AY Spring 2013

Title: Civil Military Operations (CMO) in the Philippines:

Examining Battlespace Management in the Past and the

Present
㢟ྡ㸸ࣇ࢕ࣜࣆࣥ࡟࠾ࡅࡿẸ㌷సᡓ㸦CMO㸧
㸸㐣ཤཬࡧ⌧ᅾ

ࡢᡓሙ⟶⌮࡟㛵ࡍࡿ⪃ᐹ

Delilah Ruth Russell

PhD Program in International Studies 4006s320-8

GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ASIA-PACIFIC STUDIES

WASEDA UNIVERSITY

PROF. SHIRAISHI, MASAYA

Chief
Advisor

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 Abstract

The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) continues to be involved in a drawn out war against
insurgencies, namely coming from two armed fronts: the communists and the Muslim separatists. As part of
its counterinsurgency (COIN) program, the AFP has utilized non-traditional military activities such as civic
action, public affairs, and psychological operations to deal with the complexities emanating from
socio-economic and political dimension of the insurgency. Now, collectively known as Civil Military
Operations (CMO), these operations first appeared in its nascent form during the American colonial period.
The modern foundations nonetheless can be traced back to the early 1950s when it was developed as the
left-hand approach (activities to persuade and influence) to compliment the right-hand approach (coercive
force). The succeeding decades maintained this formula in varying degrees in almost all of the AFP’s
campaigns. Nevertheless, it was only in 2006 that CMO was institutionalized for the first time.
Despite the AFP’s long experience in CMO, it remained one of the most poorly understood
operations within the military. Due to its unmilitary-like characteristics, it was associated more with
developmental assistance and public relations, setting it aside from core military operations. Apart from
select COIN specialists within the AFP, the CMO has faced challenges in its application because the
concept has been far too abstract and hypothetical for soldiers to comprehend. Furthermore, actual practices
of CMO have often been eclipsed by the military’s proclivity to conduct what they are trained for or know
best, which is to plan for and execute lethal force. Consequently, CMO operations did not mesh well with
standard military operations, making it more difficult to reach mission objectives.
Not surprisingly, its track record has been uneven. CMO lacked a doctrinal framework to guide
its operations until 2006, which has encumbered the process of transferring its best practices to succeeding
generations. Nonetheless, the thesis argues that CMO has achieved the best effects at an operational and
tactical level, when military commanders understood, in what the author interprets, as a form of maneuver
warfare that allows soldiers to reach the depth of insurgent battlespace. By tracing its successes and failures
in history, the thesis seeks to ultimately to answer the question whether these lessons were absorbed and
refined upon, after its institutionalization in 2006.

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 Acknowledgements

As it turned out, this merciless task of completing the dissertation could not be undertaken with
my efforts alone. I was proven lucky in so many ways because of the assistance provided to me by
numerous people. A simple acknowledgement of their part falls short of giving them the proper recognition
they deserve. But I would like to express that the completion of this thesis would not have been possible
without their contribution.
My utmost appreciation goes to my academic advisor, Professor Shiraishi, Masaya who has
patiently guided me over the years. He not only gave me direction on the overall research and writing, but
always motivated me do better. If it weren’t for his inspirational teaching, pursuing a PhD would have
never crossed my mind.
I would also like to thank the members of my dissertation committee. Professor Chikako Ueki
(GSAPS, Waseda University), who undertook the role of deputy advisor. Her advice provided me with the
opportunity to revisit to the fundamentals of academic research and her class that she has allowed me to
audit has broadened my research horizons. Prof. Nobuhiko Fuwa (GSAPS, Waseda University) has
generously shared his time to discuss with me my research and provide material to assist me in looking at
other aspects of Filipino society. His expertise on nonfarm development and infrastructure in rural
Philippines has greatly enlightened me on the importance of pursuing the broader issues related to internal
security problems. I was exceptionally lucky to have Prof. Takako Hikotani (National Defense Academy of
Japan). I thank her for her showing her interest in the subject, and providing me pointers on various ways to
thematically organize the research. I benefited much from her expansive knowledge on military affairs.
My experience at the Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies (GSAPS) has been of intellectual
delight. I feel privileged to have been able to attend and study in an environment consisting of excellent
professors and students. I would also like to add the GSAPS office on the 7th floor were always very kind
and helpful in attending to my inquiries.
My trips to the Philippines have left me with nothing but warm memories and I can never
properly thank the Filipino people for their kindness. In Manila, the men and women at the headquarters of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines went out of their way to receive my requests for interviews. In
particular I would like to thank Gen. Jaime Buenaflor, the first commander of the National Development
Support Command, for introducing me to the “revitalized” CMO; Col. Buenaventura Pascual and Lt. Col.
Ronaldson C. Cutillon for their assistance in organizing a trip to Taguig city and the information furnished;
and Col. Paul T. Regencia, for allowing me lengthy interviews and sharing with me so much insight on the
topic.
In Zamboanga City, I particularly indebted to Bong Garcia, Jr. He not only assisted me as a guide
and interpreter, but also assured me of my safety. At the Western Mindanao Command, Maj. Eugenio
Batara was always there to give me timely information and updates. I also appreciate his kindness for
arranging a trip to Limpapa barangay. At Peace Advocates Zamboanga, Sr. Emma was always there to
welcome me with a warm smile and share with me personal experiences concerning the conflict in the

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Southern Philippines. Also not to be forgotten is the help the U.S. forces rendered me in supplying me with
information about their involvement in CMO activities in the region.
I also wish to acknowledge the help of my seminar colleagues. Much of the tips on improving my
dissertation were generated from their comments, discussion, and questions. Additionally, I have been
fortunate to have friends who have always brought me cheer. They go out to Etsuko-san, Brian Gozun
(Boo), Katha, Rinier (Filipino language instructor), Bravo, Petra, and Daniel Ahmed.
Also, I cannot possibly fail to mention the help of my brother, Daniel. He also joined the research
trips and helped me gather information in the Philippines. In approaching the final stage of completing my
draft, he undertook the arduous task of proofreading.
I also would like to express my gratitude to Valerie Cao for assisting me in editing sections of my
thesis. Even though it was at a moment’s notice, she warmly accepted my request.
In times of need, my family has always been a source of courage. I would like to thank my aunt
Sueko for her enduring support. In Taiwan, my mother-in-law and my sister-in-law, Szu-Zing for their
kindness and love.
My special gratitude goes out to my husband, Jim. Despite my slow progress, he was always
there for me, giving me encouragement but firmly reminding me that giving up was not an option.
Finally, I would like to dedicate this work in memory of my father who continues to be a driving
inspiration behind my life’s endeavors.

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 List of Acronyms
AFP Armed Forces of the Philippines
ALPS Army Literacy Patrol System
AI Area of Influence
AO Area of Operations
AOI Area of Interest
AOR Area of Responsibility
ASG Abu Sayyaf Group
BCT Battalion Combat Team
BIAF Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces
BMA Bangsa Moro Army
CA Civil Affairs
CAO Civil Affairs Office
CENCOM Central Mindanao Command
C-H-C-D Clear-Hold-Consolidate-Develop
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CIMIC Civil-Military Co-operation
CMCoord Civil-Military Co-ordination
CMO Civil Military Operations
COC-IS Cabinet Oversight Committee on Internal Security
COIN Counterinsurgency
COG Center of Gravity
CORDS Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support
CPP Communist Party of the Philippines
CPT Communist Party of Thailand
CRS Civil-Relations Service
DCS Deputy Chief of Staff
DENCAP Dental Civic Action Program
DOD Department of Defense
EastMinCom Eastern Mindanao Command
EDCOR Economic Development Corp
ENCAP Engineering Civic Action Program
FM Field Manual
GK Gawad Kalinga
GVN Government of Vietnam
GWOT Global War on Terror
HR Human Rights
HUK Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon (HUKBALAHAP)
JDA Joint Defense Assessment
JI Jemaah Islamiya
JP Joint Publication
JSOTF-P Joint Special Operations Task Force - Philippines
JUSMAG The Joint Assistant United States Military Group
KBP Kalayaan Barangay Project (Freedom Village Project)

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KKK Kilusang Kabuhayang at Kaunlaran (Livelihood and
Development Program)
LGA Local Government Agency
LGU Local Government Unit
LIC Low-Intensity Conflict
LOI Letter of Instruction
MCP Malay Communist Party
MEDCAP Medical Civic Action Program
MILE Military Livelihood Enhancement
MILF Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MILVED Military Values Education
MNLF Moro National Liberation Front
MTPDP Medium Term Philippine Development Plan (2004-2010)
NADESCOM National Development Support Command
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NISP National Internal Security Plan
NDF National Democratic Front
NDSC National Development Support Command (this acronym precedes
NADESCOM but refers to the same command)
NISP National Internal Security Plan
NPA New People’s Army
OPAPP Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process
OPCAP Optical Civic Action
OPLAN Operations Plan
PA Public Affairs
PA Philippines Army
PACOM Pacific Command
PAZ Peace Advocates Zamboanga
PC Philippine Constabulary
PDR Philippine Defense Reform
PDT Peace and Development Team
PKP Communist Party of the Philippines
PSYMAT Psychological Material
PSYOPS Psychological Operations
PSYWAR Psychological Warfare
PHILCAG Philippine Civic Action Group
PHILCON Philippines Contingent to Vietnam
RAM Reform the Armed Forces Movement; Rebolusyonaryong
Alyansang Makabayan
RMA Revolution in Military Affairs
ROTC Reserves Officers’ Training Corps
SALAAM Special Advocacy on Literacy/Livelihood and Advancement for
Muslims
SEMP Socio-Economic Military Program
SI Social Investigation
SOF Special Operations Forces
SOT Special Operations Team
SOUTHCOM Southern Command

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TANGLAW (Beacon) Tanod at Gabay ng Lahi at Watawat
UN United Nations
USAFFE United States Army Forces in the Far East
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USIA United States Information Agency
VETCAP Veterinary Civic Action
VFA Visiting Forces Agreement
WestMinCom Western Mindanao Command
YOU Young Officers’ Union

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 Table of Contents

Page
Abstract…………………………………………………………………………….…………………… iii
Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………………...……………… v
List of Acronyms…………………………………………………………………...………….……….. vii

Chapter 1. Introduction.…………………………………………………………………….……….. 1
1.1 Background…………………………………………………………………………….……... 1
1.2 Statement of the Problem…………………………………………………………………….. 2
1.3 Research Objectives………………………………………………………………………….. 2
1.4 Survey of Literature on Relevant Aspects of CMO…………………………………………... 3
1.4.1 Overview……………………………………………………………………………... 3
1.4.2 Counterinsurgency Literature………………………………………………………… 3
1.4.3 The Expanded Role of the Military…………………………………………………... 6
1.4.4 Deepening the Study…………………………………………………………………. 8
1.5 Research Methodology……………………………………………………………………….. 9
1.5.1 Entry-point to the Research.………………………………………………………….. 9
1.5.2 Conceptual Framework……………………………….……………………………… 9
1.5.3 Method of Data Collection…………………………………………………………… 11
1.6 Definition of Terms…………………………………………………………………………… 11
1.7 Scope and Delimitations……………………………………………………………………… 15
1.8 Limitations……………………………………………………………………………………. 15
1.9 Thesis Organization……………………………………………………….………………..… 16
1.10 Significance of the Study………………………………………………….………………….. 16
Chapter 2. The Contemporary Understanding of CMO and Exploring its Roots in Military
History……………………………………………………………………………….…….... 18
2.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………………………...… 18
2.2 Defining CMO………………………………………………………………………………... 18
2.3 Distant Roots……………………………………………………………………………….… 20
2.4 Direct Antecedents……………………………..…………………….…………………….…. 22
2.4.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………………...… 22
2.4.2 The Development of CMO during and after World War II………………………...… 22
2.4.3 The Counterinsurgency Tradition………………………………………………..…… 23

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 2.4.3.1 Understanding Counterinsurgency (COIN)……………..….…….…...…………. 23
2.4.3.2 “Winning Hearts and Minds”……………………………………………………. 25
2.4.3.3 Physically Separating People from the Enemy………………………………….. 28
2.4.3.4 Summary of CMO Roots in Counterinsurgency………………………………… 30
2.4.4 CMO and Southeast Asia…………………………………………………………..… 31
2.4.4.1 Overview……………………………………………………………………….... 31
2.4.4.2 Security and Development…………………………………………….………… 32
2.4.4.3 Summary of CMO in Southeast Asia……………………………………………. 34
2.4.5 Examining Current Military Trends in CMO…………………….…………………. 35
Chapter 3. CMO in Warfare: Battlespace Management…………………………………………. 38
3.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………….……..…………….... 38
3.2 Existing Approaches to CMO………………………………………………………………… 38
3.2.1 Overview………………………………………………………………………..…..... 38
3.2.2 Winning Hearts and Minds: A Friendly Persuasion?………………………...……..... 38
3.2.3 Civil-Military Interface: the Dilemma for Civilian Partners……………………….… 41
3.2.4 The Expanded Role of the Soldier………………………………………………....… 43
3.3 Conceptual Framework: CMO in Manuever Warfare and Battlespace Management……….… 45
3.3.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………………….… 45
3.3.2 Explaining War and Warfare……………………………………………………….….. 45
3.3.2.1 Firepower………………………………………………………………………… 46
3.3.2.2 Maneuver……………………………………………………………………..….. 47
3.3.3 Defining Battlefield and Battlespace………………………………………………..... 47
3.3.4 Unpredictability of War: Fog and Friction………………………………………….... 49
3.3.5 Battlespace Management: Exploiting 3-Dimensions in Conventional War………….. 50
3.4 Managing the Dimensions of Depth in Insurgent Battlespace……………………………..… 53
3.4.1 Explaining Insurgent Warfare………………………………………………………… 53
3.4.1.1 Utilization of Space……………………………………………………………… 53
3.4.1.2 Insurgent Depth………………………………………………………………..… 54
3.4.1.3 Freedom of Action……………………………………………………………….. 56
3.4.2 Approaching the Depth of the Battlespace………………………………………….... 56
3.4.3 CMO: Helping the Military to Maneuver and Secure Conditions in the Depth…...… 58
3.4.4 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………. 60
Chapter 4. Historical Background to the AFP-CMO……………………………..………... 61
4.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………………… 61
4.2 The American Colonial Period (1898-1935)……………………………………… 61
4.2.1 Introduction to the American Period…………………………………………………. 61

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 4.2.2 Background to the Entry of Americans on the Philippine Isles…………………….... 62
4.2.3 Decision to Annex the Philippine Islands and Impact on American Policy……….…. 64
4.2.4 Winning Hearts and Minds through Nation-building……………………………….... 64
4.2.5 Counter-guerrilla Operations…………………………………………….………...…. 66
4.2.5.1 The Switch from Conventional Warfare to Guerrilla Warfare……….…....…….... 66
4.2.5.2 The American Military Adjusting to Guerrilla Warfare………………………..... 67
4.2.5.3 Recruiting Native Forces: The Philippine Scouts………………………………… 68
4.2.5.4 Recruiting Native Forces: The Philippine Constabulary (PC) and its
Methodology in Operating in the Depth of Enemy Space………………………. 70
4.2.6 Planning for an Indigenous Army…...………………………………………………… 74
4.2.7 The American Legacy…………………………………………………………………. 76
4.2.8 Summary………………………………………………………………………………. 77
4.3 The Post-Independence Years: Direct Antecedents of CMO (1946-1965)……………….... 77
4.3.1 Introduction……………………………………………………………… ……...…... 77
4.3.2 The Emergence of the Armed Leftist Movement……………………………………… 78
4.3.3 The Initial Government Response (1946-1950)…………………………….………... 79
4.3.4 Examining the Huks’ Control over the Battlespace………………………………..… 81
4.3.5 The Magsaysay Approach to the Huk Rebellion (1950-1954)……………….…… 82
4.3.6 The Left-Hand Approach and its Positioning in Warfare…………………………….. 82
4.3.7 Magsaysay’s Understanding of Battlespace…………………………………………… 83
4.3.8 Recognizing the Actors and Targeting the Respective Audiences…………………….. 84
4.3.9 Creating the Civil Affairs Office (CAO) and the American Input…………………… 85
4.3.10 The Civil Affairs Office (CAO): Organization and Functions………………………… 86
4.3.11 The Economic Development Corps (EDCORS)………………………………………. 87
4.3.12 Targeting the Solder…………………………………………………………………… 89
4.3.13 CMO’s Role in Allowing the Mobility of Troops over Battlespace…………………… 90
4.3.13.1 Battalion Combat Teams (BCT)…………………………………………………. 90
4.3.13.2 Patrols……………………………………………………………………………. 91
4.3.14 Summary…………………………………………………………………….……….... 92
4.3.15 A Synopsis of Events in the Post-Magsaysay Years (1957-1965)……………………. 93
4.4 The Marcos Years (1965-1986)………………………………………………………..… 94
4.4.1 Introduction……………………………………………………………………………. 94
4.4.2 CMO in the First Phase: Expanding the Military’s Role in Development………..….. 95
4.4.2.1 The Early Years: Marcos Cultivating his Relationship with the AFP
And Role Expansion………………………………………………………………. 95
4.4.2.2 Reviving Civic Action: Marcos’ Quest for National Development……………… 97

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 4.4.2.3 The Home Defense Program (1970): Supporting Martial Law and Marcos’ New
Society……………………………………………………………..…………….. 98
4.4.2.4 The Outcome of the Early Home Defense Activities…………………………... 102
4.4.3 Background to the Armed Movements……………………………………………… 104
4.4.3.1 Growing Unrest…………………………………………………………….…... 104
4.4.3.2 Background to the Muslim Separatist Movement……………………………… 105
4.4.3.2.1 Military Response Against the MNLF: Conventional Warfare……….. 106
4.4.3.2.2 The Role of CMO in Response to the Muslim Secessionist Threat.….. 109
4.4.3.2.3 The Decline of the MNLF and the Repercussions of the War in the
Muslim South…………………………………………………….....… 111
4.4.3.3 The Communist Movement……………………………………………………… 113
4.4.3.3.1 Overview…………………………………………………………..….… 113
4.4.3.3.2 The Resurgence of the Communist Movement: the CPP-NPA………… 113
4.4.3.3.3 Factors Leading to the Successful Resurgence of the Communists...….. 115
4.4.4 CMO in the Second Phase: Integrating CMO in COIN………………...…………... 118
4.4.4.1 The Vietnam Doctrine vs. Guerrilla Warfare……………………………………. 118
4.4.4.2 AFP: Alienating the Population and its Repercussions……..……………….…... 119
4.4.4.3 The AFP Adjusting to the New Battlespace: Oplan Katatagan………………… 120
4.4.4.4 The Reorganization of Home Defense: the Establishment of the CMO Program… 122
4.4.4.5 The AFP: a Faltering Mammoth against a Growing Communist Threat…….… 123
4.4.5 Development of CMO in Reaction to Mainstream COIN Practices……………….… 125
4.4.5.1 Reviewing Insurgent Battlespace………………………………………………. 125
4.4.5.2 Integrating CMO in Maneuver Warfare…………………………………….….. 126
4.4.5.3 COIN Plan Revamped in the Last Year of the Marcos Regime…………..…..... 128
4.4.6 Assessment of CMO in the Marcos Period……………………………………….… 128
4.5 The Corazon Aquino Administration (1986-1992)……………………………………… 129
4.5.1 Introduction……………………………………………………………………..…... 129
4.5.2 Background: Early Years of the Aquino Administration…………………….……… 130
4.5.3 CMO in Phase One: National Reconciliation……………………………..……….… 131
4.5.3.1 Oplan Mamamayan: Adding the Reconciliation Element……………………… 131
4.5.3.2 CMO and Re-indoctrinating the Soldiers with Moral Values………………....… 132
4.5.3.3 Assessing Oplan Mamayan and the Positioning of CMO……………………… 133
4.5.3.3.1 The Political Dimensions……………………………………………… 133
4.5.3.3.2 The Military Dimensions……………………………………………… 135
4.5.4 CMO in Phase Two: Improving its COIN Function………………………………… 136
4.5.4.1 Background: Coups and the Increasing Influence of the AFP in COIN Policies. 136

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 4.5.4.2 Formulating Operation Plan Lambat Bitag (1988)……………………...……….. 139
4.5.4.3 Lambat Bitag: Strategy and Tactics……………………………………………… 141
4.5.4.4 Special Operations Teams (SOT): the Role of CMO in Lambat Bitag……….…. 143
4.5.4.5 Assessing Lambat Bitag…………………………………………………….…… 145
4.5.5 Summary……………………………………………………………………………... 147
4.6 Synopsis of Events During the Ramos Administration: CMO Returns to Its Developmental
Role……………………………………………………………………………………… 147
Chapter 5. Tracking CMO’s Path to Institutionalization……………………………………..….. 150
5.1 Background: Relative Peace and the Resurgence of Threats in the 1990s…………..….. 150
5.1.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………….…….. 150
5.1.2 The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)………………………………….…..… 150
5.1.3 The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)…………………………………………………....… 152
5.1.4 The Communist Party of the Philippines – the New People’s Army (CPP-NPA)….. 153
5.1.5 CMO: a Forgotten Relic of the Past…………………………………………….…... 154
5.2 The Revival of CMO under the Arroyo Administration………………………….……. 154
5.2.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………….…… 154
5.2.2 The Reinvigoration of CMO as part of the National Security Strategy to Deal with
the Socio-economic Aspects of Insurgencies…………………………..……..…..… 156
5.2.3 COIN Plan: Targeting the CPP-NPA……………………………………….…..…..… 158
5.2.3.1 Oplan Bantay Laya (2001-2006)………………………………………….…...… 158
5.2.3.2 Understanding the AFP’s Perceptions on CPP-NPA Battlespace: Establishing
the Ground work for the Application of CMO………………………….……… 159
5.2.3.2.1 Background to “Knowing the Enemy”………………………….…….. 159
5.2.3.2.2 Geography and Topology………………………………………...……. 160
5.2.3.2.3 Managing the Human Terrain: the Countryside…………………….… 162
5.2.3.2.4 Managing the Human Terrain: Urban Sector………………………..… 163
5.2.3.2.5 Expanding the Role of the Soldier to Meet the Needs of the CPP-NPA
Battlespace……………………………………………………………… 164
5.2.3.2.6 Summary…………………………………………………………….….. 165
5.2.4 A Critical Look in the Way the AFP Approached the Human Terrain: Human Rights… 165
5.3 Tailoring CMO to Target the Muslim Battlespace…………………………………….….. 167
5.3.1 Overview……………………………………………………………….…………..… 167
5.3.2 Lack of Resources…………………………………………………………….……… 167
5.3.3 Shift in Warfare………………………………………………………………………. 168
5.3.4 MILF Base Camps and the Peace Process…………………………………………… 169
5.3.5 Multiple Threat Groups…………………………….……….…………………..….… 171

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 5.3.6 The Entry of American Forces……………………………………………………..… 172
5.3.6.1 Background to the Entry of American Forces………………………….………... 172
5.3.6.2 Debating the Legality of American Military Presence…………………….…..… 173
5.3.6.3 U.S. Forces Operating on the Ground and the Significance of CMO….……...… 174
5.3.6.4 Summary on the American Dimension……………………………………….…. 177
5.4 Conclusion………………………………………………………………………...…..… 177
Chapter 6. Civil Military Operations…………………………………………………………..…… 179
6.1 Overview………………………………………………………………………..………….… 179
6.2 AFP-CMO Definition…………………………………………………………………….…. 180
6.3 The Operational Components of CMO: The Three Pillars………………………………… 181
6.4 Lines of Operations…………………………………………………………………….….. 183
6.5 The National Development Support Command (NADESCOM)………………………..… 184
6.6 The Special Operations Team (SOT) and the Special Advocacy and Livelihood Assistance
for the Advancement Among Muslims (SALAAM)……………………………….……. 188
6.6.1 Overview………………………………………………………………………….… 188
6.6.2 The Special Operations Teams (SOT)…………………………………………….… 188
6.6.3 Special Advocacy and Livelihood Assistance for the Advancement among Muslims
(SALAAM)…………………………………………………………………………. 191
6.7 Partnering with Other Entities…………………………………………………………..……. 192
6.7.1 Overview……………………………………………………………………………. 192
6.7.2 NADESCOM Partnerships…………………………………………………….……. 192
6.7.3 Peace and Order Councils (POC)…………………………………………………… 194
6.8 CMO Schooling and the Cultivating of CMO Officers………………………………….....… 195
6.9 Conduct of the Soldier………………………………………………………………………. 196
6.10 CMO in Three Levels of Warfare…………………………………………………………… 197
6.10.1 Strategic Level………………………………………………………………….…… 197
6.10.2 Operational Level…………………………………………………………………… 199
6.10.3 Tactical Level……………………………………………………………………….. 199
Chapter 7. Case Study of CMO in Western Mindanao………………………………………... 201
7.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………. 201
7.2 Methodology……………………………………………………………………………..… 201
7.3 An Overview of the Western Mindanao Command (WestMinCom)……………………… 203
7.3.1 Background to the Creation of WestMinCom and its Battlespace……………........ 203
7.3.2 Tackling the Human Terrain in Western Mindanao……………………………….….. 207
7.3.3 Naval Forces Western Mindanao…………………………………………….………. 210
7.3.4 The Philippine National Peace (PNP)………………………………………….…… 211

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 7.3.5 The American Forces……………………………………………………………..… 212
7.4 CMO in Zamboanga City…………………………………………………………………… 214
7.4.1 Background to Zamboanga City……………………………………………….…… 214
7.4.2 Differentiating the Targets…………………………………………………….…….. 217
7.4.3 Partnering with Civilian Agencies: Sharing the Burden……………………………... 220
7.4.3.1 Introduction……………………………………………………………………… 220
7.4.3.2 Partnering with NGOs…………………………………………………………… 220
7.4.3.3 Local Government Units and Local Government Agencies……………….….. 223
7.4.4 CMO Beneficiaries…………………………………………………………………… 224
7.4.5 Analysis of CMO in Zamboanga City…………………………………………….… 233
7.4.5.1 Overview: City vs. Remote Areas……………………………………….……. 233
7.4.5.2 Military Objectives Behind the Selection of CMO Beneficiaries…………....… 234
7.4.5.3 Reaching the Effects………………………………………………………….… 236
7.5 CMO in Basilan and Sulu…………………………………………………………………… 241
7.5.1 Basilan…………………………………………………………………………….… 241
7.5.2 Sulu…………………………………………………………………………………. 249
7.5.3 An Anlaysis on Basilan and Sulu…………………………………………………… 252
7.6 Summary………………………………………………………………………………….…. 252
Chapter 8. Conclusion and Findings……………………………………………………………...… 254
8.1 Re-examining the Objectives………………………………..…………………………….…. 254
8.2 Summarizing Findings……………………………………………………….……………... 254
8.2.1 Historical Analysis: Tracing CMO’s Development……………………………….. 254
8.2.2 Historical Analysis: Contributing Factos to CMO Success……………………….. 255
8.2.3 Case Study Findings: CMO after Institutionalization in 2006…………………….. 260
8.3 Challenges and Limitations to CMO………………..………………………………………… 266
8.3.1 Operations on the Ground: Maneuvering over Human Terrain……………………… 266
8.3.2 Striking the Balance between Combat and Persuasive Measures…….……………… 269
8.3.3 Translating the Effects of CMO into Strategic Success: the Peace Process………..… 270
8.4 Following Trends and Prospects for the Future……………………………..……………..… 271
8.5 Remaining Issues and Recommendations for Further Research……………………….……… 275
8.6 Concluding Remarks………………………………………………………………….…..….. 276

xvi
List of Tables………………………………………………………………………………………..…. xviii

List of Maps………………………………………………………………………………………..….. xviii

List of Figures……………………………………………………….……………………….….....… xviii

List of Text Boxes………………………………………………………………………….………….. xviii

List of Graphs……………………………………………………………………………………….…. xix

References…………………………………………………………………………………….…….….. 277

Appendices………………………………………………………………………………………...…… 297

xvii
 List of Tables

page
4.1 Magsaysay’s Target Audience……………………………………………………………….. 85
4.2 The Left-Hand Approach and the Right-Hand Approach………………………….…….….. 93
4.3 The Pillars of the Home Defense Program as of 1978……………………………….…….... 99
4.4 Projects Accomplished by the AFP Corps of Engineers, 1966-1986……………………....... 103
4.5 AFP Strength and Estimated MNLF Strength and Armaments…………………………….... 108
4.6 National and Defense Budgets of the Philippines 1970-1983….………………..…………... 109
4.7 AFP Strength and Estimated CPP-NPA Strength and Armaments…………….…………...... 115
5.1 Political Killings (2001-2006)…………………………………………….…………………. 166
6.1 Lines of Operations…………………………………………………………………..……… 184
6.2 NADESCOM Units………………………………………………..….………………..…... 186
6.3 Number of Projects under NADESCOM…………………………………..……..…..……. 187
6.4 Funds for NADESCOM………………………………………………………………....…. 187
6.5 Breakdown of Projects as of 2010………………………………………………………..… 188
6.6 Peace and Order Council……………………………………………………..….…………. 195
8.1 Budget Appropriations for CMO and National Development 2003-2010 (Pesos)…..…....... 266
8.2 Whole Mission Approach – 6 Lines of Operations……………………………..…..……….. 273

List of Maps

5.1 Disposition of Guerrilla Fronts……………………………………………………..…...…… 161

5.2 JSOTF-P Designated Area of Operation………………………………….…………..……… 178
7.1 Map of the Philippines with the AOR of WestMinCom………………………………..……. 204
7.2 Enemy Disposition in the AFP’s AOR………………………………………….…………… 206
7.3 Map of Zamboanga City………………………………………………………………......…. 217

List of Figures
6.1 CMO Pillar and its Target Audiences………………………………………………………... 182
6.2 NADESCOM in the AFP’s Basic Organizational Structure…………………..……....…...… 186
6.3 SOT Squad Formation…………………………………………………………………..…… 190
6.4 Levels of CMO……………………………………………………………………………..... 200

List of Text Boxes

2.1 Vietnam – CORDS…………………………………………………………...……………….. 28
2.2 Algeria - Defensive Grid System (Quadrillage)…………………………….…..….…………. 29

xviii
2.3 Malaysia - The Briggs Plan……………………………………………….…….…………… 29
2.4 Vietnam - Strategic Hamlet Program……………………………………………………...... 30
3.1 Denying the Positional Advantages of the Insurgents Generated by Population Support….. 59

List of Graphs

8.1 Estimated CPP-NPA Strength (1977-2011)…………………………………………..….…. 257

8.2 CPP-NPA Affected Barangays (1981-2011)………………………………….…..………. 258
8.3 CPP-NPA Guerrilla Fronts (1981-2011)…………………………………………….…..….. 259
8.4 Estimated ASG Strength (1993-2010)……………………………………….…………..…. 262
8.5 Frequency of Conflict-Related Violent Incidents in Zamboanga City, Basilan, and
Sulu from January 2005 to August 2008…………………………………………………… 263
8.6 Annual Trend of Government of the Philippines (GPH)-Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF) Armed Skirmishes (2002-2011)…………………………………………...… 265

xix
Chapter 1. Introduction
1.1 Background
The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) has spent most of its existence combating
insurgencies within their borders. Even before the Philippine Army was formally organized under the
American Commonwealth in 1936, elements of the future standing army, the Philippine Scouts and the
Constabulary were fighting alongside the American soldiers against various Filipino insurrectionists. With
independence in 1946, the Philippines was faced with a communist-inspired agrarian uprising that
threatened to destabilize the new Republic. The AFP successfully quelled the communist rebellion, only to
be faced with a new generation of communist fighters in less than two decades. The emergence of the
communist threat coincided with the armed Muslim separatist movement, which dragged the Philippines
into a full-blown war in the early 1970s. Though the intensity of the violence has not returned to the
proportions of this period, the AFP continues to be locked in an armed struggle with threat groups coming
from these two fronts.
A combination of what the AFP refers to as the “right-hand approach” (coercive force) and the
“left-hand approach” (persuasive measures) have in varying degrees, dictated the course of its
counterinsurgency (COIN) programs. The right-hand approach is generally understood as the employment
of firepower or combat-centered measures to physically remove the threat. In contrast, the left-hand
approach is supposedly integrated into the overall military mission for the purpose of engaging the
population in a manner that would gain their support, and ultimately weaken the armed opponent’s will to
fight. They include civic action, civil affairs, public affairs, psychological operations, and nation-building.
Such activities are now collectively referred to as Civil Military Operations (CMO). CMO in its nascent
form first emerged during the Philippine-American War (1899-1902), but gained recognition as an
inseparable component of counterinsurgency (COIN) under Ramon Magsaysay who served as Secretary of
National Defense from 1950 to 1953. The succeeding decades saw the integration of CMO in most of the
AFP’s military campaigns but without the official recognition that would place it on par with other military
operations.
The decades-long experience in CMO activities finally culminated into its institutionalization in
2006. The move was in alignment with President Gloria Arroyo-Macapagal’s (2001-2010) national security
strategy to deliver a decisive blow on the insurgencies that was draining the country of its resources, not to
mention, stunting economic development. She called for a holistic approach to cover not only the military
dimensions of the insurgency but also the socio-economic aspects as well. Under theses initiatives, CMO
was institutionalized for the first time, equipped with its own independent office at the AFP headquarters
1
and furnished with its first doctrine.

1
“Military’s command in Mindanao to be divided into 2 units,” Sunstar, July 22, 2006. Available at:
http://www.sunstar.com.ph/static/man/2006/07/22/news/military.s.command.in.mindanao.to.be.divided.into.2.uni
ts.html. Accessed July 11, 2007.

1
1.2 Statement of the Problem
The AFP has experience in CMO dating back over a century. Despite it long history, the AFP has
faced challenges in exploiting CMO to bolster its counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. One such reason
lies in the military’s proclivity to prioritize combat operations over non-traditional or indirect approaches.
This is not a surprising revelation since the military is an institution created for the defense of the nation,
and soldiers are most comfortable in their prescribed roles of combat. Subsequently, CMO was considered
2
a mere adjunct to the overall military mission rather than an important force multiplier. Such attitudes
posed problems for the implementation of CMO. In many instances, any intended outcomes of CMO, such
as winning the goodwill of the population especially of those living in insurgent-affected areas, were
short-lived. The bloodshed and rapine that the AFP left behind in their offensives only alienated the
population further. To put it another way, CMO did not synchronize well with the overall military operation,
as the intricate relationship between the application of force and persuasive measures were not well
understood.
Another challenge in regards to the planning and execution of CMO was the theoretical basis of
the operation as a COIN operation was too abstract for the general military audience to comprehend. Aside
from a handful of COIN specialists within the AFP, the tenets of CMO were not successfully propagated to
the soldiers out on the field. CMO planning and implementation had been guided more by “common sense”
3
rather than the operational rigor that comes with other military operations such as combat and intelligence.
While this gave flexibility for soldiers to adapt to the situation, it required seasoned experts to lead such
military operations. Without such leadership, the majority of soldiers were limited to the superficial
understanding of CMO, which evolved around socio-economic assistance and information campaigns to
seek the support of the population.
Nonetheless, there were instances in Philippine history that CMO helped the AFP to produce
results. CMO was successfully incorporated with operational sophistication into some of the AFP’s military
campaigns under civilian/or military leadership that appreciated the validity of CMO. These results were
especially important in leaving a mark on the evolvement of CMO practices.

1.3 Research Objectives

The first objective of the thesis is to trace the evolvement of CMO in Filipino history. Even
though CMO is a relatively new term in Philippine military jargon, what constitutes as CMO activities

2
The United States Department of Defense defines force multiplier as “A capability that, when added to and
employed by a combat force, significantly increases the combat potential of that force and thus enhances the
probability of successful mission accomplishment.” Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military
and Associated Terms, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 8, 2010, as amended
through November 15, 2012, p. 119.
3
Lieutenant Colonel Ferozaldo Paul T. Regencia, Philippine Army (PA), AFP National Development Support
Command (NDSC), interview with author, Camp Aquinaldo, Quezon City, Philippines, October 8, 2008; Lt. Col.
Benjamin L. Hao, “Seven Myths about CMO,” The AFP Peace Builder, 1st ed., 1st qtr, 2008. Reprinted in the
AFP CMO School website. Available at:
http://www.afpcmos.ph/index.php/featured-article. Accessed July 11, 2012.

2
today such as civic action, information campaigns, displaying courteous behavior towards the residents,
and psychological operations to demoralize the enemy, has its roots dating as far back as the American
colonial period. These activities have been carried over from generation to generation, and used in varying
degrees to fight internal security problems. Certain components were either magnified or modified to match
the security conditions. Though the process did not follow a progressive development, certain periods in
history have been instrumental in shaping the CMO that is practiced today.
At the same time, in tracking it evolvement, the thesis seeks to assess CMO in the past and
current counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in the Philippines. In the process, the thesis seeks to answer
the questions, why it demonstrated success in certain campaigns and why it did not in other campaigns.
Finally, as the institutionalization of CMO in 2006 was considered to be a turning point for the
operation, a case study was conducted in Western Mindanao to determine whether institutionalization has
internalized lessons from the past and has set down a path for an improved the application of CMO on the
ground.

1.4 Survey of Literature on Relevant Aspects of CMO

1.4.1 Overview
Literature devoted entirely on the Philippines’ CMO remains limited. In fact, much of the
existing information and analysis on the topic draws from Filipino military history, counterinsurgency
(COIN), nation-building, and civil-military relations. As research done on CMO emerges from different
fields of study to support a particular theoretical interest, the purpose of the survey is to short-list the
relevant publications and gather the main points that have been made in their respective fields.
Broadly speaking, existing academic inquiry into the subject of the Philippine’s CMO follows
two strands of thought. The first is that, CMO is examined for its utility in COIN operations. Most of these
works are written by Filipino military officers, who have approached the subject from a military standpoint,
placing the study within the area of war studies and military history. The second strand of thought concerns
itself with the question of whether CMO really falls within the purview of military responsibilities. Such
discussions are largely found in studies related to nation-building and civil-military relations in the
Philippines.

1.4.2 Counterinsurgency Literature

A starting point in gaining insight into the AFP’s current understanding of CMO is found in a
work dating back to the early 1960s. Written jointly by two army officers: one Filipino and one American,
4
Counter-Guerrilla Operations: The Philippine Experience draws from their direct experience in fighting
the communist-inspired agrarian uprising (1946-1954), or more popularly known as the Huk Rebellion. It is
not a scholarly work per se, nor, an historical account of the events. Rather, it illustrates the operational
principles that dictated the military campaign under the Secretary of National Defense, Ramon Magsaysay.

4
Napolean D.Valeriano and Charles T.R. Bohannan, Counter-Guerrilla Operations: The Philippine Experience,
Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 1962, 2006.

3
 The CMO described in this book was referred to as activities directed by the Civil Affairs Office,
an early predecessor of the CMO office that exists today. The office was established to support the
Department of National Defense’s initiatives to apply friendly persuasion on those that could be coaxed
into supporting the government (including both the population and the enemy). The basis of this concept
comes from an understanding that the armed component was largely a by-product or an effect of unrequited
socio-economic aspirations of the impoverished masses. At the same time, the authors recognized that these
sentiments were exploited by the Huks to not only gain legitimacy for their movement, but to also translate
this legitimacy into tangible support from the people that included supplies, recruits, intelligence,
sanctuaries, and freedom of movement - all factors needed to offset the conventional capabilities of the AFP.
Therefore, early components of CMO that included medical missions, infrastructure support, information
campaigns, and amnesty programs for Huk fighters, were organized “to beat the guerrilla at his own game.”
The significance of this study, in regards to CMO, is that it demonstrated that the underlying
basis of its operations is psychological. Even the famed resettlement program for the surrendered Huk
fighters that involved extensive developmental projects by the Army Corps of Engineers was purely a
means to an end. In other words, all activities undertaken by the military, be it socio-economic assistance or
counterpropaganda was calibrated towards psychologically defeating the enemy.
More recent works on CMO do not depart greatly from the central concepts introduced in
Counter-Guerrilla Operations. For instance, the Small Wars Manual’s Strategical and Psychological
5
Principles in Philippine Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations by Lt. Col. Ben D. Dolorfino also stresses
the importance of recognizing the psychological dimensions in formulating an effective COIN strategy.
Dolorfino argues like many proponents of CMO that centering a military operation on force cannot resolve
a conflict. Namely since one, it does not target the deeper roots of the problem and two, a combat-centered
approach that is often accompanied by collateral damage and human rights violations, only alienates the
population and increases the likelihood of them giving their support to the insurgent. Therefore, Dolorfino’s
main criteria for success in COIN is understanding the nature of the insurgency problem and then achieving
it with the least amount of force: a strategy requiring soldiers to also engage in activities to uplift the lives
of the people.
Dolorfino’s article brings to mind other works that support the military’s role in socio-economic
projects to fight insurgencies. Like Dolorfino, military writers see the significance of alleviating poverty to
deter the people from supporting insurgents. AFP journal articles such as “Community Organizing Towards
6
Economic Development” discuss a COIN plan that seeks to re-orient communities towards economic
development with the help of other civilian agencies for the purpose of shifting people’s attention to their
well-being. Interestingly enough, they fall short of establishing a direct link to the soldiers’ work to actual

5
Lt. Col. Ben D. Dolorfino, “Small Wars Manual’s Strategical and Psychological Principles in Philippine
Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations, CSC, 1997.
6
RDD Branch, OG3, PA, “Community Organizing Towards Economic Development,” Philippine Army Journal,
2nd Quarter, 2007, pp. 6-14. Other works that depict similar attitudes include, “A New Sunrise,” Army Troopers
Newsmagazine, June 2008, pp. 17-19 and Lt. Col. Gilbert Gapay, “Preserving the Gains of ISO through
Bayanihan: A Concept Paper on 3MIB Bayanihan Operations, Army Journal, Oct-Dec 2007, pp. 33-38.

4
economic progress or poverty reduction for that matter. This does not come as a surprise. By whittling
down the various development themes, it comes down to the understanding that CMO’s function lies
primarily in changing the perception of the people in favor of the military and government. In short, such
activities serve psychological objectives.
Marilen J. Danguilan takes a more critical look on the perceived effects of CMO especially in
7
regards to its socio-economic aspects. While she acknowledges the validity of the military in performing
socio-economic functions to extend immediate relief to people affected by conflict, she doubts the
assumption held by the AFP that the provision of high impact and visible projects such as health care and
infrastructure support alone has the effect that the military seeks to psychologically demoralize or break the
will of the enemy.
Danguilan’s concern is not so much on the operation itself, but whether the entire nation has the
intent and capabilities to deal with the underlying causes of insurgency. No matter how much a CMO
mission achieves in gaining temporary gratitude from a community, the effects cannot reverberate up to the
national strategic level if the regime is repressive, the military abusive, the civilian agencies incompetent,
and existing socio-economic conditions continue to deepen the woes of the people. These are the very
conditions that fuel support for insurgencies.
Danguilan rounds off her study by underlining that CMO cannot cover for gaps in poor military
planning and government policymaking. To extract and sustain any positive effects CMO has on the
populace, these operations have to be followed by an overarching and long-term reform plan initiated by
the government.
When examining CMO from a military operational standpoint, Victor Corpus’ Silent War (1989)
provides one of the most penetrating insights into how CMO was necessary in helping the AFP overcome
their weaknesses in fighting an armed communist movement. As a former member of the New People’s
Army, his understanding on the inner-workings of the communist movement provided an operational plan
for the AFP to follow in order deal with the problem. In his work, he underlines the importance of CMO in
countering the political-hold that the communists had over the people and provides operational and tactical
details on how this can be achieved. In a nutshell, his take on CMO is that it should duplicate the
8
communist methodology in gaining the support of the people.
Another work that supports the utility of CMO in COIN is done by Lt. Col. Eugenio V.
9
Hernandez in his 2009 thesis. The author, being a Marine himself, focuses his study on the Philippines
Marine Corps and its three lines of operations guided by the Macapagal-Arroyo government’s National
Internal Security Plan. These lines of operations include combat, intelligence, and CMO.
Hernandez takes a slightly different approach in examining the viability of CMO by proposing

7
Marilen J. Danguilan, “Bullets and Bandages: Public Health as a Tool of Engagement in the Philippines,”
research paper no. 161, Boston: Harvard School of Public Health, June 1999.
8
Victor N. Corpus, Silent War, Quezon City: VNC Enterprises, 1989.
9
Lt. Col. Eugenio V. Hernandez, “Accessing the Parameters for Determining Mission Accomplishment of the
Philippines Marine Corps in Internal Security Operations,” master’s thesis, Quantico, Virginia: United States
Marine Corps, Command and Staff College, Marine Corps University, 2009.

5
that out of the three lines of operation, CMO provides the best set of criteria in measuring the performance
of a COIN program. He begins by arguing that performance indicators for combat operations, which base
its progress on enemy casualties, the capture of arms, and intelligence documents, can be misleading
because it only reveals short-lived tactical gains made on the battlefield. In lieu, he proposes that a more
realistic indicator of progress against the insurgencies can be measured by the impact that CMO has on the
people. While Hernandez admits that these performance indicators are much more difficult to quantify in
comparison with enemy kills, he suggests that they should be measured along the following lines:

1. The number of persons and/or households that benefit from CMO.

2. The number of information operations and other initiatives conducted by the AFP that have changed the
perceptions of the people and have resultantly worked in favor of the government.
3. The number of insurgent-influenced or insurgent-controlled communities that have “turned their backs
against the internal threat groups and joined the mainstream of Philippine society.”

Unfortunately, Hernandez does not nail his argument with enough supporting evidence to
demonstrate that CMO is a better indicator of progress with a set of comparative statistics (enemy kills vs.
CMO effects). Nonetheless, his work reveals an increasing trend in the military, even within the Marines
where soldiers are typically trained and indoctrinated under a warrior ethos, to place more premium on
CMO to improve the outcome of military operations.

1.4.3 The Expanded Role of the Military

CMO is a contentious topic in both military and civilian circles. The debate spawns from the
question whether the military should be involved in activities that are normally reserved for civilian
agencies.
In the late 1950s to the 1960s, there was a considerable amount of work done in viewing the
10
military as a “modernizing agent” or a catalyst for “economic take-off” in a newly independent country.
Based on these theories, the military was seen as one of the most organized and efficient institutions,
making it practical for the government to rely on it for national progress.
Since the 1950s, in the Philippines, the military has been directed to support, in varying degrees,
nation-building. Therefore, it is of no surprise that some scholars study CMO from within the brackets of
nation-building. It is of interest to gather the views presented in these works, because it provides insight on
how the military perceives their roles. Much of the research points out that extra-military activities have
become so embedded in the AFP’s operations, that it is considered to be one of the most important missions
11
after defense. Nevertheless, more recent works by military scholars such as Dencio Acop take the middle

10
W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1960.
11
Harold W. Maynard, “Views of the Indonesian and Philippine Elites”, in Sheldon W. Simon ed., The Military
and Security in the Third World: Domestic and International Impacts, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1978,
pp. 143-145.

6
ground. While recognizing that the military has a role to play in development and nation-building, it cannot
be at the expense of compromising combat competency and draining resources from an already
12
cash-strapped military. This brings to surface whether the AFP can strike a balance in performing in both
combat and CMO activities without weakening its core mandate to provide defense for the nation.
In issues related to the military’s role in civilian-like roles, some writers have expressed
apprehension on the over-expansion of military responsibilities. Roy Devesa who assessed the Philippine
13
Counterinsurgency Operational Methodology is critical of the National Internal Security Plan (NISP)
under the Arroyo administration that has heavily relied on Special Operations Teams (SOTs) to support the
government’s holistic approach to the insurgency problem. These are composite teams (units ranging from
teams to company-size units) that integrate combat, intelligence, and CMO in their operations. Their efforts
target the communist armed front and play a unique role in dismantling the enemy’s political structure in
remote barangays. He believes that the CMO component of SOTs, where the soldiers are tasked to conduct
infrastructure development, has been a drag on the military’s abilities to conduct their core missions of
combat and intelligence. He argues that the government has to do more in providing better funding and
establishing mechanisms to ensure a better follow-up after the military has finished its initial job of clearing
an area of enemy presence. In place, he proposes that improved coordination between the military and
civilian agencies: government agencies, local government units (LGU), and non-governmental
organizations (NGO) is necessary to ensure that the military’s responsibilities do not become overstretched.
Civilian scholars, on the other hand, are more concerned with the repercussions that CMO or
other non-traditional military activities have on democratic institutions. This strand of critical disposition
frequently falls under the academic study of civil-military relations. Not to be confused with CMO,
civil-military relations, in the simplest terms, concerns itself with civilian control over the military and the
mechanisms needed to ensure that the military submits to the authority of a democratic state.
Examining the military’s interventions in politics is beyond the scope of this research. However,
civil-military relations is a matter of interest for scholars in areas concerning COIN, because of the fear that
activities performed by the AFP outside of defense, have jeopardized civilian control over the Philippine
military.
Carolina Hernandez, who has done extensive research on the AFP, also turns her attention to the
14
civil-military relations aspect of the issue. She explains that President Ferdinand Marcos’ expansion of
the AFP’S role in development (frequently referred to as CMO) has “militarized the process on the
ground.” By this, she means that the government’s understanding of insurgency as a multi-dimensional
problem has allowed the military to expand their roles to tackle socio-economic areas, which in turn has

12
Dencio S. Acop, “Assessing the Expanded Role of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in Nation-builidng,”
Asia Pacific Social Science Review, June 12, 2006.
13
Lt. Col. Roy Devesa, Philippine Army, “An Assessment of the Philippine Counterinsurgency Operational
Methodology,” MMAS thesis, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: United States Army Command and General Staff
College, 2005, p. 69.
14
Carolina G. Hernandez, “Rebuilding Democratic Institutions: Civil-military Relations in Philippine
Democratic Governance”, in Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao, eds., Asian New Democracies: The Philippines. South
Korea, Taiwan Compared, Taipei: Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, 2006, 2008.

7
made the AFP dominate the spheres that are normally the remit of civilian authorities. Hernandez argues
that the military’s role in extra-military activities has paved way for the military to be the dominant actor in
security operations. This is a problem, she says, compounded by the fact that in conflict areas, there is a
lack of functioning government services, which inadvertently, makes the AFP the sole decision-maker in
communities.
Another analysis on how a distorted civil-military relationship can negatively impact CMO is
15
forwarded by Rosalie Arcala Hall. Her research centers on AFP operations against the communists in the
hinterlands of Central Philippines between the years 2003 and 2004. Her primary concern stems from her
findings that there is no civilian control over the AFP operating out on the frontlines. Hall argues that their
actions go largely unchecked and held unaccountable because of the lack of civilian oversight. She states
that the source of the problem comes from the fact the state places much of the COIN burden on the AFP,
especially in remote areas where there is limited government presence. Consequently, it is the AFP that
makes decisions over security with little or no consultation with civilian authorities.
While CMO is not the focus of her paper, Hall does reveal that there is a lack of civilian
participation in this area as well. Concerning CMO activities like civic action or information campaigns,
civilian participation is limited to its implementation. Hall argues that this is problematic because such
decision-making powers belong to the military, which not only endangers democratic principles, but it also
creates a biased assessment on the security problem. This leads to security measures that serve military
objectives rather than work for the interests of the local population. In short, it is stated that CMO, along
with other military operations, has to actively enlist the participation of civilians in “devising solutions for
the insurgency program.”

1.4.4 Deepening the Study

Existing literature sheds considerable light on CMO from a variety of perspectives. From the
military operational standpoint, the effects of the operation are examined for its impact in the psychological
domains. In particular, its utility in persuading the civilian audience through friendly measures is dwelt
upon in the works that are available. From the perspectives that deal with the military involving themselves
in realms outside of defense, studies explore the broader implications that a military institution has on the
state and the society at large. Earlier studies pursued the AFP’s role in socio-economic assistance for its
potential in accelerating development in a young Republic. At the same time, it can be gathered from later
studies that there is a degree of discomfort expressed by both military and civilian circles concerning the
over-expansion of military roles. From the military side, there is debate whether the military can afford to
engage in such activities without impacting its primary responsibility of defense. As from the civilian
scholars, they articulate problems that arise from the excessive entry of the military in areas normally
reserved for civilian agencies. Here, they point out that it dilutes civilian oversight, which ultimately leads

15
Rosalie Hall, "Living in the Shadow of Violence: Local Civil-Military Engagement during anti-Communist
Insurgency Operations in Central Philippines," paper delivered at “War and Our World” Conference, University
of Manchester, UK, July 19-21, 2008.

8
to an unhealthy tilt in the civil-military balance.
In summing up the literature that is available, it appears the focus is placed on studying what
CMO is either supposed to achieve or its effects and the broader implications it has on the military, society,
and state. While these arguments and insights are indispensable in exploring aspects of the AFP’s CMO and
they remain invaluable contributions to the field of study in which scholars are pursuing, the author
believes for the purpose of this research, the operation deserves more attention on the fundamentals of what
CMO is as a military operation. COIN is a long-drawn out process that includes a mixture of conventional
and unconventional methods. CMO belongs to the latter where its activities straddle both military and
civilian spheres. Resultantly, there is much confusion over what CMO is and in order to clear that up, it is
necessary to subject the operation to more intellectual rigor.
While paying homage to the works done by previous scholars, the thesis seeks to take an
approach that slightly departs from mainstream studies, and seeks to uncover the validity of CMO in the
realm of warfare. Rather than treat the operation as a binary opposite to combat, the research studies the
topic from the perspective that it is closely aligned to the application of force.

1.5 Research Methodology

1.5.1 Entry-point to the Research
The general understanding of CMO rests on diverting a portion of the military’s resources to
non-traditional military activities in areas such as civic action and public relations for the purpose of
winning the hearts and minds of the people. As the most magnified component of these operations is
friendly persuasion through good works, it is not uncommon to see it viewed for its dichotomous
relationship with the application of force. CMO is typically categorized under the headings of humanitarian,
non-traditional, non-combat, and indirect action and such such labeling obscures rather than illuminates its
operational use, which not only makes it more difficult to understand but also poses challenges for its
implementation. Though CMO departs from conventional military practices of preparing for and
conducting war, it still falls under the remit of military responsibilities, making it unavoidable to examine
the context (warfare) from which it derives from. Therefore, a conceptual framework that reconciles the
seemingly antipodal (binary) relationship between persuasive measures and coercive force is necessary to
probe deeper into the utility of CMO and subsequently use this to assess the operations within the
Philippines.

1.5.2 Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework used to guide the inquiry into CMO in the Philippines draws from
various theoretical contributions to insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN) studies, maneuver warfare,
and battlespace management. Details are fleshed out in chapter three, but it begins with studies on guerrilla
warfare. It reflects on the main challenges that a conventional force faces in tackling the guerrillas.
Drawing from Mao Tsu-tung’s treatise on guerrilla warfare, the study narrowed its focus on the
way guerrillas manage battlespace. The guerrillas transform the battlespace from one in which a

9
conventional force is most comfortable working with, to one that a conventional force has trouble
discerning its frontlines and its rear. The guerrillas rely on movement to avoid presenting themselves as
targets to a superior force, and they retreat into the depth, or the area behind the frontlines. The depth is of
particular interest for the counterinsurgent because it is in this dimension that they have the most trouble
reaching. The guerrillas are able to survive because they maximize the use of the depth that includes both
the complex physical terrain (jungles, mountains, forests, and urban areas) and the human terrain. While the
physical terrain provides concealment and a manmade or/ natural obstacle course for the regular army to
traverse through, it is the population that sustains their movement through their provision of sanctuaries,
supplies, recruits, and also the space for them to move in fluidly. These in effect, make it difficult for the
16
conventional force to apply firepower decisively.
The history of COIN reveals the variety of methods that the conventional forces uses to reach the
depth of insurgent battlespace. They include the abandonment of stationary defense in exchange of mobile
pursuit operations, improving reconnaissance, and overall attempts to discard the rigidity of thought that
accompanies a conventional force in dealing with a supposedly inferior force. CMO is one such operation
that is used, but is developed to deal exclusively with the population. Nonetheless, rather than treating the
operation singularly as a means to deal with the population component of the battlespace, it seeks to frame
it within a study that explores its relationship with coercive force and persuasive measures to reach the
depth of battlespace.
The underlying theoretical concept used to allow CMO to manage this depth, rests on the
principles of maneuver warfare. Maneuver is typically associated with movement, as troops look for
17
advantageous positions to direct a decisive blow on the armed opponent. When applied to CMO, F.G.
Hoffman theorizes that it is a “form of non-traditional maneuver” that seeks to generate and exploit
advantages over the insurgent by shaping not only the military dimension of the battlespace but also the
political, socio-economic, diplomatic, social, legal and informational dimension as well. In essence,
Hoffman argues that the concept of maneuver warfare has to go beyond the movement of troops in the
“spatial sense” and include non-tangible dimensions such as the support of the people.18 It is also a method
to generate opportunities in the depth that gives the counterinsurgent the edge they need to help defeat the
opponent.19
While it may appear at first glance delimiting to focus on the maneuver aspects of CMO, which is
based on a disciplinary approach derived from military studies, the complexities of this operation lie in the

16
Theoretical basis is drawn from Mao, Tse-Tung, Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung, Peking: Foreign
Language Press, 1967.
17
Traditional maneuver concepts are drawn from William S. Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook, Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 1985.
18
F.G. Hoffman, “Combating Fourth Generation Warfare”, in Terry Terriff, Aaron Karp and Regina Karp, eds.,
Global Insurgency and the Future of Armed Conflict: Debating fourth-generation warfare, London and New
York: Routledge, 2008, pp. 185-186; 188.
19
Maj. James D. Nickolas, “Inside the Battlespace of Stability Operations,” Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: School
of Advance Military Studies, US Army Command and General Staff College, 1999; Maj. Lee K. Grubbs and Maj.
Michael J. Forsyth, “Is There a Deep Fight in a Counterinsurgency,” Military Review, July-August 2005.

10
fact that it involves the society at large. It requires the military to understand the complex nature of
insurgency which is frequently rooted in the nation’s historical, socio, economic, and political dimensions,
in order to manage battlespace effectively.

1.5.3 Method of Data Collection

Data collection was adjusted to meet the needs and objectives of each section. In presenting the
general overview of CMO and building the conceptual framework, information was drawn from secondary
resources, primarily written by military scholars specializing in warfare studies. Additionally, in order to
incorporate the accepted principles and procedures of CMO and related operations, tertiary resources that
included military doctrines, field manuals, and dictionaries were relied upon.
In tracing the history of CMO in the Philippines, a combination of primary and secondary
resources was used. Particularly with the American colonial and Marcos period, archival and library
research for relevant material was conducted at various libraries in Manila. Personal interviews with AFP
officers also provided insight on the development of CMO since the 1980s.
In the section outlining CMO’s institutionalization, the scarcity of information made available to
the public, necessitated visits to the AFP headquarters in Manila and other AFP military installations. The
research mainly used primary techniques of data collection through military briefings and face-to-face
interviews with AFP officers. At the same time, wherever possible, information and comments gathered
were supplemented with media reports, theses and journal articles by Filipino officers, and government
documents such as policy outlines, statistical reports, circulars, and executive orders.
In the section that dealt with a case study of CMO practices on the ground, research trips were
made yearly from 2007 to 2010 to Zamboanga City and its neighboring vicinities. Information, opinion,
and insight was gathered primarily through face-to-face interviews with the local military command, the
American forces, the police, and NGOs/religious organizations, local government units, local government
agencies, and academia. The time spread over 4 years, allowed the researcher to conduct follow-up
interviews with key respondents. These interviews centered on pointed questions but left enough room for
additional information using soft questions. Thus, they were typically semi-structured and lasted anywhere
between 30 minutes and 3 hours.
Additionally, interviews were sought with CMO beneficiaries that loosely followed a survey
construct, but as the intentions were to make a qualitative analysis, outcomes were generated to form a
mini-narrative (details of interview methods should be referred to in chapter 7).

1.6 Definition of Terms

The following lists the definitions of terminology used in this research. As the existing definitions
are numerous and have variations, the definitions that the AFP provides and those that best fit the study
were selected.

Battlefield: The piece of ground, within more or less fixed physical parameters in which an overt

11
engagement of belligerents occurs.

Battlespace – For the purposes of this study, the author sums up that battlespace refers to one, a
geographical area where military operations take place or are expected to take place; two, the areas that
either belligerent has influence on and its forces can move freely in without the hindrance and obstruction
by the opposing force; and three, an area where the opposing force operates in, which may fall outside of
the area of influence of the commander but is still considered to have a potential impact on the military
mission.20

Battlespace dimensions – Battlespace dimensions constitute elements of a mental box that helps
commanders visualize the location of both friendly and enemy troops, and design operations accordingly.
21
These dimensions include width, height (air space), and depth (length). The width corresponds to the
“ground space occupied by the military force. The height represents the space required to employ weapon’s
effects. The depth represents both the distance of the weapons effects, plus the distance to the rear of the
22
military force and its logistics.”

23
Campaign: A “series of linked battles and engagements designed to meet the desired end state.”

Civil Military Operations (CMO): The AFP’s CMO are activities undertaken independent of or in
coordination with civilian entities to gain popular support, to strengthen the will of the soldiers to fight,
and weaken the will of the enemy to resist to support the accomplishment of military mission. They are
24
divided into three pillars: Civil Affair, Public Affairs, and Psychological Operations.

1.Civil Affairs: Formally known as the Civil Relations component of CMO, it is currently the pillar that
involves activities that seek the good will of the population and are often done in partnership with civilian
entities. Its ultimate objectives are to secure the environment so that other government agencies can
25
function and provide services to the community.

20
Ideas drawn from Mgr. Frank R. Boynton’s analysis of existing battlespace definitions in “Force Projection
Operations: Lesson from Amphibious Warfare Doctrine,” monograph, Fort Levenworth, Kansas: School of
Advanced Military Studies, May 23, 1996, pp. 6-9.
21
Department of the Army, FM 100-5, Operations, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, June
1993, pp. 6-12; 7-12; TRADOC Pamphlet 525-200-3, Dismounted Battlespace, Department of the Army
Headquarters, United States Army and Training and Doctrinal Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia, 1 June 1994, in
the foreword.
22
Department of the Army, FM 100-5, Operations, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, June
1993, p. 6-12; Major James D. Nickolas, “Inside the Battlespace of Stability Operations,” advanced military
studies monograph, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1999, p. 13.
23
Maj. Thomas P. Reilly, “Mao Tse-Tung and Operational Art during the Chinese Civil War,” advance military
studies monograph, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1997-98, p. 21.
24
Philippine Army, Civil-Military Operations Manual 7-00, Makati, 2002, p. 13. Hereafter cited as PAM 7-00.
25
Briefing provided by the National Development Support Command (NDSC) to the author, October 8, 2007,
Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, Philippines, Hereafter cited as NDSC briefing and date; PAM 7-00, p. 22.

12
2. Public Affairs: This is the pillar that deals with the public. It seeks to create trust with the people by the
timely dissemination of information through all available media such as the TV, radio, newspapers, and the
Internet. Additionally, it is not restricted to a one-way flow of information, but involves the participation of
people with soldiers in conducting symposiums, consultations, and dialogues in communities. Though
somewhat overlapping in civil affairs, soldiers also participate in community events such as festivals and
26
clean up drives.

3. Psychological Operations (Psyops): In the Philippine setting, Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) is

defined as a CMO pillar conducted to influence the beliefs, emotion, attitude, opinion and ultimately the
behavior of selected target audiences (primarily the enemy and secondarily its civilian supporters) toward
the accomplishment of the mission of military force. These are further divided into one, deeds propaganda
that deals with information to influence the attitudes of the target audience and two, deeds psyops that
involve combat and other activities that fall outside of “pure communication” but still seeks a psychological
27
effect on the target audience.

Counterinsurgency (COIN): These are, generally, operations conducted in response to insurgencies. In

theory, they include the whole government approach involving the following aspects: political, social,
economic, and security. Though “counter” can be read as “reactive”, the military generally avoids
transmitting this image and defines its role in COIN as military activities initiating action or proactive
28
measures against insurgents. Either way, counterinsurgency requires a significant re-orientation of the
29
military’s method of fighting that does not fit in comfort zones of established military institutions.

Guerrilla warfare: Insurgents are typically inferior to a conventional force in terms of official training,
equipment, organization, mechanized transport, and weaponry. Therefore, in order to offset their
disadvantages, insurgents rely on a set of tactics and strategies that deny conventional forces of doing what
they are best at, which is fighting a conventional war. In short, insurgents, seek to fight battles on their own
terms. They launch lightening attacks, accompanied by quick withdrawal; they do not seek to hold terrain
but capitalize on mobility; and they excel in concealing their movements. While the insurgents cannot
expect a decisive victory through their hit-and-run tactics, they seek to wear down the conventional force
30
through a protracted war.

26
NDSC briefing, October 8, 2007; PAM 7-00, p. 23
27
PAM 7-00, pp. 25-26.
28
Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam, New York:
Frederick A. Praeger 1966, p. 52.
29
Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency, Westport, CT: Praeger Security
International, 1964, 2006.
30
Mainstream understanding of insurgent warfare draws heavily from Mao Tse-tung’s writings on guerrilla
warfare. See Mao Tse-tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, trans. Samuel Griffith, Champaign, Illinois: University of
Illinois Press, 1961.

13
Insurgency: An armed manifestation of a political struggle against an incumbent authority of the state. The
objectives of an insurgency can range from the complete overthrow of the government to secession. In
some cases, political aims can be obscured by the contents of their activities that share more similarities
with violent criminal organizations.

Maneuver Warfare: Unlike attritional warfare, which entails the use of aggregated amounts of firepower
and manpower to wear down and defeat the opponent, maneuver warfare seeks to find positional
31
advantages over the opponent, for the purpose of directing firepower selectively. It is often associated
with movement in a “spatial sense”, as troops are moving over terrain to “generate and exploit opportunity”
to deal a blow on the opponent. Nevertheless, with increasing studies on insurgent warfare after 2001,
maneuver has come to be understood also as movement in psychological realms, where nontraditional
operations such as CMO play a role in exploiting opportunities that can be shaped from their interactions
32
with the population.

Military Civic Action (MCA): The AFP defines their version of MCA as the following: military initiated
developmental and sociological services to the people in order to promote public trust towards the
military… It can range upward from the delivery of basic services up to major engineering projects.
33
Popular forms of civic action are dental, medical, educational, and construction of roads and buildings.

Operational level: In the simplest terms, it is understood as the level that connects upper-strategy with
lower-tactics. It organizes planning and actions to shape tactics on the ground. More often than not, the
level points to a geographic area (theater and area of operations). It is also the level where campaigns and
major operations are planned and executed to attain strategic objectives. In regards to actual operations, it is
34
responsible for sequencing tactical actions in a coherent manner to reach military objectives. The
Philippine Army defines this level as operations conducted to reach mid-level or medium term objectives
35
and encompasses operations in support of unified commands and the campaigns of military divisions.

Tactical level: Located at a level where actual battles and engagements take place. The level concerns itself
on the arrangement and maneuver of friendly forces and enemy forces in relation to each other on the
ground. In other words, this is where troops have direct contact with the enemy and the population.
36
Tactics are shaped at the operational level. The Philippine Army defines this level as activities conducted

31
William S. Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook, Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1985, pp. 7; 19.
32
F.G. Hoffman, “Combating Fourth Generation Warfare”, in Terry Terriff, Aaron Karp and Regina Karp, eds.,
Global Insurgency and the Future of Armed Conflict: Debating fourth-generation warfare, London and New
York: Routledge, 2008, p. 185.
33
PAM 7-00, p. 24.
34
Department of the Army, FM 100-5, Operations, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, June
1993, pp. 1-3; 6-2; 6-12.
35
PAM 7-00, p. 19.
36
Department of the Army, FM-3-0, Operations, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, June

14
in battle zones that support short-term objectives. These activities typically fall under the responsibilities of
37
brigades, battalions, companies, platoons, teams and squads.

1.7 Scope and Delimitations

The scope of this study is limited to evaluating CMO’s effects as a counterinsurgency (COIN)
measure. Even though the author recognizes insurgency in the Philippines is a multi-faceted and
multi-layered problem emanating from weak governance, problems with elitist politics, lack of meaningful
38
socio-economic and political reform, and the treatment of minority groups, among others; for the
purpose of this research, the study remains within the confines of military studies, as it seeks to uncover
CMO’s utility as a military operation. Additionally, the study excludes CMO in disaster-relief and
humanitarian assistance for the purpose of retaining its focus on its COIN application.
In regards to the time frame, the study basically stops at 2010. The last research trip was made in
this year. 2010 can be considered to be a timely cut-off point because it coincides with the end of President
Gloria Macapgal-Arroyo’s presidency. However, any significant developments or events that have occurred
in the two years that followed are included either in the footnotes or in the concluding chapter.
Internal security problems in the Philippines are not concentrated in one area. Armed groups,
namely the communists, have presence throughout the archipelago. Nonetheless, due to time and resource
constraints, research trips were only made to Manila and Western Mindanao. In Western Mindanao, the
information gathered was used for the case study.

1.8 Limitations
A difficulty imposed on the author in conducting the research was gaining access to official
military publications and testimonies that dealt with the more sensitive side of CMO. The most challenging
was that the author could not access the AFP-CMO doctrine (2006). Therefore, its contents could only be
attained from personal interviews with AFP officials, other military publications, and existing research
made available to the public. Furthermore, certain aspects of the operation, especially those tied in directly
with combat or the deeds component of the psychological operations on which were not elaborated. Even
though attempts were made wherever possible to fill in these blanks by piecing together information from
outside sources, there were some constraints in providing a detailed analysis on these aspects.
It is also important to let the reader know, that direct information concerning the impact of CMO
in conflict zones was not accessible for the author. Moreover, interviews could not be secured with any
armed group, thereby making it difficult to discern their personal feelings concerning the supposed effects
of CMO. Wherever possible, interviews and information were gathered from other sources to help fill in
these gaps.

2001, pp. 2-3; 2-4.

37
PAM 7-00, p. 19.
38
See Temario C. Rivera, “The Crisis of Philippine Democracy”, in Hsing-Huang and Michael Hsiao, eds.,
Asian New Democracies: The Philippines, South Korea and Taiwan Compared, Taipei: Taiwan Foundation for
Democracy, 2008.

15
 Another limitation to this thesis lies in the findings from the case study. This case study was used
to demonstrate the utility of CMO operations on the ground after institutionalization. In the course of the
research, it became apparent that the finding made on Western Mindanao could not be directly transplanted
to other regions in the country. Military commands located throughout the country, face a different set of
challenges in their areas of responsibility, be it the context of a security problem or the AFP’s
relationship-dynamics with the people. Therefore, these differences will be noted in the conclusion.
Nonetheless, the most difficult aspect of measuring COIN success with the incorporation of
CMO is that it does not produce decisive results. Rather it is a cumulative effort that seeks to lead the
enemy into an intractable decline. Thus, even for this study, indicators of success still relied on traditional
methods, which include enemy strength (armed fighters and weaponry), number of armed incidents,
number of enemy-influenced communities, and progress in the peace talks.

1.9 Thesis Organization

The objective of Part 1 of the thesis (chapters 2 and 3) is to provide a general overview of CMO.
Chapter 2 begins with a portrayal of its historical roots in the world arena and traces its evolvement from
three different trajectories. This is followed by a summary of the definitions and operational concepts put
forth by various militaries. Chapter 3 centers on building a conceptual framework for the purpose of
understanding the utility of CMO in COIN operations. The framework draws its theories from battlespace
management in COIN and maneuver warfare.
Part 2 (chapter 4) focuses on the history of CMO in the Philippines. It begins with the emergence
of these practices during the American colonial era and ends with the administration of Joseph Estrada
(1998-2001). Particular attention will be paid to COIN campaigns waged by one, the Americans against
various Filipino revolts starting from 1898 until the mid-1930s; two, the Huk Rebellion during the
Magsaysay Era (1950-1954); three, the administration of Ferdinand Marcos (1965-1986); and finally, the
administration of Corazon Aquino (1986-1992). They deserve a more detailed analysis because they have
left significant imprints on CMO.
Part 3 (chapter 5-7) describes CMO in contemporary times. The focal point of this section is its
institutionalization in 2006. Chapter 5 sketches its path to its institutionalization. It identifies factors that
led to its revitalization and subsequently, its official recognition. Chapter 6 provides the operational
guidelines of CMO which was secured after the publication of its first doctrine in 2006. Chapter 7 uses a
case study to provide insight on whether institutionalization has helped increase CMO effects in the overall
COIN operations on the ground.
Part 4 (Chapter 8) seeks to summarize and analyze findings.

1.10 Significance of the Study

The culmination of this study hopes to provide some insight and information on aspects of CMO
where less attention is paid. After the Cold War, studies on CMO gained currency among academics and
military practitioners. The end of the bi-polar tensions allowed large powers and/or multinational forces to

16
engage in wars of choice. CMO emerged as an operation to reduce the impact of military operations on the
population, and furthermore, provide humanitarian assistance for people in war zones and in concert with
other international and local civilian agencies. Nevertheless, studies on CMO by indigenous armies remain
limited in contrast to expeditionary forces. Expeditionary forces operate under a different set of
circumstances. Most significantly, they are engaging in “wars of choices” and also have the resources and
capabilities to better accommodate the full-spectrum of conflict. In contrast, indigenous forces are often
under-resourced but are tasked to not only fight internal rebellions, but also to help the government extend
developmental work. Thus, CMO emerges from these circumstances. Nonetheless, the largest difference
between CMO in these nations, in contrast to expeditionary forces, is that operations are directed towards
their people. As a result, a substantially different set of dynamics come into play when integrating CMO in
COIN operations.
Additionally, even when CMO capabilities of indigenous forces are studied, they are from the
viewpoint of the intervening force. In the case of the Philippines, existing studies that focus on the joint
military partnership between the American and Filipino forces have a tendency to highlight American
39
challenges and contributions in stabilizing the security situation. This is not to say Filipino input is
overlooked but these studies are shaped for the most part, with American global security interests in mind.
Therefore, an in-depth examination on the subject from the Philippine side can help balance what has
already been produced.
Another factor in pursuing this research is that CMO is a difficult concept to understand,
primarily because it is an operation that straddles military and civilian spheres. CMO is frequently defined
for its aspects in winning the support of the population and its partnerships with civilian agencies, not to
mention also, that this has and continues to be considered “unmilitary-like” within the military institution.
These have the effect of limiting its understanding to a superficial level. In order to uncover more layers, it
was decided that the Philippines’ long experience in CMO and its recent revitalization would provide a
wealth of material from which to pursue the study.

39
Works that focus on joint Philippines-United States efforts in tackling terrorism in the Philippines are found
in the following: Major Stuart L. Farris, “Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines,” monograph, Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas: School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff
College, 2009; David C. Palilonis, “Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines: A Demonstration of Economy of
Forces,” thesis. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 2009; Col. Gregory Wilson, U.S. Army, “Anatomy of a
Successful COIN Operation: OEF-Philippines and the Indirect Approach,” Military Review,
November-December 2006, p.4 as printed out. Available at U.S. Army website:
http://www.army.mil/professionalWriting/volumes/volume5/january_2007/1_07_1.html. Accessed November 17,
2007.

17
Chapter 2. The Contemporary Understanding of CMO and Exploring its
Roots in Military History
2.1 Introduction
Civil Military Operations (CMO) is a term that began cropping up in military jargon after the
Cold War. This was the result of a change in the security environment, which dramatically altered defense
priorities. During the bipolar confrontation, military institutions planned and prepared for dealing with the
imminent threat of an interstate nuclear showdown, a contingency requiring the mobilization of
conventional capabilities. As ties improved between the former Cold War foes, nations, especially those
with the ability to project power, turned their attention to conflicts in areas, which did not necessarily pose
an immediate threat to their national borders. Also referred to as “wars of choice,” there appeared to be a
heightened sense of moral responsibility for the international community to deploy soldiers for military
and/or humanitarian intervention in distant lands. These conflicts frequently erupted as a result of ethnic or
1
religious tensions, separatist movements, and the breakdown of state functions. As attention turned to
stemming the violence and deflecting as much as possible the impact of war on civilians, an increased
recognition on the validity of civilian-like activities of the military came about. Nations with the ability to
project power such as the United States, United Kingdom, and international organizations like the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations (UN) made strides from applying activities,
such as coordinating with civilian agencies and extending humanitarian assistance, in an impromptu
2
manner to institutionalize its role in military operations proper. Yet, much of the core components,
categorized now under the heading of CMO such as civic action and civil affairs predate its contemporary
utilization and draw its roots from early military history.
The intentions of this chapter are to deliver a broad definition of CMO, explore the originating
sources and components of CMO, and then proceed to sketch-out its general application in the
contemporary world. For the purpose of understanding the context in which CMO was developed in the
Philippines, the chapter also devotes a section to looking at the different historical trajectories that the
practice evolved from.

2.2 Defining CMO

A number of military institutions and international organizations have produced their own
definitions of CMO with periodic updates to match the evolving challenges of the post-Cold War military
operational environment. In general, they conform to the operational principles that non-military

1
Giuseppe Caforio, ed., Science and the Military: An interdisciplinary overview, London and New York:
Routledge, 2007; Charles Moskos, John Williams, and David Segal, eds., The Postmodern Military: Armed
Forces After the Cold War, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
2
See sample works on how CMO or non-traditional military roles are viewed in the context of their respective
military traditions: from the European perspective that focus on peacekeeping: Charles Moskos, John Williams,
and David Segal, eds., The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces After the Cold War, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2000. From the American perspective: Richard A. Lacquement, Jr. “Integrating Civilian and Military
Activities,” Parameters, Spring 2010. From the British perspectives: Stuart Gordon, “Understanding the
Priorities for Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC), Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, 2001.

18
instruments of power are just as important as military ones in shaping the security environment; and that
the military has a valid role in undertaking tasks in the former. This view is largely backed by four views.
The first is to limit the interference that the population can have on military operations. For example,
managing the movement of people escaping from conflict. The second is that the degree of violence that
exists in an environment makes it difficult for civilian agencies to work unharmed without assistance from
the military. The third is that there is more concern for the population that frequently bears the heavy brunt
of the conflict. As a result, the intervening force is also expected to provide security and assistance to the
people. The fourth is that conflict is now recognized for its complex interplay of factors such as political,
socio-economic, and religious and ethnic tensions, which cannot be ignored by the military that is operating
3
in its midst. The common denominator regarding CMO activities is that it seeks to establish a
collaborative relationship with non-military actors out in the field, including civil authorities, humanitarian
agencies, and NGOs, for the purpose of stabilizing an area undergoing conflict. Areas of responsibility
include restoring civilian infrastructure, providing logistics and resource control, rendering humanitarian
assistance, protecting and supporting the population, and promoting legitimacy for the host government.
4
Additionally, CMO can take place both in hostile or non-hostile areas. For the military, these activities are
often considered a force enabler or force multiplier for its capability to shape the battlespace in favor of the
5
military and therefore help them accomplish its mission.
Though all members of the armed forces are expected to fulfill their part in CMO when called
upon, it is still an operation that requires expertise, which does not fall within the usual responsibilities of
the soldier. Therefore, militaries have dedicated units to facilitate such operations and draw its members
6
from both trained and experienced military personnel (Special Operations Forces and reservists) and
civilian experts (doctors, lawyers, engineers, police, computer programmers, bankers, etc.). For instance, in
the United States and United Kingdom, the units that support CMO are called Civil Affairs (CA) teams. CA
members liaise and coordinate with civilian actors in the battlespace on various projects. They also provide

3
A summary of these points are made in Richard A. Lacquement, Jr. “Integrating Civilian and Military
Activities,” Parameters, Spring 2010.
4
The United States military define CMO as “activities of a commander that establish collaborative relationships
among military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the
civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations are
nested in supporting the overall U.S. objective.” See Department of Defense, Joint Publication (JP) 3-57,
Civil-Military Operations, Washington, D.C.: CJCS, July 08, 2008. NATO defines their version of CMO,
referred to as CIMIC, as “The co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO
Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national
and non-governmental organisations and agencies.” See Allied Joint Publication-9, NATO Civil-Military
Co-operation (CIMIC) Doctrine, June 2003, p. 1-1. Hereafter cited as AJP-9, 2003.
5
AJP-9, 2003, p. 1-3; Department of Defense, Joint Publication (JP) 3-57, Civil-Military Operations,
Washington, D.C.: CJCS, February 8, 2001, pp. vii; x; 1-1. Hereafter cited as JP 3-57 ; Department of the Army,
FM41-10, Civil Affairs Operations, Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, February 14, 2000, ch.12; “Civil
Affairs.” Statemaster Encyclopedia, Nation Master.com. Available online at
http://www.statemaster.com/encyclopedia/civil-affairs.
6
Reservists are considered to be indispensable to CMO because of their experience working in the civilian
world. See Wayman D. Robertson and George A. Luz, “Reserve Component Role in Civic and Humanitarian
Assistance”, in John W. De Pauw and George A. Luz, eds., Winning the Peace: The Strategic Implications of
Military Civic Action, New York, Westport, Connecticut, and London: Praeger, 2003, ch.7.

19
the commander with the information he or she needs to deal with the population such as their cultural
7
background and their immediate needs. While they hold commonalities, the armed forces’ approach to
CMO reveal a differing military culture from which it has evolved from, leading to varying degrees of
emphasis on peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, counterinsurgency (COIN) and nation-building aspects
of CMO. With these in mind, the following sections explore its history.

2.3 Distant Roots

CMO would not even exist today nor lend justification to the soldier undertaking civilian tasks if
members of the armed forces did not have expertise in areas such as engineering, medicine, public health,
8
communications, transportation, logistics, and education. It holds true that soldiers are experts in violence
and the organization that they belong to is mandated to plan and mobilize for war. Yet, the act of war in
itself is a complex endeavor. Training limited to drills, marksmanship, physical fitness, and other curricula
related to advancing combat skills are not sufficient in managing battlespace. Long gone are those days
when wars were more simplistic, resembling sporting competitions in which one warrior outdid another
with strength and valor. Militaries have evolved to become large organizations that are faced with the
complexities of not only war but effectively run a large organization. Specialization beyond the realm of
war-making includes officers with administrative skills to oversee the organization, soldier-engineers for
building roads and bridges, doctors and nurses to maintain the health of military personnel, quartermasters
to handle supplies for the troops, and intellectuals to produce doctrines and field manuals. In short, the
military organization operates like a community operating in the civilian world, where the provisions of
9
services that are expected in civilian life are replicated within the camps or bases.
A launch pad in examining the roots of CMO is when the military began to develop capabilities
outside of war-making. And even so, extracting such date or time period is difficult to pinpoint precisely.
Since antiquity the military has always been involved one way or another in non-military forms of activity.
One place to begin is with the expansion of non-military technology (not involving the production of
10
weapons and arms), which played a critical role in managing battlespace and shaping warfare.
Early demonstrations of those capabilities are found in the military engineering feats realized in
the ancient empires. In the late Iron Age, armies were traveling longer distances and projecting power. An
enabling factor for the expansion was the building of roads to ensure “strategic mobility” and the
construction of fortresses to defend occupied territories. The ancient Roman Empire developed a
250,000-mile road network built mostly by army engineers that provided control over the empire and rapid

7
JP 3-57, pp. 1, 4, d.; FM 3-05.40 (FM 41-10), Civil Affairs Operations, Washington DC, Department of the
Army, 29 September 2006, pp. I-23; I-26- I-29. Hereafter cited FM 3-05.40 (FM 41-10), 2006.
8
Hugh Hanning, Peaceful Uses of the Military, New York: Praeger, 1967, pp. vvii; 28-30. Hereafter cited as
Hanning, Peaceful Uses of the Military.
9
Martin van Creveld, Technology and War: From 2000 B.C. to the Present, New York: The Free Press, 1989, pp.
141-146; 161-162. Van Creveld in these sections is making an analysis on how the development of technology
increases the specialization of soldiers. The thesis’ author applies his argument to put forward the idea that such
specialization is also the underlying basis of CMO.
10
Ibid., p. 49.

20
deployment of troops. At the same time, these roads benefited civilians in terms of transport and
11
commerce. Militaries also had manpower at their disposal and in the Warring States Period of ancient
12
China, commanders made use of their soldiers in public works in-between campaigns. Alexander the
Great (356B.C.-323 B.C.) also had engineers directly under his command and were utilized to build
battering-rams, siege towers, ramps, bridges, and military bases, and unknown hitherto, infrastructure for
13
the occupation of his rapidly expanding empire. Centuries later, the 19th century United States, still a new
nation, tapped into the technical expertise of graduates from military academies to undertake construction
14
projects such as roads, bridges, and laying down telegraph wires to expand its Western Frontier.
Such expertise became more meshed with political aspects during the colonial period. Following
the Age of Exploration, colonial powers such as Britain, France, the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, and later
the United States practically reached all corners of the globe in the aggrandizement of their empires. While
undeniably brute force was used to drive the natives into submission, empires also had to contend with the
overall administration of the colonies. As succinctly put by Douglas Porch, “Imperialism…was essentially
a military phenomenon.” It was the soldier who determined the battles and it was the soldier oversaw
15
control over the subjugated areas.
During this era, the British army was configured to engage in expeditionary wars and the
occupation of its empire. Colonial forces did not have enough personnel to administer a large population,
thereby making it more practical to take an indirect approach to governance. This resulted in a development
of civil expertise within the military which involved working with colonial subjects and deemed more
effective than putting energy and resources into repressive measures that would ultimately alienate and
16
incite rebellion from the population. Thomas Mockaitis points out that the British developed the
17
know-how of civil-military cooperation from their colonial policing and John A. Nagl adds that this
experience helped the British later to deal with the political-military aspects of counterinsurgency (COIN)
18
in the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960).
The overseas tenures in France’s colonies by General Hubert Lyautey also demonstrated the
complicated mixture of civilian-military duties that the soldiers participated in. Deeply impressed by his

11
Richard A. Gabriel, and Donald W. Boose, The Great Battles of Antiquity A Strategic and Tactical Guide to
Great Battles That Shaped the Development of War, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994. 7, Questia, Web, 10
Dec. 2010; John Keegan, A History of Warfare, New York, Vintage Books, 1993, pp. 139-141.
12
Samuel B. Griffith, “The Warring States,” in Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. and with an introduction by
Samuel B. Griffith, London, Oxford, and New York: Oxford University Press, 1963, 1971, p. 28.
13
J.F.C. Fuller, The Decisive Battles of the Western World 450 B.C. – 1757, vol. I.ed. by John Terraine, Herts:
Paladin, 1970, p. 98.
14
Jerold E. Brown, ed., Historical Dictionary of the US Army. Westport, CT, Greenword Press, 2001, p. 101.
15
Introduction by Douglas Porch in Col. C.E. Callwell. Small Wars: Their Principles & Practice. 3rd ed.
Lincoln and London: University of the Nebraska Press, 1996, p. v.
16
Col. C.E. Callwell. Small Wars: Their Principles & Practice. 3rd ed. Lincoln and London: University of the
Nebraska Press, 1996, pp. 35-37; 41-43.
17
Thomas Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency 1919-60, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990 in John A. Nagl,
Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago: Chicago
University Press, 2002.
18
John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam,
Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2002, p. 219. Hereafter cited as Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife.

21
experiences in his first posting in Indochina in 1894, where agricultural assistances, infrastructure
development, and construction of markets were rendered by colonial forces to help the populace, he carried
these ideas to Madagascar, Algiers, and Morocco. Though he never underrated the importance of combat
operations, he disdained a complete resort to force to suppress incalcitrants and preferred to share the
benefits of Western civilization to the populace. Resultantly, his interest in the political aspects of
colonization superseded military ones, and while being in the position of a professional soldier, he
betokened to a certain degree, what became the de rigueur for COIN operations in the 1950s and 1960s.19
The United States, a late arrival in the colonial scene, also had their share in handling activities
outside of fighting. They involved work in education, public health, and sanitation, among other civil
administrative duties during the transitional phase from military to civilian authorities. The practice was
particularly pronounced during the Philippine-American War (1899-1902) and the colonial period that
followed it. American soldier used a mixture of force and a policy of attraction through extensive public
works and social assistance programs to establish American control over its new colony.20
These extra-military capabilities, transmitted from generation to generation, are an un-detachable
part of the military. It would not be an overstatement to say that the built-in expertise of the military
regarding these areas provided some of the building blocks for CMO. Nevertheless, the organization of
these activities into a recognized category, that takes into account the population as an important variable in
the outcome of a war, did not emerge until the latter-half of the 20th century.

2.4 Direct Antecedents

2.4.1 Introduction
The author contends that the direct forerunners of modern-day CMO have evolved largely from
three tracks. The first stems from World War II when Allied powers took into deeper consideration the
impact war had on the population and the occupational experience the Allied Powers had in their defeated
territories after the war. The second is from the counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns waged by the
Democratic bloc against the tide of armed communist movements that swept through the Third World at the
height of the Cold War. Both were essentially experiences belonging to Western powers. The third track lies
in the development of CMO in the armed forces in developing nations, a majority of them gaining
independence from colonial powers after World War II. Unlike Western powers, their experience with CMO
evolved from within their national borders.

2.4.2 The Development of CMO during and after World War II

The first section will outline the roots of contemporary CMO from World War II. In the European
theater, the Allied forces had to develop a “practical” solution to the interruption of military operations
caused by the large-scale evacuation of people, not to mention attend to their welfare. This prompted the

19
Op cited in Robert B. Asprey. War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History. Vol.1. Lincoln, N.E.: iUniverse,
Inc., 1994, 2002, pp. 150-158.
20
Ibid., p. 46.

22
Allied Forces including the United States and Great Britain to establish units dedicated to the civilian
component of the battlefield, where much of the focus was on mitigating inadvertent civilian interference
21
on military operations. These were called Civil Affairs (CA) Divisions and they continue to exist today
in supporting the planning and implementation of CMO.
In the immediate aftermath of the war, the United States also mobilized CA to play a key role in
the administration of occupied territories of Japan and Germany. The war was such that its conclusion
could only be brought about with the unconditional surrender of the Axis powers. The United States
military went beyond “liberating” these nations from “fascist” rule to take on the responsibility of
temporarily occupying these nations to ensure political rehabilitation, economic reconstruction, and the
immediate relief to the population. Initially referred to as the military government, it was later renamed
Civil Affairs.
This was not entirely new to the United States. In its war with Mexico (1846-1848), the United
States ended up setting up a temporal government in Mexico after defeating its neighbor in order to govern
22
its territory, establish security, aid in fiscal recovery, and administer civil affairs. The American Civil War
also experienced a similar endeavor by the government forces in the South during the Reconstruction
Period. But it was only during World War II that any serious attempts were made to institutionalize the
process by creating a specialized branch known as Civil Affairs (CA). CA is roughly divided into two
areas: one is civil administration where an occupying military assists foreign governments in meeting the
23
basic requirements of governing the people and secondly, extending socio-economic projects.
In the case of Japan and the Germany, the United States mandated it’s military to administer the
defeated nations and take responsibility over the welfare of the vanquished people until the host nation and
its civilian agencies could function on its own. The long-term objectives of this endeavor were to ultimately
produce American-friendly governments as the world was beginning to divide into two ideological camps.
24

In sum, the CMO from this track evolved from one, to limit civilian interference in military
operations; two, born out of humanitarian concerns for people caught in the throes of conflict; and three; as
a means to shape the post-war battlespace to serve geostrategic interests.

