (2010b).
At first sight my practice seemed to show that the JPEG object has a
processural nature. After all it was apparent in its running or instantiations.
What became clear though was that the running was a matter of new
tensions and connections not the smooth movement of a continuing process.
Just as the evidence of my apparatuses within the mesh shows that objects
connect, so the different JPEG encodings within the mash-up appeared as
new objects. Each screengrab JFIF pulled in, each frame in the stream as a
result of JPEG’s running was an object but so was the specific JPEG
arrangement that gave rise to it. The dynamic form and content of the mash-
up process was a matter of specific, discrete objects not the flow of process.
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A processural account of the JPEG object could not account for the specific
discrete operations of encoding in the apparatuses. Once again it is not that
there is no “process” but rather than this must be understood as a matter of
objects.
Again an account of object potentiality would seem to offer value. After

all, as I discuss in terms of governmentality in the next chapter, JPEG, like
Galloway’s TCP/IP - while seemingly a neutral standard - is run through with
relations of power. Surely this is the character of objects that they harbour a
potential that is realised in particular governmental situations and spaces,
such as the Social Graph? This is of course where Harman and Bryant part
company. It is clearly not a problem for Bryant to hold to an object-oriented
ontology and still entertain the idea that objects hold something back.
Harman differs and my practice bears him out. As I discuss above, Harman
holds that objects do not hold anything back. There is no reserve. They are
always and irredeemably present and actual. This is clear from my practice.
JPEG is fully actualised (if never fully accessible) in the apparatuses. Even
when it is absent (in the RAW or WebP encoding dimensions), it is fully
actualised as an absent object. If it was holding anything back, harbouring
future effects, the instantiations and connections could not happen. JPEG’s
essence and eidos are actual in the present imaging and imagining.
Governmental rationality as a matter of objects is actual now in JPEG’s
relations and running. The only things the objects I worked with held back
was their withdrawn real nature.
My practice-research has shown that Harman’s framework of a quadruple

object that exceeds relations, approaches process as a matter of new objects
and is actually powerful in its presence offers a coherent, powerful and also
creative account of JPEG as well as powerful stimulus to creative practice. It
is to that issue of power that I now turn.
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Interlude: Robert Frank

’The photographing of America’ is a large order - read at all
literally, the phrase would be an absurdity. What I have in
mind, then, is observation and record of what one
naturalized American finds to see in the United States that
signifies the kind of civilization born here and spreading
elsewhere [...] I speak of the things that are there, anywhere
and everywhere - easily found, not easily selected and
interpreted. A small catalog comes to the mind’s eye: a town
at night, a parking lot, a supermarket, a highway, the man
who owns three cars and the man who owns none, the
farmer and his children, a new house and a warped
clapboard house, the dictation of taste, the dream of
grandeur, advertising, neon lights, the faces of the leaders
and the faces of the followers, gas tanks and postoffices and
backyards... Robert Frank’s original Guggenheim application
(Greenough & Alexander, 2009, p. 362).
Robert Frank’s paper road movie The Americans (Frank & Kerouac, 2008)
is a picture of American objects and those objects are, by the necessity of his
project, ontologically flat, democratic - present but distinct and withdrawn.
There are people yes, but also flags, jukeboxes, crosses, cigars, hats and cars
– a Latour litany of human, non human and unhuman objects, vibrant, doing
things in the world, material. The flat ontology, the materiality was
necessary because Frank’s project was a different sort of documentary. He
was after “the Americans”, not just American people or some abstract
“America”, but the Americans (human and unhuman) that as objects made
up that mesh.
These objects were the presences he encountered on his journey and he

made re-present in his book. These real objects had histories, material
conditions of production and consumption. They had pasts but also presents
and presence as the jukebox watched over the crawling baby, as the cars
watched over the kids making out. Most of the photographs Frank chose for
The Americans included people but this was no humanist or correlationist
story. Where Edward Steichen’s The Family of Man (Steichen & Sandburg,
1983) led with people, privileging the human over a material world of
objects with which he struggled or for which she cared, Frank’s people are
152
actants in a complex mesh of objects. The working class lift operator and
waitress or the society aristocrat or movie mogul are objects alongside a
Santa Claus sign or a fur stole. These objects are not semiotic markers of an
underlying class relation any more than the human is an archetype. They are
all objects in the complex assemblage of 1950s America connected and
connecting not at some external representational scale but in real world
materiality of serving drinks, being ignored by commuters or forging social
and business networks. Frank is not external to this. He too is an actant. His
shadow or gaze is woven into these object relations as it falls on windows or
is returned suspiciously. There is no objective recorder or photo-journalistic
position. There is only the position of object.
The Americans is a nested work. The objects in the coffee-bar or on the

street are connected within other objects. The sousaphone-object, the flag-
object and the Adlai-badge-object connect as object within the parade-
object. There is no decisive object, no punctum driving the story or the
meaning. These objects connect again and again with Frank within his
camera-object, with the book-object. These connection are not located in
some external realm of signification or practice but within objects that are
themselves actants reconnecting within other objects.
The image-objects are not somehow different to the objects in the images.
They are not more or less than those objects. They are just different. The
photographs (or the reproductions of the prints of the negatives...) are objects
now positioned in new object-relations with the bookmark on my desk, my
words on the screen, the image search, the print-out of my chapter, the code
of my own images, the protocols enabling those images.
Frank approached the objects in Cafe - Beaufort, South Carolina as actual

presences. The jukebox, baby, chair, light and mat were fully present but
exceeded their relations, qualities and accidents. He could not see nor
photograph the quantum dance at the subatomic level within the jukebox
glass, the baby’s hair or the photons of light. He could not see nor
photograph the rear of the jukebox. There was more to each object than the
particular manifestation before his lens. The objects withdrew but it was in
153
that withdrawal that Frank could work. It was the fact that those objects were
all equal ontologically and photographically that enabled him to take this
photograph and make it work with all the others in The Americans. Most
importantly each object was actual. It was not defined by its relations to any
other, a plasma or a potentiality. The jukebox. The DNA in the baby. The
wooden chair leg were all real, material and vibrant regardless of any other
object. But there were connections. They connected with each other in the
heart of other objects. The real baby object connected with the sensual floor
object (a dimension of the floor object) within another object - the cafe-baby
object that Frank connected with as he pressed the button and exists now as
part of Cafe - Beaufort, South Carolina, the Google search for “Robert Frank”
and this chapter. The objects are not just compositional building blocks, they
are ontological ones too. And Frank’s practice depends on them so he could
create image-objects.
154
JPEG: the governmental object

Facebook and photography
It is possible to see, even from Facebook’s own publicity, the importance
of photos to the business. In 2008, Facebook announced users had uploaded
10 billion photos or 2-3 Terabytes of data-objects every day. The site had
over one petabyte of photo storage and served over 15 billion photo images
per day or 300,000 images per second (Beaver, 2008, n.p.). When it
announced its new Haystack storage and management system in 2010, the
company said:
Sharing photos is one of Facebook’s most popular features.

To date, users have uploaded over 65 billion photos making
Facebook the biggest photo sharing website in the world. For
each uploaded photo, Facebook generates and stores four
images of different sizes, which translates to over 260 billion
images and more than 20 petabytes of data. Users upload
one billion new photos (~60 terabytes) each week and
Facebook serves over one million images per second at
peak. As we expect these numbers to increase in the future,
photo storage poses a significant challenge for Facebook’s
infrastructure (Beaver et al., 2010, n.p.).
In 2011, Pixable, a company building its own photographic social media
business on the back of Facebook, claimed that 6 billion photos were
uploaded each month, with 750 million posted over the New Year’s eve
weekend 2010/11. The company estimated Facebook had 100 billion images
(compared with 5 billion on Flickr and 7 billion on Picasa). The company
extrapolated this data (based on its 100k users) to claim that an average user
had 97,000 images in their network (pixable, 2011, n.p.). Facebook’s latest
development “Timeline” (Lessin, 2011) is quite literally photo-led. The new
design features a large photo across the top of the page.226
While of course Facebook is focused on textual data as raw material for its
Open Graph (and therefore advertising strategy), image-data, particularly in
the massive quantities it is processing, is increasingly important.
226. Daniel Rosenberg and Anthony Grafton trace the history of the timeline as a visual
and discursive device, although the book was written before Facebook’s particular
imag(in)ing of the idea (2012).
155
In the Facebook Open Graph API, photos are an object which developers
can access alongside any other data on Facebook.227 This is particularly true
in terms of how Facebook allows and encourages users to add metadata or
tags to that scopic datastore. Tagging has always been important to
Facebook. Bret Taylor, formerly co-creator of Google Maps and the Google
Maps API, CEO of FriendFeed and now CTO at Facebook said:
Facebook Photos [...] was not a great photo product by any

standard measure. There were no original-sized photos.
There was no printing. It wasn’t developed like a traditional
photo service. It just had this core piece of functionality -
tagging - that made it the biggest photo product on the web
(Cutler, 2010, n.p.)
The centrality of images, imaging and metadata to Facebook is also
apparent from the patents it has filed and the lawsuits in which it is involved.
In 2011 Facebook received a patent for tagging photos and other digital
media.228 The patent, in a list reminiscent of Manovich’s taxonomy lists the
digital media “embodiments”:
[D]igital media may include digital images, digital video,