2.4.3 The Counterinsurgency Tradition

2.4.3.1 Understanding Counterinsurgency (COIN)
The development of CMO also comes from another strain of military tradition, which is

21
Stuart Gordon, “Understanding the Priorities for Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC),” Royal Military
Academy Sandhurst, 2001.
22
John T. Fishel, Civil Military Operations in the New World, Westport, CT, Praeger, 1997, p. 6; Stanley Sandler,
“Glad to See Them Come and Sorry to See Them Go: A History of U.S. Tactical Civil Affairs/ Military
Government, 1775-1991,” Fort Bragg, N.C: US Army Special Operations Command, 1998, pp. 35-43.
23
Jerold E. Brown, ed., The Historical Dictionary of the US Army, Westport, CT: Greenword Press, 2001, p.
100.
24
John T. Fishel, Civil Military Operations in the New World, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997, ch. 1 Questia, Web,
30 Nov. 2010.

23
counterinsurgency (COIN). These are wars waged by government forces against armed people that are
banded together in order to achieve political aims such as liberation from an occupying foreign power,
revolutionary overthrow of the incumbent government, break away from the state, or even have their
grievances stemming from socio-economic disparities, unresolved land issues, and ethnic/religious disputes
acted upon.
While the Cold War represents a period where militaries raced to build conventional capabilities
under the thickening clouds of a nuclear standoff, actual fighting occurred under the nuclear threshold.
Powers from the Democratic bloc became increasingly concerned that armed developments in newly
established states or regions trying to wrest back control from the colonial powers, were in large part,
ideologically rooted in communism. Consequently, from the late 1940s and peaking in the 1970s, they
stepped up their off-shore involvement, sending their troops to in order to protect their overseas’ vital
interests. COIN was born out of these circumstances, and more specifically, from an American-led foreign
25
policy measure that sought to contain the spread of communism. Some examples of these interventions
include the British in the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) and the Americans in the Vietnam War
(1955-1975).
The basis of these wars was embedded in a web of factors that drew in part, from indigenous
resistance movements against the Japanese during the Second World War. After the war, these resistance
groups morphed into wars of liberation and/or against the newly established government. To add to the
complexities, in 1948, Joseph Stalin endorsed communist armed uprisings in the Far East, as a means to
add pressure on the Western bloc. The Chinese communists also followed this line. Even though by the
1950s, the Soviets did not determine policies for communist uprisings in Vietnam and Cuba and China’s
seriousness in her commitment to instigate regional uprisings were fading, the United States had already
viewed the growing insurgencies as a sign that communist influence was spreading in the less-developed
26
parts of the world and crafted policies to contain them.
The United States has referred to these wars as “limited brush-fire wars,” asymmetric wars,
low-intensity conflict (LIC), irregular wars, insurgencies, and unconventional wars. These terms tend to
underline the imbalance or disparity in the capabilities existing between a regular force and an irregular
force. Nonetheless, while the regular army has the advantage of superior firepower, hardware, and troop
organization, the irregular troops (guerrillas or insurgents) could offset these deficiencies by exploiting time,
space, and psychological factors that included gaining the support of the people. Unlike the conventional
forces that seek to capture and occupy key physical terrain, insurgents put off such objectives until they
reach military parity with the opposing force. In the meantime, they rely on hit and run tactics to harass and
27
wear down the conventional forces over an extended period.

25
Douglas S. Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance: 1950 to the Present, New
York, The Free Press, 1977, p. 1-2; Martin Van Crevald, Technology and War: From 2000 B.C. to the Present,
New York: The Free Press, 1991, p. 303.
26
Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era, pp. 15-21.
27
John Baylis, James J. Wirtz, Colin S. Gray, eds., Strategy in the Contemporary World, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2007, pp. 167-176; John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency

24
 For the counterinsurgent, the approach to waging such wars is typically framed by two methods:
the direct approach or the indirect approach. The direct approach centers on a military solution where the
physical annihilation of enemy forces is the main objective. This relies on massive firepower in which for
the most part, collateral damage cannot be avoided. On the other hand, the indirect approach combines
military action with socio-economic-political measures. Actual force is used more sparingly, to avoid
28
alienating the population.
The unfolding of the COIN era directed considerable attention on the indirect approach. The
underlying basis of this approach stemmed from the view that victory could not be attained over the
29
insurgent in a set-piece battle. For the insurgent, a battle-loss did not spell surrender. Rather, his ability to
secure the resources to wage small-scale skirmishes indefinitely gave them a powerful edge over a
conventional force. What sustained this insurgent activity became a focal point in COIN.
By the 1960s, many COIN experts concurred on the factor that the population was the source of
30
strength and at the same time, a critical vulnerability for the insurgents. It was primarily the support from
the population that allowed the insurgents to conceal themselves and obtain lines of communication,
31
financial support, intelligence, and recruits. Therefore, the indirect approach was devised in accordance
32
with the population as the center of gravity (COG) and a considerable amount of COIN efforts were
directed towards denying the insurgents their links with the population.

2.4.3.2 “Winning Hearts and Minds”

A representative example of severing the link between the population and the insurgents is using
friendly persuasion. It is a type of psychological operation that seeks to influence the emotions and attitudes
of the target audience for the purpose of creating a “desired behavior” that ultimately works in favor of the
military mission. When these operations target a friendly, neutral, or hostile population, information
33
campaigns and social programs are implemented to dissuade people from supporting the insurgents.

Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2002, pp. 26-29. Hereafter cited as Nagl,
Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife.
28
F.G. Hoffman, “Combating Fourth Generation Warfare”, in Terry Terriff, Aaron Karp, and Regina Carp, eds.,
Global Insurgency and the Future of Armed Conflict: Debating fourth-generation warfare, London and New
York: Routledge, 2008, pp. 178-180.
29
Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency, Westport, Connecticut and London:
Praeger Security International, 1964, 2006, p. 5. Hereafter cited as Trinquier, Modern Warfare.
30
David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, Westport, Connecticut and London: Praeger
Security International, 1964, 2006; George K. Tanham, Communist Revolutionary Warfare: From the Vietminh to
the Viet Cong, Westport, Connecticut and London: Praeger Security International, 1961-2006; Trinquier, Modern
Warfare; Napolean D.Valeriano and Charles T.R. Bohannan, Counter-Guerrilla Operations: The Philippine
Experience, Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 1962, 2006.
31
Department of the Army, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
December 2006, pp. 3-13.
32
In military terms center of gravity (COG) is the capability or resources that the enemy and friendly forces
derive their freedom of action, physical strength, and will to fight. In simpler terms, targeting COGs remove the
source of strength from the opposing force. More information can be found in Department of the Army, FM 3-24,
Counterinsurgency. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 2006, p. 3-13.
33
Department of the Army, FM 3-05.301, Psychological Operations, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
(FM33-1-1), Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Office Printing Office, December 2003, pp. 1-1 – 1-6.

25
 Referred to as “winning hearts and minds” in popular vernacular, this was in fact developed in
34
response to Mao Tse-tung’s tenets of warfare. Eminent COIN thinkers of the period such as David Galula,
George K. Tanham, Roger Trinquier, Naoplean D. Valeriano, and Charles T.R. Bohannan, among others, do
not fail to bring up this element of Mao in their writings. In particular, they use Mao’s analogy of fish in the
sea where the fish represents the insurgent and the sea, the population. As with fish that cannot live without
water, the insurgents cannot survive without the support of the population. Mao understood that in order for
the communists to gain popular support, the Red Army could not take on a purely military approach.
Soldiers had to be prepared to undertake tasks outside of fighting, which included conducting propaganda
35
work among the masses and organizing them into political fronts. Mao devoted his energies into building
their image by responding to the people’s grievances and ensuring that the soldiers behaved properly in
36
their interactions with the people. The army’s ability to systematically organize people’s support into
base areas ultimately provided them with an area to withdraw to, have people provide information about the
enemy and conversely block information from the enemy, produce armed recruits, provide transportation,
37
supplies, etc.
The insurgencies that ensued after the end of Second World War, including the Huk Rebellion in
the Philippines, the Chinese-communist movement in Malaya, and the Viet Minh and later the Viet Cong in
Vietnam, have in varying degrees integrated Mao’s principles of guerrilla warfare in their line of operations.
In particular, the Viet Minh adhered to Mao’s line of placing weight on the political aspects of war and
soldiers underwent political indoctrination. The establishment of a solid political front subsequently
allowed the Viet Minh to conduct propaganda, socio-economic programs, not to mention, “selective terror,”
38
which effectively led to the mobilization of people en masse against the French.
Thus, wresting the support of the population from the clutches of insurgents became an important
theme for COIN planners. As a means to psychologically persuade the population in favor of the
counterinsurgent, military civic action became one of the most widely used activities. Broadly defined,
military civic action is the use of military forces in projects that promote economic development and
39
delivery of basic services to the population.

34
See Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, p. 28 on further discussions on the direct and indirect
counterinsurgency approach. Mao Tse-tung was the visionary leader of the Chinese communists that fought the
Kuomintang, then the Japanese invasion, and then reverted to ousting the Chinese nationalist party that
embroiled the country in a civil war.
35
Mao Tse-Tung, “On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party,” in Selected Military Writing of Mao Tse-Tung,
Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1967, p. 54.
36
Read Mao Tse-Tung, “On Guerrilla Warfare,” in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung: Vol. IX, ch. 1, ch. 6.
Available online at: http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/1937/guerrilla-warfare.
37
Mao Tse-Tung, “Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War,” December 1936, in Selected Military Writing of
Mao Tse-Tung, Peking: Foreign Lanugae Press, 1967. p. 114.
38
George K. Tanham, Communist Revolutionary Warfare: From the Vietminh to the Viet Cong, Westport,
Connecticut and London: Praeger Security International, 1961-2006, pp. 16-17; 29; 113.
39
The United States military define MCA as “the use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects
useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture,
transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development,
which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces in the eyes of the population.” Department
of the Army, Field Manual 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,

26
 COIN measures led by indigenous and/or intervening government forces made use of civic action
to take a more comprehensive approach to the insurgency problem. Military civic action, under the
overarching objective of “winning hearts and minds” had various sub-objectives. The first was to minimize
40
as much as possible, the negative impact of standard military operations on the people. This involved
using military capabilities such as in civil engineering to rebuild broken infrastructure; and in the medical
fields, to provide medical treatment to the people. For instance in Vietnam, the Americans provided
41
treatment for South Vietnamese casualties of war, on top of other ailments and illnesses. Another was to
provide assistance in socio-economic realms as a supporting instrument in removing the sources of
42
instability. Nevertheless, it cannot be forgotten that though the military’s interaction with civilians during
a war was relatively a new phenomenon and still in the process of experiencing professional development,
the means used to “win hearts and minds” was derived from existing capabilities within the military such as
43
civil engineering and medical assistance.

17 December 1985, pp.1-6; 3-2.

40
John W. De Pauw, “Understanding Civic Action” in eds. John W. De Pauw and George A. Luz, Winning the
Peace: The Strategic Implications of Military Civic Action, New York, Westport, Connecticut, and London:
Praeger, 1992, p. 4.
41
Jeffrey Greenhut, “Medical Civic Action” in John W. De Pauw and George A. Luz, eds. Winning the Peace:
The Strategic Implications of Military Civic Action, New York, Westport, Connecticut, and London: Praeger,
1992, ch. 9.
42
Hanning, The Peaceful Uses of Military Forces, p.8; John W. De Pauw, “Understanding Civic Action” in eds.
John W. De Pauw and George A. Luz, Winning the Peace: The Strategic Implications of Military Civic Action,
New York, Westport, Connecticut, and London: Praeger, 1992, p. 4.
43
Hanning, Peaceful Uses of the Military, pp. 29-31.

27
Text Box 2.1: Vietnam - CORDS

Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) 1967-1971

The United States’ involvement in Indochina culminated into the Vietnam War. Failures in
securing a democratic government to help stem the tide of communism were exacerbated with a military
strategy that overly relied on firepower and a conventional posture. However, there were attempts to use
“pacification” or operations to gain the support of the people for the South Vietnamese government. Civil
Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) was established to create a military-civilian
apparatus that involved personnel from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the United States
Information Agency (USIA), Agency for International Development (AID), the State Department, the
White House, agencies from the South Vietnam government, and all military services. It was supposed to
be a large-scale project to disrupt the Vietnamese insurgents’ political and military infrastructure through
44
projects that would empower rural villages in areas of security and economic development.
Overall assessment on the concept of CORDS in itself was not negative in the sense that it was
the first time that the United States began to seriously link agencies together in a coordinated effort in
45
Vietnam to take comprehensive action towards the deeper problems of insurgency. Even though there
was a growing acceptance for the soldiers to undertake non-military roles such as protecting civilians and
assisting in rural development in order to separate the insurgents from the populace, CORDS could not
contribute to the COIN effort because the military organizational culture was steadfast in its ways of using
massive firepower. This rigidity did not allow room for the full utilization and proper implementation of
46
these projects to win hearts and minds.

2.4.3.3 Physically Separating People from the Enemy

De-linking the population from the enemy was not only limited to changing the attitudes of the
people. Counterinsurgents also sought to physically separate the population from the enemy. The main
objectives were to cut off supply lines to the guerrilla and help them in differentiating the civilians from the
enemy. For reasons stemming from the fact that it exacts hardships on the people through forced removal
and constraints on their freedom of movement, it is generally not considered ethical, and subsequently is
not practiced today. Yet, it reflects an early method in dealing with the population variable of a conflict.

44
Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era, pp. 249; Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, pp. 165-166
45
See Richard Weitz, “CORDS and the Whole of Government Approach,” Small Wars Journal, Volume 6, No.1,
Feb. 4, 2010, pp. 1-9, for an assessment on CORDS.
46
Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era, pp. 288-289. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, pp. 171-180.

28
Text Box 2.2: Algeria - Defensive Grid System (Quadrillage)

The Algerian War (1954-1962)- Defensive Grid System (Quadrillage)

The French forces determined that population control was necessary to protect civilians from
insurgent attacks and systematically cut the enemy off from their support base. A system of gridding was
introduced where security forces would be integrated into these tightly defended hamlets. These areas were
administered through sectors and sub-sectors with civilian leaders entrusted to take care over their
designated areas. In rural areas, the population was relocated and resettled in camps. Residents were issued
census cards that not only identified them and the households they belonged to, but also the livestock they
kept. In this way, the French forces could keep tabs on the population and monitor the flow of their food
supply in and out of a designated hamlet. Food rations were also implemented to ensure that extra food was
47
not passed on to the insurgents. The outcome of these resettlement projects did not produce the results
the French wanted, primarily because it could not deny the insurgents of their mobility. The insurgents
expanded their operations beyond the quadrillage areas to reach all corners of the colony. Moreover, it had
48
the negative effect of alienating the population by the hardships that accompanied these relocations.

Text Box 2.3: Malaysia -The Briggs Plan

Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) – “The Briggs Plan”

The British fought in the Malay Communist Party (MCP) in a guerrilla warfare that took place in
their colony after World War II. The MCP depended on its food, support, and recruits from the squatter
population living on the jungle fringe. In order to sever the MCP’s link to the population, a massive
resettlement program called the “Briggs Plan” was introduced and 400,000 peasants were moved to new
settlements (“New Villages”) that provided both security and basic social services. This project was
instrumental in cutting off supplies to the guerrillas and is considered to be a turning point in the British
49
COIN effort, leading to the eventual demise of the MCP.

47
Read the following books for the tactical and strategic objectives of population control. David Galula,
Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, Westport, CT and London, Praeger Security International,
1964, 2006 pp. 81-85; Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency, Westport, CT
and London, Praeger Security International, 1964, 2006, pp. 60-66.
48
See effects of quadrillage in Robert M. Riggs, “Counter-insurgency Lessons From the French-Algerian War,”
paper, Naval War College, Newport. R.I.: Joint Military Operations Department, September 2004.
49
Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era, pp. 42-43.

29
Text Box 2.4: Vietnam - Strategic Hamlet Program

Vietnam War – “Strategic Hamlet Program”

The American forces and the Government of South Vietnam (GVN) relocated isolated villagers in
fortified settlements known strategic hamlets or agrovilles. The concept was borrowed from the British
COIN method in Malaya for the purpose of physically cutting the population’s links with the insurgent. It
originated in Vietnam from GVN’s plan to deal with the insurgent’s base of support which was the rural
folk. In the early 1960s, the United States and GVN officially joined hands in relocating and resettling
peasant rural communities in fortified villages in attempts to cut off population ties with the Communist
insurgents. At the same time, these villages were supposed to improve the socio-economic well being of the
50
people. The program appeared to have some effect by 1962, since the Viet Cong were forced to deal with
the immediate impact of these hamlets by diverting energies into destroying them and propaganda activities
51
to discredit the GVN. If the program had been subjected to more funds, less corruption, and general
appreciation on the roots of insurgency, it may have up to a certain degree flushed out the Viet Cong from
these areas, and helped with the livelihood of peasants through the economic development of these
52
hamlets. Nevertheless, the plan that worked in Malaya failed miserably in Vietnam since these peasants
were forced off their ancestral lands and made to live in hamlets that lacked constructive government
53
support. This in turn, fueled more support for the Viet Cong and the program fizzled out in 1963.

2.4.3.4 Summary of CMO Roots in Counterinsurgency

CMO in the COIN trajectory evolved from the growing recognition, that the direct approach
produces limited results especially when insurgencies are embedded in a complex web of political, social,
and economic factors. Beginning from the late 1940s, the population was taken more seriously in planning
for military operations. Armies hell-bent on massive destruction were not only considered to be
inappropriate for democracies, but were also thought to have the effect of losing the support of the
54
people. Therefore, CMO emerged as a means for soldiers to secure strategic and tactical objectives with
minimal force through the inclusion of non-military activities. In one sense, these activities resembled
humanitarian assistance but it cannot also be forgotten that CMO was adopted in the context of an armed
55
political struggle.

50
Tanham, Communist Revolutionary Warfare, p. 72.
51
Ibid., p. 72.
52
Donald W. Hamilton, The Art of Insurgency: American Military Policy and the Failure of Strategy in
Southeast Asia, Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1998, pp. 129-130; 142-145.
53
Ibid., pp. 129-130; 142-145.
54
Gavin Bullock, “Military Doctrine and Counterinsurgency: A British Perspective,” Parameters, Summer,
1996, pp. 1-2.
55
Richard L. Sutter, “Strategic Implications of Military Civic Action,” in Winning the Peace: The Strategic
Implications of Military Civic Action, eds., John W. De.Pauw and George A. Luz, pp. 163-165.

30
2.4.4 CMO and Southeast Asia
2.4.4.1 Overview
The practice of CMO in developing countries has followed a different trajectory from their
Western counterparts. As the topic is expansive, the study limits itself to those nations in Southeast Asia,
many of them achieving statehood after the war. CMO has only recently latched on in usage, especially
56
within military circles but terminology such as “winning hearts and minds,” non-traditional roles of the
military, nation-building, peaceful uses of the military (PUMP), or military civic action were already in
circulation since the end of the Second World War. Actual delineation in terms of objectives can br
befuddling since they can swing either towards a developmental orientation or a COIN orientation and
more than often, are combined to achieve a multiple effect. This is undeniably due to the fact; the military
institution in Southeast Asia has been characterized for their pronounced role in state-building.
Understanding CMO within this contexture requires a cursory look at the recent history of the
region. Since the end of World War II, countries achieved their independence in succession and began an
arduous process of de-colonization and state-building. For those countries that gained independence, the
colonial powers left a legacy of state boundaries that marked their territory for administrative purposes,
rather than reflect ethnic or religious makeup. Consequently the leadership of these fledgling states was
faced with the challenge of achieving political legitimacy, building a collective identity to bind the new
nation, and implementing policies that accommodated groups divided along ethno-religious-linguistic
57
lines. Many of the states experienced an over-centralization of power by the ruling elite that failed to
represent the uniform needs of the entire state, leaving minority or fringe groups, the most neglected and
58
disaffected.
Since the state lacked an institutional framework that could channel opposition voices into
meaningful changes, aggrieved groups were left with the limited option of an armed uprising. For the
central government, their option in dealing with civil disobedience and suppressing opposition was
unleashing the military and other security forces (the police and militia). Thus, the security apparatus
became the elite’s repressive tool to maintain their control over the state. Resultantly, it fueled further
internal unrest, and the armed aspect took the form of secessionism, ethnic conflict, subversion or

56
Aside of the Philippines, the Royal Thai Military also uses the term CMO. Similar to the Philippines, its
version of CMO was developed in response to the communist insurgency during the Cold War. Currently, CMO
is still development-oriented but is also geared toward terrorism, drug problems and transnational crime. For
more details about CMO in Thailand see Aries A. Arugay, “The Military Along the Security Development
Frontier: Implications for Non-traditional Security in the Philippines and Thailand,” NTS-Asia Research Paper
No. 10, Singapore: RSIS Centre for Non-traditional Security (NTS) Studies for NTS-Asia, 2012, pp. 16-19.
57
Alan Collins, Security and Southeast Asia: Domestic, Regional, and Global Issues, London: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 2003, p.10. Hereafter cited as Collins, Security and Southeast Asia; Rajat Ganguly, “Introduction:
The Challenge of Ethnic Insurgency and Secession in South and Southeast Asia”, in Rajat Ganguly and Ian
Macduff, eds., Ethnic Conflict and Secessionism in South and Southeast Asia: Causes, Dynamics, Solutions,
New Delhi, Thousand Oaks, & London: Sage Publication, 2003. Hereafter cited as Ganguly, “Introduction: The
Challenge of Ethnic Insurgency and Secession in South and Southeast Asia.”
58
Ganguly, “Introduction: The Challenge of Ethnic Insurgency and Secession in South and Southeast Asia,” pp.
11-12; 16-17.

31
 59
revolutionary movements inspired by communist ideology.
Another factor that strengthened the internal-orientation of the militaries was the presence of an
extra-regional power. During the Cold War, countries in the anti-communist camp such as the Philippines
and Thailand forged military alliances or security arrangements with the United States. In exchange for
their support, especially in allowing the United States to use their soil to build bases, they secured military
assistance in terms of financing, hardware support, training, and advice. In short, the United States
guaranteed security to these states from external attack, while providing assistance in fighting the
communist expansion within and along their borders. This in turn, allowed such nations to devote their
60
military resources into quelling internal rebellions.

2.4.4.2 Security and Development

The circumstances of such shaky and precarious beginnings also placed the military in yet
another role, which is nation-building. In the 1950s and 1960s, scholars broached the topic of the military’s
role in nation-building from the standpoint that the military had the potential to expedite the
democratization process and economic development of a fledgling republic. W.W. Rostow forwards the
theory that countries could “take-off” or arrive at a stage where sustained economic growth can be achieved
61
if certain pre-conditions were met. In one of them, he argues that in a developing country, the military
has the potential to form the elite group, which could organize policies for the economic development of a
nation. The basis for his argument was that the military had a more sophisticated organization than any of
the newly established government bureaucracies. It also had at its disposal a pool of technical and
administrative experts, soldiers with a modern outlook due to their international exposure e.g. military
62
officers being trained in military academies in the West, and a strong sense of nationhood. Akin to the
idea that the military was a “modernizing agent,” Lucien Pye also expressed that technical training within
the military provided the country with skills, which are needed for economic development. Those included
63
civil engineering, operating machinery, managerial skills, and industrial work.
The argument that the military can expedite development is beyond the scope of this study, but it
is suffice to say that development is one of the raison d’etres of the military and a factor which gave the
military credence in undertaking activities which are usually the business of government and civilian
64
agencies. It also has figured into the deep-rooted belief that development and security are inseparable. In

59
Collins, Security and Southeast Asia, p. 13.
60
Mak Joon Nam, “Denuclearization in Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia”, in Derek da Cunha, ed., Southeast
Asian Perspectives on Security, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000, pp. 116-117. For more
details on the military relationship between Thailand and the United States, see Arne Kislenko, “A Not So Silent
Partner: Thailand’s Role in Covert Operations, Counter-Insurgency, and the Wars in Indochina,” The Journal of
Conflict Studies, Vol. XXIV No. 1, Summer 2004, Available at:
http://journals.hil.unb.ca/index.php/jcs/article/view/292/465. Accessed January 23, 2011.
61
W.W. Rostow, 2nd ed. The Process of Economic Growth, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1962.
62
W.W. Rostow, Politics and Stages of Growth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971, p. 96.
63
Lucian W. Pye, “Armed in the Process of Political Modernization”, in John J. Johnson, ed., The Role of the
Military in Underdeveloped Countries, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1962, pp. 80-82.
64
Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia,

32
fact, Southeast Asian countries traditionally view the lack of development as a root cause of insurgencies
65
and domestic unrest. In response, militaries have used extensive elements of CMO to target these issues.
As security was perceived to be tied in closely with development, for many of the militaries in
66
the region, development became a secondary role after defense. The promotion of economic welfare was
also sought to secure support for the regime and protect its territorial integrity. Since Southeast Asian
nations were made from a patchwork of ethnic, religious, or linguistic groups, they have had to contend
with secessionism and independence movements from groups that refused to identify themselves with the
ruling group. The Muslim minority groups in the Philippines and recently Thailand have waged
secessionist wars and East Timor experienced outright independence from Indonesia. CMO was also
launched as a nation-building exercise intended to develop an encompassing national identity by having the
military set an example for the people through socio-economic works, engaging in information campaigns,
67
and conducting educational programs.
Even in areas where there is no overt ethnic tension, the military continues to engage in
developmental projects in depressed communities. For instance, the Malaysian army has a “Hearts and
Minds” program known as Jiwa Murni to win the people’s support for the government. In it, a component
called Tentra Masak Desa or “military goes rural” is a public works project in which the army undertakes to
dispel suspicion towards the central government in the more recent entrants of the Malay Federation like
68
Sabah and Sarawak. Similarly, modern-day Vietnam dispatches soldiers to security-sensitive areas such
as the central highlands, remote border areas, and islands, to engage in socio-economic work and education
69
as a means to stabilize areas inhabited by minority groups.
Though there is no clear delineation between nation-building and COIN, the latter is also a
pronounced characteristic of Southeast Asian militaries. As mentioned above, promoting internal stability
to protect territorial integrity was one thing, but the Cold War security climate triggered militaries in many
countries such as the Philippines, Malaysia, and Thailand to launch aggressive COIN measures against the
armed communist movement. Foreign intervention has also played a significant role, because as it turned
out they were proxy wars fought on behalf of the democratic camp.

Stanford, California Stanford University Press, 2001, pp. 37-38.

65
Felipe B. Miranda and Ruben F. Ciron, “Development and the Military in the Philippines: Military
Perceptions in a Time of Continuing Crisis.” In J. Soedjati Djwadono and Yong Mun Cheong, eds. Soldiers and
Stability in Southeast Asia, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asia Studies, 1988, pp. 3; 171-173.
66
Harold Maynard, “Indonesia and Philippines Military Elites”, in Sheldon W. Simon, eds., The Military and
Security in the Third World: Domestic and International Impacts, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1978, pp.
123-153.
67
James Ockey, “Thailand: The Struggle to Redefine Civil-Military Relations”, in Muthiah Alagappa, ed.,
Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, Stanford, California: Stanford
University Press, 2001, p. 197.
68
K.S. Nathan and Geetha Govindasamy, “Malaysia: A Congruence of Interests”, in Muthiah Alagappa, ed.,
Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, Stanford, California Stanford
University Press, 2001, p. 271.
69
Thaveeporn Vasavakul, “Vietnam: From Revolutionary Heroes to Red Entrepreneurs”, in Muthiah Alagappa,
ed., Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, Stanford, California:
California Stanford University Press, 2001, pp. 353-354.

33
 The COIN posture of the state’s militaries did not make an overnight entry into the scene. They
were the byproducts of colonial legacies and the difficulties faced in the subsequent road to statehood.
Nations like the Philippines, whose military was organized along Western lines, drew its nascent
beginnings from being a colonial auxiliary force. Native officers learned at first-hand on the colonial
power’s method of putting down internal rebellions. After independence, the newly established military
received assistance from the United States through funding, training, and advice that was subsequently
applied to their internal threats (see chapter 4). The same could be said for Thailand. Even though Thailand
did not experience colonization, its modern military establishment was modeled after Western militaries,
70
and many of the officers experienced training in overseas military academies. Thailand’s version of
CMO evolved in response to the communist threat. Since the state was seen as a critical buffer to the
communist expansion in Southeast Asia, it was able to receive extensive funding and support from the
United States. The military’s CMO included civic action to help stabilize threat areas, establishing
community-based organizations to facilitate the people’s cooperation with authorities, setting up village
defense systems, and having soldiers propagate the ideal of democracy through a form of
71
counterpropaganda. Though not without brutality, the culmination of these efforts led to the successful
demise of the armed communist movement in the 1980s.

2.4.4.3 Summary of CMO in Southeast Asia

CMO in Southeast Asia is an outcome of their respective military traditions, which is ingrained,
in the state-building process as well as in their pronounced role in fighting internal security problems. CMO

70
Both Thai and Philippine military officers drew ideas about counterinsurgency practices from America’s
experience in the Vietnam War. James Ockey, “Thailand: The Struggle to Redefine Civil-Military Relations”, in
Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, Stanford,
California Stanford University Press, 2001, pp. 190-191.
71
Thailand’s version of CMO evolved in response to the communist threat during the Cold War. American
policymakers viewed this country as a critical buffer to the communist expansion and funneled huge amounts of
military and economic aid, which experienced highs in the 1950s, and during the late 60s and 70s due to
communist conflict in neighboring countries of Vietnam and Laos. The military had to contend with an armed
communist movement led by the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) that was destabilizing the rural and border
areas at an alarming rate. Both U.S. and Thai officials saw economic development as inseparable to COIN; and
civic action was launched with support of U.S. military funds. Programs included road building, education to
counter communist propaganda, and basic socio-economic services. See Robert J. Muscat, Thailand and the
United States: Development, Security, and Foreign Aid, New York: Colombia University Press, 1990, pp.
146-150; 159-161. Another component of CMO was the development of mass organizations. This was the
creation of village organizations to encourage people residing in both rural and urban areas to cooperate with
government forces in fighting the communist armed movement. A distinctive feature of this program was not just
to encourage development but also to provide training for the villagers to protect themselves. See Suchit
Bunbongkarn, The Military in Thai Politics: 1981-86, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1987, p.
50. The Thai military also involved the soldier in the political aspect of COIN. Between the periods of
1973-1991, soldiers were tasked to destroy the communist political infrastructure based on promoting democracy.
Activities included infiltrating leftist parties, taking over key positions in government, building a strong base of
support for the military through the mass-based organizations, and using radios to broadcast the military’s view
on democracy. See James Ockey, “Thailand: The Struggle to Redefine Civil-Military Relations”, in Muthiah
Alagappa, ed., Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, Stanford,
California: California Stanford University Press, 2001, pp. 196-197.

34
has been for noted for its successes in Thailand against the communists, the Philippines in the 1950s
against the Huks, and in Malaysia during the Malayan Emergency. At the same time though, it is shaded in
controversy because of its overlapping role in regime protection and the violations of human rights. Still,
the foundations of CMO are significantly different in approach in contrast to Western militaries, due to its
inward-looking nature.

2.4.5 Examining Current Military Trends in CMO

The birth of a reunified Germany, followed by the collapse of the Soviet Union were
epoch-making events which dramatically altered perceptions on the security landscape. The Cold War not
only entrapped the world order between two ideological camps but also braced the superpowers for a
conventional state vs. state war that spelled out nuclear doom. The end of the Cold War removed this threat
and it was replaced by a short-lived elation that the new world order would be based on peace. In light of
these events, catchy phrases such as the “peace dividend” defined a movement to restructure defense forces
where costs saved from cutting military expenditure could be redirected towards social programs. At the
same time, the elimination of a potential interstate warfare posed a question to the armed forces in Europe
on what their roles should be in peacetime. Charles Moskos, an advocate of the post-modern military ideal
72
called on the defense community to utilize their organization for “forces of good.” Thus, in Europe, a
trend was emerging where mission planning would be directed under normative values. The new ways of
the future would be based on militaries working jointly to conduct humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping,
and disaster relief.
But it was not long before a new set of security issues began to preoccupy the international scene
and they took the form of civil wars and complex emergencies. A sense of responsibility for maintaining
peace in the international system, not to mention overseas national interests, spurred states to intervene in
wars waged outside of their borders. Militaries were now faced with “wars of choice” which required an
“expeditionary force model” that would allow leaner and more mobile troops to be deployed to distant
73
lands.
These contemporary wars, largely occurring in weak states, necessitated not only a military
solution, but also a diplomatic, political, socio-economic approach as well. The delineation of who takes
over what in a war zone became increasingly blurred as the security situation made it precarious for civilian
actors to provide humanitarian assistance or basic government services to the affected populace, leaving the
military, at least temporarily, to cooperate with other agencies or take over functions normally reserved for
74
civilian authorities.

72
For further understanding of the postmodern military concept read in Charles Moskos, John Williams, and
David Segal, eds., The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces After the Cold War, Oxford, Oxford University Press,
2000; Andrew Cottey and Anthony Forster, “Reshaping Defense Diplomacy: New roles for Military Cooperation
and Assistance, Adelphi Paper 365, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
73
Anthony Forster, Armed Forces and Society in Europe, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, pp. 44-53.
74
The United States Department of Defense (DOD) categorizes these military’s activities also as “stability
operations.” See Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 2008, p. GL-25.

35
 Against this backdrop, countries integrated CMO in their military operations based on their
military traditions or historical past. In the case of the United States, CMO was a military operation that
was not initially welcomed. In the late 1980s and early 1990s. The United States began to fixate on
reinvigorating energies and resources on producing an overwhelming technological-edge that would ensure
an immediate and decisive victory in any battlefield as encapsulated in the concept, Revolution in Military
Affairs (RMA). However its ideal version of military reform took a blow with the harsh reality of
contemporary conflict. Undoubtedly, its superior technology helped deliver a quick victory on the
battlefield and lead to the toppling of the regimes in Iraq and Afghanistan but unexpected challenges were
met in securing peace in a post-invasion phase. Hereon, American policymakers were faced with “remaking
a nation” or long-term nation-building that included security, economic, political, and humanitarian
75
realms.
For the United States, CMO was something associated with COIN, a messy business that
involved long-term commitment, not to mention the debate over CMO’s importance in comparison to
76
traditional military tasking. In short, it was against its ideals of performing high-intensity operations for
77
the purpose of delivering quick military results. The United States only began to adopt CMO in earnest
as COIN specialists advocated that a conventional military approach could not meet the challenges faced in
78
the occupational phase of Iraq and Afghanistan. Their point of reference has been to revisit the COIN
annals of their past, including their experience in Vietnam and Latin America. Therefore, elements of
population treatment that dictated their implementation of CMO came from their COIN experiences rather
than peacekeeping.
On the other hand, Canada and Nordic countries tend to follow the traditional tenets of
79
peacekeeping, which is grounded in contributing to global stability and humanitarian efforts.
Organizations such as NATO which is comprised of alliance forces reflect a broader interpretation of
collective-defense with an understanding that the mandates and activities of civilian organizations have to

75
T. David Mason & James O. Meernik, eds., Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in Post-War Societies:
Sustaining the Peace, London & New York: Routledge, 2006, pp. 1-4; Read David H Ucko’s The New
Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the U.S. Military for Modern Wars, Washington D.C., Georgetown
University Press, 2009 for an account on how the United States military have fared in its military reform efforts
in order to adapt to the post-Cold War environment. .
76
A summary of these arguments are made in John Ulbadi, “Why Civil Military Operations will be a Combat
Multiplier in Counterinsurgency Operations,” Small Wars Journal, 2009, pp. 1-3.
77
James J. Landon and Richard E. Hayes, Ph.D., National Approaches to Civil-Military Coordination in Peace
and Humanitarian Assistance Operations, Virginia, Evidence Based Research, Inc., undated. Accessed online at:
http://www.dodccrp.org/files/landon_hayes.htm. Hereafter cited as Landon and Hayes, National Approaches to
Civil-Military Coordination in Peace and Humanitarian Assistance Operations.
78
John Ubaldi, “Why Civil Military Operations will be a Combat Multiplier in Counterinsurgency Operations,”
Small Wars Journal, 2009; The publication of a revised and updated counterinsurgency field manual The U.S.
Army * Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, Chicago and London, The University of Chicago Press,
2007. The United States had not updated its COIN doctrine since its El Salvador campaign which took place
more that two decades ago.
79
Landon and Hayes, National Approaches to Civil-Military Coordination in Peace and Humanitarian
Assistance Operations.

36
 80
be reconciled with NATO troops to make military interventions more successful. Another political
organization, the United Nations avoids association with COIN and labels their version of CMO as
Civil-Military Co-ordination (CMCoord) and CIMIC. Its activities are utilized for both peacekeeping and
81
humanitarian operations.
It was against this backdrop that Civil-Military Operations (CMO) officially came into use to
describe a distinct military function which centers on dealing and cooperating with civilian actors operating
in a conflict zone. The first commanding of media-attention in regards to CMO came from the wars in the
Balkans (Bosnian and Kosovo) that required NATO intervention and more recently the United States’
counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism operations in post-September 11th attacks. These types of
expeditionary wars have pushed militaries to institutionalize CMO practices in order to improve the overall
effectiveness of the military mission which include undertaking responsibilities normally performed by
civilian agencies, cooperating and coordinating with numerous actors in a conflict area, and also meeting
humanitarian obligations in protecting and/or minimizing damage to the population.
The timing of the Philippines’ institutionalization of CMO also coincides with the post-Cold War
trend in the Western world, reflecting a widespread movement to move away from applying CMO in an ad
hoc manner and formally incorporating CMO in core military missions. However, unlike Western powers
that engage in expeditionary wars, nations like the Philippines have developed CMO in order to deal with
internal threats. That is why even though there is an outpour of publications of doctrines and field manuals
that produce a similar-sounding definition, in actuality, there is a marked difference in the context that
CMO is applied in which comes from the type of military mission, the security environment, and the
military tradition that the soldiers come from. Consequently, any attempt on reaching a standard definition
of CMO can obscure issues and challenges that a particular armed forces faces in conducting CMO. For
this reason, a detailed investigation on the historical roots of CMO and its development was considered to
be indispensable before approaching CMO in the Philippines’ operational environment.

80
AJP-9, 2003, pp. 1-2.
81
UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). "Civil-Military Coordination in UN Integrated
Peacekeeping Missions (UN-CIMIC) Policy", January 2010, 3-4: Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination
(UN-CMCoord) website. Available at:
http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/coordination-tools/UN-CMCoord/overview. Accessed April 3, 2011.

37
Chapter 3. CMO in Warfare: Battlespace Management
3.1 Introduction
This chapter seeks to theoretically substantiate the role of Civil Military Operations (CMO) in the
context of insurgent battlespace management. The conceptual framework established in this chapter will
draw from general theories on warfare, insurgency, and counterinsurgency (COIN). The basis of this
framework is anchored on analyzing and understanding CMO as a form of maneuver warfare. Applied in
insurgent battlespace, it is considered to be a means to reach the deep depth that also includes the human
terrain. These will subsequently be used to support inquiries into the operational and tactical effects of
CMO in the military operational environment of the Philippines.
The section commences with an overview on the existing approaches to CMO. It is argued that
for the purpose of understanding its utility in COIN, they do not sufficiently explain CMO as a tool of
warfare. The section is followed by a cursory definition of warfare, battlespace dimensions and maneuver
warfare. The core of the discussion leads to the main theme of the thesis, which approaches CMO from the
standpoint that it is a form of non-traditional maneuver that allows the soldier to operate in the depth of
insurgent battlespace.

3.2 Existing Approaches to CMO

3.2.1 Overview
CMO owes its existence to the practical challenges arising from the ground where the military is
required to operate in a space that is not only occupied by belligerents but by non-combatants and civilian
entities as well.1 Rather than engaging in full-scale destruction that involves heavy collateral and property
damage, the military can choose to mitigate, as much as possible, the effects of military operations on the
local population and conversely, limit the population’s inadvertent interference with military operations by
supporting a full range of tasks that also fall outside of traditional defense roles. These activities include
providing the people with security, evacuation assistance, and humanitarian assistance.2 Not surprisingly,
CMO produces a fertile ground for debate since the operation straddles the realms of military and civilian
activity. The following summarizes the popularly explored aspects of CMO.

3.2.2 Winning Hearts and Minds: A Friendly Persuasion?

More than often, CMO is used synonymously with ‘winning hearts and minds.’ This was a public
relations slogan coined by the British Army during the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960)3 to gain the

1
The section here only discusses CMO operating in areas where there is the presence of an armed threat and not
in the context of pure humanitarian and/or disaster relief operations.
2
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations, Washington,
DC: CJCS: February 8, 2001, pp. I-9 to I-16.
3
Richard Stubbs, Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960, Singapore:
Oxford University Press, 1989, p. 1. Though the term has more than its fair share of media and military usage, it
has no official definition, for one; it is not listed in the United States Department of Defense Dictionary of
Military and Associated Terms. However it is a value-laden phrase that the military uses to promote their
humanitarian activities to project the good-will of the soldier on the target population in place of military jargon

38
support of the people living in insurgent zones. The phrase is catchy and supposedly objectifies one of the
key tenets of the indirect approach in COIN. As the population is considered to be the Center of Gravity
(COG) or the source of power for the insurgent, CMO activities are designed to deny this from the
insurgent and thereby regain the allegiance of the people to the government side.4
In broad terms, the ‘hearts and minds’ approach is a non-punitive or non-coercive approach to
persuade the population that may or not actively support the insurgency to throw in their lot with the
government forces. The means to achieve this is typically done through enticing the target community with
“material rewards” such as building schools, the provision of health-care, and other socio-economic
services. This in turn seeks the desired effect of psychologically destroying the enemy’s will to fight by
alienating him in his cause and denying him of his supply-lines by de-linking him from the support of the
population. Therefore it is considered to be more effective than launching a campaign to physically
annihilate the enemy.5
As catchy and easy-to-understand the slogan seems, the semantics behind ‘winning hearts and
minds’ “obscures rather than illuminates.” A cursory glance on the term makes it appear that the military is
simply engaging in civic action or developmental work to secure the support of the population. However,
the phrase is criticized to downplay the complexities of insurgency and threatens to misguide the military
operation by boiling down CMO activities in a quest to “win the popularity contest” with the insurgents
over the people. 6 Ian Roxborough argues that it is too simplistic to assume that the “material
improvement” of lives alone will win insurgencies. Rather ‘winning hearts and minds’ programs should be
about the government conducting institutional reforms i.e. land reforms, fair elections, and reducing abuses
in the governing institutions. In other words, the military singularly cannot gain enough support unless the
government plays up to the population’s expectations of meaningful change.7
In a vein not too distant from Roxborough, Paul Cornish argues that CMO is not about winning
over the population through tangible means as the slogan suggests but the political element has to be
appreciated as well. This requires the military to “understand” the local population and persuade them. This
inevitably requires the soldier to have “political sensitivity” built upon cultural understanding of the
population. He also adds that these intentions have to be backed by strong will from the government to
provide to the people with long-term stability and security.8

that refer to non-traditional tasking of the military.

4
Nori Katagiri, “Winning Hearts and Minds to Lose Control: exploring various consequences of popular
support in counterinsurgency missions,” Small Wars and Insurgencies, 22:1, March 2011, p. 171.
5
Michael M. Smith and Melinda Hofstetter, “Conduit or Cul-de-Sac? Information Flow in Civil Military
Operations,” JFQ, Spring 1999, p. 101.
6
Andrew J. Birtle, “Persuasion and Coercion in Counterinsurgency Warfare,” Military Review, July-August
2008, p.7; Ian Roxborough, “Counterinsurgency: The U.S. military should have learned a lot about fighting
rebels in Vietnam. So why is Iraq such a disaster?”, American Sociological Association, Vol. 6, Number 2, 2007,
pp. 16-18. Hereafter cited as Roxoborough, “Counterinsurgency.”
7
Roxoborough, “Counterinsurgency,” p. 18. For more details on the effects and necessity of winning the
support of the population, Ian Roxborough summarizes the popular arguments in pp. 16-18.
8
Paul Cornish, “The United States and Counterinsurgency: ‘political first, political last, political always,’”
International Affairs, 85:1, 2009, p. 67.

39
 On the other hand, there are skeptics on the population-centric approach which is considered to
be too narrow-minded. For one, the “soft” (non-coercive) approach of separating the population from the
enemy through persuasion is not a strategy but an operational method. Though the population is an
important factor, the enemy-focus is just as important. Rather than separating the two into different schools
of adherents and propose a singular approach, COIN practitioners should exercise lateral thinking and
deepen their knowledge on the contextual parameters of the insurgency and be prepared to switch the focus
depending on the situation. Therefore, it is implied that it is dangerous for soldiers to be misled into
thinking that a “soft” approach like CMO will be the “blueprint” for success.9
Another semantics issue is that, contrary to the friendly image that the military attempts to project
with ‘winning hearts and minds’, CMO should not be “considered a completely benign military function or
one that can be considered in isolation from combat.” CMO is still an instrument of warfare where even
though there is no direct use of force, its activities support the overall military mission.10
Concerning CMO’s relationship with warfare, a large component of CMO is psychological. It’s a
type of military operation that intends to influence the attitudes of the target audience (both enemy and
local population).11 Some of the cited controversies of ‘winning hearts and minds’ campaigns are that it
cloaks the more sinister, covert, and subversive side of the operation. For instance, CMO information
campaigns can include black propaganda where information is misrepresented or distorted (to show how
evil the enemy is). Though success hinges on the target audience (local population) believing the
information that discredits the enemy, it can also backfire if the people are doubtful of these enemy
representations. When the people suspect the military is lying, it can lead to the loss of credibility for the
military and consequently, destroy the ‘good guys’ image that they are trying to project.12
Intelligence is another controversial issue since CMO is one tool for soldiers to get information
from the community. However, unlike information, which is open, intelligence is marked by secrecy. The
methods used to secure it are done covertly and the information gathered must be concealed from the
enemy.13 CMO plays an important role in improving the situational awareness of the battlefield not only
through social surveys to enhance their cultural awareness of the community and understand the needs of
the people, but more importantly, secure critical intelligence about enemy movements through the
cooperation of the people.14

9
Jon Mikolashek and Sean N. Kalic, “Deciphering Shades of Gray: Understanding Counterinsurgency,” Small
Wars Journal, May 9, 2011.
10
David Kilcullen. “The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One,” Oxford and
New York: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 145-146; Raj Rana, “Contemporary challenges in the
civil-military relationship: Complimentary or incompatibility?”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 86,
No. 842, 2004, p. 573. Hereafter cited as Rana, “Contemporary challenges in the civil-military relationship.”
11
United States Department of Defense, JP 1-02, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.
12
Michael A. Aquino, “Psychological Operations: The Ethical Dimension,” Fort McNair, Washington D.C.:
Industrial College of Armed Forces National Defense University, 1987, p. 17.
13
Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World, New York: Vintage Books, 2005,
2007, pp. 327-328. Hereafter cited as Smith, The Utility of Force.
14
Many military COIN experts feel express reservations in systematically organizing children for intelligence
gathering. While soldiers should engage in activities to help children so as to develop their acceptance by the
community, information should only be given only on a voluntary basis so as not to exploit the children for

40
 However, CMO has difficulty in winning the support of the people when it becomes associated
with intelligence operations per se. While intelligence is critical in waging in any type of warfare, the cloak
and dagger aspect of intelligence can threaten to risk the credibility of the CMO operation.15 As was
discovered in the Philippines, some local critics of the Philippines-CMO claim that so-called the ‘hearts
and minds’ campaigns is just a smoke screen for spying and other intelligence gathering.16 This leaves the
military practitioner with the question on how much of CMO can be disassociated from other aspects of the
military operation, but at the same time maintain the good will of the people.
In COIN, conventional wisdom places the population as an important factor in determining the
outcome of a war against insurgency. Although the maxim is accepted as inseparable to COIN, the slogan
still invokes the image of two suitors showering the much-coveted damsel with material goods in hopes to
win her attentions. Or simply put, shoring up the support of the population through material incentives does
not resolve the social-political-economic and/or religious and ethnic issues that embroils the
conflict-affected society. Additionally, the emphasis placed on the ‘good works’ of the soldier tends to
distort the understanding of CMO that blends in with psychological warfare (targeted terror operations, ruse,
covert operations, increasing troop morale, and demoralizing the enemy), intelligence gathering, and
standard combat. Therefore, equating CMO to ‘winning hearts and minds’ does much more disservice to its
understanding than add clarification to it.

3.2.3 Civil-Military Interface: the Dilemma for Civilian Partners

In conducting CMO, more than often, the military partners with civilian actors. In particular,
managing the civilian-military interface is a significant challenge for the military and vice versa for civilian
agencies; and there are numerous studies that broach this topic from this angle.
A well-coordinated and collaborative relationship is a resourceful way for both parties to
maximize their capabilities in fulfilling their respective missions in a conflict zone. An advantage to the
relationship is that each party can compliment each other and make up for each other’s shortfalls. The
military has the organizational structure and resources to provide manpower, rapid deployment, logistics,
and force capabilities. Although civilian partners are not entirely bereft in areas outside the realm of
soldierly, they often lack resources to mobilize for sustained periods in a hostile environment. Nonetheless,
they are an enormous assistance to the military because they are endowed with a reservoir of knowledge
and expertise to deal with the affected population, which can ultimately ensure a better delivery of
assistance to the people.17

military missions. See Stephen T. Hosmer and Sibylle O. Crane, Counterinsurgency: A Symposium, April 16–20,
1962, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, November 1962; republished 2006, pp. 62-64. The ethics of using
children in collecting intelligence is discussed between Col. Galula, Col. White, Gen. Lansdale, and Col.
Valeriano.
15
Department of Defense, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military
Operations, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office: July 8, 2008, p. xv
16
Arnold Padilla, senior researcher, Reality of Aid/Ibon Foundations, interview with the author, IBON office,
Manila. Philippines, September 11, 2006.
17
Jennifer Morrison Taw, “Interagency Coordination in Military Operations Other Than War: Implications for

41
 Nonetheless, the “compatibility” issue appears to be the main thorn in the relationship. Besides
the practical challenges that these organizations face on the ground that include the duplication of activities,
dealing with different organizational cultures i.e. chain-of-command, division of labor, timing the transfer
of activities from the military to civilian agencies, and coordinating activities between multiple players,18
there is a concern from the side of humanitarian organizations and NGOs that the lines which used to
delineate the spheres of military and civilian activity, have increasingly become blurred. 19 Due to
complexities arising from the modern battlespace, boundaries that have kept the respective actors in their
mandated roles are less restrictive. The only line that remains untouched is that humanitarian and NGOs do
not participate in the planning and execution of combat.20
Even though civilian agencies such as humanitarian organizations and NGOs do not play a role in
combat, they can be reluctant to work alongside the military due to concerns that their impartiality,
neutrality, and independence would be compromised on account of their humanitarian activities being
integrated into the military mission.21 For one, the lines that have separated the functional specialty of the
two spheres “cease to be relevant in the eyes of the population and authorities.” 22 Humanitarian
organizations risk losing their neutrality, when the military mission begins to apply pressure on the
population to take sides with the intervening forces in exchange for protection and delivery of
socio-economic assistance. At this point, these organizations face the choice of withdrawing and retaining
their neutrality and leaving the entire humanitarian mission in the hands of the military, or having to accept
the reality that they would be perceived to be taking sides.23
Humanitarian actors also perceive information sharing with the military as a risk to being
inadvertently co-opted into the military mission. They fear information provided to the military would not
just be utilized for coordinating activities and determining the needs of the local population but also have a
role in intelligence and surveillance activities as well. Especially problematic is that the covert and
subversive nature of intelligence operations makes these organizations reluctant to provide information to
the military.24 With this in mind, the military is faced with the challenge of overcoming this distrust, which
largely lies dependent on increasing the transparency of military intent and operations.25
Preserving neutrality is a key issue for humanitarian organizations and NGOs. But the reality
reveals that even though cooperation with the military is beneficial and in many cases inevitable, it can
imperil their efforts to uphold humanitarian principles. In fact, what these civilian agencies fear most is that
collaboration can inadvertently make them “an active participant in hostilities.”26

the US Army,” Rand Study, Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1997, pp. 1-2; 11.
18
Ibid., pp. ix-xi, 3.
19
Rana, “Contemporary challenges in the civil-military relationship,” pp. 565-566.
20
Smith, The Utility of Force, p. 185.
21
Rana, “Contemporary challenges in the civil-military relationship,” p. 566.
22
Ibid., p. 580
23
Ibid., pp. 578-579; 580; 584:
24
Michael M. Smith and Melinda Hofstetter, “Conduit or Cul-de-Sac? Information Flow in Civil Military
Operations,” JFQ, Spring 1999, pp. 101-102.
25
Ibid., p.103.
26
Rana, “Contemporary challenges in the civil-military relationship,” p. 567.

42
 When CMO is approached from this angle, the prime discussion at the academic watering hole
centers on the “compatibility” between the military and civilian organizations and whether these obstacles
can be overcome. Though the lines that delineate the respective sides’ functional specialty become
nebulous, both sides still retain their own different mandates, missions, and organizational culture. As a
result, current trends on the study of this subject grapple over bridging organizational differences between
the military and civilian agencies to ensure a smooth accomplishment of each other’s goals while
preserving and recognizing the “separateness” of the two.27 These studies lean more towards the topic of
“civil-military cooperation” which is only one aspect of CMO.

3.2.4 The Expanded Role of the Soldier

Undeniably, one of the most debated issues regarding CMO from a military standpoint is that it
does not snugly fit the job description of a soldier. The military is an institution vested with a unique
prerogative by the state, the monopoly over violence. The soldiers that make up the organization are
28
“specialists in violence” or professionals that have the expertise and state-sanctioned use of lethal means
to provide defense. Even other security apparatuses such as the police do not have access to weapons of
such destructive power, signifying the military is the vanguard on the very survival of a state when faced
with armed threats.
The end of the Cold War has brought to light the increasing complexities of warfare, punctuated
by complex humanitarian emergencies, civil wars, joint-military interventions which draw a stark contrast
with interstate industrial war paradigm that continued to define the mindset of the military throughout the
bipolar confrontation. Largely developed during the Napoleonic times, it was based on unleashing force to
take territory, hold territory and physically destroy the enemy. Simply put, soldiers were in charge of
29
implementing military action that determined the outcome of the war.
Current realities reveal that no matter how much might a military has technologically and
industrially, it is morally and politically unviable to bring about the total destruction of the opponent in a
battlespace that is occupied by non-belligerents. Military action does not become the deciding factor in
30
war; rather, political and diplomatic factors also have a critical if not, play a more important role.
Under these circumstances, soldiers are subjugated to roles that do not fall in their preordained
area of warfighting. An illuminating example is set forth in the “Three Block War” concept which was
forwarded by a U.S. Marines General in the 1990s. Gen. Charles Krulack articulated his concept in a
magazine publication. His article is furnished with a fictional account about a marine squad leader and his
platoon operating in a failed state in Central Africa. What begins as a marines-led humanitarian mission

27
Rana, “Contemporary challenges in the civil-military relationship,” pp. 565-566; Stuart Gordon,
Understanding the Priorities for Civil-Military Co-operations (CIMIC), Royal Military Academy Sandhurst,
2001.
28
The term “specialist in violence” was coined by Harold D. Lassell in “The Garrison State” in the American
Journal of Sociology, Vol. 46, No. 4 (Jan., 1941), pp. 455-468.
29
Smith, The Utility of Force, pp. 19; 272.
30
Ibid., pp. 5; 190; 279.

43
deteriorates into an armed confrontation with the insurgents over the course of a morning. The story is
captivating because it conveys the realities of modern warfare. One minute, the city resembles a sense of
normalcy as the inhabitants go about their daily lives, but in the next minute, a deadly clash between the
tribal warlord and the intervening forces erupts, transforming an urban block into a battlefield. The author
uses this as a metaphor to bring to attention that soldiers have to undertake the full spectrum of operations:
humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping or policing, and combat operations in order to fight effectively in
31
contemporary wars.
On the same token, but more from a perspective steeped in the European peacekeeping
experience, military sociologists like Gerhard Kummel argue that the “definitional criteria” of the soldier
cannot remain static and that it has to adapt to changes in both the international and domestic environment.
He proposes that the ideal modern soldier must on one hand maintain his traditional function of combat but
on the other hand, must be well versed in nontraditional tasks such as engaging in policing, diplomatic-type
32
activities, and humanitarian work to stay relevant in the security climate of the post-Cold world.
While there are advocates within military circles to expand their roles, there are scholars like
Michael J. Mazaar that put their foot down on having militaries take on the additional burden of
33
non-traditional roles such as CMO or stability operations. He argues that an over-focus on
non-traditional tasks embroil expeditionary forces in prolonged commitments that do not have
decisive-endings. And ultimately, it would risk degrading conventional military capabilities that allow
major powers like the United States to respond to major contingencies, as well as maintain its role as a
34
global deterrent.
Being relevant for today’s wars and preparing for tomorrow’s big wars have created a quandary
for defense planners. Militaries still display a reluctance to undertake roles that are normally reserved for
civilian agencies. The largest concern in adapting to non-traditional roles like CMO is that it requires a
drastic reorientation of the military in training, organizational structure, and capability-building which
would ultimately take away from their core capabilities of defense. Even with militaries like the United
States that have the financial wherewithal and resources to cover the entire spectrum of military operations,
35
it still cannot accommodate two types of warfare: conventional and unconventional at the same time.
In summary, the existing approached to CMO, takes into consideration the dilemma the military
faces in undertaking roles normally reserved for civilians. It reveals that on one hand, CMO is equated to

31
Gen. Charles C. Krulack, “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War,” Marines Magazine,
January 1999.
32
Gerharnd Kummel, “As Soldier is a Soldier is a Soldier!?: The Military and its Soldiers in an Era of
Globalization”, in Giuseppe Caforio, ed., Handbook of the Sociology of the Military, New York: Springer, 2006
pp. 432-433.
33
There is a growing preference for US commanders to use stability operations rather than CMO because it is
an overarching term for nation-building in the counterinsurgency context. Stability operations is defined as
missions, tasks, and activities that the military conduct to secure an environment and provide government
services, infrastructure support, and humanitarian assistance. See JP 3-57, 2008, p. I-17.
34
Michael J. Mazaar, “The Folly of “Asymmetric War’”, The Washington Quarterly, 31:3, Summer 2008, p. 25.
35
John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam,
Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2002, p. 219.

44
soldiers doing good works, which can be regarded as un-military like. But on the other hand, it also brings
to light; CMO cannot be completely delineated from the military’s core responsibility of defense. These
issues that encircle CMO have uncomfortable bearings on the military. In summary, up to certain extent,
these studies help shed light on the factors that impede the optimization of CMO. Still, the author argues
that in order to place CMO into better perspective, it is necessary to reconcile seemingly antipodal aspects
(civilian and military; combat and non-combat) and position its role within the framework of warfare.

3.3 Conceptual Framework: CMO in Maneuver Warfare and Battlespace

Management
3.3.1 Introduction
This section seeks to provide the theoretical building blocks to support the argument that CMO in
the Philippines can be better understood and assessed for its effects when examined for its utility in dealing
with insurgent battlespace. The previous section dealt with the popularly taken conceptual approaches to
CMO that included one, friendly persuasion as opposed to coercive force; second, the military’s partnership
with civilian agencies; and third, the debated “definitional criteria” of a soldier. While these concepts
cannot be overlooked when providing a general overview of CMO, these approaches tend to highlight its
ambiguous positioning in the conventionally defined roles of the military and pose difficulty in
understanding CMO as a military operation.
Therefore, rather than analyzing CMO from these perspectives, the author has decided reconcile
the seemingly binary or antipodal roles that CMO has in respect to standard military operations by
approaching CMO from the principles of warfare and exploring its utility in battlespace management. This
is based on the understanding that CMO cannot be taken out of the context of war or else, its activities
would be categorized as pure humanitarian assistance. The gist of the argument lies in the concept that
CMO helps shape the battlespace in favor of the counterinsurgent. Before heading into CMO’s implicit role
in warfare and battlespace management, a brief repose will be taken to provide an overview on the
fundamentals of war, its playing field, and the differences between conventional and unconventional war.
Based on these theories, the chapter will proceed with the core argument on how CMO is positioned in
warfare, which will ultimately be used to examine CMO in the Philippines.

3.3.2 Explaining War and Warfare

War is a complex social phenomenon that occurs when a confrontation between opposing sides
(nation-states, sub-states, and other organized groups) reaches a point where the issue in dispute cannot be
resolved without the resort to force. War, however is not an “act of blind passion” but is dictated by
36
political objectives, meaning a political settlement is “exacted” following a military victory. Wars are
fought for territorial aggrandizement, state survival, defense, to right an injustice, for honor, or anything the

36
Carl von Clausewitz, On War, translated by J.J. Graham, BN Publishing, 2007, Book I, Chapter II, p. 24.
Hereafter cited as Clausewitz, On War; Andre Beaufre, Strategy for Tomorrow, New York: Crane, Russak &
Company, Inc., 1974, p. 3. Hereafter cited as Beaufre, Strategy for Tomorrow.

45
 37
state or the organized entity holds important to them. What causes or fuels wars are not bound in a
uniform theory, differing from one academic discipline to another, but in regards to the act of war itself,
Prussian military thinker, Carl von Clausewitz’s dictum provides an entry point. He says war in is a duel or
contest between organized groups on an extensive scale where the opposing sides uses “physical force” or
38
the “act of violence” to “compel our opponent to fulfill our will.” He elaborates further by commenting
that only by disarming the adversary or deriving him of any strength to carry on the armed collision would
39
make the adversary submit to our will (accept defeat).
The institution that is vested in carrying out physical force is the military. The military is the arm
of politics that serves no other purpose than to prepare for and implement force.

Every activity in war, therefore, necessarily related to combat either directly or indirectly. The
soldier is levied, clothed, armed, exercises, he sleeps, eats, drinks, and marches, all merely to fight at the
40
right time and place.

The culmination of military activity takes place on the battlefield. This brings to question what
happens on the battlefield. The underlying basis of this activity is combat or force. “It is both the physical
means of destruction – the bullet, the bayonet – and the body that applies it.” Force kills and maims living
things; it destroys equipment, facilities, and property, and it in-turn, the effects of force renders maximum
41
psychological impact that compels the opposing force to be subjected to our will. Therefore force is the
tool used to wage warfare and achieve results. How to direct that use of force is typically divided into two
concepts: firepower and maneuver.

3.3.2.1 Firepower
Firepower refers to a military’s capability to decimate the adversary with weapons and weapons
systems. It refers to both amassed firepower and amassed manpower (soldiers mobilized to use the
weapons).42 Also known as the kinetic (destructive) or attritional approach (continuous use of firepower to
wear down the opponent), its simplicity lies in its straightforward approach that uses direct and
overwhelming amounts of destruction to break the opponent’s will and achieve victory.43

37
Smith, The Utility of Force, p. 12.
38
Clausewitz, On War, Book I, Chapter I, Section II, p. 11.
39
Ibid., Book I, Chapter I, Section IV, p. 12.
40
Ibid., Book I, Chapter. II, p. 27.
41
Smith, The Utility of War, pp. 8; 27; 61.
42
Read William S. Lind et al, “The changing face of war: Into the Fourth Generation”, in Terry Terriff, Aaron
Karp and Regina Karp, eds., Global Insurgency and the Future of Armed Conflict, London and New York:
Routledge, 2008, ch. 2.; U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations,Washington D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, June 2006, p. 4-6. Hereafter cited as FM 3-0.
43
FM 3-0, p. 4-6.

46
3.3.2.2 Maneuver
In a nutshell, maneuver is about placing the enemy in a disadvantageous position and establishing
conditions to make his actions irrelevant.
In contrast to firepower, maneuver does not use firepower disproportionately but is selective.
Maneuver is associated with movement. In the spatial sense, it is the speed that accompanies troop
movement over the battlespace, which enables them to direct firepower selectively on enemy
vulnerabilities.44 It does not just mean to move into a “better firing position” but it entails creating
conditions that negatively impact the enemy, both physically and psychologically.45 It also seeks to delay,
forestall, disrupt, surprise, degrade, and destroy enemy capabilities.46 It is premised on the idea, the right
timing, the right amount of force, and the right positioning of forces can achieve an advantage over the
adversary and lead to mission success.47
It is also important to note, no military operation is considered wholly maneuver or wholly
firepower for that matter, and elements of both are utilized to maximize its effects on the opponent.48

3.3.3 Defining Battlefield and Battlespace

The apex of military activity takes place on the battlefield. Terms such as battlefield and
battlespace are used interchangeably, but for the purposes of this thesis, the two will be handled separately
with their respective definitions. Firstly, battlefield (also referred to as battleground, war zones, combat
49
zones, and conflict areas) is defined as an “area where a battle is fought.” Simply put, the battlefield is
the environs in which an armed encounter takes place between belligerents. These include engagements
that not only unfold on the ground but in airspace and on the water as well.
On the other hand, battlespace is a broadened concept of the battlefield that takes into
consideration any factors and conditions that can impact the military operation. Hence, it is considered to
be an instructive approach for commanders to plan for war. For instance, the United States Department of
Defense (DOD) defines battlespace as follows:

The environment, factors, and conditions that must be understood to successfully apply combat
power, protect the force, or complete the mission. This includes the air, land, sea, space, and the included
enemy and friendly forces; facilities; weather, terrain, the electromagnetic spectrum; and the information
50
environment within the operational area and areas of interest.

44
Department of the Army, FM 100-5, Operations. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, June
1993, p. 2-5.
45
William S. Lind, Manuever Warfare Handbook, Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1985, pp. 19-20
46
F.G. Hoffman, “Combating Fourth Generation Warfare”, in Terry Terriff, Aaron Karp and Regina Karp, eds.,
Global Insurgency and the Future of Armed Conflict, London and New York: Routledge, 2008, p. 186; Smith,
The Utility of Force, p. 16; FM 100-5, pp. 2-2; 2-5; 2-10.
47
FM 3-0, p. 4-5.
48
FM 3-0, p. 4-6.
49
The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 4th ed. Houghton Mifflin Company, 2000.
50
Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 1-02, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, United States Department of
Defense, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 12, 2001, As amended through 31 August

47
 This definition of battlespace in fact signifies a strategic framework for the military to not only
visually construct the battlespace but also to generate plans and execute them to attain a military mission.51
As battlespace is a concept, for tangible purposes, space is divided into manageable components or
‘sub-spaces.’ The first is the area of responsibility (AOR) which is the geographic area associated with the
combatant command, where its commander has authority to plan and execute operations within this
space.52 The second is the area of operations (AO), which is the “sub-division” of the AOR. Here, the
geographic area is smaller than the AOR and is assigned to a local commander by the joint force
commander to employ his forces.53 The third is the area of influence (AI), which is “the geographical area
in which a commander is directly capable of influencing operations by maneuver or fire support.”54 Ideally,
the area of influence should exceed the area of operations so that it allows the commander to anticipate
future scenarios and prepare for them accordingly.55 And fourthly, the area of interest (AOI), which is “the
area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending
into enemy territory to the objectives of current or planned operations. The area also includes areas
occupied by enemy forces that could jeopardize the accomplishment of the missions.”56
In returning to the concept of battlespace, which departs from a geographical construct as a
means to help commanders exercise lateral thinking,57 at moment, there is no fixed universal definition
other than the overarching definition of battlespace put forward to by the DOD. This leaves some flexibility
for scholars in the perusal of the term. For the purpose of this study, the battlespace definition used does not
depart too far from the above, but borrows from Maj. Frank R. Boynton’s concept that seeks to add clarity
to existing definitions put forth by both the U.S. Army and Navy.58

2005; Joint Publication 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence Support to Joint Operations, Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, March 22, 2007.
51
Michael J. Barnes, “The Human Dimension of Battlespace Visulalization: Reaseach and Design Issues,”
Army Research Laboratory, February 2003. This is Barnes’ interpretation of the U.S. Army’s take on battlespace,
located in U.S. Department of the Army, FM 100-5, Operations, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1997.
52
DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
November 8, 2010, as amended through November 15, 2012, p. 25.
53
Department of the Army, FM 100-5, Operations, Washington D.C.; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993,
glossary; Michael T. Flynn, “Understanding Our Future Battlespace: Why We Need to Integrate I0 into the IPB
Process,” Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, Oct-Dec, 2001. Hereafter cited as Flynn. ”Understanding
Our Future Battlespace: Why We Need to Integrate I0 into the IPB Process”; Capt. Frederick L. “Frtiz” Baier,
USAF, “Fifty Questions Every Airman Can Answer, ” Headquarters, Air Force Doctrine Center: Maxwell AFP,
Alabama, undated.
54
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-16, Multinational Operations, Washington D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, March 2007, Glossary-5.
55
Michael T. Flynn,“Understanding Our Future Battlespace: Why We Need to Integrate I0 into the IPB
Process.” p. 3.
56
JP 3-16, Glossary-5.
57
Capt. Frederick L. “Frtiz” Baier, USAF, “Fifty Questions Every Airman Can Answer, ” Headquarters, Air
Force Doctrine Center: Maxwell AFP, Alabama, undated.
58
Boynton develops his own definition after taking a meticulous look at definitions provided in US Navy,
Naval Doctrine Publication 1 Naval Warfare, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994 and
Department of the Army, FM 100-5, Operations, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997.
Major Frank R. Boynton, “Force Projection Operations: Lessons from Amphibious Warfare Doctrine,”
monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College,

48
 The battlespace is the sum of the areas of interest and influence. It is the area in which the
friendly commander can locate and influence enemy actions with fire or maneuver. It includes the areas
essential to the conduct of force projection operations. It also includes areas where the enemy can influence
friendly actions with his fires or maneuvers, including those areas essential to allow force projection
operations. These areas may be beyond the area of operations.

Based on the above, the author sums up that battlespace can one, refer to a geographical area
where military operations take place or are expected to take place; two, the areas that either belligerent has
influence on and its forces can move freely without the hindrance and obstruction by the opposing force;
and three, an area where the opposing force operates in which may fall outside of the area of influence of
the commander but is still considered to have potential to impact the military missions. In all three points, it
takes into account populated settlements and actors outside of the belligerents operating in the battlespace.
These considerations will be fleshed out more in detail in section 3.4.

3.3.4 Unpredictability of War: Fog and Friction

Yet, no matter the amount of planning and the preparation that goes into war, the battlefield is
shrouded by unpredictability and uncertainty. Rupert Smith draws on Clausewitz’s idea that war is “the
59
event of circumstance” where outcome is ultimately dictated by hap chance.

War is the province of uncertainty; three-fourths of these things upon which action in war must be
60
calculated are hidden more or less in the clouds of uncertainty.

Clausewitz attributes this to the fact that war is a reciprocated activity. It is not a one-way
application of force on an inert object but rather an interactive relationship between the antagonists that
creates an ever-changing balance, not to mention the influence of other unforeseeable circumstance such as
61
irregularities in the weather and terrain that also play a part in reducing predictability on the battlefield.
Clausewitz uses metaphors such as friction and fog to describe this phenomenon. He likens the
military organization to a machine. Well-oiled, it is expected to run smoothly but without the lubricant, the
machines not only slow down but also experience a breakdown. Friction in battle involves all the
impediments that the military can face on a battlefield. They range anything from mental and physical
62
exhaustion that soldiers experience to weather conditions that can delay the delivery of forces.
The fog on the other hand represents information that is obscured. One of the most important
factors in waging wars is gathering intelligence about the adversary’s intent, capabilities, arsenal, and force

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, AY 1995-1996, pp. 6-9.

59
Smith, The Utility of War, p. 66.
60
Clausewitz, On War, Book I, Chapter III, p. 33.
61
Ibid., Book I, Chapter VII, p. 46; Book II, Chapter II, p. 59.
62
Ibid., Book I, Chapter VII, pp. 46-47.

49
numbers and movement. There is always no complete information and much of the existing information
can be deceptive which requires a trained and experienced eye to shift through and to grasp the picture of
the battlefield. Thus, this lack of information can also be categorized as an impediment to military
63
operations.
The point that Clausetwitz drives at is that battle planning cannot be reduced to numerical or
deductive scientific reasoning, emphasizing the point that there is a great deal that will appear differently
64
from what was expected. Each war he says is an “unexpected sea” that has its unique attributes. Every
war is different: the terrain, the people, the culture, the military organization, arsenal, available resources,
and allies, to name a few, that embody the context that war is waged in. While battle outcomes can never be
entirely predictable, military practitioners and thinkers strive to reduce the uncertainties Battlespace is a
concept used by the military to assist them on making a sound strategy based gathering as much
information as possible and recognizing the possible or existing impediments and controlling them as much
as possible.

3.3.5 Battlespace Management: Exploiting 3-Dimensions in Conventional War

The challenge in waging war is reducing the friction and fog so that war can be made more
predictable. There are numerous things the commander takes into consideration in planning a battle such as
combat units, force protection, intelligence, and topography/climate/terrain. The preparation and the
sustenance of the battle also rely on non-combat expertise derived from engineers, logisticians,
65
quartermasters, commissariats, and medics.
Typically, commanders form a mental construct of the location of friendly and enemy forces to
organize and enact his capabilities. This visualization process is aided by breaking the battlespace down
into geometric/spatial properties. Known as dimensions, they traditionally include width, height (air space),
66
and depth (length). The width corresponds to the “ground space occupied by the military force.” The
height represents the “space required to employ weapon’s effects.” On the modern battlefield, this
dimension now refers to airspace that extends vertically. The depth represents both the “distance of the
67
weapons effects, plus the distance to the rear of the military force and its logistics.” In conventional
68
battles, forces are organized to direct firepower in these dimensions to seek decisive victory.

63
Ibid., Book I, Chapter VI, p. 45; Book II. Chapter II, section 24, p. 59.
64
Ibid., Book I, Chapter VI, p. 45; Chapter VII, pp. 46-47.
65
Engineers for one have to build bridges and roads to facilitate movement over natural impediments such as
mountains and rivers. Logistics also ensure that a battle can be sustained by supplying troops and equipment. See
Tsutomu Matsumura, Senjyutsu To Shiki, Tokyo: PHP Kenkyusho, 2006, Ch. 1. Hereafter cited as Matsumura.
Senjyutsu To Shiki
66
Department of the Army, FM 100-5, Operations, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, June
1993, p. 6-12; TRADOC Pamphlet 525-200-3, Dismounted Battlespace, Department of the Army Headquarters,
United States Army and Training and Doctrinal Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia, 1 June 1994, in the foreword.
67
Maj. James D. Nickolas,“Inside the Battlespace of Stability Operations,” advanced military studies
monograph, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1999, p. 13. Nickolas
summarizes the traditional understanding of the battlespace based on a construct from Napoleonic times.
Hereafter cited as Nickolas, “Inside the Battlespace of Stability Operations.”
68
With the development of firepower, these dimensions have incorporated technological advances to include air

50
 Combat formations developed prior to pre-industrial warfare; represent the fundamentals of a
69
3-dimensional battlespace. Troops were amassed into tactical formations, such as lines and columns, to
deliver to achieve desired effects of controlling fire and movement over a given battleground. For instance,
the line formation represents the width where troops are lined up horizontally. This spread allows for the
70
distribution of volley-fire, which covers a wider area. In contrast, the column formation, targets the depth
of the battlespace. This is where troops are queued up in elongated rows. Though this arrangement restricts
the breadth in which firepower can be applied, due to less numbers in the front, it allows for faster
movement than that of the line formation. The sheer weight of the men in back also aids in achieving
break-through of enemy lines. It embodies in essence the tenets of maneuver warfare where speed, mobility,
71
and precision of firepower allow force to be applied selectively on high-value targets in the depth.
Over centuries, technological and tactical innovations have altered the positioning and the
72
organization of military assets and forces in these dimensions. When national conscription was
introduced under Napoleon, the French leader used sheer manpower, capable of rapid mobilization, to
73
inflict devastating losses on the opponent on the frontlines. Yet, the Napoleonic battlespace remained
largely linear, as mass (force) was applied to a single point on the ground space that soldiers fought on.
Further experimentation on managing full set of dimensions, came with increased lethality of
firepower, mechanized warfare, and air power. This had the effect of emptying out the battlespace where
there was more distance between the operating units. Unlike the Napoleonic battlespace, men and
firepower could not be amassed to strike against a single point to secure decisive victory. Rather, troops had
to conduct military actions simultaneously, target multiple targets, and essentially maneuver in the depth of
74
the battlespace.

power for height, advanced communications systems for the depth.

69
Robert J. Bunker, “Epochal Change: War over Social and Political Organization,” Parameters, Summer 1997,
in footnote 15.
70
Smith, Utility of Force, p. 45.
71
Matsumura, Senjyutsu To Shiki p. 53-82. In ancient history, Persian and Roman armies depended on
well-trained soldiers to form complex tactical formations to maximize the effects of their weaponry. See
Matsumura, Senjyutsu To Shiki p.34.
72
William S. Lind & al, “The changing face of war: Into the Fourth Generation”, in Terry Terriff, Aaron Karp
and Regina Karp, eds., Global Insurgency and the Future of Armed Conflict, London and New York: Routledge,
2008, p. 14. Hereafter cited as William S. Lind & al, “The changing face of war.”
73
Thomas X. Hammes, “War evolves into the fourth generation”, in Terriff, Terry; Karp, Aaron and Karp,
Regina, eds., Global Insurgency and the Future of Armed Conflict: Debating fourth-generation warfare, New
York: Routledge, 2008, p. 24. Hereafter cited as Hammes, “War evolves into the fourth generation.” ; William S.
Lind & al, “The changing face of war,” p. 14; Smith, The Utility of Force, pp. 36-38.
74
Experimentation in reaching the depth of the battlespace was initiated largely due to the problem of being
unable to reach quick victory on the front-lines, despite amassed manpower and firepower (i.e. as demonstrated
in trench warfare in World War I). See details in Nickolas, “Inside the Battlespace of Stability Operations,” pp.
7-12. An innovative concept to reach the depth was developed by the Germans. At the end of World War I, the
Germans, lagging behind France and England in their industrial output, focused on tactical innovations to
overcome their weaknesses against their adversaries. Their tactics sought the depth of the enemy, and ultimately
they developed the art of maneuver warfare. Their ideas culminated into one of the most famed examples of
maneuver warfare, the blitzkrieg. This was a concentrated attack aimed to seek deep penetration of the enemy
rather than use overwhelming power. With the appearance of improved tanks and airpower, this maneuver tactic
was accompanied with unprecedented speed, producing shock and awe that allowed the breakthrough of the

51
 Achieving effects in the dimension of depth through maneuver was more recently demonstrated
by the United States. The American military, from the late 1980s, was drawn to the concept of Revolution
of Military Affairs (RMA), made more feasible with the rapid advances in technology. RMA was
considered to be the answer to make battlespace more predictable within the paradigm of
mechanized/industrial warfare. It is based on the notion that a military’s overwhelming superiority in
weaponry, network systems, and industrial base can ensure a decisive and quick victory over the
75
adversary. An event, which highlighted the much-anticipated capabilities of the United States in
mastering RMA, was exemplified in the 1991 Gulf War. The United States used the German Blitzkrieg as
its model; to by-pass enemy front lines and collapse the enemy from within. By combining superior
intelligence, communication systems, and the delivery of precision-based firepower, they were able to
target the opponent’s critical vulnerabilities. It was a feat that was thought to spell out the ultimate form of
76
warfare.
No doubt this allowed the United States to achieve lightening victory in the initial stages of the
Gulf War, and later in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003). Nonetheless, the RMA-oriented military’s
preference on protecting its force by depending on the remote control of the battlespace and over-reliance
on military technology, did not prepare the troops to manage the post-invasion battlespace. Remaining
armed groups capitalized on the invading force’s lack of legitimacy in the eyes of the people, and exploited
77
the human terrain to wage an effective and deadly form of guerrilla warfare.
As history has shown repeatedly, no matter how superior an army is in terms of equipment,
firepower, and technology, it could not solve the problem of fog and friction. The prolonged and messy
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have reduced the validity of RMA or tech-centric warfare and not surprisingly,
it was met by acerbity from COIN practitioners and military theorists alike who argued that such an
approach is irrelevant in today’s wars where a scope of actions that involve social, economic, political, and
psychological activities are required as well.78 Thus, the renewed interest in dealing with the pressing
concern of insurgencies has impacted the approach in managing battlespace.

opponents’ lines. See Hammes, “War evolves into the fourth generation,” pp. 24-25; Lind et al., “The changing
face of war,” p. 14-15; Smith, The Utility of Force, pp. 134-137.
75
Jeremy Black, War and the New Disorder in the 21st Century, New York & London: Continuum, 2004, pp. x;
91; 119; 123; 131. Black, War and the New Disorder in the 21st Century. Fighting quick and decisive wars are
essentially the preferred method for a nation such as the United States that is endowed with industrial and
military might. Furthermore, decisive victory is rooted in their military tradition, which draws from the
nation-building experience bent on national survival. See Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, p. 49.
76
A.J. Echevarria II, “Deconstructing Fourth Generation War”, in Terry Terriff, Aaron Karp and Regina Karp,
eds., Global Insurgency and the Future of Armed Conflict, London and New York: Routledge, 2008, pp. 62-63.
77
Lawrence Freedman, “War evolves into the fourth generation: A comment on Thomas X. Hammes”, in Terry
Terriff, Aaron Karp and Regina Karp, eds., Global Insurgency and the Future of Armed Conflict, London and
New York: Routledge, 2008, pp. 79-80.
78
Black, War and the New Disorder in the 21 st Century, p. x.

52
3.4 Managing the Dimension of Depth in Insurgent Battlespace
3.4.1 Explaining Insurgent Warfare
79
Insurgency, in the broadest terms, is a war that is waged between forces belonging to a
legitimate authority and an armed group that does not have constitutionally recognized rights to
monopolize violence. The aims of the insurgent group may be to completely overturn the status quo and
reestablish a government of their own or seek limited aims such as secession and socio-economic or
political reform. It is differentiated from other forms of violence such as crime and mob frenzy because the
80
insurgent consciously uses political resources in conjunction with violence to seek political goals.
Insurgents do not wage war based on conventional standards until they reach parity with the
conventional force. Any attempts to fight a battle on the same playing field as the conventional force would
risk decimation of their forces. Rather, they use guerrilla tactics, a choice weapon for a weaker force that
cannot compete with a regular army that has advanced weaponry and communication systems, aircraft,
logistics, official training, and large military formations. By avoiding pitched battles and relying more on
hit-and-run tactics, insurgents can preserve their force while being committed to harassing their opponent.
This allows them to buy time to not only build up their forces, but to also wear down and demoralize the
81
conventional force as well.

3.4.1.1 Utilization of Space

The successful insurgent is able to engage in military action without being defeated through the
82
“utilization of space.” In sharp contrast with the traditional notion of conventional battles that take place
in open space within relatively fixed physical boundaries, the insurgents invert the battlespace into one that
works to their advantage. To put it another way, the insurgents deny the conventional forces of the linear
battlefield that they are most comfortable working in, by transforming it into one that has “no definable
83
battlefields and fronts.”

79
Also referred to as revolutionary war, people’s war, wars of national liberation, colonial wars, partisan wars,
guerrilla war, small wars, low-intensity wars, longs wars, irregular wars, and asymmetric war. For a
contemporary understanding of insurgency see Steven Metz, Rethinking Insurgency, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S.
Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, June 2007, pp. 4-10. Hereafter cited as Metz, Rethinking
Insurgency.
80
Bard O’Neill, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare, Dulles, Virginia,
Brassey’s Inc., 1990, p. 13; 27; See Donald W. Hamilton, The Art of Insurgency: American Military Policy and
the Failure of Strategy in Southeast Asia, Westport, CT, Praeger Publishers, 1998, Ch.1 for discussion on
defining insurgency.
81
The main points of guerrilla warfare are summarized in David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory
and Practice, Westport, Connecticut and London: Praeger Security: 1964, 2006, pp. 3-4; 5-6; Bernd Horn,
“Complexity Squared: Operating in the Future Battlespace,” Canadian Military Journal, Autumn, 2003, p. 8;
Anthony James Jops, Modern Guerilla Insurgency, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1992, p. 5; Metz, Rethinking
Insurgency, pp. 1-2; Mao Tse-Tung, “Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan, May 1938” in
Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung, Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1967.
82
Andre Beaufre, Strategy for Tomorrow, New York: Crane, Russak & Co., Inc, 1974, p. 36. Hereafter cited as
Beaufre, Strategy for Tomorrow.
83
William S. Lind et al., “The Changing Face of War: Into the fourth generation”, in Terry Terriff, Aaron Karp
and Regina Karp, eds., Global Insurgency and the Future of Armed Conflict: Defeating fourth
generation-warfare, London and New York: Routledge, 2008, p. 15. Hereafter cited as Lind et al., “The

53
 One of the methods that illustrate this is through the allocation of their forces. Hence, expressions
84
such as “emptying out of the battlespace” or a “disaggregated battlespace” are also applied to insurgent
warfare to depict how insurgents scatter their forces over large swaths of land, using a complicated
interplay of concentration and dispersal of forces. This has the effect of extending the width, or the ground
space occupied by insurgents. Since forces are so spread out, it makes it difficult for the conventional force
to locate and engage the insurgents amassed in a singular encounter to produce a decisive result. While a
conventional force is typically numerically superior to the insurgents, any conventional method to obtain
results in this type of battlespace, requires a force-to-space ratio that for the most part, exceeds the
85
capabilities and resources that the conventional force has.

3.4.1.2 Insurgent Depth

How insurgents make space unmanageable for the conventional forces is done by shifting the
focus of operations to the depth.86 In a three-dimensional battlespace, the width provides the conventional
forces with a clear-target for attack. With airpower capabilities, the conventional forces can also take
advantage of the height to support ground maneuvers. Since the insurgents do not have the same
capabilities to project lethal force in these two dimensions, they shift their operations to the depth.
Broadly speaking, the depth is located behind the frontlines. Managing the dimensions of depth
hinges on narrowing down the targets and applying concentrated amounts of firepower on them.87 Targets
in the depth are critical because it also constitutes the rear that provides the forces on the frontlines with
supplies and reinforcement. In conventional militaries, they are the command and control centers, logistics,
and infrastructure.88 In other words, it is the space that shapes future operations.89 Opposing forces attack
these “critical nodes” in the rear for the purpose of denying the opponents the freedom to maneuver,
disrupting tempo, and generating conditions for a decisive blow.90 Targeting the depth in any type of
military operation is important also because it produces opportunities to gain intelligence and help

Changing Face of War: Into the fourth generation.”

84
“The emptying out of the battlespace” also refers to the increase in the distance that firepower can reach due
to technological revolutions.
85
Exclusive interview with Brig. Justin Kelly (Australian Army) in Pointer, Journal of the Singapore Armed
Forces, undated. Available at: http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/publications/pointer/index.html. Nickolas,
“Inside the Battlespace of Stability Operations.” The minimum number of soldiers required to effectively control
affected terrain is 10 men per square kilometer or 1,000 men to every 100 square kilometers. See Beaufre,
Strategy for Tomorrow, p. 36. From a Philippine perspective, see Victor Corpus, Silent War. Quezon City: VNC
Publishing, p. 73.
86
Major Lee K. Grubbs and Major Michael J. Forsyth, “Is There a Deep Fight in a Counterinsurgency,”
Military Review, July- August 2005, pp. 28-29; F.G. Hoffman, “Combating Fourth Generational Warfare,” p. 187.
87
Smith, The Utility of Force, p. 45.
88
Grubbs and Forsyth, “Is There a Deep Fight in a Counterinsurgency,”p. 28; FM 100-5, Operations
Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 14 June 1993, p. 7-13. Hereafter cited as FM 100-5, 1993.
89
Major Wayne A. Parks, “Operational-level Deep Operations: A Key Component of Operational Art and
Future Warfare,” monograph, Fort Leavenwork, Kansas: School of Advanced Military Studies, 1998, p. 7.
90
James J. Schneider, “A New Form of Warfare,” Military Review, January-February, 2000, pp. 56-61 in Grubbs
and Forsyth, “Is There a Deep Fight in a Counterinsurgency,”p. 28; Department of the Army, FM 100-5,
Operations Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 14, 1993, p. 7-13. Hereafter cited as FM
100-5, 1993.

54
influence events. It is also a means to reduce the uncertainties and make operations more predictable.91
Insurgents do not have a rear in the conventional sense.92 Insurgents avoid stationary and large
rear-service (lines of communication) and depend on self-sustaining units that can operate off the territory
they move in.93 Nonetheless, to avoid being a “roving bandit-group” there is still a necessity to exploit and
create conditions in the depth that can serve as their rear.94
The first area in the depth in which insurgents exploit, is the complex physical terrain.95 As the
name suggests, these are areas that present a cumbersome obstacle course for a regular army since it
includes mountains, jungles, swamps, and dense forests. Regular armies typically operate in large unit
formations (battalions, brigades, and divisions) equipped with heavy equipment and transport vehicles.
While the natural environs prevent the mobility of the conventional forces, it works in favor for the
insurgent who operates in highly-mobile and compact units, unhampered by heavy equipment. The terrain
also reduces visibility for the regular army since dense forests or triple canopy jungles conceal the
insurgents’ whereabouts, even obscuring the line of sight for military aircraft to drop bombs on its targets.96
Additionally, there is limited government presence in some of these areas due to its remoteness, making it
an ideal place for insurgents to establish sanctuaries or bases.97
Terrain is also not limited to topography, but also populated areas as well.98 The dispersion of
99
the battlespace includes the enemy’s society. More than often, insurgents engage in political activities to
not only legitimize their cause, but to also effectively organize and mobilize the people to support their
movement.100 By securing this support, the insurgents can gain from the population, weaponry, victuals,
bases, training grounds, concealment, intelligence about enemy movements, and recruits to sustain their
movement, as well, as a place to blend into and hide.101 From a military viewpoint, the population provides

91
FM 100-5, 1993, p. 2-7.
92
Mao, “Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan, May 1938,” p. 160; George K. Tanham,
Communist Revolutionary Warfare: From the Vietminh to the Viet Cong, Westport, Connecticut and London:
Praeger Security International, 1961, 2006, p.3. Hereafter cited as Tanham, Communist Revolutionary Warfare.
93
Mao, “Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War, December 1936,” pp. 98; 138.
94
Mao, “Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War, December 1936,” p. 98.
95
Brig. Justin Kelly (Australian Army), exclusive interview published in Pointer. Accessed at:
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/publications/pointer/index.html.
96
Victor N. Corpus, Silent War, pp. 77-79; Mao, “Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan, May
1938,” pp. 160-161.
97
Exclusive interview with Brig. Justin Kelly on Pointer, Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces, undated;
Metz, “Rethinking insurgency,” p. 10; Steven Metz and Raymond Miller, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in
the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing threat and response,” Carlise Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College,
Strategic Studies Institute, November 2004, p. 2. Hereafter cited as Metz and Miller, “Insurgency and
Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century.”
98
Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, pp. 33-34; Exclusive interview with Brig. Justin Kelly on Pointer,
Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces.
99
Lind et al., “The Changing Face of War,” p. 15.
100
Mao, “The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains, November 25, 1928, ” p. 29; Mao, “On Correcting
Mistaken Ideas in the Party, December 1929; p. 54; Mao, “Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War,
December 1936,” p. 114; Tanham, Communist Revolutionary Warfare, pp. 4; 9.
101
Mao Tse Tung, “Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War, December, 1936” in Selected Military
Writings of Mao Tse-tung, Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1967, pp. 113-114; Smith, Utility of Force, pp.
170-171; Metz and Miller, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century,” p. 7.