digital audio, digital audio visual media, computer games,
digital books, digital text, and/or the like (Zuckerberg, Sittig
& Marlette, 2011, col. 1 lines 57-59)
With this patent, as Goncalo Ribeiro puts it: “Static pictures have
essentially been made social” (2011, n.p.). The patent moves from discussing
tags within photos (as metadata) to how that facilitates interaction, social
connections and the broader work of the Open Graph:
227. Facebook began using the term “Open Graph” for its particular understanding, and
arguably exploitation of, the human “social graph” network at its f8 conference in 2010
(CBS News, 2010).
Facebook refers to the data it holds and allows developers to access and build
applications around (and so feed new data back to Facebook) as “objects”. Clearly this
is drawn from the use of the term in computing rather than philosophy. With that said, it
would be possible to consider Facebook’s Open Graph and its Open Graph API from an
object-oriented philosophical perspective where everything is an object connecting with
other objects within objects. Such a broader account is beyond the remit of this project.
228. For a discussion of tagging as a motor of social relations, see Rubinstein (2010).
For discussion of tagging and privacy from the point of view of technical design, see
Besmer & Richter Lipford (2010) and on patterns in collaborative tagging, see Cattuto,
Loreto & Pietronero (2007). For a semiotic discussion of tagging, see Huang & Chuang
(2009).
156
A method comprising: receiving from a device of a first user

information tagging an entity in association with an item of
digital media, wherein the item of digital media is stored in a
database; storing the association between the identified
entity and the item of digital media; responsive to receiving
the information tagging the entity in association with the
item of digital media, sending a notification of the tagging to
a device of a second user; and enabling the second user to
reject the identification, wherein the identified entity is
different from the first user (ibid col. 14 lines 49-61).
A similar connection between imaging and the Open Graph relationships

on which Facebook’s business is built appears in other patents under Mark
Zuckerberg’s name. In one concerning Dynamically providing a news feed
about a user of a social network, the patent says:
The activities may include activities performed by the

subject user e.g., add an affiliation to a group, terminate an
affiliation with a group, add information to the profile,
remove information from the profile, RSVP to an event,
withdraw the RSVP, activate a mobile connection, add a
note to the notes file, add a photo to own photo album,
approve a relationship request, create an event, create a
group, create a photo album, manually add a link, and the
like (Zuckerberg et al., 2010, col. 5 line 62-col. 6 line 2)
Here again, for Facebook, photos are more than images, they are objects
whose object-connections in the form of the broader Open Graph are
dynamic and integral to the business. In a patent for the new Timeline,
photos and “relationships” are clearly connected. Claim 5 states: “the social
timeline further comprises photos of the members connected in
relationship” (Sittig & Zuckerberg, 2010, col.11 line 41-43).
Photographs are talked about as being “utilized” as avatars but also as a

way to “access specific timeframe data about the user relationship with the
users in the photos” (ibid pp. col.8 lines 17-18). The broader mission of the
Timeline, to “measure the roles and influences the users have on one
157
another” (ibid col.9 lines 17-18) is entwined with the user’s photographic
data and metadata on the site.229
Facebook, photography and governmentality

Photography on and through Facebook can be seen as a matter of
governmentality. In a series of lectures in 1978 and 1979, Foucault opened
up the question of “government” (2008; 2009).230 Here power is addressed
as a matter of how government works as an activity or practice. While he is
concerned with the forms of rationality and regimes of truth/power that
offers answers to questions such as “who can govern”, “what governing is”,
“what or who is governed” (Gordon, 1991, p. 3), it would be a mistake to
read “governmentality” as a move away from his conception of biopower as
a modulation of power different to that of discipline, one more focused on
“care of self”. In a lecture in 1982 Foucault says:
[I]f we take the question of power, of political power,

situating it in the more general question of governmentality
understood as a strategic field of power relations in the
broadest and not merely political sense of the term, if we
understand by governmentality a strategic field of power
relations in their mobility, transformability, and reversibility,
then I do not think that reflection on this notion of
229. A final proof that imaging is central to Facebook’s strategy can be seen in the fact
that other companies are seeking to challenge its legal position. In 2011, FotoMedia
issued a writ against Facebook (as well as MySpace, Tagged and Memory Lane)
arguing it held patents that allowed users to “upload, tag, and share digital
media” (FotoMedia, 2011). Journalist Joe Mullin (2011) claims that FotoMedia is a
“patent troll” a company that buys up or acquires patents and then exploits the US’
confusing and arguably lax patent system (Blumberg & Sydell, 2011) by taking
companies to court for infringement. Regardless of the status or legitimacy of FotoMedia
or its claims, what is clear is that photos, photo management, photo tagging and photo
sharing are central to broader IP and business battles and Facebook’s position.
Furthermore software, standards in the form of patents and protocols are at the heart of
that. Similar proof comes in the shape of Facebook’s pre-IPO purchase of Instagram.
230. It is beyond the scope of this work to address the debates around Foucault’s work
on government and indeed the subtle shifts in his conception of power. For the former
see Keenan (1982); Burchell, Gordon & Miller (1991); Barry, Osborne & Rose (1996);
Rose (1999); Lemke (2001; 2011); Bratich, Packer & McCarthy (2003); Jessop (2006);
Gane (2008) and Dean (2009) and on the latter Nealon (2008). In terms of spatial
rationality, see Rose-Redwood( 2006); Crampton & Elden (2007) and Huxley (2006:
2007). For a critique of the concept as “top down” and marginalising struggle, see Kerr
(1999). Government is also a theme picked up by Guins (2009) as discussed above. For
a Foucauldian archaeology of photography, see Bate (2007). In terms of governmentality
and film, see Grieveson (2009). For an early use of Foucault to discuss the Internet in
terms of legal discourse, see Boyle (1997).
158
governmentality can avoid passing through, theoretically

and practically, the element of a subject defined by the
relationship of self to self (2005, p. 252).
A study of, or focus on governmental rationality is not simply a study of
how government is organised, in our case how the state or Facebook
governs or exercises power over us, but how that rationality, that focus on
the “conduct of conduct” becomes part of our understanding of the state and
Facebook but also ourselves - the relationship of self to self. It is here where
the more interesting questions about Facebook and scopic power can be
found and developed as a starting point for an account of JPEG’s position
within those relations.
There is an increasing amount of work on the relations between social

media space and practices such as Facebook and wider fields of identity,
biopower and ultimately governmentality.231 Lisa Nakamura has discussed
what she calls “digital racial formation” (2008; Nakamura & Chow-White,
2011); E.J. Westlake draws on Foucault to address Facebook’s News Feed in
terms of “performative surveillance” whereby Facebook users “perform
themselves and offer themselves up for surveillance” (2008, p. 38), an issue,
if not a conceptual framework, echoed by Anita L. Allen (2008) and Mark
Andrejevic (2009). There has also been work that, while addressing
Facebook practices via psychology, also addresses the notion of self and
“conduct of conduct” that is at the heart of governmental rationality. Daniel
Miller explores Facebook as a cultural practice (2011), Anabel Quan-Haase
and Alyson L. Young have taken a uses and gratifications model to address
how young people have used Facebook to organise themselves not just in a
literal but also in a subjective or governmental sense (2010). The “social
information” that they find as a key part of Facebook use is governmental. It
is about organising one’s social position and network subjectivity as well as
social events. Jane Lewis and Anne West’s study of Facebook users raises
similar issues of how, what they see as young people’s “weak, low-
231. For an early use of Foucault to explore what became known as “social media”, in
this case Usenet, see Aycock (1995). For more general explorations of governmentality
software and identity, see Elmer (2002; 2004; 2008) and Cheney-Lippold (2011). For a
discussion of databases, identity and power, see Aas (2004).
159
commitment ties” relate to wider social relations and ultimately notion of

self and “conduct of conduct” (2009). The authors talk of “managing
‘friending’” with their respondents required “to manage the blurred
boundaries between different sorts of friends, and between themselves and
the unknown, wider audience in their networks” (ibid p. 13). Here again
(governmental) management or organisation of the self is at heart of
Facebook.232 Studies that have focused on “narcissism” and self presentation
within social networks such as that by Laura E. Buffardi and W. Keith
Campbell (2008), Bernie Hogan (2010) or Andrew L Mendelson & Zizi
Papacharissi (2010) can be seen as pointing inwards to a self-presentation
but also outwards to a social-presentation and “social capital” (Ellison,
Steinfield & Lampe, 2007) as can Rob Cover’s account of social networking
sites as performative acts (2012). As Mendelson & Papacharissi say:
“Facebook pictures are where college students visually play out their lives
for each other, demonstrating their identity as college student” (ibid p. 32).
My concern here is not to rehearse those arguments or even start from their
position, but merely to note that the sense of Facebook as power-full and
governmental in a wider sense than questions around privacy or
surveillance, is widely considered.
Before I look at how JPEG is connected to these issues and how an object-
oriented account of JPEG can help us address them, it is important to draw
out more particularly, even technically the software instantiations of
governmentality within Facebook. In order to do this I return to two
Facebook patents and a technical paper from the company on photo storage
and search.
Facebook and software governmentality