55
the rear services for the insurgent.

3.4.1.3 Freedom of Action

By securing the above conditions in the depth of the battlespace, insurgents are able to achieve
mobility over space. “Constant mobility ensures security and survival” since the conventional forces cannot
102
pin them down for a decisive blow. Ability to sustain their operations comes from the population, and
being able to relocate their bases, resultantly rids them of the burden of holding and defending territory.
This works in detriment to the conventional force, because the capture of any given terrain does not
103
translate into a substantial victory. Moreover, by representing the government, the military is
responsible for defending key national and local assets, and ensuring control of the government over its
territories. Therefore, by being rigidly confined to easily identifiable physical areas, conventional forces are
104
more susceptible to hit-and-run attacks and/or raids by insurgents.
105
By shedding “physical assets” insurgents follow what Mao codified in his writings about
guerrilla warfare: “Oppose fixed battle lines and positional warfare and favor fluid battle lines and mobile
106
warfare.” In effect, it makes them a shapeless entity. These operational tenets guide the conduct of
guerrilla action that is composed of a series of tactical engagements that relies on stealth and speed to
107
inflict damage on the conventional force in the form of sallies, ambushes and raids.
In effect, mobility in the depth allows insurgents to attain “the freedom of action.” Freedom of
action translates into initiative. With initiative, the insurgents can seize opportunities, to turn around the
strengths of a conventional force into their advantage. Without initiative, insurgents would be cornered into
108
a defensive position, spelling out eventual defeat. Therefore, for the conventional force, the main task at
hand lies in denying the insurgents’ of their freedom of action.

3.4.2 Approaching the Depth of the Battlespace

An armed adversary that is shapeless (not posing a clear line of attack) and that does not operate
within the clearly defined parameters of a linear battlespace compels the conventional force to dramatically

102
Corpus, Silent War, p. 79.
103
Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency, Westport, Connecticut and London:
Praeger Security International, 1964, 2006, p. 5.
104
Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, pp. 7-8.
105
Ibid., pp.7-8.
106
Mao, Tse-Tung, “Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War, December, 1936” in Selected Military
Writings of Mao Tse-tung, Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1967, pp. 97; 138.
107
For more details see Mao Tse-Tung, “Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan, May 1938” in
Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung, Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1967, pp. 84; 97-99; 142-143; 158;
162-163; Such tenants are summarized in David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice,
Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 1964, 2006, p. 3 and Smith, Utility of War, p. 159. Nevertheless,
the first to codify these practices was Mao Tse Tung, “Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan, May
1938” in Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung, Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1967, pp. 158-165 and
Mao Tse-Tung, Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, Volume 1, Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1967, p. 215.
108
Mao Tse Tung, “Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan, May 1938” in Selected Military
Writings of Mao Tse-tung, Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1967, pp. 159-165. These ideas are also summarized
by Corpus, Silent War, pp. 80-81.

56
alter their approach to managing the dimensions of the battlespace. Since it is from the insurgents’ adept
management of the depth that allows them the “freedom of action,” the counterinsurgent, therefore must
seek the depth.109
Targeting the depth that provides the “freedom of action” for the insurgent poses an immense
challenge for the counterinsurgent. To achieve success, the counterinsurgent must secure his “freedom of
action” first before launching decisive operations. This requires the counterinsurgents to deny the
conditions in the deep dimension that sustain the insurgency.
Military action used in a conventional war, that is used to destroy the opponent, capture key
territory, and finally impose the victor’s will on the vanquished, rarely renders success in an insurgency.110
Insurgents do not stick around long or amass enough forces to allow the conventional forces to engage
them decisively.111 Instead, they use mobility and stealth, aided by the complex physical terrain of the
battlespace to launch attacks when conditions work in favor for them. Traditional COIN practices have
adapted by the use of flying columns, or lightly equipped and compact military units to overcome these
natural barriers, to attain the same fluidity as the insurgents have over the terrain. Nonetheless, while it has
the same effect the insurgents have in harassing forces, its operations alone cannot “create a permanent
presence or influence with the population.”112
This leaves the counterinsurgent with an aspect of the depth, which is considered to be less
tangible and more difficult to manage based purely on military operations. Insurgencies take place in a
complex battlespace occupied not only by the belligerents, but also the whole of their society.113 What has
traditionally been considered separate such as combatants and non-combatants, civilian and military
spheres of activity, and war and peace have “converged” or have become “ blurred.”114
The population component of the battlespace is decidedly one of the most perplexing components
of the battlespace for the counterinsurgent. Populated communities are where the insurgents blend in and
hide. Therefore, applying the usual aggregates of firepower in this area is more problematic than
prescriptive since the inability to discern the combatant from the civilian risk great collateral damage.115
A conventional force may be tempted to use its superiority in armaments and capabilities to physically
destroy the opponent but an over-reliance on the military solution does not address the real issue that fuels
armed rebellions.116 Insurgents exploit internal tensions in a country that stem from social, economic, and

109
Gavin Bulloch, “Military Doctrine and Counterinsurgency: A British Perspective,”
Parameters, Summer 1996, p. 8 as printed out; Grubbs and Forsyth, “Is There a Deep Fight in a
Counterinsurgency,” pp. 28-31; Lind et al, “The Changing Face of War,” p. 15.
110
Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, p. 5; Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View
of Counterinsurgency, Westport, Connecticut and London: Praeger Security International, 1964, 2006, pp. 5-6.
Hereafter cited as Trinquier, Modern Warfare.
111
Frank G. Hoffman, “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges,” JFQ, Issue 52, 1st quarter, 2009, p.36; Lind et al, “The
Changing Face of War: Into the fourth generation,” p. 15.
112
Grubbs and Forsyth, “Is There a Deep Fight in a Counterinsurgency, ” p. 29.
113
Lind et al, “The Changing Face of War: Into the fourth generation,” p. 15.
114
Lind et al., discusses the blurred nature of the battlespace in “The changing face of war,” p. 15. Frank G.
Hoffman discusses convergence in “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges, JFQ, issue 52, 1st quarter 2009.
115
Grubbs and Forsyth, “Is There a Deep Fight in a Counterinsurgency,” p. 28.
116
Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, p. 5.

57
political grievances.117 This in turn provides them with the psychological grounds that help them drum up
support for their cause. Any military action that is repressive and leads to the curtailment of civil liberties
only widens the rift between the population and the government. Consequently, it has the likely effect of
increasing the support for the insurgents further.
In short, the population represents the “new ground” that the counterinsurgent has to manage in
order to win the war118 and this requires the counterinsurgent to plan for deep operations that allow them to
enter the everyday space of civilians.119

3.4.3 CMO: Helping the Military to Maneuver and Secure Conditions in the Depth
In planning for operations in the depth, it is decidedly a riskier choice to rely on firepower to
physically destroy the insurgent who operates in the midst of the population. An alternative choice is to
refocus firepower from the width to the depth, and apply it selectively. Known as maneuver warfare, it
seeks to gain positional advantage over the opponent especially in the depth, in order to strike decisively. It
is typically associated with movement, since soldiers attempt to preserve their freedom of mobility while
denying this from the opponent.120 Commanders are also required to have an extensive understanding on
the strengths and weaknesses of the opponent and exercise lateral thinking to generate or find opportunities
to exploit.121
Conventional understanding of maneuver deals with securing vantage points to direct firepower
within the physical parameters of the battlespace but F.G. Hoffman theorizes that maneuver has to go
beyond movement of troops in the “spatial sense” and include non-tangible dimensions such as the support
of the people and the morale of the enemy (psychological realms). Therefore, combat skills alone cannot
attain this.122
Hoffman argues that CMO is a non-traditional form of maneuver that allows soldiers to gain
positional advantages over the insurgents in their deep depth.123 Its primary utility lies in securing the
124
population by developing closer links with the people.
At a tactical level, CMO allows the soldier to maneuver within the population and seek positional
advantages over the insurgent. These activities require direct contact with the population and this is
facilitated through activities such as civic action and information campaigns. The culmination of these
activities basically shapes the human terrain of the battlespace. Here, maneuver is implemented at an
operational level. By influencing the attitudes of the civilian audience in favor of the counterinsurgent, it
denies the insurgent positional advantages generated by population support (see textbox 3.1). Here, CMO

117
Trinquier, Modern Warfare, p. 5.
118
Galula, CounterinsurgencyWarfare, p. 4.
119
The term is used by Stephen Graham in “The Urban ‘Battlespace’”, Theory, and Culture, & Society, Vol. 26,
no. 7-8, December 2009, pp. 278-288.
120
FM 100-5, pp. 2-5, 2-14.
121
William S. Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985, p. 19.
122
Hoffman, “Combating Fourth Generational Warfare,” p. 185.
123
Ibid., p. 185.
124
Ibid., pp. 178-181; 185-187; 192-193.

58
sets the conditions of the battlespace so that if they are exploited successfully, the counterinsurgent can
engage the insurgents decisively.125 In essence, the maneuver element of CMO is about finding the source
of power or Center of Gravity (COG) for the insurgent, and transforming that into a vulnerability that the
counterinsurgent can exploit and gain military success.

Textbox 3.1: Denying the Positional Advantages of the Insurgent Generated by Population Support

1. Deny the insurgents of their base of support (sanctuaries, supplies, recruits, intelligence, etc.)
2. Deny their psychological appeal over the population by targeting the grievances of the people and
thereby securing support for the government and the military
3. Deny them the mobility over the battlespace (cannot move freely in communities)
4. Deny them the freedom of action (overall initiative in battle)

CMO is not limited to persuading the population to drop their support for the insurgents. The
126
battlespace is increasingly assuming a “crowded and complex face.” In fact, it is a kaleidoscope of
communities that include the contesting forces (government troops vs. insurgents), auxiliary (paramilitary)
forces, fringe groups that capitalize on the status quo to run criminal activities, intervening foreign forces
(either in support of the government or the insurgents), non-combatant insurgent supporters, humanitarian
127
organizations, NGOs, media, local government agencies, and the general population.
Thus, the counterinsurgent has to develop capabilities in dealing with an assortment of actors.
With lawless or fringe groups, coordination with the police is required. Lack of available security personnel
can be filled in by civilian militia, but must be closely supervised and trained to prevent them from
overstepping their lines of duty. CMO in particular is tasked to coordinate with humanitarian organizations,
NGOs, and local government officials. With an improved working relationship, the counterinsurgent can
share resources and skills, and prepare for a smooth transfer in the post-conflict stage. In dealing with the
enemy, amnesty programs can also be initiated so that they can be coaxed into giving up their cause and
re-joining society as non-combatants.
While the civilian sphere, be it coordination with various actors or influencing the people
psychologically to secure vantage points, it cannot be forgotten that CMO has also a role to play in the

125
See the following field manual for details on operational and tactical levels of war. Department of the Army,
FM 3-0, Operations, Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 2006, pp. 2-4; 2-5; 4-4; 4-5.
Hereafter cited as FM 3-0; It is important to note that at the strategic level, CMO requires solid strategic
guidance to link military and civilian efforts in tackling the root causes of insurgency and containing or
eliminated the armed threat. From the government side, CMO on the ground can only achieve long-term success,
through its implementation of meaningful structural reform in society and addressing the grievances of the
people. U.S. Government, Counterinsurgency Guide, United States Government Interagency Counterinsurgency
Initiative, Jan. 2009, p. 2.
126
United States Marines Corps, Department of the Navy, MCWP 3-33.1 MAGTF Civil-Military Operations,
U.S. Marines Corps (Coordinating Draft 01-21-01), 7 April 2003, p. 2
127
See Steven Metz, “Rethinking Insurgency,” Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies
Institute, June 2007 for a detailed understanding on the array of occupants on a battlespace, pp. 14-42.

59
physical terrain. The mainstay of CMO capabilities is civil engineering. Military engineers not only provide
construction or repair of damaged infrastructure in war zones, but military engineers “execute mobility,
counter-mobility, and survivability missions in the forward combat zone.” Construction of roads and
bridges provide mobility for forces, ensuring their freedom of movement even over difficult physical
128
terrain. Especially in insurgent battlespace, insurgents locate their forces in difficult topography such as
mountains and dense forests, often times, having limited access to arteries that connect to the outside world.
The construction of roads not only intends to benefit isolated and depressed communities, but also is
important in allowing the soldiers to maneuver in the physical depth.
Combining all the factors mentioned above, CMO is a form of maneuver that designs operations
129
to penetrate the depth of the enemy and collapse the insurgent internally with limited force. The focus
lies in denying the insurgents the conditions of the depth that sustain their mobility and freedom of
130
action and thereby, making the battlespace more manageable by the counterinsurgent.

3.4.4 Conclusion
This section places CMO within a conceptual framework that could better understand its role in
counterinsurgent warfare. It draws theories on insurgent capabilities in upsetting the might of the
conventional forces. In particular, it examined the dimension of the battlespace in which the insurgents
adeptly use, which is the depth that includes the population that supports them. Thus, the framework
established for the purposes of assessing CMO in the Philippines, derives from concepts that situates CMO
within the scheme of maneuver, one of which that allows troops to reach the populated depth of the
insurgent battlespace. It is a method that seeks to put the insurgents at a disadvantage by shaping the
attitudes of the people in favor of the counterinsurgent. Ultimately, it helps deny the insurgents’ freedom of
action, providing the counterinsurgents with opportunities to deliver decisive blows either psychologically
or physically.
Hence, it is instructive in examining CMO in the context of the Philippines, because all threat
groups, at one time or another, have engaged in guerrilla action using the tenets of Mao’s mobile warfare
where the depth of the battlespace ensures their survival. Additionally, it provides another way to measure
the effectiveness of the AFP’s COIN program. In applying this framework, it can examine the effects of
CMO on the ground. Therefore, a focused study from the operational and tactical level is conducted. At the
operational level, CMO is examined for its role in shaping the battlespace to generate opportunities for the
counterinsurgent and exploit weaknesses of the insurgent. And at the tactical level, it is studied for its utility
in allowing soldiers to directly interact with the people, which in turn, can help set the conditions for the
battlespace in favor of the counterinsurgent.

128
FM 100-5, 1993, pp. 2-9; 2-24.
129
Lind et al, “The Changing Face of War: Into the fourth generation,” p. 15.
130
Frank G. Hoffman, “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges,” JFQ. Issue 52, 1st quarter 2009, p. 38.

60
Chapter 4. Historical Background to the AFP-CMO
4.1 Introduction
While much fanfare accompanied “institutionalization” of the Philippines’ Civil Military
Operations (CMO) within the military institution in 2006, from the perspective on the type of activities
conducted, they were the mere repackaging of those found in a long history replete with them. Even CMO
officers interviewed after 2006, admit that operation in itself was nothing new.131 Variants of CMO were
practiced as early as 1898, with the entry of the Americans on the archipelago. By the 1950s, its
components such as psychological operations, civic action, and public affairs were already in place,
directed by various military bureaus such as the Civil Affairs Office and the Army Engineering Corps. It
was precisely due to its successful application in quelling the armed communist movement in this period
that succeeding administrations have either maintained its function or have readapted them to meet the
security demands of each passing generation.
Yet, when tracing the history of CMO, it did not directly build on past successes. Rather it was
punctuated by periods of failure and followed by a process of relearning. Part of the problem was that CMO
were not fully understood in the way that could replicate the success of the early 1950s. It was mainly
disjointed from overall military operations and frequently swept into the category of nation-building
Though it appeared that they worked in conjunction with military operations, since a lack of security was
perceived to be due to the lack of development, the military’s propensity to use indiscriminate firepower,
often diluted or nullified the effects of CMO that sought to uplift the lives of people. More often than not,
the nature of such military operations alienated the population, which ended up providing a means for the
insurgents to increase their support.
Taking into consideration the above factors, the objectives of this section is first, to trace the
historical development and two, explore the conditions, which either brought about its success or failure.
The chapter magnifies in particular four periods: the American colonial period, the Ramon Magsaysay
Period, the Ferdinand Marcos period, and the Corazon Aquino Period.

4.2 The American Colonial Period (1898-1935)

4.2.1 Introduction to the American Period
The direct antecedents of CMO can be traced back to the early 1950s, when the AFP established
the Civil Affairs Office (CAO) to counter the threat of the communist-led agrarian uprising. Nonetheless, a
closer scrutiny on the subject reveals that the Philippines was exposed to CMO practices in the decades that
preceded Philippine independence. Many of the CMO activities that are conducted today first emerged
during the American colonial period. When the United States came into possession of the Philippine Islands
in 1898, an early form of CMO that the Americans pursued were initially in response to the mounting
challenges that dealt with having the military take lead in the administration of the Islands. Various
activities such as the delivery of healthcare, providing education, and infrastructure-building, normally

131
Major Eugenio Batara, Asst. Chief of Unified Command Staff for CMO, U7, interview with author, Western
Mindanao Command, Camp Don Basilio Navarro, Calarian, Zamboanga City, Philippines, October 3, 2007.

61
reserved for a civilian administration were undertaken by the American military initially. As the war
continued, civic action programs were also geared to “win the hearts and minds” of the Filipino for the
purpose of building the legitimacy for American control.
The maneuver element of CMO emerged when the American soldiers shifted from a conventional
approach to a counter-guerrilla one. It was integrated in its seedling form at the end of the
Filipino-American War (1899-1902) and refined by the Philippine Constabulary that was laden with the
task of maintaining peace and order throughout the Philippines. One of the methods that the constables
devised in penetrating the physical and human depth of the complex battlespace were activities that falls in
the category of what is referred to as CMO today.
The American period merits a deeper examination because it left a significant imprint on the
orientation of the Philippine military. After independence, the AFP in practice became a predominantly
internal security force. The Filipinos that formed the officer-core of the first Filipino army were from a pool
of Filipino auxiliary and policing forces that fought alongside the Americans in their counterinsurgency
campaigns. They were the very Filipino soldiers acquainted and trained in American practices in using
CMO not only for the purpose of legitimacy-building for the government in charge but also to enhance
COIN capabilities. This segment of history reveals that it is no coincidence that future CMO programs
resemble or are reminiscent of the ones conducted in this period. Thus, it can be argued that the tradition
was passed onto to the new independent army mainly through collective experiences.
Additionally, even after independence, the Philippines maintained a strong relationship with the
United States that included a military alliance. Though the United States did not become directly involved
in the Philippines’ future internal security problems, they were instrumental in providing military assistance
that included financing, equipment, and training. Therefore, up to a certain extent, the manner in which the
AFP fought internal rebellions that included CMO was shaped by American input.

4.2.2 Background to the Entry of Americans on the Philippine Islands

The Spanish-American War (April 25, 1898 – August 12, 1898) was a turning point for the
Philippines. It was a war that had begun on the other side of the world, with Americans rallying to the cause
of the Cubans in their quest for independence from Spain. In a matter days after the Americans declared
war on Spain, the war extended to the Pacific. The United States sent a squadron of Navy warships to
Spain’s key possession in the region, the Philippines. Led by Commodore George Dewey, the American
Navy dealt a lightening blow on the Spaniards in the Battle of Manila Bay (May 1898).
In the same decade that preceded the arrival of the Americans, the Filipinos were already fighting
their own war of resistance against the Spanish. The independence movement originated from a secret
society called the Katipunan that fought to free the Philippines from the tyrannical and corrupt rule of
132
Spain. When the Spanish authorities discovered its existence; it triggered the Filipino Revolutionary

132
Teodoro A. Agoncillo, The Revolt of the Masses: The Story of Bonifacio and the Katipunan, Quezon City:
University of the Philippine Press, 2002, pp. 1-4. Hereafter cited as Agoncillo, The Revolt of the Masses.

62
 133
War (1896-1898). The American entry allowed the revolutionaries to join forces with the Americans in
ousting Spain. On June 12, 1898, the leader of the Filipino resistance movement, General Emilio Aguinaldo,
134
proclaimed Philippine independence and set up a revolutionary government and army.
For Aguinaldo’s revolutionaries, the Spanish-American War was a short but a sordid affair. Even
before the billows of smoke from Commodore Dewey’s battleship could settle, they had nagging doubts
135
about America’s true intentions. This was not unfounded since back in Washington, a heated debate was
going on concerning the future of the Philippines. The success of the American Navy in defeating the
136
Spaniards, demonstrated that the United States could project power. This could not have but strike a
reverberating chord with McKinley’s Republican camp, the military, business groups, and Protestant groups
who saw the Philippines as a vast pool of untapped potential to serve their respective interests. On the other
hand, the opposition party, the Democrats were staunchly against expansionism. President McKinley, with
137
presidential elections of 1900 in sight, was wedged in the middle.
Under these political currents back at home, McKinley still pushed on with war, while in the
Philippines; he played a delicate balancing act with both the Filipinos and the Spanish. The Americans
needed the revolutionaries to remove the Spanish from power but avoided making any explicit promises on
138
recognizing Philippine independence. On the other hand, the Spanish, aware of their approaching defeat,
made secret concessions with Americans so that they could at least retain some dignity in their defeat. As a
result, the conquest of Manila by the Americans on August 13, 1898, was a face-saving battle for the
139
Spanish and the Filipinos were deliberately shutout from participating in the Spanish surrender.
Filipino suspicions of American’s imperial ambitions in their Islands were finally confirmed with
the subsequent signing of the Treaty of Paris (1898) in December that formerly ended the war. In it, it was
stipulated that the United States would gain most Spain’s colonial possessions, including the Philippines.
The Philippines’ 333-year control under Spain ended with a consolation check of 20 million dollars made
out by the United States to Spain. Within a month and a half after the treaty, the Filipino revolutionaries
angered by the terms of agreement began attacking the Americans in February 1899. What followed was a
140
long and bloody war between the Americans and Filipinos.

133
Cesar P. Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 2000,
pp. 19-21. Hereafter cited as Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People.
134
Teodoro A. Agoncillo, Malolos: The Crisis of the Republic, Quezon City: The University of the Philippine
Press, 1997, ch. 7, for details about Aguinaldo’s proclamation and plans to set up a revolutionary government.
Hereafter cited as Agoncillo, Malolos.
135
Agoncillo, Malolos, p.143. See Ch. 7 for more on the growing rift between the American and Filipino
“alliance.”
136
Herman Herst, Jr., “Philippine Guerrilla Posts,” Bulletin of the American Historical Collection Foundation,
Vol. XXVII, No. 3 (108), July-September 1999, p. 31. Hereafter cited as Herst, “Philippine Guerrilla Posts.”
137
Agoncillo, Malolos, pp. 517-520.
138
Ibid., pp. 118-119.
139
Ibid., pp. 145; 148; 160-168; 518.
140
Herst, “Philippine Guerrilla Posts,” p. 31.

63
4.2.3 Decision to Annex the Philippine Islands and Impact on American Policy
As soon as Dewey’s ships dropped anchor in Manila Bay, German naval ships began to
surreptitiously coast the Philippine waters. This alarmed the Americans, since they considered a fledgling
Republic under Aguinaldo would be too weak to stave off other imperial powers. McKinley, not wanting to
miss the opportunity to secure a strategic docking position in the Pacific; one that that would allow the
Americans to impose their military presence in the region and control over trade routes, sought to fulfill
141
these geostrategic ambitions by taking control over the Philippines.
However, the United States’ decision to annex the Philippines was problematic for a nation that
had carved out its existence from its own war of independence and denying this from the Philippines was
142
contradicting the very democratic principles that the nation was built on. Thus, McKinley chose his
words carefully to appease the anti-imperialists and those elements of the American public that were not
ready to accept a new American colony. He played down American imperial ambitions by emphasizing that
it was not in the initial intentions of the United States to take control over the Philippines but it was God
143
who chose the United States to undertake the duty of enlightening and civilizing the Filipino people.
Though this is generally accepted as McKinley’s attempt to rationalize American imperial
expansion, this paternalistic approach was reflected in the broad policy directed towards the Islands that
144
centered on persuading Filipinos to accept American sovereignty.

4.2.4 Winning Hearts and Minds through Nation-building

The Philippines was an unexpected outcome of the Spanish-American War. Even before
Washington had prepared a set of guidelines regarding the administration of its new colonial possession, the
decision to annex the Philippines was made. There were urgent questions on how to administer the Islands.
The Philippines presented numerous challenges especially since it was geographically distant from the
United States and at the same time, the outbreak of hostilities by the Filipino revolutionaries in February
1899 placed them at a state of war. Considering the security situation, and the lack of policy direction, the
expeditionary forces sent by the United States War Department were tasked to not only fight the
revolutionaries, but also for the time being, take charge of the colonial administration. This enabled
Washington to buy time, in studying, preparing, and setting up a civil government. Consequently, until the

141
Agoncillo, Malolos, pp. 128-129; Allan D. Marple, “The Philippines Scouts: A Case Study in the Use of
Indigenous Soldiers, Northern Luzon, the Philippine Islands, 1899,” master’s thesis, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas:
Army Command and General Staff College, 1983, pp. 35-36. Hereafter cited as Marple, “The Philippines
Scouts.”
142
Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, p. 97.
143
Agoncillo, Malolos, pp. 336; 519-520. Read an excerpt of report on President McKinley’s speech to
Methodist church leaders in General James Rusling, “Interview with President William McKinley,” The
Christian Advocate 22 January 1903, 17. Reprinted in Daniel Schirmer and Stephen Rosskamm Shalom, eds.,
The Philippines Reader, Boston: South End Press, 1987, pp. 22–23. Available at:
http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/5575/.
144
Col. R.N. Perley, “The Philippine National Guard,” National Science, Nov. 1917, republished in Bulletin of
the American Historical Collection Foundation, Manila: American Historical Collection Foundation, Vol. XXIV
No.3 (6), July-September 1996, pp. 40-41. Hereafter cited as Perley, “The Philippine National Guard.”

64
 .145
termination of the Filipino-American War in 1902, the Philippines was led by a military government.
Due to these circumstances, the War Department operated under limited supervision from
Washington. American military personnel filled in numerous civilian posts, assuming gubernatorial and
mayoral positions, supervising tariff collection and revenue affairs, establishing schools and teaching in
them, building infrastructure, and overseeing the implementation of health measures such as disease control
146
and sanitation. This was in line with McKinley’s proclamation made on December 1898 that stated that
the United States military was not only tasked to ensure American authority over the islands but also to win
147
the support of the people in what he called benevolent assimilation.
Thus, the first U.S. commander of the Islands, Major General Elwell Otis, laid out civic action as
148
the base of his military operations. Particular care was given to respecting local and law customs while
assuming responsibilities in improving health standards, educating the masses, and introducing the
149
Filipinos to the democratic model of governance. The operation was based on severing the links
between the revolutionaries and the people, but some military commanders were driven by feelings of
responsibility to uplift the Filipinos from socio-economic deprivation and help them enjoy the fruits of
150
civilization.
One of the classic examples of “winning hearts and minds” approach was education, which
remains a permanent fixture in current Filipino CMO. Even before the ink could practically dry on the
Treaty of Paris, the United States military had embarked on a project to reopen schools and provide
wide-scale education to Filipino children. This was perceived to be the quickest way to gain the support of
the Filipinos adults by giving their children the advantages of a free public schooling. Furthermore, a
soldier acting as a teacher would improve the image of the military and dampen the appeal that the
151
revolutionaries had over the population. In fact, the effects of the civic action program in Manila were
felt so quickly, that the revolutionaries were soon stripped of their population support. Along with dimming
prospects of winning the war against the Americans through a conventional method, it became one of the
factors that forced them to pack up and relocate their base of operations in the neighboring mountain
152
provinces.
Even after the official turnover of the Islands to civilian authorities, the military continued to
conduct civic action. The beginning of Filipino involvement in CMO began with the establishment of

145
Romeo V. Cruz, America’s Colonial Desk and the Philippines, 1898-1934, Quezon City: University of the
Philippine Press, 1974, pp. 25-28. Hereafter cited as Cruz, America’s Colonial Desk and the Philippines,
1898-1934.
146
Cruz, America’s Colonial Desk and the Philippines, 1898-1934, p. 27.
147
Pres. William McKinley's BENEVOLENT ASSIMILATION PROCLAMATION
Dated December 21, 1898.
148
Brian McAllister Linn, The Philippine War, 1899-1902, Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2000, p. 200.
Hereafter cited as Linn, The Philippine War, 1899-1902.
149
Agoncillo, Malolos, pp. 519-520; Perley, “The Philippine National Guard,” pp. 40-41.
150
Linn, The Philippine War, 1899-1902, pp. 84-85.
151
United States, Philippine Commission, Reports of the Philippine Commission Civil Governor, and Heads of
Executive Departments of Civil Government of Philippine Islands (1900-1903), Washington D.C., U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1904, pp. 689-690.
152
John M. Gates, School Books and Krags, Westport, Connecticut: Greenword Press, 1973, pp. 30-35.

65
native forces such as the Philippines Scouts and the Philippine Constabulary. They assisted the American
soldiers in extra-military tasks such as road and telegraph construction. American colonial bureaus used the
Filipino auxiliary forces to assist them in other areas such as public health where they were tasked in
setting up quarantines and fighting diseases like cholera and small pox. In farming areas, they participated
153
in controlling foot-and-mouth disease and rinderpest in livestock and battling locusts on farmlands.
Dencio S. Acop assesses that the American period “suppressed the nationbuilidng capacity of the
Filipinos,” and argued that the Filipino soldier was only trained to put down resistance against the
154
Americans and not prepared to engage in developmental programs. While it’s true, the Americans led
the nation-building projects for their own purpose of stabilizing the Islands and preparing it for
independence, it can also be argued that the future nation-building role of the Filipino military draws its
experiences from the American period. Civic action practiced in this era (construction of roads, bridges,
schools, and communication lines, as well as the delivery of healthcare and education) has striking
similarities with those that are practiced in the Philippines today and for the same purpose of building
legitimacy for the government.

4.2.5 Counter-guerrilla Operations

4.2.5.1 The Switch from Conventional Warfare to Guerrilla Warfare
The development of CMO capabilities in actual warfare during the American period was only
nascent in form but the way the Americans approached unconventional warfare, laid a basis for
understanding how a mixture of direct action (coercive force) and indirect action (persuasion) were
important in regulating guerrilla battlespace.
Initially, the Philippine revolutionaries fought a conventional war along European standards; part
155
of the reason was to raise their prestige and international recognition for the fledgling army. However as
they were no match for the conventional might of the American forces, by the end of 1899, Aguinaldo’s
group had fled to the mountains where the leader promptly dissolved his regular army and transformed it
156
into a guerrilla force.
The switch allowed the Filipinos to successfully maneuver in remote areas. They discarded
157
military uniforms and donned civilian clothes that enabled them to blend in with the population. They
shifted to classic guerrilla tactics of roaming the countryside in flying columns and operated in stealth,
158
launching ambush attacks to harry the American army ceaselessly. The terrain and the population helped

153
Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, p. 109.
154
Dencio S. Acop, “Assessing the Expanded Role of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in Nation-Building,”
Asia-Pacific Social Science Review, Vol. 6 (2) 2006, p. 134.
155
Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, pp. 51-52.
156
Agoncillo, Malolos, pp. 478; 481; Matthew A. Parker, “The Philippine Scouts and the Practice of
Counter-Insurgency in the Philippine-American War, 1899-1913,” master’s thesis, Baylor University, 2008, p. 11.
Hereafter cited as Parker, “The Philippine Scouts and the Practice of Counter-Insurgency in the
Philippine-American War, 1899-1913.”
157
Linn, The Philippines War, 1899-1902, pp. 188-90.
158
Aguinaldo decree, 12 November 1899, in John R. M. Taylor The Philippine Insurrection against the United
States, Pasay City: Eugenio Lopez Foundation, 1971, vol. 4, p. 734 cited in Pobre, History of the Armed Forces

66
 159
conceal the guerrillas so effectively that Aguinaldo’s forces were nicknamed the “Phantom Army.”
Additionally, Aguinaldo promoted a loose-command structure, allowing any eager Filipino to join the
movement, and he delegated more power to local commanders. With a flatter organizational structure and
more fighters, the revolutionaries could rapidly gain ground coverage.
They were also successful in dominating the population by creating shadow governments in
parallel to municipalities set up by American authorities led by Filipino officials. Under these shadow
governments, the population was especially useful in providing intelligence about the movement of
American troops, hiding weapon supplies, providing material support to the revolutionaries, and also
160
spreading propaganda. In summary, the revolutionaries had the upper hand not only in the physical
domain of adjusting military operations to counter large, conventional armies, but also in securing the
support of the population.

4.2.5.2 The American Military Adjusting to Guerrilla Warfare

The initial adjustment to the type of warfare that the revolutionaries fought was painful for the
American Army. The tables had turned when the initial advantage they had over their opponent in terms of
armaments, logistics, and troop organization worked against them in hunting down guerrillas who chose
hit-and-run tactics. The topography of the Islands’ wilderness obstructed conventional tactics of big
movement that included the transport of troops, bulky equipment, and supplies through precipitous
mountains, dense forests and jungles, and rivers that became swollen during the rainy season. To add to
their woes, tropical disease like malaria and dysentery festered in the jungle. Not surprisingly, casualties
161
rose also from exposure to the elements. Initially, American troops were pushed into a reactive role, as
they had to deal with increasing surprise attacks and ambushes. Early firearms were rendered useless
against the oncoming rush of the bolo or kris, the traditional bladed weapons used by the various Filipino
162
tribes; and battle casualties rose at alarming rates.
Thus the regular Army had to revise their formations to flying columns, where combat units were
reduced in size and were required to operate independently, discarding the luxury of having stable lines of

of the Filipino People, p. 55-56.

159
Vic Hurley, Jungle Patrol, New York: E.P. Dutton and Company, Inc., 1938, pp. 36-37. Hereafter cited at
Hurley, Jungle Patrol.
160
Agoncillo, Malolos; p. 478; Linn, The Philippines War, 1899-1902; pp. 191-193; Parker, “The Philippine
Scouts and the Practice of Counter-Insurgency in the Philippine-American War, 1899-1913.” p. 12.
161
Hurley, Jungle Patrol, pp. 36-37; 71; Marple, “The Philippines Scouts: A Case Study in the Use of
Indigenous Soldiers, Northern Luzon, the Philippine Islands, 1899,” pp. 51-52; Russell Roth, Muddy Glory:
America’s ‘Indian Wars” in the Philippines 1899-1935, W. Hanover, Massachusetts: The Christopher Publishing
House, 1981, p. 162. Hereafter cited as Roth, Muddy Glory.
162
“A Howling Wilderness? The Samar Campaign 1901-1902, as Recorded in the Military Papers of Major
Littleton L.T. Waller, U.S.M.C.,” (part II), Bulletin of the American Historical Collection, Volume XXX,
Number 1 (118), Jan-Mar 2002, pp. 31-55; Hurley, Jungle Patrol, pp. 32; 37-37. The War Department had to
recall the .38 caliber Colt and Smith and Wesson revolvers, and issue the colt.45 pistol instead in 1911. It was
determined that former firearms were rendered useless in fighting against the charge of the Moros. The Moros
tightly wrapped their torso in strips of white cloth, allowing them to sustain gun injuries long enough to reach
their opponent and strike a deadly blow with their kris. See an account of these attacks in Roth, Muddy Glory, pp.
29-30.

67
communication. Objectives switched from fighting pitched battles to mobile warfare, where soldiers were
constantly on the move in quests to find enemy trails, weapon caches, food supplies, and enemy letters of
correspondence or anything that could lead them to the guerrillas. This was a difficult adjustment for an
163
army used to depending on overwhelming firepower and large formations.
In regards to the population, one of the first attempts to physically separate the population from
the enemy in areas where shadow governments existed was instituted by Brigadier General J. Franklin Bell
in Southern Luzon. Also known as “the Reconcentration System,” Bell used the method of zoning the
population in pre-selected areas for the purpose of separating belligerents from the non-belligerents. Any
individual found outside the zone without permission was treated as the enemy and dealt with accordingly.
Food, livestock, and other materials located outside of the zone were destroyed as well. The measure was
harsh on the population if not brutal, for people’s lives were disrupted by their relocation to squalid camps
not mention, the extreme measures taken against guerrilla sympathizers. Though it was successful in
cutting off enemy supply lines and dissuading the population from supporting the insurgents, this formula
164
was considered to be too excessive for further use.
Yet, it was evident that the Americans still faced numerous challenges in maneuvering in enemy
territory even with adjustments through small-unit action and population zoning. One of the most difficult
problems came with the “fog” of operating in foreign soil. It came with the unfamiliarity in dealing with the
people and tribes that were so diverse, not to mention the fact that there were more than 500 dialects,
making interaction with the locals almost impossible. Furthermore, the physical terrain, which teamed with
lush vegetation, contained labyrinthine swamps, and jugged volcanoes and mountains bisecting the land,
was a nightmarish experience for the average soldier to traverse through and plan operations
165
accordingly. Thus, in order to reduce these uncertainties and make the battlespace more predictable, the
United States Army embarked on what was considered to be controversial at this time, the hiring of native
Filipinos as their auxiliaries.

4.2.5.3 Recruiting Native Forces: The Philippine Scouts

American policy-wise, activities to deal with the population took the form of nation-building,
primarily to ensure a smoother recognition of the American sovereignty over the Islands and strengthen
political institutions for eventual statehood. However, actual pacification of the Islands was more
challenging, especially in remote areas since the conventional army could not maneuver successfully in the
rugged interior and where the allegiance of the population was questionable. In order to counter the
advantages the enemy had, the United States Army began employing and training Filipino soldiers to help
them operate in the same way the enemy did, which was conducting operations with the same mobility over

163
Hurley, Jungle Patrol, pp. 36-37; 40-41; 43.
164
Linn, The Philippines War, 1899-1902, pp. 154-161; Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino
People, pp. 66-67. Bell was in fact put on trial by the Americans for this method since it was considered to be
too excessive but later was exonerated.
165
Marple, “The Philippines Scouts: A Case Study in the Use of Indigenous Soldiers, Northern Luzon, the
Philippine Islands, 1899,” p. 51.

68
the physical and human terrain. The Filipinos were not only utilized for their knowledge over the terrain,
but to serve also as an interface between the Americans and the local communities.
The use of native forces to assist the United States army began as an experiment soon after the
outbreak of the war to augment COIN capabilities and at the same time put a cap on the drainage of
166
American manpower and expenditures. Resultantly, the success of these American-trained security
forces became not only instrumental in defeating the revolutionary movement but also became the partial
.167
basis of the indigenous army that would be created during the American commonwealth.
U.S. Lieutenant Matthew Batson was the first to propose the creation of a Scout company
composed of the Macabebes, a tribal group located in central Luzon. He selected them because of their
bitter feelings towards the Tagalogs, the ethno-linguistic group that dominated the ranks of Aguinaldo’s
Philippine Revolutionary Army. The raising of Scouts was nothing new. Many of the American officers in
the Philippines were veterans of the Frontier Wars back home, meaning they were familiar with raising
Scouts from among the American Indian tribes. The Indian Scouts, many of them motivated by inter-tribal
enmity, assisted America’s Westward Expansion by serving as scouts, guides, and interpreters. Their role
168
was indispensable for the Army to navigate in the hostile and unfamiliar terrain of the West.
Following Batson’s success, other American officers also raised Filipino Scouts in their area of
operations (AO), which eventually led to the dramatic capture of Aguinaldo in March 1901. This
169
effectively ended the first phase of the Philippine-American War. Despite some skepticism displayed by
some American officers on arming a native force, the Scouts became a permanent unit of the U.S. Army by
an act of Congress that took effect in September 1901. They were trained and organized by American
officers based on U.S. Army regulations. As it turned out, their roles were not limited to just interpreters
and guides, but participated in battles and in intelligence gathering. After the defeat of the main
revolutionary forces, the Scouts were deployed to almost every part of the Islands to defend American
170
sovereignty by fighting regional uprisings and outlaws.

166
Parker, “The Philippine Scouts and the Practice of Counter-Insurgency in the Philippine-American War,
1899-1913,” p. 94.
167
James R. Campbell, “Making Riflemen from Mud: Restoring the Army’s culture of Irregular Warfare,”
Carlisle, PA: Army War College (U.S.), Strategic Studies Institute, October 2007, pp.10-11. Hereafter cited as
Campbell, “Making Riflemen from Mud: Restoring the Army’s culture of Irregular Warfare.”
168
Marple, “The Philippines Scouts: A Case Study in the Use of Indigenous Soldiers, Northern Luzon, the
Philippine Islands, 1899,” pp. 6-7; 18-26; 47-49: Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, pp.
74-75.
169
Under General Frederick Funston, the same Macabebes were used to hunt down Aguinaldo through a
combination of intelligence gathering, infiltration, ruse and deception. Macabebes exemplary conduct
accelerated the trend to use Filipinos from other ethnic backgrounds in the American campaign, and it generally
became an accepted tenet of counterinsurgency, that counter-guerrilla forces of a similar ethnicity, character, and
background should fight guerrillas. See Parker, “The Philippine Scouts and the Practice of Counter-Insurgency in
the Philippine-American War, 1899-1913,” p. 89-90 and Andrew James Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency
and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941, Washington D.C.: U.S. Army Center for Military History,
1998, p. 116 cited in Campbell, “Making Riflemen from Mud: Restoring the Army’s culture of Irregular
Warfare,” pp. 8-9.
170
Clayton D. Laurie, ‘The Philippine Scouts: America’s Colonial Army, 1899-1913,” Philippine Studies, 2nd
Quarter, 1989, p. 188; Parker, “The Philippine Scouts and the Practice of Counter-Insurgency in the
Philippine-American War, 1899-1913,” pp. 2; 28.

69
 Campbell assesses that without the cooperation of these natives, the Americans would have never
been able to gain “human intelligence,” which was key to increasing battlespace awareness of the local
171
geography, culture, and language, and personality. However, contrary to popular assumption, the native
172
Scout could not place themselves exactly in the shoes of the guerrilla. Unlike the American Indians in
the United States that had extensive knowledge on the terrain and people they operated in, Filipino Scouts
were sent to areas outside their home provinces, where they had little or no knowledge on.
Therefore, their contribution in allowing Americans maneuver through physical and human
terrain came only through training and experience working under the Americans. The American trainers
drew out their talents in memorizing features and landmarks in the topography, distinguishing tribes,
ferreting out infiltrators, and other skills required maneuvering in enemy territory. In short, they quickly
173
adapted to American COIN methods.
Consequently, they gradually stepped up their responsibilities from non-combat roles such as
174
guard duty to covering the full-spectrum of warfare. Those included combat, skillfully using ruse and
175
deception as a component of psychological warfare, and interacted with the population to gain
intelligence and conduct reconnaissance activities. Later, they were given positions of responsibility in their
176
command, and by the eve of the Commonwealth, many of the Filipino Scout officers were recruited into
177
the new Filipino Army. In retrospect, the success of the Philippine Scouts lay in the fact that they were
178
groomed to become a skilled counterinsurgent force.

4.2.5.4 Recruiting Native Forces: The Philippines Constabulary (PC) and its Methodology in
Operating in the Depth of Enemy Battlespace
If the Filipino Scouts became skilled counterinsurgents, it was the Philippine Constabulary (PC)
that took it up a notch higher. In what appeared to be an approaching closure to the American military
campaigns in the Philippines, a civilian counterpart of the Scouts, the Constabulary was established July 18,
1901 so that the military could unload their security responsibilities. If the subjugation of the Islands had
been completed, the Constabulary would have been a mere policing force to maintain law and order.

171
Campbell, “Making Riflemen from Mud: Restoring the Army’s culture of Irregular Warfare,” p. 20.
172
Parker, “The Philippine Scouts and the Practice of Counter-Insurgency in the Philippine-American War,
1899-1913,” p. 2.
173
Marple, “The Philippines Scouts: A Case Study in the Use of Indigenous Soldiers, Northern Luzon, the
Philippine Islands, 1899,” pp. 93-94.
174
Marple, “The Philippines Scouts: A Case Study in the Use of Indigenous Soldiers, Northern Luzon, the
Philippine Islands, 1899,” p.68; Parker, “The Philippine Scouts and the Practice of Counter-Insurgency in the
Philippine-American War, 1899-1913,” p. 101.
175
Parker, “The Philippine Scouts and the Practice of Counter-Insurgency in the Philippine-American War,
1899-1913,” pp. 90-93.
176
Ibid., pp. 101; 103.
177
Parker, “The Philippine Scouts and the Practice of Counter-Insurgency in the Philippine-American War,
1899-1913,” p.101; Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, p. 190.
178
Major J.N. Munro, Philippines Scouts, “The Native Scout Organization,” Journal of U.S. Cavalry
Association, 20, July 1909 to May 1910, cited in Marple, “The Philippines Scouts: A Case Study in the Use of
Indigenous Soldiers, Northern Luzon, the Philippine Islands, 1899,” pp. 106 -107.

70
However, the circumstances that the Constabulary evolved from and subsequently operated in; consigned it
to a path of COIN, and as it turned out, became the basis of the future independent army.
179
The Constabulary was established largely for political reasons. The capture of Aguinaldo in
March 1901 rang the death knell for the principle revolutionary movement, leading way for an official end
to the Philippine-American War in 1902. However, the United States was still far from subjugating the
Islands. Due to Aguinaldo’s loose-command structure, spinoffs of the original movement led by former
revolutionaries created power bases throughout Luzon. Additionally, regional uprisings in Samar, Leyte,
Panay, Surigao and the “Moro Wars” in the Muslim South were a major headache for American security
efforts, not to mention security problems posed by quasi-Christian groups and bandits led by local ‘cult’
180
personalities that roamed and terrorized the countryside.
Nonetheless, the American military in the Philippines wanted to impress upon Washington and
the American public that the resistance had successfully been put down and that there was now only a law
181
and order problem. And with the official end to the war in 1902, it was hard to justify the presence of
182
74,000 American soldiers. As an urgent necessity, an insular police force was established to fill in the
183
security gaps that would emerge with the incremental withdrawal of American troops.
The Constabulary, in practice was an organization run initially by a few American and European
184
army veterans, the ratio being 50 natives to 2 white officers. The force was mandated to ensure law and
185
order but in practice, the Constabulary became a quasi-military organization conducting operations
186
alongside the Army and the Scouts. The main difference between the Scouts and the Constabulary was
jurisdictional, with the former belonging to the United States Army, and the latter directly under the control
187
of the civilian colonial administration.
It is a wonder, that a force numbering no more than 7,000 men at its peak, working in the most

179
Hurley, Jungle Patrol, p. 46.
180
Kagawaran ng Tanggulang Pambansa, Philippine Department of National Defense, 2009.
181
Hurley, Jungle Patrol, pp. 46-47; Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, pp. 96-97.
182
Timothy K. Deady, “Lessons from a Successful Counterinsurgency in the Philippines, 1899-1902,”
Parameters, Spring 2005, p. 55; Parker, “The Philippine Scouts and the Practice of Counter-Insurgency in the
Philippine-American War, 1899-1913,” pp. 16-17; Hurley, Jungle Patrol, p. 57. Following the creation of the PC,
the United States Army was able to reduce their presence from 74,000 men to 12,000 men by 1904. See Hurley,
Jungle Patrol, p. 64.
183
Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, p. 98.
184
Roth, Muddy Glory. p. 31.
185
“The Philippine Constabulary is the armed force of the Government of the Philippine Islands subject to the
command and general supervision of the Governor-General, established and maintained for the preservation of
peace, law, and order in the Philippine Islands. The Constabulary is in the Department of the Interior. Members
of the Constabulary are peace officers and are authorized and empowered to prevent and suppress brigandage,
unlawful assemblies, riots insurrections, and other breaches of the peace and violations of the law.” Manual for
the Philippines Constabulary, Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1922, p. 8.
186
Hurley, Jungle Patrol, p. 31; Marple, “The Philippines Scouts: A Case Study in the Use of Indigenous
Soldiers, Northern Luzon, the Philippine Islands, 1899,” pp. 117-118; Parker, “The Philippine Scouts and the
Practice of Counter-Insurgency in the Philippine-American War, 1899-1913,” pp. 84-85. Pobre, History of the
Armed Forces of the Filipino People, p. 108. The military-like characteristics of the constabulary was in part,
due to the fact they were run by retired Army personnel. The training was similar to the army, the force assumed
military titles and ranks, and the uniforms resembled army uniforms.
187
Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, pp. 106-107.

71
dire conditions of inadequate pay, lack of equipment, antique weapons, operating in isolated base stations
with nil lines of communications, practically bereft of commissary and medical divisions, and under
suspicion by some American officers who questioned their loyalty and discipline, were able to place the
188
“finishing touches” on the subjugation on the entire Islands and transform into a militarily capable force
189
on the eve of the Commonwealth.
Its success can be attributed to the fact that the Constabulary was able to refine what the Scouts
had done in practicing maneuver in both physical and psychological depth of the insurgent battlespace. The
Constabulary is of particular interest in the study of CMO because it emerged to be a classic example of a
force that was capable to conduct maneuver warfare in the depth of the enemy battlespace. Untangling
early elements of CMO from actual combat operations are difficult, because its role is obscured under the
layers of bloody fighting. Nonetheless, from the way the Constabulary sought mobility over the battlespace,
especially through patrol and pursuit operations, it was unavoidable that they would be entering populated
settlements. The following section summarizes the main points on how the Constabulary dealt with the
depth of the battlespace.

Physical Terrain
In terms of jurisdiction and duties, the Constabulary had an advantage over the Scouts. The
Scouts were employees of the U.S. War Department. The war had officially been concluded and this could
not justify the retention of numerous army bases nor have American soldiers and their Scouts engage in
190
military operations that went beyond the immediate vicinity of the existing posts they were stationed in.
By comparison, the Constabulary was under civilian authority, meaning local governments could use the
policing force to fight rebellions under the pretext of enforcing law and order in their localities. This
191
allowed for a greater dispersion of Constabulary camps throughout the entire archipelago.
The Constabulary was also able to cover for the weaknesses that a conventional military faced in
adapting to jungle warfare. In 1901, most of the colony was covered in dense forests and jungle. A mere
100-mile road crisscrossed the archipelago. The means of tracking down guerrillas were through trails that
were frequently impassable. But the Constabulary, unlike the conventional military could operate in small
192
units, typically no larger than a squad, which enhanced their mobility. The supply-line problem was also
193
resolved because native constables demonstrated the ability to live off the land.
As it turned out, patrols became a major factor in its success. In contrast to slow-moving
conventional large-army units, patrols allowed soldiers to traverse the country with more agility to comb

188
Hurley, Jungle Patrol, p. 11.
189
Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, p. 118; To prove this, the constabulary recorded
better results than the United States Army in the number of lost arms, desertions, and renegades; Hurley, Jungle
Patrol, pp. 34-26.
190
Hurley, Jungle Patrol pp. 59 –60. In 1904, there were approximately 250 Police Stations in the Philippines
and as opposed to the Army’s 34 posts, see Hurley, Jungle Patrol, p. 93; Roth, Muddy Glory, pp. 31; 100.
191
Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, pp. 106-107.
192
Hurley, Jungle Patrol, p. 71.
193
Hurley, Jungle Patrol, pp. 36-37; 41; 48 Roth, Muddy Glory, p. 162.

72
out guerrillas. Patrols when conducted successfully, allowed forces to reach even the most remote areas of
the brush. Aided by information from the people, they could prepare for and launch ambushes against the
194 195
enemy. Over time, they were able to prove that no mountain or forest was impenetrable.

Human Terrain
196
The Constabulary drew its members from “nearly all the tribal groups.” It was America’s use
of Filipino scouts that opened up possibilities for the increased trend in recruiting natives but the
197
Constabulary recruited troops from the district that they would operate in, which was in stark contrast
198
with the Scouts that hired natives that were deployed to areas outside of their home village. This was an
199
advantage since they were familiar with the terrain, geography, and the people. These native constables
were a key factor in allowing the Americans to operate more smoothly in the human terrain because the
constables aroused less suspicion and were more welcomed than those forces entirely composed of
200
Americans and other white officers.
Being a civilian agency, the constables additionally provided more leeway for local authorities to
ask for their assistance in participating in civilian tasks. This was precisely something that the U.S. Army
wanted the Scouts to disengage from, since they were expected to focus on defense. Consequently, the
Constabulary was tasked to work under various government departments and agencies in areas such as
health, pest control, and husbandry. They also assumed some responsibility over telegraphy and telephone
201
lines, which were left behind by the gradual pullout of the U.S. Signal Corps.
As part of their training, all members were expected to study the geography, topography,
202
personality, and history of the residents in their assigned areas. The constable also played the role of the
policeman, the diplomat, and advisor, and mediated in local disputes to gain the confidence of the local and
203
tribal leadership. In their interactions with the residents on a day-to-day level, constables were expected
to act courteously and respectfully. They included respecting the law, i.e. not entering private residents
without a warrant, and also rendering assistance to the community in various activities such as village
204
festivals.

194
Hurley, Jungle Patrol, pp. 71-71; Manual for the Philippine Constabulary, Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1922,
p.115. Hereafter cited as Manual for the Philippine Constabulary
195
Hurley, Jungle Patrol, pp. 36-37; 41; 48 Roth, Muddy Glory, p. 162.
196
Roth, Muddy Glory, p. 32.
197
Hurley, Jungle Patrol, pp. 11-12; 58.
198
Marple, “The Philippines Scouts: A Case Study in the Use of Indigenous Soldiers, Northern Luzon, the
Philippine Islands, 1899,” p. 93
199
Hurley, Jungle Patrol, p. 36.
200
Hurley, Jungle Patrol, pp. 11-12; Roth, Muddy Glory, p .32.
201
Even though the Scouts engaged in civil works, the U.S. Army was careful that they did not get too involved
in this area, fearing that the Scouts could potentially develop a close relationship with mayors and governors,
that could potentially help Filipinos turn against American rule. Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the
Filipino People, pp. 106-109.
202
Handbook, Philippines Constabulary, Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1901, p. 30.
203
Hurley, Jungle Patrol, pp. 341; 351; Manual for the Philippine Constabulary, p. 270.
204
Manual for the Philippine Constabulary, pp. 272-273.

73
 Gaining intelligence to improve situational awareness was indispensable in fighting the guerrilla.
Native constables were directed to use their observatory and communication skills to collect vital
information about the enemy from the villages in the course of their patrols. They could be as simple as
joining a discussion at a local gathering or developing a close relationship with the village to develop a
205
better understanding on its customs and history. As the population was seen to be key variable to the
success of these military missions, patrols that were dispatched to remote areas, also undertook civilian
responsibilities such as providing education, organizing sanitation inspections, the treatment of minor
injuries and ailments, registering marriage, births, and deaths, among others. In fact, this patrol system was
206
later revived during the early 1950s against the communist uprising.
The list of factors listed above demonstrated the Constabulary’s success in battling insurgents by
devising tactics to increase their maneuverability over the insurgent battlespace. They operated in smaller
units and conducted extensive patrols to enhance mobility. They also paid attention to the population as a
means to bolster their operations and secured vantage points over the enemy in terms of intelligence and
securing other forms of cooperation.

4.2.6 Planning for an Indigenous Army

It was never in the intentions of the United States to keep the Philippines permanently. The
long-term notion that guided the United States from the beginning was to stabilize the country and
strengthen its governing institutions so that it would not fall prey to other colonial powers. Once this was
on track, the Islands under American guidance would incrementally move towards independence.
In 1916, the Jones Law was passed which marked the first legislative milestone in preparing for
the Islands’ future independence. In taking steps towards establishing their self-government, the biggest
issue that the American Congress grappled over was with defense. The Philippines still did not have a force
that was capable of protecting the Islands from an external attack and that entire obligation was left up to
207
the United States military. With World War I in full swing and the increased likelihood of an American
entry, there was an imminent need for the Islands to create a Filipino force strong enough to one, defend the
208
Islands from foreign aggression and two, to assist the Americans in its war against Germany.
After much brainstorming and debate by both American and Filipino authorities, their first
concrete attempt in building an indigenous army was essentially starting from scratch. Despite continuous
209
calls for creating a force with the existing capabilities and men from the Constabulary and Scouts, the

205
Manual for the Philippine Constabulary, pp. 15-117; 119; 270; 272-273; Handbook Philippines
Constabulary, p. 30.
206
Napolean D. Valeriano and Charles T.R. Bohannan, Counter-Guerrilla Operations: The Philippine
Experience, Westport, CT: Praeger Security, p. 1962, 2006, p. 177. Hereafter cited as Valeriano and Boahannan,
Counter-Guerrilla Operations.
207
Perley, “The Philippine National Guard,” p. 40; Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People,
pp. 124.
208
Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, pp. 122-123.
209
Perley, “The Philippine National Guard,” p. 42; Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, p.
136.

74
proposal did not take off at this time. The most obvious reason was that these forces were geared towards
internal security operations and they lacked the large, coordinated action and capabilities that a
conventional army would need to protect the nation. Additionally, there were some technical difficulties in
using the Scouts because they were under the United States War Department, making them “American
soldiers.” And as for the Constabulary, though they were seasoned combat fighters, they were expected to
210
operate within policing duties. In short, the American colonial authorities were looking to create a
conventional army in line with the tenets of self-determination, which was a building a force “created by
211
Filipinos, composed of Filipinos, and for the Filipinos.”
The first bold attempt was made with the National Guard. It was modeled on the American
National Guard, a type of militia force, which upon its founding in 1917, strove to recruit Filipinos in the
212
25,000 range. Despite the pomp and circumstance that surrounded its birth and it expectations that it
213
would evolve into a standing army for the future republic, lack of funding and arms requisition, supine
commitment from Congress, weak discipline, and overall shortage of recruits, thwarted its development. By
214
1921, the National Guard had become defunct. There were other attempts to build a force, one being the
Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC), and another with the Philippines National Volunteers, a
215
semi-military organization, but these also failed to materialize into a permanent defense organization.
Interestingly enough, World War I had the effect of strengthening the military capabilities of the
Constabulary which was not officially slated to become the national army. With the majority of American
officers called to fight the war in Europe, the depleted ranks of the Constabulary were filled up by Filipino
216
officers, accelerating the Filipinization of the insular police force. Furthermore, they became the
217
primary force in battling internal security threats. Moreover, there were trends in strengthening the
military capabilities of the Constabulary prior to the inauguration of the Commonwealth in 1934. Funding
was increased for manpower and weapons acquisition, the force was reorganized along military-lines, and a
218
Philippine Constabulary aviation unit was created.
In 1934, Senate President Quezon, pending the likely assumption of presidency of the New
Commonwealth, sought the consulting services of the American General, Douglas MacArthur, then the

210
Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, pp. 167; 186-187.
211
Perley, “The Philippine National Guard,” pp. 42-42.
212
Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, pp. 122-123; 127.
213
Perley, “The Philippine National Guard,” pp. 41-45. The failure of the National Guard to takeoff was largely
due to WWI. It was this war that propelled to set into motion, the decision to create a new army, but with the end
of the war, the sense of urgency dissipated. See Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People,
p. 153.
214
Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, pp. 124-125; 132-134; 153-154.
215
See Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, pp. 154-165, for more information
concerning early attempts to organize an indigenous Filipino force.
216
For instance in 1917, the number of American officers leading the Constabulary were 102, whereas in 1918,
the number of officers dived to 39, and by 1926, there were only 25 American officers to lead 6,000 Filipino men.
See Hurley, Jungle Patrol, p. 364 and Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, pp. 131-132.
217
Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, p. 351.
218
Ibid., p.185.

75
 219
chief of staff of the U.S. for defense planning. Under MacArthur’s directives, a Philippine National
Defense Plan was created in Washington and in it, it was decided using the Constabulary, was the most
220
practical and cost-effective approach in building a new Philippine regular army.
After much debate and experimentation with various organizations including the National Guard,
it was determined by the eve of the Commonwealth that the Philippine Constabulary would serve as the
basis of the new indigenous Army. The main reason for this was because the Constabulary on a day-to-day
basis was on the front lines fighting internal wars, making them the most organized, best trained and most
221
militarily capable.
So it came to pass, after years of debate the transfer of the Constabulary to the new Philippine
222
Army. The new Filipino Army was established in 1936, consisting of a small regular force, with the
Constabulary at its kernel, and a reserve force that would be trained gradually to augment the core. Their
duties would be for the time being carrying on what the Constabulary was doing, which was maintaining
internal security. In fact, upon establishment, they went on the fight the lingering resistance in the
Muslim-dominated South, labor unrests, and election violence. As with officer recruitment, they were
223
drawn from the Scouts and Filipinos from other regular American units.

4.2.7 The American Legacy

With the Philippine Constabulary serving as the kernel for the new Army, the tradition and
experiences that they were built on had lasting implications on the orientation for the new Philippine Army.
224
It remained an overwhelmingly land-based force with a strong proclivity to police-like functions. It was
also no coincidence that the future Armed Forces of the Philippines would be influenced by the American’s
method of fighting internal security operations, not to mention the military’s pronounced role in
225
nation-building. Interestingly enough, the American military legacy did not bequeath the Philippine
Army with an institutionalized understanding of such practices, because it was preparing to transform into a
conventional force. Still, many of the Filipinos that constituted the officer corps of the first indigenous
Filipino Army came not only from the Constabulary but from the Scouts as well. Having had the exposure
and experience in the American way of COIN, inclusive of early CMO, these were transmitted to the new
Army in the form of collective experiences that provided a reservoir of experiences that could be drawn

219
Ibid., pp. 174-175; 195.
220
Ibid., pp. 186; 188-189; 205.
221
Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, pp. 186; 188-189; 205. See Pobre, History of the
Armed Forces of the Filipino People, pp. 122-165 and Perley, “The Philippine National Guard,” p. 40 on early
attempts to organize a Filipino Armed Force especially with the Philippine National Guard.
222
See Commonwealth Act no.1 or National Defense Act, 1936. Available online at:
http://www.chanrobles.com/commonwealthacts/commonwealthactno1.html. Accessed September 11, 2011.
223
In 1938, the PC was separated from the Army. It was subsequently, reintegrated into the Armed Forces of the
Philippines after World War II. Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, pp. 190; 206-207;
212-214.
224
Carolina G. Hernandez, “The Philippines”, in Harold Crouch & Z.H. Ahmad eds., Military-Civil Relations in
Southeast Asia, eds, U.S.A.: Oxford University Press, 1986, pp. 160-161; 163.
225
Ibid., pp. 160-161.

76
from for reference or replicated and/or refined in the succeeding generations.

4.2.8 Summary
The purpose of this chapter was to substantiate claims that the AFP-CMO’s embryonic
beginnings can be traced back to the American period. Originally, it was developed from the need to have
the American military temporarily be responsible for administering the colony and promoting America’s
legitimacy on the Islands through numerous civic action projects. Later, civic action resurfaced in COIN
operations against guerrillas and outlaws. They involved the use of native auxiliary troops to maneuver in
the human terrain that hinged on gaining the support of the population
In assessing the use of CMO activities of this period, it can be discerned from the outcome, that it
played an instrumental role in facilitating the United States’ control over the Philippines. But the true
challenges came when the war was officially declared over in 1902. The Americans were still faced with
numerous armed groups that operated in the rugged interior, propelling the American colonial
administration to delegating the internal security operations to the Philippine Constabulary. Even though,
the policing force was underfunded and left to their own devices to put down revolts, it was led by
seasoned American and European officers that understood what was needed to operate in insurgent
battlespace. Their success lay in hiring native constables that not only allowed them to operate in the
difficult physical terrain, but also provided them with a means to interact with the population. Rather than
terrorizing the population, there were more efforts to secure friendly relations with the people, which were
made possible with native recruits that knew the culture and language of the locality. In effect, these
operations culminated into a form of maneuver warfare where the constables were able to gain initiative
over the armed groups by securing unhampered mobility in both the human and physical terrain.

4.3 The Post-Independence Years: Direct Antecedents of CMO (1946-1965)

4.3.1 Introduction
The American soldiers and later their Filipino auxiliaries engaged in a form of CMO that had
elements of one, psychological persuasion to boost the legitimacy of the American government; two,
improve the military-civilian interface in order to enhance the mobility of troops. Yet, the practice was
never institutionalized or recognized as a distinct operation within the U.S. military. Consequently, the
concept was not incorporated into the formal training of the fledgling Philippine Army. The American
approach to guerrilla warfare that took into consideration the population factor was not carried out in the
immediate years after independence since the Philippine Army had ambitions to evolve into a conventional
force. As a result, in face of the new republic’s first armed threat from the agrarian uprising, security forces
could not adapt to guerrilla warfare. That was, at least until the appointment of the new Secretary of
Defense, Ramon Magsaysay. Magsaysay, with the assistance of American advisors, used a daring and an
unconventional method of combining precision-based force, socio-economic projects, and psychological
operations to quell the internal threat. Many of the activities launched resembled those of the American
period, supporting the argument that the military drew ideas from this period. However, it was in the 1950s

77
that CMO once again demonstrated its utility in bolstering the AFP’s maneuverability in the depth of the
insurgent battlespace. Though it was yet to be known under the appellation of Civil Military Operations
(CMO), the period laid down the foundations of a method of warfare upon which the AFP-CMO is
anchored on today.
The following section covers the period from the first president of the independent Republic,
Manuel Roxas (1946) until the end of President Diosdado Macapagal’s term (1965) but magnifying in
particular the period 1950-1954, when then-Secretary of National Defense Ramon Magsaysay ran military
operations against the Huk Rebellion.

4.3.2 The Emergence of the Armed Leftist Movement

After the liberation of the Philippines from Japanese control in 1945, the country was in disarray.
The newly inaugurated independent government was preoccupied with the economic reconstruction of the
country. In matters related to defense, the internal security condition was deteriorating since the war
allowed a proliferation of loose firearms that sustained the existence of armed bands. To aggravate the
situation further, the effects of the Second World War was especially hard on the people occupying the
lower social stratum. With a political structure that predominantly represented the interests of the elite, the
Philippine communist movement emerged to become the de facto spokesperson of the impoverished
masses. These circumstances added momentum to the armed component of the movement, which was
226
rapidly snowballing into a full-fledged confrontation with the government forces.
The leftist movement in fact emerged before the Japanese invasion in the 1930s. During the
227
American period, the economic structure of the Philippines remained largely unchanged. The
Philippines was largely agricultural where the majority of the people eked out a living by tilling the lands
held by the elite minority. As plots of land allowed for cultivation became smaller by the rapidly expanding
population, life became increasingly harder for these peasants. Land yields were insufficient to sustain a
family and peasants had to draw loans at usurious rates from their landowners who ensnared them in a
228
grinding cycle of debt and poverty.
But the Americans did encourage the development of a political conscious that spread throughout
the masses, instigating the creation of labor unions and farmers’ associations that eventually became the
basis of the Philippine Communist Party (PKP). The party was organized in 1930 under the platform to
229
emancipate the downtrodden people like the peasants and laborers from economic bondage. While its

226
Douglas S. Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance: 1950 to the Present,
New York: The Free Press, 1977, pp. 23-24. Hereafter cited as Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era; Pobre,
History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, pp. 366; 369.
227
Alexander Aguirre, Readings on Counterinsurgency, Quezon City: Fineprint, 1987, p. 99.
228
Lt. Col. L. Grant Bridgewater (USAF), “Philippine Information Operations During the Hukbalahap
Counterinsurgency Campaign,” Joint Information Operations Center, Spring 2006, p. 37. Hereafter cited as
Bridgewater, “Philippine Information Operations During the Hukbalahap Counterinsurgency Campaign.”
229
Jacinto C. Ligot, “Communist Insurgency in the Philippines,” master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, California: International Resource Planning and Management, June 1994, pp. 9-10. Hereafter cited as
Ligot, “Communist Insurgency in the Philippines.”

78
party was forced to disband in 1932, its military wing continued its operations against plantation owners
230
and raids on their property. When the Japanese took over the Islands, they shifted their energies to
fighting a war of resistance. In March 1942, they established Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon
231
(HUKBALAHAP) or in English, the People’s Army Against the Japanese. Popularly known as the Huks,
they did not join the other resistance groups. And instead, continued their attacks against plantation owners
232
and even other resistance groups.
During the Japanese occupation, the Huks demonstrated their organizational capabilities. They
were equipped with a political apparatus, an army, and mass base support. This allowed them to easily
recruit supporters and fighters. As a strategy, they played down the original political nature of their
movement (the communist platform) and embraced the anti-Japanese cause to further swell their ranks.
233
Resultantly, by the end of the war, they were well entrenched in the countryside.
After liberation, the government’s attitude towards the Huks was ambiguous. On one hand, there
appeared to be some tolerance on the part of the government to accommodate the Huks politically. To begin
with, Huk fighters numbering in the 10,000-range were invited in 1944 by the Commonwealth President
Osmeña along with other resistance groups to join the newly reactivated Philippine Army. After the
Philippines gained independence, they were also allowed to join the congressional elections in 1946, and
the Huk supremo, Luis Taruc and 5 other members succeeded in gaining seats. Yet on the other hand,
suspicions towards them were running high. The Huks’ war-record of frequent skirmishes with other
resistance groups and their political ideology, especially at the dawn of the Cold War, did not sit well with
the Americans who still had significant influence over the Philippine’s economic and military policy after
234
independence. From the Filipino-side, the government led by the elite minority was not comfortable
with their political platform of agrarian reform, and so it came to pass, that these sentiments took the upper
hand, and ousted the communists from any political representation. Consequently, the newly elected 6 Huk
congressmen were denied of their seats in Congress, which sent the Huk supremo, Luis Taruc and his men
235
fleeing to the mountains of Central Luzon. Shortly afterwards, they resumed guerrilla operations.

4.3.3 The Initial Government Response (1946-1950)

Government initiatives that dominated its anti-Huk campaign from 1946 to the end of 1950 were
a mixture of intensive military operations and piece-meal amnesty and attraction programs.
The first president of the independent Republic, Manuel Roxas (1946-1949) began with an

230
Bridgewater, “Philippine Information Operations During the Hukbalahap Counterinsurgency Campaign,” p.
37.
231
Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, p. 312.
232
Ibid., p. 323.
233
Bridgewater, “Philippine Information Operations During the Hukbalahap Counterinsurgency Campaign,”
p. 37.
234
Michael McClintock, Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and
Counterterrorism, 1940-1990, Pantheon Books, 1992, p.2 of Ch.4. Available at: www.statecraft.org. Accessed
December 4, 2007. Hereafter cited as McClintock, Instruments of Statecraft.
235
Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era, p. 25; Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People,
pp. 361; 389.

79
ambitious pledge to eliminate the Huks within 60 days. Roxas swiftly launched an amnesty program, which
included a number of economic incentives for the Huks to return to the folds of the law while meting out
stiffer punishments for those carrying unauthorized firearms, a move directed towards disarming the Huks.
In response, Taruc presented a list of demands that called for drastic socio-economic reforms to benefit the
peasant and allow for the political representation of the Communists. It was only a matter of time, before it
became to light that these talks had reached a dead end. Roxas was more interested hammering out a deal
quickly rather than committing to long-term reforms which diluted the government’s sincerity in Taruc’s
236
eyes.
When the Huks took no heed to the deadline in surrendering their firearms, fighting broke out
again in September 1946. This time the administration took a “mailed-fist” approach, where military action
237
would take center stage in fighting the rebels. “Mailed-fist” was supposed to impress upon the public
that the government was taking a firm stance in wiping out the internal rebellion but it was only a matter of
238
time before it had become a byword for brutality.
When Roxas suddenly succumbed to a fatal heart attack, Elpidio Quirino took over. The new
president decided to ease the all-out-force approach and embark on a “policy of attraction” to coax the
Huks to give up their struggle. An amnesty was proposed to the communist guerillas on June 21, 1948.
Encouraged by the government’s position to make mends, Taruc showed willingness in complying but talks
239
broke down again and war resumed.
240
By 1949, rebel strength had reached 12,000 with more than 100,000 mass base supporters.
Despite the fact the rebels were outnumbered by government forces (24,000 PC and 13,000 AFP), three to
one, the government finally came to realize that this was no simple law and order problem. The Huks had
virtual control over the countryside surrounding Manila and were ready to spread the movement to the
islands outside of Luzon. The government was also faced with the increasing possibility that the
241
Communist Party of the Philippines and their armed organization could overrun the central government.
In retrospect, the major factor behind the failure to address the Huk problem was that the Manila
government never took the Huk problem seriously. They ignored the socio-economic, political, and
psychological dimensions of the agrarian problem and left the actual security operations mainly in the
242
hands of a poorly equipped and trained police force.

236
Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, pp. 390-391.
237
Ibid., p. 391.
238
Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era, p. 26.
239
Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, pp. 393-396.
240
By 1949, the Huks had renamed their armed component to Hukbong Magpagpalaya ng Bayan (HMB) or
People’s Liberation Army but the term Huks will be used to avoid confusion.
241
Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era, p. 27; Bridgewater, “Philippine Information Operations During the
Hukbalahap Counterinsurgency Campaign,”p. 37; Alvin H. Scaff, The Philippine Answer to Communism,
Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1955, pp. 27-28.
242
Maj. Alvin V. Flores (INF) PA, “Internal security Operations then and now: An Assessment,” Army Journal,
April-June, 2007, p. 17.

80
4.3.4 Examining the Huks’ Control over the Battlespace
The Huks were adept in dictating the conditions of the battlespace to ensure their freedom of
action. They Huks did not fight battles to gain or defend territory, which gave them the advantage of
243
moving freely. In regards to the human terrain, their success in propagating their political ideology to
the villagers combined with terror threats to non-cooperative villagers and officials assured them of
political control, a sanctuary, a steady flow of funds and recruits to sustain their movement. Additionally,
244
the villagers provided information about government troop strength, location, and movement.
In stark contrast, government troops lacked these maneuver capabilities and support of the
population, which was in part due to the government’s unwillingness to face the problem as more than a
criminal problem, and used the police as the main instrument of force rather than the AFP to handle the
245
situation.
This led to poor strategy and tactics, scarce intelligence, and insufficient training. Combat
operations were restricted to large-scale sweeps and encirclement; which seldom produces results in
guerrilla warfare, not to mention, the haphazard nature of these operations, produced more civilian
246
casualties than damage to the enemy.
It was the Philippine Constabulary (PC) that was sent to the frontlines but they became notorious
for human rights abuses. As the former PC was forced to disband during the Japanese period, upon
liberation in 1945, the new PC was hastily put together, this time under the Department of the Interior. In a
rush to fill the ranks, Japanese collaborators and criminal elements were recruited. A problem from this
247
became manifest in the abusive behavior of the police in regards to the population. Compounding the
problem, they were inadequately supplied and poorly trained. They left a trail of destruction in the villages
they entered. There were extra-judicial killings of Huk suspects, looting, and the burning down of villages.
248
In fact, these tactics backfired, since it drove the people to favor the Huks over the government.
Planning for offensive action was also met with challenges. As soldiers were located in scattered
camps, they could only provide limited protection or “static defense” to villages and officials being targeted
by the Huks. Furthermore, the military that was established after liberation was orientated towards external
defense and were trained to become a conventional army. Not surprisingly, the heavy equipment–toting
army units were no match for a highly mobile guerrilla force that had mastered the tactics of surprise,

243
Benedict J. Kerkvliet, The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines, Quezon City: New
Day Publishers, 1979, pp. 210-213.
244
Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era, p. 38.
245
In April 1946, Roxas removed the PC from the military and placed it under the Department of the Interior.
246
Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era, pp. 25 -26; Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People,
p. 391 ; Commnents made by Col.Charles T. Bohannan in “Winning the Counterguerrilla War, ” April 20, 1962,
P.M., in Stephen T. Hosmer, and Sibylle O. Crane eds. Counterinsurgency, a symposium, Santa Monica, CA:
Rand Corporation, 2006, p.145. Available at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R412-1. Accessed July 16, 2007.
247
Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era, p. 38.
248
Bridgewater, “Philippine Information Operations During the Hukbalahap Counterinsurgency Campaign,” p.
38: Ricardo T. Jose, “The Philippine Armed Forces: Protector or Oppressor? A Historical Overview,” Kasarinlan,
16 (2), 2001, p. 84.

81
 249
stealth, and concealment.

4.3.5 The Magsaysay Approach to the Huk Rebellion (1950-1954)

The lackluster performance the government counterinsurgency program finally reached a turning
point with an event that spurred President Quirino to take drastic measures. On April 28, 1949, the Huks
250
ambushed and killed the highly popular former first lady, Aurora Quezon and members of her entourage.
Quirino had enough foresight to understand that unless fundamental reforms were made, the country would
251
be swept up in chaos. As it turned out, the institution that was entrusted with the reform was the military.
Quirino appointed Ramon Magsaysay to head the Department of National Defense, and his
selection was based on his known competence in military affairs. During the Japanese occupation, he
fought the Japanese and become an adept guerrilla leader. He later joined other American officers in the
resistance movement, and was eventually assigned to run an entire guerrilla operation consisted of 10,000
252
people in his home province, Zambales. In the post-war period, he entered politics, winning a
congressional seat in the Zambales district and became chairman of the House National Defense
253
Community in 1946.
Magsaysay was as man of colossal character, with an abundance of energy, dedication, and
254
shrewd judgment. Endowed with extraordinary jurisdictional powers over the military and support from
American advisors, he was able to swiftly translate his ideas into action. He immediately set to work on
revamping the AFP, and creating a new set of COIN strategy and tactics. He recognized that a complete
mobilization of the military and other government resources would be needed to fight the insurgency.
Furthermore, he recognized that a military solution alone would not suffice, and socio-economic programs
would be necessary to break the Huk’s sway over the population. Thus, this two-pronged approach became
summed up in his own words as, “With my left hand, I am offering to all dissidents the road to peace,
happy homes, and economic security; but with my right, I shall crush all those who resist and seek to
255
destroy our democratic government.”

4.3.6 The Left-Hand Approach and its Positioning in Warfare

Magsaysay’s right-hand approach and left-hand approach remain the operational tenets of COIN
today in the Philippines with the left-hand, now referred to as CMO. The broad range of activities that fit
this operational scope not only centered on winning hearts and minds of the population, but also was

249
Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era, p. 26.
250
Bridgewater, “Philippine Information Operations During the Hukbalahap Counterinsurgency Campaign,”
p. 38.
251
Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era, pp. 27; 29.
252
Donald Lane Berlin, Before Gringo: History of the Philippine Military 1830-1972, Pasig City: Anvil
Publishing, Inc., 2008, pp. 52-53. Hereafter cited as Berlin, Before Gringo; Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency
Era, p. 29.
253
Anthony James Jops, Modern Guerrilla Insurgency, Praeger: Westport, Connecticut & London, 1992, p. 69.
Hereafter cited as Jops, Modern Guerrilla Insurgency.
254
Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era, p. 29.
255
Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, p. 400.

82
inherently linked with the psychological and the physical realms of warfare. These overlapping effects are
expressed as follows:

In practice, effective counterguerrilla action – especially that of troops-so

intermingles concrete useful actions, protective actions (combat against guerrilla),
and psychological operations that it is difficult to tell where one action leaves off
and the other begins. Properly performed they blend in a spiral, moving more and
more rapidly from one success to another, from one field to another, until the
desired objective is achieved, until the fish is driven out of the sea in which he can
256
no longer live.

At the heart of this centrifugal blend of combat, psychological operations and civic action, is
what the author argues, a period that understood and practiced the most sophisticated form of maneuver
warfare in the history of the Philippines.
Maneuver warfare is typically associated with movement or the ability of a force to move their
257
units over terrain to secure positional advantage over the enemy to seek its destruction. Maneuver
warfare is the choice method for an inferior army that does not have the capabilities to defend fixed
territories and assets or attack the opponent and take control over territory. In lieu, they offset these
deficiencies by moving more fluidly over battlespace that is secured through the insurgent’s control over
258
the population. Therefore, Magsaysay used a mixture of force and psychological warfare to deny the
Huks of their mobility in their battlespace, ultimately securing key positions in both the physical and the
psychological dimensions to deliver force decisively. This was achieved in a mere 15 months after
Magsaysay took office. And in large part, success can be attributed to incorporating the tenets of CMO in
the majority of operations. Before going further into how CMO contributed to maneuver warfare, the
following sections will briefly examine how Magsaysay understood the battlespace and the actors operating
in them.

4.3.7 Magsaysay’s Understanding of Battlespace

During the Philippine-American War, the American soldiers faced numerous challenges in
improving their mobility in the rugged and mountainous interior, covered in dense jungle and swamps to
hunt down the guerrillas. The revolutionaries used their knowledge of the physical terrain to secure food
and cover. At the same time, it was the perfect base of operations for the guerrillas since the remoteness
provided little or no communications and roads, making it difficult for bulky and large troop movement of

256
Napoleon D. Valeriano and Charles T.R. Bohannan, Counter-Guerrilla Operations: The Philippine
Experience, Westport, CT: Praeger Security, 1962, 2006, p. 174. Hereafter cited as Valeriano and Bohannan,
Counter-Guerrilla Operations.
257
F.G. Hoffman, “Combating Fourth Generation Warfare”, in Terry Terriff, Aaron Karp and Regina Karp, eds.,
Global Insurgency and the Future of Armed Conflict: Debating fourth-generation warfare, New York: Routledge,
2008, p. 185. Hereafter cited as F.G. Hoffman, “Combating Fourth Generation Warfare.”
258
Comments made by Col. David Galula in “Characteristics and Patterns of Guerrilla Warfare,” April 16, 1962,
A.M, in Stephen T. Hosmer, and Sibylle O. Crane, eds., Counterinsurgency, a symposium, Santa Monica, CA:
Rand Corporation, 2006, p. 2.

83
the regular forces. The Huks on the other hand, took advantage of a different type of terrain. Though they
continued, like the revolutionaries to operate in the rugged interior, they were also operating in the
wide-open plains of Central Luzon, an area that had a network of roads and communications. Such an
environment would have usually made it easier for government forces to traverse through and hunt down
the Huks had it not been for the fact that these lands were densely populated by people long victimized by
landlords, politicians, and land racketeers. It was amongst these oppressed people, that the Huks were able
259
to build their bases.
Magsaysay from the outset was acutely aware there was an inseparable link between the people’s
260
grievances and the sustainability of the movement. Since the Huks operated in the midst of the
population, a pure military approach would only increase civilian casualties and subsequently risk
alienating the population from the government and the military. Therefore, he expanded the spatial confines
of the battlespace to include the human terrain, where the thrust of his anti-Huk campaign would rest on
261
psychological operations.

4.3.8 Recognizing the Actors in Battlespace and Targeting the Respective Audiences
Magsaysay was astute in making a clear connection between the population and the enemy. The
enemy thrived on the people’s grievances and manipulated these attitudes to sustain their movement. But
Magsaysay did not resort simply to winning the hearts and minds approach to sever the link between the
population and the guerrilla. In other words, activities were not implemented with a “one-size fits all”
formula. They were carefully crafted to apply the greatest psychological impact on their respective
audiences (the population, the enemy, and the soldiers) in order to support the military mission.262 With the
Huks, he organized activities based on their shades of allegiance. With the core Huk members, he struck
with force and used psychological warfare that included sowing seeds of confusion within their ranks,
deception, and terror to ultimately demoralizing the dissidents263 With the part-time guerrillas, he sought to
coax them into siding with the government through incentives that included amnesty, rewards, and
socio-economic assistance.264 The population was also not treated singularly. They were those that were
actively supportive or against the Huk cause, and there were those that were indifferent or tolerant.265
While he sought to promote the sincerity of the government to the general populace, he paid special

259
Comments made by Col. Charles T. Bohannan in “Characteristics and Patterns of Guerrilla Warfare,” April
16, 1962, A.M, in Stephen T. Hosmer, and Sibylle O. Crane eds. Counterinsurgency, a symposium, Santa Monica,
CA: Rand Corporation, 2006, p. 8; Valeriano and Bohannan, Counter-Guerrilla Operations, p. 27.
260
Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era, p. 28.
261
Bridgewater, “Philippine Information Operations During the Hukbalahap Counterinsurgency Campaign,”
pp. 39-40; McClintok, Instruments of Statecraft, p. 6.
262
Bridgewater, “Philippine Information Operations During the Hukbalahap Counterinsurgency Campaign,”
p. 39; Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era, p. 30.
263
Bridgewater, “Philippine Information Operations During the Hukbalahap Counterinsurgency Campaign,”
p. 39; Valeriano and Bohannan, Counter-Guerrilla Operations, pp. 113-114.
264
Ibid., pp. ix; 56.
265
Ibid., pp. 14; 184.

84
attention to negating the appeal the Huks had over the supportive population.266
He also did not neglect the soldiers themselves. He implemented a reform program to boost the
morale of soldiers by providing more benefits, delivering recognition for exemplary soldierly action, and
267
punishing or removing the errant ones. In sum, actors were differentiated for the purpose of tailoring
268
activities to shape events on the battlespace that would work in favor for the counterinsurgent.

Table 4.1: Magsaysay’s Target Audience

㻌 Target Audience 㻌㻌
㼀㼔㼑㻌㻱㼚㼑㼙㼥㻌㻌 㼀㼔㼑㻌㻼㼛㼜㼡㼘㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌 㼀㼔㼑㻌㻼㼔㼕㼘㼕㼜㼜㼕㼚㼑㻌㻹㼕㼘㼕㼠㼍㼞㼥㻌
㻯㼛㼞㼑㻌㻴㼡㼗㻌㻲㼕㼓㼔㼠㼑㼞㼟㻌 㻌 㻴㼡㼗㻌㼟㼡㼜㼜㼛㼞㼠㼑㼞㼟㻌 㻌 㻰㼑㼐㼕㼏㼍㼠㼑㼐㻌㼟㼛㼘㼐㼕㼑㼞㼟㻌
㻼㼍㼞㼠㻙㼠㼕㼙㼑㻌㻴㼡㼗㻌㻲㼕㼓㼔㼠㼑㼞㼟㻌 㻴㼡㼗㻌㼛㼜㼜㼛㼚㼑㼚㼠㼟㻌 㻱㼞㼞㼍㼚㼠㻌㻿㼛㼘㼐㼕㼑㼞㼟㻌
㻌㻌 㻺㼑㼡㼠㼞㼍㼘㻛㼀㼛㼘㼑㼞㼍㼚㼠㻌 㻌

Source: Compiled from Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era, p. 30; Valeriano and Bohannan,
Counter-Guerrilla Operations, p. 15l; Bridgewater, “Philippine Information Operations During the Hukbalahap
Counterinsurgency Campaign,” p. 40.

4.3.9 Creating the Civil Affairs Office (CAO) and the American Input
Magsaysay was a man of ideas and he liked to deliver them on the spot. But he was not a military
theorist nor did he have any grounding in psychological warfare (psywar). What he knew was that simply
issuing an order from the top to the soldiers on something fuzzy as shaping military outcomes through
269
psychological manipulation was not going to translate into meaningful action.
It was the American advisors assigned to the Philippines to assist in this Huk campaign that
270
helped codify the psywar aspect. American involvement in this war remained on the sidelines, but they
provided support through funding and advice under the Joint Assistant United States Military Group
271
(JUSMAG). The coterie of advisors dispatched to the Philippines consisted of American military
officers well versed in counterinsurgency and intelligence work. The most notable of them was Air Force
Lieutenant Colonel Edward Lansdale, who headed the intelligence divisions of the Philippines (Ryukyus)
266
Ibid., p. 22.
267
Ibid., pp. 112; 190;
268
F.G. Hoffman, “Combating Fourth Generation Warfare,” p. 185, Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era, p.
30.
269
Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, p. 412; Valeriano and Bohannan,
Counter-Guerrilla Operations, pp. 165-169; 170.
270
The increased American involvement came in 1949, as the Americans became anxious about the state of
affairs in the Philippines. They feared they were losing a pro-American government to the communists. In the
end, the United States decided against committing combat troops and in place, bolstered military funding and
sent more American advisors to the Philippines under the Joint Assistant United States Military Group
(JUSMAG); Michael McClintok, Instruments of Statecraft, Ch, 4, available online. JUSMAG was created in
1947 for the purpose of having American military officers advise, organize, and train the Philippine military.
271
Jops, Modern Guerrilla Insurgency, pp. 75-76. JUSMAG was made up of the American Army, Navy, and
Air Groups for the purpose of giving military advice, training and assistance to the AFP.

85
Command and Captain Charles Bohannan, an army counterintelligence officer that experienced wars in the
272
Philippines, Indochina, and Latin America. The setup was successful especially since Lansdale formed
an extraordinary relationship with Magsaysay. For reasons that stemmed from the fear that the Huks would
assassinate the Defense Secretary, Magsaysay roomed with Landsdale in a JUSMAG compound for close
273
to a year. The relationship was characterized as something of a brotherhood but with some evidence
showing that Lansdale in fact, was the man in control over charting the course of the Philippine’s COIN
274
program.
The culmination of these consultations led to the creation of a special psychological warfare
division called the Civil Affairs Office (CAO), an early predecessor to the CMO office that exists today.
Along with this office, Lansdale also contributed to the formulation of the Economic Development Corps
275
(EDCOR) and other psychological warfare schemes. As it turned out, the CAO was the answer to
Magsaysay’s problem of translating his ideas on psychological persuasion into action.

4.3.10 The Civil Affairs Office (CAO): Organization and Functions

The Civil Affairs Office (CAO) was designed to “beat the guerrilla at his own game” which was
the Huks’ dominance in the psychological dimension. Until 1950, they were able to attract popular support
by demonstrating that they were “morally superior” to the government by promoting the cause of the
peasant. The new office was tasked to reverse this effect and improve perceptions of the people towards the
276
government disillusioned by its policies and its heavy-handed military measures.
The CAO had an unusual arrangement. The office was placed directly under the control of the
Secretary of National Defense, meaning all Civil Affairs officers reported directly to Magsaysay himself.
Though it had the trappings of a technical service such as the Engineering Corps, it was not positioned in
the General Headquarters of the Military (GHQ) and remained an office within the Department of Defense.
In short, Magsaysay prevented it from being institutionalized within the military’s organizational structure
so that he could have full control over it and remove any “arbitrary or formal limitations” that could
obstruct any “activities designed to win popular support for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).”
277

The office itself was staffed at most with 200 CAO officers (military officers, enlisted personnel,
278
and civilians and these officers were assigned to the highest echelons of command down to the battalion
279
level, where they served as advisors to the local commanders in their respective areas of operations.