Facebook’s software does not act as a simple channel for governmental
power. Following an object-oriented approach, the company’s patented
software systems can be seen as objects within which other objects
(including JPEG) connect. These objects are governmental. As they connect
232. Eli Pariser’ discussion of what he calls the “Filter Bubble” (2011) and Jonathan
Zittrain and John Palfry’s work on internet filtering (2007) point to the material and
technical underpinnings of these social and cultural practices of management of
information and the self.
160
and enable to connect human and unhuman actants, structures, institutions,

ideologies and subjectivities (the Latourian litany of objects), they set in
motion power relations. Contra Latour, these do not define or exhaust the
objects. They do not determine the objects’ position through a field of
relationality. But they are inevitably power-full.
Clearly as a legal document conferring rights and delimiting IP space

within a competitive market, a patent is governmental. It is a part of a system
of organising knowledge, information, even truth. But the technologies that
it discusses - as well as the way it discusses them - are also issues of
governing, of “conduct of conduct”. Facebook’s patent on Managing
information about relationships in a social network via a social timeline
(Sittig & Zuckerberg, 2010) and Tagging digital media (Zuckerberg, Sittig &
Marlette, 2011) further suggest that the patent object can be seen as an
object within which governmental objects (hardware, software, processes,
practices, business strategies, human and unhuman objects) connect. The
hardware/software mesh that these patents lay claim to - and that forms the
basis for Facebook social practices and business - appears as governmental
insofar as it is designed to trace and generate relationship objects through
connecting and ordering objects. Furthermore those processes appear as
dynamic, machinic, material and scopic. That mesh can be characterised,
following Charles Babbage, as a “relationship engine”. The patents point
towards Facebook’s development of (and proprietorial claim to) a system that
enables and multiplies “social” relationships via a computational mesh.
These relationships are positioned as themselves objects in a system that
connects and orders them ultimately for data mining and advertising
purposes. In the abstract to the Timeline patent, Facebook’s engineers and
lawyers agree on what they are building and laying claim to:
A system, method, and computer program for generating a

social timeline is provided. A plurality of data items
associated with at least one relationship between users
associated with a social network is received, each data item
having an associated time. The data items are ordered
according to the at least one relationship. A social timeline
161
is generated according to the ordered data items (Sittig &

Zuckerberg, 2010, col. 1 lines 42-48).
What is important about this phrasing is that “data items [are] associated
with at least one relationship between users”. This is the core of Facebook’s
business: forming a bridge between data and relationships, turning
relationships into data (objects). The social timeline is “generated” from the
data, and itself becomes a data object within the “relationship storage
module” (ibid col. 3 lines 54-56). Furthermore, “a different social timeline
can be generated for different communities associated with the user” (ibid
col. 4 lines 4-6). Here relationships are dynamically created by user or by
machinic action.
Any type of data can be utilized to generate the social

timeline and to be displayed via the social timeline page.
Further, some of the time identifiers may not have any names
or events listed.
“The photos may be selected automatically, based on
profiles associated with the users or any other data. The
photos may be automatically updated when a user uploads
or otherwise provides updated photos that the social
network engine determines to be relevant to the social
timeline (ibid col. 8 lines 21-30).
The human and machine actant-objects within the mesh generate

relationships and connections and order data objects (including images) and
those relationships. This ordering and connecting is governmental. It is
governing and managing self, others and the self-others network as well as
enabling self-government. The relationships managed, generated and
governed by Facebook’s “relationship engine” are dynamic and productive.
They suggest new timeline connections and thus relationships. They position
images/subject positions by software action but also by encouraging and
enabling us to do the discipline/governing ourselves - for ourselves or others.
Similar governmental practices of ordering and connecting (by machine,

by self or by self and machine; by human or unhuman objects) are apparent
in Facebook’s tagging patent (Zuckerberg, Sittig & Marlette, 2011). The
patent, which uses the digital image as its core example, argues that the
patented technology is necessary because of a desire for and to order.
162
Some social networking websites offer mechanisms that may

allow the user to select particular photos or albums for
immediate viewing. Typically, however, these photos are
disparate and disorganized. In other words, the user must
spend time visually searching through albums, photo by
photo, for individuals or objects that are not presented in a
coherent or consolidated manner. Often, many of the photos
do not depict persons or objects of interest to the user. Just
as often, the user remains unaware of the existence of some
photos that were overlooked. What is needed is a method to
organize digital media and automatically generate
notifications to persons or entities interested in the digital
media (ibid col. 1 lines 39-50).
This tagging, not just of the image as a whole but of sections of it,
facilitates a form of ordering that the Foucault of The Order of Things (1989)
would recognise.233 That tagging can again be human or machinic or a
hybrid (where software offers “choices” to a human actant). While it
facilitates an ordering of self, it also enables a governmental ordering of self
and others. Tags connect users.
Clicking any of the previously used tags may associate the

tag with the selected region. Clicking any of the entries in
the friends list may associate the friend’s email address with
the selected region (Zuckerberg, Sittig & Marlette, 2011, col.
8 line 66-col. 9 line 3).
The taxonomy (or folksonomy) 234 of tags are part of the relationship
engine’s work of generating the Open Graph. Tagging an image or part of an
image can send a notification to another user of Facebook or someone
outside, connecting or reconnecting what Google+ has called “circles” and
what here are referred to as segmented communities (ibid col. 3 line 41).
Images and tags become data elements or objects. What is more the
connections themselves become data objects where “[t]he association
between the digital image and the email address may be stored in the media
233. See also Geoffrey Bowker and Susan Leigh Star’s discussion of categories and
standards (2000).
234. Folksonomy refers to a “bottom-up”, user or crowd-generated collection of tags or

metadata. The term is usually credited to Thomas Vander Wal in 2004 (Vander Wal,
2007). For a discussion of the potential compatibility of folksonomies and formal
ontologies, see Halpin, Robu & Shepherd (2007).
163
database” (ibid col. 5 lines 11-12). The governmentality here is more than
simply labeling and positioning (or self-labeling and self-positioning) of
population as data or information. It is the creation of a self-sustaining
human-unhuman machine of governmentality. The relationship engine
continually generates, or helps us generate, new orders, new connections,
new relationships which are fed back into the engine as new data objects
open to yet more orderings, connections and relationships. Ultimately of
course this Open Graph becomes the engine for advertising and data-mining
as well as surveillance.235
Images and imaging are a key part of that engine, as evidenced in both
the timeline and tagging patents. They act as vehicles for ordering and
connecting and relationships - self and self to self-management.
Facebook and machinic governmentality

What is important to note and is often missing from critical accounts of
Facebook and power, is that this governmentality operates through a
material, machinic (and I will argue) object-oriented apparatus. Here
discipline, biopower and governmental rationality are enfolded in real
material objects and technologies. The patents are necessary because the
governmental engine being built is enfolded within the machinic. The
timeline is generated by and through a “relationship storage module” (Sittig
& Zuckerberg, 2010, col. 3 line 44); “social timeline module” (ibid col. 3
line 57) and a “display module” (ibid col. 4 line 9). These are not just
modules in the sense of boxes on a patent flow chart but real material
235. Even leaving aside any potential state uses of the Social Graph, Facebook is happy
to talk of “monitoring” as a core component of its technologies: “The monitoring module
tracks one or more user’s activities on the social network environment. For example, the
monitoring module can track the user’s interaction with one or more items of digital
media, such as digital images, news stories, other users’ profiles, email to other users,
chat rooms provided via the social network provider, and so forth. Any type of user
activity can be tracked or monitored via the monitoring module. The information, digital
media (e.g., digital images), people, groups, stories, and so forth, with which the user
interacts, may be represented by one or more objects, according to various
embodiments. The monitoring module may determine an affinity of the user for subjects,
other user’s digital images, relationships, events, organizations, and the like, according
to users’ activities” (Zuckerberg, Sittig & Marlette, 2011, col. 4 lines 44-58). For
discussions of monitoring and databases, see Andrejevic (2009) and Parry (2011). For a
discussion of the US government’s “Project Carnivore” surveillance programme (a
project critiqued by Galloway and his Radical Software Group, http://r-s-g.org/carnivore)
in terms of concepts of governmentality, see Ventura, Miller & Deflem (2005).
164
technologies, objects in a (computer as well as ontological) object-oriented

sense. They are hardware and software meshes, built and housed in real
locations, generating CO2, protected by human and unhuman security. The
“social network engine” (ibid col. 3 line 5) is not a metaphor. It is a real,
material and machinic object.
Facebook’s IP lawyers make it clear:
The social network provider includes a profile database, a

communications interface, a monitoring module, a media
database, a display engine/GUI, an activity database, and an
advertising module. Although the social network provider is
described as being comprised of various components (the
profile database, the communications interface, the
monitoring module, the display engine/GUI, the media
database, the activity database, and the advertising module),
fewer or more components may comprise the social network
provider and still fall within the scope of various
embodiments (Zuckerberg, Sittig & Marlette, 2011, col.3 line
67-col.4 line 11).
These modules, engines, databases and evocatively titled “embodiments”

are certainly business objects within Facebook’s strategy, legal objects within
its IP portfolio and ideological objects within its brand, but they are also real
and material. What is more they are nested. Fig 3A in the patent shows the
“media engine” as consisting of an “album component”, a “digital media
component”, a “digital image edit component” and a “tag component”. In
turn Fig 4 unpacks the black box of the “tag component” to show a “region
selection component”, an “auto list component”, an “email component” and
a “tag display component”. The governmental engine is revealed as a
Latourian black box,236 as an object-oriented nested object - but a concrete,
real one.
This is even more apparent when we consider Facebook’s solution to the

real problems of storage, search and access that its self-perpetuating
relationship engine generates.
236. Harman says: “While the term ‘black box’ is not of Latour’s own invention, he
deserves much of the credit for importing it into philosophy. A black box is any actant so
firmly established that we are able to take its interior for granted” (2009c, p. 33).
165
Facebook and scopic governmentality

Faced with the overwhelming quantity of image objects being added to,
and generated by the site (Facebook software creates multiple versions of the
images uploaded as well as storing copies in distinct locations (Beaver et al.,
2010)) as well as the data, metadata and arguably meta-metadata the
relationship engine generated, the engineers at Facebook decided to
redesign the image storage system, creating a system they called “Haystack”.
A key element in the commercial and governmental success of Facebook

as a practice is that the ordering and connecting, the generating of new
relationships happens as seamlessly, transparently and quickly as possible by
“dramatically reducing the memory used for filesystem metadata, thereby
making it practical to keep all this metadata in main memory” (ibid p. 4).237
The secret to effective photo storage and retrieval and so running of the
“relationship engine” is metadata - creating, finding and serving scopic data
points to enable new relationships.238 Leaving aside issues surrounding the
company’s controversial exploration of face-recognition,239 what Facebook’s
Timeline, tagging and other relationship services and practice do is deal with
metadata. Users connect “images-taken-on-my-birthday”, “images-tagged-
with-Charlie’s name”, “images-in-my-eBook-album”. This metadata can be
organised, connected and governed, by me or by software. The key problem
for Facebook and the most important aspect of Haystack, is managing or
governing that metadata as a way not only of finding and serving images but
also enabling relationships. The engineers identified that the existing system
was slowing down because of the amount of (governmental) metadata
237. The engineers report that “in Haystack, each usable terabyte costs ~28% less and
processes ~4x more reads per second than an equivalent terabyte on a NAS
appliance” (Beaver et al., 2010, n.p.). Here financial and user experience cost are seen
as equivalent. It is interesting to note the governmental discourse of waste and efficiency
that runs through Beaver et al.’s paper.
238. This separation of data and metadata can be approached from an object-oriented
point of view with engineers as well as philosophers and media critics working with
distinct, actual objects and their connections. Needless to say, however, that is beyond
the scope of this project.
239. For discussion, see Pidd (2011). For a broader discussion of the legal implications
of facial recognition technology, see McClurg (2007) and for a more technical discussion
of the possibilities of finding images of people in crowd scene photographs through
visual and contextual cues including time-stamps, see Garg et al. (2011).
166
associated with each image-object and the financial, storage and speed of
access costs involved in having to access all that metadata each time an
image was searched for or rendered. Their solution was to “keep[..] all
metadata in main memory, which we make practical by dramatically
reducing the per photo metadata necessary to find a photo on disk” (ibid p.
1). By making image objects in the system easier to find, resources could be
saved for the social metadata that enables the relationship engine to function
and new governmental relationships to be set in motion.
On a user’s domestic photo management system such as iPhoto, Aperture,

Lightroom or Google’s Picassa, each photo-object is stored as a separate file
- visually apparent in the PC’s directory structure or Finder. This results in a
lot of metadata. Each image has its own location as well as any other
metadata (time of creation, time of modification, owner etc). With a small-
scale archive on a PC, this is not a huge problem. On a social archive, it is.
Facebook needs to keep that metadata in memory to allow quick and easy
access and connection. Haystack’s solution was to store multiple photos in a
single file and therefore maintains very large files. The system then works
with “needles” and “index records”. “Each needle represents a photo stored
in Haystack” (ibid p. 6) complete with the metadata supplied at upload.240
Searches however are not on the metadata in the JPEG-encoded files or even
the needles but on an index record.
There is a corresponding index record for each needle in the

haystack store file [...] The index file provides the minimal
metadata required to locate a particular needle in the
haystack store file [...] The main purpose of the index is to
allow quick loading of the needle metadata into memory
without traversing the larger Haystack store file, since the
index is usually less than 1% the size of the store file [...]
Storing photos as needles in the haystack eliminates the
metadata overhead by aggregating hundreds of thousands of
images in a single haystack store file. This keeps the
metadata overhead very small and allows us to store each
240. The authors continually elide between “photo” and “file” or “data”. Such language is
clearly interesting in terms of the ontology of image/data objects and issues of
discourses of representation. I use Facebook’s language here while recognising it as
problematic.
167
needle’s location in the store file in an in-memory index.

This allows retrieval of an image’s data in a minimal number
of I/O operations, eliminating all unnecessary metadata
overhead (Vajgel, 2009, n.p.).241
It is “minimal”. Space and computing power is used to connect those
objects, set up governmental relations. In simple terms, each discrete photo
is mapped to a needle which is in turn mapped to an index record. Each
mapping makes the data smaller, more manageable and more
connectable.242
It is important to emphasise that this “system” is materially located - a

series of actual, material, connected objects. The Haystack architecture
consists of the Haystack Store, the Haystack Cache, external CDNs (content
delivery networks, often hosted by an external company) and the Haystack
Directory. The Store, the persistent storage where “photos” are stored,
consists of arrays of 10 terabyte web servers (materially present and real),
which the system divides into 100 physical volumes each of 100 gigabytes.
These physical volumes are grouped into “logical volumes” across different
machines. This allows for protection against data loss dues to hardware or
software failure. A photo object uploaded to Facebook is resized into four
different sized image-objects (via the JPEG protocol) and stored on a logical
volume and written to all corresponding physical volumes. Haystack retains
external CDNs but adds a Cache, an internal CDN “which shelters the Store
from requests for the most popular photos and provides insulation if up-
241. Vajgel, one of the Haystack engineers, also says: “The main requirement for the
new tier was to eliminate any unnecessary metadata overhead for photo read
operations, so that each read I/O operation was only reading actual photo data (instead
of filesystem metadata)” (2009, n.p.). Of course the system is not reading the JPEG-
encoded “photo data” so much as data about that “photo”. The metadata being left out
is about the filesystem.
242. There is an interesting object-oriented parallel with the way JPEG compresses
space and data through DCT and Huffman coding.
168
stream CDN nodes fail and need to refetch content” (ibid p. 4).243 The Cache
includes copies of the most frequently requested files. The Directory (note
again that this is materially located within a software/hardware mesh, it
exists somewhere in Facebook’s server farms) does not store “images” but
rather keeps track of the logical to physical mapping, any free space
available on the volumes and the metadata necessary for the browser to
construct the URL for an image.
This architecture establishes particular scopic and necessarily

governmental practices when a user uploads an image to become an object
within, and generator of, governmental relations. Beaver et al. acknowledge
this human object dimension when they turn from an account of their
computer architecture to the user experience of that material mesh (ibid p.
4). They explain how a user uploads an image to Facebook and the Social
Graph as well as how a “friend” accesses it and so sets a “relationship” in
motion.
When I uploaded the “pages” of my eBook to my Facebook album, I sent

the data to a web server where it was re-encoded through JPEG in different
sizes. The server contacted the Directory for a write-enabled logical volume
to store the files upon. It then assigned a unique id to the file and uploaded
it to each of the physical volumes assigned to the logical volume. Here a
“photo” becomes a data as well as metadata object for Facebook and for the
user’s “profile”. It it ready to connect with that profile, the Timeline and
whatever tags become associated with it. It is integrated into and set to
generate relationships, organisations, connections and data trails. When my
examiner seeks to read my eBook,244 his browser sends a request to the
243. JPEG-encoded files (or, as Beaver et al. refer to them, “photos”) are cached after
retrieval from the Store or CDN only if the request comes directly from a user and the
photo is fetched from a write-enabled i.e. more current Store machine (As Directory and
Store “machines” become full, they become read-only). The authors report that “photos
are most heavily accessed soon after they are uploaded and filesystems for our
workload generally perform better when doing either reads or writes but not both. Thus
the write-enabled Store machines would see the most reads if it were not for the Cache.
Given this characteristic, an optimization we plan to implement is to proactively push
recently up-loaded photos into the Cache as we expect those photos to be read soon
and often” (2010, p. 5).
244. And of course download a copy to his or her browser cache,
169
Facebook server (for a page including an image). That server, contacts the
Directory which creates a URL for the JPEG-encoded image file held in the
Store and/or the Cache and/or the CDN. 245 The URL that is used to locate
the file destined to be Liked on the user’s page takes the form:
http://(CDN)/(Cache)/(Machine id)/(Logical volume,