272
McClintock, Instruments of Statecraft, p. 3 of ch. 4.
273
Bridgewater, “Philippine Information Operations During the Hukbalahap Counterinsurgency Campaign,” pp.
38-39.
274
Cecil B. Currey. Edward Lansdale, the Unquiet American. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1988, p. 90.
McClintock, Instruments of Statecraft, p. 5.
275
Lansdale quoted from his memoirs in Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era, pp. 30; 39.
276
Bridgewater, “Philippine Information Operations During the Hukbalahap Counterinsurgency Campaign,” pp.
39-40; Valeriano and Bohannan, Counter-Guerrilla Operations, pp. 21-22; 165.
277
Valeriano and Bohannan, Counter-Guerrilla Operations, pp. 169-170.
278
Ibid., p. 170.
279
Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era, p. 30; Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, p.

86
 The mission of CAO was never made specific but in broad terms, they were responsible for all
activities that required or initiated interaction with the population. In one sense it functioned as a Public
Relations office that worked on both the national and local level, to disseminate information to the public at
280
large. They organized public rallies, open forums, movie showings, distribution of leaflets, to promote
the accomplishments of the AFP and to discredit the communists in the form of propaganda and
281
counterpropaganda. In areas where there was a low literacy rate, they utilized plays, movies, and other
forms of entertainment, as a practical means to transmit information and to establish good relations with the
282
community.
On the more surreptitious side, the CAO officers launched rumor campaigns, devised black
propaganda, manipulating local superstitions to raise terror, and provided rewards for information, capture,
283
or the killings of Huks, for the purpose of demoralizing the enemy. One simple technique, which had
far-reaching implications on the psyche of the enemy, was when the AFP made repeated radio broadcasts
from Taruc’s mother that pleaded her son to return to the folds of the law. Resultantly, this became one of
the reasons that drove Taruc to his surrender. Ultimately, with his surrender, the Huk movement lost steam
284
and spelt out its decline.
The CAO was also not directed solely outwards. The CAO officers kept themselves up-to-date on
issues related to the community they were working in, and attempted to address the needs of residents.
They took action if there were reports by residents on abusive soldiers. CAO made sure, the culprit was
285
promptly tried and prosecuted. They also did not fail to publicize this clean-up action.
Activities also expanded to include other government agencies such as the Department of
Education and Bureau of Public Works. This was for the purpose of collaborating with non-military
government personnel in the COIN effort. It also had the effect of augmenting the functions of these
agencies with the help of the soldiers. Thus, the military was extensively used in civic action projects,
which involved infrastructure repair and construction, medical assistance, and educational assistance.
Nonetheless, CAO made sure that these projects were selected based on gaining the most favorable
286
impression from the people, and did not neglect to publicize its activities.

4.3.11 The Economic Development Corps (EDCORS)

The Economic Development Corps (EDCORS) was one of the most touted projects of the
287
Magsaysay period. Approximately 1,500 Huks surrendered due to the psychological effect of EDCOR.

409.
280
Valeriano and Bohannan, Counter-Guerrilla Operations, p. 170.
281
Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, pp. 408-409; 413.
282
Valeriano and Bohannan, Counter-Guerrilla Operations, p. 171.
283
Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era, p. 31.
284
Valeriano and Bohannan, Counter-Guerrilla Operations, p. 172.
285
Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era, p. 31; Valeriano and Bohannan, Counter-Guerrilla Operations, p. 175.
286
Valeriano and Bohannan, Counter-Guerrilla Operations, pp. 64-65; 177. Though the Engineering Corps did
the actual implementation of infrastructure works, it was the responsibility of the Civil Affairs Officers to advise
commanders on what kind of socio-economic activities to select.
287
Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era, p. 33.

87
It was a program established on December 15, 1950, under advice by the Civil Affairs Office (CAO).
288
Originally a benefits program for retired military personnel that fell out of use; it was resurrected and
redirected towards the rehabilitation of surrendered Huks. Provided that the Huks did not have a criminal
record and were willing to reintegrate in society, they would to be given homesteads (six hectares to twelve
hectares of land) in undeveloped public land. Army Corps of Engineers would help clear the land, build
basic infrastructure, and facilities such as schools and the government would provide a startup capital for
289
each settler. Once the Huks did their share of clearing the land, they would be able to acquire land deeds
after 2 years. By the end of the program, three resettlement colonies were carved out in Mindanao and one
290
in Northern Luzon, all distant from population centers and Huk bases. But a final project targeted a
community right at the nose of Luis Taruc’s hometown in San Luis in 1953. It involved relocating an entire
village to a nearby but more arable land. This hammered in the final nail, since almost all of the members
of the village had at least one family member active in the movement. Indebted to the government’s
initiatives that improved their lives, they pressured their Huk relatives to surrender. This led to another
291
irreversible decline for the Huks.
EDOCR was essentially a message by the government to counter the Huk’s slogan, “Land for the
292
Landless” which struck a chord with the majority of peasants. The civic action component was simply a
means to an end. Magsaysay was not under any delusion that the military could uplift the people from
poverty. While it was true that a number of rebels were resettled and there was some effect in spurring
economic activity in the areas where settlements were built, the reality was that the military could not give
land to all the landless. Rather, CAO officers selected high-value targets where Magsaysay could achieve
293
the most effects in negating the Huks’ slogan: “Land for the Landless.”
The true success lay in influencing and behavior of the enemy and its supporters. The Civil
Affairs Office (CAO) made sure that the program got maximum publicity, and instilled in the minds of the
population, that the government was taking constructive action to address the grievances of the peasants.
Although less than 1,000 Huks were resettled and the actual commitment of resources by the government
minimal, the propaganda effect surpassed these inputs. News quickly circulated through the media and by
word-or-mouth, which spurred Huk supporters to advise the fighters to give up the cause and it even had
294
the effect of persuading fighters to surrender.

288
EDCOR was originally intended for drafted or retired soldiers. By giving them homesteads, this would
provide these soldiers a post-retirement arrangement, and the crops harvested from these lots could be diverted to
provide food for the military. Even though a bill was passed by Congress, it was never implemented.
289
Settlers also included retired personnel of the AFP and ex-guerrilla fighters who fought under the U.S.
command during the Japanese occupation to act as “stabilizers” in a new community consisting of former
communist guerrillas. Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era, p. 32; Valeriano and Bohannan, Counter-Guerrilla
Operations, p. 178;
290
EDCOR also had side projects such as job training for Huks and helping villagers relocate to more arable
land. See Valeriano and Bohannan, Counter-Guerrilla Operations, p. 179.
291
Valeriano and Bohannan, Counter-Guerrilla Operations, pp. 177-182.
292
Ibid., p. 40.
293
Valeriano and Bohannan, Counter-Guerrilla Operations, p. 180; Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the
Filipino People, p. 416.
294
Col. Bohannan comments made in “Psychological Warfare and Civic Action,” April 18, 1962, P.M, in

88
 EDOCR effectively dislodged the Huks from their vantage point in the psychological dimension
and seized the initiative to win back the masses including those who had joined the dissident movement for
a lack of a better choice. EDOCR was a large-scale program that effectively used the non-coercive form of
295
psywar to improve the image of the soldier and win back substantial support for the government.

4.3.12 Targeting the Soldier

As the majority of activities organized under the CAO were directed to gain control over the
psychological domain of the population, the real raison d’etre of the office tends to be overlooked. That
was, Magsaysay’s primary mission to indoctrinate the soldier who was rigidly conformed to operate under
conventional war-making principles, to make them understand that their actions would have political
implications, and wherever necessary, they had to be prepared to expand the scope of their activities to
achieve mission success.
Magsaysay began by raising the morale of the troops. He made sure they got the full backing of
the government by providing sufficient equipment and supplies, benefits, and promoting soldiers based on
296
merit.
At the same time, he used the CAO to propagate the notion of psychological warfare. It began
with something as simple as their behavior and conduct towards the population for any abuse could
reverberate all the way up to the top of the command and jeopardize the entire military campaign.
Magsaysay dealt with this aspect by encouraging troops to demonstrate friendly behavior to the population
and enforcing discipline amongst the AFP through surprise inspections and punishing infractions on the
297
spot.
However, this did not mean that soldiers would be disproportionately involved in “winning the
hearts and minds” projects. Rather, CAO helped to instill in the minds of the soldiers the intricate
relationship between one, combat operations; two, intelligence-gathering; and three, psychological warfare
including public relations. Hence, the slogan directed at the soldier “Every solder is a PsyWar Man” was to
remind him that the political implications must be always considered when conducting any type of

Stephen T. Hosmer, and Sibylle O. Crane eds. Counterinsurgency, a symposium, Santa Monica, CA: Rand
Corporation, 2006, p. 83. Foreword by Kalev Sepp in Valeriano and Bohannan, Counter-Guerrilla Operations, p.
ix.; Valeriano and Bohannan, Counter-Guerrilla Operations,, pp. 173-179; Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of
the Filipino People, p. 416.
295
Magsaysay as president, made the first substantial moves towards alleviating the plight of the peasants by
attempting to improve the delivery of government services in rural areas and also reforming the agrarian sector.
He passed several major bills such as Agricultural Tenancy Act (1954) to correct exploitive behavior by
landlords over tenants and the Land Reform Act (1955) to redistribute massive landholdings (rice and corn) to
individuals. See David Wurfel, “Philippine Agrarian Reform under Magsaysay,” Far Eastern Survey, January
and February 1958. Available in two installments at:
http://davidwurfel.ca/philippines/philippine-agrarian-reform-under-magsaysay-part-i. and
http://davidwurfel.ca/philippines/philippine-agrarian-reform-under-magsaysay-part-ii. Accessed November 27,
2012.
296
Valeriano and Bohannan, Counter-Guerrilla Operations, p. 111.
297
Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era, p. 30; McClintock, Instruments of Statecraft, p. 7 of ch. 4; Valeriano
and Bohannan, Counter-Guerrilla Operations, pp. 75; 171-176.

89
 298
operation. Today, the slogan has been revived for the same purpose with a slight alteration of the term:
“Every soldier is a CMO Man.”

4.3.13 CMO’s Role in Allowing the Mobility of Troops over Battlespace

4.3.13.1 Battalion Combat Teams (BCT)
CMO also had a critical role to play in ensuring the mobility of troops over insurgent battlespace
and denying the insurgents the freedom of action. Prior to Magsaysay, offensive measures took the form of
occasional large-scale sweeps carried out by conventional military or police units, but for the most part,
security operations were characteristically those of static defense.
To counter this, the AFP reorganized its combat units into Battalion Combat Teams (BCT), a
recommendation made by JUSMAG, for the purpose of allowing a more efficient spread of its forces. At
the same time it was large enough to amass men for concerted military actions to either deflect Huk attacks
or strike them. They were also highly mobile military units manned approximately by 1000 men, and
assigned to different geographical locations. There was a reduced need for lines of communication since
they were close to self-sufficient. All BCTs were equipped with heavy weapons, artillery, and service units
299
that included the signal corps, engineering corps, as well as a Civil Affairs unit.
The BCTs were effective against the Huks who moved fluidly in both the physical and human
terrain. Being more mobile, the BCTs could pursue the Huks better than in the previous strategy of
300
organizing large-scale sweeps to capture a handful of escaping guerrillas. Its success was based on
inflicting deadlier force on its intended targets. The BCTs were equipped with highly-trained scouts squads
301
that were capable of penetrating the depth of the enemy strongholds to conduct strikes, and harassment.
But much of this could not have been done without acquiring the ability to maneuver in the sea of
population. The population was important for providing information, severing their lines of support to the
insurgents. Much of the directives of CAO were carried out by these battalions operating on the front
302
lines. Civil Affairs (CA) officer were assigned to each BCT for the purpose of advising the commander
on the best approach in developing and maintaining friendly relations with the population. They also helped
the commanders to select projects that would elicit the most positive reaction from the people. Some
commanders even depended on CA officers to serve as a liaison with the civilian authorities in his area of
responsibility.
CA officers’ tasks did not end here. Their job was also to disseminate the information to the
public. They were always equipped with projectors, radios, leaflets, and other forms of communication
devices to publicize the achievements of the AFPs, deliver an awareness campaign on the repercussions of

298
Bridgewater, “Philippine Information Operations During the Hukbalahap Counterinsurgency Campaign,” p.
40; Gen. Edward Lansdale’s comments in “Principles and Techniques of Political Action,” in Counterinsurgency:
A Symposium, pp. 56-57; Valeriano and Bohannan, Counter-Guerrilla Operations, pp. 75; 175-176.
299
Valeriano and Bohannan, Counter-Guerrilla Operations, pp. 99-100
300
Ibid., pp. 91-92.
301
Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era, p. 28; Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, p.
397.
302
Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, p. 410.

90
 303
joining the Huk movement, and keep their soldiers up-to-date on general military affairs.

4.3.13.2 Patrols
One of the key characteristics of guerrilla warfare is that it does not operate within fixed
parameters of a conventional battlefield. Guerrilla movements are likened to fish in the water where they
can swim fluidly over terrain. They are also masters of dispersal and reassembly, which make them an
elusive target when they are hunted and lethal when they amass to launch ambushes and raids.
This typically requires a response based on maneuver rather than on one that relies on
indiscriminate firepower. Counterinsurgents can only overcome the challenges of operating in this type of
battlespace in highly agile, mobile, and compact units to seek penetration of the enemy and collapse it from
304
within. As it turned out patrols, combined with combat and civic action became the most effective
305
weapon in allowing the AFP to gain initiative and control over the battlespace.
The advantages of patrols are that it allows troops to one, go on an offensive, two, deny the
freedom of movement for the guerrilla, and third, increase the frequency that it can make contact with a
guerrilla. Patrols in this period were usually conducted in units ranging from half-squads to platoon size.
They were arranged to follow random timetables and random routes. They were frequently conducted, so as
to keep the guerrillas always on the move and in a state of anxiety, of not knowing when to expect the next
encounter. While patrols yielded a small number of kills and captures, it had an effect of demoralizing the
306
guerrillas, and ultimately clearing an area of insurgent control.
At the same time, patrols also had to take into consideration they were operating in the midst of
the population. Patrols conducted previously by the notorious Nenita units that hunted down and killed the
leaders of Huks produced successes but it also had the effect of terrorizing the population. Furthermore,
other patrols stole food from the people when supplies ran low, creating more hostility from the
307
population.
Thus, patrols under the Magsaysay leadership were led with more focus on limiting the negative
impact it had on the people. The patrols that entered populated realms were suggestive of those conducted
by the Philippine Constabulary during the American colonial era where civic action and community
assistance programs were incorporated to improve the relationship between the military and the population.
But under Magsaysay, the practice was more formalized and specific, as he assigned CA officers, trained in

303
Valeriano and Bohannan, Counter-Guerrilla Operations, pp. 171; 174; 175; 177
304
William S. Lind, John F. Schmitt, Joseph W. Sutton, & Gary I Wilson, “ The changing face of war: into the
fourth generation”, in Terry Terriff, Aaron Karp, and Regina Karp, eds., Global Insurgency and the Future of
Armed Conflict: Debating fourth-generation warfare, pp. 14-15
305
Valeriano and Bohannan, Counter-Guerrilla Operations, p. 104.
306
Valeriano and Bohannan, Counter-Guerrilla Operations, p. 104. Read more on the effects of patrols in
insurgent battlespace based from discussions between Col. David Galula, Col. Napoleon D. Valeriano, Col.
Charles T.R. Bohannan, Capt. Anthony S. Jeapes in “Primary Objectives of Counterinsurgency and Some
Effective Organizational and Operational Approaches,” April 16, 1962, P.M. and “Tactics and Techniques of
Counterguerrilla Warfare (1), April 17, 1962, A.M. in Stephen T. Hosmer, and Sibylle O. Crane eds.
Counterinsurgency, a symposium, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2006, pp. 20-31; 39-40; 43.
307
Valeriano and Bohannan, Counter-Guerrilla Operations, pp. 79; 84-85.

91
the field, to accompany patrols to provide advice to the commanders. For instance, CA officers gave
pointers on how to distribute psywar material; how to investigate a community and gauge attitudes of the
people, and how to formulate corrective measures to change negative perceptions of the people towards the
government. But such actions had to be accompanied with action to demonstrate the good will of the
soldier. Those included having medical-aid men accompany patrols for the purpose of providing treatment
to civilians wherever needed. Others also included rendering assistance to residents fleeing from military
308
operations.
Patrols were also the most effective way to collect basic combat intelligence. They could be
secured by extensive patrolling over unfamiliar terrain, or scouting for unusual activity. They could also be
conducted in secrecy, under disguise or concealment, to locate positions of guerrillas to prepare for
309
full-scale military operations. Yet, when it came down to interaction with people, obtaining their
cooperation was one of the most reliable forms of intelligence gathering. Therefore, soldiers on overt
patrols, meaning identifying themselves as soldiers, were expected to act cordially and respectfully towards
310
the peoples and previous practices such as taking food from the population were forbidden. The
following lists the three basic missions of a patrol. Civic action, public information campaigns, and other
community assistance activities were incorporated in 2 and 3.

1. To find and capture, kill, or harass the enemy

2. To obtain and compile information
311
3. To win the support of the people by demonstrating their concern for them.

In summary, promoting better relationships with the people played into the factor of facilitating
troop movement in a battlespace occupied by non-combatants. It not only helped gain the cooperation of
the people and deny the support-base that the insurgents relied on, but it also helped the soldiers secure
information that would allow for selective and targeted used of force.

4.3.14 Summary
In retrospect, the main factor that determined the success of the Huk campaign was an
administration that appointed the appropriate person for the job in leading the campaign. Under the
leadership of Magsaysay and with his support of his American advisors, the AFP was able to take a creative
approach to a problem that could not be solved with punitive action alone. The very ingredient that
bolstered COIN operations were those activities categorized as the left-hand approach, now referred to as
CMO. Magsaysay made sure that the know-how of CMO was transmitted down the chain of command.
And he did not conduct activities without a clear purpose. He established targets (the people, the Huks, and

308
Ibid., pp. 174; 176-177.
309
Ibid., p. 126.
310
Ibid,, pp. 84-85; 176.
311
Ibid., pp. 104; 197.

92
the soldiers themselves) and had CA officers plan and oversee the implementation of these activities with
the clear goal of supporting the military mission. In its implementation, the left-hand approach was
successful because it was guided by principles of maneuver. CMO effectively demonstrated the soldiers’
commitment to the people that had the effect of dislodging the Huks from their pedestal of moral
superiority (decisive point) over the agrarian poor, which ultimately secured the intractable decline of the
Huks.
.
Table 4.2: The Left-Hand Approach and the Right-Hand Approach

Left-Hand Approach Right-Hand Approach

Population Abandoned static defense-->Spreading out forces
Medical assistance Compact and semi-independent military units
Candy for children Patrols
Information campaigns through Psychological terror
newspapers, leaflets, radio broadcasts, Infiltration
and movies/plays/entertainment in remote areas Deception
Counter-propaganda
Civic action (roads and school building)
Huks
Amnesty
Vocational schools
Resettlement programs
Soldier Behavior
Bringing own food or paying for food
Punishing errant soldiers
Acting cordial

In the following decades, the left-hand approach was maintained as reflected in the replication of
its activities in future administrations. Nevertheless, the know-how was not transferred smoothly,
underlining the problem that without efforts to formally preserve its lessons with periodic updates, it was
difficult to implement successfully without the exceptional leadership such as one by Magsaysay.

4.3.15 A Synopsis of Events in the Post-Magsaysay Years (1957-1965)

The military under Magsaysay was allowed to expand its role beyond the normally accepted
boundaries of military prerogatives, most notably in socio-economic spheres. Riding high on his popularity,
he became president in the December of 1953. However after his untimely death in a plane crash in 1957,
the succeeding administrations under Carlos Garcia and Diosdado Macapagal dramatically reduced the

93
AFP’s roles in both military and non-military spheres, which in effect stalled any further development in
CMO. The first reason for this was because the internal security problem was basically under control, with
312
only an estimated 500 Huk fighters holed up in the remote mountains of Luzon. The second reason was
by 1957, the power of the AFP relative to civilian bureaucracies and political leaders had grown to a level
where it became a source of suspicion for Garcia and Macapagal. Both presidents, unlike Magsaysay did
not have military background, nor, the interest in cultivating close ties with the AFP to secure their political
base. Rather, they sought to diminish the role of the military. This was made apparent in personnel and
budget cuts, frequent reshuffling of the AFP’s top brass, the removal of military officers from civilian posts,
313
and the reduction of civic action.
In regards to the civic action component of CMO, it was especially considered to be problematic.
President Garcia’s constituents were the landed-elite and they did not view with favor the interference of
the military in rural areas to uplift the lives of impoverished people. There was an apprehension that the
314
AFP could potentially alter the power balance between the traditional oligarchy and the peasant.
315
Additionally, too much civic action was considered to be dangerous, since it could politicize the military.
Still, what Magsaysay started in involving the military in socio-economic areas was not
completely erased. Civic action was maintained to target the roots of dissidence, particularly in rural areas.
Under President Macapagal, a token effort to continue the tasks of EDCOR, materialized into the 1958
Socio-Economic Military Program (SEMP). This authorized the use of military personnel and facilities for
316
public works, construction, farming, land resettlement, and rural development. It was a program that
made use of available military manpower in peacetime to help improve socio-economic conditions in rural
317
and depressed areas.
In summary, CMO in this period can be characterized as something that was losing its utility due
to the improved security situation and experienced further decline with the deliberate curtailment by the
318
presidents in allowing soldiers to participate in areas sensitive to political control. What was continued,
especially under SEMP, was characterized more for its developmental orientation rather than for its utility
in COIN.

4.4 The Marcos Years (1965-1986)

4.4.1 Introduction
319
The AFP marks 1985 as the official conceptualization of CMO. As history has shown, what

312
Berlin, Before Gringo, p. 87
313
Ibid., pp. 84-85.
314
Berlin, Before Gringo, pp. 86-87.
315
Ibid., pp. 86-87, 100-101.
316
Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, pp. 417; 429.
317
Philippine Army, Civil-Military Operations Manual (PAM-7-00), Makati, 2002, p. 5; Pobre, History of the
Armed Forces of the Filipino People, p. 417.
318
Berlin, Before Gringo, p. 105.
319
Lt. Col. Ferozaldo Paul T. Regencia, PA, interview with author, AFP National Development Support
Commnand, Camp Aguinaldo, Manila, Philippines, October 8, 2007. Hereafter cited as LTC Regencia and date
of interview.

94
constitutes as CMO today were integrated into numerous military campaigns but were referred to under
different names, depending on the contents of these activities, such as psychological operations, civic
action, public affairs, civil affairs, and civil relations. Under Marcos, these activities fell under the
jurisdiction of the Home Defense Program, later renamed CMO. However, it was only at the tail end of the
Marcos regime that these activities were bound together and conceptualized as a distinct military operation.
Yet, the conceptualization of CMO during the Marcos years followed a long and arduous path.
The lessons provided from the Magsaysay era in quelling the Huk Rebellion through a combination of
combat, intelligence, psywar, and early CMO activities, were not applied with the same understanding and
sophistication towards the insurgents. Rather, the AFP underwent a painful experience of relearning the
tenets of COIN warfare before CMO emerged in the form that it is understood today.
Still, events in the Marcos era had a critical role in shaping CMO in basically two phases. The
first phase (1969-1978) was marked more by its developmental orientation. Marcos mobilized the military
to fit in his scheme of nation-building and impose social order. As a result, the developmental aspect of
CMO is derived in part, from this period. The second phase (1981-1986) was in response to the emergence
of the internal security threats. CMO were intensified to deal with the armed communist movement.
However, the AFP encountered colossal challenges in integrating CMO into their newly established COIN
plan due to their weakening military capabilities and poor adjustment to COIN warfare. While this
mainstream COIN plan was underway, a small group of military officers had begun to experiment with a
form of maneuver warfare that incorporated CMO. This was in response to the limited progress that the
military was making towards the insurgents. The fruits of these efforts led to the conceptualization of CMO
in 1985. The section below traces the transition of CMO from a large-scale nation-building exercise to one
that evolved into a COIN tool.

4.4.2 CMO in the First Phase: Expanding the Military’s Role in Development
4.4.2.1 The Early Years: Marcos Cultivating his Relationship with the AFP and Role Expansion
CMO during the early Marcos period cannot be explained in isolation from the web of politics
that it emerged from. CMO would not have grown to play such a major role in national affairs if Marcos
did not use the military to centralize his power. From the outset, President Ferdinand Marcos latched onto
the military to strengthen his powers as executive. Through a series of well-timed and deftly planned moves,
he succeeded in bringing the military behind him. In the course of cultivating his ties with the military, he
secured increased funding for the AFP and also helped improve its prestige by expanding its roles, most
notably in development which later became to be referred to as CMO. Thus, the first phase of CMO under
Marcos re-emerged under these conditions.
Initially, the new leader had a lofty vision to bring about revolutionary politico-socio-economic
change from the center through a massive redistribution of power, land, and wealth in a nation suffering
from a wide disparity between the haves (wealthy land-owners) and have-nots (landless peasants and/or
impoverished people). With the traditional elite (landowners) dominating the legislature, Marco could not
implement his scheme to restructure Philippine society without drastically altering their status quo.

95
Therefore, he needed an alternative source of power to strengthen his position as executive. Consequently,
he chose the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to serve as his vehicle to consolidate his political
320
power.
321
Marcos began to cement his ties with the military as soon as he stepped into office. For the
first 13 months of his presidency, he served as his own Secretary of Defense and presided over
322
organizational and personnel changes to consolidate his control over the military. He also secured their
loyalty by increasing military funding. The national defense budget rose from P271.1 million in the year he
was elected in 1965 to P366 million in 1967. This was followed by P415 million in 1968 and another jump
323
in 1969, with P513 million. This endeavor was largely made possible due to Marcos’ ability to
manipulate Cold War events, and in particular the Vietnam War.
The Vietnam War involved the Philippines in an unavoidable net of commitments with the United
States. The Philippines, being America’s military ally, was asked to contribute to the war effort. Even
before Marcos took office, in 1964, under President Macapagal, a bill was passed to allow the Philippines
to send their troops to Vietnam for civic action, psywar advisory roles, and medical assistance and by the
time Marcos took office, three Filipino contingents had already been deployed to Vietnam with the fourth,
324
in-waiting.
As the war intensified in Vietnam, the United States ratcheted up pressure on its military ally to

320
William E. Berry, Jr. “The Changing Role of the Philippine Military During Martial Law and the
Implications for the Future”, in Edwards A. Olsen and Stephen Jurika Jr., eds., The Armed Forces in
Contemporary Asian Societies, Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1986, p. 215. Hereafter cited as Berry,
“The Changing Role of the Philippine Military During Martial Law and the Implications for the Future”; Noel M.
Morada and Christopher Collier, “The Philippines: State Versus Society?”, in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Asian
Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998; pp. 353-354.
Hereafter cited as Morada and Collier, “The Philippines: State Versus Society?” See ch. 2 in David G.
Timberman, A Changeless Land: Continuity and Change in Philippine Politics, Singapore: Institute of Southeast
Asian Studies, 1991 for an in-depth understanding Filipino political traditions.
321
In actuality, Marcos began cultivating his relationship with the military long before his presidency. Unlike
his predecessors, Carlos Garcia and Diosdado Macapagal who did not have a military background and did not
see any political advantage in coddling the AFP, Marcos capitalized on his association with the AFP, which
began before WWII. Marcos’ military experience began as a member of the Philippines Reserve Officers’
Training Corps (ROTC). During WWII, he saw action as a lieutenant with the United States Armed Forces in the
Far East (USAFFE). After independence, he played a role in gaining more recognition for Filipino veterans and
upon entering politics; he continued to develop close ties with members of the AFP. See Donald Lane Berlin,
Before Gringo: History of the Philippine Military 1830-1972, Pasig City: Anvil Publishing, Inc, 2008, pp. 87;
112-117. Hereafter cited as Berlin, Before Gringo.
322
Berlin, Before Gringo, pp. 117-121; Richard J. Kessler, Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines, New
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1989, p. 116. Hereafter cited as Kessler, Rebellion and Repression in
the Philippines.
323
Berlin, Before Gringo, op. cit., p. 128. (1965-USD 69.5 million, 1967-USD 93.8 million, 1968-106.4 million,
1969-USD 131.5 million Currency rates from The University of British Columbia: Pacific Exchange Rate
Service. Available at: http://fx.sauder.ubc.ca/etc/USDpages.pdf. Accessed January 18, 2013).
324
The three contingents were the Philippines Contingent to Vietnam (PHILCONV I), consisting of 28 military
and 6 civilians, deployed in September 1964; PHILCON II, numbering 34 men deployed in April 1965;
PHILCON III, composed of 15 psywar-civic action officers, 1 surgical team of 6 men and 2 rural health teams,
deployed in August 1965. After Marcos assumed presidency, PHILCON IV was sent in April 1966. This group
consisted of 7 doctors, 6 nurses, and 7 enlisted men. For details see Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the
Filipino People, pp. 464-474.

96
increase its support. Military civic action became the centerpiece of negotiations between the two countries,
as the agreement was based on the Philippines providing non-combat support. The United States promised
325
increased military funding, specifically aimed at bolstering the AFP’s engineering capabilities. In 1966,
Marcos agreed to send the fifth Filipino contingent, the Philippine Civic Action Group V (PHILCAG V) to
Vietnam, with numbers exceeding 2,000 personnel. The civic action group focused on large-scale
infrastructure construction as well as other community-level civic action to increase the good will of the
326
Vietnamese people.
This give-and-take arrangement between the two countries was in fact based on Marcos’
327
calculated move to strengthen his political powers. In exchange for his support to the United States, in
what he described in his own words as “precedent-breaking,” the AFP was able to organize a new
328
engineering brigade with ten engineering construction battalions. Politically, this meant two things for
Marcos. The first was that civic action became the chess piece that allowed him to secure extra military
329
funding which solidified his control of over the military as an uncontested patron. The second was that
with strengthened engineering units, the military now had the resources and capabilities to be incorporated
in Marcos’ scheme of development. Marcos could now use the military to implement his polices without
330
relying solely on government bureaucracies that he had a deep-seated distrust for. And from the military
aspect, the civic action contingents sent to Vietnam would later influence the way AFP conducted COIN,
including the implementation of civic action (see section 4.4.4.1).

4.4.2.2 Reviving Civic Action: Marcos’ Quest for National Development

Increased U.S. military funding helped strengthen the engineering battalions and Marcos used
them to further expand the activities of the military. But from a legal standpoint, Marcos used what was
preserved from the Magsaysay era of using soldiers in socio-economic projects through the
Socio-Economic Military Program (SEMP), which was established between 1958 and 1959. Though
previous administrations only retained what Magsaysay started to preserve the option of using military
331
resources where needed, Marcos used this as a legal basis to directly involve the AFP in nation-building.

325
Kessler, Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines, pp. 122-123; Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the
Filipino People, p. 463.
326
For more details on the contents of PHILCAG V see Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino
People, pp. 474-484.
327
Kessler, Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines, pp. 122-123.
328
Pres. Ferdinand E. Marcos, State-of-the-Nation Message, January 22, 1968 in Jose M. Crisol, Marcos on the
Armed Forces Manila: Capital Publishing House, Inc., 1971, p. 24. Hereafter cited as Crisol, Marcos on the
Armed Forces; Kessler, Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines, pp. 122-123.
329
David G. Timberman, A Changeless Land: Continuity and Change in Philippines Politics, New York: M.E.
Sharpe and Singapore Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001, p. 84. Hereafter cited as Timberman, A
Changeless Land; The United States provided at least 7 million dollars to train and equip AFP engineering
construction battalions in 1967 and 1968, and an additional 39 million dollars for the PHILCAG unit. See
Kessler, Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines, p. 123.
330
Timberman, A Changeless Land, p. 84.
331
Jose M. Crisol, Men and Arms, Makati, Metro Manila: Agro Printing & Publishing House, 1981, pp. 61-62.
Hereafter cited as Crisol, Men and Arms.

97
 In his first State of the Nation address (1966), he outlined a bold initiative to fast track the
development of the Philippines in his Four-year Development Plan. The plan centered on large
construction projects to improve ground, air, and waterways infrastructure as well as electrification and
irrigation projects. In his address, he declared his intentions to mobilize the armed forces to help the nation
332
achieve its developmental aims. What Marcos saw in the military was not only a pool of untapped
potential of technical expertise, manpower, and equipment, but also an organization bound by discipline
333
and cohesiveness.
To implement his massive scheme of involving soldiers in infrastructure development, civic
action, and community assistance programs, in 1966, he directed the AFP to create a Department of
Defense-Home Defense Program (later renamed AFP Civil-Military Operations Program in 1982), which
334
was officially launched in 1970. The program had two broad objectives: development and national
335
security. Marcos perceived that the two had a complimentary relationship since social and political
dissent stemmed from conditions of poverty. Already in the mid-1960s, there was growing unrest from the
student and labor sectors in the nation’s capital, and Marcos declared publicly in 1968 that the only durable
solution to internal subversion was advancing the nation economically and to achieve this, he said, “I
intend to harness to a greater extent the resources of our defense establishment in our task of
336
nation-building.”
Thus, the Home Defense Program became the official embarkation point for Marcos’ scheme to
involve the military beyond its prescribed roles of defense. In the years leading up to martial law, these
roles remained bracketed in development, but at levels that far exceeded those of the previous
337
administrations, so that the program itself almost resembled a developmental agency. As a result, the
expansion of military’s roles allowed Marcos to use the AFP to implement his policies after he declared
martial law.

4.4.2.3 The Home Defense Program (1970): Supporting Martial Law and Marcos’ New Society
Martial law (1972) was the answer to Marcos’ quest to centralize his power. The pretext in which
he used to declare a state of emergency was the raging protests in the capital and the war against both the
Muslim separatists and communists. Though the leader argued that asserting emergency powers was
unavoidable due to the uptick in violence, his ultimate motive was seeking an extension of his powers,

332
Ferdinand E. Marcos, First State of the Nation Address, January 24, 1966. Available at:
http://www.gov.ph/1966/01/24/ferdinand-e-marcos-first-state-of-the-nation-address-january-24-1966.
333
Jose M. Crisol, Men and Arms, p. 62.
334
At the AFP level, the implementing arm was the AFP Home Defense (Strategic) Program, supervised by the
Deputy Chief of Staff for Home Defense.
335
Crisol, Men and Arms, p.69.
336
Marcos, State-of-the-Nation Message, January 22, 1968 in Crisol, Marcos on the Armed Forces, p. 26.
337
Felipe B. Miranda and Ruben F. Ciron, “Development and the Military in the Philippines: Military
Perceptions in a Time of Continuing Crisis,” in Soldiers and Stability in Southeast Asia, eds, J. Soedjati Djiwand
and Yung Mun Cheong, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1988, p. 174. Hereafter cited as Miranda
and Ciron, “Development and the Military in the Philippines: Military Perceptions in a Time of Continuing
Crisis.”

98
 338
since his presidency was coming to a close. The efforts that Marcos put into increasing the military’s
developmental role had paid off. Marcos needed the military to enforce his rule, serve as the basis of his
339
legitimacy, and impose law and order. The expanded prerogatives of the AFP were made apparent
immediately. Upon declaration of martial law, the military literally marched up the steps of Congress and
shut it down. They muzzled the press, suspended civil liberties, and arrested elements of society determined
340
to be a threat to Marcos’ regime. They assumed judicial roles by creating military tribunals that tried
341
civilians. In effect they became the implementers of Marcos’s laws, decrees, and orders.
Marcos also did not fail to reward the military for their backing. He raised their motivation with
an enlarged military budget that led to pay raises. The ballooning manpower not only meant there were
342
more soldiers to fight, but also more soldiers to engage in non-military activities. In the latter, Marcos
343
divvied out administrial and managerial positions to AFP officers in state-run and private companies.
The Home Defense Program, in fact a CMO office, was established in 1970 prior to Martial Law.
What it did was establish a basis for the military to widen and deepen the scope of its role that went beyond
defense. Prior to martial law, it remained largely confined to national development and developing the
AFP’s reserves but starting from 1974, it began to add more pillars that sought to rationalize Marcos’
authoritarian control and at the same tackle the growing insurgency problem.

Table 4.3: The Pillars of the Home Defense Program as of 1978

The Pillars of the Home Defense Program as of 1978
1. Manpower, reserve affairs/administration and reserve force development (1966)
2. Civil security force development (1966)
3. Civil assistance (added in 1974)
4. Civil Relations (1966)
5. Military economic development activities -MEDA (1966)
6. Mass-base operations (added in 1978)
344
7. Motivation and Enlightenment (added in 1978)

The first two components were carried over from before martial law and fell under the objectives

338
Prior to the 1987 Constitution, Philippine presidents were allowed to serve a 4-year term, with a single
chance at re-election (based on the 1935 Constitution, amended in 1940).
339
Gretchen Casper, Fragile Democracies: The Legacies of Authoritarian Rule, Pittsburgh and London:
University of the Pittsburgh Press, 1995, p. 37.
340
Timberman, A Changeless Land, pp. 75-77; 81-85; Jose M. Crisol, Men and Arms, p. 9.
341
Miranda and Ciron, “Development and the Military in the Philippines: Military Perceptions in a Time of
Continuing Crisis,”p. 174; Timberman, A Changeless Land, p. 85.
342
Felipe Miranda, “The Military”, in R.J. May and Francisco Nemenzo eds., The Philippines After Marcos,
Kent and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1985, p. 94; Miranda and Ciron, “Development and the Military in the
Philippines: Military Perceptions in a Time of Continuing Crisis,” p. 170.
343
Miranda and Ciron, “Development and the Military in the Philippines: Military Perceptions in a Time of
Continuing Crisis,” p. 174.
344
Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, p. 560.

99
of developing a citizenry response to national security. The first one, manpower, reserve
affairs/administration and reserve force development, dealt with strengthening core military manpower
by developing the military reserve forces in preparation for war or a national emergency. The second
component, civil security force development was aimed at creating a local defense system especially in
remote towns and villages. This involved training civilian volunteers and organizing them into a security
force. The umbrella organization for these paramilitary groups including both armed and unarmed men,
345
was the Integrated Civilian Home Defense Forces (ICHDF).
The next two pillars (3 and 4) operated under the principles of supporting government programs
346
and activities on socio-economic progress. Civil assistance, a component added in mid-1974, involved
a coordinated effort between the military and civilian authorities to conduct law enforcement, infrastructure
and civil engineering, civic action or social services, disaster relief, and the take over of public utilities in
347
case of emergency. Most of the activities conducted under this pillar were civic action. Broadly defined,
civic action was the use of military resources for constructive civilian activities that would elicit the support
348
and respect of the people for the government but not at the expense of diluting combat effectiveness.
The activities included road and school building, electrification, irrigation, road cleaning and de-clogging
349
sewage systems, and dispensing medical and dental assistance.
Civil Relations, an original component of Home Defense, dealt with the military’s relations with
the public at large. Its main responsibility was making sure that Home Defense activities left a favorable
mark on the people. It had four aspects: one, command information which was directed towards the
military in order to keep the soldiers well informed about their duties and obligations; two, public
information, to inform the public about the AFP and its activities through the press; three, community
relations, to foster good relations with the target community such as through sports’ competitions and other
social events; and fourth, psychological operations, aimed at influencing the attitudes of the target
audiences in support of the military operation. These included the transmission of propaganda and
counterpropaganda through the radio and other forms of media. Target audiences also included the enemy
and the AFP themselves. With the enemy, attraction programs were put into place in attempts to elicit their
surrender, and with the AFP, actions were designed to boost their morale and ensure that their sense of
mission was intact. In regards to the psyops component of civil relations, it came directly under a separate
350
office, the Undersecretary for Civil Relations (USCR) as it dealt directly with the enemy.
The fifth pillar, military economic development activities (MEDA) focused on agriculture and
up to a certain extent, the industrial sector. Simply put, it was a Research and Development center for

345
General Headquarters, AFP, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Civil Military Operations, J-7, Camp
General Emilio Aquinaldo, Quezon City, 19 April, 1982, Annex, A-1; B-1: Crisol, Men and Arms, p. 71.
346
Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, p. 560.
347
Crisol, Men and Arms, pp. 72-73.
348
“Military Civic Action,” prepared by Civic Action Branch, OUSHD, DND, undated (estimated to be
published between 1974 and 1982), pp. 49-50; 61.
349
Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, pp. 561-563.
350
Crisol, Men and Arms, pp. 69; 73 ; Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, pp. 564 ;
567-570.

100
developing techniques to improve the lives of the people. The bulk of the projects were related to food
production that included cattle raising, fish cultivation, rice-production, improving agricultural yields
351
through environmental engineering, and tree-planting.
While development remained a significant theme in Home Defense throughout the first half of
the 1970s, it experienced a qualitative change when the military was placed in the role as the vanguard of
social change against the backdrop of growing unrest. As Timberman put it, Marcos’ “grab for power did
not happen in a vacuum” underlying the fact its imposition was not made purely on political whim. Marcos’
quest for absolute authority was partially intended to actualize his vision to revolutionize Filipino society
by removing the old repressive structure dominated by the oligarchy. He viewed the traditional elite as the
obstacle to progress and peace. They were the ones that monopolized power and economic wealth, leaving
the masses impoverished; and to make matters worse, these socio-economic grievances fuelled insurgencies.
And the only way to defeat the subversive elements that fed off the grievances of the oppressed was to
352
transform the old society into what he termed the New Society. In the New Society, he called for the
self-sacrifice and self-discipline of the people to turn the Philippines into a unified and prosperous nation in
353
which all of its citizens could equally benefit.
Thus, the Home Defense Program not only placed the military as a key player in development
and security, but it also took up psychosocial concerns which dealt with the “values and attitudes of the
354
people.” That is why the sixth pillar, motivation and enlightenment was added in 1978. By way of
example, the AFP was tasked to propagate democratic values of unity and self-reliance to the people. This
was geared so that the people could emulate the soldiers’ dedication to the nation and take their own
355
initiative in generating socio-economic development. In other words, the AFP would take the leading
role in transmitting the values of the New Society to a nation bound more by family, tribal, and ethnic
356
affiliations, and help rally the Filipinos under a modern and single Filipino identity.
Under the motivation and enlightenment pillar, a CMO program called Tanod at Gabay ni Lahi
at Watawat (TANGLAW) or “beacon” was devised specifically to indoctrinate the soldier on the principles
of the New Society, mold his image as both a “fighter” and a “nation-builder,” and thereby transmit these
357
values to the people.” A component of Tanglaw, the Army Literacy Patrol System (ALPS) was
established in 1979, to help the government propagate the values of New Society through the soldier. The

351
Crisol, Men and Arms, pp. 69-74; Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, pp. 561; 564.
352
Noel M. Morada and Christopher Collier, “The Philippines: State Versus Society?”, in Muthiah Alagappa,
ed., Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998; pp.
553-554; Timberman, A Changeless Land, pp. 34-35.
353
Timberman, A Changeless Land, pp. 80; 90-91.
354
Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, pp. 560; 570.
355
Crisol, Men and Arms, pp. 63; 76-77.
356
AFP Annual Report ’82, A Year of Solid Achievement, pp. 8-9. The AFP defines nation-building as a
“process whereby a sense of national loyalty is developed, which transcends local, family, tribal or ethnic
loyalties. It involves the development of a national identity and the establishment and maintenance of the
legitimacy of the political system so that diverse groups within the national boundaries perceive themselves as
constituting a simple entity.” Crisol, Men and Arms, p. 63.
357
Crisol, Men and Arms, pp. 145-148; PAM 7-00, p. 9; Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino
People, p. 590.

101
ALPS was a program that sent soldiers to remote areas to teach reading, writing, math, livelihood skills,
and health awareness. Incorporated into the educational curriculum was also personality development and
358
values-formation.
In conjunction with the ideals set forth in the New Society to transform barangays (villages) into
self-reliant and productive communities, a large-scale livelihood program called Kilusang Kabuhayan at
Kaunlaran (KKK) was launched. KKK’s purpose was to generate jobs in depressed areas especially in
waste utilization, agriculture, livestock and light industry enterprises. Soldiers were dispatched to rural
359
areas to conduct job training.
A new pillar that directly involved the community in tackling the insurgency problem was the
mass base operations. Added in 1978, when the state was faced with the growing communist threat, these
were activities conducted by the military in insurgency-influenced areas or combat zones. The main
objective of this pillar was to isolate the insurgents from their base of support, which was the population,
by using the AFP to build closer ties with the people and help depressed communities to be self-reliant.
Activities such as evacuation and resettlement of civilians during military operations, humanitarian
assistance, and socio-economic projects were designed to address grievances of the people and win their
support for the central government. Other activities such as the organization of youth, religious, and civic
leaders in action groups and the training of local government leaders were designed to strengthen the
360
community’s political apparatus so that it could prevent the infiltration of the enemy.

4.4.2.4 The Outcome of the Early Home Defense Activities

During the 1960s, the economy was growing at approximately 5 per cent per year. Much of the
efforts that Marcos put into improving irrigation and electrification with the assistance of the military
benefited the agricultural sector. Between 1972 and 1976, the Philippines was able to reach food
361
self-sufficiency. Marcos also devoted his energies into infrastructure building using the military. For
instance in 1969, the army engineers’ involvement in civilian construction projects were double the military
ones; and in most years leading up to 1977, the military’s involvement in civil works overtook military
362
ones (see table 4.4). It is also interesting to note, the amount of civil projects began to drop when the
AFP began turning their attention to the armed communist front in 1978 (see section 4.4.3.3).

358
Ricky J. Bautista, “The “Barefoot” Soldiers Called ALPS!,” Samar News, January 12, 2004. Available online
at http://www.samarnews.com/Special_report/specialreport3.htm, accessed February 2, 2011.
359
Jacinto C. Ligot, “Communist Insurgency in the Philippines,” master’s thesis, Monterey, California: Naval
Postgraduate School, 1994, p. 46. Hereafter cited as Ligot. “Communist Insurgency in the Philippines.”
360
General Headquarters, AFP, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Civil Military Operations, J-7, Quezon
City: Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo, April 19, 1982, Annex D-1; D-2; D-3.
361
Timberman, A Changeless Land, pp. 48; 87. Between 1972-1976, Philippines was able to reach food
self-sufficiency.
362
Felipe B. Miranda and Ruben F. Ciron, “Development and the Military in the Philippines: Military
Perceptions in a Time of Continuing Crisis,” in Soldiers and Stability in Southeast Asia, eds, J. Soedjati Djiwand
and Yung Mun Cheong, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1988, pp. 174-175. Hereafter cited as
Miranda and Ciron, “Development and the Military in the Philippines: Military Perceptions in a Time of
Continuing Crisis.”

102
Table 4.4: Projects Accomplished by the AFP Corps of Engineers, 1966-1986

Number of Number of Total Number Ratio of

Civil Military of Civil and Civil to

Year Projects Projects Military Projects Military Projects

1966 4 16 20 1: 4
1967 17 18 25 1: 1
1968 8 18 26 1: 2
1969 40 17 57 2: 1
1970 33 55 88 1: 2
1971 76 21 97 1: 3
1972 20 5 25 4: 1
1973 40 16 56 3: 1
1974 25 18 43 1.4: 1
1975 112 88 200 1.3: 1
1976 44 86 130 1: 2
1977 54 23 77 2.3: 1
1978 18 194 212 1:11
1979 19 73 92 1: 4
1980 15 171 186 1:11
1981 35 188 223 1: 5
1982 36 136 172 1: 4
1983 36 178 214 1: 5
1984 109 106 215 1: 1
1985 30 120 150 1: 4
1986 7 115 122 1:16

Source: Office of the AFP Chief of Engineers, "Accomplishment of the AFP Corps of Engineers: 1966-87,"
1987 in Miranda and Ciron, “Development and the Military in the Philippines: Military Perceptions in a
Time of Continuing Crisis,” p. 175.

By the late 1960s, it became a common sight to see a soldier toiling on a construction project.
Thus the Philippines continued to ride high on the economy in the first-half of the 1970s. Yet, martial law
could not sustain these economic gains indefinitely. By the late 1970s, martial law began to bear signs of a
seriously flawed economic system. The nation slid into an economic crisis. Bad economic policy-making
often tainted with cronyism and corruption, combined with externally generated events such as the oil price
rise in 1979 were behind the widening income disparity and increased unemployment rates. The ambitious
land reform program that Marcos also had set up was faced with challenges in finding enough land to

103
 363
distribute, not to mention dealing with increasing resistance from landowners. Consequently, any impact
the military may have had on economic development was submerged under the failure in Marcos to
implement effective economic and fiscal policies.
The declining economy also impacted the successful implementation of CMO programs. For
instance, KKK or the livelihood program which was intended to develop the countryside by generating jobs,
failed to make in-roads. In the end, Manila lacked the finances to support local governments in delivering
basic services. Without the financing, the AFP could not do their part of the job. Even though KKK was
also supposed to foster good relations with the people, it eventually backfired, because it only exposed
364
people to the incompetence of the military and the government.
Nevertheless, the largest issue concerning the effective implementation of Home Defense was
that the soldiers were insufficiently trained to handle these extra-military roles. The Defense College did
not furnish these soldiers with courses that allowed them to work smoothly in the civilian world. With the
only check in the system coming from Marcos, the military had a free hand in almost everything. Rather
than cooperating with civilians, they used coercive practices to dictate their method of administration.
Placed in corporate and bureaucratic roles, the positions exposed them to the lure of self-aggrandizement.
365
Not surprisingly, corruption and graft became rampant. Opportunists in the military made profits
366
through illegal enterprises such as racketeering and gambling. The abuse of power was also made
manifest in the trampling of human rights. Suspected political enemies were imprisoned, tortured or killed.
Thus, it contradicted the very principles of the CMO program, which was supposed to create a friendly
military-people partnership under the guidance of the disciplined and dedicated soldier.
In sum, though CMO espoused in the Home Defense Program was initially to realize Marcos’
ideal of transforming Philippines into a New Society and bringing economic progress, any intended effects
became negated by Marcos’ poor economic policymaking and the brutality of martial law. The slide into a
political and economic crisis added momentum to internal unrest, fostering armed movements that would
grow in strength. As Marcos became more preoccupied in protecting his power, he also neglected tending
to the military’s defense capabilities. By the time the first COIN plan came into effect (1981), it was
evident that the military was in no state to effectively fight the internal security problem

4.4.3 Background to the Armed Movements

4.4.3.1 Growing Unrest
The Philippines in the early 1960s was not immune to the global student protests. The student
movement was building up steam on Manila’s campuses where students, intellectuals, and labor unions
linked up to organize protests. By the late 1960s, these radical student movements capitulated into

363
See Timberman, A Changeless Land, pp. 91-92; 106-114, for more details about the impact of martial law on
the Philippine economy.
364
Ligot, “Communist Insurgency in the Philippines,” pp. 46-47.
365
Miranda and Ciron, “Development and the Military in the Philippines: Military Perceptions in a Time of
Continuing Crisis,” pp. 174-176.
366
Kessler, Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines, pp. 126.

104
existence a new generation of armed organizations that included both the Communists and the Muslims
separatists. The protest movement in the capital, along with the threats from the two fronts was used as a
pretext for Marcos to declare martial law. Soon after, the Muslim rebellion escalated into a full-blown war
while at the same time, the military were fighting the communists. CMO or what was known as Home
Defense Activities were not aligned well with military operations. They sat at the far ends of a long table,
with only an occasional nod to each other. Internal security operations focused on conventional military
assaults that left limited room for CMO to exercise its utility. It was only when the communists regrouped
and refined their strategy and tactics in guerrilla warfare that the AFP began to experiment with CMO
driven by tenets of maneuver warfare. The section below will cover the two threat groups, the AFP’s
approach to them, and the process in which CMO shifted from a nation-building orientation to one that
became re-conceptualized as a distinct operation within the confines of COIN warfare.

4.4.3.2 Background to the Muslim Separatist Movement

The distant roots of the modern Muslim struggle can be traced back to the Spanish era when
various Muslim powerful sultanates fought off Spanish attempts to conquer the Southern portion of the
Philippine archipelago (Mindanao and its outlying islands). These sultanates had an advanced political
system, thriving trade, and military prowess, which allowed them to maintain their sovereignty until the
367
turn of 20th century. Following a protracted and bloody war against the Americans, the Muslims or
368
Moros fell under the control of the United States. Thus, the Muslim South (Mindanao and its outlying
islands of Sulu) was incorporated into the Filipino polity in preparation for independence.
The integration of the Muslim South with the rest of the Christian dominated archipelago was a
painful process and to this day, remains incomplete. The central government of the Philippines since
independence directed ill-guided policies towards the Muslim, a minority currently consisting of a mere 5
per cent of the population but concentrated in the Mindanao region. The most outwardly damaging was the
government-sponsored migration of Christian settlers from other parts of the archipelago to Mindanao in
order to ease population pressure and cultivate new lands. Many foreign and domestic businesses also
tapped into the resource-rich region. Consequently, many Muslims were forced off their ancestral lands and
made a minority in their homeland. Their plight was further exacerbated by overall government neglect on
369
the socio-economic welfare of the Muslims and the lack of law-and-order in the region. A proliferation

367
The Spanish instilled strong feelings of fear and animosity in their colonial Filipino subjects toward the
Muslims as the Filipinos were conscripted to attack the Muslim strongholds. Moreover, the Spanish incorporated
themes of anti-Muslim sentiment in their cultural plays. Consequently, this prejudice was transferred to future
generations, which was one factor in creating a cultural fault-line between the Hispanicized Filipino and the
Muslim Filipinos in the independent Republic. See Macapado Abanton Muslim, The Moro Armed Struggle in the
Philippines: The Nonviolent Autonomy Alternative, Marawi City: Office of the President and College of Public
Affairs, Mindanao State University, 1994, pp. 47-51. Hereafter cited as Muslim, The Moro Armed Struggle in the
Philippines.
368
Moro was a term used by the Spanish colonial administrators to refer to the Muslim population in the
Southern Philippines. It is still an appellation that Muslim Filipinos use to identify themselves.
369
Patricio P. Diaz, Understanding Mindanao Conflict, Davao City: Minda News, Publications, 2003, pp. 2-6;
14; 29-30; Muslim, The Moro Armed Struggle in the Philippines, pp. 89-92.

105
of firearms and tensions between the Christians and the Muslims led to an outgrowth of private armies in
370
the 1960s, which were controlled by political dynasties and business owners.
All these conditions made the region ripe for a rebellion but the politicization of the Muslim
struggle had yet to take hold as a unifying force. In the post-war period, a self-conscious Muslim identity
that transcended multiple Muslim ethnic divisions engendered in part by the American colonial authorities
as a means to expedite their social progress and entry into Filipino statehood, guided the Muslim elites in
the 1950s and 1960s to take steps towards self-determination. However its success was limited because it
371
ultimately failed to gain mass-based support. Nevertheless, it did lay down the foundations for a
separatist movement led by new set of young Muslim leaders. This movement, which was more successful
in mobilizing the ordinary Muslims to fight for the cause of a homeland, was not led by traditional leaders
372
but came from young intellectuals, and many of them coming from the Marxist persuasion. One such
intellectual who emerged to become the leader of the armed Muslim independence movement was Nur
Misuari. As a young political science professor at the University of the Philippines, he was active on the
organizational side of the student movement. Originally from Jolo, an island some 951 km from Manila, he
was not of aristocratic stock. Coming from an impoverished background himself, he was acutely aware of
the social issues that entrapped the Muslim Filipino in poverty and sought to unshackle them from all forms
of oppression that not only came from being denied of statehood, but also from the feudalistic control by
the traditional Muslim elites. This attracted a new breed of young recruits that did not want an independent
373
homeland under the old leadership. Between 1969 and 1971, Misuari created his underground resistance
group, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and its military arm, the Bangsa Moro Army (BMA).
Upon declaration of martial law, the MNLF launched a full-blown war against the Philippine government.

4.4.3.2.1 Military Response against the MNLF: Conventional Warfare

The Muslim conflict embroiled the nation in a five-year war, transforming much of Mindanao
and its outlying islands into a ferocious battleground. The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) stunned
the international community with their ability to fight in well-trained units along conventional lines. Unlike
other known sub-state armed movements, the Muslim rebels did not resort to guerrilla tactics of hit-and-run.
Rather they demonstrated their capabilities to engage in large-scale offensives that not only included sheer
striking power and amphibious landings but also the capacity and resources to capture and hold key terrain.

370
T.J.S. George, Revolt in Mindanao: The Rise of Islam in Philippine Politics, London: Oxford University
Press, pp. 137-141. Hereafter cited as George, Revolt in Mindanao; Muslim, The Moro Armed Struggle in the
Philippines, p. 93.
371
Thomas M. McKenna, Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern
Philippines, Berkeley: University of the California Press 1998, pp. 132-149. Hereafter cited as McKenna,
Muslim Rulers and Rebels. The underlying argument of this book departs from conventional understanding that
the Muslim Filipino identity was engendered during the Spanish colonial period but argues it was the American
colonial and military authorities that were responsible for laying down the foundations for a unified Muslim
movement.
372
George, Revolt in Mindanao, pp. 192; 194-199.
373
Ibid., pp. 197-201.

106
 374
In 1973, it was estimated that there was anywhere between 14,000 and 16,000 rebels.
The initial gains of the Muslim rebels were in large part due to Misuari’s diplomatic acumen.
From the outset of the war, Misuari was able to build an international platform for the recognition of the
Filipino-Muslim struggle. Islamic countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and Libya saw the
375
war as a persecution of people of their own creed and condemned Marcos. The most enthusiastic
support came from Libyan leader, Moammar Gadhafi, who allowed the exiled Misuari to set up his interim
government in Libya while providing armaments and logistical support to the MNLF. Malaysia and
Indonesia were also suspected of extra-diplomatic support, but Malaysia got the most heat from Marcos, as
captured MNLF documents revealed that the rebels including Misuari were trained in base camps in
Malaysia. Yet, both countries maintained for the official record that intervention was only through
diplomatic channels. Either way, securing the supply-lines for the war allowed Misuari to sustain
operations against the AFP and concurrently have control over his army, which in fact was far from a
376
cohesive force, composed of loosely-aligned bands of armed Muslims.
Government forces had no choice but to counter the armed insurrection with the full mobilization
of sea, air, and ground forces. Troops on the ground were supported by air strikes and naval bombardments
377
as they advanced from one town to another to neutralize rebel strongholds. What dictated the AFP’s
methods were the American doctrines used in the Vietnam War. These operations focused on unleashing
overwhelming firepower; and success was determined by body counts, arms captures, and battle wins
378
tacked up on the battlefield scoreboard. The war effort was also manpower intensive and required
resources. In response to the accelerating war and the sharp increase in MNLF numbers, which had reached
20,000 fighters in 1975, the AFP in response had nearly tripled their numbers from 58,000 to 142,490 by
1976 (see table 4.5). Along came increased military funding which went up from 136 million dollars to 410
379
million dollars in 1976 (see table 4.6).

374
Ibid.,, pp. 212-213.
375
Ibid., pp. 244-245.
376
Ibid., pp. 231-233.
377
For further information about the military campaigns fought in Mindanao, refer to Pobre, History of the
Armed Forces of the Filipino People, ch. 16.
378
Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, p. 503.
379
Timberman, A Changeless Land, p. 90.

107
Table 4.5: AFP Strength and Estimated MNLF Strength and Armaments

AFP MNLF
Year MNLF
Strength Armaments
1971 58,000 N/A N/A
1972 62,715 N/A N/A
1973 73,500 14,100 9,200
1974 87,920 14,000 9,100
1975 90,804 9,300 6,000
1976 142,490 6,900 4,300
1977 146,527 21,200 13,500
1978 152,561 20,000 13,000
1979 146,068 13,325 7,790
1980 146,400 16,000 12,000
1981 149,265 14,380 10,050
1982 149,107 13,130 7,500
1983 154,773 11,190 6,941
1984 151,051 9,179 5,739
1985 153,365 8,099 5,336
1986 156,139 19,833 10,638

Source: AFP strength statistics from 1961-1971 are in ACDA; 1972-1987 are in OSND, "DND Statistical
Data," 1987, p. 3. Both cited in Miranda and Ciron, "Development and the Military in the Philippines:
Military Perceptions in a Time of Continuing Crisis," p. 169; MNLF statistics from Office of the Secretary
of National Defense (OSND), "DND Statistical Data," 1987. Cited in Felipe B. Miranda and Ruben F.
Ciron, "Development and the Military in the Philippines: Military Perceptions in a Time of Continuing
Crisis," p. 172.

108
Table 4.6: National and Defense Budgets of the Philippines 1970-1983

National Defense
Year Defense as
Budget budget
(P million) (P million) Percentage of
National budget
1970 3,196 367 11.5
1971 3,462 413 11.9
1972 4,574 608 11.3
1973 5,639 842 14.9
1974 8,606 1,392 16.2
1975 20,169 2,962 14.7
1976 22,399 2,918 13
1977 23,759 5,381 22.6
1978 28,681 5,845 20.4
1979 32,236 5,579 17.3
1980 37,894 5,864 15.9
1981 50,320 7,108 14.1
1982 57,092 8,312 14.6
1983 61,838 8,808 14.2

Source: Annual National Budgets 1970-1983 in Felipe Miranda, "The Military," in eds., R. J. May and
Francisco Nemenzo, The Philippines after Marcos London and Sydney, Croom Helm, 1985, p. 95.

The conflict spiraled into a full-blown war covering provinces in Mindanao, the Sulu Island chain,
Basilan, and Palawan. At the height of the war, the AFP had 17 battalions, equating to approximately 75 per
380
cent of their combat forces in Mindanao.

4.4.3.2.2 The Role of CMO in Response to the Muslim Secessionist Threat

In a strange twist of events, the psychological operations (psyops) program (one of the precursors
of CMO) carefully cultivated by Magsaysay to promote the credibility and friendly image of the AFP
during the Huk Rebellion, became the direct instigator of the Muslim Rebellion. Magsaysay’s successors
preserved the civic action and psychological component of EDCOR, which was originally tasked to induce
the Huks to surrender through socio-economic incentives. In the Vietnam War, it actively played a role in
directing socio-economic programs, public affairs, and psywar operations conducted by Filipino soldiers
381
deployed to Vietnam. In 1967, Marcos redesignated the office as the Civil Affairs Office (CAO).

380
George, Revolt in Mindanao, pp. 213; 215. Battalions in the Philippines consisted anywhere between 400
and 500 men.
381
Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, p. 418; The Civil Affairs Office (CAO) was
elevated to the status of General Staff on July 1, 1967. See Civil Relations Services, AFP website:

109
 In 1968, news erupted on a CAO-orchestrated military operation that went haywire. In fact, it
was an operation so covert that many of the AFP officers in the upper-echelons of command were kept in
the dark about its existence. According to a lone Muslim survivor, the AFP’s Christian soldiers murdered at
least 14 of their fellow-trainees when they mutinied on the account of not being paid their monthly
allowance. Even to this day, the details of the “Jabidah Massacre” remain murky as none of the suspects
were charged. The popular theory that emerged was that it was part of Marcos’ intentions to take over
Sabah, a contested island between Malaysia and the Philippines. Sabah, once belonging to the Sultanate of
Sulu in 1658 but was absorbed into the Malaysian Federation in 1963. The Muslim recruits, some of them
natives of Sulu were handpicked by the CAO because of they were perceived to have a kindred spirit with
the Muslim inhabitants of Sabah. For reasons unknown, the plan was aborted and the recruits were killed
under the pretext they had mutinied. The event sent shock waves throughout the Muslim communities and
subsequently drove a deeper wedge between the Muslim Filipinos and the central government. In that same
year, Misuari, also a native from Sulu rode on the wave of protests launched by Muslim students in the
382
capital against the Jabidah Killings to launch a separatist movement. No less significant was the impact
that it had on relations with Malaysia. The affair triggered certain sectors in Malaysia to support Misuari’s
383
forces through training and logistics.
This blunder led to the abolition of the CAO and many of its activities that were related to the
non-combat aspects of psyops appeared to have been partially absorbed or expanded in the Home Defense
Program and Civil Relations. Nevertheless, it remains true, that the early CMO-like practices of
Magsaysay-origin began on the wrong footing with the Muslims and destroyed the credibility of the AFP.
As the war intensified in the Southern Philippines, there were various attempts made to restore the faith of
the Muslims with the government. Home Defense activities were squeezed into places to take care in theory,
the population needs and to win hearts and minds. According to the campaign plan named “Bagong Buhay”
(New Life), CMO was to be incorporated in almost all stages of the war that included the evacuation of
people during the offensive, the reestablishment of civil authority after clearing the area of rebels, and the
re-launching of basic government services. And in the final stages, reconciliation was promoted in order to
remove prejudices between Muslims and Christians. A new military command called the Central Mindanao
Command (CEMCOM) was established by Marcos in 1973 to stem the spiraling violence in the central
384
portion of Mindanao (Cotabato) and in their line of operations, CMO was included, albeit, on a limited
scale. These included the dropping of leaflets in rebel strongholds to warn the population of an approaching
artillery bombardment and induce the rebels to relinquish hold over the town. Others included the use of
the media to inform the population of AFP operations and improve the image of the military. Some civic

http://www.afp.mil.ph/c_r_s/history.htm.
382
George, Revolt in Mindanao, pp. 122-127; 200; McKenna, Muslim Rulers and Rebels, pp. 140-141.
383
“Challenges and Opportunities: The Army in the 1970’s and towards the EDSA Revolutions,” Ch. V, in
Philippine Army: The First 100 Years, Philippine Army, 1997 available at
http://www.oocities.org/afpmuseum/history/history_chapter05.htm, Accessed Feb 4, 2012. Hereafter cited as
AFP, “Challenges and Opportunities,” ch. V.
384
Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, pp. 513-514.

110
 385
action was also conducted to help evacuees and improve literacy rates of the Muslims.
Despite efforts made in this area, it did not close the divide between the Muslims and the
government. The main reason being was in the way AFP managed the overall battlespace. From the get-go,
the MNLF engaged the AFP in a conventional war that left the AFP with limited option of countering them
with an attritional approach. There was little room for Home Defense activities to exercise its utility and
therefore could not alleviate the sufferings of the Muslim people victimized by the war. The conflict left
scores of Muslim civilians dead or homeless. By the end of 1977, it was estimated that anywhere between
386
half-a-million and a million people were displaced. In the provinces of Cotabato and Lanao alone, there
387
were as many as 100,000 evacuees of whom were mostly Muslim.
No less significant was also the force-space ratio issue. The war covered the western peninsula of
Zamboanga in Mindanao, and its outlying islands of Palawan, Basilan, and the Sulu Island Chain. In central
Mindano, there was fighting in Lanao and Cotabato, the latter forming the MNLF’s main base of operations
388
which fielded anywhere between 5,000 to 6,000 men. In the early stages of the war, the AFP was
389
particularly stretched thin and soldiers were at times without air cover or any lines of communications.
In 1971, the AFP had only 58,000 personnel, of which only a portion were re-assigned to the region to fight
390
the rapidly increasing strength of the rebels. With the lack of troops to cover large swaths of land
occupied by the MNLF, the AFP depended on airpower. On the ground, the first batch of young officers
deployed to the field in Mindanao traded physical space with psychological terror. They resorted to brutal
tactics that focused on interrogation, torture, revenge and extrajudicial killings. This psychological terror
391
became another brutal characteristic of the war. In short, Home Defense activities could not achieve its
effects because they were not compatible with the destructive methods of the AFP.

4.4.3.2.3 The Decline of the MNLF and the Repercussions of the War in the Muslim South
The war dragged on with the same intensity until Marcos and the Moro National Liberation Front
(MNLF) were forced to sit at a table for peace negotiations in 1976. Marcos was put in a diplomatic
squeeze by oil-producing Islamic countries (Libya and Saudi Arabia), as well as the Organization of the
Islamic Conference (OIC) that included member-states such as Malaysia and Indonesia who threatened the
Philippines with an oil embargo unless Marcos created some sort of an arrangement to recognize the

385
PAM 7-00, pp. 7-8.
386
Aijaz Ahmad, “The War Against the Muslims”, in Kristina Gaerlan and Mara Stankovitch eds., Rebels,
Warlords and Ulama, Quezon City: Institute for Popular Democracy, 1999, , pp. 26 in Carolina G. Hernandez,
“Institutional Responses to Armed Conflict: The Armed Forces of the Philippines,” a background paper
submitted to the Human Development Network Foundation, Inc. for the Philippine Human Development Report,
2005, p. 7. Available at: http://hdn.org.ph/wp-content/uploads/2005_PHDR/2005%20AFP_Assessment.pdf.
Accessed November 11, 2011.
387
Timberman, A Changeless Land, p. 90.
388
AFP, “Challenges and Opportunities.”
389
George, Revolt in Mindanao, p. 217.
390
Miranda and Ciron, “Development and the Military in the Philippines: Military Perceptions in a Time of
Continuing Crisis,” p. 169.
391
Alfred W. McCoy, Closer than Brothers: Manhood at the Philippines Military Academy, Pasig City: Anvil
Publishing, Inc., 1999, pp. 203-205.

111
national aspirations of the Muslim people. Furthermore, with the growing communist threat, Marcos was in
392
a hurry to shift his resources to fighting the communist front.
On the other hand, the MNLF could not prolong the war fighting a conventional method since
they needed more numbers and arsenal as the war carried on. After CENCOM began an unrelenting
offensive in central Mindanao, the MNLF forces were forced to scatter and downgrade their tactics to
393
guerrilla-style ambushes, terrorism, and harassment in which they did not have sufficient experience in.
To add to their blows, Misuari was losing credibility in the eyes of the Islamic countries that were
supporting him. There was a growing suspicion that Misuari was seeking his own political aggrandizement
rather then looking out for the interests of the Filipino Muslims. They began to pressure Misuari to abandon
the armed struggle and to come to the negotiating table. Consequently, an agreement was forged in Tripoli
(Libya) between the Philippine government and Misuari to end hostilities. A compromise was made for a
ceasefire in which Marcos promised autonomy for 10 Muslim provinces in 1976. Though the ceasefire did
not last and Marcos dodged from making a full-commitment to Muslim autonomy, the MNLF was not able
394
to gather the same number of fighters and resources to mobilize a war with the same intensity.
While the war carried on after the breakdown of the ceasefire, from the military viewpoint, the
attritional approach was successful in wearing down the MNLF and containing the threat to occasional
skirmishes. As for the use of the soft-methods as embodied in the Home Defense Activities, it did not play a
significant role. Still, the war had repercussions for the AFP.
The first was that it locked the military in a mindset that overwhelming firepower was the most
effective method in fighting internal rebellions. The AFP used the same approach towards the communists
but with staggering setbacks. The armed communists quickly learned to offset the AFP’s conventional
395
capabilities by adopting Mao’s strategy of guerrilla warfare. Consequently, the AFP was forced to
re-think its usual choice of military strategy and tactics, which resultantly led to a gradual integration of
CMO related activities in military operations.
The second was that, though the military was able to extract military successes in the war in the
Muslim South, it did not lead to a sustainable peace. Splinter groups such as the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF) and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) emerged in the succeeding generations, uncovering a host
of problems, which were not resolved with the military’s successes in wearing down the MNLF. The
Muslim South was still trapped in a culture of violence and grinding poverty. The after-effects of this war
also left the Muslim people traumatized, making them distrustful of the central government and the AFP.
The reemergence of the Muslim armed threat at the turn of the millennium instigated a response from the
military that could not only rely on force to quell rebellions. Thus, paving way for the greater dependence

392
Timberman, A Changeless Land, p. 90.
393
Aijaz Ahmad, “The War Against the Muslims”, in Kristina Gaerlan and Mara Stankovitch eds., Rebels,
Warlords and Ulama , Quezon City: Institute for Popular Democracy, 1999, pp. 30-31; AFP, “Challenges and
Opportunities.”
394
See ch. 14 and ch. 15 in George, Revolt in Mindanao to see details leading to the cease-fire and immediate
aftermath.
395
Victor N. Corpus, Silent War, Quezon City: VNC Enterprises, 1989, p. 23. Hereafter cited as Corpus, Silent
War.

112
on CMO to regain the people’s faith in the military and the government (see chapter 7).

4.4.3.3. The Communist Movement

4.4.3.3.1 Overview
In contrast to the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the armed communists were able to
rebuild their strength and adapt to a sophisticated form of politico-guerrilla warfare after experiencing
military setbacks in the 1970s. It was the AFP that had the difficulty in adjusting to the CPP-NPA’s switch
in strategy and tactics due to their preference in fighting full-scale offensives based on firepower. To make
matters worse, AFP capabilities were deteriorating in the last few years of the Marcos regime. This was
acutely felt on the frontlines as the AFP lacked adequate resources, training, and morale to stem the rising
tide of communism. When Marcos lifted martial law, the AFP began to turn its attention to battling
communists and developing a military strategy to counter the communist’s control and influence over the
majority of the nation’s provinces. Though they appeared good on paper, it produced little results, if not
making the security situation even worse. Nonetheless, on a tactical level, a method of integrating combat,
intelligence, and CMO was underway experimentally, and was gaining currency amongst officers deployed
to communist strongholds. Consequently, CMO emerged to play a key role in directing COIN efforts as
more attention began to be paid to how the communists gained the upper hand in manipulating the depth of
the battlespace. This section covers the second phase of CMO of this period, which laid down the track to
its conceptualization as a distinct military operation.

4.4.3.3.2 The Resurgence of the Communist Movement: the CPP-NPA

The communist movement emerged more than two decades after Magsaysay consigned them to
near dormancy. What helped revive the movement was student activism building momentum on university
campuses from the early 1960s. Jose Sison, the future leader of the reactivated PKP (Communist Party of
the Philippines) was introduced to the communist circuit by the old guard that allowed him to organize a
new mass youth organization known as the Kabataang Makabayan (Youth Nationalist) in 1964. Originally
an adherent of Mao Tse-tung, by the time he formed the new Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), he
espoused a combination of Marxist-Leninist-Mao thought to better accommodate the situation of the
396
Philippines. He gained traction with the youth, intellectuals, and labor groups. Upon the party’s
founding, its original members included 25 members and in the following year (1969), its military wing,
397
the New People’s Army (NPA) was formed with a mere 9 squads and 35 assorted rifles.
Similar to the earlier Huk uprising, they initially focused their operations in rice-rich Central
Luzon and in Manila. The CPP-NPA capitalized on the grievances of the poor, especially since a mere 10
per cent of the population controlled 90 per cent of the national’s wealth. Regarding the student sector,

396
See Kathleen Weekley, The Communist Party of the Philippines: 1968-1993: A Story of its Theory and
Practice, Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 2001, p. 21
397
Corpus, Silent War, p. 26.

113
 398
there were plenty of potential recruits, as the young were politically driven and idealistic. By 1971,
Bernabe Buscayno, the commander of the NPA managed raised the number of fighters to anywhere
between 300 and 400 men and women. Nonetheless, the Marcos leadership did not treat the problem as a
serious security threat until after a series of grenade-triggered explosions in the capital in the year
preceding marital law, allegedly orchestrated by the NPA. As Marcos took steps to declare a state of
399
emergency, the AFP began to intensify its operations.
Martial law effectively eliminated a large number of political fronts of the CPP-NPA such as
labor unions and student groups, but it did not stop its armed wing from expanding into rural areas. They
were successful in developing a mass-based support in Northern Luzon such as in the provinces of Cagayan,
Isabela, and Bicol. In the Eastern Visayas region, they infiltrated Samar and Leyte. They also attempted to
penetrate the Northeastern and Southeastern provinces of Mindanao. Nevertheless, thanks to the Muslim
secessionist movement, the AFP was better funded, better equipped, and had more soldiers to engage in
sustained combat operations. With superiority in firepower, the government forces pounded the rebel
strongholds, effectively neutralizing them. By 1976, many of the senior commands were either killed or
captured, and scores of fighters deserted or surrendered. To add to their woes, their very existence was put
to test with the capture of Bernabe Buscayno, the senior commander of the NPA in 1976, which was
followed by the capture of Jose Sison in 1977. By the late 1970s, the communist threat was considered to
400
be contained.
Driven further underground, the CPP-NPA changed its strategy and entered a period of rebuilding.
They withdrew from launching military attacks and focused on re-learning the tenets of Mao’s guerrilla
warfare, which depended on developing a “mass base” of rural supporters. They also worked on making
their movement more attractive to non-communists or the so-called middle forces by using an umbrella
401
organization established in 1973, called the National Democratic Front (NDF).
From the period between 1979 and 1980, the CPP-NPA started to engage the AFP in aggressive
military campaigns. Their years of preparation finally bore fruit. In 1981, the NPA had approximately 6,000
402
fighters (see table 4.7) and were known to have 26 guerrilla fronts through the archipelago. In 1981, the
403
NPA claimed to be operating in 43 of the 72 provinces in the Philippines. In a reversal of fortune, the
NPA had gained the initiative in battlespace and they were able to overcome factors, which worked against
them initially, namely from the AFP’s superiority in numbers and firepower.

398
There are various factors concerning the explosion of the leftist movement on the campuses. They included
immediate economic problems such as tuition hikes and unemployment. Regarding political freedom, they
protested against diminishing rights in school campuses and in press. They also protested on wider issues such as
economic disparity, graft and corruption in the government, and American Imperialism. See Pobre, History of the
Armed Forces of the Filipino People, p. 420.
399
“Maoism in the Philippines,” editorial, The Japan Times, September 4, 1971, p. 12.
400
Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, pp. 504-509; 592; Timberman, A Changeless
Land, p. 89.
401
Timberman, A Changeless Land, pp. 114-115.
402
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Philippine Army, 1993 cited in Ligot, “Communist Insurgency in
the Philippines,” p. 79.
403
Timberman, A Changeless Land, p. 115.

114
Table 4.7: AFP Strength and Estimated CPP-NPA Strength and Armaments

NPA NPA
Year AFP Strength
Regulars Armaments
1969 55,000 250 300
1970 59,000 245 240
1971 58,000 500 700
1972 62,715 1,320 1,520
1973 73,500 1,900 1,515
1974 87,920 1,800 1,600
1975 90,804 1,800 1,620
1976 142,490 1,200 1,000
1977 146,527 2,300 1,700
1978 152,561 2,760 1,900
1979 146,068 4,908 1,960
1980 146,400 5,621 2,834
1981 149,265 6,013 2,546
1982 149,107 7,000 2,500
1983 154,773 8,900 4,620
1984 151,051 10,570 8,351
1985 153,365 22,500 10, 125
1986 156,139 24,430 13,000
May-87 154,893 23,260 N/A

Source: NPA statistics cited in OSND, "DND Statistical Data: ST/FA" (1987), p. 4 cited in Miranda and
Ciron, "Development and the Military in the Philippines: Military Perceptions in a Time of Continuing
Crisis," p. 173.

4.4.3.3.3 Factors Leading to the Successful Resurgence of the Communists

1. Applying Mao’s Principles of Guerrilla Warfare

Upon declaration of martial law, the CPP-NPA suffered devastating setbacks in both its military
and political fronts. The AFP launched aggressive military campaigns, which neutralized many rebel
strongholds, and in the capital, a crackdown on the dissident movement left the CPP bereft of a legal
404
front. Consequently, they were driven underground and forced to rethink their strategy and tactics.
The CPP-NPA began placing more attention on the classical tenets of Mao’s guerrilla warfare.
Being largely inferior to the government forces, they needed time to train, equip, expand, build, and
405
mobilize their armed units alongside building their political apparatus. In other words they embarked on

404
Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, pp. 504-505.
405
Corpus, Silent War, p. 25.

115
a strategy of protracted warfare, dictated by three stages. The first stage, strategic defense begins with the
preparation of building military and political strength, which is based on mobilizing the support of the
population. This is followed by strategic stalemate, which involves initiating periodic armed assaults on the
government forces, primarily to harass the government forces and drive them towards a defensive posture.
The strategic offensive is the final stage, in which the guerrilla forces have mustered enough strength to
406
launch an overwhelming offensive and overthrow the central government.
During the period between 1977 and 1981, the rebels laid down the groundwork to control the
battlespace. To achieve the requirements of the first stage, they refrained from armed activity so as not to
attract the attention of the AFP. Especially since their forces were still weak, any major offensives by the
AFP would risk the decimation of their forces. Instead, they devoted their attention to quietly building their
407
base areas. Though seeming contrary to the principles of mobile warfare where the physical and
stationary control over key territory was shunned, they still needed a base area to serve as their command
center and maintain lines-of-communication with operatives out in the field, not to mention also the
necessity in tending to the day-to-day needs of armed fighters such as training, food, recuperation, and
408
shelter.”
Therefore ideal areas in building bases were the hinterlands. The plan was to dot the countryside
with self-reliant and semi-autonomous guerrilla fronts. As soon as there were sufficient numbers, they
409
would link-up and launch a coordinated attack on the cities. Also known as the “encirclement strategy,”
this was a move to first build NPA strength in the peripheries where government presence was the weakest
and then gradually work their way into the city-center, to prepare for the final stage of capturing the seat of
410
the government.
Building bases did not mean a preoccupation with a physically defined piece of territory. Rather,
their idea of a base area was produced from a supportive community. In other words, the CPP-NPA built a
political infrastructure through their own mass organizations and political organs to exercise control. At the
same time, they also developed guerrilla zones, where guerrilla presence was even more fluid. In these
zones, the communists only exercised control when they were physically there and relinquished that control,
upon leaving. These were important to maintain, especially when the infrastructure for political control was
411
still under works.
Physical elements of the battlespace were also taken into consideration such as the natural
topography. Their choice-terrain for fighting guerrilla warfare resided in the physical depth of the
battlespace: in mountainous or forested areas. The rebels maneuvered in physical space that provided
natural barriers for large and heavily equipped military to operate effectively in. Often times the

406
Ibid., pp. 27-30.
407
Corpus, Silent War, p. 59.
408
Ibid., p. 34.
409
Ireneao C. Espino, “Counterinsurgency: The Role of Paramilitaries,” master’s thesis, Monterey, California:
Naval Postgraduate School, December 2004, pp. 18-19.
410
Corpus, Silent War, p. 93.
411
Ibid., p. 33.

116
government forces did not have the same familiarity with the terrain as the rebels did; and the rebels used
412
their knowledge of the physical environs for cover when escaping and launching ambuscades and raids.
Additionally, the communists selected areas that straddled two or more provinces, making it a jurisdictional
413
nightmare for government security forces to chase the rebels.

2. Building the Support of the Population: the CPP-NPA’s Version of CMO

How the CPP-NPA gained the support of the population is also a remarkable study on what was
wrong with the existing Home Defense Program. The CPP-NPA understood that in order to reverse their
fortunes, mass support was indispensable. The people were the building blocks for their control especially
in the countryside. For starters they differentiated their targets. In the urban areas they recruited idealistic
youth from the student-sector, as well as professionals and intellectuals. They went on to serve as the
instructor-cadres in the countryside. In rural areas, the CPP-NPA capitalized on the socio-economic plight
of the peasants to gain their support.
They won the hearts and minds of the rural folk through their own version of CMO called mass
414
work. In contrast to those of the AFP, the CPP-NPA made efforts to understand the communities
located within the boundaries of their chosen base-area. The cadres (drawn from the intellectual pool) were
dispatched to these communities first for the purpose of conducting Social Investigation (SI). SI involved
holding small meetings with the villagers to acquire an understanding on their sources of discontent. In the
process, the cadres identified individuals in the community of whom they could befriend such as people
from the lower social stratum and listed up those that were considered to be potential enemies such as
people with close ties with the military or the wealthy landlords. After compiling and processing the results
of the survey, the cadres began organizational building through the spread of propaganda and civic
415
action.
SI was followed by revolutionary propaganda. This included the oral element, which was
intended to indoctrinate the villagers with communist ideology through mass meetings, speech, and radio
broadcasts. The written element was circulated through underground newspapers, magazines, and
pamphlets. In regards to the contents of the propaganda, the CPP-NPA gained more credibility than the
AFP due to the fact that they took a truth-centered approach. AFP propaganda failed miserably in garnering
the trust of the populace as they mixed truth with gray propaganda (half-truths) and the more notorious,
black propaganda (falsehood), which was used in their psyops program to cover-up AFP misdeeds and
vilify the enemy. The CPP-NPA propaganda was also successful in rallying target communities to their
cause since they were propped with deeds. Deeds ranged from the day-to-day behavior of the rebels
416
towards to the people to actual implementation of projects to benefit the people.
Concerning deeds, the activities that had the most pronounced effect on the people were their

412
Ibid., pp. 64-65
413
Ibid., pp. 33-35
414
Ibid., p. 39.
415
Ibid., pp. 36-40.
416
Ibid., pp. 42; 124-125.

117
 417
own version of civic action work. Though the AFP’s extensive implementation of civic action was
operating under the correct assumption that a military solution is not the answer to the insurgencies, any
success gained was quickly erased by the destruction, the terror, and intimidation that came with military
418
entry into the communities. Furthermore, it did little to solve the fundamental problems of
socio-economic inequalities since they were not backed by workable government policies. Even Marcos’
ambitious land reform scheme fell flat as he made too many exemptions due to resistance from landlords,
the challenges of administrative work, and the reality that there were just not enough lands to
419
redistribute. It was here that the communists made a difference. While they did not have the resources to
engage in large-infrastructure work, they were still able to provide rudimentary healthcare and assist people
in their house and farm chores. The cadres also helped to improve the livelihoods of the peasant by
increasing productivity of the lands, ensuring better prices for their products, pressuring landlords to reduce
420
rent, and forming trade unions and cooperatives for them.
In short the CPP-NPA skillfully managed the human element of the battlespace by bringing the
people to their side with a combination of attractive ideology and the prompt delivery of action. The rural
support was especially indispensable in their military build-up. The people replenished their supply-lines
and provided manpower. The community members could also be depended on as a communications system.
Intelligence was vital since the people could block information from leaking to government authorities and
simultaneously provide the rebels with information about troop movement and dispositions. All these
421
factors provided the NPAs with the capabilities to offset the superior forces of the AFP. By 1981, the
CPP-NPA had influence in 1,173 barangays and had infiltrated 2,147 barangays out of the nation’s
422
approximately 40,000 barangays.

4.4.4 CMO in the Second Phase: Integrating CMO in COIN

4.4.4.1 The Vietnam Doctrine vs. Guerrilla Warfare
The first difficulty the AFP had in adjusting to the Communist Party of the Philippines-New
People’s Army (CPP-NPA)’s battlespace was in the way the AFP conducted military operations. The AFP’s
combat methods were largely built and organized along methods which relied heavily on firepower and
air-support, search and destroy, and combined with addressing the population component through the
organization of village defense, strategic hamleting, civic action, and population control. All of these

417
Ibid., p. 42.
418
Ibid., pp. 108-109
419
See Timberman, A Changeless Land, pp. 108-110 for more details about Marcos’ land reform program.
420
Corpus, Silent War, pp. 42; 52.
421
Ibid., p. 39.
422
Corpus, Silent War, pp. 33-34; 104. In AFP jargon, “influenced” areas refer to areas where the CPP-NPA has
already set up a political infrastructure. Also known as base areas. “Infiltrated” are those barangays that did not
have political organizations like associations and councils. Also known as guerrilla areas. ” Statistics produced
by the AFP in Carolina G. Hernandez, “Institutional Responses to Armed Conflict: The Armed Forces of the
Philippines,” a background paper submitted to the Human Development Network Foundation, Inc. for the
Philippine Human Development Report, 2005, p. 7. Available at:
http://hdn.org.ph/wp-content/uploads/2005_PHDR/2005%20AFP_Assessment.pdf. p. 24. Accessed July 7, 2012.

118
 423
methods were borrowed from the American military’s COIN doctrines applied in Vietnam. While it bore
results in the military campaigns against the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), it did not wear down
the CPP-NPA. Rather the communists showed resilience and honed in on classic guerrilla tactics of
hit-and-run, rapid concentration and dispersal, feint and deception, small-unit operations, and the building
of bases in the midst of a supportive population. It was increasingly becoming clear that the Vietnam
doctrines was in fact unaffordable for the AFP and misaligned to the Filipino conditions, and even worse,
424
stalled the AFP in re-orientating its methods in facing guerrilla warfare.

4.4.4.2 AFP: Alienating the Population and its Repercussions

One of the largest failures of the AFP in countering the surge in the communist threat lay in its
treatment of the population. For starters, the AFP did not build an effective presence in those remote
communities that were considered to be under the influence or control of the Communist Party of the
Philippines-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA). Rather, soldiers operated from their military bases located in
urban areas. This static–defense posture was almost a flashback to the early campaigns against the Huks in
the late 1940s. They made the same mistake in launching occasional search and destroy missions into
rebel-strongholds. The net-effect of these forays was that it was seldom decisive and it was only a matter of
425
time before the rebels returned to a cleared area. Additionally, these missions left a trail of destruction,
which drove the people further away from the military. The deepening gulf between the population and the
military was not simply a matter of civilians being caught in the crossfire but senior officers on a
rotational-basis did not make the efforts to develop contacts with the population. Not surprisingly, it
revealed the fact that Home Defense activities were not used initially in the most needed places. Having
little understanding of the population, the commanders tended to view the civilians with suspicion, which in
effect, exacerbated the relationship between themselves and the communities they were supposed to
426
protect.
Even CMO activities embodied in the Home Defense Program, which had a “noble” purpose of
uplifting the lives of the people and promoting friendly relations with the communities, fell short of their
427
objectives. What happened was that they became “disjointed” with the actual COIN plan as any positive
effects of the programs were quickly overrode by the destruction and uprooting of lives accompanied by
military operations. Furthermore, the AFP was dictated by the Vietnam COIN doctrine, which was more
interested in physically cutting the people’s links with the guerrillas. These included the strategic hamleting

423
The two American military doctrines referred to is the Airland Battle Doctrine and Low Intensity Conflict.
424
Corpus, Silent War, p. 108.
425
The retreat of rebel forces during a government offensive is a strategic move by the rebels to preserve their
forces. It is a method to avoid confrontation with an opponent superior in numbers and armaments. It also serves
as a feint where the opposing forces are made to think the rebels are running away where in fact; they are buying
time to prepare themselves for a counter-offensive. Also known as the “strategic retreat.” See Corpus, Silent War,
pp. 63-64; 108.
426
Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, p. 508; Kessler, Rebellion and Repression in the
Philippines, pp. 146-147.
427
Corpus, Silent War, p. 108.