Photo)
It is designed to enable Haystack to “find” and render the file (via the
JPEG decoder built into the browser).
The first part of the URL specifies from which CDN to

request the photo. The CDN can lookup the photo internally
using only the last part of the URL: the logical volume and
the photo id. If the CDN cannot locate the photo then it
strips the CDN address from the URL and contacts the
Cache. The Cache does a similar lookup to find the photo
and, on a miss, strips the Cache address from the URL and
requests the photo from the specified Store machine. Photo
requests that go directly to the Cache have a similar
workflow except that the URL is missing the CDN specific
information (ibid p. 4).
The URL can be seen as governmental. It is an object created by Haystack
(a material hardware/software mesh) that does things in the world. It orders
data for the users and the system. It facilitates scopic and governmental
encounters and relationships. As an address that can be used elsewhere on
the Web or posted, mailed, tweeted etc. it generates new (governmental)
data, data trails and data relationships.
In terms of issues of governmental rationality, the Haystack system

underpins the “relationship engine” in terms of ensuring that images and
image data seamlessly and efficiently allows the organisation, management
and government of self and social relations. Without Haystack’s technical
infrastructure, its concrete material instantiation in server architecture,
standards of encoding and metadata, hard drives and light-as-data image
245. The aim of Haystack is to make sure that images are held, and available for
connection, in whichever space is most beneficial to the user and the relationship
engine.
170
file-objects written in/on it,246 profiles, timelines, “friendships” and the

panoply of Facebook’s Open Graph would not be possible. Haystack
provides the techno-scopic underpinning for the relationship engine, the
Open Graph and its governmental rationality.
Reading the relationship engine in terms of objects

An object-oriented account of this governmental relationship engine
allows a technically located, materialist conception of how that engine is
built and operates but also allows those material objects to be seen in
relation to other human, unhuman, abstract, even virtual objects.
As has been noted the engineers think in object terms. The lawyers’
discourse too is object-oriented. The “modules”, “machines”, “databases”,
“fields”, “needles”, “files”, “data” and “metadata” as well as the tagging,
ordering and connecting associations detailed by both are objects on the
pages but also on material servers. Where Harman’s framework adds value is
firstly in opening up the scope of the objects that make up the engine and
secondly in explaining how they connect as a matter of objects not some
wider field. In short it enable us to see Facebook’s governmentality as a
matter of objects not as the outcome or result of an external governmental
rationality.
From Harman’s perspective what we see in Haystack, the Timeline and the
Open Graph is objects connecting within objects. The objects discussed
above and familiar to the engineers and lawyers are joined by the Facebook
user-object, the photographer-object, the Facebook brand-object, the
“friend”-object, the “Like” object (Gerlitz & Helmond, 2011) - a whole
collection of objects within and without Facebook. All have a real
dimension that withdraws. We can never access the totality of the
“relationship storage module”, the “needle” or the “identifier”. We
encounter its sensual dimension as we (human user, software algorithm,
image data etc.) expand energy on it. But those objects have real dimensions
outside of our relation to them. The Haystack has a reality “beneath” the
246. My language here is deliberately tentative and perhaps confusing because

following Matthew Kirschenbaum (2008), I seek to draw attention to the very real,
material and yet subtle physical operation of read/write media.
171
shifting accidents as we walk around it or encounter its particular

instantiations. But those wider objects in play have that dual character too.
The Facebook brand, the Open Graph are not just ideologies floating in the
abstract. We encounter their sensual dimension as they are realised in the
world but they have a reality, an eidos that I can intellectually approach (see
above) and an essence (fundamental characteristics that make them what
they are). They also connect as objects within other objects: the state’s
surveillance, an IPO or a company’s marketing programme. When we come
on to look at how objects connect, we realise that engineers actually have a
lead on philosophers. For the developers of Haystack or the creators of
Timeline, objects connect within objects. The “network” is nothing more
than nested objects: components connect within engines, metadata objects
connect within indexes within servers within... For them this is a matter of
engineering reality. Harman would see the same thing. Objects connect
within objects. There is nothing outside objects. User-objects and
governmental “self”-objects connect within profile-objects, connect within
timeline-objects, connect within Open Graph-objects, connect within...
What Harman would add is that those object never fully connect. Real
can never connect with real, sensual with sensual. Objects connect through
mediating objects. There are “real” Facebook users and there are real
Facebook “users”. From an object-oriented point of view, both the flesh and
blood human and the social media “user” have a reality. As objects they
have a real dimension that withdraws and can never be grasped in its
totality. The relationship engine (and Facebook’s business depends on
connecting them. One has real money to spend, one a data position to be
sold and managed). These real objects connect within an object. They are
mediated by a sensual object, one that can be accessed. In this case they
connect (or are connected) within the Open Graph and Timeline (sensual)
objects. These objects, while also having real dimensions that cannot be
fully accessed also have a sensual dimension that is available for access as
long as energy is expended on it - literally in terms of the user being logged
in and also ontologically in terms of objects relating to it.
172
Similarly that real Timeline, the unfathomable software/hardware object

that has more to it than we can access (governmental powers, real qualities
that define its essence etc.) mediates the connection between the sensual
dimensions of Facebook objects. The particular profile (another ontological-
computational language parallel) of me as a user, that instantiation as “Close
Friend”, “Family Member” or whatever I or Facebook’s database define it,247
connects with another user’s sensual profile or the particular instantiation of
a marketing company’s demographic target, is mediated through that real
Open Graph. It is not just human objects that Facebook connects.
Facebook as relationship engine, as an issue of governmental rationality,

surveillance, sousveillance (Dodge & Kitchin, 2007; Bakir, 2010; Ganascia,
2010), power, psycho-cultural practice or any other framework by which it is
explored, is a matter of objects not of some meta-field of becoming,
processuality or determinacy.
The question then become how does the JPEG object fit into this mesh.
My aim is not to argue that JPEG is the only protocological object in play
within Facebook, its business and IP struggles or their governmental or
disciplinary effects. Facebook connects with other standards objects. Users
can upload GIF, PNG and TIF-formatted files. But JPEG does have a
privileged position. In order to explore that, I turned to my practice.
Facebook, photography and protocol

When I uploaded any of my images (whether originally JPEG-encoded or
not) to Facebook, they were re-encoded through JPEG as four-different size
image files within Haystack. JPEG as an object connected with the uploaded
data if it was in a format Facebook’s upload software could read. JPEG was
not the only protocol object in play. PNG, the format of my screengrabs,
could connect with Facebook’s software (including JPEG) but WebP and
RAW could not. When I “published” one of my eBooks on/in Facebook, the
encoded image files of the pages (including the photos) were added to my
247. Facebook “encourages” users to tag their Friends according to a taxonomy of

relations. These may parallel how I define myself or not. From an OOP perspective both
are sensual profiles, particular subjective instantiations. The interesting thing of course is
that Facebook’s taxonomy also has a real dimension as data points are created and
used on the Social Graph.
173
Facebook profile, my Timeline.248 As discussed above, I tried to upload RAW

and WebP-encoded versions of the pages, and failed.249 In the dialog box
that opened, I could see the files on my computer. JPEG-encoded and PNG-
encoded files were visible. Their names were black. I could select them, add
them to the waiting list and upload them to my account/Timeline/profile, tag
them and make them part of the government of (my)self on the Open Graph.
The RAW-encoded and WebP-encoded objects however are “greyed out” - a
symbolic lesser status. They fade into the background. Inaccessible.
Unvisible. They are locked out, unavailable for networking, tagging,
recognising, data-mining, integrating into and exploiting (or being exploited
by) the power of the Open Graph. My imaging was about encoding and then
sharing and connecting light-as-data through standards. When I built that
apparatus with JPEG, it worked fine. Light became social data. When I
didn’t... it didn’t. Light became unsocial data.250
It is not that Facebook’s upload software-object fails to connect with RAW.

Rather it connects in terms of failure, rendering a greyed-out name that
creates a new object: a “cannot upload object”, a “blank photo album
object”. RAW and Facebook’s algorithms are part of the same object-mesh.
They connect in the heart of a new object, a non-searchable, non-taggable,
non-networkable, “failed upload”-object which is still real and powerful - it
is part of this PhD for instance. This is not semantics. It is important within
OOP that we do not narrow down the range of objects in play or their
connections. Just because the RAW-Facebook connection is not the same
“successful” connection as the JPEG-Facebook one does not make it any less
real or important. If one were to build a Facebook marketing strategy around
images of products encoded by the RAW protocol, that “failed-upload”-
object would be very important. Similarly if one were looking to image
248. I use the term “my” advisedly.
249. For a discussion of “failed” image searches, see Pu (2008).
250. I use the term “unsocial” in the same way I use the term “unvisible” (see n. 183) to
draw attention to the sense in which the data is somehow “outside” a particular social
mesh. It could be “social” within a different mesh.
174
outside the social web, data-mining and Facebook’s hegemony, “failure”

would be an important mark of a successful mesh.
JPEG is enfolded in Facebook’s Open Graph, Timeline and its