119
program that forcefully resettled villagers. The ones conducted in Samar and Davao del Norte were done at
such severity that it turned the people against the AFP. In the latter province, the AFP impounded food from
villagers and Home Defense soldiers engaged in extortion in the set up roadblocks. And in regards to the
physical defense of the people, the overstretched military delegated village protection to trained and armed
civilians. The Civilian Home Defense Forces (CHDF) in particular became notorious for their abuse of
428
power and terrorized the very people they were supposed to protect.
Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that the most serious drawback to the AFP COIN campaign was
the declaration of martial law. In Marcos’ quest for total control, he used the military as a tool to crush
political opposition and suppress civil liberties. There were unwarranted arrests, prolonged detentions, and
summary killings of people suspected to be enemies of the state, and many of them attributed to the AFP.
Therefore any attempts to gain the support of the people through CMO would only serve as a hypocritical
429
reminder that the AFP was only serving the interests of the regime.
As the war against the CPP-NPA continued, it was increasingly becoming apparent how critical
the support of the population was. The AFP was often operating on the home turf of the rebels. With the
population supporting the rebels, the military did not have the means to gain intelligence from the civilians.
Without local intelligence, the soldiers could only rely on maps and other navigational instruments to trek
through the physical terrain that consisted of jungles, mountains, and marshes in search of the rebels.
Making the job even more difficult was that the NPA had mastered the know-how of mobile warfare. With
no stationary targets, the government forces at best could only wait for a chance-encounter with the enemy.
With the opponent having superior knowledge over the terrain, and having a near-monopoly over
intelligence sources from the population, it allowed them to initiate attacks at their own choosing. As a
result, troops were often caught unaware in ambushes when they were insufficiently unmanned and too
430
exhausted from a long march to effectively counter such attacks.
.
4.4.4.3 The AFP Adjusting to the New Battlespace: Operation Plan Katatagan
The resurgence of the communist movement forced the AFP to re-examine its existing internal
defense program. In the process of searching for a better approach, the military examined the factors that
enabled the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA) to dominate the
battlespace. These findings are listed as follows:

428
Kessler, Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines, p. 144; Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the
Filipino People, p. 508.
429
Ben D.Dolorfino, “Small Wars Manual’s Strategic and Psychological Principles in Philippine
Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations,” CSC, 1997, p. 13; Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino
People, pp. 575-576. Hereafter cited as Dolorfino, “Small Wars Manual’s Strategic and Psychological Principles
in Philippine Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations.”
430
Corpus, Silent War, pp. 65: 78-79. Corpus also points out, there was something fundamentally wrong with
the methods of the AFP intelligence community. He cites that the AFP did not understand the enemy thoroughly
and primarily depended on intelligence gathered from urban centers. While, the CPP-NPA did build political
organizations and recruited in the cities, actual armed operations occurred in the countryside. Therefore, any
intelligence gathered from urban centers and shared with combat units deployed at the front were hardly of use.
See Corpus, Silent War, p. 21.

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1. Socio-economic issues which made the people vulnerable to the lure of communism.
2. The lack of government presences in rural areas.
3. The lack of coordination between the military and civilian authorities in answering to the security and
developmental needs of the people.
4. The CPP-NPA’s ability to commit to an ideological struggle.
5. The CPP-NPA’s overall organizational strength in producing quality leadership and situational
431
awareness (socio-economic and cultural issues) over the battlespace or Area of Operations (AO).

Based on these insights, the AFP came out with its first comprehensive strategy to fight
insurgencies. In 1981, the same year that martial law was lifted, Letter of Instruction (LOI) 2/81 Katatagan
432
(stability) Operation Plan (oplan) was put into action. It was a strategy that placed civic action at its
433
centerpiece. It prioritized meeting the needs of the people over applying overwhelming force.
Katatagan was formulated to rollback the successes of the CPP-NPA in the countryside by
streamlining combat operations and CMO. The objectives were twofold. One was to improve security
operations for the purposes of protecting the government, allow the safe entry of government services in
conflict zones, and most importantly, to protect the people. The second was to win the hearts and minds of
people by removing the seeds of discontent that came with poverty, ignorance, disease, and injustice. This
was done by developing a partnership between the military and civilian agencies, especially at a grass-roots
434
level, towards an overall COIN effort. Katatagan would be carried out in four stages:

1. Clearing the battlespace of insurgents through combat and civil-military activities.

2. Holding or maintaining a security presence to prevent the return of the insurgents, removing the
communist political infrastructure, rehabilitating the people, and having local government agencies resume
delivery of basic services.
3. Consolidating control by maintaining security and having civilian agencies conduct immediate
socio-economic and political reform.
435
4. Developing the area for long-term and establishing permanent security.

431
AFP Annual Report ’82, A Year of Solid Achievement, p. 40.
432
Ligot, “Communist Insurgency in the Philippines,” p. 41; When Letter of Instructions (LOI) preceded the
name of AFP campaign plans, it meant that civic action was central to the campaign. See Espino,
“Counterinsurgency: The Role of Paramilitaries,” p. 28, footnote 97.
433
Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, p. 597.
434
AFP Annual Report ’82, A Year of Solid Achievement, pp. 3-4; 55; Jose P. Magno, Jr. and A. James Gregor,
“Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the Philippines,” Asian Survey, Vol. 26, No. 5, May 1986, p. 508.
Hereafter cited as Magno and Gregor, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the Philippines.”
435
General Headquarters Armed Forces of the Philippines, LOI Katatagan Handbook, Quezon City: Camp
Aguinaldo, 1983, p. 5 in Ligot, “Communist Insurgency in the Philippines,” pp. 42-43.

121
4.4.4.4 The Reorganization of Home Defense: the Establishment of the CMO Program
In accordance to Katatagan’s Letter of Instruction (LOI), the Home Defense Program also
experienced an organizational change in the following year (1982). Katatagan ultimately changed the
course of Home Defense Activities from one that was oriented towards nation-building to one that was
supposed to be streamlined with military operations. One of the major obstacles in sustaining any gains of
CMO was that there was a lack of coherent connection with combat operations. Intensive ground and air
assaults that produced casualties, property destruction, and the forced-relocation of villagers in combat
zones only worsened the plight of the people. Consequently, it gave the rebels an upper hand in seizing the
psychological domain of the battlespace as more and more people threw in their support for the
436
communists. In order to support the people component of Katatagan Home Defense was combined with
Civil Relations (CR) and labeled under the heading The AFP-Civil Military Operations, marking its first
official use of the term. Under the new AFP-CMO, its activities were organized under two sub-programs:
Home Defense and Civil Relations. Home Defense retained most of its former activities (see section
4.4.2.3) but dropped motivational enlightenment and civil relations. Civil Relations gained a
semi-independent position as a sub-program, with motivational enlightenment becoming fused into its
respective components. The components of Civil Relations are as follows:

1. Public Information – Keeping the public informed on the AFP’s activities.

2. Command Information – Keeping the soldiers well-motivated, educated and informed on military
matters.
3. Community Relations – Activities involving the civilian community.
4. Psychological Operations – Aimed at producing psychological leverage over the target audience
437
(population and enemy). Activities includes both psywar and non-combat operations

The basis of these activities resembles those of Magsaysay’s Civil Affairs Office. The combining
of Civil Relations and Home Defense led to the explicit recognition on the psychological effects of its
programs. All activities, be it civic action or the dissemination of information to the public, were to be
integrated with propaganda to raise the standing of the government. They included the use of written
publications (word), pictorial messages such as through movies (symbols), and socio-economic activities
438
(deeds).
The CMO component, which was supposed to play the largest role in reaching the depth of the
communist strongholds, both psychologically and physically, was the Mass Base Operations. These were
military activities that were specifically tailored to de-influence communities under communist control for
the ultimate purpose of isolating insurgents from their base of support and thereby, securing the support of
the population for the government. They included the protection of people from military operations and

436
Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, pp. 508-509.
437
Ibid., pp. 560; 564; 568-569.
438
Ibid., pp. 568-569.

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insurgent retaliation, socio-economic assistance to impoverished communities, and the re-habilitation and
re-settlement of people affected by military operations. It also had long-term objectives of preventing the
insurgents’ return by taking steps to ensure that local government agencies were on the forefront of
439
strengthening the Mass Base Operations, even after the termination of military operations.
Having said that, CMO was not formalized. Nor was it treated as an independent operation.
Rather it was referred to a collection of activities that embraced various functional areas and fell under
various chief of staff responsibilities including Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS) Personnel, DCS Intelligence,
440
DCS Operations, DCS Plans and DCS CMO.

4.4.4.5 The AFP: a Faltering Mammoth against a Growing Communist Threat

Oplan Katatagan was unarguably a practical solution to reverse the setbacks that the AFP faced
against the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA). Some progress was seen
especially in improving the civil-military partnership (involving 26 government ministries and 91
441
government corporations) and the variety of civic action programs carried out (installing electrification
lines, building schools and housing, dispensing medical and dental treatment to patients, and conducting
442
dialogues in communities). Nonetheless, as good as the ideas were, there were too many factors
blocking its proper implementation. The first was that it was not an indigenous doctrine tailored to fit local
443
conditions. Rather it still drew ideas from American COIN practices. It was not only infeasible because
of the astronomical amount of resources needed, especially in developing all areas influenced or controlled
444
by communist insurgents, even though it was funded by 1 billion pesos, an eighth of the total defense
445
budget in 1985. Furthermore, actual practices spelled out a sharp departure from the tenets of Katatagan,
which called for small-unit action, with corresponding activities that involve CMO and intelligence
gathering. Military commanders could not easily rid themselves of a combat-oriented mentality that
focused on large-scale operations nurtured by American COIN practices. This became increasingly
apparent as the bulk of resources went disproportionately into combat operations at the expense of
446
intelligence and CMO.
Another difficulty for the AFP in weaning themselves off from the Vietnam COIN doctrine was
the way in which they treated the human element of the battlespace through strategic hamletting and village

439
General Headquarters Armed Forces of the Philippines, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Civil Military
Operations, J-7, Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City, April 19, 1982, Annex D-1 – D-3.
440
General Headquarters Armed Forces of the Philippines, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Civil Military
Operations, J-7, Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City, April 19, 1982, Annex F-1.
441
Magno and Gregor, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the Philippines,” p. 510.
442
See Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, pp. 561-563 for statistics on the number and
type of CMO carried out by 1984.
443
Ligot, “Communist Insurgency in the Philippines,” pp. 45-46; Magno and Gregor, “Insurgency and
Counterinsurgency in the Philippines,” p. 507.
444
Ligot, “Communist Insurgency in the Philippines,” p. 46.
445
“Pertinant Answers and Questions: National Security,” Backgrounder, Manila, Office of Media Affairs, n.d.,
p. 1 cited in Magno and Gregor, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the Philippines,” p. 508.
446
Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, pp. 509; 597.

123
defense. Strategic hamleting was already in practice before 1981, but the new operation plan intensified
efforts to physically separate the rural communities from the communist rebels. As villages were forced to
relocate under military threats, many of the inhabitants were deprived of their farmlands and livelihood.
447
This was just another factor that defeated the purpose of bringing the people closer to the military.
Village defense was also strengthened as a means to provide improved security for the people in rural
communities. The Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF), a part of the CMO program, had already been
established in 1976. Though it seemed like a practical answer to make up for the shortfall of troops to cover
extensive areas and reduce costs, it backfired since the militia made up of civilians was not only abusive
but failed to protect the people and consequently, drove the people into the arms of CPP-NPA. Furthermore,
the militia, being poorly trained was easy targets for NPA raids. Militia detachments turned out to be a
godsend for the CPP-NPA, since foreign sponsorship was by that time non-inexistent. Arms could now be
acquired by raiding poorly defended CHDF posts. Ironically, the CHDF ended up replenishing the NPA’s
448
arms supplies.
Defense capabilities were also not commensurate with what was required in Oplan Katatagan.
The military institution was beginning to fray. Officers were promoted based on their loyalties to Marcos,
449
and not by merit, which was in sharp contrast to the NPA’s command structure. Consequently, the AFP
became a top-heavy organization where the majority of high-ranking officers served Marcos in the capital,
450
draining the battlefield of competent field commanders. Furthermore, their assignments in top civilian
451
management positions also presented them opportunities for graft and corruption. To make matters
worse, Marcos with his failing health was becoming more preoccupied in protecting his regime and
diverted much of the needed military resources in protecting himself. Thus, many of the combat units were
452
reassigned to Malacanang, the presidential palace.
Needless to say, all this put a drag on the combat capabilities of the AFP. The soldiers fighting on
the frontlines against the NPA were sorely lacking in training, supplies, equipment and quality leadership.
It was not only damaging for their morale, but it also spurred a movement amongst certain elements within
453
the military to eventually embroil the country in a series of coups in the post-Marcos period.
In actuality, Oplan Katatagan remained a military endeavor and it was not backed up with a
blueprint for political reform. Following relative peace in the late 1970s, Marcos could not justify the

447
Timberman, A Changeless Land, p. 100.
448
Kessler, Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines, pp. 120-121; 150. Read Irenco C. Espino,
“ Counterinsurgency: The Role of Paramilitaries,” thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California,
December 2004 for a comprehensive study on paramilitaries in the Philippines. The CHDF in the Marcos era is
recounted in pp. 17-32. The CPP-NPA did try to establish ties with China to secure arms but this so-called
“China Project” failed when two attempted shipments of arms in the 1970s failed. For further details see Gregg
R. Jones, Red Revolutions: Inside the Philippine Guerrilla Movement, Boulder: Westview Press, 1989, pp.
71-82.
449
Kessler, Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines, p. 106; Timberman, A Changeless Land, pp. 137: 159
450
Corpus, Silent War, p. 129.
451
Timberman, A Changeless Land, p. 85.
452
Kessler, Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines, p. 121; Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the
Filipino People, p. 597.
453
Timberman, A Changeless Land, pp. 96-98.

124
continuation of martial law and terminated it, only to be replaced with developmental authoritarianism. Yet,
454
in practice, this was only a euphemism for an extended authoritative regime. However, it was evident
that Marcos’ power was eroding and the country was sliding into a political crisis. A pivotal moment came
in 1983, when the only viable opponent to Marcos, Benigno Aquino, Jr. was shot to death on the tarmac of
Manila’s international airport. When it was revealed that the elements of the AFP were behind the
assassination, the public targeted their anger against Marcos. The event was so ground-shaking that people
455
became more emboldened to protest against the Marcos regime. The CPP-NPA was able to capitalize
on the growing discontent on the people, as they provided the most viable alternative to opposition. In 1983,
456
the CPP-NPA had 20,000 regulars. By 1985, it was estimated that there was anywhere between 12,000
457
to 20,000 fighters, of whom, two-thirds were armed. It was not only the countryside that was affected,
but also their umbrella organization, the National Democratic Front (NDF) had managed to gain a foothold
in urban areas by infiltrating leftist groups. In 1984, the NPA launched urban-based terrorist attacks
especially in Davao, Mindanao where squads struck terror by assassinating government and security
458
personnel.
Against this backdrop, CMO could not reach its potential in the revitalized COIN program. The
main reason being was that Marcos was not committed to turning around the failing AFP and seriously
taking the insurgent threat by the horns. While the reorganization of Home Defense Activities and Civil
Relations under CMO spelled out a better understanding on the non-combat activities of the military from
the aspect of countering the insurgent hold over the population, its planning and its implementation
remained flawed.

4.4.5 Development of CMO in Reaction to Mainstream COIN Practices

4.4.5.1 Reviewing Insurgent Battlespace
In conventional warfare, the objective is to find the main body of the opposing force in order to
destroy it and also attacking a physically territory that the enemy defends and capturing it. Once these are
accomplished, the outcome of the war is decidedly in the favor of the attacker. Nevertheless, these same
ideas cannot be applied to guerrilla warfare since the guerrilla deny denies the attacker from locating it
main body through mobility and also do not typically have to stick around to defend a geographical area to
preserve their existence. Therefore, the counter-guerrilla has to find what allows the guerrilla to sustain his
459
operations and when denied of this, significantly plays a part in his demise.
As with most guerrilla movements, the population became the lifeline to the Communist Party of
the Philippines-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA). During the late 1970s, the communists were able to gain
influence if not control over wide stretches of land in the rural backwaters. By the early 1980s, the

454
Ibid., p. 81.
455
Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, pp. 577-578.
456
Ibid., p. 507.
457
Magno and Gregor, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the Philippines,” p. 502.
458
Ibid., pp. 503-504; 507
459
Cyril Falls, A Hundred Years of War 1850-1950, New York: Collier Books, 1962, pp. 132-133.

125
CPP-NPA had the “best articulated and most effective political organization in the Philippines
460
countryside.” This created a sea of population that provided a resourceful alternative to fixed
supply-bases and lines of communication that a conventional force would be equipped with. The population
not only secured the CPP-NPA of recruits, supplies, and intelligence about the government forces, but also
did not physically tie down the NPA to an area. They were able to control communities through shadow
governments, which did not require a stationary presence but allowed them to move in and out as they
pleased. In sharp contrast, government forces were either tied down to defending their posts or were
constantly chasing an ever-moving target. The chase was a nightmarish challenge since the AFP was not
only bogged down by their heavy transport and equipment in mountainous or jungle terrain, but they
literally “groping in the dark” to find the whereabouts of the rebels that the population so effectively hid
461
from the AFP either by concealing them or denying them on any information concerning their location.

4.4.5.2 Integrating CMO in Maneuver Warfare

CMO was further developed under the new COIN plan to fix these problems but if failed to reach
its objective in separating the insurgents from the people. The biggest challenge was that many of the AFP
officers could not really grasp how the communists systematically organized the human element of the
battlespace and how this in turn, provided the guerrillas with an overwhelming advantage over the AFP in
conducting warfare.
Yet, the guidelines set forth in Katatagan involving the organization of small military units for
tactical engagements; improved intelligence gathering and managing the human component of the
462
battlespace were not rendered useless. On a tactical level, a handful of army officers that had a deeper
understanding on the link between the mass-base support and the excellent maneuverability of the
communists over the battlespace, began to experimentally counter-organize the communist-infiltrated
communities based on these guidelines. They deployed what became known as Special Operations Teams
(SOT), which had three built-in capabilities: combat, intelligence, and CMO. It was based on these
operations that CMO emerged to become better conceptualized within the confines of maneuver warfare.
SOTs began experimentally by Army Captain Alex Congmon of the Army’s 4th Infantry Division
(ID) in a village called Agusan Del Norte in Mindanao. Having a background as a field intelligence officer,
he initially focused on intelligence gathering and psychological operations. He believed that the only way
the military could override the influence of the communists in villages was to gain the trust of the people in
the manner that the communists did. At the same time, he demonstrated his understanding on the tenets of
maneuver warfare in an insurgent battlespace where large military units could not produce results in the
operational depth that the NPAs so skillfully exploited. He sought out to deny these positional advantages
that the insurgents had over the population, by placing closer attention on building relationships with the
people. By 1982, he developed what became known later as the Special Operations Teams (SOTs), military

460
Magno and Gregor, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the Philippines,”p. 503.
461
Corpus, Silent War, pp. 77-79; 111.
462
Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, p. 597.

126
team that had integrated components of CMO, combat, and intelligence. These teams registered enough
success to be further tested by the 53rd Infantry Battalion under Colonel. Cesar F. Ilano in Misamis Oriental
463
and later refined and implemented by units of the 4th ID under Brigadier General Mariano P. Adalem.
One early prototype of SOT bore success in Arakan Valley, Mindanao, an impoverished
agricultural region located at the base of the nation’s tallest mountain, Mount Apo. For the communists, it
was an ideal spot for base-building due to its rugged terrain, isolation, lack of government presence, and
socio-economic conditions. In 1978, communist propaganda teams began entering the area and within the
span of two years, effectively organized many of the communities under their political control. Around the
same time, the AFP’s Central Mindanao Command (CENTCOM) was tasked to stabilize the area and
re-establish government control. The notion to use large army sweeps was quickly discarded since it only
had the effect of clearing an area of guerrilla presence temporarily. Once the military withdrew, the
guerrillas made their way back. Therefore, the focus was placed on dismantling the communist political
apparatus by deploying teams of Special Forces trained for no less than a year for this specific mission.
The nascent SOT engaged firstly in providing security for the communities, which was backed by
a Home Defense Company whose main role was to train and organize village defense forces. Secondly,
they ferreted out guerrillas through aggressive reconnaissance and combat patrols. And thirdly, in what was
considered to be the most important in dismantling the communist infrastructure, was CMO. CMO here did
not simply engage in civic action or broadcast propaganda. It was developed to mirror the mass work of the
communists. In contrast with existing military missions that were deployed to enemy areas for a short
duration, the Special Forces embedded themselves in the community for an extended period, literally
“living, eating, working, and studying together” with the people. As a result, they were able to project their
image as a dedicated soldier and gain the trust of the people. In the course of their stay, the CENTCOM got
the support of the provincial and national government to deliver services based on the people’s needs such
as schools and farm-to-market roads. To top it off, these projects provided employment to the local
inhabitants. This had the effect of restoring the people’s faith in the government. By the end of 1982, the
AFP reported that they had removed the communist political apparatus and expelled the core fighters from
Arakan Valley. While it did demonstrate initial success, reports that elements of the NPA were returning
into the valley later, exposed the budgetary constraints placed on these operations, especially in the
464
follow-up stage that largely depended on developmental initiatives.
In many ways, the SOTs draws striking similarities with Battalion Combat Teams (BCTs) of the
Magsaysay period, where military units were stripped down in size and made to operate
semi-independently, which in turn allowed them to move more fluidly over the physical and human terrain.
Both were formed in response to the problems of static defense and engaging in large-scale sweeps, which
rarely net results. CMO was similiary recognized to be a stepping-stone to penetrating the depth of the

463
Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People p. 598; PAM-7-100, p. 10: Criselda Yabes, The
Boys from the Barracks; The Philippines Military after Edsa, updated edition, Pasig City: Anvil Publishing Inc.,
2009, p. 121.
464
Magno and Gregor, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the Philippines,” pp. 511-514.

127
insurgents. The major difference was that it had a more pronounced political aspect on the ground, where
the AFP sought to counter-organize the political infrastructure with their own community organizations.

4.4.5.3 COIN Plan Revamped in the Last Year of the Marcos Regime
465
The AFP states that the CMO as it is practiced today was developed between 1985 and 1988.
Actual conceptualization of CMO as a distinct military operation and separate from its former
466
developmental orientation is said to be in 1985. The timing is logical since in the very same year, a new
COIN plan was in the works to replace Oplan Katatagan. In fact is was drawn up and implemented in parts
by the end of 1985, but was prevented from unveiling itself until a few weeks after Corizon Aquino was
installed as the new president in 1986. Despite the argument that nothing had fundamentally changed
467
between the old and the new operation plans, it was evident that more emphasis was placed on
468
integrating CMO better with the overall military operations (see section 4.5).

4.4.6 Assessment of CMO in the Marcos Period

CMO from the Magsaysay period was not understood concretely in the way he did by succeeding
administration, and his untimely death left the legacy of this program on nebulous terms. What was
retained of early CMO was broadly split into two branches where the developmental aspect was retained in
SEMP and the psychological aspect in Civil Affairs.
In the early years of the Marcos administration, Marcos latched onto the developmental
component of CMO rather than on the COIN aspects. He used it to develop the nation and also bring the
military behind him. Furthermore, it had a strong nation-building orientation where the military would set
examples to the people for the purpose of unifying them under a single Filipino identity.
Concerning warfare, it played a minimal role in the Muslim secessionist war, as both sides for the
most part relied on conventional operations. However, when it became apparent that the same method
could not be applied with same results on the communists, the AFP worked towards developing a COIN
program that relied on CMO to not only to deliver socio-economic to the impoverished people but to also
tackle the psychological dimensions of the war, especially through winning hearts and minds. As pointed
out earlier, even though it had a role to play in battling insurgents, CMO was disjointed from the overall
military operations since both operations did not compliment each other. The AFP still could not shake off
its old ways based on firepower, not to mention Marcos’ lack of interest in boosting military capabilities
was taking a toll on the AFP. When it became apparent that the new COIN program directed towards the
Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA) was yielding little results, certain

465
Lt. Col. Regencia, interview with author, National Development Support Command, Camp Aguinaldo,
Quezon City, Philippines, October 8, 2007. Hereafter cited as Lt. Col. Regencia and date.
466
Lt. Col. Regencia, November 4, 2010.
467
Gareth Porter, “The Politics of Counterinsurgency in the Philippines: Military and Political Options,”
Philippines Studies Occasional Paper No. 9, Honolulu: Center for Philippine Studies Center for Asian and
Pacific Studies, University of Hawaii, 1987, p. 86
468
Magno and Gregor, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the Philippines,” p. 510

128
commanders began to experiment with small-unit action that involved CMO to counter the communist
insurgents’ control over remote communities. Hence, this laid down the basis for how CMO would play out
in the next administration.

4.5 The Corazon Aquino Administration (1986-1992)

4.5.1 Introduction
The period that bridges the administration of Marcos and Aquino, and the events that transpired
in the latter, makes the analysis of CMO difficult. CMO is often eclipsed by the turbulence of the period,
marked by the explosion of events that led to the downfall of Marcos, and the period of government
instability that followed. One author describes the Aquino period as “too short for basic reforms,”
469
suggesting that little could be said on any progress the AFP made in CMO. Even the Philippine Army’s
field manual on CMO, that has a section devoted to its history, hardly makes any references to this
470
period. Yet, when carefully uncovering the layers of political turmoil, military intrigue, and the
mounting threats from the communists that so often define this period, it can be argued that it was one of
the most critical chapters in the history of CMO.
The AFP marks 1985 as the official beginning of CMO, stating that the operation itself was
471
conceptualized for the first time as a distinct operation geared towards insurgency. Even though CMO
was utilized in military campaigns during the Marcos era, not to mention the fact that the official use of its
term had already emerged in 1982, accompanied by the creation of a CMO office (J7) at the AFP Deputy
Chief of Staff level, CMO still connoted a stronger socio-economic role rather than one that was fine-tuned
to counterinsurgency (COIN). It was only with the rebound in the armed communist movement at the tail
end of the Marcos regime that propelled a handful of Army commanders to incorporate CMO within the
context of maneuver warfare. Consequently, the diffracted components of CMO that included civic action,
psychological operations, civic action, public affairs and community assistance were bound together in an
understanding that it was a distinct operation that should be treated for its utility in COIN warfare. From
evidence collected in the previous section, CMO was conceptualized as result of the improved
understanding on using maneuver to reach the enemy depth. The CMO concept was based on activities to
remove communist influence in barangays through a series of persuasive activities. Nevertheless, the idea
remained for the most part too abstract for the majority of the soldiers to understand and implement. Actual
implementation on a larger-scale, practice came only in the latter-half of the Aquino administration.
Based on a close examination of events of the period, the author argues that CMO during the
Aquino administration was shaped by two phases. In the first phase, it embodied up to a certain extent, an
attempt to redefine the AFP’s role in society and restore the public’s trust in them, especially through a

469
Marilen J. Danguilan, “Bullets and Bandages: Public Health as a Tool of Engagement in the Philippines,”
research paper no. 161, Boston, MA: Takemi Program in International Health, Harvard School of Public Health,
June 1999, pp. 24-26.
470
PAM-7-00, p. 10.
471
Lt. Col. Ferozaldo Paul T. Regencia, Philippine Army, interview with author, AFP National Development
Support Command, Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, Philippines, November 4, 2010.

129
moral and spiritual indoctrination of the soldiers. Nevertheless, these attempts were eclipsed by the difficult
transition the nation was undergoing to achieve democracy. The second phase began when the AFP was
able to regain full control over COIN measures after a series of coup attempts. CMO shifted from one that
was supposed to be aligned with her administration’s quest to politically end the communist conflict
through reconciliation and peace agreements, to one that was retooled to bolster the AFP’s COIN efforts. It
was in this stage that the conceptualization of CMO was picked up from where it was left off at the end of
the Marcos era and implemented more effectively.

4.5.2 Background: Early Years of the Aquino Administration

The EDSA people uprising in February 25, 1986 effectively dislodged Marcos from dictatorial
power and installed Corazon Aquino as the new president. As the bereaved widow of the late Marcos-critic,
472
Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr., she glided into power by overwhelming support from the Filipino masses.
The people were under high expectations that she would restore democracy, turn around the economy, and
473
peacefully end the insurgencies.
However under the veneer of public jubilancy, Aquino and her cabinet were beset with a host of
problems, the most immediate concern coming from the military. Aquino was bequeathed with “a bloated
and seriously decayed military led by an officer corps that, under Marcos, was accustomed to playing an
474
influential role in national affairs.” For years, the military had been involved in activities outside the
scope of defense, especially in development and administering martial law, which subsequently
“politicized” a segment of the officers. This experience made them feel justified in challenging Aquino’s
475
cabinet if it could not fulfill its responsibilities of governance. At the same time the “decay” that set in
within the military was not only from its abuse of power which was demonstrated in human rights
violations and corruption, but also by the overstretch of its responsibilities which ultimately weakened its
476
abilities to tend to its main business of defense.
The impulse to shun the military by the new administration did not come as a surprise. Aquino,
having little knowledge over defense matters, surrounded herself with like-minded political advisors who
consisted of technocrats and human rights lawyers. Some of them even served jail time as political
dissidents under martial law, which explained their visible contempt and suspicions towards the military.

472
Former Senator Aquino, an opposition rival to Marcos was gunned down by elements of the AFP on August
21, 1983 upon returning from exile in the United States. Suspicions immediately fell General Fabian Ver who
was closely associated to Marcos and this incident was one factor that deepened the political crisis in the last few
years of the Marcos regime. See Timberman, A Changeless Land, pp. 125-129.
473
Timberman, A Changeless Land, pp. 167-169.
474
Ibid., p. 247.
475
See the following works on how the experiences under Marcos impacted the military officers’ perceptions on
their role in national governance. Miranda and Ciron, “Development and the Military in the Philippines: Military
Perceptions in a Time of Continuing Crisi,” pp. 163-212; Viberto Selochan, “The Armed Forces of the
Philippines: Its Perceptions on Governing and the Prospects for the Future,” Working Paper 53, The Center of
Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, Clayton Victoria, Australia, 1989. Hereafter cited as Selochan,
“The Armed Forces of the Philippines: Its Perceptions on Governing and the Prospects for the Future.”
476
Raymond Jose G. Quilop, “Waltzing with the Army: From Marco to Arroyo,” Kasarinlan: Philippine
Journal of Third World Studies, Vol. 16, No, 2, 2001, p. 93.

130
Rather than engaging the military officers, the new administration chose to have this troublesome military
simply “return to the barracks” without clarifying their new roles under a democracy. As a result, the
military officers were shut out of their accustomed role in decision-making, and their feelings of alienation
were further exacerbated when they were excluded in determining policy in matters related to national
477
security. This growing fissure between the military and the Aquino cabinet developed into an intense
civil-military tug-of-war, one that would be punctuated by at least 7 coup attempts between July 1986 and
December 1989.

4.5.3 CMO in Phase One: National Reconciliation

4.5.3.1 Operation Plan Mamamayan: Adding the National Reconciliation Element
Contrary to public expectations, the transition to a democratic government did not immediately
turn around the security situation. When Aquino assumed presidency in 1986, the Muslim separatism
478
movement continued to simmer in the South. While this front was more or less contained, the more
disturbing developments came from the armed communist movement. In 1986, the New People’s Army
(NPA) regulars amounted to 24,430 with 64 guerrilla fronts scattered across the country. Despite peace
overtures made by the new administration, their ranks swelled to 25,200 members with 72 guerrilla fronts
479
in the following year. Furthermore, the years they spent on developing a political infrastructure
especially in the countryside, allowed them to gain a mass base of 1 million people, and it was also
estimated that in this period, that they had influence, if not control over, at least 20 per cent of the nation’s
480
barangays.
A new COIN plan called Oplan Mamamayan (people) was made official as soon as Aquino
stepped into office in 1986. It simultaneously targeted threats from both the Muslim and communist fronts
but its primary focus fell on the communists. The new operation plan closely resembled Marcos’ Oplan
Katatagan, which was supposed to take a people-centric approach by addressing their socio-economic
grievances in order to cut the insurgents’ hold over them. Despite the validity in the ideas embodied in
Marcos’ first comprehensive COIN strategy, it ended up serving the protection of the regime rather than
protect the people. This time around, Oplan Mamamayan would try to ensure that Katatagan’s clear, hold,
481
consolidate, and development formula would be implemented to help the people. In fact this operation
plan was already prepared and made ready in the last year of Marcos’ reign with CMO playing a more

477
Criselda Yabes, The Boys from the Barracks: The Philippine Military after EDSA, updated edition, Pasig
City: Anvil Publishing, Inc., 2009, pp. 11-12. Hereafter cited as Yabes, The Boys from the Barracks.
478
President Aquino attempted to secure peace with the Muslim separatists with the restoration of democracy. A
ceasefire was secured with the MNLF in 1986 but broke down the following year. Neverthless, she did include in
her talks provisions for a Muslim autonomy and established the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao in
1989. Four provinces were included as a result of a plebicite held in provinces and cities with a sizable Muslim
population.
479
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Philippine Army (1993) in Ligot, “Communist Insurgency in the
Philippines,” pp. 78-79.
480
Timberman, A Changeless Land, p. 160.
481
Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, pp. 596-598.

131
 482
significant role in COIN but was postponed by sudden political developments. With Aquino in power,
the only difference she added was the reconciliation element. This was in step with Aquino’s National
Reconciliation and Development Program (NRDP), which was a policy based on having rebel surrenderees
return to the folds of the law through state-sponsored incentives that extended amnesty, cash for
483
surrendered arms, and livelihood support. In sum, Mamayan had three main objectives:

1. Develop the AFP and other security forces (police and militia) into an effective force that can effectively
protect the people.
2. Promote and implement the new administration’s policy of national reconciliation and unification.
484
3. Strengthen and transmit the spirit of nationhood amongst the people.

On the ground, in conjunction with combat operations, CMO continued to play a central role in
removing the political hold of the communists in communities and/or securing communities from the
485
infiltration of insurgents. Much of the developmental orientation of CMO remained unchanged, as its
civic action programs were still expected to tackle the socio-economic roots of insurgency and spur
development in the countryside.

4.5.3.2 CMO and Re-indoctrinating the Soldier with Moral Values

The transition to a democracy was an opportune time for the ill-reputed military to redeem
themselves in the eyes of the citizen by transforming themselves into a professional force that was capable
of serving the people and submitting to civilian supremacy. CMO thus assumed two more functions that
were one, to indoctrinate the soldiers with a set of values and moral obligations as defenders of the people
486
and two, to improve the morale and discipline of the soldiers. With the two included, CMO was
reorganized under the following pillars which remained in effect until 1988.

1. Value Orientation Indoctrination and Continuing Education (VOICE)

2. Military Economic Welfare Program
3. Public Affairs and Interagency Coordination (PAIC)
4. Civil Affairs
487
5. Manpower, Reserve, and Reserve Affairs Administrations.

482
Gareth Porter, “The Politics of Counterinsurgency in the Philippines: Military and Political Options,”
Philippines Studies Occasional Paper No. 9, Honolulu: Center for Philippine Studies Center for Asian and
Pacific Studies, University of Hawaii, 1987, p. 86.
483
Ligot, “Communist Insurgency in the Philippines,” pp. 49-50.
484
LOI Mamayan Handbook, General Headquarters AFP, Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, 1986 in Ligot,
“Communist Insurgency in the Philippines,” pp. 48-49.
485
Espino, “Counterinsurgency: The Role of Paramilitaries,” p. 28.
486
Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, pp. 588-589.
487
Lt. Col. Ferozaldo Paul T. Regencia, Philippine Army, interview with author, October 8, 2007

132
 The Value Orientation Indoctrination and Continuing Education (VOICE) played a focal role in
attempts to have the military “reconcile” with society after the pain and suffering they had imposed on the
people during the Marcos period, and instill discipline within the ranks. The AFP had soldiers undergo
indoctrination on the principles of national reconciliation and national unity. Soldiers were also expected to
understand Aquino’s initiative to have them withdraw from national affairs and return to their defense roles.
There was also a religious element to this program where value-building would be based on Christian or
Muslim beliefs. In other words, the VOICE pillar was supposed to provide the moral and spiritual rebirth of
488
the AFP.
On the other hand, there was an urgent need to boost the sagging morale of the soldier especially
since their unfavorable working conditions were adversely impacting the fight against the insurgency, not
to mention, a cause of friction between the central government and the military. Thus, the Military
Economic Welfare Program was established to address the basic needs of the soldier by improving pay and
489
allowance, healthcare, housing, and field medical support on the front lines.
The remaining three pillars were carry-overs from the Marcos period. Aside from the normal
functions in conducting public information programs, coordinating with the other agencies in civic action,
and developing the reserve force of the AFP, there was an added emphasis on promoting the National
Reconciliation drive which targeted not only the insurgents to elicit surrender, but also towards the public.
In regards to civic action programs, they were expanded for the first time to involve non-governmental
490
organizations (NGOs) in the civil-military partnership.

4.5.3.3 Assessing Oplan Mamamayan and the Positioning of CMO

4.5.3.3.1 The Political Dimensions
Undeniably, one sticking point in the effective implementation of Mamamayan was that the
Aquino administration and the military could not agree on an overarching security policy. On one hand,
Aquino wanted to pursue a reconciliation policy with the insurgents but on the other hand, the military
491
rejected these accommodating measures, and sought a hard-line approach.
Though Aquino and her cabinet had admirable intentions to remove repressive elements from the
Marcos period that included having the military return to the barracks, the new administration lacked the
political experience and strong leadership to go through with their policies. In regards to the internal
security situation, she could not get a good grasp over the social, economic, political, and military
dimensions of the insurgency and subsequently could not clarify the role of the military in it. It was evident

488
Carolina G. Hernandez and Maria Decilia T. Ubarra, “Restoring and Strengthening Civilian Control: Best
Practices in Civil-Military Relations in the Philippines,” ISDS, December 31, 1999, pp. 24-26 as printed out.
Available at http://www.pdgs.org.ar/pom-fhi.htm. Accessed August 7, 2009. Hereafter cited as Hernandez and
Ubarra, “Restoring and Strengthening Civilian Control: Best Practices in Civil-Military Relations in the
Philippines,” Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, pp. 588-589.
489
Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, pp. 588-589.
490
Hernandez and Ubarra, “Restoring and Strengthening Civilian Control: Best Practices in Civil-Military
Relations in the Philippines,” pp. 9-10 as printed out.
491
Timberman, A Changeless Land, pp. 174-175.

133
 492
that Aquino “confused” counterinsurgency and reconciliation.
These were made apparent by the responses that she got from the communists. Despite the peace
overtures by the president, the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA) did
not reciprocate readily. The communists had already built an extensive political infrastructure in the
493
countryside and were not prepared to cede this control with minimal political enticements. Rather, in
their negotiations with the new government, they demanded a coalition government, which Aquino did not
494
intend to give in to. Furthermore, during the 60-day ceasefire, the National Democratic Front (NDF),
the umbrella organization of the CPP, capitalized on the downtime to step-up its propaganda efforts and
politically mobilize. While the NPA generally complied with the ceasefire, certain elements still blatantly
495
violated the agreement. These elements were becoming more brazen as they continued to raid heavy
equipment plants, vital communication installations such as roads and bridges, agro-industrial facilities,
military and militia outposts, and also used threats and force to extract revolutionary taxes from local
496
businesses and individuals. They not only maintained and continued setting up political organs in
497
remote areas but were also rapidly expanding in the cities by organizing left-leaning groups.
At the same time, Aquino’s well-intended efforts to disband the CHDF, the civilian militia,
notorious for their excesses, backfired. In areas such as Mindanao where there was a breakdown in law and
order, the people found Aquino’s new COIN program unreliable and formed their own vigilante groups to
498
protect themselves from the increasing attacks by the NPA. Often backed by the military, these groups
were one factor behind the uptick of violence as suspected communists and their sympathizers were killed.
Human rights violations retained a high, comparable to the Marco years, with 93 disappearances and 439
499
extrajudicial killings in the years between 1986 and 1987.
Finally, the new government could not hammer out a comprehensive plan to tackle the roots of
socio-economic discontent. Land reform was a central issue but Aquino could not commit to producing
500
legislation that could effectively break up large landholdings for distribution. The Mendiola Incident in
January 1987 was a huge set back in attempts to reach out to the agrarian poor. The Marines fired upon a

492
Peter M. Sales, “Back to the Future? Gradual Constriction as a New Phase of Counter-insurgency in the
Philippines,” Small Wars & Insurgencies, 4:1, 1993, p. 76. Hereafter cited as Sales, “Back to the Future? Gradual
Constriction as a New Phase of Counter-insurgency in the Philippines.”
493
Jose P. Magno, Jr. and A. James Gregor, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the Philippines,” Asian
Survey, Vol. 26, No. 5, May 1986, p. 503. Hereafter cited as Magno and Gregor, “Insurgency and
Counterinsurgency in the Philippines.”
494
Joseph, Santolan, “Corazon Conjuangco Aquino, 1933-2009,” part 2, International Committee of Fourth
International (ICFI), World Socialist Web Site, Available at:
http://www.wsws.org/articles/2009/aug2009/cory-a05.shtml
495
Sesinando C. Canding, “Insurgency: A Formidable Threat to Philippine Security, “ research report, Maxwell
Air Force Base, Alabama, April, 1988, p. 45.
496
Magno and Gregor, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the Philippines,” p. 305; Marilen J. Danguilan,
“Bullets and Bandages: Public Health as a Tool of Engagement in the Philippines,” research paper no. 161,
Harvard School of Public Health, Boston, June 1999. p. 24
497
Magno and Gregor, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the Philippines,” p. 504.
498
Timberman, A Changeless Land, pp. 184; 278-279.
499
Kessler, Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines, p. 137; Timberman, A Changeless Land, p. 184.
500
Timberman, A Changeless Land, pp. 351-364.

134
crowd of farmers staging a demonstration against the stalled progress on land distribution, which resulted
in the death of 19 people, with scores being wounded. The incident not only dampened initial enthusiasm
by the public for meaningful agrarian reform, but it appeared that the Aquino government was returning to
pre-Marcos days in unleashing force to quell discontent. As for the CPP-NPA who already had doubts over
the government’s sincerity in coming to a political settlement, used this unfortunate massacre as a pretext to
501
terminate talks with the government.

4.5.3.3.2 The Military Dimensions

Following the August Coup in 1987, intelligence reports submitted to the new Chief of Staff, de
Villa relayed some disturbing news. The AFP had made no progress in their fight against the communist
and their military capabilities were just as poor. In short, nothing had changed since the last years of the
502
Marcos regime.
On the military side, there were numerous obstacles besides Aquino’s lackluster policies in
economic and political reform that prevented the AFP from implementing Mamamayan effectively. The
main being that the AFP could not reverse the “decay” that set into their institution under Marco quickly
503
enough to build a strong COIN force. They were beset with a host of problems including the low morale
of the soldiers, insufficient logistical support, an over-reliance on American aging equipment, and the
504
dogged faith in the American COIN approach, which did not match Filipino conditions.
Another problem, in which the military preferred to see as the source of its woes, was the
government’s handling of the COIN problem. While it was true that Aquino lacked a coherent national
strategy to defeat the insurgencies, the fundamental mistake she made was shutting out the military from
COIN policymaking. By leaving the military under the impression that its ability to fight the insurgency
was constrained or compromised by Aquino’s reconciliatory measures towards the communists, she not
505
only deepened the civil-military fault-lines, but created discord within the military. As one coup attempt
was yet followed by another, both parties became more preoccupied with the civil-military tension, rather
than tend to the bigger picture of the insurgency at hand.
Under these circumstances, it was no surprise that Mamamayan made little headway. With a
divided leadership, even the best local commanders out on the frontlines were left without clear direction
506
on how to pursue their fight against the communists. Therefore, the AFP still conducted what they knew
best which was making occasional sweeps in rebel strongholds, and devoting the rest of the time, to
507
protecting their bases, government installations, businesses, and roads.

501
Ibid., p. 182.
502
Yabes, The Boys from the Barracks, p. 116.
503
Timberman, A Changeless Land, pp. 306-307.
504
Timberman, A Changeless Land, pp. 306-307; Yabes, The Boys from the Barracks, pp. 117-118.
505
Timberman, A Changeless Land, Ch. 8.
506
Sales, “Back to the Future? Gradual Constriction as a New Phase of Counter-insurgency in the Philippines,”
p. 76.
507
Philippines National Security Index, June 1991, in section “The Counterinsurgency Campaign.”
Re-published from The Library of Congress Country Studies and the CIA World Factbook available at:

135
 The same could be said for CMO, which was supposed to be the central fixture of the COIN
program in reversing the insurgents’ hold over the population. It had difficulty in propagating its use within
the ranks of the military. The truth of the matter was that, there were only a limited number of military
officers that understood the political dimension of an insurgency and devise COIN programs accordingly.
But for the majority of soldiers, their understanding of CMO did not go beyond gaining the goodwill of the
population through socio-economic activities. The integration of CMO, intelligence, and combat in a
military operation was a steep learning curve for soldiers who did not graduate from the academy, and in
508
effect, was too abstract for the average soldier to implement.

4.5.4 CMO in Phase Two: Improving its COIN Function

4.5.4.1 Background: Coups and the Increasing Influence of the AFP in COIN Policies
The coup phenomenon had an inadvertent but significant impact on the development of CMO,
which eventually led to its improved application in insurgent battlespace. Though none of the coups
achieved military control over the government, it did weaken Aquino’s position, especially over defense
issues. As a result, the military was able to throw more weight around in the formulation of COIN measures
that ultimately allowed CMO to take a more pronounced role in COIN. The section will cover the
background to the coups and the gradual erosion of Aquino’s will to resist AFP demands, which ultimately
altered her security policy in the AFP’s favor.
The main factor behind the string of coup attempts was basically tied into the military’s
disagreement over Aquino’s lenient posture on the communists. One of the first acts that Aquino passed
upon becoming president, despite protests from the military, was the release of all political prisoners. 500
of them were jailed under Marcos. Additionally, Jose Sison, CPP chairman and NPA commander Bernabe
509
Buscayno were also released. Other decisions followed such as the setting up of a Human Rights
Commission to investigate the alleged abuses of the soldiers, the appointment of left-leaning members in
her cabinet, and like-wise, at the local government level, a reconciliation plan for the rebels that included
510
amnesty and livelihood assistance, and initiating talks with the CPP-NPA that led to a 60-day ceasefire
511
in 1987.
All these measures were conducted without consultation with the military, which infuriated the
512
AFP. Moreover, they were also upset in what they perceived to be a biased concern by Aquino and her

http://www.photius.com/countries/philippines/national_security/index.html. Accessed September 6, 2011.

508
Yabes, The Boys from the Barracks, pp. 121-122. The majority of AFP officers (90 percent) was from the
reserve officers training program and did not have the training to understand the complex nuances of COIN
principles and implementation. See Far Eastern Economic Review, November 26, 1987, p. 37 in Timberman, A
Changeless Land, p. 307.
509
Yabes, The Boys from the Barracks, pp. 23-24.
510
This was called National Reconciliation and Development Program (NRDP) issued through an executive
order by Aquino in 1986. It was program to encourage rebels to give up their armed struggle and reintegrate into
society through incentives such as livelihood support. See Ligot, “Communist Insurgency in the Philippines.”
pp. 49-50. .
511
Timberman, A Changeless Land, pp. 175; 180-181; 252.
512
Ibid, p. 175.

136
coterie of “left-leaning” cabinet members on the welfare the communists rather than on the predicament of
their under-paid and ill-equipped soldiers who were putting their lives at stake in the front lines against the
513
communists.
Interestingly enough, CMO was one of the first gambits that the APF used in attempts to secure
influence over security policymaking. In 1986, both Secretary of National Defense Ponce Enrile and AFP
Chief of Staff, Fidel Ramos tried to pressure Aquino into replacing her reconciliatory stance towards the
communists with a CMO program that would use a more holistic approach and a collaborative relationship
with civilian agencies and government officials at a local level to “defeat” the insurgents. If this could be
realized, the AFP officers could at least exercise influence in formulating their own COIN policies at a
local level and secure a larger COIN budget, even if they were shut out of defense decision-making at the
central government level. Despite the enlarged civilian participation in the proposal, Aquino deemed it too
risky to employ, as she feared that the communists would view it as backtracking from her peace initiatives,
and she turned down this demand. However in 1987, it appeared that she gave in some inches to this
demand when she set up the Peace and Order Council (POC). The POC was a coordinating body for
various government agencies, inclusive of the military, to develop a concerted effort to deal with internal
514
security threats.
Still these grievances may had been reduced to grumblings, had it not have been for the
development of powerful cliques within the military that had refused to supinely submit to the new civilian
authority. Those factions included the Marcos loyalists who tried to usurp Aquino of her position and
restore Marcos as leader in a coup attempt under Arturo Tolentino, former vice-presidential running mate
515
of Marcos. Interestingly enough, the threat did not really come emanate from Marcos loyalists per se,
but rather the support the coup got from soldiers that were disenchanted with Aquino’s stance on the
516
communists. These grievances became the focal rallying point of other powerful military cliques that
sought to increase their influence over her.
A more powerful clique came into the picture with Aquino’s Secretary of National Defense, Juan
Ponce Enrile and his “RAM boys.” RAM was the Reform the Armed Forces Movement that was
established at the end of the Marcos regime with Colonel Gregorio (Gringo) Honasan as its central figure.
In rhetoric they wanted to reform the putrefying military, but in sub-rosa, they were planning to oust
Marcos and take over the government. Enrile and RAM had a symbiotic relationship based on furthering

513
Miranda and Ciron, “Development and the Military in the Philippines: Military Perceptions in a Time of
Continuing Crisis.” pp. 183-184.
514
See Gareth Porter, “The Politics of Counterinsurgency in the Philippines: Military and Political Options,”
Philippine Studies, Occasional Paper, no. 9, University of Hawaii, Center for Philippine Studies, 1987; See
Timberman, A Changeless Land, pp. 175; 252-256; Philippines National Security Index, June 1991, in section
“The Counterinsurgency Campaign.” Re-published from The Library of Congress Country Studies and the CIA
World Factbook available at: http://www.photius.com/countries/philippines/national_security/index.html.
Accessed September 6, 2011.
515
Erwin S. Fernandez, M.A., “The Quest for Power: The Military in Philippine Politics, 1965-2002,” Asia
Pacific: Perspectives, Vol. VI, No.1, May 2006, p. 41. Hereafter Fernandez, “The Quest for Power.”
516
Miranda and Ciron, “Development and the Military in the Philippines: Military Perceptions in a Time of
Continuing Crisis,”p. 183; Timberman, A Changeless Land, p. 176.

137
their respective interests. Enrile, also Secretary of National Defense during the Marcos period formed an
alliance with RAM to block the anticipated takeover by the AFP Chief of Staff, General Fabian Ver and the
First Lady, Imelda in the advent of the leader’s death. RAM soldiers also benefited from their association
with Enrile who generously gave them comfortable positions both within the military and corporate worlds,
opportunities to study abroad, and higher pay. Though their plans for a takeover of the Marcos regime were
517
derailed by the unexpected turn of events at EDSA and had to initially rally behind the new president,
they did not discard their original ambitions to take over the government. Under Aquino, they gained
support from soldiers who were disenchanted with their ill-defined role under the new government. Even
when Enrile was forced out of the limelight when he was removed from his post as Secretary of National
Defense over his plan to take over the government in the 1987 God-Save-the-Queen incident, RAM
518
continued to engineer the coups that followed.
At the same time, there existed another group of soldiers that adhered to civilian supremacy. The
most influential of these “constitutionalists” was Fidel V. Ramos, a West Point graduate and former chief
of the Philippines Constabulary. When Aquino came to power, he was appointed Chief of Staff of the AFP
and played an instrumental role in crushing the coups instigated by the rebel camps. Although he
maintained his loyalties to the president, he shared views with the cross-section of the AFP that the new
government was inept in governing, especially in regards to the internal security situation. Nonetheless, he
disdained the adventurism within the rebellious factions of the AFP. Instead, he increased the AFP’s power
within the scope of defense policymaking by cultivating Aquino’s dependency on him to protect her from a
519
military takeover.
In retracing the timeline of the coups (see appendix A for the list of coups), it can be observed
that Aquino was walking down a treacherous road to secure her political survival. Though Ramos helped
Aquino to assert her control over the politicized military, it was increasingly becoming clear with each
passing coup, her resistance towards the AFP’s demands for a larger role in COIN and political treatment
of the leftist movement was eroding. It began with piecemeal concessions such as increasing pay and
520
promotions for the soldiers. Aquino gave way bit by bit because she did not want to jeopardize her plans
521
for a political settlement with the armed communists. Nevertheless, she was desperate to bring the
military behind her. At the timing of the formal end of the cease-fire with the CPP-NPA, there was a third
coup attempt on Jan 1987 (Channel-7 television station). With no signs from the communists to re-launch
talks and 40 per cent of the military rejecting her new constitution that overwhelmingly got the approval of

517
Enrile and RAM were hailed as heroes by the public, when they decided to throw in their backing for the
people during EDSA.
518
See Alfred W. McCoy, Closer than Brothers: Manhood at the Philippine Military Academy, Manila: Anvil
Publishing, Inc., 1999, ch. 7 “Mutiny” for a detailed account on the rise of various cliques within the AFP.
519
Timberman, A Changeless Land, pp. 175; 181; 197; 254; Selochan, “The Armed Forces of the Philippines:
Its Perceptions on Governing and the Prospects for the Future.” 17.
520
Gretchen Casper, Fragile Democracies: The Legacies of Authoritarian Rule, Pittsburg and London:
University of Pittsburg Press, 1995, pp. 142-143. Hereafter cited as Casper, Fragile Democracies: The Legacies
of Authoritarian Rule.
521
Timberman, A Changeless Land, pp. 252-253.

138
the people in a plebiscite, she tried to mend the rift by initiating dialogue with the military. Even though she
still maintained a reconciliatory posture with the communists, she also gave the AFP the green light to
522
resume some fighting. There were other compromises such as increasing the military budget, convening
the National Security Council to allow military officers voice their opinion, among others, but in the end
523
they did not sufficiently appease the military.
It was the August Coup that dramatically reversed Aquino’s reconciliatory posture toward the
524
communists. Shortly after 1 am on August 28, 1987, RAM leader, Gringo Honasan and his 200 rebel
soldiers began attacking the presidential palace. Other rebel troops surrounded Camp Aguinaldo, the AFP’s
GHQ at 3 am, while soldiers who threw in support for Honasan occupied a number of sites and military
camps not only in Manila but also in areas as far as Pampanga and Cebu. It took Ramos and other
commanders more than 10 hours to find enough loyal troops to repel the attack. Though the coup ended in
failure a day and half later, rebel troops were reported to have occupied all their intended targets aside from
525
the Palace and the mutiny left 53 people dead with more than 200 wounded. On September 1, 1987,
Ramos submitted a report to Aquino outlining the details of the coup. At the end of it, Ramos assured
Aquino of his loyalty, but he also strongly urged her to convene the National Security Council. While he
stressed the importance of preventing future occurrences, he also reminded her without going into detail,
that there were deeper issues at hand concerning the military situation. In other words, Ramos used the
526
opportunity to apply stronger pressure on Aquino to retract her policies that were alienating the military.
For Aquino, the coup was by far the closest it came to toppling her. Once again, Ramos stepped
in to save the day. To survive politically, she had no other choice but to concede to Ramos’ demands. This
time around, there was a cabinet shake-up and she was forced to oust her closest advisor, Joker Arroyo, a
vocal opponent of the AFP. Also in order for Ramos to have complete reins over the AFP, she appointed
him as the new Secretary of National Defense. There was also a 60 per cent pay raise for the military and
she also submitted to Ramos plans to revive paramilitary groups that she initially planned to disband.
However, the largest sacrifice she made was giving up her reconciliatory approach to the communists. She
527
abruptly ended talks with the CPP-NPA and allowed the military to launch an all-out-war. What this
meant was that Aquino gave the AFP under Ramos full control over internal security policymaking.

4.5.4.2 Formulating Operation Plan Lambat Bitag (1988)

During the wrangling between the military and the Aquino cabinet over the role of the AFP under

522
Yabes, The Boys from the Barracks, pp. 62-63.
523
See Casper, Fragile Democracies: The Legacies of Authoritarian Rule, pp. 141-145 for a round-up of the
coups and the corresponding concessions made by Aquino; Timberman, A Changeless Land, pp. 252-256
524
Miranda and Ciron, “Development and the Military in the Philippines: Military Perceptions in a Time of
Continuing Crisis.” p. 184.
525
See Yabes, The Boys from the Barracks. pp. 74-94 for a detailed account on the movements of the rebel
soldiers on August 28th and 29th; Fernandez, pp. 41-41.
526
Initial report on the August 28th Coup by Ramos and addressed to Pres. Aquino, September 1, 1987, in Yabes,
The Boys from the Barracks, pp. 83-94.
527
Timberman, A Changeless Land, pp. 255-257; 280-281;Yabes, The Boys from the Barracks, pp. 108.

139
the new government, COIN was left in a limbo. It was only after Ramos protected Aquino from the August
Coup (1987) that any constructive steps were made in the war against the communists. As a reward to
Ramos in bringing the military behind her, Aquino elevated him to the position of Secretary of National
Defense and subsequently allowed the AFP to take full control over decisions related to internal security.
528 529
With the AFP under his reins, Ramos endorsed Renato de Villa, his close ally from his Philippine
Constabulary days, to take over his former position as Chief of Staff and take lead in the COIN
530
operations.
Upon assuming the position of Chief of Staff, de Villa promptly took action in sending out a clear
message to the communists that he meant business. He had already arrested several senior members of the
communist party in a series of sweeps, inflicting some serious blows on the CPP-NPA. But he also knew
that to make any strategic inroads, the current COIN plan, Mamamayan had to be completely revamped.
Therefore, he assigned the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (J3), to craft a new and more aggressive
531
COIN plan.
It was no coincidence that a number of the AFP officers involved in the formulation of the new
plan at J3 had experience working in Special Operation Teams (SOT) at the end of the Marco era. Still, it
was Victor Corpus who became the key architect in the development of the new plan.
Victor Corpus was a constabulary soldier who defected to the communist side in 1970. After
becoming a rebel commander, he made his way up the party ranks to become a member of the Central
Committee. Experiencing disillusionment, he surrendered to the AFP 1978. After serving jail time for more
than 10 years, he was reinstated in the AFP as lieutenant colonel. When the J3 office designated to produce
a new COIN plan, he was asked the join the team. It was based on his experiences with the CPP-NPA that
gave the AFP valuable insight on how the communists operated in both the military and political
dimensions. Thus, the culmination of Corpus’ input and other counterinsurgency officer’s contributions
resulted in the unveiling of the COIN plan named Lambat Bitag (Fishnet Entrapment) in September
532
1988. Lambat Bitag in part was developed in part to wean the AFP off of its reliance on the American
doctrine used in Vietnam. There was too much focus on search and destroy tactics which not only alienated
the population but turned the AFP into a reactive and a stationary force. In order to reverse this debilitating
tendency, efforts were made to build a more indigenous doctrine that took into account the character of the
533
Filipino security environment.

528
Ramos was a specialist in civilian-military affairs and psywar. He had training with the Special Forces at
Fort Bragg, a military academy and served in Vietnam as a member of the Philippine Civic Action Groups
(PHILCAG).
529
De Villa was an intelligence office of the presidential guards under President Diosdado Macapagal. Like
Ramos, he also gained experience in psywar and CMO by serving in Vietnam as a PHILCAG member.
530
Yabes, The Boys from the Barracks, pp. 108; 112-113.
531
Ibid., pp. 115; 117.
532
Ibid., pp. 117; 119; 121.
533
Ibid., p. 117.

140
4.5.4.3 Lambat Bitag: Strategy and Tactics
The main operating principle behind Lambat Bitag was based on beating the insurgents at their
534
own game. This meant denying the advantages that the Communist Party of the Philippines-New
People’s Army (CPP-NPA) had, involving factors such as time, mobility over difficult terrain, and
population support. Based on Corpus’ observations, it could be understood that the CPP-NPA followed
Mao’s strategy of protracted war, which capitalized on time to build from a small and insignificant force to
one that that had control over large portions of the countryside. While they were numerically weak, they
avoided military engagements to attract the least possible attention from the government forces, and
devoted their attention to strengthening their armed component. The objective was to build a force strong to
reach closer parity with the government forces, so that they could engage in a full scale offensive. For party
building, they conducted mass work to gain the support of the people to help expand and consolidate their
535
base areas.
For the AFP, a long, drawn-out war was something they wanted to avoid. It not only drained
government resources, but it also had the pernicious effect of wearing down the military and sapping the
536
morale of the soldiers. Therefore, any success from a campaign hinged on bringing an end to the war as
quickly as possible. Known at the “war of quick decision,” this became the guiding strategy of Lambat
537
Bitag.
Having said this, how to go about ending the war quickly was another issue. One of the daunting
challenges that faced the AFP was its inability to maneuver in the depth or deep area of the enemy
battlespace. Unlike a conventional military, where the depth constitutes the rear support which is more
directly linked to the frontlines through fixed installations such as control centers, supply depots, and lines
538
of communication, the CPP-NPA’s rear posed a more perplexing problem. Though the rear was
necessary for the survival of any armed movement, they were not as easy to scope out for the conventional
forces since the insurgents’ the rear was located in the deep areas of the battlespace that included remote
tracts of land with difficult terrain (dense forests and mountains) and in human settlements that had limited
government presence. The guerrillas attained this by setting up numerous bases embedded in these areas.
Their methodology was such that they did not have to physically hold these spaces. Rather an emphasis
was placed on gaining the freedom of movement over the difficult terrain, which is an advantage against a
conventional force that is adjusted to movement in open space and accessible roads with its large
539
equipment (tanks, armored vehicles, armaments) and troop formations.
Furthermore, the physical control over a defined geographic area was not as important as having
control over the population. The population was what could provide them with recruits, sanctuary,

534
Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, p. 599.
535
Corpus, Silent War, pp. 25-30; 75.
536
Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, p. 598; Yabes, The Boys from the Barracks, p.
118.
537
Corpus, Silent War, p. 139.
538
Lee K. Grubbs and Michael J. Forsyth, “Is There a Deep Fight in a Counterinsurgency?,” Military Review,
July-August 2005, p. 28.
539
Corpus, Silent War, pp. 38; 78-79.

141
intelligence or communications, supplies, and freedom of movement. The CPP-NPA achieved this by
devoting much of the building-phase to mass work. Through mass work, the communists were able to gain
the people’s recognition on the legitimacy of their movement, which allowed them to build a political
infrastructure. This was done through propaganda and activities to win the people’s support. Once there
were enough bases in the countryside, they could be stringed together and consolidated for the final
offensive, which was to take over the central seats of power in the cities. Otherwise captured in the slogan:
540
“encirclement of the cities from the countryside.”
Therefore, the AFP had to re-orient its forces to allow for its improved mobility in these types of
terrain. This meant the AFP could no longer remain in a defensive and static posture, which centered on
541
guarding key roads, government infrastructure, and military bases and outposts, but had to fan out in
guerrilla areas in small and mobile units. At the same time, the soldiers had to undo the communist
influence over populated communities. With all this being said, these units, no matter how stripped down
and compact, had to maintain combat capabilities.
Taking these factors into consideration, the AFP built a campaign strategy called “gradual
constriction” which was built on a systematic method to roll back the expansion of the CPP-NPA bases. As
its name suggested, Lambat Bitag or “Fishnet Entrapment” evoked the image of draining the pond to force
the fish to seek refuge in the center where the water was deepest, and ultimately netting the fish trapped
there. In other words, government forces would seek to deny the water (depth) that allowed the insurgents
to swim (maneuver) in. The AFP would begin by deploying mobile units to the outer-fringe of guerrilla
zone and gradually working their way into their stronghold. The outer-fringe was where the insurgents’
control over the population was the weakest. Here, the terrain was more accessible being located at the base
of mountains. It was in this location that the AFP could capitalize on the existing road networks to secure
its lines of communication before advancing to the center. The center, in contrast with the outer-fringe of
the area of influence for the insurgents was ideal for their sanctuary and warfare. The center was the base
542
command that typically straddled several provinces and where the population support was the strongest.
The AFP mobile units would be deployed in a manner that could approach the central base from the
outer-rings, regaining control of the insurgent-influenced or controlled barangays on their way, gradually
543
cornering the insurgents into the center, and thereby allowing the AFP to make a decisive blow. By
“tightening the ring of encirclement” the AFP was limiting “the insurgents’ room for maneuver, rendering
his forces less and less mobile.” With less mobility, the insurgents could not amass or disperse their forces,
choose their time and place for battle, and thus ceding the battlespace initiative to the AFP (See appendix B
544
for image).

540
Ibid., pp. 33-34;39.
541
Philippines National Security Index, June 1991, in section “The Counterinsurgency Campaign.”
Re-published from The Library of Congress Country Studies and the CIA World Factbook available at:
http://www.photius.com/countries/philippines/national_security/index.html. Accessed September 6, 2011.
542
Corpus, Silent War, pp. 167-169; 179.
543
Corpus, Silent War, pp. 140; Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, p. 598.
544
Corpus, Silent War, pp. 177; 179.

142
4.5.4.4. Special Operations Teams (SOT): the Role of CMO in Lambat Bitag
Lambat Bitag’s success depended on sustaining gains that the AFP made in their advance to the
center of the insurgents’ stronghold. Unlike previous military operations that deployed troops for the
duration that was needed to physically clear the insurgents off the enemy-influenced area, Lambat Bitag
545
sought to consolidate the gains made in the forward advance of the AFP mobile units.
The Special Operations Teams (SOT) was the main weapon used in the strategy of “gradual
constriction.” The concept was drawing together the operational and tactical effects of employing small
unit action for the prime objective of neutralizing guerrilla fronts and dismantling their political
546
infrastructure in the rural barangays.
547
The SOT consisted of 21 soldiers which was comprised of three interlocking teams: CMO,
intelligence, and combat. Though they were differentiated by role and function, they played a
548
complimentary role to each other.
While these teams were used experimentally during the Marcos period with some success, the
component that encountered the most challenges when it came to propagating the concept to the majority of
soldiers was CMO. The general understanding of “winning hearts and minds” did not go beyond
conducting civic action and propaganda and the SOT operational principles of reversing the communists’
549
hold over the population was too abstract for widespread application. Thus, under Lambat Bitag, the
prime concern of the AFP was to direct the effective deployment of SOTs in the human terrain that could
engage both the population and the enemy at a tactical level.
The SOT was geared towards addressing the communists’ mass base approach which was largely
made successful through the NPA’s strict adherence to discipline in their dealings with civilians, political
activities to vocalize the people’s sentiments, siding with the rural people against ruthless landlords, and
550
other activities to help the impoverished villages. In a nutshell, the CMO component of SOTs focused
on “mirroring” the activities of the CPP-NPA’s armed propaganda teams known as Sandatahang Yunit
551
Pampropaganda (Armed Propaganda Unit). These were in fact expansion teams deployed by the
CPP-NPA to consolidate political control over communities on the outer-rim of their base areas through a
552
series of mass work. Therefore, the actual reversal of the communist influence was entrusted to the
CMO team. The CMO team engaged in activities that included dismantling the communist infrastructure,

545
Ibid., pp. 168-169.
546
Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, p. 598.
547
The SOT was closer to a platoon in size. A platoon in the Philippine Army typically consists of 30 soldiers.
An actual team consists anywhere between 7 to 11 soldiers.
548
In addition to the main SOT, two other platoons (also referred to as SOTs) accompanied the team to provide
protection from enemy harassment. See Special Operations Team Manual, Headquarters Philippine Army,
Manila, 1989, pp. 3-6 in Ligot, “Communist Insurgency in the Philippines,”
pp. 51-52.
549
Yabes, The Boys from the Barracks, pp. 117- 119.
550
Corpus, Silent War, p. 42.
551
Sales, “Back to the Future? Gradual Constriction as a New Phase of Counter-insurgency in the Philippines,”
p. 77.
552
Corpus, Silent War, p. 34.

143
conducting civic action, and broadcasting counter-propaganda. CMO was also used interchangeably with
PYSOPS since the tactical objectives of its activities were to deny the insurgents their base of support by
influencing the minds and attitudes of the people. They also did not neglect to consolidate their gains and
follow-up activities were conducted by setting up counter-organizations such as village defense (CHDF)
and sectoral groups for the youth and the peasants. The AFP also took into consideration; the best
553
propaganda depended on the soldier being on his best behavior with the people.
CMO also worked closely with intelligence and combat teams. CMO teams depended heavily on
intelligence teams to provide them with the vital information about a barangay such as its demographics,
socio-economic aspects, and the sources of discontent amongst the people, along with intelligence about
the enemy’s organization presence and its membership. It was based on this information, that CMO could
arrange activities for the purpose of winning hearts and minds. In other words, the intelligence teams were
conducting Social Investigation (SI) which was a methodology used by the CPP-NPA to acquaint
554
themselves with a new barangay they were planning to penetrate.
Intelligence was critical for combat teams as well. One huge disadvantage for the AFP was that
they were greatly inferior to the access of combat intelligence in comparison with the NPA. The NPA had
the support of the population to provide them with key information about AFP movements. Thus, as soon
as support was build up for the AFP, intelligence teams worked on establishing a clandestine intelligence
555
network in the barangays with informants to deliver information to the AFP.
Combat units were organized to address the previous drawbacks of the AFP’s COIN which was
grounded in static defense, periodic forays into communist strongholds, and working in large formations.
This gave the rebels almost unrestricted mobility in their areas of influence, making the AFP more
vulnerable to hit-and-run attacks. Combat teams within the SOTs were expected to shed their heavy
equipment, avoid main transport arteries, and rely less rear support, to aggressively seek out the enemy, and
keeping the insurgents constantly on the move through foot patrols. Having said this, the combat team was
largely operating in unfamiliar terrain, and it was paramount that the CMO team built a close relationship
with communities so that the intelligence team could feed the combat troops on the whereabouts of the
556
insurgent.
In the campaign of gradual constriction, the six steps that the SOTs were tasked to follow are
listed below:

1. Improving the situational awareness of the target areas. These involve gathering intelligence about the
enemy situation and understanding the socioeconomic, demographic, and geographic features of the
battlespace (see Appendix D for a sample of an area study).
2. Conducting psychological operations through dialogues with community members, having the soldiers

553
Ibid., pp. 119; 125; 151.
554
Corpus, Silent War, pp. 151-152; Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, p. 598.
555
Corpus, Silent War, pp. 153-154; Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, p. 599.
556
Corpus, Silent War, pp. 112; 117-118; 127-128; 146.

144
 immerse themselves in the communities to understand the needs of the people, and also extract
intelligence about rebel presence
3. Neutralizing the enemy in conjunction with promoting amnesty and helping them re-integrate into
society.
4. Mobilizing the community members and local government officials in developing a committee similar
to the CPP-NPA’s revolutionary committee for intelligence collection and security.
5. Organizing a village defense system where inhabitants are trained to defend their villages.
6. Developing the community by assuring the delivery of basic government services and promoting
socio-economic activities with local government agencies taking the lead.557

4.5.4.5 Assessing Lambat Bitag

There is a general consensus that the SOT approached embodied in Lambat Bitag reduced the
558
communist threat considerably. Within three months of its launch, rebel strength was reduced from
25,000 to 22,860. By the end of 1989, rebel strength totaled 18,440. In December 1991, the number of NPA
combatants plunged to 14,800. The SOTs were also successful in dismantling the political organs of the
communists. Whereas there were 7,552 influenced barangays in 1988, there were only 3,623 in 1991.
Furthermore, the CPP-NPA was known to have 72 guerrilla fronts in 1989, but this was reduced to 47 in
559
1991.
Nevertheless, Lambat Bitag was not without its drawbacks. On the ground, some field
commanders could not entirely grasp the concept of “gradual constriction” where units were supposed to
clear and hold rebel-influences areas through a combination of intelligence, combat, and CMO. Some still
resorted to the old tactics of “search and destroy” which was accompanied by forced relocation of villagers
which defeated the purpose of winning hearts and minds. Yet, the most serious problem stemming from
Lambat Bitag was that most of the socio-economic and political dimensions of the insurgency were left up
560
to the military. As Corpus pointed out, no matter how much the AFP engaged in civic action, nothing
could remove the fundamentals of the people’s frustration unless these initiatives are backed by robust
561
government response in areas such as land reform to uplift the lives of the impoverished people.
Another problem in relation to CMO was that it inadvertently politicized the soldiers. The
soldiers who engaged in SOTs witnessed at first-hand, the impact of poverty in the communist-infiltrated
barangays. This in effect, made the soldiers ruminate on the inadequacies of the government in addressing
these socio-economic issues. Many of the soldiers came to realize that they did not have a message to
compete with the CPP-NPA’s attractive ideology that provided better answers to the economically
marginalized people. These circumstances placed the soldiers in a quandary. In order to counter the

557
Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, p. 599.
558
PAM 7-00, p. 10; “Philippines: The Counterinsurgency Campaign,” the Library of Congress Country
Studies: CIA World Factbook, p. 4/6. Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, p. 600.
559
Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, p. 600.
560
Yabes, The Boys from the Barracks, p. 125.
561
Corpus, Silent War, p. 109.

145
propaganda of the communists, a national ideology was necessary. Nevertheless, without the government
following through with its policies to back up the AFP’s CMO initiatives, any counter-propaganda could
not convince the people. Resultantly, the soldiers themselves began to harbor doubts on their role in
addressing insurgency.
Politicization of the soldiers became more acutely felt especially in the remote areas where the
government lacked the resources and manpower to fill in the political vacuum in communities that had
shadow governments. In these areas, AFP officers often assumed the role as de facto mayors and with little
guidance on how to maintain their distance from political affairs, the experience strengthened their feelings
562
that they had the right to govern. AFP factions that were still intent on overthrowing the government
manipulated these sentiments. The group that became most susceptible to these radical ideas in the military
was the Scout Rangers. This was an elite group that played a significant role in the SOTs that were
deployed to the communist hotbeds. Due to their successes, they became the main force in the COIN
563
campaign,
Within the Scout Rangers, there was a growing feeling that the central government could only
blame themselves for the conditions that spawned violent unrest and insurgency. In their view, the
government was inefficient and lacked credibility. They believed that unless the military could build a
political organization that could operate as effectively as the communists, there was no lasting solution. As
564
it turned out, their grievances were played out in the December 1989 coup.
565
This failed coup evidently revealed that factionalism was rampant and there were elements
within the military that were not ready to submit to civilian control. But the seeds of the coup lay in the
566
weak legitimacy and credibility of the government that invited military intervention. These were felt
down to the ground level of military operations. It was apparent that a lasting solution to insurgency could
not be attained if left to military devices alone, even if they were equipped with some ability to deliver
socio-economic relief of the people. There was a growing sentiment within the AFP circles that the bulk of
development should be left up to civilian agencies. In the case that military was to be deployed for

562
Victor Selochan, “The Armed Forces of the Philippines: Its Perceptions on Governing and the Prospects for
the Future,” pp. 8;18; Yabes, The Boys from the Barracks, pp. 128-130;.134-135.
563
Yabes, The Boys from the Barracks, pp. 132-133.
564
Ibid., p. 199.
565
Once again the instigators of the coup were Honasan-lead RAM and Marcos loyalists. Out of all coups
launched in the nation, especially under President Aquino, the December Coup was considered to be the most
threatening. The battle raged on from November 29 – December 9 resulting in 669 casualties. Malacanang
Palace, the seat of government, also came under bombing and strafing. It came so close to toppling Aquino from
power, that upon the president’s request, the United States sent Phantom F-4 jets to fly over the capital. On the
final day, the coup was squashed and the rebel soldiers and the government reached a ceasefire agreement. See
Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, pp. 619 – 632 for details on the December 1989 coup.
566
Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, pp. 631-632. Some scholars believe that when
soldiers are placed purely in a nation-building role, it does not lead to the politicization of the soldier. Rather,
when soldiers conduct socio-economic activities within the scope of counterinsurgency, is when they become
subject to politicization. This is engendered because under the grueling conditions of war, the soldiers become
acutely aware of the limitations of the central government in tending to the socio-economic ills of the society.
See Dencio A. Acop, “Assessing the Expanded Role of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in Nation-Building,
“ Asia-Pacific Social Science Review, Vol. 6 (2), 2006, p. 144.

146
socio-economic projects, they were to be done selectively with a clear tactical objective on who was to be
567
won over and what resources were needed to achieve these gains. In short, this period demonstrated
that CMO as a military operation enabled the soldiers to operate in the depth of enemy battlespace which
resulted in tactical and operational success in the military dimension. Nonetheless, it still highlighted that
the military could not completely resolve the roots of insurgency at hand without proper government
backing.

4.5.5 Summary
CMO during the Aquino administration was marked by the military’s continuing quest to improve
its COIN capabilities. Rather than go through Aquino’s initial drives to align its CMO activities with her
plan for national reconciliation, a series of coups landed CMO in a focal point in the AFP’s newly
established control over counterinsurgency measures.
What was conceptualized in the 1985 was actualized in Lambat Bitag. CMO shed its
developmental orientation 568 and vague understanding of “winning hearts and minds” component to
become integrated in counterinsurgency operations that could better penetrate the depth of insurgent
battlespace. Subsequently, CMO demonstrated its effects at an operation and tactical level by managing to
clear barangays one by one and integrating CMO into intelligence and combat operations. Fused into a
composite team, it helped soldiers to maneuver over human terrain and reach enemy strongholds though a
process of constriction.
Nonetheless, at a national strategic level, the ineptitude of the government in following though
with socio-economic reforms in the impoverished barangays, highlighted the fact that operational and
tactical successes in the military dimension were not enough to remove the armed threat all together.

4.6 Synopsis of Events during the Ramos Administration (1992-1998): CMO

Returns to its Developmental Role
In 1991, Lambat Bitag II was launched to address the drawbacks of its predecessor. It sought to
alleviate the COIN burden on the AFP and spread out its responsibilities to other agencies. To assist the
security effort, the Philippine National Police became more involved. Territorial defense was strengthened
to help communities withstand enemy attacks and prevent the re-infiltrations of the communists. In areas
related to CMO, the AFP formed better partnerships with other government agencies and local government
officials to conduct socio-economic work. Yet, this did not mean there was a let up in offensive operations.
The integrated approach of combat, intelligence, and CMO were intensified which lead to further
dismantling of communist fronts along with the capture and surrender of its members. As a result, by 1992,
569
AFP was able to neutralize 26 CPP-NPA guerrilla fronts.

567
Interview with former Defense Secretary Rafael Ileto, March 23, 1987 in Miranda and Ciron, “Development
and the Military in the Philippines: Military Perceptions in a Time of Continuing Crisis,” p. 180.
568
Lt. Col. Regencia, interview with author, National Development Support Command (NDSC), GHQ, Camp
Aguinaldo, Quezon City, Philippines, November 4, 2010.
569
Ligot, “Communist Insurgency in the Philippines,” pp. 52-53; “31st Infantry (Charge) Battalion, 9ID, PA,”

147
 One year after Lambat Bitag II was launched, Fidel Ramos assumed presidency. Once a military
man, who knew the ins and outs of the military, he understood that the civilian government had to be strong
enough to lead the military in fighting the insurgencies. Unless the government set into motion the wheels
of socio-economic reform, it would invite further military intervention and any military gains in its fight
against insurgency could not be sustained.
Within two years of Ramos’ presidency, the military arm of the Communist Party of the
Philippines-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA) was considered to be strategically defeated. Their numbers
570
sank from their peak of 25,200 in 1987 to 6,930 in 1994. The CPP-NPA was also having their problems.
They were not able to adapt to the currents of the time. Their political appeal was beginning to dampen
beginning with the return of democracy with Aquino. Furthermore they made a political blunder by
boycotting elections. Factional in-fighting also erupted and with the disclosure that there were government
operatives within their ranks, the CPP-NPA began as series of massive purges (1985-1988) which
571
disillusioned many of its members. Still there could be no denying that SOTs under Lambat Bitag I and
II made it difficult for the communists to expand their bases further while the AFP chipped away at their
military capabilities in conducting guerrilla warfare.
Ramos also displayed determination in following up on the military successes of the AFP’s
COIN program by aggressively pursuing a national policy of reconciliation and development. He organized
572
amnesty programs for the rebels to re-enter society. Ramos also did not ignore the military, and the
same treatment was extended to those soldiers that mutinied, allowing them to be reinstated into the
573
military.
In the political dimension, he repealed the Anti-Subversion law, which in effect, gave the CPP
legal political recognition. Peace talks were also pursued with both the communists and the Muslim
separatist group, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). Though not as threatening as in the early
Marcos years, they continued their armed activity. While the CPP-NPA peace talks still faced hurdles, the
avenues for talks remained open. Ramos had more success with the MNLF, as he was able to forge a Final
Peace Agreement in 1996. Though independence was not recognized, the agreement did allow the Muslims
574
improved political representation and participation in the conduct of their affairs.
Ramos was also determined to turn around the economy. Among his many initiatives to reform

available at: http://www.9idspear.com/31IBhistory.html. Accessed March 14, 2012.

570
Dolorfino, “Small Wars Manual’s Strategic and Psychological Principles in Philippine Counterinsurgency
(COIN) Operations,” p. 14.
571
Timberman, A Changeless Land, pp. 317-319; Philippines National Security Index, June 1991, in section
“The Counterinsurgency Campaign.” Re-published from The Library of Congress Country Studies and the CIA
World Factbook available at: http://www.photius.com/countries/philippines/national_security/index.html.
Accessed September 6, 2011.
572
Hernandez, Carolina. “The AFP’s Institutional Responses to Armed Conflict: a Continuing Quest for the
Right Approach,” Policy Notes, No. 2006-02, March 2006, p. 5. The Balik-Baril (Return-the-gun) program gave
the insurgent surrenderrees a start-up capital to secure a livelihood of 9,000 pesos in exchange for a gun.
573
Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, p. 638.
574
Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, pp. 639-641.

148
 575
the economy and industrialize the country, he revived the AFP’s developmental role. In 1994, when the
576
numbers of communist armed rebels were reduced to fewer than 7,000, the AFP launched a campaign
plan called “Unlad Bayan” (National Development) which underlined the shift in priorities from COIN to
peace and development efforts. It was premised on using the AFP’s available resources in activities
reminiscent of the Marcos period, which included infrastructure building, food production, and delivery of
government services to remote areas. To dovetail this new campaign plan, CMO shed its COIN orientation
and increased community outreach programs that included civic action, literacy programs, and the delivery
577
of dental and medical care. As Pobre said, “Unlad Bayan was actually a more ambitious version of
578
Lambat Bitag, which aimed at winning people’s hearts and minds through community development.”
The return of CMO to its developmental role spelled out an era of relative peace. Internal security
problems still persisted but they were downgraded to a law and order issue which belonged to the domains
of the police. Once again, CMO followed a cyclical pattern where the dramatic drop in the internal security
levels shifted its role back to development. Even though, CMO helped the internal security plans to secure
success through its improved understanding and effective implementation within the context of COIN, it
fell short of the official recognition needed to establish formal guidelines. With improved internal security
579
conditions, political stability, and the prospects of economic growth under Ramos, CMO was placed on
the back burner of military.

575
Ramos did succeed in bringing some economic growth and stability to the Philippines.
576
Dolorfino, “Small Wars Manual’s Strategic and Psychological Principles in Philippine Counterinsurgency
(COIN) Operations,” p.11.
577
Philippines – 1998 Defense Policy Paper, Ch. 2; Ch. 6. Under Unlad Bayan, the AFP was assigned to the
following developmental or non-combat activities:
Infrastructure development
Rescue and relief operations
Resettlement and rehabilitation operations
Protection and preservation of the environment
Safety of life at sea
Sealift and airlift of civilians passengers and cargoes
Delivery of government services to remote areas
Food production
Assistance to law enforcement
578
Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People, pp. 641-642.
579
Yabes, The Boys from the Barracks, p. 241.

149
Chapter 5. Tracking CMO’s Path to Institutionalization
5.1 Background: Relative Peace and the Resurgence of Threats in the 1990s
5.1.1 Introduction
In the 1990s, CMO began to lose its utility as a component of counterinsurgency (COIN) in what
appeared to be a decline in insurgencies. At the same time, the end of the Cold War also had implications
for the Philippines’ defense priorities. The pullout of American bases in 1992 propelled the AFP to move
towards a self-reliant posture. In 1995, the Philippine Congress passed the AFP Modernization Act, which
was intended to transform the AFP into a conventional military force with capabilities to repel an external
1
attack. In the 1998 Defense Policy Paper, the Philippine Department of Defense outlined policy objectives
2
that reflected a shift in security concerns from internal security to the changing geopolitical climate. As
attention went into the AFP’s new defense priorities, CMO was consigned to the backseat of military affairs.
While it was retained for its developmental utility, there was limited activity in regards to codifying its
practices.
Nonetheless, in the years marching to the new millennium, relative peace, secured through
intensive COIN operations, and bound by progress in peace talks, began to unravel when President Joseph
Estrada (1998-2001) broke from his predecessor, Fidel Ramos’ reconciliatory position towards the Muslim
separatists and the armed communists. In place, he initiated his own security policy that took a hard stance
3
against armed dissent. The following section provides a cursory overview on the three major threat groups
that emerged during his tenure and went on to dominate the security agenda of Estrada’s successor,
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (2001-2010). This section is deemed necessary to provide the
background that led to the revival of CMO under the administration of Arroyo

5.1.2 The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)

Estrada’s tenure in office was marked by a particularly bloody war with the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF). The MILF was led by Ustadaz Salamat Hashim, a former vice chairman of the
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), who split from the original separatist movement over ideological
differences in 1977. The militant group formally declared its existence in 1984. The MILF espoused an
Islamic ideology that dictated its quest to establish a separate homeland for the Muslim Filipinos and based
4
on the Islamic way of life. This was in contrast to the MNLF’s “secular-nationalist” movement. They
began their quiet build-up during the Aquino years while the administration was kept busy fighting the

1
See Republic Act No. 7898 or more commonly know as the “AFP Modernization Act.” Available online at:
http://www.gppb.gov.ph/laws/RA_7898.pdf. Accessed September 6, 2012.
2
Philippine Department of National Defense, In Defense of the Philippines: 1998 Defense Policy Paper,
Quezon City: Department of National Defense, 1998.
3
Carolina Hernandez “The AFP’s Institutional Responses to Armed Conflict: a Continuing Quest for the Right
Approach,” Policy Notes, No. 2006-02, March 2006, p. 6. Hereafter cited as Hernandez, “The AFP’s Institutional
Response to Armed Conflict.”
4
See Thomas M. McKenna, Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the
Southern Philippines. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998, pp. 207-210 for more details on the origins
of MILF. Hereafter cited as McKenna, Muslim Rulers and Rebels.

150
communists and subduing rebellious elements within the military. Under Ramos, less attention was paid to
the MILF since Ramos directed his energies into forging a peace agreement with the main separatist group,
the MNLF, which was finalized in 1996. Though the MILF refused to join in signing this peace agreement,
the MILF did reciprocate to Ramos’ peace overtures with a ceasefire agreement in 1997 that remained
5
largely intact until March 2000.
Estrada, in contrast with Ramos who as much as possible, avoided instigating an adverse reaction
6
from the MILF, did not want to back down from a splinter Muslim separatist group that was rapidly
7
growing in strength. In 1999, they were estimated to have 15,690 fighters, equipped with 11,280 firearms.
8
Some years earlier in 1996, they had already secured control over one-tenth of Mindanao through the
presence of their known 46 camps in the central portions of the island. The camps have always remained a
contentious issue, since it was within these sprawling camps that the rebel group exercised their de facto
sovereignty. Though 7 of these camps were recognized as a result of negotiations between the Ramos
9
government and the MILF, including the MILF’s main bases of Camp Abubakar and Camp Bushra,
Estrada began to view them as a threat not only because they covered large tracts of land, but because they
10
were active recruiting and training grounds. However, Estrada did what Ramos avoided, which was
ordering the AFP to launch attacks on MILF camps in March 2000. This became to be known as his policy
11
of “all-out-war.”
The war that followed in Central Mindanao was short in duration but the intensity of the war was
reminiscent of the campaigns that the AFP launched against the MNLF in the 1970s. The AFP’s objective
was to recover key territory and infrastructure occupied by the rebels and to destroy their bases. They took

5
In July 1997, the Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities (AGCH) was signed between the Philippine
government and the MILF. Four months later, the Coordinating Committee for Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH)
was established to provide ceasefire guidelines. Ramos did not entirely neglect the MILF but chose to maintain
the status quo with them in order to not jeopardize the peace process in Mindanao. Nevertheless, he did release
funds for developmental projects that would benefit the MILF as a good-will gesture. See Zachary Abuza,
Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003, pp. 45-46.
Hereafter cited as Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia; Marites Danguilan Vitug and Glenda M. Gloria,
Under the Crescent Moon: Rebellion in Mindanao, Ateneo Center for Social Policy and Public Affairs, 2000, pp.
113; 150. Hereafter cited as Vitug and Gloria, Under the Crescent Moon.
6
Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia, pp. 45-46; Vitug and Gloria, Under the Crescent Moon, pp. 113; 150.
7
Ben Cal, Gallantry in Mindanao: Preserving the Republic, Quezon City, Mabuhay Communications Service,
2000, p. 25. Hereafter cited as Cal, Gallantry in Mindanao.
8
Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia, pp. 40; 45.
9
The government recognized Camp Abubakar and Camp Bushra, designating them as protected zones. This
meant the AFP was not allowed to extend their operations into these camps. Since 1992, the AFP has been
ordered to stay clear of these areas. See Vitug and Gloria, Under the Crescent Moon, pp. 110-111.
10
Fr. Roberto Layson, In War, the Real Enemy Is War Itself, Davao City: Initiatives for International Dialogue,
2003, p.12; Soliman M. Santos, Jr., “Delays in the Peace Negotiations between the Philippine Negotiations
between the Philippine Government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front: Causes and Prescriptions, working
paper, East-West Center Washington, no. 3, January, 2005, p. 9; Soliman M. Santos, Dynamics and Directions of
the GRP-MILF Peace Negotiations, Davao City: Alternate Forum for Research in Mindanao, Inc., 2005, pp.
13-15.
11
Estrada justified his declaration to go to war with the MILF on the basis that the Muslim separatist group
occupied several towns and took control over the national highway linking the cities of Marawi and Cotabato.
See Raymund Jose Quilop, “Waltzing with the Army: From Marcos to Arroyo,” Kasarinlan:Philippine Journal
of Third World Studies, Volume 16 (2), p. 97.

151
 12
an attritional approach that relied on heavy artillery and aerial bombing. It was a war that imposed much
hardship on the civilians as they were forced to flee their homes. The estimated number of internally
displaced people was approximately 750,000, with a portion of them not being able to return home for
13
more than 2 years. In the end, the AFP secured its military objective of flushing the rebels out of most of
14
their bases and this campaign ended with the fall of Camp Abubakar in July 2000. The military success
did not translate into a victory that compelled the MILF to surrender and enter negotiations as Estrada
thought it would. Instead, armed activity continued, albeit at reduced intensity, and the government was
faced with having to deal with the deeper issues of the Muslim problem, especially in relation to their
15
sovereignty and economic development.

5.1.3 The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)

Concerning the armed Muslim front, Estrada also faced the growing threat from a radical Islamic
group, the Abu Sayyaf Group (the Bearer of the Sword). This was another spin-off group of the Moro
National Liberation Front (MNLF). It was established in the early 1990s by Abdurajak Janjanlani, a veteran
of the Afghan war who fought the Soviet occupation. The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) originally waged war
against the government forces for the purpose of establishing an Islamic state in the Southern Philippines.
The group recruited former MNLF members and other young men in their area of operations (Basilan and
Sulu). In contrast with the MILF, which has maintained off and on communications with the government,
the government has never entered into negotiations with the ASG, branding them as a lawless
group/terrorist group. Even though the ASG are currently considered to be criminal opportunists, with a
flare for extreme violence, in the early stages, they were relatively centralized in leadership and bound by a
mystical ideology. The demise of its founder, Janjanlani in a 1998 firefight with government forces, did not
eliminate the organization. Rather, the group rapidly devolved into a loosely knit organization that
resembled a criminal organization more than a group with separatist aspirations. Their modus operandi also
16
settled into a routine of kidnappings, extortion, and terror attacks. Events took a sinister turn in March
2000, when they kidnapped 58 students and teachers from two schools off the island of Basilan in
17
Southwestern Mindanao. This was followed by an even more brazen abduction that took place on a
Malaysian resort island. The kidnapped people were mostly foreign vacationers who were brought to the
ASG base in Jolo, Sulu in April 2000. As a result, Estrada ordered the military to step up their operations

12
Read Cal, Gallantry in Mindanao, for more information about the various campaigns during the 2000 war in
Mindanao.
13
Keith Bacongo, “The Return to Spring”, in Fr. Eliseo R.Mercado, Jr., OMI and Margie Moran Floirendo, eds.,
Mindanao on the Mend, Pasig City: Anvil Publishing, 2003, p. 55.
14
Ben Cal, “FVR says ‘war is not an option,’ Balita, October 26, 2011, available online at
http://balita.ph/2011/10/26/fvr-says-war-is-not-an-option. Accessed March 23, 2012.
15
See commentaries on the failure of the government to deal with the conflict comprehensively in Patricio P.
Diaz, Understanding Mindanao Conflict, Davao City: MindaNews Publication, 2003, pp. 206-207; 228.
16
Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia, pp. 99-110; Vitug and Gloria, Under the Crescent Moon, pp.
204-205.
17
The story of the kidnapping is depicted in Jose Torres Jr., Into the Mountain: hostaged by the Abu Sayyaf,
Quezon City, Claretian Publications, 2001.

152
 18
against the ASG in the Basilan and Sulu area.
The ASG never fielded armed fighters to the degree that the MNLF had or the MILF has. It was
estimated that during this period they had a mere 500 fighters. But they were considered to be a serious
threat due to their connections with international terror groups: Al Qaeda and later the Indonesian-based
jihadist group, the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). The ASG’s growth into a potent force was in part, due to the
support they gained from providing Al Qaeda a potential base of operations in the southern Philippines. The
types of support that came from Al Qaeda included funding, jihadi indoctrination, and training (bomb
making and developing urban commando skills). Known Al Qaeda operatives working in the Philippines
were also responsible for a bomb explosion on a Philippines Airlines flight in 1994, killing one Japanese
passenger. They were also behind a failed assassination attempt against Pope Paul John II and plans to
19
bomb a dozen U.S. airliners.
The response to the ASG was primarily a military one. They involved large-scale pursuit
operations, and often at the expense of civilians living in the area (forced evacuation and collateral damage).
Operations were not only hampered by the ASG’s remote hideouts, but also because they were not
completely independent from the MILF and the remnants of MNLF. Linked by family ties, religion, and to
some degree, sympathy for each other’s causes, these organizations were known to have colluded when
20
practicality called for it. In short, the main challenges the Estrada administration faced in this battlespace
21
was the ASG’s ability to manipulate the deep depth to secure their sanctuaries and concealment.

5.1.4 The Communist Party of the Philippines- the New People’s Army (CPP-NPA)
The communist armed movement, which occupied most of the government’s COIN program
from the Marcos period until the beginning of the Ramos presidency, remained relatively quiet in the
interim years. That was until Joseph Estrada became president. The effects of the military operations during
Lambat Bitag I and II had taken a toll on the movement. Furthermore, factional fighting over the direction
of the movement within the CPP-NPP in the early 1990s stalled any further progress in helping the
movement from recuperating and regaining its original strength. On the peace front, Ramos allowed the
22
CPP to legally pursue political representation in 1992 and he did accept their demands to abide by
23
international humanitarian law and recognizing human rights in 1998. Nevertheless, such steps forward

18
See Enrico Antonio La Vina and Lilita Balane “Timeline: Abu Sayyaf Atrocities,” ABS-CBN News,
November 9, 2009. Available online at http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/03/31/09/abu-sayyaf-atrocities.
Accessed March 24, 2012.
19
See Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia, pp. 99-115 for details on the Al-Qaeda connection.
20
Details of links between the MILF and ASG is covered in depth in Crisis Group Asia Report No. 152, The
Philippines: Counter-Insurgency Vs. Counter-Terrorism in Mindanao, May 14, 2008.
21
Larry Niksch, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation, CRS Report RL31263,
updated April 8, 2003, pp. 7; 9. In 2000, Estrada ordered an AFP offensive in Jolo, which resulted in civilian
casualties and displaced 600,000 people.
22
In 1992, Ramos repealed the 1957 Anti-subversion Law or Republic Act 1700. Full text of RA 1700 available
at: http://www.chanrobles.com/republicactno1700.htm#.UICDyGdEXKQ. The act allowed the communist party
to operate legally.
23
Crisis Group Asia Report, No. 202, The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: Tactics and Talks, Crisis
Group Asia Report, No. 202, February 14, 2011, pp. 6-7; For more details on the economic and political

153
experienced a setback when Estrada became president. He angered the communists when he ratified the
24
Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) with the United States in 1999, which could not have avoided stinging
invectives by the CPP-NPA that were adamantly against any agreement deemed to compromise Philippine
sovereignty. A series of events ensued which led to the resumption of war. Even though Estrada proceeded
later with peace talks, he chose not to negotiate with their umbrella organization, the National Democratic
Front (NDF), and instead initiated talks with groups that split from the core organization in 1992 and
legally entered politics. Not surprisingly, little headway was made since these groups did not have control
25
over the military arm of the communist organization.

5.1.5 CMO: a Forgotten Relic of the Past

Estrada’s security policy was dominated by a military solution in order to end the resurgence of
armed groups as quickly and decisively as possible. While the existing CMO office, the Office of the
Deputy Chief of Staff for Civil Military Operations, J7, was retained, it played a minimal role during this
26
period. There was more focus on the combat aspect, which was in-line with the “all-out-war” policy.
What was retained from the peak of the insurgency during the Aquino administration was only the
developmental aspect of CMO. Once the CPP-NPA strength was dramatically reduced in the early 1990,
Ramos also decreased the number of COIN operations. This had the effect of shifting CMO’s role in COIN
27
to one that was oriented towards development, especially in regards to communist areas. Thus, what was
conceptualized during the previous COIN campaign plans did not experience any further development until
Arroyo came to power. Nevertheless, the Estrada period is a subject of interest because the inability of the
country to stem the resurgence of the threat groups through military means would propel the next president
to take a more comprehensive role in dealing with the internal security problem.

5.2 The Revival of CMO under the Arroyo Administration

5.2.1 Introduction
When President Gloria Arroyo-Macapagal stepped into office in 2001, she was facing a rapidly
deteriorating security situation. The communists had gained a second wind after what was thought to be a
decline in their movement from the early 1990s. The communist cadres had engaged in successful

conditions of the period see Paul D. Hutchcroft, “Sustaining Economic and Political Reform: The Challenges
Ahead,” in David G. Timberman ed., The Philippines: New Directions in Domestic Policy and Foreign Relations,
New York: Asia Society, 1998, pp. 23-47.
24
The Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) is a bilateral agreement signed between the Philippines and the United
States. It is primarily concerned with the legal issues associated with military personnel stationed in a host
country. The communists have always maintained their opposition toward the presence of American troops
calling it a manifestation of American imperialism.
25
Hernandez, “The AFP’s Institutional Responses to the Armed Conflict,” p. 6.
26
Major Eugenio S. Batara, Asst. Chief of United Command Staff for CMO, U7, interview with author, Camp
Don Basilio Navarro, Western Mindanao Command, Calarian, Zamboanga City, Philippines, July 29, 2009.
Hereafter cited as Maj. Batara and date of interview.
27
Crisis Group Asia Report, No. 202, The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: Tactics and Talks, Crisis
Group Asia Report, No. 202, February 14, 2011, p. 8.

154
socio-political activities in urban centers that had helped to swell their ranks while they increased their
armed attacks in the countryside. By 2001, they were reported to have close to 12,000 fighters, almost
28
double of what they had during the mid-1990s. On the Muslim front, the all-out-war with the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) exacerbated the volatile situation in Mindanao. To add to the region’s
security woes, there was no let up in the bombings and kidnappings conducted by the Abu Sayyaf Group
(ASG). Even before the ascendency of Arroyo, the Department of National Defense in 2000 was compelled
29
to shift the AFP’s priorities from external defense back to internal security concerns.
Under these circumstances, President Arroyo took initiatives to increase the tempo of military
operations and at the same time take a “soft” or a developmental approach towards insurgency and
terrorism. On June 19, 2001, the President signed Executive Order No. 21 which highlighted the urgency to
deal with internal security problems and ordered government agencies to play their part in a concerted
30
effort to deal with the political, economic, psycho-social and security components of the armed conflict.
CMO was the military’s response to the president’s national strategy in taking a holistic approach to the
insurgency problem. This involved building partnerships with other civilian agencies for the purpose of
conducting socio-economic assistance programs in conflict areas.
It was against this backdrop that CMO was once again revived. The only difference this time
around was that it led to its formal recognition as a distinct military operation through institutionalization.
That being said, the event did not spell out a dramatic departure from the existing CMO practices, which
drew its roots from the past. Rather, the event marked the process of translating these accumulated
experiences into a doctrine that would establish a better understanding on its positioning and utility in
31
COIN warfare.
The section thus proceeds to track its path to institutionalization. They are categorized under the
following themes. The first is that at a national strategic level, CMO was revived to support what the
government termed as a holistic approach to the insurgency problem. This entailed the tapping of the AFP’s
engineering capabilities to initiate development in security-compromised areas. The second lies in
improving the military’s capabilities to maneuver in insurgent battlespace at an operational and tactical
level. The third deals with Muslim threat groups. CMO gradually began to be tailored to address the needs
of the Muslim communities. Under this category, the American dimension is explored in detail.

28
Renato Cruz de Castro, “The 21st Century Armed Forces of the Philippines: Orphan of Counter-insurgency or
Military Geared for the Long War of the Century? Contemporary Politics, vol. 16, issue 2, 2010, pp. 156; 159.
Hereafter cited as Cruz de Castro, “The 21st Century Armed Forces of the Philippines.”
29
Philippine Department of National Defense, The AFP Modernization Program Annual Accomplishment
Report 2001 Annual Report, Quezon City: Department of National Defense, 2001, p.5.
30
See Executive Order. No. 21, S-2001, Creating a Coordinative and Integrative System in Internal Security,
available online at: http://www.chanrobles.com/executiveorders/2001/executiveorderno21-2001.html/ Accessed
April 6, 2012.
31
This refers to the Armed Forces of the Philippines Doctrine for Civil Military Operations (AFPM 2-7), which
was published in 2006.

155
5.2.2 The Reinvigoration of CMO as Part of the National Security Strategy to Deal with the
Socio-economic Aspects of Insurgencies
Under Arroyo, the old practice of utilizing CMO to target the socio-economic roots of armed
unrest were resurrected as part of the nation’s strategy to mobilize existing government resources to take a
32
comprehensive approach to the insurgency problem. When President Arroyo issued EO No. 21 in 2001,
she ordered the creation of the Cabinet Oversight Committee on Internal Security (COC-IS), composed of
representatives from various government agencies, including the Department of Defense. The committee
was tasked to formulate a National Internal Security Plan (NISP) for the main purpose of implementing the
33
“Strategy of Holistic Approach.”
The policy document was eventually completed in 2004. It encapsulated the administration’s
thrusts to holistically address the security problem from the dimensions of one: political, legal, and
diplomatic; two: information; three: socio-economic and psychological; and four: security. The broad
objectives of the NISP were as follows:

1. Defeat the armed groups.

2. Dismantle the political-infrastructure of the armed group.
3. Protect the people and vital installations.
4. Reestablish government control in insurgent-influenced/controlled areas.
5. Reduce the root causes of insurgency.
6. De-link the insurgents from their base of support (population) and deny them of recruits, equipment,
and other materials to sustain their operations.
7. Win the people over to the government side.34

Broadly speaking, the NISP was the grand strategy that provided guidelines on establishing a
coordinating mechanism for government agencies, in efforts to contribute to the overall effort of
35
reestablishing peace and order. This was bolstered by the Medium Term Philippine Development Plan
2004-2010 (MTPDP), a national development agenda that laid down the framework and roadmap for the
Philippines to achieve poverty reduction. In the MTPDP, security concerns were also addressed, underlying
the importance of ending the insurgencies to create a stable environment conducive for economic growth.
The security component of the MTPDP called for strengthened peace talks and rehabilitation and

32
Soliman M. Santos, Jr. expressed that in the first few years of the Arroyo tenure, her intentions to target the
roots of the insurgencies remained with a military solution, but with the cooperation of other agencies to work on
the socio-economic aspects of the problem. In other words, less attention was paid to strengthening national
consensus and mechanisms to seek a political settlement. See Soliman M. Santos, Jr. “Delays in the Peace
Negotiations between the Philippine Government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front: Causes and
Prescriptions, working paper, East-West Center Washington, No. 3, January 2005, pp. 11-12; 16.
33
See Executive Order. No. 21-S-2001.
34
Ariel B. Bernado “Philippine Response Against Terrorism: Consequence Management and Building Resilient
Communities,” ARMY JOURNAL, January-March 2007, p. 7. Hereafter cited as Bernado. “Philippine Response
Against Terrorism.”
35
Ibid., p. 7.

156
development of conflict areas through a convergence of government agencies and grassroots’ organization.
It also stated that in order for the military to fulfill their role in spurring development, the AFP’s capability
to conduct CMO was to be enhanced in a collaborative relationship with other government departments and
36
agencies.
An AFP-CMO program, which was established to support the NISP and MTPDP initiatives for a
coordinated developmental approach to the insurgency problem, was the Kalayaan Barangay Program
37
(KBP) or Freedom Village Program. It was implemented as early as 2002. This was a nation-wide
program that sought to end the insurgency problem by transforming conflict areas into areas of peace and
38
development, using a combination of the “right-hand” and the “left-hand” approach.
In the “right-hand” approach, the AFP and the police were tasked with the role of clearing and
stabilizing conflict areas. The AFP’s engineering brigades were then deployed to undertake the construction
of large infrastructure works, such as access roads, portable water systems, school buildings, electrification,
and health facilities. This was followed by a “left-hand” which involved a convergence of civilian agencies
and local stakeholders for the purpose of reforming and strengthening local governance structures and
addresses the roots of conflict through confidence-building measures, dialogues, peace education and
peace-building. The program was overseen by the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process
(OPAPP), a government agency tasked to direct the peace process and help select barangays for the
39
program. Civilian agencies involved were the Department of Public Works and Highways, Department
of Agriculture, Department of Health, Department of Education, Department of Social Welfare and
40
Development, and the National Anti-Poverty Commission.
Even though the KBP was mandated to address all threat groups, in actual practice it was geared
41
towards reverting CPP-NPA controlled or influenced areas back to government control. Thus, at the
beginning of Arroyo’s term, CMO capabilities of the AFP were resurrected to pursue a developmental
approach in countering communist influence in depressed barangays.

36
National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan
2004-2010.National Economic Development Authority, Manila. Philippines, 2004, Ch. XIV; Ch. XXIII.
37
Undated documents received on March 27, 2007 from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Civil
Military Operations, J7, GHQ titled AFP Report, Kalayaan Barangays Programs. KBP was formerly known as
“KALAHI (Kapit Bisig Laban sa Kahirapan) para sa Kalayaan.” It was initially launched in the Bicol region in
2002 to deliver basic government services backed by 20 government agencies in impoverished areas. See
“Kalahi Projects Cover 89 Barangays in Bicol,” Bicol Mail, April 14, 2005. Available online at
http://www.bicolmail.com/issue/2005/april14/kalahi.html. Accessed March 18, 2012.
38
The” right-hand approach” and the “left-hand approach” are terminologies coined during the Magsaysay
period to spell-out the thrusts of his counterinsurgency program against the Huks.
39
The OPAPP is a government office that overseas, coordinates, and integrate the implementation of the peace
process. It has established peace panels to speed up the peace process with the MILF and the CPP-NPA. Its
complimentary track involves overseeing development in conflict areas. See OPAPP’s official website:
http://opapp.gov.ph/.
40
Undated documents received on March 27, 2007 from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Civil
Military Operations, J7, GHQ titled “The “Kalayaan Barangay” Program and AFP Report, Kalayaan
Barangays Programs.
41
Maj.Gen. Jaime B. Buenaflor, commander of the AFP National Development Support Command (NDSC),
interview with author, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Civil Military Operations, J7, GHQ, Camp
Aquinaldo, Quezon City, Philippines, March 27, 2007.

157
5.2.3 COIN Plan: Targeting the CPP-NPA
5.2.3.1 Oplan Bantay Laya (2002-2006)
As soon as Arroyo issued EO 21, the AFP crafted a security document called the AFP 2001
National Military Strategy. From the document, it revealed the AFP’s challenges in simultaneously dealing
with various armed fronts: namely the communist movement and the Muslim threat groups. The entire AFP
inclusive of paramilitary and the police amounted to 120,000 personnel while the Communist Party of the
Philippines-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA) consisted of 9,500 armed regulars, the Moro Islamic
42
Liberation Front (MILF) between 10,000 and 15,000, and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) 1,500, which
demonstrated a force-to-space ratio dilemma. The AFP learned from their experience in their all-out-war
with the MILF in 2000, that the redeployment of forces to Mindanao from other parts of the country left a
vacuum in areas they were deployed from. The communists seized the opportunity to increase their
43
influence in these areas. Therefore, in order to maximize the effectiveness of their limited manpower, it
was decided that the AFP would increase military offensives in priority areas while using minimal forces to
contain threats from spilling over into other areas. This was also known as the “focus and contain”
44
strategy.
The so-called priority areas were initially determined to be the communist strongholds. Unlike
the Muslim armed groups that were restricted geographically to the Southern Philippines, the communists
45
were known to be operating in numerous provinces that covered the entire Philippines. Furthermore, the
AFP maintains that the CPP-NPA remains the largest threat to the stability of the country because of the
46
group’s objectives in taking over the government. To drive home the message that Arroyo meant
business, she ordered the AFP to eliminate the communist threat and dismantle their political organizations
47
by 2006.
How to implement the “focus and contain” concept was fleshed out in the AFP’s new COIN plan
released in December 2002. Oplan Bantay Laya I (Operation Plan Freedom Watch) narrowed its mission to
deal with the communists first before dealing with other threat groups. Many of its principles date back to

42
International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2000-2001. London: Routledge,
2000, pp. 205-206.
43
Cornelio H. Valancia Jr., “ Kapit Bisig RP-US-Military Exercises: A Key to the War on Terror in the
Philippines,” Research Report, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, April 2007, p. 12
44
General Headquarters Armed Forces of the Philippines, AFP National Military Strategy, Quezon City:
General Headquarters, 2001, pp. 20-21, 26-27 in Renato Cruz De Castro, “Abstract of Counterinsurgency in the
Philippines and the Global War on Terror. Examining the Dynamics of the Twenty-first Century Long Wars,
European Journal of East Asian Studies, 9,1, 2010, p. 147.
45
AFP National Military Strategy, 2001, pp. 20-21, 26-27 in Renato Cruz De Castro, “Abstract of
Counterinsurgency in the Philippines and the Global War on Terror. Examining the Dynamics of the Twenty-first
Century Long Wars, European Journal of East Asian Studies, 9,1, 2010, p. 147.
46
Maj. Gen. Reynald D. Sealana, Deputy Chief of Staff and Chairman, GRP-CCCH, interview with author,
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Civil Military Operations, J7, Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon
City, Philippines, August 3, 2009.
47
“5 years under Arroyo: A New Dictator Arises,” Davao Today, July 24, 2006. Available at:
http://davaotoday.com/main/2006/07/24/5-%C2%BD-years-under-arroyo-a-new-dictator-rises/. Accessed
October 19, 2012.

158
 48
Oplans formulated under Marcos, Aquino, and Ramos administrations. It was based on the
all-too-familiar operational methodology that hinged on sustaining military victories by coordinating with
other civilian agencies to deliver basic services to the people in the post-conflict stage. CMO is included in
each step. In the entry phase, CMO prepares for a possible encounter or battle. CMO operators interact with
the population to gain a situational awareness on both the needs of the people and enemy activities. During
military operations, initial CMO work such as information campaigns, if successful, can gain the support of
the people, and help the military maneuver in battlespace through intelligence. When insurgents are cleared,
CMO is geared towards establishing an environment where other civilian agencies can enter and resume
49
services for the people. By the time troops pullout, these agencies will take lead. The following fleshes
out the Clear-Hold-Consolidate-Develop (C-H-C-D) methodology:

1. Clear – neutralize the insurgent (Main actor: military, inclusive of CMO)

2. Hold –prevent the return of the insurgent (Main actor: military, inclusive of CMO)
3. Consolidate – sustain the gains of the military by initiating development (Main actor: civilian
agencies. Supporting role: military, inclusive of CMO)
4. Develop – spur economic development (Main actor: civilian agencies. Supporting role: military,
50
inclusive of CMO).

5.2.3.2 Understanding the AFP’s Perceptions on the CPP-NPA Battlespace: Establishing the
Groundwork for the Application of CMO
5.2.3.2.1 Background to “Knowing the Enemy”
While the developmental component of CMO was revived to support the nation’s holistic strategy
towards insurgency and the subsequent release of Oplan Bantay Laya I revealed operational procedures for
the military to follow, it was more difficult to discern how CMO was going to play out on the ground. A
clearer understanding on the factors that necessitated CMO was demonstrated in a PowerPoint presentation
dubbed “Knowing the Enemy.” In 2005, the General Headquarters of the AFP made this presentation
available to the public. This 335-slide show was intended to brief the military audience on the strategy and
tactics of the communist movement, its disposition, its political organization, the prevailing conditions on
the ground, and to furnish the AFP leadership with recommendations on how to carry out a successful
51
COIN operation. While CMO was not explicitly referred to in the presentation, it did underline the

48
Benjie Oliveros, “Oplan Bantay Laya as Arroyo’s Inhumane War,” Bulatlat, June 20, 2006. Available online
at: http://www.bulatlat.com/news/6-20/6-20-obl.htm. Accessed June 18, 2009.
49
Lt. Col. Ferozaldo Paul T. Regencia, Philippine Army, presentation made to author, AFP National
Development Support Command, Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, Philippines, October 8, 2007.
50
General Headquarters Armed Forces of the Philippines, AFP National Military Strategy, Quezon City:
General Headquarters, 2001, pp. 20-21, 26-27 in Renato Cruz De Castro, “Abstract of Counterinsurgency in the
Philippines and the Global War on Terror. Examining the Dynamics of the Twenty-first Century Long Wars,”
European Journal of East Asian Studies, 9,1, 2010, p. 147; Ecumenical Movement for Justice and Peace, “Oplan
Bantay Laya Primer,” PowerPoint presentation, 2006, slide no. 19.
51
General Headquarters, Armed Forces of the Philippines, Knowing the Enemy, PowerPoint presentation, 2005.
Hereafter cited as AFP, “Knowing the Enemy,” PowerPoint presentation, 2005.

159
complexities of the battlespace that could not be resolved entirely with standard combat operations. Listed
below are the main challenges the AFP faces in defeating the insurgents, and draws attention to areas that
suggests the need for CMO.

5.2.3.2.2 Geography and Topology

The first challenge the AFP faces in defeating the insurgency lies in the geographic configuration
of the islands. The Philippines is an island-nation, consisting of 7,107 islands and islets, of which
approximately 1,000 islands are inhabitable. The Philippines shares no land borders with other nations. In
terms of length, its coastline is ranked third in the world, with a combined length of some 36,289 km. The
Philippines has 3 major island groups: Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. Of the 88,574,614 Filipinos, more
than half are concentrated in the largest island, Luzon which houses the nation’s capital, Manila.
The composition of the Philippine archipelago works both in favor and disfavor for the insurgents.
On one hand, the dispersed islands have hampered the communist rebels’ ability to amass their forces to
defeat the government forces in their planned final offensive. Lacking naval transport, the sea is one natural
52
barrier, which has kept them cloistered in their respective island-strongholds.
On the other hand, the remoteness of many areas in the Philippines has allowed the Communist
Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA) to build their semi-independent bases that are
located throughout the archipelago. Combined with a lack of government presence and difficult
accessibility from outsiders, the CPP-NPA has been able to develop base areas with limited interference.
The CPP-NPA has deliberately scattered its bases across the islands so that the AFP forces would be spread
53
out thinly, preventing the government forces from decisively defeating them. The black dotted areas on
54
the map show the disposition of the communist guerrilla fronts produced from AFP intelligence.

52
Victor N. Corpus, Silent War, Quezon City: VNC Enterprises, 1989, p. 31. Hereafter cited as Corpus, Silent
War.
53
General Headquarters, Armed Forces of the Philippines, “Knowing the Enemy,” manuscript version of the
presentation, p.12. Hereafter cited as AFP, “Knowing the Enemy,” manuscript AFP, “Knowing the Enemy,”
manuscript, pp. 17-19.
54
In military jargon, disposition refers to stationing, arrangement, or positioning of troops/combatants to
prepare for military action (defense and attack).

160
Map 5.1: Disposition of Guerrilla Fronts

Source: “Knowing the Enemy” AFP PowerPoint presentation, 2005, slide no. 44.

In other words, the disposition of CPP-NPA bases in remote areas is the physical depth of the
battlespace that the AFP has to contend with. The depth here is considered to be areas that are difficult to
access by government forces but ideal for the communists to build sanctuaries and engage in guerrilla
55
warfare. To add to the difficulties in penetrating the depth, the Philippines has a rugged topography
consisting of active volcanoes, mountain ranges, dense forests, jungles, swamps, hills, and burols. The

55
“Knowing the Enemy,” PowerPoint presentation, 2005, slides 43-44.

161
longest mountain range in the country is the Sierra Madre, located on the largest island of Luzon, which
56
extends from Cagayan province in northern Luzon down to Aurora Province in Southern Tagalog.
57
Mountain ranges such as these and other topographic configurations such as volcanic craters have long
been ideal base locations for the communists since many parts remain inaccessible to outsiders due to its
58
tortuous terrain of steep ravines, dense forests, and overall isolation. Thus, any operations in the physical
depth require the AFP to operate in smaller and more mobile units.

5.2.3.2.3 Managing the Human Terrain: the Countryside

On top of the geographic and topographic factors, the CPP-NPA also takes into consideration the
human terrain when selecting their base areas. Their choice communities are usually situated in the
mountainous interior and other remote locations where limited accessibility makes it difficult for the
government to extend its presence. As these communities are typically lacking in basic services, the
59
CPP-NPA is able to capitalize on the community’s socio-economic woes to build their support. For
instance, communities that are comprised of the indigenous people of the Philippines known as the lumads
are ideal locations. Lumads belong to a marginalized minority that has plenty of grievances the communists
60
can direct their political activities towards. Furthermore, these resource-endowed regions attract mining
and logging companies that provide the following merits for the communists: one, exploitive business
practices makes the communist ideology attractive for the lumads; two, a source of financing for the
CPP-NPA. The NPA can extract “revolutionary taxes” from these big businesses through acts or threats of
terror; and three, the availability of existing local organs of political power (unions and cooperatives). As
these organizations are already in existence for the purpose of protecting people from exploitive business
practices, it saved the CPP-NPA time and energy of building support infrastructure from scratch, if they

56
During the Revolutionary Period, the Filipino rebels used the mountains as their hideouts and were able to
gain ample water and food from the natural environs.
57
Another example of a mountain range is the Zambales mountain range located in Western Luzon. The New
People’s Army was founded in 1969 in Capas. Assisted by mountainous surroundings; the location has been the
traditional maneuver space for the guerrillas. Though the AFP says the movement has splintered since 2007,
there are still 20 barangays in Capas that are under enemy influence. Gilbert Gapay, “ Preserving the Gains of
ISO through Bayanihan: A Concept Paper on 3MIB Bayanihan Operations,” Philippine Army Journal, 4th
Quarter, October-December 2007, pp. 33-38.
58
In Northern Mindanao, in the sitio of Lantad, is yet another example where the communists mastered a
treacherous terrain. Once a hotbed of the communist activity in the 1980s, it is now considered to be a cleared
area. Still, it represents an ideal guerrilla base, being located in the crater of a volcano. Its deep ravines and sharp
slopes serve as natural barriers from external attackers, not to mention the rugged configuration also limit the
number of entry and exit points. Furthermore, the natural cover serves as a perfect staging area for ambushes and
sniper fire. See “A New Sunrise,” Army Troopers – The Philippine Army News Magazine, June 2008. p. 17.
59
AFP, “Knowing the Enemy,” manuscript version, p. 15.
60
AFP, “Knowing the Enemy,” manuscript version, pp. 13-15. Military operations in lumad areas were also
complicated by the fact that certain areas were recognized as legitimate ancestral domains by the government
and subsequently designated as Zones of Peace. This meant that armed encounters could not occur within the
established perimeters. While it was supposed to protect people from military operations, it hampered the AFP
from hunting down the communists who had built their bases within these zones. AFP, “Knowing the Enemy,”
manuscript version, pp. 17-19.

162
 61
could convert them to the communist cause.
It was revealed from the presentation that the AFP was acutely aware that it was not just the
physical terrain that allows the communists to engage in effective guerrilla warfare but also their ability to
manipulate the human depth. Based on these observations, the AFP latched onto the correlation between
government neglect of these communities and the support the communists gained from the people. In order
to reverse this situation, the AFP expressed the need to strengthen the existing
62
clear-hold-consolidate-development (C-H-C-D) methodology. In it, the development stage was seen as a
means to divert the people’s attention from the lures of communism and instead, have them focus on
securing better economic opportunities with government support. From the military operational standpoint,
63
this was one way to insulate the community from the re-entry of insurgents. Though not specified in the
presentation, the AFP was already leaving behind soldiers to conduct CMO activities (medical outreach and
64
civil engineering) in cooperation with other civilian agencies.
At the same time, it strongly suggests that this was a partial solution to the force-space ratio
problem. The CPP-NPA deliberately scatters their bases to prevent the AFP from applying decisive force on
a concentration of their armed elements. Furthermore, it has the effect of overstretching the government
forces. Once the AFP clears a communist area, they cannot stay long with their limited resources. As soon
as the AFP withdraws, the communists can reenter. Therefore this AFP methodology is also seen for its
utility in delegating the post-clearing stage to other government agencies. A government presence with the
improved delivery of basic services in a community would help repel any returning communists by
providing a better economic alternative to the people.

5.2.3.2.4 Managing the Human Terrain: Urban Sector

The CPP-NPA engages in intensive and widespread political activities. Communist cadres are
dispatched to communities to mobilize the agricultural workers (inclusive of the indigenous people),
65
industrial workers, youth, women, the urban poor, and the middle forces. In particular, the AFP takes a
particular interest in the youth and student sector, since the communists prey on impressionable youth for
recruits and subsequently rely on their “articulate, dynamic, and liberal-minded” traits to form the
66
propaganda machinery of the party.
The following identifies the percentage makeup of the CPP-NPA’s support base:

61
AFP, “Knowing the Enemy,” manuscript version, p. 16.
62
AFP, “Knowing the Enemy,” PowerPoint presentation, 2005, slide no. 24.
63
RDD Branch, OG3, PA, “Community Organizing Towards Economic Development,” Army Journal, April –
June, 2007, p.7.
64
Lt. Col. Bienvenido R. Datuin, Jr., “Visayas ISO Transition Plan: A Breakthrough in the AFP’s
Counterinsurgency Campaign,”Army Troopers – The Philippine Army News magazine, March 2009, pp. 27-29.
65
In the Philippines, the middle forces constitute the middle and upper class, private sector, and the church;
“Knowing the Enemy, manuscript version, pp. 6-7. Middle forces include religious workers, professionals,
teachers, local politicians, and small entrepreneurs.
66
AFP, “Knowing the Enemy,” manuscript version, p. 17.

163
1. Peasants 75 percent
2. Labor 15 percent
3. Youth and Students/ Middle Forces 8 percent
4. National Bourgeoisie 2 percent67

While the AFP views rural areas as the recruiting grounds for foot soldiers to support the armed
component of the CPP-NPA, the AFP sees equally threatening, the underground political movement by
68
sectoral groups in urban areas. The urban to rural ratio of political work in this period was determined by
69
the AFP to be 60:40. As the CPP-NPA’s strategy is to encircle the city from the countryside, when the
time is ripe, a general offensive would be led from rural areas while the communist urbanites would
orchestrate the popular uprising from the cities. When the two converged, a takeover of the government
70
could be realized. These were the political dimensions that came into play in the overall AFP’s threat
perceptions. This PowerPoint presentation brought to light the AFP’s interest in operating in urban areas.
Even though they are far from battle zones, cities and towns are still considered to be part of the communist
battlespace, primarily because it allows the CPP-NPA to expand their political infrastructure.
Though the presentation does not make explicit references to CMO as a means for the soldier to
operate in urban areas, the awareness has helped develop a course of action that the AFP would take in
approaching the urban depth of the battlespace. This became more visibly apparent after CMO was
institutionalized when soldiers began to be frequently deployed to urban centers to conduct community
outreach programs and information campaigns.

5.2.3.2.5 Expanding the Role of the Soldier to Meet the Needs of the CPP-NPA Battlespace
“Knowing the Enemy” also drew attention to the inadequacies of the soldier in dealing with the
political-socio-economic context of the insurgency. The method that the AFP uses in highlighting the
existing gap is through a comparison made between a typical AFP infantryman and a NPA combatant.
Whilst in terms of initial combat training, both are coequal, the NPA cadre is considered to be superior in
his interaction with people, as he devotes much attention to propaganda work and party organizing. The
NPA literally spends longer periods in a community, “eating, sleeping, working, and working” with the
people while conducting social investigation, organizing party organs, holding lectures, recruiting, and
providing support for people through rudimentary medical and para-legal assistance. Per contra, the AFP
soldier only stays in the field for a limited time and activities involving socio-economic assistance and

67
“Knowing the Enemy,” presentation, slide no. 29. National Bourgeoisie referred to the educated and skilled
workers. E.g. doctors, lawyers, and professors. The middle forces constitute the left-leaning political/advocacy
groups.
68
Sectoral groups include organized labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and
youth groups.
69
“Knowing the Enemy,” manuscript version, p. 5. The national bourgeoisie sector is composed of national
politicians, business leaders, and big compradors.
70
“Knowing the Enemy,” manuscript version, pp. 6; 12.

164
 71
information activities are for the short-term. In sum, the presentation underlined the need for the AFP to
actively enhance their skills in interacting with the people on a long-term basis.

5.2.3.2.6 Summary
Though the presentation does not furnish the military audience with specifics on CMO per se, it
did point out how the CPP-NPA was able to dominate the human terrain through its extensive and
sophisticated political activities. In other words, the AFP was facing a task that required more than combat
skills to defend the country from the growing menace of communism. This perception was reinforced in
other publication that came up with specifics on how the military’s non-combatant roles can make a
difference in staving-off the communist threat. For instance the DND 2004 Accomplishment Report cites
that the re-introduction of Special Operations Teams (SOT) had improved the COIN campaign against the
CPP-NPA. The SOTs were the main weapon of Oplan Lambat Bitag I and II, which were aimed at
dismantling communist political infrastructure in the countryside through a combination of CMO,
intelligence, and combat (see chapter four). The SOTs in this period were accredited for stemming its
72
growth and ultimately reducing them to insignificant numbers. According to the accomplishment report,
there were 282 SOT sorties to win the people’s support for the government in CPP-NPA affected barangays,
with 236 ongoing. Similarly, in alleviating the socio-economic plight of the marginalized people, the
Philippine Army conducted 347 Community Assistance and Rural Empowerment for Social Services
(CARES) activities. Therefore, the shift in attention to methods to deal with the population was bearing
73
some results. By June 2004, the NPA strength was shown to have dropped from 8,892 to 8, 534.

5.2.4 A Critical Look in the Way the AFP Approached the Human Terrain: Human Rights
While it appeared that the National Internal Security Plan (NISP), Oplan Bantay Laya I
(2002-2006), and “Knowing the Enemy” presentation was preparing the AFP towards a more sophisticated
approach to the communist insurgency that relied on providing clearer guidelines in approaching the human
terrain, in retrospect, in the immediate years before institutionalization, the AFP was still undergoing the
same problems they experienced in the past. In the process of relearning the tenets of CMO, the AFP still
had a tendency to resort to indiscriminate COIN measures that were alienating the population.
Contrary to perceptions that the communist threat was decreasing, with the reduction of armed
fighters, by the end of Arroyo’s first term in 2006, an American embassy cable revealed that
communist-affected barangays role from 1,969 in 2001 to 2,129 in 2006, confirming that the communists
74
were gaining ground in extending their political reach in communities.

71
AFP, “Knowing the Enemy,” manuscript version, pp. 34-35.
72
Renato Cruz De Castro, “The 21st Century Armed Forces of the Philippines: Orphan of Counter-insurgency
or Military Geared for the Long War of the Century?”, ContemporaryPolitics, vol. 16, issue 2, 2010, p. 158.
Hereafter cited at Cruz de Castro, “The 21st Century Armed Forces of the Philippines.”
73
Philippines Department of Nation Defense, Accomplishment Report, January – June 2004.
74
American Embassy in Manila (2006-12-28). “Latest Drive Against the New People’s Army.” WikiLeaks,
WikiLeaks cable: 06MANILA5097. Available online at:
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/12/06MANILA5097.html#. Accessed April 10, 2012.

165
 One of the tell-tale signs that the population approach was not working was that Oplan Bantay
Laya I, was accompanied with a sharp rise in political killings, reaching almost half of what it was during
the period when political repressions was strongest under Marcos (1972-1986).

Table 5.1: Political Killings (2001-2006)

Political Killings
(2001 to 2006)
2001 98
2002 111
2003 128
2004 73
2005 182
2006 98
(As of June 2006)

TOTAL 690

Source: Statistics from the Karapatan presented in Banjie Oliveros, “Oplan Bantay Laya as Arroyo’s
Inhumane War,” Bulatlat, Vol. VI, No. 20, June 25 – July 1, 2006. Available online at:
http://www.bulatlat.com/news/6-20/6-20-obl.htm.

Therefore, it was no surprise when human rights organizations and other activists gave the AFP’s
presentation, “Knowing the Enemy” a stinging reception. The bulk of the criticism was aimed at the AFP’s
75
blacklisting of legal associations, party-list groups, and other sectoral organizations. They lambasted the
AFP’s COIN stance that was bent on destroying the “political infrastructure” without properly
differentiating NPA combatants from legal democratic organizations. In their own words, they called the
76
AFP’s methodology as a “Psychological Warfare (PSYWAR) program.”
Thus AFP’s 2005 presentation, “Knowing the Enemy” only reinforced perceptions by activists
that Arroyo was on a crusade to crack down on any form of political dissidence and this brought back
painful memories of Martial Law. Notwithstanding, the PowerPoint presentation was removed from public
77
eye by then-Defense Secretary, Avelino Cruz.
Nevertheless, the PowerPoint presentation represented a critical juncture in the way the AFP
approached insurgencies. First of all, it provides an insight into the AFP’s mindset concerning the complex

75
Slide no. 228-279 from “Knowing the Enemy” are devoted to listing organizations deemed to be front
organizations of the CPP-NPA.
76
Spokesperson for Karapatan, interview with author, Citadel Inn, Manila, Philippines, July 24, 2008.
77
Dabet Castaneda and Alexander Martin Remollino, “A Reign of Silence by GMA,” part 2, Bulatlat, Vol. V.,
No. 14, May 15-21, 2005. Available online at: http://bulatlat.com/news/5-14/5-14-investigative2.htm. Accessed
October 29, 2012.

166
battlespace that the communists operated in. This laid down the groundwork for the AFP to devise and
implement operations that would allow the AFP to maneuver in the human terrain.
Second of all, this approach also uncovered the problematic side of the AFP’s COIN program,
especially in the realm of human rights. The military was seen to be overstepping their boundaries by
entering civilian spheres. As they did not have strict guidelines on how to differentiate combatants from
civilians, and differentiating legal activists from the armed component of the CPP-NPA, it culminated into
serious human rights violations. By the time, CMO was institutionalized in 2006; more efforts were made
to clean up the act of abusive soldiers. CMO officers interviewed admitted that the behavior of errant
78
soldiers and their human rights violations were prolonging insurgencies. Thus, more focus was placed on
making the soldiers aware that behavior towards the people also plays into the outcome of a military
mission.
In sum, in the years preceding the institutionalization of CMO, the AFP was grappling with ways
to improve their maneuverability over the insurgent battlespace. As the human dimension was once again
recognized to be a key variable in conducting a successful military operation, efforts were made to
determine methods to overcome their deficiencies in dealing with people.

5.3 Tailoring CMO to Target the Muslim Battlespace

5.3.1 Overview
In dealing with the Muslim threat groups, fine-tuning CMO to match this particular theater only
began in earnest around 2000, albeit slowly at first, and then accelerating in pace. It began with the
formation of the Special Advocacy on Literacy/Livelihood and Advancement for Muslims (SALAAM)
79
units, composed of Muslim soldiers (see Chapter 6). These units entered impoverished Muslim
communities for the purpose of winning the hearts and minds of the people through literacy programs and
small-scale socio-economic assistance. Larger projects dealing with infrastructure-building and medical
services also began to appear around the same time. There are several factors perceived to be behind these
developments in regards to this theater. They are listed below:

5.3.2 Lack of Resources

In retrospect, one of the factors behind the emergence of CMO on the Muslim front was because
practicalities called for it. The AFP was faced with battling both the communists and Muslim rebels and as
amplified in the AFP’s 2001 National Military Strategy, the AFP was left without choice but to economize
their allocation of combat power due to budgetary constraints and limited manpower. Therefore, the focus
of intense military operations was directed towards priority threats, while a policy of containment was used
80
for lesser threats.
The Muslim front, aside from the war in the early 1970s, has generally been considered far less

78
Maj. Batara, October 3, 2007.
79
Maj. Batara, July 29, 2009.
80
Cruz de Castro, “Abstract of Counter-Insurgency in the Philippines and the Global War on Terror,” p. 147.

167
threatening than the armed communists. While it remains true, the largest Muslim group, the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) has quasi-conventional strength, being equipped with high-power firearms and
capabilities to amass their forces unlike the communists (NPA fighters do not carry sophisticated
81
weapon-systems and face challenges in concentrating their forces as they are geographically dispersed),
the Muslim front is restricted geographically to the Southern Philippines, at least 800 km away from the
capital. The distance from the central government minimizes concerns over the possibility that the conflict
would spillover. These are likely reasons for the AFP’s choice in containing the Muslim threat, which was
82
clarified with the second COIN plan (Oplan Bantay Laya II) launched in 2006 under President Arroyo.
Nonetheless, periodically, a military solution to the problem has been attempted. These entailed
83
full-scale offensives that resulted in the capture of key base camps of the MILF. While some circles
within the government and military preferred this approach, it was not feasible, since these
84
resource-intensive military operations could not be sustained over long stretches of time. Therefore, an
alternative to a costly heavy-on-guns approach was to mobilize soldiers for “winning hearts and minds”
projects that not only secured the presence of the soldiers in security-compromised areas, but it had the
supposed effect of allowing the AFP to administer costly combat power selectively on critical enemy
85
vulnerabilities, while using friendly persuasion on non-combatants.

5.3.3 Shift in Warfare

Another factor that underlined the necessity of CMO was the shift in how the battles were fought.
The wars that took place in the Mindanao region beginning with the Moro National Liberation Front
(MNLF) and then followed by its breakaway group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), were
fought along conventional lines. Battlespace management on the side of the Muslim insurgents was dictated
more by territorial control, which reflected their aspirations to seek broader autonomy, if not complete
separation from the state. This was in sharp contrast with the armed communist movement that pursued a
mobile warfare, depending more on the support of the population in their areas of operations rather than
86
physical control.
After the peace agreement signed with the MNLF in 1996, the MILF emerged to become the
largest Muslim rebel force with numbers hovering in the 12,000-range. The MILF built its strategy on

81
Soliman M. Santos,”Delays in the Peace Negotiations between the Philippines Government and Moro Islamic
Liberation Front: Causes and Prescriptions,” working paper, East-West Center, No.3, January 2005, p. 6
82
Cesar P. Pobre with Raymund Jose G. Quilop at al., In Assertion of Sovereignty: the Peace Process, vol. 2,
Quezon City: Office of Strategic and Special Studies Armed Forces of the Philippines, 2009, p. 127.
83
These offensives refer to ones launched in 2000 and another in 2003.
84
International Crisis Group (ICG), The Philippines: The Collapse of Peace in Mindanao, October 23, 2008,
Asia Briefing No. 83.
85
While CMO officers did not directly bring up the topic of the AFP’s lack in equipment and funding, they
generally concur on that CMO is a cost-effective way to deal with insurgencies and security problems that draws
its roots from socio-economic grievances. Major General Reynald D. Sealana, Deputy Chief of Staff and
Chairman, GRP-CCCH, interview with author, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for CMO, J7, Camp General
Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City, August 3, 2009.
86
United Nations Children’s Fund and IBON Foundation, Inc., Uncounted Lives: Children, women and conflict
in the Philippines, UNICEF and IBON, December 2007, pp. 33-34.

168
defending its sprawling camps, which not only served as the base of its operations and housed communities,
but were also located in areas that were claimed to be rightfully belonging to the Muslims. Therefore, the
AFP responded differently to the Muslim front, applying the advantage they had in firepower and
87
conventional capabilities to administer force on the fixed targets that the MILF provided. Most intense
of these campaigns were those launched in 2000 and 2003.
Consequently, the offensives resulted in the loss of its major base camps, and the MILF switched
from a fixed positional warfare to one that relied more on classic guerrilla tactics. These involved
small-unit action that sought to harass government forces through raids and ambushes and avoided a
head-on conventional clash with government forces. They also resorted to increasing mobility over the
88
battlespace and concealing their field commands in populated areas.
In response, the AFP had to shift their ground tactics to adjust to this type of mobile warfare,
which required a more sophisticated form of maneuver warfare that would allow the soldiers to enter the
depth that the MILF had retreated to.

5.3.4 MILF Base Camps and the Peace Process

Since 1996, the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) have
engaged in on-and-off peace talks. While the government views their grievances are legitimate, especially
since the Muslim Filipinos have been victims of neglect by the central government, the most contentious
issue has been the degree of autonomy that could be given to the Muslims without impinging on the
89
territorial integrity of the Philippines.
One controversial step for the government in moving the peace process forward was the
recognition of the MILF camps. The MILF insisted that any ceasefire could not be implemented without its
recognition. These bases not only served military purposes but also symbolized the political and religious
90
aspirations of their movement. Beginning from 1997, in attempts to move the peace process forward,
the Philippine government and the MILF signed an “Agreement for General Cessation of Hostilities.” A
91
ceasefire ensued and the government recognized 7 out of the 46 known MILF bases. Nevertheless,

87
Fernando M. Reyeg and Ned B. Marsh, “The Filipino Way of War: Irregular Warfare through the Centuries,”
thesis, Monterey, California, Naval Postgraduate School, December 2011, p. 111. Hereafter cited as Reyeg and
Marsh, “The Filipino Way of War.”
88
Cesar P. Pobre with Raymund Jose G. Quilop at al., In Assertion of Sovereignty: the Peace Process, vol. 2,
Quezon City: Armed Forces of the Philippines Office of Strategic and Special Studies, 2009, the p. 4; Soliman M.
Santos,”Delays in the Peace Negotiations between the Philippines Government and Moro Islamic Liberation
Front: Causes and Prescriptions,” working paper, East-West Center, No.3, January 2005, p. 6. Hereafter cited as
Santos, “Delays in the Peace Negotiations between the Philippines Government and Moro Islamic Liberation
Front: Causes and Prescriptions.”
89
See Santos, “Delays in the Peace Negotiations between the Philippines Government and Moro Islamic
Liberation Front: Causes and Prescriptions.”
90
Santos,”Delays in the Peace Negotiations between the Philippines Government and Moro Islamic Liberation
Front: Causes and Prescriptions,” p. 9.
91
Details on the agreement is provided by Abhoud Syed M. Lingga, “Peace Process in Mindanao, The
MILF-GRP Negotiations,” paper delivered during the Round Table Discussion on Updates on Muslims in
Mindanao, sponsored by the Institute of Islamic Studies, University of the Philippines on February 7, 2002 at
Romulo Hall, UP Diliman, Quezon City. Available at:

169
following administrations deemed these as a threat and launched full-scale offensives in two separate
occasions. The first was in 2000, when then-President Joseph Estrada launched an all-out-war against the
MILF. This resulted in the fall of Camp Abubakr, the MILF’s headquarters, and a base compound covering
92
100km, along with other MILF installations (13 major camps and 43 minor camps). In 2003, under
President Arroyo, another AFP offensive was launched against the MILF, resulting in the capture of its new
93
military headquarters, the Buliok Compound in 2003.
It was only at the beginning of 2005, when peace talks resumed with the MILF that once again,
the government agreed to recognize some of their bases. As of 2005, the MILF had 14 guerrilla base
94
commands, located mostly in Central Mindanao. The on-going peace process and the acknowledgement
and verification of certain MILF bases had implications on how the AFP could manage the battlespace.
These base commands are referred to by the AFP as “areas of temporal stay” and due to the
95
ceasefire agreement and peace talks, they are off-limits to the AFP. This works both to the advantage and
disadvantage to the AFP. On one hand, these recognized base commands are in fixed geographical areas,
making it easier for the AFP to monitor their activities and prevent them from expanding. On the other hand,
there were concerns that the MILF were using these bases to quietly train their members and build up their
96
forces, using the ceasefire agreement to their advantage. To add to their concerns, there were reports that
these bases were serving as sanctuaries for militant groups, not recognized by the government (i.e. the ASG,
remnants of the MNLF, and Jemaah Islamiyah). Though the MILF maintains they are separate from these
other organizations, they are linked to each other through kinship or ethno-linguistic ties. Elements of the
MILF that harbor sympathy of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), have allowed them to seek refuge in the
cease-fire compliant base areas. The same has been said for the remnants of the Moro National Liberation
97
Front (MNLF) as well as foreign terror groups. This tangled web of relations has frustrated the AFP’s
98
efforts in conducting military operations.
With a ceasefire in effect, and to avoid jeopardizing the peace talks through unexpected military
encounters, CMO became a means for the AFP to extend their presence in a friendly manner in the environs

http://www.yonip.com/archives/BANGSAMORO/Moro-000007.html. Accessed October 20, 2012.

92
See Vitug and Gloria, Under the Crescent Moon, pp. 106-110 for details about the make-up of the camp.
93
President Arroyo argued that this offensive was not targeting the MILF per se, but rather to eliminate the base
that were allegedly harboring criminal groups. See Jeffrey M. Tupas and Aquiles Z. Zonio, “Gov’t troops take
over “mansion” of top MILF leader,” PDI Mindanao, February 17, 2003. Reprinted in AFP website:
http://afp-cmo.tripod.com/articles-2003/02-23-govt-troops-take-over-mansion-of-top-milf-leader.html/ Accessed
October 20, 2012.
94
Armed Forces of the Philippines Intelligence Estimate for 2006 in Leonardo I. Pena, “Finding the Missing
Link to a Successful Philippine Counterinsurgency Strategy, thesis, Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate
School, 2007, p. 17.
95
Lt. Col. Rodrigo T. Gregorio GSD (INF) Philippine Army, Assistant Chief of Staff for CMO, G7, interview
with author, Headquarters 1st Infantry (Tabak) Division, Philippine Army, Labangan, Zamboanga del Sur,
October 29, 2010.
96
Reyeg and Marsh, “The Filipino Way of War,” p. 111.
97
A peace treaty was concluded with the MNLF in 1996 but the agreement did not call for the disarmament of
its fighters. The small minority that did not return to civilian life maintained their armed presence in Sulu.
98
International Crisis Group (ICG), The Philippines: Counter-Insurgency Vs. Counter-Terrorism in Mindanao,
May 14, 2008, Asia Report No. 152.

170
outside of the camps. From the findings made in a case study conducted on Zamboanga Peninsula, it
appeared the AFP could simultaneously demonstrate their support for the peace process by extending
socio-economic assistance to the Muslims and at the same time, making sure the MILF remains contained
99
in their base areas (see Chapter 7).

5.3.5 Multiple Threat Groups

The AFP not only has to contend with the MILF but other threat groups as well. They include the
100
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), the remnants of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), and the
presence of foreign terror groups. The ASG in particular has added a complex variable to the battlespace.
Even though their numbers are small, complete eradication remains elusive, as the group has devolved into
a network of lawless elements, which is bound more by financial gain rather than religious or separatist
ideology. Additionally, the ASG is also known to support the presence of foreign terrorist groups such as Al
Qaeda, especially in the late 1990s and the beginning of the millennium, and later the Jemaah Islamiyah by
101
providing them sanctuaries in return for training and funding.
The ASG modus operandi is based on kidnappings where the ransom money collected has
secured them with a steady flow of funding. Their hostages are typically transported to their strongholds in
Basilan and Sulu, or in remote islands nearby. The AFP has responded with pursuit operations that require
the use of Special Forces and intelligence, because the ASG is adept in concealing themselves in the jungle
102
terrain and remote communities.
Concerning the latter, the population is considered to be the key element behind the support of
the ASG. Though lacking in the political appeal that the MILF has, the ransom-money collected from their
kidnappings, not only finance their operations, but is used to enrich their families, communities, and
103
pay-off so-called subcontractors that help them with the operations.
It was primarily based on these concerns that SALAAM units were deployed to remote Muslim
communities. As CMO officer, Major Batara explained, the remoteness of these areas made the people
susceptible to the lures of the ASG and by having Muslim soldiers initiating the first contact from the
government side, the AFP could simultaneously demonstrate the concerns for the community and provide
104
the residents with information on how “dangerous” the ASG are.

99
Even under President Ramos, developmental activities conducted around the MILF bases as a strategy to
prevent the expansion of MILF control. See Vitug and Gloria, Under the Crescent Moon, pp. 149-150.
100
The MNLF is considered to be a latent threat. By 2010, their numbers were thought to be in the 600-range,
and are not expected to increase. Col. Wilson O. Mitra, CMO officer, interview with author, Camp Don Basilio
Navarro, Western Mindanao Command, Calarian, Zamboanga City, Philippines, October 27, 2010. Hereafter
cited as Col. Mitra, interview, October 27, 2010.
101
Col. Wilson O. Mitra, CMO officer, interview with author, Camp Don Basilio Navarro, Western Mindanao
Command, Calarian, Zamboanga City, Philippines, October 27, 2010.
102
Reyeg and Marsh, “The Filipino Way of War,” pp. 126-127.
103
Edgar Araojo, Professor of Political Science at Western Mindanao State University, interview with author,
Baliwasan Central School (Elementary School), Baliwasan Barangay, Zamboanga City, Philippines, October 25,
2010; Bong Garcia, interview with author, Zamboanga City, October 26, 2010.
104
Maj. Batara, October 3, 2007.

171
5.3.6 The Entry of American Forces
5.3.6.1 Background to the Entry of American Forces
Upon further examination on existing pieces of information available and with the benefit of
hindsight, it can be argued that CMO initiatives directed towards the Muslim theater would have remained
piece-meal if it not have been for the entry of American forces, especially since much of the CMO
remained focused on countering the communist threat and tailoring CMO to the Muslims was still in its
embryonic stage. Though there is limited information on the American role in the institutionalization of
CMO if any, at least it is evident that they helped laid down groundwork to increase and accelerate CMO
activities in the Muslim South.
The background to this development came unexpectedly with the simultaneous attacks launched
by Al Qaeda on American soil in 2001. The shock and horror of the September 11th attacks reverberated to
the far corners of the world. The Philippines was one of the first countries to declare support for the United
States and joined the coalition of foreign countries supporting the United States in what became known as
105
the Global War on Terror (GWOT).
Consequently, the Philippines became the United States’ second front in fighting international
terror. As most of the attention went into to the unfolding war in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Philippines
remained a sidelight. But in actuality, at its peak, the United Stated deployed over 1,300 troops to the
Philippines for the main purpose of eradicating its homegrown terrorist group located in the Southern-most
106
region of the Philippines.
American security concerns in the Southern Philippines emerged even before September 11th.
The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) was involved in a series of high-profile kidnappings that included American
107
citizens in 2000 and 2001. In response to the second kidnapping, the United States sent military
advisors to assist the AFP in recovering the hostages by providing intelligence in 2002 but maintained an
108
extremely low profile. But with the September 11th terror attacks, the United States fixated their
109
concerns on the links that the ASG had with Al Qaeda and the Jemaah Islamiyah.
On the side of the Philippines, September 11th presented an opportunity for the president to revive
the weakened military alliance with the Philippines and gain access to the much needed security assistance

105
For further details on reasons behind president Arroyo’s support see Zachary, Militant Islam in Southeast
Asia, p. 202.
106
Larry Niksch, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperations, CRS Report RL31263,
updated April 8, 2003, p. 10.
107
One of the most attention-grabbing kidnapping incidents was the Sipadan Hostage Crisis in 2000. 21
hostages were kidnapped from a Malaysian resort island and delivered in high-speed boats to their base in Jolo,
Philippines. Involving American citizens, an American citizen who had converted to Islam, kidnapped in 2000
and another was the Dos Palmas Kidnappings in 2001, where 20 people were kidnapped from a resort on the
Philippines island of Palawan. Amongst the hostages were an American missionary couple and a
Peruvian-American.
108
Larry Niksch, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperations, CRS Report RL31263,
updated April 8, 2003, p. 11.
109
Jemaah Islamiyah, is an Indonesian-based Islamic militant group, most notorious for the 2002 Bali hotel
bombing resulting in over 200 deaths.

172
 110
to bolster the AFP’s counterinsurgency (COIN) and counter-terror capabilities.

5.3.6.2 Debating the Legality of American Military Presence

Philippine-American relations go back over a century, with the entry of American soldiers after
the Spanish-American War. After independence, the two countries formed a military alliance bound by the
Mutual Defense Treaty (1951). Throughout the following decades, the United States was instrumental in
providing military assistance to the Philippines in the form of hardware, logistics, and training. This was
reciprocated by the Philippines in large part by the 1947 Philippines-U.S. Military Bases Agreement, which
111
allowed the United States maintain its military presence in Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, this was all to
change when the Philippine Senate voted down by a margin of 1, the extension of the base leases in
112
1991. While the alliance was still intact, the pullout of American soldiers dramatically reduced
American military funding for the Philippines. Without the extra-support, most of the nation’s generated
funds for the AFP was absorbed by personnel costs, leaving very little to maintain or upgrade the aging
113
military equipment, thereby impacting the AFP’s capabilities to fight insurgencies.
After the September 11th attacks, President Arroyo seized the chance to resurrect the faltering
military alliance. As a result of her support for the GWOT, she was rewarded USD 93 million in November
2001 in order to fight the ASG. From October 2001, the U.S. began to send military observers to assess
114
AFP capabilities in fighting the ASG. This was followed by American military personnel being sent to
train their Filipino counterparts in counter-terrorism, equipping them, as well as assisting them in
115
intelligence acquisition.
Nevertheless, having ground support was a contentious issue. Even before the September 11th
attacks, George W. Bush pushed for a more direct role for the American forces (involving combat) in

110
Renato Cruz de Castro, “The Revitalized Philippine-U.S. Security Relations: A Ghost from the Cold War or
an Alliance for the 21st Centruy?,” Asian Survey, 43:6, November/December 2003, pp. 971-988; Renato Cruz de
Castro, “Abstract of Counter-Insurgency in the Philippines and the Global War on Terror. Examining the
Dynamics of the Twenty-first Centruy Long Wars,” European Journal of East Asian Studies 9.1, 2010, pp. 151.
In return for President Arroyo’s support, President Bush promised not only funds to upgrade AFP capabilities
and other defense-related concerns but also included economic realms as well (food aid, poverty reduction, trade
benefits). See Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia, pp. 205-206.
111
An instance that shows how much the AFP depended on the United States can be see from figures during the
Aquino administration. In 1989, the Americans provided US$127.6 million in military aid that covered 80
percent of the Philippines’ procurement, operations, and maintenance costs in 1989. Statistics from Country Data,
“Philippines Defense Spending and Industry,” June 1991. Available at:
http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-10516.html. Accessed May 18, 2009.
112
See more on the post-September 11th attacks on the Philippine-U.S. security alliance in Renato Cruz de
Castro, “The Revitalized Philippine-U.S. Security Relations: A Ghost from the Cold War or an Alliance for the
21st Century?”, Asian Survey, 43:6, November/December 2003, pp. 971-988;
113
For details about the decline in hardware and its impact on COIN capabilities see Renato Cruz de Castro,
“Abstract of Counter-Insurgency in the Philippines and the Global War on Terror. Examining the Dynamics of
the Twenty-first Century Long Wars,” European Journal of East Asian Studies 9.1, 2010, pp. 147-148.
114
Larry Niksch, “Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperations,” CRS Report RL31263,
updated April 8, 2003, p. 7
115
Roel Pareno, “US to train more RP soldiers in counterterrorism,” The Philippines Star, June 28, 2004.
Available at: http://www.philstar.com/philstar/NEWS200406280405.htm. Accessed July 12, 2004.

173
fighting the ASG that had kidnapped American citizens. Arroyo was no less eager to welcome American
soldiers, but she remained adamant in drawing the line between advisory and assistance roles and their
116
direct role in military action.
The main reason behind this was that Arroyo wanted to deflect any criticism on what appeared to
compromise Philippine sovereignty. Without the base agreement, the legality of allowing American troops
to enter the Philippines basically depended on the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) - forged by Arroyo’s
117
predecessor, President Joseph Estrada with the United States in 1999.
Still, the “popular” interpretation of the 1987 Philippine Constitution does not allow the presence
118
of foreign troops on its soil to conduct combat operations and it was decided that the best way to serve
both American and Philippines security interests was to avoid operations that could be seen as impinging
119
on Filipino sovereignty. As it turned out, the two sides would work around this problem by having U.S.
forces in the Philippines on a rotational basis and limiting their role to advising.

5.3.6.3 U.S. Forces Operating on the Ground and the Significance of CMO
How CMO fits into the scheme of things appears to be linked with the outcome of negotiations
that played out between the two countries in deciding the degree of military support that the American
military could provide on the ground. As the U.S. forces could not participate in combat, any direct
operations on the ground were to be restricted to CMO and/or humanitarian assistance.
Balikatan (shoulder-to-shoulder) 2002 helped determine the “character” of American support for
the AFP. In February 2002, 1,300 American troops were deployed to the island of Basilan, with 300 of them
designated to do civic action (coming primarily from Navy engineers), alongside with 1,200 of their
120
Filipino counterparts in this joint military exercise. In previous joint-military exercises, the focus was
on enhancing AFP combat readiness and interoperability between the two countries in case of an external
121
attack. While some CMO activities were conducted, they remained more of a gesture of goodwill. With

116
Larry Niksch, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperations, CRS Report RL31263,
updated April 8, 2003, pp. 9-10.
117
Eric C. Ramos discusses the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) and its surrounding issues concerning its
legality in his thesis. “RP-Balikatan Exercises: A Peace-building Tool for Mindanao?” master’s thesis, Monterey,
CA: Naval Post Graduate School, December 2005, pp. 20; 22; 24-26. This was an agreement that dictated the
jurisdictional control over the soldiers concerning criminal offenses.
118
Herbert Docena, “The U.S. troops’ ‘unconventional’ presence,” posted in Governance, Peace and Public
Security, Stories, I Report, January 15, 2007, p. 3 as printed out. Available at: http://pcij.org/stories/the
-u-s-troops-unconventional-presence/ Accessed January 30, 2007.
119
This approach was mutually agreed upon even though it was pointed out from the American side that there
was nowhere to be found in the constitution, a clause that specifically banned foreign troops in conducting
combat operations on Philippine soil. Major Stuart L. Farris, “Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines,”
monograph, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command
and General Staff College, 2009, pp. 29-31 for a summary on the constitution issue.
120
Larry Niksch, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperations, CRS Report RL31265,
updated January 24, 2007, p.10. Balikatan 2002 was the first annul joint exercise held between the two countries
after September 11th. It focused on expanding counter-terrorism cooperation with the Philippines. Balikatan was
first established in 1981 and held annually until 1991. It was resumed in 2000 after the Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA) was ratified.
121
These CMO activities took place on the main island of Luzon.

174
Balikatan 2002, the nature of the joint-military exercise operations shifted to a COIN approach, geared
more towards eradicating homegrown terror groups terror groups in the Philippines, with a stronger focus
122
on activities to win over the population.
The CMO aspect, particularly civic action projects related to infrastructure building in Balikatan
was especially successful in getting positive media reviews and improving the perceptions of the Muslim
123
Filipinos towards the Americans. For at least the first few years, it was considered to have brought a
sense of normalcy to the island by flushing the ASG out. Civic action is also thought to have jump-started
124
economic development, or at least create an environment secure enough for more businesses to enter.
The success of Balikatan 2002 set a precedent for both militaries to concentrate on the human
terrain of the battlespace. This meant the key objectives were to gain the popular support of the people so
that it would ultimately deny the terrorists sanctuary, mobility, and resources. To win this support, CMO
activities such as Engineering Civic Action Program (ENCAP), Medical Civic Action Programs
125
(MEDCAP) and Dental Civic Action (DENCAP) were organized and implemented. And to reassure the
Filipino audience that the United States was committed but only from the sidelines, any CMO activity was
126
done in partnership with the AFP, with the latter taking lead.
Such CMO activities increased in numbers as both forces sought to replicate the success of
Basilan in Jolo and other parts of the Sulu Island chain. As these activities went beyond the rules of
engagement of the Balikatan exercise, tough negotiations on its continuation ensued between the two
127
countries.
In July 2002, the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF-P) was established under the
United States Pacific Command (PACOM) in order to retain the presence of American forces on a
128
rotational basis. Its mission was to support the Philippines in fighting terrorists, eliminating terrorist
129
havens, and building conditions for peace. The U.S. forces continued to respect Arroyo’s requests to
130
remain on the sidelines, and did not directly inject themselves in any fighting. The lines of operations

122
Rosalie Arcala Hall, “Boots on Unstable Ground: Democratic Governance of the Armed Forces under post
9/11 US-Philippine Military Relations,” Asia-Pacific Social Science Review 10:2, 2010, p. 31.
123
Larry Niksch, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperations, CRS Report RL31265,
updated April 8, 2003, p. 12.
124
Lt. Cmdr of the Joint Special Operations Task Force Philippines, Fred Kuebler (U.S.Forces), interview with
author, Camp Navarro, Western Mindanao Command, Zamboanga City, Philippines, October 3, 2007.
125
Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines, PowerPoint briefing, February 2008, version 2.
126
Major Tyler Wilson (Civil Military Operations Planner Civil Affairs, U.S. Army) and SSG Calen A. Bullard
(JSPTF-P), interview with author, Camp Navarro, Western Mindanao Command, Camp Navarro, Zamboanga
City, Philippines, July 28, 2009.
127
Larry Niksch, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperations, CRS Report RL31263,
updated April 8, 2003, pp. 12-13.
128
Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P) in Global Security.org. Available at
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/jsotf-p.htm. Accessed October 14, 2012.
129
Joint Special Operations Task Force-P Fact Sheet. Available at:
http://jsotf-p.blogspot.jp/2011/09/type-your-summary-here_20.html. Accessed October 14, 2012.
130
Fred Kuebler, Lt. Cmdr. of the Joint Special Operations Task Force Philippines, U.S. Forces, interview with
author, Camp Don Basilio Navarro, Western Mindanao Command, Calarian, Zamboanga City, Philippines,
October 3, 2007. Hereafter cited as Kuebler, interview, October 3, 2007; Joint Special Operations Task Force-P
Fact Sheet. Available at: http://jsotf-p.blogspot.jp/2011/09/type-your-summary-here_20.html. Accessed October

175
culminated into the following:

1. Building the capacity of the AFP through training, advice, and assistance.
2. Conducting CMO (civic action and humanitarian assistance) to help uplift the lives of people in
economically depressed areas.
131
3. Information operations as a means to improve the legitimacy of the Filipino government in the region.

To add further legal basis for existing activities of the U.S. forces, the concept of Kapit Bisig
132
(Linking Arms) strategic framework was proposed by the AFP in 2004 to PACOM and formally agreed
133
upon in July 2006. As Balikatan was originally established to assist the AFP in preparing for external
134
contingencies, critics questioned the legality of shifting this to internal security threats. Therefore, Kapit
Bisig became the new framework that would allow the U.S. forces to provide the AFP with the assistance
135
they needed in tackling terror. In it, a particular focus on CMO or humanitarian assistance was added. In
short, this new framework allowed the U.S. forces to extend their presence beyond what was stipulated in
the joint-military exercises of Balikatan, and humanitarian assistance would help justify their extended
136
presence.
Another development, which led to the strengthening of the AFP’s CMO by American
intervention, is found in the Philippines Defense Reform (PDR) in 2003. This was the outcome of a joint
Philippine-American defense assessment made over the capabilities of the AFP. The objective of this Joint
Defense Assessment (JDA) was to find deficiencies within the Philippine military establishment, and
provide the assistance required to improve these areas. In one of the 10 key areas of reform, CMO was
pointed out to be a critical component in addressing the socio-economic roots of insurgencies and thereby
requiring improved mechanisms for the AFP to work jointly with other civilian agencies, to bolster its
137
COIN campaigns.

14, 2012.
131
Col. Gregory Wilson, U.S. Army, “Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation: OEF-Philippines and the
Indirect Approach, “ Military Review, November-December 2006, p.4 as printed out. Available at U.S. Army
website: http://www.army.mil/professionalWriting/volumes/volume5/january_2007/1_07_1.html. Accessed
November 17, 2007.
132
Lt. Colonel Cornelio H. Valencia (Philippine Army), “Kapit Bisig RP-US Military Exercises: A Key to the
War on Terror in the Philippines,” research report, Alabama: Maxwell Air Force Base, April 2007, pp. 2-3.
Hereafter cited as Valencia, “Kapit Bisig RP-US Military Exercises.”
133
Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, March 24 2009. Available at:
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Armed+Services+Committee+testimony.-a0207539985. Accessed November 1,
2012.
134
Valencia, “Kapit Bisig RP-US Military Exercises,” pp. 5-6.
135
U.S. Congress, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, March 24, 2009. Available
At: http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Armed+Services+Committee+testimony.-a0207539985. Accessed
November 1, 2012.
136
Anthony Vargas, “RP, US troops to train in Central Mindanao,” ABS-CBN News, July 20, 2006. Available at:
http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/storypage.aspx?StoryId=44884. Accessed July 25, 2006.
137
Contents of the PDR can be viewed on the official website of the Philippine Department of National Defense.
Available at: http://www.dnd.gov.ph/DNDWEBPAGE_files/html/pdrpage.htm. Accessed November 5, 2012.

176
5.3.6.4 Summary on the American Dimension
In walking the legal tightrope, the Americans had to find ways to fulfill their mission to counter
global terrorism, while maintaining their respect towards Philippine sovereignty. As they could not directly
participate in combat operations, having being limited to an advisory role, CMO became the one option that
allowed the Americans to directly inject themselves in operations on the ground; giving them more control
over the battlespace. At the same time, in trying to justify a prolonged presence on Philippine soil, the
humanitarian aspect of CMO was another way to overcome this problem. As CMO, image-wise, had less to
do with guns, and had more to do with good works, it generated less criticism concerning the presence of
138
the American military.
While the above generally gives the American-side to the story, it has also worked in the security
interests of the AFP. The AFP has been able to regain the much-needed support to bolster its COIN
capabilities through American assistance. With the focal point being placed on CMO, this has expanded the
possibilities and potential of using this approach in the Muslim battlespace. Consequently, by 2006, when
the AFP institutionalized CMO, the American forces had already begun to help the AFP in engaging in
139
CMO on a wider-scale. With the Americans covering a greater part of these costs, the AFP has been able
to accelerate and improvise CMO to better meet the needs of the Muslim audience (See chapter 7 for
details).

5.4 Conclusion
In tracking the immediate events to CMO’s institutionalization, it can be determined that the
major factor in its revival and subsequent recognition as a valid military operation, was primarily due to the
deteriorating security situation and the quandary that the AFP was placed in, in having to deal with multiple
fronts at once. At a strategic level, President Arroyo attempted to deal with the problem holistically, by
gaining the support of all government agencies as a means to tackle the socio-economic roots of the
problem. Within the military, there was a renewed attention on the way communists operated in battlespace,
especially in the human terrain. From the AFP presentation referred to in the chapter, it revealed that the
AFP was aware of their deficiencies in maneuvering over the population, signifying a need to integrate
CMO effectively in military operations. In regards to the Muslim front the emergence of the ASG and the
MILF that were engaging in guerrilla tactics, was a major factor in developing CMO for the Muslim theater.
Additionally, the United States’ entry into the Southern Philippines has also helped the AFP expand the
CMO-alternative in dealing with the Muslim theater.

138
Mary Nancy P. Gadian, affidavit, August 26, 2009, p. 7. Available at:
http://ja.scribd.com/doc/40149967/Nancy-Gadian-Affidavit. Accessed November 1, 2012.
139
Maj. Tyler Wilson (Civil Military Operations Planner Civil Affairs, U.S. Army) and SSG Calen A. Bullard
(JSPTF-P), interview with author, Camp Navarro, Western Mindanao Command, Camp Navarro, Zamboanga
City, Philippines, July 28, 2009.

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Map 5.2: JSOTF-P Designated Area of Operation

Source: Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines, official website:

http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_TsXXhqhJjos/SmlnM14_dCI/AAAAAAAAAHQ/BmVLBWRd9VU/s1600-h/m
ap-philippines.PNG

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CHAPTER 6. CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS (CMO)
6.1 Overview
Steps towards the institutionalization of CMO began within the Philippine Army. On December
2000, military officers with CMO expertise were gathered by the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for
Civil-Military Operations to produce a CMO vision that could better support the army mission. Several
months later in early 2001, a CMO workshop-seminar was held to translate concepts into concrete
guidelines. The culmination of these efforts resulted in the publication of the Civil-Military Operations
Manual in 2002. This was the first field manual of its kind to “provide commanders and operators in the
field a clear outline of what to do in conducting CMO based on the standards set with the changing times
1
and the current trends in warfare.”
In actuality, the CMO office (J7) was already in existence at the beginning of Arroyo’s first term
but it was deactivated on January 1, 2005 and its operations, training, and on-going doctrine development
functions were transferred to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (J3). J3 is the office
responsible for executing military operations on the ground. Little can be gathered concerning its loss of its
independent status in 2005, aside from official statements made to the effect that organizational changes
were necessary to make the military more responsive to the security environment.2 Nonetheless, it appears
it was not so much of a move to downplay its importance, as it was to better integrate CMO within the
scope of the military mission.
Nevertheless, within a year and half, it was decided that CMO was too much work for the J3
3
office to handle and on July 1, 2006, an independent CMO office (J7) was re-established at the AFP
4
Deputy Chief of Staff. This event marked its institutionalization. CMO was now officially recognized as a
5
distinct military operation, applicable to all three services (the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force). In the
same month, on July 13, 2006, the AFP Doctrine for Civil Military Operations (AFPM 2-7) was published,
providing a set of guidelines for soldiers and CMO operators out on the field.
In analyzing the change and continuity that came with institutionalization, it can be determined
for the most part there were no significant differences in the contents of its activities. These activities were
still maintained under the categories of civic action, information campaigns, and psychological operations.

1
Philippine Army, Civil-Military Operations Manual (PAM 7-00), Makati: The Philippine Army, 2002, pp. 1; 15.
Hereafter cited as PAM-7-00.
2
“New Structure of the AFP Organization” from the Armed Forces Philippines official website. Available at:
http://www.afp.mil.ph/archives/afp_org.htm. Accessed July 11, 2007.
3
Major General Reynaldo D. Sealana, Deputy Chief of Staff for CMO, J7, interview with author, Camp
Aguinaldo, Quezon City, Philippines. August 3, 2009. Hereafter cited as Maj. Gen. Sealana, August 3, 2009.
4
At the AFP’s General Headquarters, the chief of staff (rank of a general) exercises command over the AFP’s
services. The headquarters is staffed with coordinating staff offices numbered J1 through J10. They include
personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, plans, comptrollership, education and training, material
development, and retirees and reserve affairs. CMO is the J-7 office. See organizational structure of Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/philippines/afp.htm/. Accessed
November 6, 2012.
5
“Military’s command in Mindanao to be divided into 2 units,” SunStar, July 22, 2006, Available at:
http://www.sunstar.com.ph/static/man/2006/07/22/news/military.s.command.in.mindanao.to.be.divided.into.2.uni
ts.html. Accessed July 11, 2007.

179
Furthermore these projects were designed for the same objectives of boosting government legitimacy and
shaping the perceptions of the target audiences (the people and the threat groups) in favor of the military
mission.
But when drawing out the differences, the most important came from the publication of a
doctrine. As AFP officers profess, the difference that came with institutionalization was not so much in the
nature of its activities, but providing soldiers out on the field clear guidelines rather than rely on common
6
sense as was done before. Under “common sense,” CMO lacked a codified set of instructions that
normally guides other military operations. But with institutionalization, a newly published doctrine filled in
gaps concerning the know-how in one, producing an area assessment; two, producing a planning estimate;
three, developing an operational plan; four, developing communication products; five, planning for its
7
distribution; and six, studying the effects of its actions. In other words, efforts had been made to subject
CMO to intellectual rigor, internalizing lessons derived from the AFP’s past experience, and thereby
ensuring the military audience directed these efforts not arbitrarily, but with a clear guide to its action.
Another difference was that the scope of CMO was widened. This involved strengthening
partnerships with not just government agencies and units (both at the national and local level), but also
involved NGOs as well. And in regards to developing CMO in response to various threat groups, what was
originally created to deal with the mass base support of the communists was also expanded to specifically
target the human terrain in which the Muslim armed groups operated in.
The following section provides its definition, operational components, principles, the
organizational structure, and other related topics. As the actual doctrine, AFPM 2-7 could not be accessed,
information primarily comes from interviews and briefings provided by AFP officers, the 2002 Army CMO
manual (PAM 7-00), and other AFP publications.

6.2 AFP-CMO Definition

The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) defines Civil Military Operations (CMO) as
planned activities undertaken independently or in coordination with civilian entities in support to the
accomplishment of AFP mission to gain popular support and weaken the will of the enemy to fight. It is
characterized by activities that influence the beliefs, emotion, behaviors, attitudes and opinions of selected
target audience; it establishes and maintains good relations between military forces, civil authorities and
the civilian populace to facilitate military operations in support to the accomplishment of the AFP
8
mission.

6
Lieutenant Colonel Ferozaldo Paul T. Tegemcia (PA), interview with author, AFP National Development
Support Command, Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, Philippines, October 8, 2007.
7
Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin L. Hao (U7, AFPNDSC), “Seven Myths About CMO,” The AFP Peace Builder,
first edition, 1st qtr, 2008. Reprinted on AFP CMO School. Available at:
http://www.afpcmos.ph/index.php/featured-article. Accessed May 18, 2012.
8
Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Internal Peace and Security Plan: Bayanihan, Quezon
City: Armed Forces of the Philippines, 2010, B-4. In the Philippine Army’s manual doctrine published in 2002,
PAM 7-00, CMO is defined as activities undertaken independent of or in coordination with civilian entities to
gain popular support, to strengthen the will of the soldiers to fight, and weaken the will of the enemy to resist in

180
 Broadly speaking, CMO is differentiated from other military activities because it has a
pronounced civilian association. CMO encompasses activities that are mostly non-combatant in nature and
are also undertaken in close collaboration with government agencies, local government units (LGUs), civil
society, religious organizations, and to some extent business groups. Broad objectives are to win popular
support for the government, help tackle the root causes of insurgencies and help spur development in
economically depressed areas, and act as a force multiplier for existing military operations. While it is an
integral part of combat operations occurring prior to, during, and after military operations, CMO can also
take place in conflict-free zones.
In terms of its contents, CMO runs the full gamut of activities at the non-combatant end of the
spectrum of operations. It can range from heavy construction works undertaken by military engineers to
small-scale information and community assistance programs conducted by CMO specialists. Nonetheless, it
involves psychological operations and to some extent, combat. But aside from activities directed towards
the population and the enemy, CMO also involves driving the concept within the ranks of the AFP for the
purpose of instilling discipline. The slogan “Every soldier is a CMO man” is a strong reminder that that
9
each soldier is expected to demonstrate exemplary conduct in the community he or she operates in.

6.3 The Operational Components of CMO: The Three Pillars

CMO consists of 3 pillars: Civil Affairs (CA), Public Affairs (PA), and Psychological Operations
(PSYOPS), each targeting their respective audiences. The first pillar, Civil Affairs (CA) targets the
community. These activities involve military civic action in areas of engineering, health, education, and
disaster relief. CMO units often partner with Local Government Units (LGU), national government
agencies, and other civilian organization for the purpose of one, securing the environment so that other
government agencies can function and provide services in the community and second, to strengthen the
bond between the community and the AFP and government.
Public Affairs (PA) targets the public at large. It is centered on the timely dissemination of
information to the public, typically through the media or can take place in the form of information
campaigns where soldiers are deployed to the community to increase awareness on government programs
and threat groups. PA also includes building community relations in the form of dialogues and symposiums

support to the accomplishment of military mission. The main difference lies in the excerpt, “strengthen the will
of the soldiers to fight.” Between 1993 and 2006, CMO pillars targeting the soldier that included Military Values
Education (MILVED) and Military Livelihood Enhancement (MILE) was moved to the personnel office (J1).
Traditionally, CMO targeted the welfare of the soldier for the purpose of improving morale, and therefore
improving his or her performance on the frontlines. Lt. Col. Ferozaldo Paul T. Regencia, (PA), interview with
author, AFP National Development Support Command, Camp Aquinaldo, Quezon City, Philippines, October 8,
2007.
9
Maj. Eugenio S. Batara, Assistant Chief of Unified Command Staff for CMO, U7, interview with author,
Camp Don Basilio Navarro, Zamboanga City, Philippines, October 3, 2007. Hereafter cited as Maj. Batara and
date of interview. “Every solder is a CMO man” is reminiscent of the Magsaysay Era in the 1950s, when the
“Every soldier is a Psywar man” was propagated to the internal audience. See Valeriano and Boahannan,
Counter-Guerrilla Operations, pp. 175-177.

181
 10
organized in communities.
PA often works together with the AFP Civil-Relations Service (CRS), which is the primary arm
11
of PA. CRS is a military support unit with offices nationwide that serves as the interface between the
military and the public. Tasks include the printing of posters and leaflets, publishing newspaper articles,
and providing material for radio broadcasts. In short, they take the lead responsibility in disseminating
12
information to the public.
Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) are conducted to influence the beliefs, emotions, attitudes,
opinion and ultimately the behavior of both the enemy and the people. This is the only pillar, which
includes combat operations. PSYOPS is divided into two categories. The first is words PSYOPS, which is
media-related and deals with psychological materials (PSYMAT). PSYMAT involves the distribution of
printed material in communities that call for the surrender of rebels. Deeds PSYOPS are conducted in
guerrilla theater operations. In combat operations they are integrated in raids and patrols. In deception
operations: ruse, decoy, and diversionary tactics are used to mislead the enemy, thus contributing to the
13
demoralization of the enemy.

Figure 6.1: CMO Pillar and its Target Audiences

Source: PAM 7-00; Col. Regencia, October 8, 2007.

10
Lt. Col. Ferozaldo Paul T. Regencia, Philippine Army, AFP National Development Support Command,
interview with author, Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City, Philippines October 8, 2007. Hereafter
cited as Lt. Col. Regencia and date of interview.
11
Maj. Gen. Sealana, August 3, 2009.
12
Major Gamal Hayuduni, Civil Relations officer, interview with author, CRS-AFP Office, Camp Don Basilio
Navarro, Western Mindanao Command, Zamboanga City, Philippines, July 29, 2008. The Civil Relations Service
website states that its mission is “to conduct public information and community relations in order to create a
favorable atmosphere between the community and the AFP.” Available online at: www.crsafp.ph
13
Lt. Col. Regencia, October 8, 2007.

182
6.4 Lines of Operations
14
By 2010, the AFP had altogether 250 CMO activities. Many of these activities have
overlapping functions and target audiences. For instance, a civic action project intended to win hearts and
minds of a community belongs to Civil Affairs but the publicity gained from this, also falls within the
purview of Public Affairs. If a common denominator needs to be extracted from for the listed activities,
PSYOPS can be named since all CMO activities have the ultimate purpose of influencing the minds of the
15
target audience. Nevertheless, for the sake of categorization, CMO activities are listed below in its
respective areas of CA, PA, and PSYOPS.

14
Lt. Col. Regencia, November 4, 2010.
15
The overlapping nature of CMO activities was noted by Lieutenant Colonel Rodrigo T. Gregorio, Assistant
Chief of Staff for CMO, in an interview with author, Headquarters 1 st Infantry (Tabak) Division, Philippine Army,
Zamboanga del Sur, Philippines, October 29, 2010. Hereafter cited as Lt. Col. Gregorio, October 29, 2010.

183
Table 6.1: Lines of Operations

㻌 Lines of Operations 㻌
Civil Affairs㻌 Public Affairs PSYOPS
Words

Donation of clothes and (counter-propag-

Engineering Civic Action school supplies Media-Related anda)

Distribution of

Road building/ rehabilitation Radio/TV material

School building/ repair Education Photo video coverage Radio broadcast

Press conference

Internet websites, and Symposiums/Lec-

Flood control projects Adult Literacy Program Facebook tures

Portable water systems Humanitarian Assistance Community Film showing

Amnesty

Electrification Disaster relief Dialogue Program

Processing of

Health Assistance Environmental Symposiums rebel surrenders

Medical Civic Action Programs Balik-Baril

(MEDCAP) Coastal cleanup Anti-drug information (weapons return)

Dental Civic Action Programs

(DENCAP) Tree planting Fun games Deeds (Combat)

Optical Civic Action Programs (OPCAP) Cleanliness drives Information drives Patrol

Circumcision "Operation Tuli" Beautification projects Interagency coordination Checkpoints

Other Community Service 㻌 Sporting events Deception

Special

Livelihood training 㻌 Cleanliness drives Operations

Bloodletting (soldiers donating blood) 㻌 Beauty contests SOT

Feeding mission 㻌 SALAAM

Source: Compiled from briefing material and interviews provided by the AFP-CMO but primarily drawn
from documents provided by Major Eugenio S. Batara, Asst. Chief of Unified Command for CMO, U7,
Camp Don Basilio Navarro, Western Mindanao Command, Zamboanga City, Philippines, October 4, 2007.

6.5 The National Development Support Command (NADESCOM)

16
The National Development Support Command (NADESCOM) was activated pursuant to the

16
Originally the acronym for the National Development Support Command was NDSC. NADESCOM was later
deactivated on May 3, 2012. See “AFP deactivates NADESCOM,” Zamboanga Times, May 4, 2012. Available
at: http://www.zambotimes.com/archives/47171-AFP-deactivates-NADESCOM.html/ Accessed November 9,

184
Department of the Defense (DND) Department Order NR 238, dated October 30, 2007, roughly a year after
the creation of an independent CMO office at the GHQ. NADESCOM is the engineering arm of CMO
which handles large construction projects such as roads, bridges, school buildings, and electrical and water
systems. Its objectives are to “undertake developmental programs nationwide to establish a physically and
17
psychologically secure environment conducive to socio-economic growth in support of the AFP mission.”
The rationale behind the creation of an entirely new command devoted to infrastructure projects
was in line with President Arroyo’s “humanitarian offensive” of transforming conflict-affected
18
communities into areas of peace and development. It was also established to help unload the
19
developmental burden of the AFP when pursuing its COIN tasks. Previously, large infrastructure work
was left up to area commands, but with their focus on security operations, it was very difficult to attend to
development properly. Therefore, a command was established to take lead responsibility in orchestrating
20
and synchronizing developmental projects. Similarly, NADESCOM was also created to assist the AFP in
21
overcoming challenges in consolidating its gains after clearing areas of enemy-presence.
NADESCOM has the same status as the 7 area-based unified commands situated throughout the
archipelago. The only difference with other area commands is that it does not have an area of responsibility
(AOR) and is instead assigned on a project-basis to geographic areas. In short, it is a functional command
22
that centers on engineering work. While the number of personnel under this command was not made
23
public, it was by far the largest command, with operations covering the entire nation. And aside from the
24
usual military funding, it had access to a yearly budget amounting to approximately P1 billion. The

2012.
17
Presentation manuscript titled “AFP National Development Support Command” provided to author by Major
Julius A. Cabarloc, NDSC, Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, Philippines, July 25, 2008.
18
“Mixed Reaction to AFP "humanitarian offensive, "” the PCIJ Blog, August 28, 2007. Available online at:
http://www.pcij.org/blog/?p=1919. Accessed Jan 18, 2008.
19
Major Adolfo B. Espuelas Jr., Philippines Army, “Examining the Capacity of the Philippine Army’s Enlisted
Corps To Accomplish the Government’s Counterinsurgency Strategy: Sharpening the Tool,” master’s thesis,
“ Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2008, p. 83. Hereafter cited as
Espuelas, “Examining the Capacity of the Philippine Army’s Enlisted Corps To Accomplish the Government’s
Counterinsurgency Strategy: Sharpening the Tool.”
20
Major General Jaime Buenaflor, commander of NADESCOM, interview with author, National Development
Support Command, Camp Aquinaldo, Quezon City, July 25, 2008. Hereafter cited as Maj. Gen. Buenaflor, July
25, 2008.
21
Espuelas Jr., Philippines Army, “Examining the Capacity of the Philippine Army’s Enlisted Corps To
Accomplish the Government’s Counterinsurgency Strategy: Sharpening the Tool, p. 83. Additionally, the
creation of an independent command for development was perceived to be one way to raise motivation for
soldiers by giving the overseeing organ a status equal to a unified command.
22
Presentation manuscript titled “AFP National Development Support Command” provided to author by Major
Julius A. Cabarloc, NDSC, Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, Philippines, July 25, 2008. AFP Unified Commands
are regional commands that are composed of the three services (Army, Navy, and Air Force) and are located in 7
different locations in the Philippines. As of July 2012, 7 unified commands were reduced to 6.
23
Colonel Rodolfo Santiago, Philippines Army, Chief of Staff for CMO, interview with author, National
Development Support Command, Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, Philippines, November 4, 2010.
24
Approximately USD 25 million. Lt. Col. Regencia, interview with author, NADESCOM, GHQ, Camp
Aguinaldo, Quezon City, “AFP deactivates NADESCOM,” Zamboanga Times, May 4, 2012. Available at:
http://www.zambotimes.com/archives/47171-AFP-deactivates-NADESCOM.html/ Accessed November 9, 2012.