governmental work. Its sensual dimension connects with the sensual
(accessible) dimension of other software (the upload algorithm) and
hardware (the Haystack, Timeline and tagging modules and servers) within a
real, withdrawn, governmental Open Graph object. Its real dimension
connects with the withdrawn dimensions of Facebook as a business object,
the inaccessible dimensions of the “user”, within a particular sensual
instantiation of the Timeline. Similarly RAW is enfolded with the same
objects in terms of its technical failure to connect. The sensual dimension to
RAW connects with the the sensual (accessible) dimension of the upload
algorithm, within the real Open Graph. If it did not, it could not have
returned a failure warning. Similarly its real dimension connects with the
real Facebook business object again as a “failure warning”, an exclusion
from the social imag(in)ing system Facebook has set up, that it can manage
and can exploit. Its exclusion is just a different form of connection. The
important thing is that RAW does connect ontologically if not technically.
The fact it is rejected is as relevant as the fact JPEG is accepted. Both
connections are enfolded in the mesh that is Facebook’s social imag(in)ing
systems and its government of the self.251
Conclusion
JPEG, not just JPEG-encoded files, is enfolded with Facebook, its
technologies, material infrastructures, IP, datamining, advertising and
business practices. As such, as it connects with the panoply of objects in
play in the relationship engine’s Open Graph, it has governmental
implications. So much is clear from from an analytical and a practice-
research point of view. To see that with OOP eyes is not to position JPEG as
251. One could of course discuss the connection between JPEG and/or RAW-encoded
image files and Facebook’s software but the JPEG and RAW standards also connect or
“fail” to connect within the (social) digital imaging pipeline and so the imag(in)ing mesh.
An example is those photo library applications that enable direct uploads to Facebook.
Here JPEG’s presence as an encoder within the software connects with Facebook’s
upload software.
175
a determinant, to overmine or undermine its position with relation to

governmental rationality. Rather it is to ascribe it a position alongside that
panoply of human, unhuman, structural, infrastructural and superstructural
(to use the old-fashioned terms) objects, all of which connect and re-connect
within objects through the tensions of their sensual and real poles.
To say that “JPEG is governmental” is a power-full statement and, I would

hold, accurate. But it is only as accurate as to say that “the Timeline is
governmental”, “the inode is governmental” or “the Facebook Like is
governmental”. What OOP offers us is a perspective that refuses to leave any
object outside of power.
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Conclusion: by way of an Exploit

This project began with Barthes staring at a photograph, unable to clearly
position it as text or practice, unable or at least unwilling to account for its
power through his existing conceptual apparatus. Camera Lucida famously
continues as a meditation refracted through another (unseen) image-object,
a photo of the author’s dead mother. My project began with a similar gaze.
Looking at JPEG I too was as at a loss for a vocabulary appropriate to
something that, while clearly powerful, remained elusive. Again like Barthes
I have sought to meditate on JPEG, in my case refracted through practice.
This is a practice-research project. Practice is not an illustration of my
thought, nor theory and analysis of my practice. Rather I have sought to
bring my object-oriented photography and object-oriented philosophy
together in object-oriented practice-research. By doing so I have looked to
explore the character and workings of JPEG within my own practice but
more widely within social digital imaging and archiving. The OOPh eBooks,
the commentaries on photographers scattered throughout this thesis, the
JPEG-encoded images and RAW-encoded “non-images’, the mash-ups as
well as the written chapters are all objects connecting within the heart of
that practice-research object.
In a paper I published early in this research, before I fully developed an

object-oriented account of JPEG, I argued:
In his great unfinished Arcades Project (2002) [Walter]

Benjamin collected fragments of material about the
nineteenth-century Paris Arcades. He brought together
(mashed up one might say) traditional historical information
with what he called the ‘rags ‘n refuse’ of the everyday. He
built an analog database of file cards with quotations,
aphorisms and historical details perhaps with the aim of
producing a traditional linear book but also, as with his
earlier One Way Street (1997), of writing history in a new
way.
The Arcades Project can be seen as a form of data mash-up,
an exploit opening up the process of writing history. In
Benjamin’s hands the ‘rags ‘n refuse’ - the advert, the
window display, the fashions - are ‘black boxes’ that unfold
177
to tell the story of a particular moment in the history of

capitalism. The fragment is his protocol. It gives his work its
particular form in the same way that JPEG generates the form
of Flickr-space.
One could argue that Benjamin’s collection offers a
fragmentary view of history where structural processes of
capitalist development are hidden by a kaleidoscope of signs
which are made the centre of attention by his method.
Likewise, mash-ups of 2012 imaginings could be seen as
distracting critical attention from the workings of
globalisation. I would argue that the two mash-ups tell the
story (as Latour might express it) of the Paris Arcades or 2012
in a way that avoids determinism and pays attention to the
specificities of the actor-networks at work in those complex
historical moments and processes. Furthermore, in terms of
critical intervention, Benjamin would argue, colliding
fragments in his database of file cards or a mash-up app,
creates a Brechtian-style montage that shocks the viewer and
sends meanings and significations spinning.
The protocols (the ‘fragment’ or JPEG/XML) hold within their
black boxes the potential to ‘hide’ history but also to open it
up, as an exploit. The same protocols that can underpin
ideologies of consumerism and capitalist development,
legacy and participation can set in motion mash-up/
dialectical image montages that destabilise that hegemony
(Caplan, 2010, p. 35).252
This project moved beyond the creation of imaging mash-ups (what
became one of my apparatuses) to take that idea of fragment/object-oriented
philosophy and practice across the project as a whole. I would assert, as I
did in 2010 that this offers critical potential in terms of developing an
account of JPEG but also launching an exploit within photographic practice
and within the PhD thesis object. Approaching JPEG as an object has
allowed me to not only understand its withdrawn and yet deeply networked
character as well as its presence within governmental spaces and objects
such as Facebook’s Open Graph, it has also enabled me to develop a
252. It should be noted that this paper, with its more Bryant-like embracing of protocol
“hold[ing] within their black boxes” a potential for exploit, was written before I explored
the critique of potentiality outlined above. As my practice moved on, so did my thinking.
I would now argue that the position of exploit is not dependent on hidden potential but
rather can be accounted for in terms of actuality and object connections.
178
particular form of object-oriented imaging. I would assert that OOPh can be

seen as acting as an Exploit within digital imaging.
My OOPh practice problematises the traditional ontological hierarchies

and discourses of representation and relationality that dominate
photographic practice - even in new digital art practices where the network
field of relationality and becoming, the imaging process and the potential
image are key themes. My practice widens the cast of actants to include
myself as breathing, shaking object; Facebook and its patented Timeline;
light photons with no respect for security fences and of course JPEG. All are
in play. All are equally real, present and fourfold. OOPh is unwilling to
privilege the technology, the artist, the medium or the Subject. Such a flat
ontology takes the logic of “the democratic art” (whether in terms of the
rhetoric of William Eggleston or the hype around social imaging and “citizen
media”) and turns it back on itself. The OOPh Exploit, like Galloway and
Thacker’s virus remains within the mesh, pushing its logic into a liminal
space where the Subject, the image, the photographer lose whatever
privilege they claimed or was granted to them by structural actants such as
Apple, Tate Modern or a practice-research PhD.
Similarly I would argue that the object-oriented focus of this project (in
terms of theory, practice and methodology) has, like Benjamin’s mosaic,
through connecting and reconnecting object-fragments, problematised the
writing of media. As I discuss in my JPEG Object in Practice chapter,
practice-research claims to explore new ways of writing (and judging)
media. Amerika’s remix the book project and Bogost’s software works have
challenged the dominant (and lately powerfully governmental) discourse of
what counts as research. By working with and through objects, by allowing a
panoply of actants a place in my work and submitting a fragmentary mosaic
of objects, I look to follow their lead but also follow Benjamin in making the
form of my work as important as the content.253 Like Benjamin I look to my
253. For discussions of the relationship between Benjamin’s method and imaging/
visuality, see Buck-Morss (1989). Also see Gunning (2003) on Möbius strip-like
topographical views; Dubow (2004) on a particular Judaic conception of vision, and in
terms of Benjamin’s archive, see Leslie & Marx (2007). On montage as a method in The
Arcades Project, see Doherty (2006).
179
palimpsest to act as Exploit, to work within my discipline but allow the

writing to undermine by overwhelming. Benjamin’s mosaic of fragments:
character objects like gamblers, whores, mirrors, dust, wax figures and
mechanical dolls; trace-objects like quotations and textual ephemeral; the
interwar equivalent of tweets and anything else he collected, like Barthes’
fractured analysis in Camera Lucida were not just merely a response to
complexity but the development of a form appropriate to that object-mesh.
Perhaps the reason that The Arcades Project and Camera Lucida have such
a pull for academics is because they act from within the academic mesh to
overwhelm them by their own logic. Like Galloway and Thacker’s Exploit it
is not a gesture but a “swarm, the flood” (2007, p. 98). There is too much in
The Arcades Project and Camera Lucida. There are too many objects.
Benjamin’s form and Barthes’ tone while remaining within their respective
meshes overwhelm not just the reader but the mesh itself. Like a virus they
set off new connections, configure new objects, replicate and reconfigure
“history” and “photography”. Similarly I look to my photos, mash-ups,
eBooks, interludes and chapters to collide and connect within other objects,
to disturb as “dialectical images”. My aim is to analyse objects, work with
objects and use objects as a way of doing practice-research. By approaching
those objects as having a fourfold character, as withdrawing from access but
at the same time real, connected and present; by writing through and with a
flat mosaic of objects, I look to open up a space for those connections and
dialectics, question the scale of analysis and the scope of praxis and so
create an Exploit.
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Epilogue
As part of my experiments with JPEG, I looked for an imaging practice that
was “beyond JPEG” not just in the sense of being analogue, but in terms of
being outside the governmental meshes I identified. I used a 1950s stereo
camera, the Belplasca and the last remaining rolls of Kodachrome 64 slide
film (the film and processing were discontinued in November 2010) to take
OOPh images.
The resultant “stereo” slides were one-offs. Of course they could be

copied but as with all analogue media, the “quality” would degrade.
Furthermore as Kodachromes they were “unique” and irreplaceable. What is
more they could only be viewed through a stereo viewer, one image, one
viewer at a time. They were not viewable or shareable online. Even if they
were scanned and output as JPEGs or, through software (such as Fuji’s MPO
“3D image” format - essentially a pair of JPEG-encoded files) as a “3D”
image, they were not the image or scopic experience I intended.
The scopic object and experience was particular and unique, it could not
connect with JPEG.
I include a unique stereo Kodachrome slide with each copy of this thesis.
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Appendix: the memory card