185
 25
following military units come under NADESCOM.

Table 6.2: NADESCOM Units

1$'(6&620 8QL W V
6HU YL FH 6XSSRU W  8QL W V 8QL W V /RFDW L RQ
$UP\ VW(QJLQHHULQJ%ULJDGH %ULJDGH/LELV4XH]RQ&LW\
QG(QJLQHHULQJ%ULJDGH 0DOD\EDOD\%XNLGQRQ
UG(QJLQHHULQJ%ULJDGH &HEX&LW\
WK(QJLQHHULQJ%ULJDGH 0DQDRDJ3DQJDVLQDQ
WK(QJLQHHULQJ%ULJDGH 'DYDR&LW\
$LU)RUFH WK$YLDWLRQ(QJLQHHULQJ*URXS 0DVEDVWH
1DY\ VW1DYDO0RELOH&RDVW%DWWDOLRQ %DVLODQ
&LYLO5HODWLRQV6HUYLFH WK&LYLO5HODWLRQV*URXS 4XH]RQ&LW\

Note: The 8th Civil Relations Groups was created in 2007 to support NADESCOM.
Source: Briefing made by NADESCOM headquarters, AFP Headquarters, Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City,
Philippines, October 8, 2007.

Figure 6.2: NADESCOM in the AFP’s Basic Organizational Structure

Kalayaan Barangay Program (KBP)

The largest project undertaken by NADESCOM is the Kalayaan Barangay Program (KBP) or
freedom villages. The project largely deals with communist-influenced areas. Military engineers are
deployed to these areas that are usually remote and have limited or no government presence. The military

25
“AFP National Development Support Command,” PowerPoint presentation delivered by Major Julius A.
Cabarloc, NDSC, Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, July 25, 2008.

186
does not work unilaterally but collaborates with other government agencies such as the Department of
Public Works and Highways, the Department of Health, and the Department of Education. Activities
include the construction of farm-to-market roads, schools, water systems, electrification, and services
26
related to health (see Appendix E for a sample of a medical outreach program by NADESCOM).
Communities are selected based on whether the barangay hold the existence of a communist
shadow government, legal fronts, and/or have armed components of the threat group. Threat assessments
are first made by the AFP’s field units. Based upon these findings, areas eligible for KBP are designated by
the Office of the Presidential Advisor on the Peace Process (OPAPP), a government office responsible for
27
overseeing the peace process vis-à-vis armed groups.
Table 6.3 reveal the number of projects planned and the number completed. Table 6.4 shows the
amount of funds released for these projects. Table 6.5 is also included to show the breakdown of the
projects.

Table 6.3: Number of Projects under NADESCOM

FY Total Projects Finished Projects

2005-2007 501 501
2008 658 642
200928 585 546

Table 6.4: Funds for NADESCOM

FY Funds Released (in millions) Number of barangays

2005-2007 439.7 pesos (USD 10,030,103.92)29 367
2008 985.00 pesos (USD 22,503,999.38) 234
2009 1,000.00 pesos (USD 22,846,698.71) 204

26
Maj. Gen. Buenaflor, July 25, 2008.
27
Lt. Col. Regencia, August 3, 2009. In 2008, priority areas were listed as follows:
Region 3 (Central Luzon)
Region 4 (Calabarzon and Mimaropa)
Region 5 (Bicol Region)
Region 8 (Eastern Visayas)
Region 12(SOCCSKSARGEN: South Cotabato, Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sarangani, and General Santos City)
Region 13 (Caraga Region)
28
According to the AFP, problems in reaching the number its quota, not to mention a drop in the number of
projects in 2009 is due to the lack of logistics for the AFP. Jaime Laude, “AFP to get donations from South
Korea,” PhilStar, January 6, 2007. Available at:
http://www.philstar.com/headlines/378536/afp-get-donations-south-korea. Accessed January 26, 2007; Col.
Regencia, August 3, 2009.
29
Based on currency exchange rates from November 17, 2010.

187
Table 6.5: Breakdown of Projects as of 2010

1,491.33 km farm-to-market roads 171 health centers, toilets, etc.

160 electrification projects 528 school buildings
16 bridges 10 daycare centers
365 water system projects

Source: Lt. Col. Regencia, official statistics presented in a PowerPoint presentation, NADESCOM
Headquarters, AFP Headquarters, Camp Aguinaldo, Philippines, November 4, 2010.

6.6 The Special Operations Team (SOT) and the Special Advocacy and Livelihood
Assistance for the Advancement Among Muslims (SALAAM)
6.6.1 Overview
The Special Operation Team (SOTs) and Special Advocacy and Livelihood Assistance for the
Advancement Among Muslims (SALAAM) are the only CMO activities that do not come under the direct
administrative and operational control of the CMO office (J7) at the AFP GHQ. Since these operations also
involve combat and intelligence, they are headed by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (J3). The J3
office is in charge of the planning of military operations, and the assignment and deployment of troops
30
throughout the country. SOT and SALAAM are teams that embody the AFP’s efforts to strike at the
depth of the enemy battlespace.

6.6.2 The Special Operations Teams (SOTs)

The Special Operations Teams (SOTs) practiced today owe its existence to the experimental
efforts made in the early-1980s and refined in the late 1980s (see chapter 4). Due to its success in reducing
the communist armed strength in the late 1980s, it continues to be a major tool for the AFP in dealing with
31
the local communist movement.
SOTs originally had three built-in capabilities: combat, intelligence, and CMO (sometimes
referred to as PYSOPS). The overall objectives of the SOTs are to neutralize the communist armed
movement, dismantle its political infrastructure, and shift the community’s support/attention away from the
communists and re-orient the community’s efforts towards economic growth. SOT action plans have
guidelines but leave enough room for innovation by local ground commanders. To give one example of its
methodology, the section below examines the SOT phases conducted by an army battalion in 2005. SOTs
were deemed necessary in this unspecified locality in Luzon because most of the barangays were under the
shadow government of the communists. These SOT units targeted sitios, or hamlets located far from the

30
Maj. Batara, October 3, 2007, July 31, 2008; Lt. Col. Gregorio, October 29, 2010.
31
PAM 7-00, p. 10.

188
 32
barangays center. This SOT plan came in three phases:

1. Planning, Neutralization and Immersion Mode

Ÿ Intelligence work is done to identify key enemy personalities and structures.
Ÿ SOTs are deployed in “combat mode” meaning their presence is not announced to the
community and no courtesy calls are made to barangay captains. At this stage, no permanent
military presence is set up in the community.
Ÿ Neutralization of the enemy is done through stealth, feint, and deception.

2. Implementation Phase
Ÿ SOT teams begin to operate openly. Contact is made with local government executives and
residents are organized into counter-insurgent defensive structures.
Ÿ SOTs explore and develop plans to assist in community development.
Ÿ Dialogues are conducted with the youth, local government officials, and residents.

3. Mobilization, Empowerment, and Maintenance Phase

Ÿ Further community organization work is conducted with local government leaders, but with
the latter taking lead.
Ÿ Further assessment is made to verify that existing livelihood and other socio-economic
assistance matches the needs of the barangay.
Ÿ SOTs organize barangay defense units and place them in strategic locations to defend their
33
communities from the re-entry of communists.

The above describes the operational methodology of a SOT that involves soldiers operating in the
field sub rosa in the early phases, which is a tactic used to gain intelligence for the purpose of pinpointing
communist rebels for neutralization and finding out the political sympathies and socio-economic issues of
the community.
The SOTs in general, target remote areas where there is limited government presence and has
34
problems with security. SOTs also operate in urban areas. Here, the SOT is tailored to meet the needs of
the urban setting. Since city residents are better informed about the government and have better access to
35
government services, SOTs focus on targeting the political fronts of the communist movement.
The duration of one SOT mission is 3 months. In some cases, they can be as short as 1 month or

32
A loose translation of barangay is village. It is the smallest administrative division in the Philippines. A sitio
is a hamlet or a territorial enclave that forms part of a barangay. Sitios are typically located in rural areas and are
distant from the barangay center.
33
Research and Doctrine Development Branch, OG3, PA, “Community Organizing Towards Economic
Development,” Philippine Army Journal, (2nd Quarter) 2007, pp. 6-14.
34
Maj. Batara, October 3, 2010.
35
Maj. Batara, July 31, 2008.

189
 36
as long as 6 months. During the mission, SOT soldiers immerse themselves in a community.
However the media and leftist groups have pointed out this operation has led to human rights
violations and extrajudicial killings of community organizers, student leaders, and union organizers who
are linked to the leftist movement. They are particularly wary of the SOT’s function in intelligence
37
gathering and ruse.
To improve their image, beginning from around 2010, SOTs attempted to shed their sinister
image by focusing more on development and fast tracking the delivery of basic services to impoverished
barangays. Renamed Peace and Development Teams (PDT) to provide a more “pleasing name” to the
public, these new SOTs do not allow to soldiers immerse themselves in a community in a civilian disguise
and are required to identify themselves to barangay authorities. The secretive nature of SOTs has been
38
discarded so that SOT soldiers can be presented as good-will ambassadors to the community.
39
SOTs consist of soldiers from regular Infantry Battalions of the Philippine Army. SOTs work in
small numbers. There are no fixed SOTs and teams specializing in their respective areas of expertise are
combined and orchestrated to achieve a mission. Once the mission is completed, the teams are dissolved.
Each team consists between 1 to 3 members. Three teams form a squad or the SOT in its complete form.
The teams are now composed of CA, PA, PSYOPS rather than Intelligence, Combat, and CMO. Each SOT
40
“squad” averages between 5 and 8 soldiers.

Figure 6.3: SOT Squad Formation

36
Lt. Col. Gregorio. October 29, 2010.
37
Spokesperson for Karapatan, interview with author, Citadel Inn, Manila, Philippines, July 24, 2008.
38
Lt. Col. Gregorio. October 29, 2010. The term SOT is retained within the military.
39
Espuelas, “Examining the Capacity of the Philippine Army’s Enlisted Corps to Accomplish the Government’s
Counterinsurgency Strategy: Sharpening the Tool, ” p. 21.
40
Col. Mitra, October 27, 2010.

190
Source: Lt. Col. Rodrigo T. Gregorio GSD (INF) Philippine Army, Assistant Chief of Staff for
CMO, G7, interview with author, Headquarters 1st Infantry (Tabak) Division, Philippine
Army, Labangan, Zamboanga del Sur, October 29, 2010.

The early stages deal with intelligence gathering conducted by the PSYOPS team. These soldiers
make a rapid assessment of the target community and gather data on existing security problems and what
kind of CMO projects are needed (see Appendix D for a complete list) and plan action accordingly. For
instance if a community lacks schools, schools will be constructed or teachers are sent. The CA teams often
41
coordinate with LGUs to plan and implement socio-economic projects. Information campaigns are
conducted by the PA team to influence the attitudes of a target community in favor of the government. They
are as follows:
1. Explaining the communist threat
2. Explaining the CPP-NPA’s ideology and principles
3. Explaining available government programs
4. Provide basic education (reading/writing) especially in far-flung areas that do not have
42
schools.

6.6.3 Special Advocacy and Livelihood Assistance for the Advancement among Muslims
(SALAAM)
SALAAM which means “peace” in Arabic is the acronym for the Special Advocacy and
Livelihood Assistance for the Advancement among Muslims. SALAAM is the SOT counterpart for
Muslims. It began operations sometime after 2000, to specifically address the problems Muslims faced in
43
poor communities. This is altogether a different theater and deals with different concepts and culture
from the communists. The concern with Muslims and the security element differ in the locality but the AFP
44
mostly points to the dangers of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). But in actual practice, the AFP’s focus is
placed more on trying to represent the good intentions of the government and regain back the trust of the
Muslim people, who have been marginalized and neglected by the central government for decades. In the
year following the institutionalization of CMO, a SALAAM manual (2007) was published by the AFP
45
headquarters.
SALAAM teams were originally composed of Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) or Moro
National Liberation Front (MNLF) integrees, but now include Muslim soldiers and those who have the
linguistic ability to speak the dialect of the community they are deployed to. They are sent to poor
barangays both in rural and urban areas in the Mindanao region, with the exception of areas inside MILF

41
Major General Reynaldo D. Sealana, Deputy Chief of Staff for CMO, J7 GHQ AFP, interview with author,
Camp Gen. E. Aguinaldo, Quezon City, Philippines, August 3, 2009. Hereafter cited as Maj. Gen. Sealana,
August 3, 2010; Major Batara, July 29, 2009.
42
Maj. Batara, October 3, 2007.
43
Maj. Batara, July 29, 2009.
44
Maj. Batara, October 3, 2007.
45
General Headquarters, Armed Forces of the Philippines, Modernization Program Management Office,
Moving On: Annual Accomplishment Report 2007, p. 29.

191
 46
camps. Nonetheless, SALAAM units are sent to areas where the military arm of the MILF, the
47
Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF) has influence in central Mindanao. Like SOTs, SALAAM
soldiers must immerse themselves in target communities, typically a month at time. Through mingling with
the community for a prolonged period, soldiers can build relationships with the people, deliver
48
socio-economic assistance, and help win back the faith of the Muslim people.

6.7 Partnering with other Entities

6.7.1 Overview
A large part of CMO depends on forging partnerships wherever possible with other civilian
agencies and organizations. This is aligned with the nation’s strategy of the “total approach” where the
insurgency problem is addressed in a concerted effort by various stakeholders and not just with the military
49
taking lead. There are also practical reasons behind this. First, a multi-agency cooperation can help share
costs, resources, and expertise. For instance in building roads, the AFP can provide engineers, machinery,
50
and security. Actual cost and supply of materials can be covered by other government agencies.
Partnering with NGOs is also beneficial since the AFP can tap into the expertise of NGOs in acquiring a
51
basic understanding on the needs and issues of a community.
Partnerships are formed either in an ad hoc manner or through established channels that are
backed by memorandums or decisions made by Peace and Order Councils (POC). Nevertheless, from
information gathered by interviews, when individual requests are made by a local barangays or NGOs, the
52
decision to give the green light, ultimately lies with the military.
Other partnerships include national government agencies, local government agencies, local
government units, international donor agencies, civil society, business groups, the police, and in the
Mindanao region (the Southern Philippines), the U.S. forces.

6.7.2 NADESCOM Partnerships

NADESCOM, the engineering arm of CMO, responsible for large infrastructure projects, has also
expanded the scope and enhanced the effectiveness of their projects primarily through partnerships.

Public-Private Partnership (PPP)

NADESCOM in the advent of their 3rd anniversary since founding in 2007 sought more

46
Maj. Batara, October 3, 2007.
47
Subramunya Das, “Revisiting the Code Team Concept,” Army Troopers Magazine, March 2011.
48
Maj. Batara, October 3, 2007.
49
Major General Jaime Buenaflor, interview with author, Officer of the Deputy Chief of Staff for CMO, J7,
GHQ, Quezon City, Philippines, March 27, 2007.
50
Lieutenant Ronaldson C. Cutillon, platoon leader (Philippine Army), interview with author, CMO Battalion,
Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, Manila, Philippines, October 10, 2007.
51
Frencie L. Carren, president of Kiwanis Club of Metro Zamboanga, interview with author, Mein
Technological College, Zamboanga City, Philippines, July 27, 2009.
52
Ibid.

192
cooperation with not only government agencies and NGOs but with business sectors as well. The command
established the public and private partnership (PPP), which is a “contractual agreement between
governments, private sector organizations, and civil society players in the provision of services and
products that traditionally have been provided by the public sector alone.” In short, this is a way to involve
the private sector in sharing expertise and shoulder some of the cost burden for the purpose of optimizing
53
the delivery of public services to people in need. For the business sector, the AFP aligns their Military
Social Responsibility (MSR) to the CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility). As of October 2010,
NADESCOM has forged a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with groups such as:

Philippine Chamber of Commerce (PCCI)

Foreign Buyers Association of the Philippines
Universities
Environmental groups
54
Garment Manufacturers Association of the Philippines

Most recently, Cisco System Inc, a US-based IT company signed a MOU with NADESCOM on
November 3, 2010 to provide scholarship grants to individuals between the ages 15 and 60 in impoverished
communities. NADESCOM says CISCO approached them to form a partnership upon hearing that the
55
military has the resources to find prospective scholars in the communities that they work in.

Value-Added-Projects for Peace and Development (VAP-4-PaD)

The VAP-4-PaD operates under the “doing the extra-mile” principle. This is a new concept
generated from trial and error. One striking example of a problem that NADESCOM encountered was in
school construction. After a building was turned over to the community, the school sometimes was turned
into a goat pen or a stockpile site. To prevent the misuse or unintended usage of a project outcome,
NADESCOM as much as possible, avoids giving just the “shell.” To ensure that the school is utilized for its
original purpose, the constructed school is turned over as a complete package with textbooks, blackboards,
curtains, landscaping, computers, etc. This operation is known as “Bayanihan sa Barangay” or helping the
village. NADESCOM accomplishes this by partnering with different agencies and business groups to
secure funds and material. In the case of the Philippines Chamber of Commerce, NADESCOM was able to
have the Chamber of Commerce cover for a teacher’ first year salary. This is important because under
government regulations, a teacher could only start working after the Department of Education (DOE) has
passed the year’s budget. As a result, a school would have to wait for a year to fill in the teaching vacancy.
But with funding from the private sector, this has allowed teachers to start immediately.

53
Lt. Col. Ferozaldo Paul T. Regencia, “Dynamics of a Public-Private Partnership,” The AFP Peace Builder,
Second Quarter 2009, pp.6-8.
54
With the garment association, NADESCOM projects provide livelihood support through training and ready
markets for finished products.
55
Lt. Col. Regencia, November 4, 2010.

193
 In conjunction with “Bayanihan sa Barangay” and doing the extra-mile, there are programs called
“Hire for Peace” and “Hire for Development.” “Hire for Peace” involves the use of rebel returnees to
provide the manpower for NADESCOM projects and at the same give former rebels a chance to develop
job-skills. “Hire for Development” seeks to empower the community by building the community’s sense of
56
ownership over the project through the hiring of local workers.

6.7.3 Peace and Order Councils (POC)

In a move to give more decision-making powers to local stakeholders, a council was set up. At a
national level, the Philippines has a National Security Council, which is the policy-making and advisory
body for issues related to defense. The council is composed of the president and commander in chief who
acts as the chairperson, the vice-president, senate president, speaker of the House of Representatives, the
national security advisor, the Secretary of National Defense, and other secretaries from foreign affairs,
Interior and Local Government, and Labor and Employment. The chief of staff for the AFP also attends
57
council meetings and may advise or assist in the deliberations.
On August 19, 2008, President Gloria Arroyo issued Executive Order (EO) 739 for the purpose of
bolstering COIN efforts through the strengthening of security policy-making at a local level. Simply put,
this was an EO issued to help relieve the AFP’s responsibility in taking the front lead in COIN by
transferring this role to Local Government Units (LGU). Known as the Peace and Order Council, its
composition and functions are similar to the National Security Council except for the chairmanship and
membership, which corresponds to the government/administrative level of their respective districts. They
include councils starting from the national level down to the city or municipal level. In the sub-national
levels, councils are given authority to convene meetings, recommend measures to improve the security
situation, and initiate and oversee the convergence and orchestration of internal security operations that
58
involve civil authorities and agencies, the military, and the police.
On January 5, 2009, another Executive Order was issued (EO 773) to further reorganize the POC
and strengthen its mechanisms to ensure convergence can be achieved through a multi-stakeholder and
59
cultural partnership.
The composition is basically commensurate with their respective administrative levels. For

56
Lt. Col. Regencia, November 4, 2010.
57
Executive Order No. 34, Reconstituting the National Security Council and for other Purposes, September 17,
2001. Available at:
http://www.chanrobles.com/executiveorders/2001/executiveorderno34-2001.html#.UKMYVGdEXKQ. Accessed
July 22, 2009.
58
Executive Order No. 739, August 19, 2008, “Reorganizing the Peace and Order Council.” Available at:
http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/index10.php?doctype=Executive%20Orders&docid=12269701491409813034.
Accessed November 8, 2012. Katherin Evangelista, “DND: New EO to boost counterinsurgency,” Inquirer.net,
January 8, 2009. Available at:
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view/20090108-182227/DND-New-EO-to-boost-counterinsurg
ency. Accessed January 14, 2009.
59
Executive Order No. 773, January 5, 2009, “Further Reorganizing the Peace and Order Council.” Available
at: http://www.lawphil.net/executive/execord/eo2009/eo_773_2009.html . Accessed November 13, 2012.
Hereafter cited as EO No. 773.

194
instance at a provincial level, the governor acts as chairperson and members from government departments,
offices, and agencies are the provincial counterparts. From the military, a commander of an infantry
division, battalion commander, or in some cases, the commander of an area command is its representative.
From the police, its regional director is their representative. And applicable to any level, 3 representatives
60
of the private sector are selected by the chairperson.
The POCs provide a venue where representatives from the local government, government
agencies, religious groups, NGOs, and private organizations, and the AFP and Philippine National Police
(PNP) can convene to discuss peace and order issues. This allows more sectors to take ownership over
security problems which was traditionally reserved for the AFP and PNP.
From the perspective of the AFP, with the existence of POCs, there is a better implementing
mechanism to jointly decide on what kind of CMOs to conduct and discuss responsibility and resource
sharing among participants. Focus areas can also be decided and on-going socio-economic projects can be
monitored to ensure its full realization. Additionally, the AFP and the PNP can provide the security
61
component for each CMO project.
.
Table 6.6: Peace and Order Council

Peace and Order Council Chairperson Military Counterpart

62
Regional Governor * Division Commander
Provincial Governor Brigade Commander
City Mayor Battalion Commander
Barangay Barangay Chief Company Commander

Source: Colonel Wilson O. Mitra, interview with author, Camp Don Basilio Navarro, Calarian, Zamboanga
City, Philippines, October 17, 2010.

6.8 CMO Schooling and the Cultivating of CMO Officers

Before the institutionalization of CMO, activities undertaken by soldiers in this area drew
personnel primarily from the army and expertise from Corps of Engineers, Civil Relations Service,
Intelligence units, and the Special Forces. A CMO school was in place by 1985 but it was reserved for
63
Army engineers since CMO is inherently a ground operation. In short, CMO was an army specialty.
In 2006, following the formal recognition that CMO is a key variable in the success in internal
security operations (ISO), a CMO school was established at Fort Bonfacio in Metro Manila. The new
60
EO No. 773.
61
Col. Mitra, October October 27, 2010.
62
At the regional level, the chairman and vice chairman is appointed from amongst the membership of the
council by the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government (SILG) and must be approved by the president.
63
Lt. Col. Jefferson S. Omandam, Executive officer of Civil-Relations Service-CMO, interview with author,
Camp Aquinaldo, Quezon City. July 25, 2008; Lt. Col. Regncia, October 8, 2007.

195
school caters to all three services: Army, Air Force and Navy (inclusive of Marines). Training is not
64
mandatory, but highly encouraged for both officers and enlisted personnel. To maximize training, the
AFP has set up on-line correspondence schools and deployable mobile training units that can train soldiers
65
assigned to remote areas.
CMO training typically runs 3 months for each CMO component and requires immersion or
hands-on training in a community. The Civil Affairs course is designed to help soldiers interact with
civilians and learn methodologies in understanding the sociological and developmental aspects of a
community. There is no engineering course per se but soldiers acquire skills related to inter-agency
coordination and community organizing.
In the Public Affairs course, soldiers study mass media and the skills needed in communicating
with the general public. Courses include speaking to the media, managing press conferences, responding to
media queries, producing press releases and other information pieces, and basic public speaking skills.
In Psychological Operations, students acquire skills in influencing the behavior of the target
66
audience. Soldiers study how to create and design posters, leaflets, billboards, and documentaries.
Additionally, students also receive lectures on human rights and international law, how to gather
and access data from a community, and occasionally, have the opportunity to attend lectures conducted by
university professors on the subject of socio-anthropology, so as to familiarize themselves on the diverse
67
tribes that exist in the Philippines. In dealing with different tribes, there is an advocacy program within
68
the CMO School that encourages soldiers to learn dialects in the areas they would be operating in.
The CMO Battalion located in Manila also sends soldiers for a hands-on-training in barangays in
the capital. The duration lasts up to a month and soldiers can test and practice their skills in coordinating
69
with community stakeholders.
In terms of specialization, there are CMO career courses that are now equivalent to a normal
military course. Furthermore, it has become an occupational specialty where soldiers can earn promotions
based on achievements in this area.

6.9 Conduct of the Soldier

CMO operates on the principle of “winning hearts and minds.” A military that is treated with
suspicion and feared by the population only alienates the citizens from the government. CMO is seen as a
way to re-build the image of the AFP tarnished by poor human rights records by doing good works for the
community. It is also perceived for its effect in changing the mindset of the military from pure warriors to

64
Lt. Gen. Jaime Buenaflor, Command of Civil Military Operation (CMO) J7 office, interview with author:
July 25, 2008, Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, Philippines.
65
Lt. Col. Regencia, October 8, 2010
66
Civil-Military Operations School website. Available online at: http://www.armycmoschool.page.tl/Home.htm.
67
Maj. Batara, July 31, 2008.
68
Lt. Col. Regencia, October 8, 2007.
69
Lt. Ronaldson C. Cutillon, Philippines Army, Platoon Leader interview with author, October 10, 2007, CMO
Battalion, Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, Philippines.

196
 70
peacemakers.
The conduct of the soldier does not fall under any CMO pillars but soldiers are strongly
encouraged to follow a code of conduct that shows respect to people they meet in the course of their
operations. This extends to behavior of all soldiers working in their respective fields, meaning they must
conduct themselves in a courteous manner and observe regulations. Therefore, CMO slogans such as “a
disciplined soldier is the best CMO” are intended to ensure that the effects of a CMO project are not
71
undone by the misconduct of one undisciplined soldier.

6.10 CMO in Three Levels of Warfare

The information above lists a basic overview of its operations. A further analysis on the
positioning and intended effects of CMO in COIN warfare can be made when examined from its
implementation in the three levels of warfare: strategic, operational, and tactical levels.
The level is determined by the type and size of the target audience, the area of operations (AO),
the media used, and the timeframe as well. All levels are mutually supportive and integrative, and therefore
72
the lines of distinction between the levels are not always clear.

6.10.1 Strategic Level

At the strategic level, the Commander-in-chief, policy makers from the service commands, the
AFP GHQ, the Department of National Defense, and other government agencies establish CMO guidelines
73
to support the long-term and broad objectives in the strategic prosecution of war.
In 2006, more focus was placed on CMO to help the AFP reach the 2010 deadline set by
President Arroyo to strategically defeat the communist armed rebellion, eradicate the Abu Sayyaff (ASG)
and other terrorist groups, and contain the Muslim secessionist movement.74
From the view of national strategy, CMO is considered to be the catalyst in allowing the
75
government to take a “total government approach” to the insurgency problem. Otherwise known as the
Strategy of the Holistic Approach (SHA), the concept is enshrined in the set of guidelines called the
National Internal Security Plan (NISP) produced in 2001. It calls for the complete mobilization of all
76
government agencies to tackle the root causes of insurgencies. While the military still take lead in the

70
Maj. Batara, October 7, 2010; PAM 7-00, 2002.
71
Lt. Col. Gregorio, October 29, 2010.
72
PAM 7-00, p. 19.
73
PAM 7-00, p. 19.
74
Maj. Gen. Buenaflor, March 27, 2007. This timeline is also found in Administrative Order No. 169, S. 2007,
“Amending the Implementing Guidelines, Rules and Regulations of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
Modernization Program.” Available at: http://www.gov.ph/2007/01/30/administrative-order-no-169-s-2007/.
Accessed November 5, 2012.
75
Maj. Gen. Buenaflor, March 27, 2007.
76
Lieutenant Colonel Roy Devesa (Philippine Army), “An Assessment of the Philippine Counterinsurgency
Operational Methodology,” MMAS thesis, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and
General Staff College, 2005, p. 6. Executive Order 21 issued June 19, 2001 by former President Arroyo is the
legal basis for the security plan.

197
security realm, they are also mandated to play a supporting role in the socio-economic dimension.
Not surprisingly, CMO retains a pronounced developmental orientation, a characteristic which
can be traced to the AFP’s long tradition in mobilizing their forces for nation-building. This reflects the
Philippines’ deeply rooted belief that the well being of the nation is anchored on security and
77
development. NADESCOM, the engineering arm of CMO, is tasked to apply a coordinated and
integrative response with other civilian agencies in matters related to economic development. Nonetheless,
NADESCOM is treated somewhat separately from the military’s core operations in COIN. NADESCOM
78
officials maintain they are not a COIN unit and support solely development.
Therefore, aside from NADESOM and despite the fact that CMO is for the most part is
non-coercive and is involved in activities related to socio-economic development, it is essentially a COIN
operation. Activities are designed to act as force multiplier to existing military operations to direct
precision-based assaults, limit collateral damage, and manipulate the psychological environment that the
insurgents operate in.
This leaves the AFP with a military strategy, which supports the nation’s holistic approach, but at
the same time, tackles the combat dimension. The military component of the NISP is crystallized in
Operation Plan Bantay Laya II (Operations Plan Guard Freedom 2006-2010). The strategic goal of Oplan
Bantay Laya is to defeat all groups posing a threat to national security, enhance the security situation and
peace and order condition in the country to establish a physically and psychologically secured environment
79
conducive to national development.
CMO’s role in Bantay Laya is to eliminate the armed threat through the minimum use of force. In
essence, it is a force multiplier that seeks to apply precision-based attacks through a methodology that seeks
to constrict enemy movements by gaining support of the people. By 2008, the AFP-GHQ directed that
80
military operations should be broken down as follows:

70 percent CMO – Launch activities centered on “winning the hearts and minds” of the population to
ensure their support for the government and prevent them from siding with the insurgents.
20 percent combat – The neutralization of the armed components of internal threats.
10 percent intelligence – Identifying strengths and weaknesses of the enemy based on the analysis and
assessment of the terrain to help ground commanders execute a doable plan to defeat the enemy force.

77
National Economic and Development Authority, Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan, 2004-2010,
Manila: National Economic and Development Authority, 2004, ch. 24.
78
Colonel Rodolfo Santiago (Philippine Army), Chief of Staff of CMO, interview with author, NADESCOM
headquarters, Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, Philippines, November 4, 2010.
79
General Headquarters, Armed Forces of the Philippines, AFP ISO PLAN s-2007 “Bantay Laya” Quezon City:
Philippines, Camp General Aguinaldo, December 1, 2006), p. 5 found in Lieutenant Colonel Eugenio V.
Hernandez, “Assessing the Parameters for Determining Accomplishment of the Philippine Marine Corps in
Internal Security Operations,” Masters of Military Studies, United Stated Marine Corps Command and Staff
College Marine Corps University, Quantico, Virginia, August 8, 2009, pp. 2-3.
80
Major General Reynaldo D. Sealana, Deputy Chief of Staff for Civil Military Operations, J7 GHQ AFP,
interview with author, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Civil Military Operations, J7 GHQ, AFP, Camp
Gen E. Aguinaldo, Quezon City, August 3, 2009. Hereafter cited as Maj. Gen. Sealana, August 3, 2009.

198
6.10.2 Operational Level
This is the level that links strategic CMO and tactical CMO. Operational CMO seeks to achieve
mid-level objectives in support of major military campaigns. CMO is encompassed in military operations
81
conducted by unified regional commands and divisions.
Translating national policy goals at an operational-level is encompassed in the
82
“Clear-Hold-Consolidate-Develop” methodology (See section 5.2.3.1). These are undertaken by area
commands in their respective AOR. It is a multi-step process that seeks to clear areas of insurgent presence
83
and follow-up with socio-economic activities that focus on preventing the return of the enemy.
The 4-step operational methodology reveals that CMO plays an integral part in creating
conditions favorable to the military in pursuing standard military operations and sustaining their gains. It is
a method that places the population at the center of gravity (COG) or the key vulnerability of the insurgents.
Gaining the support of the people is a means to create and exploit opportunities to isolate the insurgents or
cut them off of their support. Critical information shared by the people to the military prevents the
insurgents the mobility they need over the human terrain, and therefore corner them into locations that is
easier for the military to launch precision-attacks. The civil-military partnership also underlines the
importance of the unity of effort in ensuring that an affected community does not revert back to insurgent
control through the strengthening of governance and the basic delivery of service.
The operational-level is also important in dealing with respective theaters. Each regional
command deals with different threat groups and/or level of threat in their Area of Responsibility (AOR).
For instance, the commands located in Luzon and the Visayas deal primarily with the communists. Whereas
the regional commands in Mindanao, face a mixture of both the Muslim separatists and the communists.
Therefore military operations, including CMO are shaped at the operational level to target the specific
conditions of the region. The maneuver utility of CMO begins with its role in “shaping” the particular
battlespace in favor of the military.

6.10.3 Tactical Level

These encompass CMO activities conducted on the ground and are implemented by brigades
(BDE), battalions (BN), companies (COY), platoons (PLTN) and squads, i.e. SOTs and SALAAM. It
serves short-term objectives and requires soldiers to come into direct contact with the people and the enemy.
The AO is limited to a community or a segment of a battle zone. Decidedly, this is one of the most complex
undertakings since it seeks to directly change the attitudes of the people in favor of the military. It ranges
from the orderly conduct of the soldier to one engaging in activities to shape the perceptions of the people.

81
PAM 7-00, p.19.
82
See General Headquarters Armed Forces of the Philippines, AFP National Military Strategy, Quezon City:
AFP General Headquarters, 2001, p. 26, in Renato Cruz De Castro, “Abstract of Counter-Insurgency in the
Philippines and the Global War on Terror. Examining the Dynamics of the Twenty-first Century Long Wars,”
European Journal of East Asian Studies, 9.1 2010, p. 147.
83
From briefing slides provided to the author by Lieutenant Colonel Ferozaldo Paul T. Regencia, PA, AFP
National Development Support Command, Camp General Emilio Aquinaldo, Quezon City, Philippines, October
8, 2007; Devesa, “An Assessment of the Philippine Counterinsurgency Operational Methodology,” pp. 40-42.

199
The next chapter uses a case study to elaborate further on the tactical and operational application of CMO.

Figure 6.4: Levels of CMO

Source: PAM 7-00, 2002, p.19.

200
Chapter 7. Case Study of CMO in Western Mindanao
7.1 Introduction
The institutionalization of CMO in 2006 was followed by an increase and acceleration of CMO
activities across the country. A case study was conducted to determine whether the event marked a renewed
understanding on the utility of CMO, especially in allowing the soldiers to maneuver in the depth of
insurgent battlespace. As the case study seeks to examine CMO on the ground, it covers for the most part,
its effects at an operational and tactical level.
Due to the widespread mobilization of CMO nationwide, the research was narrowed down to one
region, Western Mindanao. The region falls under the Area of Responsibility (AOR)1 of the AFP’s Western
Mindanao Command (WestMinCom). The factors that were taken into consideration when selecting this
AOR for the case study was one, it is the only command that targets all threat groups: terrorist
organizations, namely the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG); followed by the Muslim separatists: the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) and remnants of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF); and the Communist
Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA). This provides a clearer insight on how CMO
operates in a battlespace occupied by different armed groups. Two, the increased presence of American
forces in the Southern Philippines as a result of the September 11th attacks has helped expand CMO
programs in the region. Three, the region originally headquartered the Southern Command (SouthCom) that
led the largest military offensive to date against the Muslim rebellion in the 1970s. Consequently, the
impact of the war has left not only emotional scars on the people, but a deep-rooted distrust towards the
military and the central government. Fourth, contrary to popular perceptions that CMO activities are mainly
directed towards communities in remote and/or conflict areas, there are numerous CMO activities
conducted in urbanized locations that do not face an immediate threat from any armed group. This in turn
sheds light on the AFP’s understanding of battlespace, which is not limited to war zones.

7.2 Methodology
In order to build this case study, research trips were made to the Philippines on an annual basis
starting from 2007 and ending in 2010. A substantial portion of these trips was devoted to collecting
primary sources by employing the methodology of face-to-face interviews. These interviews were
conducted in Manila, the nation’s capital, and Zamboanga City in the Southern Philippines. In 2010,
additional visits were paid to two other provinces in the South: Basilan and Zamboanga Del Norte. The
interviews did not strictly adhere to one structure and were adjusted accordingly to serve different
objectives and to match the type of response that could be expected beforehand from the informants. The
interviewees are broadly divided into five groups.
The first group of interviewees is officers from the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). The
objective was to collect information and raw data that was not readily made available to the civilian

1
Pre-determined geographic areas assigned to area commands throughout the country. Area commanders are
given authority to plan and conduct operations within these physical boundaries.

201
audience. Especially when CMO was first institutionalized in 2006, little could be drawn from existing
research papers or official government publications. Therefore, some of the interview sessions began with
briefings made by the military and followed by questions concerning the contents of the information
provided. At the beginning, the interviews took an unstructured format for the main purpose of getting
acquainted with the subject. In follow-up interviews, a focused (semi-structured) approach was taken where
specific questions were prepared beforehand. It is important to add that with the military, a number of
officers were interviewed more than once over the course of the years, allowing for additional probes into
the individual solder’s insights and personal experiences related to the topic.
The second group of interviewees include agencies that partner with the AFP in CMO programs.
They include security forces such as the U.S. forces, the Philippines National Police (PNP), as well as
NGOs, government agencies, and local government officials. A similar approach was taken with this group,
where they provided the author with an overview of the organization, followed by a semi-structured
interview. The objectives here were to gain an understanding of the organization, their stance on working
with the military, and views on the effects of completed or on-going CMO projects.
The third group of interviewees is the CMO beneficiaries themselves. The objectives here are to
collect responses on their perceptions on the military, and ultimately gauge the effect that CMO has on
communities. A hired interpreter2 accompanied these interview sessions since some community members
felt more comfortable speaking in their own local dialect (mainly Chavacano) or Filipino. In the
communities visited, there was only one occasion in which the military accompanied the author (Limpapa
Barangay). The remaining visits were done independently and locations picked out were based on
information made available by the local press.
The visits to these beneficiaries originally took the form of a structured interview where a list of
predetermined questions were prepared and were subsequently intended to be re-used in other communities.
As it became apparent early on in the research that this short-answer survey would produce limited
variation in response, largely due to the fact they were conducted in non-conflict areas, the questions were
altered to serve as mere prompts or signposts when the key informants were asked to recount their
experiences in the form or a mini-narrative. The modification was made to add further depth to responses
that for the most part were uniform, when collected in a short-answer survey.
In regards to handling the results of this group, it was taken into consideration that the dynamics
of the relationship between the military and the people are fundamentally different in non-conflict areas as
opposed to conflict areas. Since trips for the most part were not paid to communities in
security-compromised areas, other informants were necessary to gauge the impact of CMO in different
environs to provide a comparison. In attempts to expand on the differences and similarities, interviews were
conducted with local government officials, NGOs, and soldiers who have experience or are currently
working in security compromised areas. These took place in the form of focused and in-depth interviews.
The fourth group of interviewees includes informants coming from advocacy groups, religious

2
Interviews with beneficiaries interpreted by Bong Garcia.

202
personalities, and academia that have specialized knowledge about conflict issues but were not involved in
linking-up with the military on CMO projects. These took place in the form of in-depth interviews and the
objectives here were to seek an outside opinion for the purpose of integrating more of a balanced view in
the process of analyzing the overall findings.
It is also important to note that wherever deemed necessary, interview findings were backed and
corroborated with information from government and organizational publications, media reports, and
material produced by civilian and military scholars.

7.3 An Overview of the Western Mindanao Command (WestMinCom)

7.3.1 Background to the Creation of WestMinCom and its Battlespace
The chapter will begin with a general overview on the operations of WestMinCom and the
incorporation of CMO in their internal security operations. WestMinCom is one of the 7 unified area
commands that cover the Philippine Archipelago. It is the largest area command in the country, holding
15,000 military personnel. Under its command, it has one infantry (TABAK) division, three Marine
Battalions, a Naval Force, and an Air Division.3 Its headquarters, Camp Don Basilio Navarro was the seat
of the former Southern Command (SouthCom) that covered the entire Mindanao region. In August 2006, as
part of the efforts to improve the effectiveness of the counterinsurgency (COIN) operations at an
operational and tactical level, SouthCom was split into two. 4 The Eastern Mindanao Command
(EastMinCom) established its headquarters in Davao city, and covers Northern Mindanao, Southeastern and
Southwestern Mindanao, and the Caraga region. The Western Mindanao Command (WestMinCom),
retained its former SouthCom headquarters in Zamboanga City, but its area of responsibility (AOR) was
reduced to a total of 8 provinces: Zamboanga del Norte, Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga Sibugay, Lanao
del Norte, Lanao del Sur, and the island provinces of Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi and also its charter city,
Zamboanga City (see map 7.1).5

3
Gordon Arthur, “Interview General Benjamin Dolorfino Commander of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
Western Mindanao Command,” Jane’s Intelligence Weekly, September 1, 2009. Available at:
http://www.janes.com/news/defence/triservice/jdw/jdw090901_1_n.shtml. Accessed November 9, 2009.
4
Al Jacinto and Bong Garcia, “Southern RP military chief bows out,” Sunstar, August 28, 2006. Available at:
http://www.sunstar.com.ph/static/zam/2006/08/28/news/southern.rp.military.chief.bows.out.html/. Accessed July
15, 2007.
5
Walter I. Balane, “Officials See Better Security in Mindanao With SouthCom Split,” MindaNews, August 31,
2006. Available at: http://mindanews.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=773&Itemid=50.
Accessed March 31, 2007; Walter I. Balane, “Southcom Split Starts August: more troops expected,” MindaNews,
August 19, 2006. Available at:
http://mindanews.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=699&Itemid=50. Accessed October 22,
2006.

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Map 7.1: Map of the Philippines with the AOR of WestMinCom

Source: “Philippines,” UNESCO National Education Support Strategy (UNESS), UNESCO,

204
January 2009. Available at: http://www.unesconatcom.ph/docs/education/uness_report.pdf. Accessed
July 4, 2012.
The split in SouthCom, allowed the two new commands to focus on priority threats in their newly
designated AORs.6 While EastMinCom is geared towards tackling the Communist Party of the Philippines-
New People’s Army (CPP-NPA) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), WestMinCom focuses
primarily on the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and other international terror groups. Nonetheless,
WestMinCom is the only area command that targets all armed fronts including the CPP-NPA, MILF,
remnants of the MNLF, otherwise known as the Misuari Breakaway Group,7 and other lawless groups. In
its AOR, the CPP-NPA has the weakest front in the entire region of Mindanao. They are located the
provinces of Lanao, Zamboanga del Norte, and Sibugay. 8 The active MNLF faction operates in 24
barangays in Sulu, Basilan, and Zamboanga del Norte. They are estimated to have 580 regular fighters,
2,050-armed reserves, and a mass base of 19,800.9
Concerning the Muslim armed front in WestMinCom’s AOR, the MILF is situated in Lanao,
Basilan, and more recently in Northern parts of Zamboanga peninsula; and the ASG, in Basilan, Sulu, and
Tawi-Tawi.10 The Muslim armed front poses a different set of problems because it constrains the AFP. The
MILF occupies swaths of land recognized by the government under the terms of the ceasefire agreement
(2003). As of 2007, the AFP refers to these lands as “areas of temporal stay” meaning the military is
prohibited from conducting military operations within these parameters, dictated by the government’s
interim arrangement with the MILF.11 This complicates the AFP’s operations against the ASG, since the
ASG rely on sympathetic members of the MILF to find refuge in these MILF bases. There have been some
instances when soldiers were met with armed resistance from the MILF when pursuing the ASG within the
vicinity of the MILF camps.12

6
Al Jacinto and Bong Garcia, “Southern RP military chief bows out,” Sunstar, August 28, 2006. Available at:
http://www.sunstar.com.ph/static/zam/2006/08/28/news/southern.rp.military.chief.bows.out.html/ Accessed July
15, 2007.
7
Elements of the MNLF group, headed by original leader, Nur Misuari. They continue to fight the Philippine
government.
8
Lieutenant Colonel Rodrigo T. Gregorio (INF), Philippine Army, Assistant Chief of Staff for CMO, G7,
interview with author, Headquarters of the 1st Infantry (TABAK) Division, Labangan, Zamboanga del Sur,
Philippines, October 29, 2010. Hereafter cited as Lt. Col. Gregorio, October 29, 2010.
9
“What the future holds for Bangsamoro,” Agora Business Intelligence, October 25, 2012. Available at:
http://www.agora.ph/country.php?id=795. Accessed December 18, 2012.
10
Colonel Wilson O. Mitra, Assistant Chief of Unified Command Staff for CMO, U7, interview with the author,
Camp Navarro, WesMinCom, Zamboanga City, Philippines, October 27, 2010. Hereafter cited as Col. Mitra,
October 27, 2010.
11
Lt. Col. Gregorio, October 29, 2010. Areas of Temporal Stay or recognizing MILF rights to occupy their
territory temporarily, came out of an interim agreement between the government and the MILF rebels in 2007 for
the purpose of preventing confrontations between the AFP and the MILF. Nonetheless, this has led to occasional
skirmishes when the AFP entered MILF territory to chase down the ASG. Edd K. Usmann, “ATS no longer
exists?”, The Manila Bulletin, November 8, 2011. Available at:
http://www.mb.com.ph/articles/340568/ats-no-longer-exists-milf. Accessed November 9, 2011.
12
Crisis Group Asia Report No.152, The Philippines: Counter-Insurgency Vs. Counter-Terrorism in Mindanao,
14 May 2008; Jojo Malig, “Al-Barka: How villagers killed Marines, Special Forces troops,” Abs-Cbn News,
October 26, 2011. Available at:
http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/-depth/10/19/11/al-barka-how-villagers-killed-marines-special-forces-troops.
Accessed May 21, 2012. In July 2007, 23 marines were killed in a clash with the MILF in Basilan during an

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Map 7.2: Enemy Disposition in the AFP’s AOR

Source: 1st Infantry (TABAK) Division, Philippine Army, official website (MNLF-Moro National
Liberation Front, LCM-Local Communist Movement, ASG-Abu Sayyaf Group, MILF-Moro Islamic
Liberation Front, ID-Infantry Division, PA-Philippine Army, and AOR-Area of Responsibility). Note: The
area shaded by a box is the AOR of WestMinCom.

Thus, WesMinCom has to contend with a mixed battlespace that holds the presence of various
armed groups, and some even operating in each other’s area of influence. Conducting military operations
have been challenging in this environment not only because the AFP has limited resources to battle all
fronts with the same intensity simultaneously, but also because each group requires a different response.
They depend on the manner of warfare the armed groups engage in, the physical and human terrain they
operate in, their objectives, their armed strength, the degree of control they have over territory or political
apparatuses, and also their status with the government, meaning whether or not there is an on-going peace
process.
Further complicating the situation is that the battlespace is crowded with different actors. Aside
from the belligerents (the threat groups, the military and other security forces such as the police, U.S. forces,
and civilian militia), there are also civilian agencies and the population the AFP has to deal with. Local
government units and agencies, international aid agencies, and NGOs also work under their respective
mandates, which inevitably blur the lines between military and civilian spheres. And in regards to the
population, threat groups often rely on their support or at least their acquiescence so that they could move
unrestricted, using the population as concealment and a source of sustenance. Therefore, even the AFP sees
that relying on military solutions alone are impractical on a battlespace that is teaming with diverse actors.

attempt to rescue an Italian priest held by the ASG. Similarly, in another operation to recover ASG hostages, an
encounter with the MILF led to the death of 19 Special Forces in October 2011 on the same island. In both cases,
the local military commanders did not properly coordinate with the MILF before entering the vicinity of MILF
camps.

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 With the official recognition of CMO as a valid military operation in 2006, it gave more impetus
for WestMinCom to shift its operations from a combat-heavy approach to one that exercises more lateral
thinking in tackling the complex battlespace. As findings from the case study show, the human terrain has
become the key battleground in which the Filipino troops seek to improve maneuverability over.

7.3.2 Tackling the Human Terrain in Western Mindanao

The guiding principles of CMO under WestMinCom is building the image of the soldier and
subsequently bringing the people closer to the AFP.13 The command faces a specific set of challenges in
the regional context of Mindanao. The area has been the tragic setting for government neglect, misplaced
policies, and conflict, leaving the region, one of the most impoverished places in the country. As of 2009, 3
provinces (Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Norte, and Lanao del Sur) out of the 8 provinces falling within the
jurisdiction of WestMinCom’s AOR, belong to the top ten poorest provinces in terms of the poverty
incidence. The province of Tawi-Tawi was ranked number one (see Appendix F).14
Furthermore, Muslim secessionist wars in the 1970s accounted for numerous civilian
displacements, casualties and human rights abuses caused by both sides: the government forces and the
rebel groups. In particular, the marked brutality of the AFP in quelling these rebellions has left emotional
scars on the psyche of the people, leaving communities in the region with an instinctive distrust towards the
military.15
From the point-of-view of WesMinCom, their poor image, coupled with basic government
neglect in the most impoverished areas, have bolstered the popular support of the threat groups. Therefore
the military objective here is “looking for a civilian response that will weaken the enemy.”16 The “civilian
response” that the AFP is looking for is one that shifts the people’s allegiance from the enemy to the
government, or even just simply deterring the people from supporting and/or joining the enemy. Based on
the viewpoint, this response can only be elicited if the people can feel that the government cares for them
and at the same time, raise the level of awareness concerning the threat groups.17
Broadly speaking, there are two methods to elicit such a response from the population. The first

13
Major Eugenio S. Batara, Jr., Assistant Chief of Unified Command Staff for CMO, U7, interview with author,
Camp Don Basilio Navarro, Calarian, Zamboanga City, Philippines, October 3, 2007. Hereafter cited as Maj.
Batara and date.
14
Philippines National Statistical Coordination Board, 2006. Available at: www.nscb.gov.ph. Accessed
November 27, 2012.
15
Sister Emma Delgado, OP, Peace Advocates Zamboanga (PAZ), interview with author, PAZ office,
Zamboanga City, Philippines, July 28, 2008. Hereafter cited as Sr. Delgado and date; United Nations Children’s
Fund and IBON Foundation Inc., “Uncounted Lives: Children, women, and conflict in the Philippines, UNICEF
and IBON, December 2007, p. 47. Hereafter cited as “Uncounted Lives: Children, women, and conflict in the
Philippines.”
16
Lt. Col. Rodrigo T. Gregorio GSC (INF) PA, Assistant Chief of Staff for CMO, G7, interview with author, 1 st
Infantry (Tabak) Division, PA, Labangan, Zamboanga del Sur, Philippines. October 29, 2010. Hereafter cited as
Lt. Col. Gregorio, October 29, 2010.
17
Maj. Batara. July 31, 2008; Col. Wilson O. Mitra, Assistant Chief of Unified Command Staff for CMO, U7,
interview with author, Camp Don Basilio Navarro, Calarian, Zamboanga City, Philippines, October 27, 2010.
Hereafter cited as Col. Wilson, October 27, 2010.

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is physically addressing the needs of the community, which falls under the CMO pillar of Civil Affairs
(CA) and the second, providing information to the community, which falls under the CMO pillar of Public
Affairs (PA).

Civil Affairs: Community Outreach Programs

Civil Affairs (CA) organizes and implements civic action in communities. To the public, they are
known as community outreach programs. These activities vary in duration and activity. For short-term
missions, the military launches outreach programs that are high-impact or are considered to be the quickest
way to gain the appreciation of the people. These typically fall under the category of medical assistance.
Medical missions can be more easily organized and launched because the AFP has its own group of medical
specialists. They target poorer barangays (villages) that lack health facilities and medicine. Services
provided include minor surgery such as removing cataracts and circumcision, and the distribution of
medicine such as paracetamols (pain killers and fever reducers) and vitamin supplements. Military dentists
conduct tooth extraction and provide toothpaste and tooth brushes. Medical consultations are held and
referrals are made to larger hospitals for those patients that need further treatment.
The sheer amount of medical missions conducted was already on the rise since CMO’s
institutionalization. For instance in 2006 alone, WesMinCom conducted 1,831 medical missions benefiting
31,630 people, and 2,365 dental missions reaching 10,500 people.18 The advantages of medical missions
are that they usually take place within one or two days and have the advantage of covering a succession of
barangays in a short period of time. For instance in 2012, Operation Tuli (Operation Circumcision) was
held in Zamboanga City, covering 7 villages in the coastal region and in one village alone, more than 100
boys benefited.19
Other short-term community outreach programs include the distribution of goods such as clothing,
diapers, veterinary assistance for livestock animals, and cleanliness drives.20 There are also longer-term
CMO activities that seek to tackle lack development and poverty. The AFP continues to see poverty
combined with a lack of government services, the very conditions that armed groups exploit to fan the
flames of anti-government feelings and draw support to their cause. WestMinCom engages in larger and
resource-intensive projects in remote and conflict areas where it is more difficult for Local Government
Units (LGU) and other government agencies to enter.21
In a nutshell, such activities fall under Clear-Hold-Sustain-Develop (CHSD) methodology that
draws its roots from earlier COIN plans where the AFP is tasked to clear a remote area of armed threat

18
CMO Annual Accomplishment Report, January to July 2006, and June to December 2006, Western Mindanao
Command, Afp, Office of the Assistant Chief Unified Command Staff for CMO, U7, Camp Navarro, Calarian,
Zamboanga City.
19
Bong Garcia, “104 Children Benefit in ‘Operation Tuli,’ ”SunStar, April 24, 2012. Available online at:
http://www.sunstar.com.ph/zamboanga/local-news/2012/04/24/104-children-benefit-operation-tuli-218001.
Accessed May 22, 2012. Circumcision, despite the medical debate over its perceived benefits, is considered by
many to be an important rite of passage into manhood and therefore is highly appreciated.
20
Maj. Batara, October 4, 2007.
21
Maj. Batara, October 3, 2007.

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while providing limited developmental assistance until the community is secure enough to allow the entry
of other government agencies.22 The CMO projects conducted are centered on infrastructure projects,
electrification, building portable water systems, healthcare delivery providing educational and livelihood
assistance.23 In the AOR of WestMinCom, such activities are particularly visible in the remote island
provinces of Basilan and Sulu, where the ASG and other armed groups are active. Infrastructure work is
done in earnest because it not only supports the needs of the community but at the same time, facilitates the
movement of troops, vehicles, and material in times of contingencies.24

Public Affairs (Information Campaigns)

WesMinCom also devotes much energy into disseminating information about the AFP, promoting
government programs, and increasing awareness of the enemy so that people are not “misled” by enemy
propaganda. Various mediums are used to get the AFP message out to the public. They include the use of
the media (radio, TV, print journalism), organization of symposiums and dialogues in communities, and
activities as simple as removing enemy posters. Information drives frequently accompany medical and/or
dental missions in barangays since the AFP finds it an opportune time to give out information to a large
gathering of people.25
The youth sector is given special attention since they are considered to be most impressionable
and idealistic, and therefore the most susceptible to the ideological and sometimes the financial lure of the
threat groups.26 For instance, in the first quarter of 2007 (January to March), there were 62 symposiums
held in high schools and colleges in the AOR or WestMinCom.27
Yet at another level, these information drives are one way to elicit information about enemy
movements. They are aimed at orientating the residents, the barangays (village) council on what to do if
they spot any suspicious activities.28 In 2009, the AFP established a “text hotline” so that the public could
report “the presence of any suspicious people in a particular place.” The campaign was called "I-text Mo
Ang Terrorista Kay Sarge," Roughly translated, it means “Text your Sergeant concerning terrorists.”29

22
Lt. Col. Regencia, October 8, 2007.
23
Maj. Batara, October 4, 2007; Lt. Col. Regencia,, October 8, 2007. Presentation delivered by Major Julius A.
Carbarloc at the AFP National Development Support Command, Camp Aguinaldo, AFP Headquarters, Manila
Philippines on July 25, 2008.
24
The Philippine Marine Corps official website, “Civil-Military Operations in Sumisip: Marine Battalion
Landing Team-1 CMO Projection in its Current AOO.” Available at: http://pmc.navy.mil.ph/c6_toc2007.html.
Accessed May 15, 2012.
25
Major Gamal Hayudini, Civil Relations officer, interview with author, Civil Relations Office, Camp Navarro,
Western Mindanao Command, Calarian, Zamboanga City, Philippines, July 29,2008. Hereafter cited as Maj.
Hayudini, July 29, 2008. The Civil Relations Office is tasked with the handling of the informational-aspect of
CMO.
26
Maj. Hayudini, July 29, 2008.
27
Maj. Hayudini, July 29, 2008. According to Maj. Hayudini, the communists infiltrate schools by organizing
parties, gatherings, outings, or clubs that promote rock-singing or dancing. They also entice youth with promises
to pay their tuition.
28
Halima J. Apalad, Limpapa kagawad (barangays council member), interview with author, Limpapa,
Zamboanga City, July 20, 2009.
29
Bong Garcia, “Wesmincom to open text hotlines,” Sunstar, July 22, 2009. Available at:

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7.3.3 Naval Forces Western Mindanao
While the Army was traditionally on the forefront in implementing CMO activities, upon
institutionalization, the AFP has also bolstered the role of CMO within the Navy and to a certain extent, the
Air Force. The Naval Forces Western Mindanao (WestMinCom) also plays a significant part, especially in
taking a multi-sectoral approach in establishing security in the region.
In Western Mindanao, the Navy has carved out their own specialty in CMO. In addition to the
three pillars (Civil Affairs, Public Affairs, and Psychological Operations), the Navy actively engages in
environmental protection. It involves a CMO and Environmental Management Staff that coordinates and
organizes activities to enhance the protection of the environment.30
Since the maritime environment is expansive in the area, the navy is active in environmental
activities that include mangrove planting, coastal cleanup, along with law enforcement functions to
apprehend violators. They are particularly concerned with the depletion of fish, rapid disappearance of
coral, and mangrove clearing. Patrols are conducted to monitor illegal fishing, dynamite fishing, and the
transport of mangrove and other endangered forestry products. For instance, the Navy maintains
detachments such as on Santa Cruz island, a 15-20 minute boat ride from the downtown district of
Zamboanga City31 which is supposed to serve as a deterrent for these activities.32 Though the Navy did
not elaborate on any specific threat groups operating in the region, coastal areas are a large security concern.
Kidnapping attributed to the ASG or wayward MILF members, not to mention lawless groups have skirted
authorities by means of island-hopping. The Army does not have enough personnel to man all these
scattered islands, leaving the Navy with this responsibility.33
The promotion of environmental protection is also seen to make in-roads in the tourism sector.
For instance, the 11-Island Group (see map 7.3), a group of islands off the coast of Zamboanga City has
pristine white beaches and oceans ideal for scuba diving. The Navy conducts medical and dental services
on these islands, which have improved the working relationship with the regional tourism office and the
city police station. Such efforts are seen to be ways to transform these areas into potential tourist
attractions.
While the Navy maintains that the Army remains on the forefront of CMO, they have seen their
own contribution to the civil-military cooperation. Similar to the Army, the Navy underlines the importance
of improving relations with the people. As Rear Adm. Emilio C. Marayag Jr, expresses, “we are trying our
best to be with the people and to let them feel secure, and to let them know that we are also human beings

http://www.sunstar.com.ph/zamboanga/wesmincom-open-text-hotlines. Accessed December 13, 2009;

“Philippine Military sets up anti-terrorism text campaign, Business Online, October 5, 2009. Available at:
http://www.textually.org/textually/archives/2009/10/024660.htm. Accessed November 18, 2012.
30
Rear Admiral Emilio C. Marayag Jr, AFP, Commander, Naval Forces Mindanao, interview with author, HQs
Naval Forces Western Mindanao, Naval Station Zamboanga, Bagong Calarian, Zamboanga City, Philippines,
July 31, 2008. Hereafter cited as Rear Adm. Marayag, July 31, 2008.
31
The population includes only three families. The navy has removed illegal dwellers from the island since
establishing its detachment.
32
Rear Adm. Marayag, July 31, 2008.
33
Bong Garcia, interview with author, Zamboanga City, July 31, 2008.

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and we are not just fighters or warriors.” Since 2007, the Naval Forces Western Mindanao has provided a
venue for civilian agencies and other stakeholders to gather and share ideas on how to help communities.
Based on the input, the Navy decides on which locations and what resources they can provide in the
realization of these projects.
However, all in all, the region’s Navy comment that they do not have sufficient funds to conduct
CMO at the level they want to, and primarily depend on resource sharing with other agencies to implement
projects. The Navy states that their main contribution is providing logistics, expertise such as in medical
areas, and manpower. But in other areas, they depend on NGOs and local government agencies to provide
the material to distribute to a community. In regards to financial contributions, the U.S. forces are without a
doubt, the largest budget-holders. Many large-scale community outreach programs are done in partnership
with the American soldiers, who are accompanied with assistance from their aid agency (USAID) to cover
the bulk of the cost.34
In summary, the institutionalization of CMO (2006) has paved way for other military services
other than the Army to participate in. It appears that the Navy, after the Army, is the second most important
contributor to CMO. And within the AOR of WestMinCom, they have also carved out their role in maritime
environmental protection.

7.3.4 The Philippine National Police (PNP)

A brief look at the Philippine National Police (PNP) reveals that they also join the AFP on
numerous CMO projects. The PNP is the law enforcement body of the nation. Originally one of the services
belonging to the AFP, it has a history of being on the forefront of fighting insurgencies. Though the PNP is
no longer under the AFP (the PNP was officially transferred to the Department of the Interior and Local
Government in 1998),35 they are also tasked to launch operations jointly or independently with the military
against threat groups that go beyond their usual law enforcement functions.36
Like WesMinCom, the regional PNP in the region also faces challenges in developing a
relationship of trust with the communities due to a poor track record on human rights. Their own equivalent
of the CMO is the Police-Community Relations.37 Its mission is to “to cooperate with various sectors of
the community and impel their continuing collaboration and support to the police programs and activities;
educate and inform the public on the Criminal Justice System; and undertake such other
community-oriented activities essential for an effective and efficient police service.”38

34
Rear Adm. Marayag, July 31, 2008.
35
Republic Act No. 6975 “An Act Establishing the Philippine National Police under a reorganized
Department of the Interior and Local Government and Other Purposes as amended by RA 8551 Philippine
National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998 and further amended by RA 9708.”
36
For instance in Zamboanga City, when there is a security problem such as a bombing, the security force,
closest to the scene, is called upon, be it the AFP or the PNP.
37
Police Superintendent Joselito Gallano, Deputy Commander, PNP Regional Mobile Group, interview with
author, Zamboanga City, Philippines, July 28, 2009. Hereafter cited as Supt. Gallano, July 28, 2009.
38
Philippine National Police (PNP) official website. Available at:
http://pnp.gov.ph/main/citizens%20charter/PCRG%20CRAC.pdf.

211
 Though they do not have the civil engineering capabilities of the military, they have the ability to
organize, collect donations, deliver basic medical care to communities, as well as providing logistics,
manpower and security when working co-jointly with NGOs and government agencies. For large-scale
programs, they also work with the AFP and the U.S. Forces. Similar to the AFP, they engage in community
outreach programs and information campaigns.
Before they conduct their community outreach programs, the police conduct research and gather
statistics from barangays. They prioritize barangays with the most needs. For medical missions, the
medicine and funds come primarily from donations, sometimes coming from the police themselves. Actual
medical experts that are deployed are PNP doctors and nurses. This medical mission spans between 1 to 3
days, depending on the volume. In areas where there is a security problem, the PNP clears out the area first
and provides protection for NGOs and civilian agencies entering.
Additionally, such activities are perceived to be one way to elicit the trust of the people and gain
their cooperation. In conducting overall law enforcement, a cooperative community translates into
“feedback” about criminal and terrorist activities, which is helpful in maintaining law and order.39

7.3.5 The American Forces

The Joint Special Operations Task Force – Philippines (JSOTF-P) are the contingent of American
forces deployed to the Philippines after the September 11th attacks. They are headquartered within the
compounds of the WestMinCom, Camp Navarro in Zamboanga City. At any given time, their numbers
range from 500 and 600 U.S. military personnel. Its AOR is mainly restricted to the Mindanao region,
inclusive of the outlying islands of Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi (see map 5.2. in chapter 5).40
The ultimate goal of the American forces is to neutralize “high-value” targets or core members of
the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and other terrorist groups in cooperation with the Filipino forces.41 The
means to achieve this are done by advising and training their Filipino counterparts in counter-terrorism,
rendering engineering and medical assistance (combat injuries), provide hardware, and conducting CMO
activities.42
The JSOTF-P began shifting their focus to CMO after the success of the Balikatan exercises in
2002. It was determined that CMO played a significant role in eroding the support of the ASG by providing
for the basic needs of the people and thus paving way for a formula that could defeat insurgences.43 Once

39
Supt. Gallano, July 28, 2009.
40
Joint Special Operations Task Force-P Fact Sheet. Available at:
http://jsotf-p.blogspot.jp/2011/09/type-your-summary-here_20.html. Accessed October 14, 2012.
41
Tom Shanker, “U.S. Military to Stay in Philippines,” The New York Times, August 20, 2009. Available online
at: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/21/world/asia/21military.html. Accessed August 26, 2009.
42
Medical training is aimed to increase the chances of survival for AFP personnel wounded in combat. “Subject
matter expert exchange” is often used in place for training as both sides gain from the experience. The
Americans also learn from their Filipino counterparts, especially in working in a jungle environment.
Lieutenant Commander Fred Kuebler, JSOTF-P, U.S. Forces, interview with author, Camp Navarro, Calarian,
Zamboanga City, Philippines, October 3, 2007. Hereafter cited as Lt. Cmdr. Kuebler, October 3, 2007.
43
Dencio Severo Acop, “The Expanded Nontraditional Role of the AFP: A Reassessment,” Prism, Vol. 3 No.2,
March 2002; B.A. Patty, “To Raise them up. Part 1: The lesser and greater insurgencies of the Philippines,” The

212
CMO became institutionalized in the Philippines in 2006, the U.S. forces also followed track, and increased
support for CMO programs. According to the JSOTF-P fact sheet, between October 2007 and June 2011,
JSOTF-P provided more than USD24 million in humanitarian projects to communities in need in Mindanao.
And in partnership with the Philippine military, they conducted more than 500 civic action projects
alongside the provision of medical and dental care, in which beneficiaries amounted to 104,600 people.44
CMO is seen by the U.S. forces as a constructive way to shape the battlespace that is composed
of communities that provide the ASG their safe havens or more broadly speaking room to maneuver.45
CMO is used as a tool to remove the conditions that make the ASG-alternative attractive for the people,
which are considered to be poverty and lack of government presence.46 CMO is not just limited to
persuading the populace to support the Filipino government and themselves. Large infrastructure projects
such as extending airport runway, road up-keep, and construction of piers and jetties serve the purpose of
allowing for the physical mobility of the troops, securing lines of communications, and also to protect
troops.47
CMO activities conducted in Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, and Basilan jointly with the AFP include road
projects, water improvement facilities, construction and building improvements on mosques, schools, and
Area Coordinating Centers (ACCs).48 More short-term activities such as medical and dental missions,
school refurbishment, doing book reading in elementary schools are also organized in urban centers as
well.49
The U.S. forces state that “CMO is applied in a combined and coordinated effort between the
AFP, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), NGOs, and the Philippine
government” underlying the fact that the U.S. forces do not conduct CMO unilaterally and make sure the
AFP takes lead. Additionally, advice is sought from local governments and traditional leaders on the best
ways to meet the needs of the community.50 In a CMO project, U.S. forces contribute resources and
involve themselves in the planning, but ultimately the ownership of the project goes to the AFP and the
local government.51
For WestMinCom, the presence of the American military in the region has significantly opened

Long War Journal, October 15, 2007, p. 3 as printed out. Available at:
http://www.longjournal.org/archives/2007/10/to_raise_them_up_par.php. Accessed January 8, 2008.
44
Joint Special Operations Task Force-P Fact Sheet. Available at:
http://jsotf-p.blogspot.jp/2011/09/type-your-summary-here_20.html. Accessed October 14, 2012.
45
Tom Shanker, “U.S. Military to Stay in Philippines,” The New York Times, August 20, 2009. Available online
at: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/21/world/asia/21military.html. Accessed August 26, 2009.
46
Lt.Cmdr. Kuebler, October 3, 2007.
47
Herbert Docena, “The U.S. troops’ ‘unconventional’ presence,” posted in Governance, Peace and Public
Security, Stories, I Report, January 15, 2007, p. 6 as printed out. Available at: http://pcij.org/stories/the
-u-s-troops-unconventional-presence/ Accessed January 30, 2007.
48
Area Coordinating Centers (ACCs) serves as a central government office, administrative office, open-air
market, town assembly hall, and storage-facility.
49
Lt.Cmdr. Kuebler, October 3, 2007.
50
Lt.Cmdr. Kuebler, October 3, 2007.
51
Major Tyler Wilson, US Army, Civil Affairs, Joint Special Operations Taskforce-Philippines, interview with
author, Western Mindanao Command, Zamboanga City, Philippines, July 28, 2009.

213
up further possibilities in the manner and scope of conducting community outreach programs, especially
due to their resources. While the American military has limited funding, its financial strength lies in its
support from the State Department, and links to aid agencies and NGOs.52 In particular, the U.S. forces
work closely with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), a government agency
responsible for providing foreign aid. In regards to funding to the Philippines, USAID has centered many
of its programs in Mindanao. Between 1996 and 2009, the agency provided nearly USD500 million to the
region to help with the construction of roads, bridges, ports, and promoting microenterprises.53 But it was
after the September 11th attacks that USAID began maximizing the military-civilian cooperation in order to
remove the sources of terrorism in the Southern Philippines. 54 Thus, for an under-resourced AFP,
partnering with the American military has become a key factor in expanding CMO in the region.

7.4 CMO in Zamboanga City

7.4.1 Background to Zamboanga City
CMO activities are conducted year-round in Zamboanga City. The city is located on the southern
tip of Zamboanga peninsula in Mindanao, more than 860 km from Manila. The port city is also known as
the sardines’ capital of the Philippines, with an economy heavily based on agri-fisheries along with trade,
tourism, and manufacturing. The city in itself is sprawling, being the third largest city in the nation in terms
of area size, and covering some 1,500 sq. km. The city consists of 98 barangays, of which 31 are island
barangays. Most of the city is rural and only a mere 29 out of the total barangays are considered to be
urban.55
According to the August 2007 census, the population of Zamboanga City was 774,407 and it
continues to experience a rapid population growth especially in urban areas. In 2010, it was estimated to
have 807,129 people.56 The factors behind the rise is one, the Philippine government’s campaign to
promote the region as a place for economic opportunity to attract businesses and job-seekers and two, the
armed conflict in surrounding regions had added to the influx of migrants, fleeing from the strife.57 The
city-dwellers are mostly Christian but approximately 36 percent of the population is composed of “cultural
minorities,’ which are generally classified as belonging to the Muslim faith.58 Banners fluttering in the

52
Command Sgt. Major William Eckert, JSTOF-P, “Defeating the idea: Unconventional Warfare in southern
Philippines,” Accessed online at: http://www.socom.mil/Releases/Jan/JSOTF/JSOTF.pdf
53
Jerry E. Esplanada, “US to hike aid to Mindanao,” Philippines Daily Inquirer.net, October 31, 2011.
Available at: http://philippines.usaid.gov/newsroom/us-hike-aid-mindanao. Accessed November 3, 2012.
54
See “Military Coordination” on USAID official website available at:
http://philippines.usaid.gov/about/military_coord. Accessed November 3, 2012.
55
National Statistical Coordination Board, Available at:
http://www.nscb.gov.ph/activestats/psgc/municipality.asp?muncode=097332000&regcode=09&provcode=73.
56
Philippines National Statistics Office, 2010 Census. Available at: http://www.census.gov.ph/. Accessed
November 7, 2011.
57
Madge Kho, “A Conflict That Won’t Go Away,” PhilippineUpdate.com, undated. Available at:
http://www.philippineupdate.com/Conflict.htm/. Accessed March 25, 2013.
58
The cultural minority groups include the Tausugs, Yakans, Badjaos, Samals, and the Subanens. The Subanens
are considered to be the indigenous people or the lumads. See City Government of Zamboanga official website
at http://www.zamboanga.gov.ph/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=466&Itemid=28. Accessed

214
wind read “Asia’s Latin City” and the language spoken by the majority of the residents, Chavacano,59
provide a distant but lingering reminder of its colonial past under the Spaniards.
The history of the city plays into the military dimension of the city. Being located at the tip of the
peninsula, it has always provided a strategic location for any military garrisoned there. During the Spanish
period, the Spaniards built Fort Pillar in 1635 to provide a defense system against external attacks, which
came from the British, the Dutch, and the Portuguese. It also provided a staging ground to launch attacks
against the Moros.60
It was with the entry of the Americans that the Muslim South was ceded to the United States by a
treaty drawn up at the end of the Spanish-American War, but the Americans also encountered countless
challenges in putting down the Muslim uprisings. While the rest of the Philippines came under the control
of the American civilian government in 1902, the American military continued to administer control over
the “Moro Province” from its army headquarters in Zamboanga City until 1913. As a testament to the
American presence, a plaza located at the heart of the city center is named after John J. Pershing, an
American general who ran the province as governor from 1908-1913.
After independence, the Philippine military also situated its regional command there. In the 1970s,
the largest area command known as Southern Command (SouthCom) was established in Zamboanga City
and led operations against the Muslims secessionist wars. Since then, a new generation of Muslim threat
groups has emerged and the current command, WestMinCom, organized in 2006, is tasked to focus
particularly on the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) based in the outlying islands of Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-tawi.
The city today continues to hold a heavy military presence. It includes Camp General Basilio
Navarro (the seat of the Western Mindanao Command located in Calarian), Camp General Arturo T. Enrile
(headquarters of the military’s maneuver force - Task Force Zamboanga located in Malagutay), Edwin
Andrews Air Base (Philippine Air Force located near Zamboanga International Airport), Naval Forces
Western Mindanao (Philippine Navy located in Bagong Calarian), and Marine Base Zamboanga (Marine
Forces South located in Cabatangan). The American forces are camped at Camp Navarro and the Police
Regional Office 9 is located in Mercedes. In short, the city, maintains an important command center that
organizes and deploys soldiers to battle zones or rebel-influenced areas in the nearby islands and to
neighboring provinces on the peninsula. The city is generally free of large-scale military operations but
faces periodic bombings allegedly by the ASG. The latest and most serious incident happening in 2011
when 3 people were killed in a hotel explosion.61 Additionally, the city itself is more than twice the size of
Metro Manila which makes it difficult for the undermanned police force to cover the vast area, and in

December 4, 2012.
59
A Spanish-based Creole language. A distinctive feature of the Chavacano language is that there is no verb
conjugation and all nouns are expressed in the masculine form.
60
Zamboanga City was as far as the Spaniards could get in maintaining a semi-permanent location in the
Muslim South, as they were beaten back by the Muslims in the region.
61
See “3 dead, 27 injured in Zamboanga City explosion,” ABS CBN News, November 28, 2012. Available at:
http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/regions/11/27/11/23-injured-zamboanga-city-explosion. Accessed
November 20, 2012.

215
particular, the huge coastline.62 Consequently, there are periodic kidnappings where victims are whisked
from the city and transported to ASG lairs located in Basilan and Sulu.63 The segmentation or the
kidnapping business makes it a perennial headache for the security forces. Subcontractors for the ASG are
divided into spotters (people who find potential targets), strikers (people who abduct the victims), and
transporters (people who transport the victims) to ASG hideouts in the nearby islands.64 Many of those
involved in the kidnapping enterprise are not core ASG members but are friends or relatives of the ASG
that are in for financial reward rather than any ideological conviction. As their involvement may be for a
one-time deal, they are more difficult to trace.65

62
Edgar Araojo, Professor of Political Science, Western Mindanao State University, interview with author,
Baliwasan Central School, October 25, 2010. Hereafter cited as Araojo and date of interview.
63
Araojo, October 25, 2010.
64
Araojo, October 25, 2010.
65
Sr. Delgado, July 31, 2009.

216
Map 7.3: Map of Zamboanga City

Source: Office of the City Mayor and City Tourism Office, Zamboanga City.

7.4.2 Differentiating the Targets

While the majority of CMO activities target the public at large, CMO is also tailored to adjust to
a community, depending on which armed group they can be most susceptible to. The driving force behind
the differentiation is to reach the deep depth of the respective threat groups. Since there is no overt presence

217
of armed groups in Zamboanga City, the depth constitutes the psychological domain in which the threat
groups can manipulate to their advantage and eventually gain support. Therefore, one of the key methods in
preventing the effects of enemy propaganda on reaching the population was to shape CMO activities based
on the religious and/or ethnic affiliations, and political leanings of the people.
Concerning the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA), the
majority of armed encounters occur within the AOR of the Eastern Mindanao Command (EastMinCom),
the area command that covers Central and Northeastern Mindanao. In the AOR of WestMinCom, their
presence is smaller, being limited to the hinterlands in the northern portion of Zamboanga peninsula. While
Special Operations Teams (SOTs) are deployed to these communist-affected areas, usually in remote areas
within the city,66 the primarily concern is with their political activities conducted within the confines of the
city.67
AFP officials admit that by law, the communist party has a right to exist legally; but their
problem with the movement is that these legal fronts are connected to the underground movement. The
underground movement is perceived to be inter-connected with the armed component.68 According to their
intelligence reports, this underground movement in the peninsula has shifted from armed operations to
infiltrating sectoral organizations in white areas (urban).69
Therefore, the main thrust of CMO in regards to the communists in the city is to reach their
political “rear” through activities categorized under the Public Affairs (PA) pillar.70 The AFP actively
conducts information campaigns to raise the level of awareness concerning the activities of communists to
the people. The focal concern of the AFP is the youth sector, since they are the traditional recruiting ground
for the CPP-NPA. CMO and civil relations officers organize forums in school campuses (university and
high schools) to instruct students on the recruiting methods of the communists and the dangers of joining
the movement.71
This also applies to SOT operations. In contrast to the typical triad concept (combat, intelligence,
and CMO) where SOTs are used to clear communist presence in rural areas, SOTs have to deal with city
dwellers that are better informed and have more access to government services. Therefore, SOTs in the city
are basically trained to counter the legal fronts that the communists have set up in the city.72
Concerning the Muslims, the memories of the conflict in the 1970s and the lack of government

66
The concern with these far-flung barangays is that the overall lack of government services and low
educational rates have created an ideal recruiting ground for the communists. Moreover, local government units
have been unable to enter due to security concerns. To overcome these problems, SOTs, in coordination with
local government units (LGU), enter these baranagays to help with the delivery of basic services, provide
livelihood programs, and launch information campaigns. Maj. Batara, October 3, 2007.
67
Lt. Col. Gregorio, October 29, 2010.
68
Lt. Col. Gregorio, October 29, 2010; Lt. Col. Regencia, November 4, 2010.
69
Lt. Col. Gregorio, October 29, 2010.
70
Maj. Hayudini, July 29, 2008.
71
According to Major Hayudini, the communists infiltrate schools by setting up clubs such as rock-singing or
dancing and organizing other social functions. To entice the student, the CPP-NPA may promise to sponsor
tuition fees, livelihood benefits, or medical benefits. Maj. Hayudini, July 29, 2008.
72
Maj. Batara, July 31, 2008.

218
initiatives to help the Muslim poor, have made them particularly suspicious and distrustful of the military.
To breakdown these barriers, Zamboanga city has one Special Advocacy for the Livelihood and
Advancement of Muslims (SALAAM) team.73 Members that were selected for the mission originally were
MNLF or MILF integrees74 but now are selected on the basis of their Muslim faith and ability to speak the
language of a target community.75 The SALAAM team in the city consists mostly of Muslim soldiers.
Prerequisites for Salaam soldiers include CMO training and also a good understanding of the language and
culture of the community they are entering in. Many of the SALAAM soldiers, especially of the Muslim
faith volunteer, “to help their Muslim brothers and sisters.” The makeup of SALAAM units is intended to
dispel distrust of these target communities and help soldiers exercise cultural and religious sensitivities.76
The SALAAM team is deployed to poor Muslim communities in the urban areas of the city. The
main objective of SALAAM in the city is to prevent the community from supporting the ASG.77 As of July
2008, 9 barangays78 were covered by SALAAM. These missions typically involve soldiers mingling and
living with the community over a span of 45-days. In the process, the soldiers conduct studies on the
community in order to acquire an understanding on their needs and upon analysis, assistance is provided
through livelihood training, education, medicinal distribution, and small-scale infrastructure projects.79 At
the same time, information is given out about government services, with a special emphasis on the point
that the government is not neglecting them.80 In fact, the SALAAM concept has been so successful that a
counterpart has been set up by the PNP in the city. The SALAAM police focus on addressing terrorism
(ASG) and other law and order issues while ensuring the rights of the Muslim people are respected.81

73
The SALAAM team is based in Task Force Zamboanga, the AFP’s maneuver unit in Zamboanga City. The
number of military personnel were not given for confidential reasons. 2 nd Lieutenant Maria Lourdes P. Manandeg,
SALAAM team leader, interview with author, Camp General Arturo Enrile, Task Group Zamboanga, Zamboanga
City, Philippines, July 31, 2008. Hereafter cited as 2nd. Lt. Manandeg and date of interview.
74
These are fighters that either surrendered to the AFP or were absorbed by the AFP after the MNLF signed the
final peace agreement with the Philippine government in 1996.
75
For instance, the 1st Infantry Division (Philippine Army) has trained a group of Muslim soldiers that speak
Maranao, a language of the Muslim ethno-linguistic group so that they could be deployed to communities in the
Lanao region. See “Govt troops in Lanao to undergo Salaam training,” GMA News, November 18, 2008.
Available at:
http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/133657/news/regions/govt-troops-in-lanao-to-undergo-salaam-training,
Accessed November 20, 2008.
76 nd
2 Lt. Manandeg, July 31, 2008.
77
Maj. Batara, July 31, 2008.
78
Barangays were not named.
79
Unlike the SOTs, SALAAM units have the capability to do small-scale construction. I.e. water wells and
basketball courts. Major General Reynald D. Sealana, Deputy Chief of Staff and Chairman, GRP-CCCH,
interview with author, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for CMO, J7, Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo,
Quezon City, Philippines, August 3, 2009. Hereafter cited as Maj. Gen. Sealana and date of interview.
80 nd
2 Lt. Manandeg, July 31, 2008.
81
The PNP’s version of SALAAM encourages its non-Muslim members of the police force to increase their
understanding of Muslim beliefs, culture, and traditions. They also train SALAAM members in
community-relationship building in Muslim communities, while tending to counter radicalization and
de-radicalization operations. See “Salaam Police Center and Counter-Radicalization Aspects,” Police Regional
Office 9 official website. Available at:
http://pro9.pnp.gov.ph/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=687:salaam-police-center-and-counter-
radicalization-aspects&catid=66:salaam-police&Itemid=106. Accessed November 22, 2012.

219
7.4.3 Partnering with Civilian Agencies: Sharing the Burden
7.4.3.1 Introduction
CMO in Zamboanga City provides an insight on how the AFP engages other civilian actors in
gaining mobility over the population in the city (analysis provided in section 7.4.5) Many of these
community outreach or civic action programs are done in coordination and in partnership with local
government agencies (LGA), local government units (LGU), NGOs, and aid agencies. The driving
principle behind this relationship is to involve as many stakeholders as possible in tackling the insurgency
and/or terrorism problem. There are also practical reasons for the AFP to seek partnerships. The first is
resource-sharing. WestMinCom has limited funds and capacity to conduct all projects alone. Working with
other agencies help alleviate the burden. The second is tapping into the expertise of these agencies to
provide services that best fits the communities’ needs.82 The following examines the viewpoint of civilian
partners in the AFP’s CMO projects.

7.4.3.2 Partnering with NGOs

The Philippines has a vibrant NGO sector. According to the Philippine Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), there are approximately 60,000 non-stock, nongovernmental institutions registered in
the country and they are considered to be indispensable in assisting the state in delivering socio-economic
assistance and empowering the disadvantaged. Zamboanga City is a hub for NGO activity, largely due to its
strategic location. The particular circumstances surrounding the history of the region and the ongoing
conflict play into the type of activities that are organized. Numerous NGOs seek to improve relations
between Christians and Muslims that were damaged during the secessionist wars in the 1970s. For instance,
the Silsilah Foundation, Inc., established in 1984, seeks to mend relations by bridging the divide between
the two groups by promoting an understanding on the respective groups’ religious beliefs, lifestyles, and
attitudes. Activities involve dialogues that take place in the form of workshops and seminars. They also
have established living spaces called “Harmony Zones” where Muslims and Christians can live together,
under the spirit of understanding and commitment to peace.83
Similarly, Peace Advocates Zamboanga Foundation, Inc. (PAZ) is a Catholic NGO that works
towards similar goals but with the main difference being, they involve the military in their initiatives. PAZ
is active in peace education and organizing conferences, seminars, and assemblies to promote dialogues or
a healthy exchange of ideas between various religious groups. Its main mandate is to involve all
stakeholders in the peace-building efforts of Mindanao.84 Rather than distancing themselves from the AFP,

82
Maj. Batara, October 3, 2007; July 29, 2009.
83
Aminda Sano, executive vice president of Silsilah Foundation, Inc., interview with author, Harmony Village,
Zamboanga City, Philippines, October 2, 2007. See their official website for more details:
http://www.silsilahdialogue.com.
84
For more information on Peace Advocates Zamboanga, refer to their website:
http://zabida.com.ph/peace-advocates-zamboanga/paz.html#.UMAr1WdEXKQ.

220
PAZ believes that the military cannot be detached from the peace building process.85
From the perspective of PAZ, the military is both part of the problem and part of the solution in
the on-going conflict with Muslim threat groups. Sr. Emma Delgado, a staff member of PAZ, discussed that
the secessionist wars in the 1970s not only divided the Muslim and Christians, but also left an invisible scar
on the psyche of people, which has been transferred through generations. There were massive human rights
violations, which were perpetrated by the AFP, civilian militia, rebels, and the Christians and Muslims alike.
She too was trapped in a strong bias, especially towards the AFP, stemming from her past growing up in
Basilan.86 Her experience is also shared with Father Angel Calvo, the president of PAZ and heads other
organizations that form part of the broad coalition of NGOs working on peacebuilding. Fr. Calvo is a
Spanish priest that came to Zamboanga City during martial law and subsequently opened a school in
Basilan. He recalls the 1970s as the “worst period of militarization.” The massive human rights violations,
and the killing and threatening of civilians in the area, created an intense hatred towards the military that
led to their loss of credibility. Even the priest himself was accused by the military of collaborating with the
Moro National Liberations Front (MNLF) as he was involved in a program to help displaced civilians in
Basilan.87 But over the years, PAZ believes that a concerted effort is needed to break down the structural
biases that exist between the people and the military and also between the Muslims and Christians.88 Such
initiatives are important in the city, not only because of the concentration of mixed communities, but also
because there are people living in the city who have fled from military operations from nearby conflict
zones.89
In regards to the military, they are invited to forums as one of the stakeholders to peace. An
example of such meeting took place in November 2006. The objective of this interfaith, multi-sectoral
dialogue was for soldiers to develop cultural sensitivities in the context of the ongoing conflict with the
Muslim rebels and also help them to change their mindset from a combat-oriented one to exploring
peaceful alternatives. Issues were raised over the intense military operations conducted in the outlying
island provinces of Basilan, Tawi-Tawi, and Sulu that were resulting in collateral damage. During the
dialogue, Lt. Gen. Nelson N. Allaga, then-commander of WesMinCom, revealed that the military was
making efforts to transform soldiers from a warrior-ethos dominated mindset to one of a peacebuilder.90
PAZ also partners with the military in community outreach programs. Nevertheless they are

85
Sr. Delgado, July 28, 2008.
86
Sr. Delgado, October 2, 2007; July 29, 2008.
87
Fr. Calvo admitted that he still had 6 pending cases against him for activities of dissent from marital law.
Father Angel Calvo, President of Peace Advocates Zamboanga, chairman of Nagdilaab Foundation, Inc., and
regional head of the Zamboanga-Basilan Development Alliance, interview with author, Lantaka Hotel,
Zamboanga City, July 28, 2008. Hereafter cited as Fr. Calvo and date of interview.
88
Sr. Delgado, July 28, 2008. Lumads or the indigenous people are included. In the city, they consist of the
Subanons. They are considered to be the first settlers on the Zamboanga peninsula.
89
Fr. Calvo, July 28, 2008.
90
Darwin Wally Wee, “AFP forsaking guns increasingly for the bow and arrow of peace-making,” PeaceWorks,
Vol. VI No. 11, December 2007, p.4. A typical agenda of such meetings include 1) Culture of Peace 2) Conflict
transformation 3) Analyzing the causes of conflict 4) Going beyond military solutions 5) Understanding the
culture of various religious and ethnic groups.