The practice at the heart of my research and discussed in this report
consisted of my OOPh experiments with a digital pinhole camera, mash-up
and eBook imag(in)ing apparatuses. It was in the practice of creating and
using these apparatuses that JPEG’s quadruple form became apparent. I
could have chosen to just present the report on those experiments. Instead, I
have chosen to include the eBooks (and therefore the mash-ups and images)
with this document. Although, as I have noted above, OOPh and my
practice research are not about the final (sic) products - images or eBooks, I
include these “works” as philosophical objects, as ongoing theoretical
works, that open up JPEG’s quadruple form and weird workings for any
reader who “reads” them. As such the image files, eBook files etc. could be
the subject of an OOP analysis, exploring their quadruple forms and the way
they connect. As discussed, my intention has not been to explore those
objects but the JPEG standard with which they connect.
I include the eBooks as objects that, like all objects, must be addressed in
their specificity and actuality. As objects they have a reality that exceeds
their relations within my work. The objects on the “memory card” continue
as experiments. Following Bogost’s idea of “carpentry” they are also
theoretical works themselves - not illustrations of my theory nor just source
material for it, nor even a record of my own practice. As with the images and
imaging apparatuses, they were and remain the vehicles of the theory. I
“crafted” a range of eBooks as objects where JPEG and RAW/WebP
standards in authoring and viewing software, servers and hardware meshes
connect or fail to connect with other objects. It was that practice that
opened up the black box of JPEG for me to explore (and on which I report).
The book objects attached here continue to do the same philosophical work
for objects encountering them, connecting with them or even using them as
imag(in)ing apparatuses.
the eBooks
I chose to use the OOPh sections of this work as the material for my
eBooks. This obviously included the images, mash-ups and remixes I crafted
182
within my practice-research but also the text that forms the “interludes”. In
order to remain focused on images and imag(in)ing I chose to render/encode
that text as image files.254
The objects I chose to use to “craft” my eBooks were:
• 60 digital pinhole imag(in)ing objects encoded with the JPEG standard
• 60 digital pinhole imag(in)ing objects encoded with the RAW standard
• 60 digital pinhole imag(in)ing objects encoded with the WebP standard
• 2 mash-ups generated via JavaScript and server-side software255
• 4 “text-as-image” imag(in)ing objects (each of the “interlude chapters”)

encoded with the JPEG, DNG and WebP standards.
During this project I created and worked with other images and mash-ups
such as the geolocation and augmented reality screengrabs I discuss in my
report. These do not form part of the eBooks although as images I have
added to Facebook’s Haystack, Flickr and my Blog, they may end up as parts
of the image-search mash-up.256
As discussed in The JPEG object in practice chapter, I chose to publish my

project in five formats (an Apple iBook, a Kindle book, an Evernote
“notebook”, a Facebook album “book” and an HTML Webpage “book” ) to
investigate how each connected with or failed to connect with the different
data objects.
The eBooks are included on an imag(in)ing apparatus “memory” card.
The eBook document (iBook and Kindle)

There is currently a format war in the rapidly expanding ePublishing
industry as the open standard ePub, Amazon’s proprietary Kindle format,
Apple’s iBooks format and newer HTML5 formats battle for market share and
254. There is an interesting parallel with the way vector-software Adobe Illustrator can
trace text and make it a vector “object”.
255. The JavaScript for the mash-ups was made available at http://tutorialzine.com/
2010/02/photo-shoot-css-jquery and http://www.zurb.com/playground/rapid-prototyping-
with-flickrbomb as well as http://jquery.com
256. They can be seen on my Flickr photostream http://www.flickr.com/photos/

content2bdifferent/
183
acceptability. Where of course an ANT framework would see these struggles

as proof of the importance of the number and extent of relations in
determining an actant’s power, an OOP perspective addresses the objects in
play and their connections within hardware and software objects as well as
cultural-practice and business/brand-objects, as the important issue. By
encoding my work in the various frameworks, I looked to investigate how
JPEG connects with those meshes.
Technically in terms of the Kindle (.mobi) and the iBooks (.ibooks) files,
both formats are variations on the standard epub format. Issues surrounding
these formats, standards and protocols are beyond the scope of this project
which is around how JPEG connects or fails to connect with these meshes.
My experience of creating quadJPEG.mobi and quadJPEG.ibooks is however
instructive.
Kindle (quadJPEG.mobi)
In order to create an eBook for the Kindle (using the .mobi format257) I
created a simple HTML page with HTML <img src> links to the three sets of
differently encoded image files. The Kindle eReader available in the UK (not
the Kindle Fire tablet which is unavailable in the UK) cannot read (or
connect with, as an OOP approach would have it) JavaScript files so if I
wanted my HTML file to compile as a .mobi format eBook, I could not
include the HTML code necessary to make my mash-ups visible. Although
the Kindle could have connected with the JPEG-encoded objects brought
into the mash-up, the “failed” connection with the JavaScript meant the
Flickr, Google, Bing, Yahoo image searches and the Artviper server-objects
were inaccessible.
Having created the HTML file (and the two XML files necessary to encode
the eBook) I attempted to connect those objects with Amazon’s kindlegen
software. When the software “reached” the first RAW-encoded file and
attempted to connect with the non-JPEG objects, it “failed”. In order to
257. The Kindle uses files encoded using the .mobi and .azw standards, both
proprietary to Amazon and each of which allows DRM “protection” for books sold
through Amazon’s store. It has also developed a .kf8 standard for its new Kindle Fire.
184
encode the eBook I needed to remove the non-standard objects and the links
to them. When I did I could encode the eBook.
I then tried using the Open Source calibre software to convert the HTML
package. This eBook software object could connect with the HTML file and
while it too “failed” to decode the RAW/WebP-encoded objects, it did not
fail to create a viewable eBook. That eBook - the object that my Kindle
object connected with - includes the JPEG-encoded but not the RAW and
WebP-encoded objects. It is not that the Kindle device could not connect
with them. It did not even get the chance as other software intermediary
objects failed to connect and so did not include them. It is this calibre-
encoded Kindle file that I sideloaded 258 onto my Kindle and include on the
memory card. As a further experiment to see how JPEG-encoded, RAW-
encoded and WebP-encoded objects connect or fail to connect with the
Kindle-object, I sideloaded the complete set of images into a folder called
quadJPEG within a pictures folder on the device. In a little-known feature of
the Kindle, this creates a picture viewer. By pressing Alt-z, this quadJPEG is
added as a book on the home screen. When this is opened, the device-
object, operating system-object, screen-object connect with the JPEG-
encoded files, decoding and rendering them visible, but fails to connect with
the other digital objects.
iPad (quadJPEG.ibooks)
The iBooks format is an Apple-adapted version of the epub standard
(Glazman, 2012) and the iPad can read epub books. I could have re-
encoded my HTML, CSS and JavaScript “package” as an epub file. I chose
however to use Apple’s new iBooks Author WYSIWYG software to create an
eBook. By using this software (positioned as Apple’s attempt to popularise,
and arguably dominate, the creation as well as the consumption of
eBooks)259 I could explore how the JPEG object connected with an
authoring programme object as well as the browser and server software
258. To sideload means to transfer files directly onto a device as a mounted disc or
volume rather than using the App/Kindle store etc. These issues of “official” and
“unofficial” channels could of course be explored as a matter of objects but again, they
are beyond the scope of this project.
259. See notes 195 and 225 above.
185
objects in the other eBook experiments. As I used the software, I found that I
could add RAW-encoded .orf files to the page. When I disassembled the
quadJPEG.ibooks file (essentially a zipped epub archive), I found that the
software had stripped the JPEG preview embedded in the Olympus .orf file
and used that as the image file. It could not do this with the WebP or DNG-
encoded files as there was no JPEG-encoded preview.260 Again, in terms of
my practice-research, it was the JPEG protocol object that was facilitating
connections, visibilities and the wider proprietorial and governmental
connections within which iBooks as brand, business and strategy are
enfolded.
The Facebook Timeline “book”

In order to explore the governmental nature of Facebook’s Timeline and
Haystack, I uploaded a series of JPEG-encoded images (as well as attempted
- and failed - to upload RAW and WebP-encoded images) of the eBook to
Facebook.261 These JPEG-encoded images were loaded onto the Timeline to
form a sort of eBook which was searchable and taggable by, within and
through Facebook.
The database “book”

Although more usually thought of as the basis for a publication (via CMS
for instance), a database can itself be seen as a publication. In a nod in the
direction of Walter Benjamin’s own Arcades database, I published the thesis
as a database using www.evernote.com.262 Evernote works in a way
Benjamin would recognise. Each database entry is a note in a notebook. All
notes can be titled, tagged, dated and even geolocated. All are searchable. I
added each image fragment to a note. This rendered the “book” as a series of
“dialectical images”, searchable and capable of being organised by tags and
searches. In addition I used Evernote’s OCR capabilities (where the text in
images is recognised (by software objects) and made searchable) to make the
text in the JPEG-encoded images searchable.
260. One can choose to embed a JPEG-encoded preview when saving a .dng file. I
chose not to.
261. https://www.facebook.com/pages/Jpeg-the-quadruple-object/227885703990297#
262. https://www.evernote.com/pub/theinternationale/jpegthequadrupleobject
186
The HTML webpage “book”

I chose to create a version of the eBook in an as open as possible a
standard - HTML, CSS and JavaScript. While there are issues around the
forms of “openness” involved in these technologies, which OOP could
unpick, they remain standards which work/connect with a wide variety of
apparatuses - including non-Apple mobiles, TVs and games consoles. The
webpage “book” uses basic HTML, CSS and JavaScript to create a website
with 192 pages - one for each encoded image and one for each encoded
“interlude” plus two pages for the two mash-ups. Rather than host this
webpage “book” online, I included it along with the other eBooks on the
card as a directory of files which would render the “book” differently
depending on whether it was online to connect with the mash-up data (as
well as the Google-hosted JavaScript) objects. As with the Apple iBooks
Author experience, I found that Apple’s Safari browser could “render” the
pages of the book with RAW-encoded .orf files. It appears that as with
iBooks Author, Apple’s browser could “read” the JPEG preview in the file. It
could not do so with the .webp or .dng files.
A word about design

This project is about protocol, imag(in)ing standards and encoding. It is
not about web design. I deliberately did not “design” the pages or the
layouts of the eBooks, nor post-process the digital pinhole images. I want the
emphasis to be on the images as data objects, encoded by protocol objects.
A word about photography

As noted above, this project is about standards. I use my (OOPh)
photographic practice as a way to explore that issue. My eBooks include
photographs but they are not the “point” of the exercise. As I have discussed,
their absence or more correctly their failure to appear/connect is as
important as their presence. I ask my reader to approach my books as
protocol rather than photographic works. If the images are pleasing,
challenging or interesting themselves, so much the better but it is the
protocol works I ask my reader to address.
187
Reading the eBooks

This thesis comes with a memory card. When a reader connects that
object to his or her computer263 the eBook-file-objects will connect or fail to
connect with the computer’s software - the operating system, browser and
any other software. The reader can then load (or in object-oriented terms,
“connect”) those eBook objects with a Kindle and iPad object - or fail to
connect them with other hardware objects. As I discuss in my report it is
these “successful” and “failed” connections that can be addressed via OOP
as opening up the form and workings of JPEG.
Of course it is impossible to set out every way in which the digital objects
I have “crafted” will be used and connected. A reader may read them on a
Mac or a PC; on Linux or Android; unpack them and recompile them for
different devices or simply never connect them with any other device. I will
however outline what a human-Apple-Amazon object (a reader with a Mac,
an iPad and a Kindle) might experience:
1. When the disc is plugged in, a folder appears on the desktop which
contains 3 files and 2 directory/folders: quadJPEG_web; quadJPEG.mobi;
quadJPEG.ibooks and the folders quadJPEG_web_files and pictures.
2. If the user clicks on the quadJPEG_web file, the webpage book opens.
This consists of a series of HTML pages, JavaScript files and image files all
held in the quadJPEG_web_files folder.
3. Depending on the browser the reader uses, she will see some image
files and not others. In OOP terms some object connections will “work”
others will “fail” depending on whether the various protocols involved in
the digital imag(in)ing pipeline of which the eBook is now a part, have
“worked” or “failed”.264
263. Of course the card could also be loaded into/connected with a camera. The
software in the camera would then display some of the encoded image files. Depending
on the model of the camera and the standards it uses, these could include the RAW-
encoded files as well as the JPEG-encoded files.
264. The terms “worked” and “failed” are, as discussed above, used advisedly see pp.
173-175 above.
188
4. The menu in the quadJPEG_web book also includes links to the

Facebook and Evernote eBooks which are available if the user’s device is
online (again a matter of objects, protocols and standards). As discussed
above the Facebook eBook only contains the JPEG-encoded images.
Haystack would not allow any other files to be uploaded. Evernote
includes all three sets of files but only the JPEG-encoded ones have
previews, even when using Google’s own browser which, while capable
of connecting with the WebP encoded files, could not connect with the
Evernote page/server which displays the WebP-encoded data. Within the
Evernote eBook it is possible to search for text within the four interlude
images - or at least the JPEG-encoded versions.
5. If the reader has access to an iPad, she can sideload the

quadJPEG.ibooks file via iTunes into iBooks. The book can then be read
(in landscape format) again as a series of chapters some of which “work”
and some of which “fail”. As noted above, the RAW chapter displays not
the RAW data files but the embedded JPEG previews stripped during
authoring. Again if the iPad is protocologically connected to the Internet,
the mash-ups will work by using JPEG to render live image search objects.
6. If the reader has access to an Amazon Kindle, she can sideload the
quadJPEG.mobi file. When this book is opened on the Kindle devices
available in the UK (i.e. not the full colour Kindle fire), the book and its
JPEG-encoded images will appear in 16 shades of grey. The reader can
also sideload the pictures folder (containing all three sets of images) onto
the device, press alt-z and then open the quadJPEGslideshow “eBook”.265
These various scopic and imag(in)ing experiences (if the reader chooses to
use the apparatuses to screengrab 2012 imagin(in)ings and upload them to
265. The reader can also zoom in on the images: q = zoom in; w = zoom out; e = reset
zoom; c = actual size; f = full-screen; r = rotate; nav controller = pan and page forward
and back = cycle through images. The Kindle does include a WebKit based browser
and so could access, if not fully decode and render, an online version of the eBooks, but
my concern is with the Kindle as an eBook reader/imag(in)ing apparatus. Once again
there are interesting issues about eInk display objects and screen refresh technologies
which OOP could approach but are beyond the scope of this project.
189
the social web to appear in the mash-ups for instance266 ) of “success” and
“failure”, visibility and unvisibility, sociality and unsociality are the work of
quadruple objects connecting. JPEG is one of the objects in play here as it
was in my original OOPh. These eBooks are philosophical carpentry insofar
as they “do philosophy” every time they are read - or refuse to be read. My
practice in crafting them and yours in reading them are moments of object-
oriented practice-research.
266. To screengrab on an iPad click the Power and Home buttons simultaneously. The
png-encoded file will be added to the Photo stream. To screengrab on a Kindle, press alt
+ shift + G. The gif-encoded file will be added to the documents folder. These can then
be uploaded from the iPad or via a PC/Mac to the social web.
190
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JPEG: the quadruple object

Paul Lomax Caplan

School of Media and Cultural Studies

Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

I declare that the contents of this thesis are my

Paul Lomax Caplan

As part of a practice-research project, the author looked to use that

Thanks also to the organisers of the conferences where I have presented

The Digital Imaging Pipeline! 16

Interlude: Eugene Atget! 25

The JPEG object in the literature! 28

The processural object 43

The potential object 48

The protocol object 55

Interlude: Sally Mann! 69

The JPEG object in theory! 72

Overmining and undermining 76

The sensual object 81

The real object 84

Fusion and fission 87

I object: potentiality 100

I object: formalism 104

I object materialism 108

Interlude: William Eggleston! 114

The JPEG object in practice! 117

Object-oriented photography (OOPh) 117

JPEG imaging 122

Why practice? 129

Carpentry and remix 131

Focus and practice 134

The report! 137

The sensual JPEG 137

The real JPEG 138

JPEG’s qualities 140

JPEG and time 140

JPEG and space 142

JPEG: eidos and essence 144

JPEG: fusion and fission 146

JPEG and connections 147

JPEG and materiality 149

Interlude: Robert Frank! 152

JPEG: the governmental object! 155

Facebook, photography and governmentality 158

Facebook and software governmentality 160

Facebook and machinic governmentality 164

Facebook and scopic governmentality 166

Reading the relationship engine in terms of objects 171

Facebook, photography and protocol 173

Conclusion: by way of an Exploit! 177

Appendix: the memory card! 182

The eBook document (iBook and Kindle) 183

Kindle (quadJPEG.mobi) 184

iPad (quadJPEG.ibooks) 185

The Facebook Timeline “book” 186

The database “book” 186

The HTML webpage “book” 187

A word about design 187

A word about photography 187

Reading the eBooks 188

• One 35mm stereo slide