221
particularly sensitive in working with uniformed personnel because certain communities harbor
deep-rooted grievances or distrust towards the AFP. Whenever the target beneficiaries indicate such
sentiments, they ensure that the military is not included.91 On the positive side, collaborating with the
military has provided them with assurance on their safety, some transportation help, equipment, and
manpower.92 On the downside, PAZ complains that the military’s outreach programs are done “randomly”
and for the short-term. As Sr. Delagado expressed, these initiatives should be done in “journey with the
people,” meaning the AFP needs to spend more time in developing programs that address the deeper issues
of conflict and poverty.93
Kiwanis Club of Metro Zamboanga has been in existence for over two decades. It is an NGO that
extends assistance to poor communities, with a particular focus on vulnerable sectors such as women, youth,
and children. For women, they provide classes for expecting mothers, distribute baby diapers, bottled water,
sanitation napkins, and hand sanitizers. For child and youth, they provide sessions on spiritual growth. With
small children, they provided immunization and tuition especially for disabled children. For the youth, they
provide school scholarships and drug prevention programs. Many of its members are from the business
community that help with the fund raising by holding events like government tournaments and making
personal donations.
Kiwanis partners with the AFP, PNP, and the American forces in a variety of community outreach
programs. According to the president of Kiwanis, Frencie L. Carren, there are advantages and
disadvantages to partnering with the security forces. In regards to the advantages, the first is that the
military and the police can provide security. This is something that other NGOs concur on.94 Coordination
with the police is especially critical in working along coast on the Western side of peninsula, since this is
where lawless groups or ASG operate in. The second advantage is logistics, which comes mostly from the
U.S. forces and the PNP. The third is that with the AFP, military doctors and dentists are provided.
On the downside, there are issues mostly related to working with the AFP. The first is that there is
too much bureaucracy, which stymies the ability for projects to move forward smoothly. The second is that
since AFP officers are rotated on a frequent-basis, the officials they meet and coordinate with one year are
not there the next. It is a problem because as the president Kiwanis brings up; the spirit of cooperation does
not run through the command. While lauding AFP soldiers on an individual-basis, she admitted that certain
officers were more difficult to work with than others. Thus, a smoother implementation or realization of a
joint project depended on who was in charge. The third is that sometimes their club ends up helping the
AFP more than they help them. This is especially pronounced in the area of logistics. The AFP is sorely
lacking in logistical capabilities and has to depend on its partners for this support.
For the AFP, U.S. forces, and the PNP, working with Kiwanis is beneficial. The organization

91
Sr. Delgado, July 28, 2008.
92
Sr. Delgado, July 28, 2008; July 31, 2009.
93
Sr. Delgado, July 28, 2008.
94
Prof. Edgar Araojo, Professor of Political Science, interview with author, Western Mindanao University,
Zamboanga City, Philippines, July 31, 2009. According to Prof. Araojo, when planning for outreach programs in
far-flung communities, coordination has to be done with the military due to the security problems.

222
helps the soldiers and police identify the needs of the community and provide CMO accordingly. They also
give them pointers on how to deal respectfully with the local people. For instance, they orient the PNP
about mannerisms in doing CMO in Muslim communities. In working with the American soldiers, they tell
them to appear in “civvies” rather than in uniform when conducting activities for children, such as in
school-related projects.95
In drawing together the commonalities expressed in the views of the NGOs interviewed, it can be
gathered that the NGO in the city are relatively open to working with the military. Part of it comes from the
necessity of seeking protection in dangerous areas, and another is maximizing the socio-economic
assistance that can be given to people by sharing resources. At the same time, some of the NGOs recognize
that the military is an important stakeholder to peace as well. While the relationship is a two-way street
with both sides pooling their resources to achieve their mandate, the increased interaction can also be
viewed as a step forward for the AFP in improving relations not only with CMO beneficiaries but their
civilian partners as well.

7.4.3.3 Local Government Units and Local Government Agencies

The institutionalization of CMO has also helped the AFP to expand its activities with local
government units (LGUs) and local government agencies (LGAs). With the further reorganization of peace
and order councils (POC) under Executive Order (EO) 771 (2009), it has facilitated the convergence and
coordination between the multiple actors involved in community outreach programs and in areas related to
security. It has also helped civilian partners to step up their responsibilities in dealing with the on-going
conflict.96
At the city-level, the POC of Zamboanga City convenes several times a year at city hall. Their
crisis management committee is an integral part of the POC, which takes care of specifics related to disease
outbreaks, man-made situations (conflict), and natural disasters.97
The city also has an Area Coordinating Center (ACC), or the security nerve center, already
established under the former regional command (SouthCom) in the late 1990s. This center has helped
98
strengthen the relationship between the city government and the military, especially in areas regarding
tackling terrorism and other law and order issues. Mayor Celsio Lobrgat comments that no other city has
such a concentrated number of military bases and camps, so it is imperative to have a close relationship
with the military.99 Turning to matters related to CMO, he believes that the military does not have to limit

95
Frencie L. Carren, President of the Kiwanis Club of Metro Zamboanga, interview with author, Mein
Technological College, San Jose, Zamboanga City, Philippines, July 27, 2009. Hereafter cited as Carren and date
of interview.
96
Col. Mitra, October 27, 2010.
97
Mayor Celsio Lobregat, Zamboanga City mayor, interview with author, Zamboanga City Hall, Zamboanga
City, Philippines, October 27, 2010. Hereafter cited as Mayor Lobregat and date of interview.
98
Bong Garcia, “Mayor: Death of Zambo’s adopted son tragic, sad,” SunStar, February 8, 2011. Available at:
http://www.sunstar.com.ph/zamboanga/local-news/mayor-death-zambos-adopted-son-tragic-sad. Accessed
December 6, 2012.
99
Mayor Lobregat, October 2, 2007.

223
their roles to defense, but can also play an important role in taking a holistic approach to the conflict
problem.100 Nonetheless, he states that the main issue related to the rise in community outreach programs
is that there are a myriad number of NGOs and other partners involved, and to avoid confusion, they should
coordinate with the city government first.101
Concerning the military’s relationship with local government agencies (LGA), it appears that one
of the largest drivers behind the partnership is resource sharing and security assurance. Similar to the
partnership with NGOs, local governments pool their expertise, financing, and material with other agencies,
including the military. For instance, the city’s housing management office, the main support center for
people who have lost their homes in calamities, cannot depend on their own resources, due to limited
funding. Therefore they seek cooperation from NGOs and the military. The military from time to time send
their soldiers to help in the construction of houses and other structures.102
Another government agency that frequently works with the military is the regional Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH). In conflict areas such as Basilan and Sulu, the AFP’s engineering
brigades work together with the DPWH and its contractors to build roads and bridges. Nevertheless in the
city, the DPWH coordinates with military authorities to seek protection for their construction workers and
equipment. This is particularly critical in remote areas of the city where construction equipment are
frequent targets of sabotage by armed groups.103

7.4.4 CMO Beneficiaries

The following examines communities that were beneficiaries of the AFP-CMO programs. The
selection of these communities by the author was based on accessibility and information gathered from the
local media. The purpose of this section is to sketch out how a military outreach program was conducted in
the communities and schools from the perspectives of the beneficiaries and also gauge their feelings about
these military endeavors (see Appendix H for the list of questions addressed to community members).

Culianan Barangay
Culianan Barangay is located 14 km away from Zamboanga City proper. It is considered to be
urban with a population consisting of 7,607 people,104 amounting approximately to 2,000 households. The
majority of the residents are Christian. Compared to the hinterlands, this barangay is far from being in dire
need of government services. Nevertheless, there is still a lack of basic assistance to the residents,
particularly in the provision of medicine and simple medical treatment.
At the time of the interview in late 2007, the barangay had already experienced several CMO

100
Mayor Lobregat, October 27, 2010.
101
Mayor Lobregat, October 2, 2007.
102
Rodrigo Pagotaisidro, Zamboanga City Management Office official, interview with author, Zamboanga City
Management Office, Zamboanga City, Philippines, July 28, 2009.
103
Regional Office (XI), Department of Public Works and Highways, in response to written questions
submitted by the author to the Public Relations Officer, July 29, 2009.
104
National Statistical Coordination Board,
http://www.nscb.gov.ph/activestats/psgc/municipality.asp?muncode=097332000&regcode=09&provcode=73

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missions including the joint Philippine-American military exercise, Balikatan in 2005, which was followed
by a Medical Civic Action (MEDCAP) in 2006 conducted by the Philippine Army and Philippine Air
Force.
Anabella Salazar (aged 49) is a beneficiary of a medical check-up conducted under Balikatan
(2005). Salazar said she is generally happy with the existing government services in her community.
Nevertheless, due to her meager income, she was unable to get the medical attention that she needed for her
heart ailment. When the soldiers came in, she was able to receive medicine and she feels that her condition
has dramatically improved. She also recalled the deployment of USNS Mercy, an American Naval hospital
ship that made a stop in Zamboanga City to provide city residents with medical assistance in 2006.105
Combined with this experience, she has learned to trust both the Americans and Filipinos soldiers and has
no hesitation in having the military visit her community. When asked if she had any idea on why the
military was conducting these missions, she shrugged and said she was not particularly interested or cared
about their agenda.106
Pablo Manalo (aged 65) and his wife, Satupinina Manalo (aged 59) are both farmers. Mr.
Manalo has not been able to find a full-time job due to his frail health and ekes out a living by growing fruit,
vegetables, and rice in his backyard. Though enough to get by, seeking any medical attention was a luxury.
Therefore, they say the community outreach programs conducted by both the American and
Filipino soldiers have been beneficial to them, especially due to their meager income.
Mr. Manalo explained roughly on how CMO played out in his barangay. In the planning stage,
soldiers consulted the barangay officials, health workers, and the residents on what kind of services they
needed. Upon their recommendations, a one-day MEDCAP program was conducted. The first one was
under Balikatan 2005. They were given basins, shorts, underpants, and some free glasses. An eye
examination was done during the day and glasses were later claimed at a general hospital for free. Another
community outreach program was conducted by the AFP (Army and Air Force). A free medical clinic was
set up for a day at their basketball court. Medicine such as antibiotics and anesthesia was provided for.
Simple procedures such as the removal of cysts were done on the spot and with patients suffering from
more serious problems, were treated in a general hospital, free-of-charge.
The couple both admitted that medical assistance is especially appreciated by the people

105
USNS Mercy is a hospital ship belonging to the American Navy that is deployed overseas for humanitarian
missions. For instance in 2005, the ship was deployed to Asia, stopping at Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, and
East Timor to provide medical and dental assistance to people in wake of the 2004 Tsunami disaster. In 2006, it
made a month-long stop in Zamboanga City, Jolo, and Tawi-Tawi as part of the United States non-combative
efforts to fight terror in the Southern Philippines. Selected medical patients from the city could avail themselves
to free medical operations on the ship. On board were American and Canadian military doctors and dentists;
volunteer civilian specialists working alongside their local counterparts that included medical personnel from the
AFP; volunteer civilian doctors and other medical specialists, and NGOs. Additionally, American naval
engineers were dispatched to conduct small-scale construction along the coast of Zamboanga City. See “USNS
Mercy Arrives in Southern Philippines,” The Mindanao Examiner, May 26, 2006. Available at:
http://zamboangajournal.blogspot.jp/2006/05/usns-mercy-arrives-in-southern.html. Accessed March 3, 2010.
106
Anabella Salazar, resident of Culianan Barangay, interview with author (interpreter: Bong Garcia), Culianan
Barangay, Zamboanga City, Philippines, October 3, 2007

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belonging to the low-income bracket since existing health services rendered by the government is
insufficient and often times, medicinal supplies run out. They both agreed that that the experience has
improved their image of the AFP. Though they have not experienced any problems with the military in the
past, they have heard about the atrocities that the AFP has committed, which had made them distrustful of
the soldiers. Upon being asked if there were any security problems in their barangay they laughingly
replied, “There are no terrorists here and the community has never had a security problem. But either way,
we feel safer with the presence of the military.”107
A female resident interviewed Rosana Alfaro (aged 29), the mother of two children and the
owner of small shop similarly expressed happiness for being able to receive free medicine. However in
contrast with other interviewees, she did not want to reply to the question on how she felt about the military
before they entered her community. Nevertheless she mentioned that her current impressions on the AFP
were okay.108

Barangay Malagutay
Malagutay is a barangay located near Camp Enrile. According to the 2007 census, the barangay
109
holds roughly 5,600 people or 939 households. It is considered to be urban but has limited
transportation. There are only two jeepneys per day to ferry people in and out of the barangays to the center
of the city.
The barangay council members shared their experiences with the military. According to them, as
of October 2007, they had received assistance from the U.S. forces and the AFP jointly on four separate
occasions, the earliest one going back to 2003. Malagutay’s chairwoman commented that they did not
approach the AFP but rather it was a small group of U.S. military officers who initiated the first contact by
making a courtesy call to their barangay after Balikatan 2002. When the Americans came, she complained
to them that it was unfair that the island province of Basilan was getting all the benefits from the military’s
community outreach programs and that none were being extended to Zamboanga City. The culmination of
this first meeting led to a medical mission launched by the U.S. forces in 2003, which was followed by
several others.
A mixture of complaints and gratitude were revealed in the course of the discussion towards the
American presence. They were particularly appreciative towards the American in constructing a deep well
(a small community water system) for a neighborhood of 20 households and a basketball court that was
constructed mostly by the Americans.
However, the councilwoman expressed indignation at the 2nd and 2rd batch of American soldiers

107
Pablo and Satupinina Manalo, residents of Culianan Barangay, interview with author (interpreter: Bong
Garcia), Culianan Barangay, Zamboanga City, Philippines, October 3, 2007.
108
Rosana Alfaro, resident of Culianan Barangay, interview with author (interpreter: Bong Garcia), Culianan
Barangay, Zamboanga City, Philippines, October 3, 2007. Note: Interviews were conducted in interviewees’
respective homes or front yards with the assistance of June C. Ramacho, a barangay health worker from
Culianan Rural Service Center.
109
See Zamboanga City Information website:
http://www.zamboanga.com/z/index.php?title=Malagutay_Zamboanga_City_Philippines.

226
that came after 2003 because as the military camp was located nearby, they were impacted by the live fire
drills conducted. Since there was no notification to the barangays, the drills created panic the village. In
fact it created so much commotion that villagers were running, some urinating in fear, thinking that there
was an actual military operation. One house was even was hit by stray bullet. The chairwomen complained
immediately to the city mayor, and since then she commented that her village has not experienced similar
problems.
Regarding the military’s entry, the council chairwoman admitted that it was still unclear why her
barangay was singled out for these military-led medical missions, as they were not the first to initiate the
contact. The Americans, she said, just showed up one day, and asked her questions about possible
community needs. And in regards to security, she said her community was extremely vigilante. If there was
a group of people they did not know entering the barangay, the inhabitants would let her know. She said the
closest experience she had with a security problem was when a group of policemen or whom she suspected
were posing as law enforcement came to her house. She immediately asked for their IDs and that sent them
running. Therefore, if there were any infiltration by the communists or the ASG for that matter, it would be
110
brought to attention by the community members and subsequently be reported to security forces.
Carlos Remoto (aged 49) is an example of a CMO beneficiary who received extended treatment
for a serious injury sustained in a work-related accident. He and his wife, Gliceria (aged 50) live as tenants
on a small plot of land in Malagutay. He was a carpenter for 17 years until the day of his accident in 2002.
At the time he was the lead-man on a construction project when he noticed smoke coming from a
warehouse. Afraid that the paint in the warehouse would ignite and cause an explosion, he ran in to remove
the paint. In the process, he sustained serious burns to his right leg. The building contractor provided him
7,000 pesos which was barely enough to cover his ambulance ride and first trip to the hospital. Not having
enough money to get the right medical attention, he was forced to quit from his job and rely on his grown
children for support.
On February 2, 2004, a MEDCAP was held jointly between the AFP and U.S. forces. Medical
consultation booths were set up in the local school and villagers were also able to receive medicine,
multi-vitamins, and bandages. One of the legislative members of the barangay council worked it out so that
Mr. Remoto could seek further medical attention. He was given a card in advance, qualifying him for
serious or enhanced medical attention. On the day of the civic action, he went to the school where the
villagers had gathered. After being examined by a team of military doctors, he went to Camp Enrile (the
headquarters of WestMinCom) and received medical attention by American doctors. The treatment lasted
for 8 months.
He said he was extremely lucky to get the medical attention at that timing because his burns had
become infected with gangrene, and would have been amputated within a week if it had not been for the
MEDCAP. He admitted that the experience has greatly changed his impressions on the military, especially
towards the AFP. Before the treatment, he and his wife had no interaction with the military. To him they

110
Emerita C. Caringal, barangay chairwoman of Malagutay, interview with author, Caringal residence,
Malagutay, Zamboanga City, Philippines, October 4, 2007.

227
appeared to be “in a different world, very forbidding and a world you can only see from peeping through
the (military camp’s) gates.” Now, he sees the divide has been narrowed and that they actually help the
people. He added further that other members of the community have also warmed up to both the AFP and
the U.S. forces.
Concerning basic government services, Mr. Remoto complained that he seldom saw any
developmental works extended by the government. Even if there were any community assistance programs
provided by the LGUs, he explained that the barangay officials and their family and friends often
monopolized them. Other villagers were often excluded and not informed about the event. A wealthy
Chinese monopolized even the water system that was connected to the existing source, forcing villagers
living in the vicinity to walk distances to get their water. The Americans, he recalls, on the day of the civic
111
action, attached a hose to this water source so residents could get their water directly.

Bolong Barangay
Bolong is a coastal barangay on the Eastern side of Zamboanga City. Coastal barangays are a
particular concern for the AFP since this geographic configuration and access to the sea makes it an easy
getaway for kidnapping groups. In the June of 2010, a Chinese-Filipino trader was kidnapped by armed
men, believed to be led by a Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) member who was running a
kidnapping-for-ransom and piracy operation, operating in the neighboring province of Zamboanga
Sibugay.112
Bolong is located 33 km east of the city proper. The population is 5,691 inclusive 1,027
households.113 The composition of the barangay is roughly made up of 80 percent Christian and 20 percent
Muslim. The barangay chief, Tony Evengelista was interviewed about his experiences with the military.
Mr. Evangelista explained briefly the conditions of his barangay. He said due to its remoteness
from the city proper, basic services were limited. Even though they have a health center, overall medical
and dental services were insufficient. To add to the difficulty of his residents, Bolong, is located close to the
provincial border and for many of the residents, paying for the public transportation to seek medical
attention in downtown Zamboanga was a financial burden.
He said he was the first to initiate contact with the AFP. The Naval Forces finally accepted his
request and on September 15, 2010, a single-day MEDCAP, DENCAP, and VETCAP (Veterinary Civic
Action Program) was held in his barangay. The operation was jointly led by the Filipino Navy and U.S.
forces, while involving other participants such as the Philippine National Police (PNP), other members of

111
Carlos Remoto, resident of Malagutay barangay, interview with author (interpreter: Bong Garcia), Remoto
residence, Malagutay, Zamboanga City, Philippines, October 4, 2007.
112
See news on the kidnapping in “Businessman kidnapped in S. Philippines,” People’s Daily Online, June 17,
2010. Available at http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90777/90851/7028697.html. Accessed May 18, 2012. The
kidnapped victim was later released after his family raised an undisclosed amount of ransom money.
113
Zamboanga, Portal to the 42,027 Barangays in the Philippines. Available at:
http://www.zamboanga.com/z/index.php?title=Bolong_Zamboanga_City_Philippines. Accessed October 2,
2012.

228
the AFP, the Department of Health (DOH), and NGOs.114
The barangay chief said that this medical mission was greatly appreciated by the people and he
believes that this has helped to build up the trust between the population and the AFP. He felt that
especially in the last 10 years or so, WestMinCom had made efforts to reach out to the people and noted
that the behavior of the AFP was much improved. “They are more respectful and more disciplined.” He
contrasted this behavior with the soldiers back in the 1970s that acted “crazy” and basically both sides (the
civilians and the military) didn’t trust each other.
In response to the question about the security situation of the barangay, he stated that there were
no security problems aside from the recent kidnapping. Nevertheless, he did add that the 11 Island Group,
the barangay-island group just off the coast of Bolong was dangerous because this was one of the staging
areas of the kidnapping groups. When asked further if the military had any information campaigns to orient
the residents on such security concerns, he answered that on the day of the medical mission, an information
campaign was held but rather than discuss threat groups, the information delivered was based on orienting
the residents on existing government programs.115

Resettlement Project in Tulungatung Barangay

A re-housing project is an example of how WestMinCom supports programs led by other civilian
agencies. A Catholic NGO called Gawad Kalinga (GK) spearheaded a humanitarian measure to re-settle
illegal dwellers (squatters) from different barangays, some including fire victims, in a barangay called
Tulungatung. This was supported and coordinated by the Zamboanga City Office. The project involved the
building of 60 new houses (duplex-houses that could accommodate two households) that came complete
with a water system and electricity. The land in which the houses were built on belongs to the government
but was to be turned over to the squatters. At the time of the interview, GK had helped resettle 80 families
and the city government, 420 families.
The city office said it was part of their efforts to provide assistance to underprivileged families.
Though they did not go into details, it was mentioned that the city also wanted to contribute to the security.
These housing projects are one way to keep tabs on residents and to monitor the movement of people
coming in and out of the city.116 A beneficiary interviewed later said that if any newcomer enters the
housing site, they had to report it to the city housing office. In principle, they were only allowed to
accommodate visitors for several nights. And if any visitor was going to stay for over a month, they had to
submit their pictures and provide the number of occupants and names.117

114
The event was published in the local newspapers. Riza P. Lacbao, “NAVFORWEM conducts CIVIC
ACTION in Barangay Bolong,” Zambo Times, September 16, 2010. Available online at:
http://www.zambotimes.com/archives/24915-NAVFORWEM-conducts-CIVIC-ACTION-in-Barangay-Bolong-v
ideo.html. Accessed May 18, 2012.
115
Bolong was not personally visited by the author. The interview with Tony Evangelista, barangay chief of the
Bolong Barangay was held at the Zamboanga City Hall, October 27, 2010.
116
Rodrigo Pagotaisidro, representative of City Housing Management Office, interview with author, City
Housing Management Office, Zamboanga City, Philippines, July 28, 2012.
117
Roasalina, Salazar, carpenter, interview with author, housing (GK) site, Tulungatung, Zamboanga City,

229
 The city management housing office, due to its limited resources seeks help not only from NGOs
but the military as well. According to Rodrigo Pagotaisidro, the housing office representative, the office
approached WestMinCom and asked for their assistance. After sending a letter of request to the
commanding officers on how much manpower they needed, the AFP send them a group of soldiers to work
on the construction of the houses.
Alex Lagling (aged 43) said he was able to become a beneficiary after he obtained a fire victim
certificate from the urban poor office. He said the city provided land; GK, the housing material; and the
settlers like him provided the “sweat equity” or labor. The agreement with the city government was that the
settlers would pay for the land after a grace period of a year. Mr. Lagling recalled that the PNP and the AFP
engineers from the army, navy, and air force came in after a few months to work on one portion of the
housing complex. The soldiers worked half of the time in uniform and the other half of the time in
“civvies” (civilian clothes).118
The president of the neighborhood association also came to the settlement under similar
circumstances. He was also a squatter on a piece of land that he had been living on for over 40 years. When
a fire destroyed his home and along with his neighbors’, the landowners expelled them from the land. He
sought assistance from the social welfare office, and he was directed to the housing office. He too gained a
favorable impression of the soldiers. Serving as a construction foreman on the site, he said it was the first
time he had any interaction with the military. He said the soldiers were obedient to his instructions and
were impressed with the work the soldiers did. In regards to security, he said there were no security
problems but they were advised by the village officials, the AFP, and the PNP to report of any suspicious
activity.119

Limpapa Barangay
Similar to Bolong, Limpapa is also a coastal village, which is located in the hinterlands. It is also
the last barangay on the Western Side of Zamboanga City. In July 2008, military intelligence produced
reports that the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) had established a training camp somewhere on the
border between the city and the neighboring province of Zamboanga Del Norte. According to the reports,
armed men were fanning out into the areas to recruit and train locals.120 At the time of the incident, two
CMO missions were conducted in the same month the reports came out, with another conducted in the
following year.
The barangay has a population of 4,916 people in which the majority makes a living off of
fishing and farming. There are both Christians and Muslims living in the community. The military first

Philippines, July 28, 2009.

118
Alex Lagling, resident of Tulungatung barangay and beneficiary of the GK housing project, interview with
author, Tulungatung barangay, Zamboanga City, Philippines, July 28, 2009.
119
Neighborhood association president of the GK housing unit, interview with author (interpreter: Bong
Garcia), Tulungatung, Zamboanga City, Philippines, July 28, 2009.
120
Bhong Simbajon, “MILF establishes camp in Limpapa,” ZamboTimes, July 24, 2008. Available online at:
http://zambotimes.com/archives/10513-MILF-establishes-camp-in-Limpapa.html. Accessed May 18, 2012.

230
entered on a CMO mission on July 17, 2008. They included the AFP, the PNP, and volunteer civilian
doctors. Soon after, on July 20, 2008, WestMinCom conducted another one-day medial mission in
partnership with more than 20 government agencies, which included the Department of Health, Department
of Public Works, and the city government. U.S. forces also entered the barangay on April 19, 2009 under
Balikatan to conduct MEDCAP and DENCAP and also distributed school supplies. In all three missions,
the AFP was primarily responsible for providing tooth extraction, circumcision, medical check-ups, and the
distribution of free medicine.
Alongside these missions, the AFP oriented the people on security. According to the baragany
121
kagawad, all residents were briefed on the procedures to take when they encountered any security
problems. They were told to immediately inform the PNP or AFP by text-messaging or visiting the nearest
police station or barangay hall.
Before the military came in 2008, the residents did not have any interaction with the AFP aside
from weekly patrols. The barangay kagawad explained that it came as a surprise when the AFP came in,
some even panicking, as military entry was often associated with trouble. Nevertheless, due to the
barangay’s remoteness and insufficient government services, the residents were grateful for the health
assistance given. They now personally feel closer to the government and the AFP.122
Individuals were also asked about their experiences. For instance Jumaatiya Muztapha (aged
27), a Muslim woman with three children was interviewed at the Feeding Center. Her husband works as a
fisherman, but she said his job was unstable. Before the entry or the AFP, she mentioned she had no
interaction with them, so it was difficult to describe her impressions about them prior to the medical
missions. To her, their sudden entry came as a surprise but she was glad she was able to get some medicine
and a check-up. When asked about her worries about the security situation, she said she was afraid of the
rebels even though she has never encountered one. She said there were rumors circulating around her
community about their possible presence, which scared her.123
Impressions about the medical missions were also gathered from high school students. Mae Anne
Esperat Dela Cruz (aged 16), a 4th year high school student. She remembered the medical outreach that
organized by the AFP and the American forces. For her, the experience was personal because with so many
soldiers helping the people, it strengthened her resolve to become a nurse. She further recalled that the AFP
had a symposium, provided free medical consulting, and gave out pap smears. The Americans also gave out
backpacks. Her final comment about the soldiers was that she was really excited about seeing them and she
was also proud of her country’s soldiers.
Ariel D. Ebol (aged 12), a first year high school student also shared his experience. He

121
An elected member of the barangays council. Also known as the barangay councilor.
122
Halima J. Apalad, Limpapa Kagawad, barangay council member, interview with author (interpreter: Bong
Garcia), Limpapa Barangay Hall, Limpapa, Zamboanga City, Philippines, July 30, 2009.
123
Jumaatiya Muztapha, resident of Limpapa barangay, interview with author, Limpapa, Zamboanga City,
Philippines, July 20, 2009. A community mid-wife, who went by her first name, Jenny, explained the Mrs.
Muztapha was one of the eight mal-nourished mothers visiting the feeding-center. She added that Limpapa had
the highest number of malnourished children. In 2008, there were over 100 malnourished children.

231
remembered in particular, the American soldiers. They were always smiling and that they talked to him in a
friendly manner. He was also very happy with the T-shirt he got but for him personally, the best thing about
the whole experience was the dental assistance. He said there were no dentists in the barangay, and when he
got a cavity, it just rotted. But when the soldier-dentists came, he was able to get his tooth extracted. When
asked about any worries about armed men and kidnapping, he said he only saw the MILF and ASG on
T.V.124

Elementary Schools
Public schools, especially elementary schools have also been beneficiaries to numerous CMO
programs. A visit was paid to Boalan Elementary School in Boalan barangay. The school consists roughly
of 1,400 students. Under Balikatan, both American and Filipino soldiers entered the school to do repairs on
the buildings and the Americans donated some textbooks, books, shoes, clothing, and notebooks for the
children.
According to Edwina S. Apolinario, one of the administrators of the school, the soldiers visited
the school in advance to ask for their needs. Based on the school’s requests, they came in one week before
classes began during the holidays to paints walls, repair rooms, and also to convert a stockroom into a
classroom. Once the school term began, the American soldiers visited the classes to do some teaching and
reading. They did not bring up any security problems.
A group of children of 10 and 11-year olds were asked about their experiences with the American
soldiers. They said the Americans read out loud stories like “The Milky Way,” “The Red Riding Hood,”
and “The First Santa Clause.” Soldiers individually talked about their pets, children, and their lives back at
home. One boy excitedly talked about a soldier’s story about icebergs in his home state of Alaska. When
asked if the soldiers explained to them why they were there, one boy replied that the soldiers told them they
were there to help their schools. When asked if they were afraid of having soldiers entering their schools,
the group replied they were not scared at all and were very excited about meeting the soldiers. They added
further that they helped make the school more beautiful and that they wanted them to come again and bring
more textbooks, provide new drum sets, and renovate the school stage.125
The school administrator said that the U.S. forces were very cooperative, approachable, and
generous. She added that her impressions on the U.S. were very good stating that, “We Filipinos, love the
Americans.” The grade 6 subject teacher, Norito D. Castromayor also held the same opinion about the
Americans. He also explained that public schools are in dire need for supplies. According to him, it take
anywhere between 5 to 6 years for a request go through. Aligned with the administrator’s viewpoint,
basically any form of assistance from any group is appreciated.126

124
Interviews with the students were conducted by the author at Limpapa National High School, Limpapa
Barangay, Zamboanga City.
125
Nathalia M. de Verra (aged 10), Aiten Marie Y. Lumanta (aged 10), Gelbert E. Perez (aged 11), and Franz
Edrien J. Ong (aged 11), group interview with author, 6 th grade homeroom, Boalan Elementary School,
Zamboanga Elementary School, Zamboanga City, Philippines, July 28, 2008.
126
Interviews conducted by the author at Boalan Elementary School, Boalan Barangay, Zamboanga City,

232
 To elaborate on this issue, a visit was also paid to an elementary school in Culianan that was still
waiting for assistance from U.S. forces. At the time of the interview, U.S. forces had already met with the
school officials to make assessments on their needs. Librarian and subject teacher, Leonopia Layonera
revealed why public schools depended so much on any outside help. She explained that the school had
1,173 students from grade one through six. There were only 30 teachers including the principle, making the
teacher-student ratio at about 1:50. Understaffed, the school also suffers from a shortage of basic teaching
and learning material. The central government she added only pays for the teachers’ salaries and everything
else, including chairs, desks, and books are donated. Therefore, any assistance be it from the military or
donors are greatly appreciated.127
Going back to the Boalan School, it was interesting to note that while Filipino soldiers also
participated in the school projects, the children did not mention them and from the teachers, more praise
was delivered to the Americans. When asked about this, Mr. Castromayor answered that though the Filipino
soldiers accompanied the U.S. troops, he mentioned that they came only once in a while, especially during
the school holidays to work on building renovation and “kept a very low-profile.”128

7.4.5 Analysis of CMO in Zamboanga City

7.4.5.1 Overview: City vs. Remote Areas
In assessing the effects of CMO in Zamboanga City, there are several points that need to be taken
into consideration beforehand. The first is that, for the most part, security is stable in the city,129 which is in
contrast to neighboring islands under the Area of Responsibility (AOR) of WestMinCom such as Basilan
and Sulu where battles between the government forces and armed groups occur frequently. Thus, any
findings from Zamboanga City cannot be wholly applied to these areas, where fighting directly impacts the
lives of civilians. The second it that, in comparison to remote areas, there is a functioning local government
and the active presence of NGOs, meaning there is a better availability of services for the people. This also
underlines a difference in how CMO transpires. Unlike in remote and insurgent-influenced areas where
there is limited or no government presence and the military often end up taking over the role of the civilian
agency in delivering basic services; in the city, the military-civilian partnership is mutually reinforcing. The
third is that the city holds a concentration of media, allowing for the maximum coverage of CMO efforts,
not to mention, better accessibility to information regarding military operations, which is hard to get by in
conflict areas.

Philippines, July 28, 2008.

127
Leonopia Lagonera, library and subject teacher, interview with author, Culianan Elementary School,
Zamboanga City, October 3, 2007.
128
Norito D. Castromayor, Grade 6 subject teacher, interview with author, 6th grade homeroom, Boalan
Elementary School, Zamboanga City, Philippines, July 28, 2008.
129
In recent decades, the most serious ASG incident was on June 10, 1994, when bomb attacks in Zamboanga
City left at least 71 people dead.

233
7.4.5.2 Military Objectives behind the Selection of CMO Beneficiaries
WestMinCom officials maintain that CMO in the city is to gain the good will of the people and at
the same time, target the roots of insurgency, which is perceived to be coming from socio-economic
deprivation.130 Nevertheless, they did not go into details about their selection process.131 One of the most
perplexing questions about CMO conducted in Zamboanga City concerns what sort of factors helped single
out communities for CMO projects, especially since many of them have no overt security concerns. For
instance, none of the beneficiaries interviewed felt threatened or encountered any presence of terrorist
groups. This seemingly goes against the objectives of CMO, which is to cut existing links between the
insurgents and the people. Another question concerns why CMO was extended to areas where the
availability of government services is far better than those communities in the hinterlands.132 This is not to
say that CMO is not conducted in remote areas but it appeared the bulk of CMO is conducted along the
primary road, the main artery that travels around the coast of the peninsula; and its secondary roads.
Therefore, gaining an understanding on the military’s objectives behind their CMO selection is key to
reconstructing the AFP’s perceptions on battlespace and its subsequent management.
Upon asking NGOs, academia, journalists, and the beneficiaries about the selection process, they
too were left scratching their heads over WestMinCom’s intentions as it is difficult to read the minds of the
military.133 Some perceive CMO activities in the city as pure assistance for the needy.134 Others expressed,
it was a subtle way to ward off lawless elements.135 One of the most penetrating insights on the AFP’s
choice came from Sr. Delgado. She observed that the AFP’s choice in barangays are one, areas covering
ancestral domain or pieces of territory declared by the MILF as rightfully belonging to the Muslim or
indigenous people (e.g. Limpapa barangays);136 two, holds a mixed community (Muslims, Christians, as

130
Maj. Batara, October 3, 2007; Col. Mitra, October 27, 2010.
131
The barangays officials and NGOs interviewed said the realization of a CMO project was reached by either
the military approaching them or the civilian-side making a request. Nevertheless, at the end of the day, it was
the military that decided on which projects to converge on with their civilian counterparts. Sr. Delgado, July
31,2009; Emerita C. Caringal, barangays chairwoman of Malagutay, interview with author, October 4, 2007,
residence of Ms. Caringal, Malagutay, Zamboanga City, Philippines, October 4, 2007; Frencie L. Carren, July 27,
2009; Tony Evangelista, October 27, 2010.
132
Sr. Delgado, July 31, 2009.
133
Sr. Delgado, July 31, 2009; anonymous NGO worker, interview with author, PAZ office, Zamboanga City,
Philippines, July 27, 2009.
134
Zamboanga City-based journalist, interview with author, Pangalian, Zamboanga del Sur, Philippines,
October 28, 2010.
135
Frencie L. Carren, July 27, 2009.
136
Ancestral domain is the term that the MILF uses to refer to land and bodies of water that rightfully belong to
ancestors of the Bangsamore (Muslim Filipino). The areas that are recognized to fall under ancestral domain are
those where a tribe has had occupancy between 1898-1939 before being uprooted. It also involves having had a
sultanate reign over the tribe that occupied the islands. See Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain
Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001. Available at:
http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/%28httpDocuments%29/5487E98B62DA0FD1C125
756700307D5D/$file/Memorandum+of+Ancestral+Domain+-+August+2008.pdf. This has been one of the
obstacles to the progress in peace talks between the MILF and the Philippine government until a breakthrough
was made in 2012 when the government and the MILF agreed on a peace framework. Zamboanga City’s mayor
continues to be strongly opposed to the national government’s issuance of the certification of ancestral domain
title (CADT) to 7,850 hectares of land within the barangays of Limpapa, Labuan, and Patalon and more than

234
well as non-Islamized indigenous people); and three, are located on the shoreline. 137 Her opinion
encompasses WestMinCom’s concerns on the possible link that these communities may or may not have
with armed groups. In regards to the ancestral domain, the military have traditionally sought to gain
favorable attitudes from the Muslim population, and thereby prevent the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF) from expanding its area of influence.138 Similarly, mixed communities hold minority groups,
especially the Muslim and indigenous people that are most marginalized, and therefore can be attracted to
separatist or extremist ideology. And regarding the third factor, coastal areas have always been a security
concern because it is difficult to regulate the movement of people, including the ASG and other armed
groups.
Based on further examination on the points raised above and with other existing information, it
can be gleaned that extensive CMO operations are conducted in Zamboanga City, so that WestMinCom can
secure their rear or the area furthest from the frontlines.139 Zamboanga City holds numerous military bases,
which are important launch pads for operations in Western Mindanao. For security reasons, the areas
surrounding the military/police bases or detachments need to be clear of any infiltration by threat groups.
Most likely security concerns can be possible attacks on major camps or raids on smaller and undermanned
detachments that are located in the remote corners of the sprawling city140 Raids are particularly difficult to
deal with. These are attacks conducted in secrecy and surprise followed by a quick withdrawal. The
objectives are to capture intelligence and weapons, harass the troops, destroy equipment, and kill personnel
manning those posts. The disadvantage the military has in regards to raids is that their installations are
stationary, making it a fixed target for armed groups. One method in countering this disadvantage is

4,546 hectare of waters of the Celebes Sea within the coast of three barangay. See “Mayor Lobregat opposes
ancestral domain title issuance,” Luwaran, February 25, 2012. Available at:
http://www.luwaran.com/home/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2553:mayor-lobregat-opposes
-ancestral-domain-title-issuance&catid=81:news&Itemid=457. Accessed December 16, 2012. Earlier in 2008,
Zamboanga City rejected to include 8 barangays, including two from the downtown area to be included in the
proposed Muslim homeland. Only Sacol Island made up of mostly Muslims with 6 barangays was allowed to
hold a referendum amongst the residents to decide whether to join or not. See “Zamboanga City to Resist
Inclusion of 8 villages to Muslim Ancestral Domain,” The Mindanao Examiner, August 6, 2008. Available at:
http://zamboangajournal.blogspot.jp/2008/08/zamboanga-city-to-resist-inclusion-of-8.html. Accessed December
10, 2012.
137
Sr. Delgado, July 31, 2009.
138
While the AFP recognizes MILF camps, settlements covering ancestral domain is a more complex issue.
First, Zamboanga City government is opposed to recognizing any of them on the mainland (see footnote 1057),
and secondly, it can be speculated based on the AFP’s traditional approach to MILF bases and its environs, that
in areas where the MILF champion the cause of their Muslim brethren, such as through the reclaiming of their
ancestral land, they have influence in. Though ancestral domain is scattered and spread out in the Mindanao
region, the AFP may perceive them as pockets of “depth” in the battlespace that allow the MILF to have
positional advantage over the military and that they can operate with less restrictions. For information about how
the AFP dealt with areas outside of MILF camps in the past see Vitug and Gloria, Under the Crescent Moon,
p.149-150.
139
The rear in military jargon occupies the battlespace which is furthest from the front-lines. The rear provides
the support for military units engaging in action.
140
The most serious raid by the ASG took place on April 4, 1995. The ASG raided the town of Ipil in
Zamboanga del Sur (now Zamboanga Sibugay). The ASG attacked and ransacked the police station. They cut off
all communications at the station, which led to a delayed response by the military. The attack left at least 53
people dead and wounded 48 others.

235
mentioned in Maj. Bunayog’s article. He strongly urges local commanders to initiate CMO activities in the
surrounding vicinity of a detachment to develop a “harmonious relationship” with the community. A
cooperative population can deter or help the military preempt enemy attacks. While raids are regular
occurrences on Basilan141 and communist strongholds,142 the city itself needs be vigilant from these
attacks that could sow seeds of confusion and impact overall operation. Ensuring security and control over
the rear of the battlespace could be supported by some evidence that along with CMO projects conducted in
a barangay, a communication-link was also set up with the people, where the military provided hotline
numbers for the people to call or text to, in case of any suspicion activity. Similarly, local barangays
officials are also known to exchange personal cellular phone numbers with military personnel.143
If Zamboanga City provides the rear for the military, it also constitutes the depth for the armed
groups operating in at a more clandestine level. These include political activities by the CPP-NPA, and for
the ASG and rogue elements or the MILF or MILF-posers, establishing the sub-contracting network for the
kidnapping business.144 The city holds a sizable population and certain communities linked to the armed
group through kinship and other associations provide a good source of recruits, supplies, and information.
Thus the vastness of the city and concentration of people, allow members of the armed groups mobility
over the city. Therefore, the military’s entry into population zones is supposed to serve as a deterrent and/or
deny the enemy of moving freely within the population.
Nonetheless, it cannot be forgotten, that without any overt security concerns, the military are
constrained from entering communities aside from conducting periodic patrols. In other words, the military
cannot just enter a community without raising fear and suspicion from the residents. Consequently, to help
soldiers extend their presence in the barangays, CMO is one way for them to enter communities without
upsetting the people. By gaining the good will of the population, the soldiers can improve their mobility
over the population, and thereby limit or deter armed elements from securing a vantage point against the
soldiers in the populated depth of the battlespace.

7.4.5.3 Reaching the Effects

1. Winning hearts and minds: People
As military objectives are to secure their rear, and gain psychological advantage over the

141
For instance, in 2012, an army detachment in Sumisip, Basilan, was attacked by the ASG five times in the
space of 3 months. See Frances Mangosing, “Sayyaf bandits launch 5 th attack on Army detachment in Basilan
town,” InquirerNet, September 18, 2012. Available at:
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/272958/sayyaf-bandits-launch-5th-attack-on-army-detachment-in-basilan-town.
Accessed December 16, 2012.
142
Maj. Ricky P. Bunayog (INF) Philippine Army, “The Raid of a CAA Detachment: Lessons learned,
Foresight and Call to Action,” Army Journal, January –March 2007, pp. 1-4. In communist-influenced areas, the
CPP-NPA is known to collude with local government officials and seek the support of the population in blocking
the timely passage of intelligence concerning the NPA’s activities.
143
Exchange of cell numbers between military and barangays officials witnessed in Limpapa barangays. With
better coordination between NGOS, city government, AFP, and village administrators, contact can be more easily
made between these respective parties. Additionally, signs in the city which say “I-text Sarge mo” or “Text your
sergeant”, solicit the cooperation of the public in the case of suspicious activity.
144
Col. Mitra, October 27, 2010.

236
population against threat groups, this leaves us with the question, whether CMO has been able to reach
their intended effects of producing good relations with the people to serve as a basis for cooperation. From
the responses gathered in the city, in general, all parties interviewed had a favorable impression on the
military’s community outreach programs. In particular, the beneficiaries themselves were almost uniform
on their perceptions on the military. They expressed gratitude for the medicine, medical consultations,
glasses, and community improvements made. While it appears that they are obligated to give positive
responses to the military’s initiative, NGOs concur on the fact that they are genuinely appreciative.145
Before a further analysis can be made about these responses, it is important to note that these
residents said they had never encountered or felt threatened by any threat group. At the same time, they had
no contact with the military prior to CMO activities conducted in their barangays. Nevertheless, they said
their image of the AFP had improved; suggesting that their initial perceptions were shaped by the military’s
ill-reputed past. People who remember the soldiers from the 1970s Muslim separatist conflict, have
expressed the soldiers are now more professional, well behaved, and disciplined.146 As a result, an
increased interaction between the military and the people through social assistance, has at one level,
narrowed the military-civilian divide from one of suspicion and indifference to one of familiarity and
improved trust.

2. Impressions from Civilian Partners and Outside Opinion

Perspectives gathered from those groups that have partnered with the military or have observed
the military’s actions over the last few years, have also expressed a positive view on the military’s CMO.
The largest advantage brought up by both sides (the military and its civilian partners) is resource sharing.
For a cash-strapped military, engaging in extensive CMO is beyond their budget, and collaboration with
civilian agencies has helped overcome this.147 At the same time, NGOs have also benefited from more
resources, especially from the U.S. forces, an assurance on their safety when traveling to
security-compromised areas, transportation, and expertise in fields such as medicine and dentistry.148 This
is in contrast with views from organizations outside of Zamboanga City who have had more experience or
knowledge about military operations occurring in communist strongholds. For instance, a senior researcher
at IBON Foundation, a non-profit research and education organization that has documented enforced
disappearances and extra-judicial killings of leftist individuals under President Arroyo,149 takes a long and
hard look at the AFP’s CMO program. Arnold Padilla says, “Once you put poverty reduction within a
military framework, then the ultimate goal is not really poverty reduction, but the goal is to crush
insurgency and in the process, you commit human rights violations.” He believes that the military should

145
Prof. Edagar Araojo, Professor of Political Science, Western Mindanao University, interview with author,
Western Mindanao University, July 31, 2009; Sr. Delgado, July 29, 2008.
146
Fr. Calvo, July 28, 2008; Tony Evanagelista, October 27, 2010; Zamboanga-based journalist, interview with
author, Pangalian, Zamboanga del Sur, Philippines, October 8, 2010.
147
Maj. Batara, July 29, 2009.
148
Sr. Delgado, July 29, 2008; Frencie L. Carren, July 27, 2009.
149
See IBON Foundation’s official website at http://www.ibon.org/ibon_ffe.php.

237
not be engaging in community outreach programs because they are participants in an on-going war. His
largest concern is that development money (including foreign aid) is channeled through the military, which
defeats the purpose of poverty reduction, because it ultimately aids the military in fighting the war.150
Karapatan, a human rights organization, also shares his view. A spokeswoman for the organization also
adds that the military should stay out of civilian affairs, because entering a community and working with
village officials means that they are undermining the latter’s authority. Some officials she believes
cooperate with the military out of fear. It is also serves as a cover for surveillance and intelligence gathering
amongst the people. An example of this is in Negros, where there is an on-going war against the communist
rebels. She strongly remarked that the military should stick to their roles of defense, and at most, extend
assistance in the case of natural disasters.151
NGO members interviewed in Zamboanga City, in contrast, take a more reconciliatory approach
to the military. Their mandate is to involve all stakeholders, inclusive of the military to promote peace.
CMO, they believe is a step forward in bridging the divide between the people and the military.152 Even
Prof. Edgar Araojo, one of the founding members of the left-leaning party, Akbayan153 who was on the
military’s order of battle (hit-list) during martial law, says it’s a welcome sight to witness the military
engage in activities to help the people. He expresses that the “military is now doing double-time” through
CMO to makeup for their past atrocities and gain credibility in the eyes of the people.154 Though these
groups concur that activities related to socio-economic assistance, have very little impact on poverty
alleviation,155 it’s symbolic that the AFP sees the “militarization” or a combat-centered approach is not the
solution.156

150
Arnold Padilla, senior researcher, Reality of Aid/Ibon Foundations, interview with the author, IBON office,
Manila. Philippines, September 11, 2006.
151
Public Information Officer, Karapatan, interview with author, Citadel Inn, Manila, Philippines, July 24,
2008.
152
Fr. Calvo, July 28, 2008; Sr. Delgado, October 2, 2007.
153
Akbayan was established in 1988. It is a party-list group whose mandate is to help the marginalized and the
poor. They are known to be “progressive” in the sense that they oppose both HR violations by the military and
the CPP-NPA. Despite their track record in supporting measures for land-reform and other areas to help the
disadvantaged, they are labeled as “fake socialists” by the far-left. Prof. Araojo, July 31, 2009.
154
Prof. Araojo, July 31, 2009.
155
“Ben,” local journalist, interview with author, Orchard Hotel, Zamboanga City, Philippines, October 2,
2007; Fr. Calvo, July 28, 2008; Sr. Delgado, July 29, 2008.
Failures in addressing poverty are attributed to the local government. Prof. Araojo points out that the city does
not spread out the wealth evenly. The city he says is “awash with money” with more than P2 billion savings in
banks. Nonetheless, they do not reach the poorest of the poor. Tax money is spent more on beautification projects
or paving existing main roads and not on farm-to-market roads.” In particular Muslim enclaves are left out of the
essential government services. They depend on foreign aid for basics such as water and electricity. The U.S.
forces and U.S. aid agencies are the ones who provide the bulk of electrification, medical assistance, and
infrastructure. See Al Jacinto, “Zambo Christians told to fight Muslim ancestral domain deal,” GMA News
Online, August 3, 2008. Available at:
http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/111170/news/regions/zambo-christians-told-to-fight-muslim-ancestral-
domain-deal. Accessed December 10, 2012.
156
Fr. Calvo, July 28, 2008; Prof. Edgar Araojo, professo at Western Mindanao State University, interview with
author, Baliwasan Central School, Baliwan, Zamboanga City, Philippines, October 25, 2010; Attorney Manual S.
Mamauag MNSA, Regional Human Rights Director, Western Zamboanga regional office of the Human Rights
Commission, interview with author, regional office, Zamboanga City, July 28, 2008.

238
 This is not to say, the CMO program is without its criticism. While WestMinCom’s CMO seeks
to improve the image of the soldier in the eyes of the people by making sure their soldiers “toe the line” in
regards to discipline and conduct with civilians,157 the human rights (HR) aspect is treated differently by
non-military circles in Zamboanga City. For instance, the regional HR director of the nation’s Commission
on Human Rights professed, “HR violations by the military occur with or without CMO.” Though he did
not downplay the significance of CMO programs to help the poor, it is a separate matter from the fact that
the AFP was not aggressively pursuing convictions for their errant members.158 Though in 2007, the AFP
established their first independent HR office to monitor HR cases and coordinate with the CMO office,159
it is still a small setup staffed with officers who are not trained to be HR workers.160 Though HR violations
occur generally in remote and insurgent areas, media coverage of this continue to make people suspicious
of the military. Ultimately, CMO has to compliment other aspects such as HR education for the soldiers. A
CMO project just cannot be conducted and then allow a military bombing. Otherwise, it negates the
soldiers’ efforts to win hearts and minds.161
Another problem that CMO faces in the city is collusion between local government officials and
the AFP. Before elections, local officials seek the cooperation of the AFP to conduct civic action in their
constituency to win support.162 Yet another problem stems from the make-up of the Peace and Order
Council (POC). The POC, which is chaired by the city mayor, is selective in the participation of NGOs.
Those who do not see eye-to-eye with the mayor and are critical over his policies are deliberately shutout,
making it less inclusive than what it appears to be.163
More complaints are centered on the corruption within the AFP. The media came out with reports
that certain members of the AFP were colluding with the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) through secret arms
trading, which is paid for by the ASG with ransom money. Equally serious, were reports that the AFP
informed the ASG in advance of a military operation, allowing the latter to escape.164 A journalist
interviewed said there are stories circulating, which make some people suspect that the ASG does not even
exist, but rather are a collection of armed groups run and supervised by the military.165 Though there is no
clear-hand evidence on this, the spread of such rumors indicates that people are not wholly convinced of
AFP’s integrity or at worst, see them as the roots of the violence.
Despite such criticism, at least within the operational area of Zamboanga City, civilians have

157
Maj. Batara, October 3, 2007; Lt.. Col. Gregorio, October 29, 2010.
158
Attorney Manual S. Mamauag MNSA, Regional Human Rights Director, Western Zamboanga regional
office of the Human Rights Commission, interview with author, regional office, Zamboanga City, July 28, 2008.
159
Upon its establishment, the AFP-HR office consisted of 5 officers and 9 enlisted personnel. 1st. Lt. Adelfo S.
Marasigan, Philippine Army, interview with author, AFP-HR office, Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, Philippines,
July 25, 2008.
160
Atty. Mamauag, July 28, 2008.
161
Prof. Araojo, July 31, 2009.
162
Prof. Araojo, October 25, 2010; Sr. Delgado, July 31, 2009.
163
Prof. Araojo, October 25, 2010.
164
Orlando de Guzman, “Army ‘colluded’ with Abu Sayyaf,” BBC News, January 31, 2002. Available at:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1792350.stm. Accessed December 14, 2012.
165
Local journalist, interview with author, Zamboanga del Sur, Philippines, October 28, 2010.

239
noted that the soldiers were behaving better, and CMO was a factor in building improved relations with the
public. A symbolic as the AFP’s efforts are, there is a general consensus that the AFP is moving towards the
right direction.166 In sum, the net effect of CMO’s objectives to win hearts and minds has allowed the AFP
to interact more positively with the communities, and has broadened the relationship with NGOs, opening
up further possibilities in the way the military can manage battlespace in the city.

3. Building Legitimacy through American Presence

The entry of American troops in the region and their involvement in CMO has contributed in the
management of battlespace in Zamboanga City. One of the observations made through interviews with the
CMO beneficiaries is that the American soldiers etched a strong impression on the minds of people. The
first most likely reason is that the city does not enjoy a stream of foreign visitors nor has many foreign
residents.167 Exposure to foreigners, especially from the West is a rarity. Another reason is that in some
CMO missions, the Americans are visibly on the forefront, with the Filipino soldiers lingering in the back.
This was especially evident in CMO activities that centered on school refurbishing and improvement. The
children interviewed at Boalan elementary school, only remember seeing the American soldiers who joined
them in fun-related activities during school hours. According to school administrators, the Filipino soldiers
had no contact with the children, since their efforts were limited to working on building repairs during
off-school hours.
At first glance, it seemingly appears to contradict the principles on having the AFP take lead in
CMO projects.168 Yet, these impressions made by the people reveal the ongoing challenges the AFP faces
in entering communities. The AFP is aware that they do not enjoy good relations with the public169 and
even though CMO is a good way to initiate the contact, the people still regard AFP entry with suspicion.170
Therefore, by allowing the American soldiers enter first and conduct community assistance, it has helped
reduce the tension and mistrust of the community, and thereby allowing the AFP to enter more smoothly. In
other words, the U.S. forces have played a bridging role between the AFP with the community.171
Upon further examination on why communities are more accepting of American soldiers than
their Filipino counterparts, the underlining reason appears to lie in the perception that they belong to a
third-party. Though they are not entirely perceived to be neutral, with some suspicions that the Americans
172
have a hidden agenda of trying to establish a permanent foothold in the Southern Philippines, there is a

166
Fr. Calvo, July 28, 2008; Sr. Delgado, July 29, 2008,
167
Foreign embassies periodically issue travel warnings to their citizens visiting to Mindanao due to
kidnappings. For instance in 2011, an American citizen was kidnapped in Zamboanga City, which prompted the
American embassy to issue a travel warning. See Jerry Esplanada, “US embassy issues travel advisory on
kidnappings in Philippines,” Philippine Inquirer, July 19, 2001. Available at:
http://globalnation.inquirer.net/6385/us-embassy-issues-travel-advisory-on-ph-kidnappings. Accessed December
20, 2012.
168
Lt. Cmdr. Kuebler (JSOTF-P), October 3, 2007.
169
Lt. Cmdr. Kuebler (JSOTF-P), October 3, 2007.
170
Sr. Delgado, July 28, 2008;
171
Carren, July 27, 2009; Lt. Cmdr. Kuebler (JSOTF-P), October 3, 2007.
172
Sr. Delgado July 27, 2009; Prof. Shariff M. Julabbi, Moro Islamic Liberations Front/Bangsamoro

240
general feeling that Americans have the effect of ensuring that the AFP toe the line. Even an American
173
officer stated that he has never seen the AFP violating human rights.
It is also noted that since independence, American soldiers have not been deployed for combat in
the Philippines. Even though antagonistic relations with the Philippine public because apparent with rape
174
cases involving American soldiers, and in communist strongholds, the communists air views that
175
American military presence is unacceptable, Western Mindanao has been relatively free of such
attitudes namely because it has not traditionally held any U.S. bases and also, there is limited communist
presence in the AOR of WesMinCom.
Another point that cannot be missed is that the Americans have been successful in cultivating
their image as the friendly soldier, ready to help with the needs of the people. The Balikatan exercises in
2002 in particular helped the U.S. forces to secure this image with the public in the region. Furthermore,
they have taken steps to prevent possible public backlash by staying out of combat and limiting their
interaction with the locals through CMO. In other words, locals do not see soldiers when they are off-duty,
176
because they are strictly prohibited from leaving their military compounds.

7.5 CMO in Basilan and Sulu

As findings from Zamboanga City is shaped by its circumstances particular to a non-conflict area
and its urban setting, a brief look is also made on areas in the AOR of WestMinCom where there are
ongoing military operations. Basilan and Sulu were selected because they are the AFP’s focal point in their
war against terror groups.

7.5.1 Basilan
Basilan is an island province, which is just 53 km from Zamboanga city and it takes
approximately 2 hours by ferry or one hour by high-speed boat from the city. The economy is largely
dependent on agriculture and fisheries. As of 2010, the population of Basilan was at 408,520177 with the
majority of the population consisting of Muslims at 65 per cent and Christians at 33 per cent. It has an
aggregate land area of 1,379 square kilometers.178

Mujahideen Alliance, interview with author, Guiwan, Zamboanga City, October 4, 2007.
173
Major Tylor Wilson and SSG. Calen A. Bullard (JSOTF-P), interview with author, Camp Navarro,
WestMinCom, Zamboanga City, Philippines, July 28, 2009.
174
Ninotchka Rosca, “Rape case exposes U.S. dominion of Philippine government,” Socialism and Liberation
Magazine,” March 2007. Available at:
http://www2.pslweb.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=10692&news_iv_ctrl=1041. Accessed May 16,
2013.
175
“Protest permanent presence of US Military forces in the Philippines—CPP,” March 23, 2013. Communist
Party of the Philippines. Available at:
http://www.philippinerevolution.net/statements/20130323_protest-permanent-presence-of-us-military-forces-in-t
he-philippines-cpp. Accessed May 15, 2013.
176
Lt. Cmdr. Fred Kuebler (JSTOF-P), October 3, 2007.
177
National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB). Available at:
http://www.nscb.gov.ph/activestats/psgc/listprov.asp. Accessed December 16, 2012.
178
The Provincial Government of Basilan. Available at: http://www.basilan.gov.ph/index.php/land-area

241
 Basilan has been referred to as the “microcosm” of Mindanao. It depicts all the complexities that
the region has endured in its history of the marginalization of the Muslim people through Christian
migrations, land-grabbing, and exploitation of resources by foreign corporation. The original settlers of the
islands, a Muslim group called the Yakans, were largely displaced by invasions from neighboring Muslim
group in Sulu, the Tausug, and Christians from Zamboanga peninsula that came to acquire land.
Plantation-running by foreigners began during the American period. Even to this day, there are 15 large
corporations, mostly run by foreigners, tapping into the rubber, coffee, and African palm that the island
provides. In the 1950s, the Chinese began controlling the businesses and agriculture.179 While the Muslims
are the majority group, 90 percent of the agriculturally productive lands are owned mostly by Christian
residents in Isabela, the provincial capital located in the North.180 Consequently, the most developed
portions of the island (inclusive of government services and infrastructure) are located on this portion of the
island. The least developed areas are located on the Eastern and Southern portions of the island, where the
majority of Muslims live.181
A Catholic priest who experienced living on the island in the early 1970s recalls that before
martial law, there was no military presence and peace and order was basically enforced by a few Philippine
National Police (PNP) detachments. When martial law was declared, the Moro National Liberation Front
(MNLF) started to take over villages and properties and at one point controlling 70 percent of the island.
This led to the entry of the AFP and fighting erupted. “This was the worst period of militarization,” he
comments. The AFP had to expand so quickly, that the frontlines were filling up with soldiers still in their
late teens that were badly trained and some so scared they were crying. There were rampages, human rights
violations, the killing and threatening of civilians, and villagers fleeing. Hatred towards the military was
intense and ultimately the AFP lost their credibility in the eyes of the people.”182
After the peace agreement was signed with the MNLF in 1996, a radical spin-off of the group, the
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), was established on the island by Abdurajik Abubakar Janjalani, following his
stint in the Afghan wars. It pulled parts of the island in pockets of lawlessness and terror. Even with the
death of its leader in the late 1990s, Basilan remained the stronghold of the ASG, as they mutated into a
loose network of criminal elements, bound more by financial gain than ideology, but still maintaining
tenuous links with international jihadist groups such as Al Qaeda and the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). By 2000,
Basilan harbored over a 1,000 ASG and JI, with some reports saying that 40 per cent of the 9/11 operatives
having some form of links to the region.183
The ASG have molded their operations on a “water lily” strategy, which is based on the tenets of

179
Father Calvo, July 28, 2008.
180
Philippine Cities Trade and Tourism, Information Service website. Available at:
http://www.philcttis.org/about.php?wuid=771&cid=39/ Accessed December 18, 2012.
181
Jonathan P. Hastings and Krishnamurti Mortela, “The Strategy-Legitimacy Paradigm: Getting it Right in
the Philippines,” master’s thesis, Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, December 2008, p. 53.
Hereafter cited as Hastings and Mortela, “The Strategy-Legitimacy.”
182
Fr. Calvo, July 28, 2008.
183
William, Eckert, “Defeating the idea: unconventional warfare in the southern Philippines,” Special Warfare,
November 1, 2006.

242
guerrilla warfare. At the core of it, is avoiding direct military contact, relying on knowledge over the
battlespace to achieve mobility in both complex physical terrain and human terrain. Their attacks are based
on a sophisticated form of concentration and dispersal. In recent years, they have settled into a mode of
conducting kidnappings, and attacking security outposts and other civilian installations and ambushing
soldiers and civilians alike. They are not only protected by population, either through a policy of attraction
or coercion, but their links to elements of the MILF and MNLF, have provided them with refuge in their
areas.184 While it was reported that international terror groups such as the Al Qaeda had a hand in their
financing in the late 1990s, they now rely on generating their own funds through kidnapping and extortion.
The latter is similar to the “revolutionary taxes” that the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s
Army (CPP-NPA) imposes on local business and people. The ASG extracts such “taxes” from local
businesses and plantation cooperatives.185
For the AFP, since the mid-1990s, operating in the core battlespace of the ASG has been a
particularly complex one. In regards to the physical area, they are “the masters of the terrain” where they
know their physical environs well enough to secure shelter and concealment.186 The ASG has a particularly
“small landmass” in which they operate in but their knowledge of the triple-canopy jungles and forests,
marshes, mountains, waterways, and plantations, have allowed them to survive countless military
operations.187 The AFP has largely responded with pursuit operations. In the early 1990s, when the ASG
began kidnappings, the AFP had to ferret out ASG positions to rescue hostages. The terrain concealed the
location of the camps, and there was very little intelligence to work off of. Furthermore, the AFP was
hampered by poor logistics and equipment such a night-vision goggles to secure physical mobility over the
space.188
Additionally, the ASG enjoys some support from the population. Though their
ideological-attraction is limited to a small segment of the population, they mostly maintain their influence
over the population through coercion and financial lures. A number of ASG-affiliates are farmers-by-day

184
Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Abu Sayyaf Threat,” Naval War College
Review, Vol. 58, No. 4, Autumn 2005, pp. 70-71. Hereafter cited as Banlaoi, “Maritime Terrorism in Southeast
Asia.”
185
Most recently, there were a series of attacks against rubber workers in 2012. In July 2012, the ASG
ambushed a truckload of rubber plantation workers, belonging to a cooperative, killing six. The cooperative had
refused to pay extortion to the ASG. See “6 die, 20 hurt in ambush, blast,” SunStar, July 11, 2012. Available at:
http://www.sunstar.com.ph/zamboanga/local-news/2012/07/11/6-die-30-hurt-ambush-blast-231458?utm_source=
feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+SunStarZamboanga+%28Sun.Star+-+Zamboanga%
29/. Accessed July 25, 2012.
186
Bong Garcia, October 26, 2012.
187
This concept of space applied to the ASG battlespace is drawn from Maj. Tiernan’s observations on the
MILF area of operations. He points out that unlike the CPP-NPA that is scatter across the country, the MILF is
fighting for not just political control, but physical control over a “smaller landmass” which makes them very
acquainted within the geographic boundaries that they work in. Thus, it gives the MILF operational advantage
over the Philippine soldiers. Maj. Christopher E. Tiernan (USMC), “Revolution in the Philippines: Comparing
the Communist and Muslim Insurgencies,” paper, Newport, RI: Naval War College, p. 14.
188
Antonio R. Lastimado and Arturo G. Rojas, “The Armed Forces of the Philippines and Special Operations,”
master’s thesis, Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, December 2004, pp. 56-64.

243
who are linked to the group through kinship or community-ties.189
Targeting the ASG has also been problematic because they share the battlespace with the MILF
and the Misuari Breakaway Group (the rogue faction of the MNLF that remain belligerent), not to mention
the foreign jihadist terrors cells, primarily the JI that are embedded to varying degrees in the respective
groups’ strongholds. The island holds MILF camps, the largest being the 114th Base Command located in
Al-Barka, a municipality on the east side of the island. Additionally, the MNLF are also known to have
influence in 7 of Basilan’s barangays.190 Both U.S. forces and the AFP do not want to incite hostilities with
the MNFL and MILF since these groups are considered to fall within the spectrum of insurgency with
legitimate grievances and therefore present a politically negotiable alternative. 191 While the MILF
officially denies links to the ASG,192 all groups are allegedly linked to each other through its members who
are sympathetic to the terrorist cause.193 In this aspect, the largest impediment to AFP operations are the
MILF because have harbored the ASG in their bases, which are determined to be no-entry zones for the
military.194 Major incidents unfolded when the AFP entered or neared MILF territory, in pursuit of the ASG,
resulting in clashes between the AFP and the MILF in 2007 and 2011.195
As early as 2001, the AFP recognized that a military solution could not wipe out the ASG on
Basilan and operations necessitated an integration of efforts by the local government and civilian agencies
to promote better governance backed by political and legal reform, and socio-economic improvement.196
The military was also called upon to help create conditions for such endeavor through an improved
provision of security and participating in socio-economic assistance to the people. On one hand, CMO was
the means to help the government with the holistic approach, but on the other hand, it fell within the scope

189
Bong Garcia, July 27, 2009.
190
“What the future holds for Bangsamoro,” Agora Business Intelligence, October 25, 2012. Available at:
http://www.agora.ph/country.php?id=795. Accessed December 18, 2012.
191
Col. Wilson O. Mitra, October 27, 2010; Hastings and Mortela, “The Strategy-Legitimacy,” p. 41; The
Philippines Counter-Insurgency Vs. Counter-Terrorism in Mindanao, Asia Report No.152 –May 2008, May 14,
2008, p. I;
192
The Philippines Counter-Insurgency Vs. Counter-Terrorism in Mindanao, Asia Report No.152 –May 2008,
May 14, 2008, p. 11.
193
Ibid., p. i.
194
Col. Mitra, October 27, 2010.
195
In 2007, 23 Marines were killed and 14 of them beheaded in Al-Barka municipality in Basilan. The marines
were on a mission to rescue a kidnapped Italian priest from the ASG when they entered the vicinity of the 114 th
MILF Base command. The pursuit operation ended in an intense battle between the soldiers and the ASG and
members of the MILF. In October 2011, Special Forces soldiers operating in Al-Barka based on tips on the
presence of the ASG and kidnap victims. There are conflicting reports on where the government forces were
operating in. The AFP says they were 4 km away from the MILF camp, but the MILF say that the soldiers had
entered their territory. As a result of the bloody encounter, 19 soldiers were killed and the MILF lost 5 men.
Problems cited in both incidents were that the AFP did not follow procedures and failed to coordinate with the
MILF before the operations against the ASG. Nevertheless, these incidents reflect the complexity of dealing with
multiple threat groups in one battlespace. See Jojo Malig, “Al-Barka: How villagers killed Marines, Special
Forces troops,” ABS-CBN news, October 19, 2011. Available at:
http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/-depth/10/19/11/al-barka-how-villagers-killed-marines-special-forces-troops/.
Accessed December 20, 2012.
196
Banlaoi, “Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” pp. 74-75. This falls under the Arroyo administration’s
Strategy of the Holistic Approach (SHA).

244
of military operations which sought to reduce the uncertainties of the complex terrain197 and allow the AFP
maneuver over a battlespace occupied by a mix of civilians and different armed groups, all requiring a
different response.
The turning point came with the increased American presence in the region triggered by the
September 11th attacks, which played a large factor in the acceleration of CMO. In 2002, the American and
Filipino forces on the island of Basilan held a military exercise. It was the operational constraints the
Philippine government imposed on the U.S. forces that helped expand CMO. Furthermore, an assessment
by the American-side also determined the underlying causes of insurgency was weak governance and lack
of basic government services for the impoverished people, not to mention the lack of economic opportunity,
which attracted young men to join or cooperate with the ASG.198

The Effects
Balikatan 2002 is often referred to as a model for counterinsurgency. The ASG, by some reports
was estimated to be as high as 1,000 as of 2002, but was reduced to the 200-400-range by 2005.199 Many
of the key ASG leaders and operatives had been killed or captured, with 24 remaining at large by 2012. The
success is attributed to the combined operations of the Philippine and American military.
In terms of basic military operations, intelligence gathering was greatly improved.200 From the
American side, sophisticated grid coordinates provided to the AFP, helped the soldiers locate ASG lairs in
the triple-canopy jungle areas.201 The United States has also shared their inventory of unmanned spy planes
and smart bombs to help the AFP direct precision attacks.202
Nonetheless, much of the success could not have been achieved without CMO. Concerning
activities in dealing with the human terrain, much more emphasis was placed on outreach programs which
have helped the communities warm up to the presence of the military in their communities.203 Human
intelligence became forthcoming as residents began to alert the AFP and U.S. forces of rebel and lawless
activities.204 For instance at the end of July 2008, an attack by MILF elements in Basilan was preempted
when community members alerted the PNP and the AFP. This resulted in the dispersal of these armed
men.205

197
Bong Garcia, October 25, 2010.
198
Major Tylor Wilson and SSG. Calen A. Bullard (JSOTF-P), interview with author, Camp Navarro,
WestMinCom, Zamboanga City, Philippines, July 28, 2009.
199
“Philippine Forces Capture Abu Sayyaf Militant Suspected of Beheading Marines,” International Herald
Tribune, January 21, 2008.
200
Jim Michaels, “Philippines a model for counterinsurgency,” USA Today, March 31, 2011. Available at:
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2011-03-30-secretwar30_ST_N.htm/ Accessed April 8, 2011.
201
Jim Michaels, “Philippines a model for counterinsurgency,” USA Today, March 31, 2011. Available at:
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2011-03-30-secretwar30_ST_N.htm/. Accessed April 8, 2011.
202
“Forward base,” editorial, Philippine Daily Inquirer,” March 27, 2012. Available at:
http://sg.news.yahoo.com/editorial-forward-055004335.html. Accessed March 28, 2012.
203
Major Tylor Wilson and SSG. Calen A. Bullard (JSOTF-P), interview with author, Camp Navarro,
WestMinCom, Zamboanga City, Philippines, July 28, 2009.
204
Lt. Cmdr. Fred Kuebler (JSTOF-P), October 3, 2007.
205
Al Jacinto, local journalist, interview with author, Zamboanga City, Philippines, July 30, 2008.

245
 Success from Balikatan 2002 has also helped paved way for the active participation of local
government units. By the time CMO was institutionalized, local government officials have openly
welcomed the entry of the military in their jurisdictions and furthermore, have passed unanimous
resolutions supporting the deployment of US forces.206 For instance in the city of Lamitan,207 Mayor
Roderick Furigay expressed that he approves of military interventions, provided that it is related to
improving security and conducting development projects. Contributing to this positive reception was that
the military always works through the local government, i.e. the Peace and Order Council and align
themselves with their internal defense and development plan. The military are also respectful to the wishes
of the council of elders, or the non-elected traditional leaders, and listen to their recommendations as well.
He added that both the AFP and U.S. forces have contributed to the island. With the AFP, he said they have
increased their presence positively in communities through medical and dental civic action and livelihood
projects. He recognized that the culmination of their activities has helped improve the AFP’s image. He
also noted that the U.S. forces were also constructive in helping the people with their large infrastructure
projects such as the construction of farm-to-market roads and the rebuilding of dilapidated schools.208
These developments have worked in favor for the AFP in entering both the physical and
psychological depth of the battlespace. Prior to American entry, the AFP had a very poor relationship with
the populace. With the American soldiers providing the bulk of the CMO resources, it has been easier for
the AFP to engage in CMO. Furthermore, the American presence, as was similarly noted in Zamboanga
City, became a factor in easing the local people’s suspicions on the Philippine military and thereby allowing
the AFP to gradually win back some trust.209 Development projects were also viewed as a success in
penetrating the physical depth of the battlespace. This is exemplified in the construction of the
circumferential road, an all-weather road extending some 135 km,210 encircling the entire island. It is
funded both by the Saudi Fund for Development and the Philippine government through its DPWH.211 As
of 2008, 3 AFP engineering battalions: the Naval Construction Brigade, Air Force Engineering Battalion
and Army Engineer Battalion have contributed to building and protecting segments of the road.212 The U.S.

206
Hastings and Mortela, “The Strategy-Legitimacy,” p. 55.
207
City of Lamitan is the second most populated area in the region after the capital, Isabel, holding 20.1 percent
of the provincial total. Lamitan has a population of 82,074. The religious make-up is 55 percent Christians and
40-45 percent Muslims. Lamitan is the center of trade and commerce for this part of the island.
208
Mayor Roderick Furigay, Lamitan City mayor, interview with author, Lamitan City Hall, Maganda Barnagay,
Basilan, Philippines, October 26, 2010.
209
Lt. Cmdr. Kuebler (JSOTF-P), October 3, 2007.
210
The circumferential road is the government’s economic strategy in improving peace and order and spurring
economic development an in Basilan. As of March 2011, approximately 80 km of the 132 km of the national
road has been paved. See Department of Public Works and Highways official website. Available at:
http://www.dpwh.gov.ph/offices/region/09/index.asp Accessed December 11, 2012. For studies done on the
impact that road-building has on economic development and poverty reduction in the Philippines see Nobuhiko
Fuwa, Arsenio M. Balisacan, Dennis Mapa, Carlos Abad Santos, and Sharon Faye, Piza,"Sectoral Growth
Linkages and the Role of Infrastructure Development: Revisiting the sources of nonfarm development in the
rural Philippines." 2012 Conference, August 18-24, 2012, Foz do Iguacu, Brazil 126456, International
Association of Agricultural Economists.
211
The Saudi Fund for Development loaned the Philippine government 20million USD in 2005.
212
Major Gamal Hayudini, Civil Relations officer, interview with author, CRS-AFP office, Camp Navarro,

246
forces have also provided their engineers from their Naval Construction Task Force to work on its
rehabilitation and construction.213 According to an AFP civil relations official, farmers have benefited from
the road because it has allowed them to bring fresh produce to markets in a timely manner and reduce travel
time.214
The road represents the fundamentals of CMO because it not only won over the population and
subsequently demoralized the ASG, but it has speeded up the transport of troops to ASG battle zones. In
fact these effects were so significant that the ASG, concerned about the debilitating effects of the road on
their ability to continue their operations, began to harass private contractors working on road
construction.215
Another contributing factor of CMO was that it became easier for the military to maintain some
sort of presence within the Muslims communities and in populated areas surrounding Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) camps. The MILF, unlike the ASG do not object to the developmental initiatives
of the AFP and welcome them.216 In fact the positive feedback that these projects received from the people,
prompted the MILF to create their own CMO or community outreach programs in Central Mindanao. They
too recognized that winning hearts and minds were just as important in promoting their legitimacy.217 As
Col. Gregario remarked, like the ASG, the MILF had to give back something to the community by
“cultivating a Robin Hood image.” If the ASG attracted people with cash, the MILF also had to add
development on top of their ideology.218
While the net effect of the military’s CMO activities in Basilan is positive, the downsides cannot
be ignored. The first is sustainability. The AFP heavily depends on the U.S. forces for the numerous CMO
projects, depending on their resources and capabilities, not to mention the indirect support they get for core
military operations such as training and equipment. During the Balikatan exercises in 2002, the influx of
U.S. forces has helped reduce the number of ASG and improve security on the island temporarily, but this
could not be sustained at the levels they hoped for. Col. Tylor Wilson explains what happened. He said that
with the large number of U.S. forces (1,300 U.S. troops including 160 special operations forces), the ASG
was pushed out. Determined a success, most of the U.S. troops pulled out, leaving a vacuum. With the
people still not having socio-economic development, it was easy for the ASG to return. Furthermore, the
Philippine forces did not have enough fuel, ammunition, equipment, and logistical capabilities to mobilize

WestMinCom, Zamboanga City, Philippines, July 29, 2012.

213
AFP news article, “Basilan Infrastructure Projects and the Exercise Balikatan 02-01.” August 2002.
Available at:
http://afp-cmo.tripod.com/articles-2002/08-12-basilan-infrastructure-projects-and-the-balikatan.html/.
Accessed December 19, 2012.
214
Major Gamal Hayudini, Civil Relations officer, interview with author, CRS-AFP office, Camp Navarro,
WestMinCom, Zamboanga City, Philippines, July 29, 2012.
215
Bong Garcia, interview with author, Basilan, Phillippines, October 26, 2010
216
Gen. Sealana, August 3, 2008.
217
Gen. Sealana, August 3, 2008; Col. Gregario, October 29, 2010; MILF Central Committee website,
“Civil-Military Operations more Lethal says MILF” referred to in Hastings and Mortela, “The
Strategy-Legitimacy Paradigm,” p.92.
218
Col. Gregario, October 29, 2010. Nonetheless, any military units operating within MILF vicinity, without
their engineer logos are targets of attacks and ambushes. Col. Regencia, November 4, 2010.

247
faster; it was difficult for them to sustain the effects of the Balikatan exercise.219
NGOs working on the grassroot-level in Basilan are more openly critical about the military’s
CMO projects in Basilan in contrast with those in Zamboanga City, which leads to the second problem that
concerns its limitations in tackling the deeper roots of the security, governance, and socio-economic
problems. The endless cycle of violence on the island has made the people inherently suspicious of the
military. They still see the government forces working in the interests of the central government and
Christians. According to a NGO worker on the island, people are generally afraid of people with guns, be it
the ASG or the AFP or the militia. A commonly heard complaint about the military, which is not restricted
to Basilan, but to other areas that constitute the MILF strongholds, is that the AFP does not do enough to
intervene on the behalf of the people during a military operation. Armed confrontations leave hundreds of
people displaced and the destruction that accompanies military operations makes it difficult for people to
return to their old lives. Therefore, her take on CMO is that it should be geared more towards protecting the
people during ongoing military operations, and provide them with relief and rehabilitation in the
aftermath.220
In regards to the developmental effects of CMO in alleviating the conditions of the poor, she feels
that they are only for the short-term, and does not address examine the deeper dynamics (politics and
socio-economics) that traps people in poverty and exacerbates the already volatile situation The NGO
worker remarked that the best indicator of progress in Basilan is not military statistics of body counts but
the presence of an effective and credible local government. For this to be realized, it is the government not
the military that has to step in to implement meaningful reform.221
Despite these drawbacks, it was pointed out, NGOs see Basilan as the first place in the region
where the AFP has developed a concrete partnership with NGOs. This relationship has been beneficial
because one it has allowed NGOs to gain access to remote and dangerous areas, and two, it has set a path
for the military to involve themselves as one of the stakeholders for peace. While the change has not been
sweeping, they observe that the new paradigm WesMinCom operates under, has changed the mindset of
soldiers from battle-seekers to demonstrate more concern for the people.222

219
Major Tylor Wilson and SSG. Calen A. Bullard (JSOTF-P), interview with author, Camp Navarro,
WestMinCom, Zamboanga City, Philippines, July 28, 2009.
220
Sr. Delgado July 27, 2009; Anonymous member of a Basilan-based NGO, interview with the author, PAZ
office, Zamboanga City, Philippines, July 27, 2009. The AFP Headquarters on the other hand say an inherent part
of CMO is to help internally displaced people (IDP). Gen. Sealeana explains that “we do help to alleviate the
suffering of these people. We help them by transport, telling them where to go and not to go, and sharing food,
medicine, resources, etc. Some people cannot return, so we keep them in IDP camps. That’s where relief
agencies come in. The military helps with the security and protects people in these areas.” Gen. Sealana, August
3, 2009.
221
Anonymous member of a Basilan-based NGO, interview with the author, PAZ office, Zamboanga City,
Philippines, July 27, 2009.
222
Sr. Emma; Anonymous member of a Basilan-based NGO, interview with the author, PAZ office, Zamboanga
City, Philippines, July 27, 2009. The AFP also says Basilan and additionally Sulu, where the soldiers were able
to develop interagency coordination and understand that support from the LGUs and NGOs were indispensable
in bringing peace. Lieut. Col. Regencia, October 8, 2007.

248
7.5.2 Sulu
The success or at least the initial success of the Basilan model, led the combined forces to apply
the same model in Sulu.223 This region was formally the stronghold of the Moro National Liberation Front
(MNLF), but its remnants are known to have presence in 12 of its barangays.224 But military operations
currently are geared towards the ASG.
Sulu is a province located further Southwest of Basilan. The distance from Zamboanga City to
Sulu’s provincial capital, Jolo is 150km. Its economy is mostly agricultural. The dominant Muslim
ethno-linguist group is the Tausug, which is the ethnic group that the MNLF is composed of. In 2006, the
poverty incidence of Sulu was at 46.5 percent, which is almost double the national average at 26.9 per cent
and ranks no. 14 among the top 20 poorest provinces.225 Only 59 percent of the barangays have electricity.
The literacy rate is 61.72 percent. Out of the 410 barangays, there are 119 barangays without any
226
schools.
The Balikatan exercises have helped flush out large elements of the ASG and some JI members
from Basilan but at the same time, the ASG has shifted its operations to Sulu.227 The AFP and U.S. forces
therefore turned their attention to this island chain. But approaching this new area posed different
challenges. The main being, the sentiment of the population towards the Americans was more sensitive,
stemming from the bloody operations that the Americans conducted in the region during the American
colonial period. At the same time, perceptions towards the AFP was not much better since the area was also
the scene of heavy fighting between the MNLF and the government forces during the 1970s.228
The people’s reception of the American forces is a complex one. It cannot be denied that the
Americans have the strongest impact on the people, primarily because little is known about other countries.
The United States have left a strong imprint from the colonial times, commonwealth period, and the entry
of their plantation businesses. Before the war in the early 1970s, the Americans had their peace corps
stationed in Sulu. On one hand “There is a fawning awe but at the same time they repel the Americans.”229
Socio-economic assistance is for the most part appreciated by the people. Nevertheless, suspicions persist
that the Americans have a self-serving agenda. NGOs articulating these views stem from the concern that
the Americans are trying to “buy off people” for the purpose of establishing permanent foothold in the
Mindanao region.230 Additionally there is an apprehension that the Americans have a vested interest in

223
Jim Michaels, “Philippines a model for counterinsurgency,” USA Today, March 31, 2011. Available at:
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2011-03-30-secretwar30_ST_N.htm/ Accessed April 8, 2011.
224
“What the future holds for Bangsamoro,” Agora Business Intelligence, October 25, 2012. Available at:
http://www.agora.ph/country.php?id=795. Accessed December 18, 2012.
225
National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB), 2006.
226
“Sulu’s Peace & Development Initiatives,” Official website of the Province of Sulu. Available at:
http://www.sulu.gov.ph/weboffice/pdf/sulu_peace_and_devlopment_iniatives.pdf. Accessed January 11, 2013.
227
Hastings and Mortela, “The Strategy-Legitimacy Paradigm,” p.75.
228
Hastings and Mortela, “The Strategy-Legitimacy Paradigm,” pp.79-80; 82
229
Freelance journalist and former consultant to the government during the Sipadan hostage crisis, interview
with author, Orchard Hotel, Zamboanga City, Philippines, October 2, 2007.
230
Sr. Delgado, July 31, 2009; Prof. Edgar Araojo, July 31, 2009; Prof. Shariff M. Julabbi, Moro Islamic
Liberations Front/Bangsamoro Mujahideen Alliance, interview with author, Guiwan, Zamboanga City, October 4,
2007.

249
exploiting business opportunities in the resource-rich region.231
As these sentiments were especially pronounced in Sulu, the initial American contingent sent was
smaller and began with a focus on CMO activities to break down suspicions from the people.232
Though initially the people were wary of the military, it was the local government that helped
pave way for the AFP and American forces to enter. The former provincial governor, Benjamin T. Loong,
well aware of their track record in Basilan, sought their assistance, seeing CMO as a means to help alleviate
poverty and prevent people from being recruited by the terrorists.233 His successor, Gov. Abdusakar Tan
who was elected in 2007, also supports the AFP and U.S force presence. Their entry has opened up more
opportunities with the presence of foreign assistance such as from the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID), Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Australian
Agency for International Development (AUSAID), the Canadian International Development Agency
(CIDA), and the European Union (EU) development agency. He comments that the security situation has
much improved and violence has been much reduced. The AFP has also left a favorable impression on the
people in their efforts to organize CMO in their communities.234 The AFP and U.S. forces jointly worked
on road projects, water improvement facilities, construction of Area Coordinating Centers (ACCs), building
improvements on mosques and schools.235 A change was also noted in the attitudes of the people towards
the military. Before the influx of CMO, people were more aloof and distant in their dealings with the
military. But now more citizens are cooperating with both forces.236 In one such incident, a renegade
MNLF rebel, Ustadz Hubier Malik who was known to team up with the ASG, attacked an AFP camp
containing American soldiers in February 2007. Initially the people had supported Malik, but fed up with
the violence, two months later, when he attacked a Marine detachment, the people began supporting the
AFP and U.S. forces by distancing themselves from Malik.237
In fact the success of CMO in Sulu in helping the military step up pressure on renegade MNLF
commanders and capturing key ASG personnel and armaments has played a significant factor in shifting
the bulk of WestMinCom’s operations to CMO. In 2009, when Gen. Benjamin Dolorfino took the helm of
the area command, he declared that the military in the AOR of WestMinCom would work under the
paradigm of 80 percent CMO and 20 percent combat.238 Dolorfino states that the turning point for CMO in

231
Prof. Edgar Araojo, July 31, 2009.
232
Hastings and Mortela, “The Strategy-Legitimacy Paradigm,” pp. 79-80; 82
233
Hastings and Mortela, “The Strategy-Legitimacy Paradogm,” p. 78; “Welcome to Sulu,” Facebook.
Available at:
http://www.fbjs.facebook.com/media/set/?set=a.101235069943885.1487.100682236665835&type=3/ Accessed
December 19, 2012.
234
Governor Abdusakur Tan, interview with author, Tan residence in Zamboanga City, Philippines, July 30,
2008.
235
Lt. Cmdr. Kuebler, (JSOTF-P), October 3, 2007.
236
Governor Abdusakur Tan, interview with author, Tan residence in Zamboanga City, Philippines, July 30,
2008.
237
Lt. Cmdr.Fred Kuebler, (JSOTF-P), October 3, 2007; “Philippine Military Put Up P1-M bounty for MNLF
Commander Ustadz Habier Malik in Sulu,” AJLPP-USA, April 18, 2007. Available at:
http://www.indybay.org/newsitems/2007/04/18/18401079.php. Accessed December 26, 2012.
238
Bong Garcia, “New Wesmincom chief: Offensive vs Abu Sayyafs continue,” SunStar, July 16, 2009.

250
the AOR of WestMinCom from the AFP-side can be attributed to the work of Maj. Gen. Juancho Sabban,
then-commander of Joint Task Force Comet (February 28, 2007 to July 13, 2009). The task force were
comprised mostly of Marines and tasked to oversee counter-offensive operations in Jolo, Sulu. Sabban’s
method was based on relentlessly pursuing the ASG and simultaneously integrating CMO with other
military operations.239
From what has been gathered, Mag.Gen. Sabban’s methodology of striking the balance between
CMO and combat, has improved the ability of the soldiers to maneuver in the depth of the enemy
battlespace through CMO.240 Sabban, in partnership with his American counterpart, Task Force Sulu,241
was able to gain the people’s cooperation of hunting down the ASG. The socio-economic projects
implemented by both militaries helped improved the standing of the AFP in the eyes of the local populace.
In return, the population became cooperative in sharing information about the location and activities of the
ASG. Thus, it was reported that the ASG was being effectively cut off from the population, and thereby
making it exceedingly difficult for them to even access the basics such as food and water. Furthermore,
with the disclosure of their whereabouts, the ASG could not move with the same mobility over the
battlespace.242 Consequently, Sabban was accredited for the neutralization of 7 ASG sub-leaders, the
apprehension of its 23 members and supporters, and the surrender of 5 ASGs and 1 MILF rogue member,
not to mention the capturing of arms and explosive.243
The AFP with the help of its U.S. counterparts was in fact, applying the principles of maneuver.
Considerable weight was placed CMO because these activities helped shape the battlespace in favor of the
AFP. By securing the support of the people, the AFP was able to seize vantage points over the enemy

Available at: http://www.sunstar.com.ph/zamboanga/new-wesmincom-chief-offensive-vs-abu-sayyafs-continue.

Accessed December 13, 2009.
239
Maj. Gen. Dolorfino, interview conducted in place of the author by Bong Garcia, responds to questions
e-mailed to author on August 20, 2009. In a report produced by the AFP, “Major General Juancho M. Sabban
0-7709,” July 7, 2009, from the period of February 2008 to July 17, 2009, Gen. Sabban oversaw the completion
of 14 Area Coordination Centers (ACCs), initiated livelihood projects such as livestock raising, seaweed
cultivation, and cassava farming in collaboration with the business sector, completed 22 water system projects,
constructed 57 water well, renovated 47 Madrasa mosques and school buildings, initiated 150km of
farm-to-market roads, and other CMO projects over 128 occasions for the benefit of the population. Maj. Gen.
Sabban also led a task force in Basilan earlier, and combined CMO and offensives targeting the ASG.
240
General Sabban is quoted as follows: "I have told my commanders that all military operations should be
intelligence-driven and surgical. How do we do this? Through intelligence enhanced by civil-military operations.
We do civil-military operations to get people onto our side. More people on your side will produce more and
better intelligence, and if you have better intelligence you'll have more successful operations that are precise and
surgical and that don't hurt innocent civilians. Thus we will get more support from the people and you will be
denying the enemy resources and space to operate. People will drive them from their own areas. So now their
space is getting smaller and smaller, until we can pinpoint them with information coming from the people
themselves." See Max Boot, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, and Richard Bennet, “Treading Softly in the Philippines,”
Weekly Standard, Vol. 014, Issue 6. Available at:
http://www.cfr.org/philippines/treading-softly-philippines/p18079. Accessed November 13, 2012.
241
Task Force Sulu is one of the three subordinate regional task forces under JSOTF-P, which operates in
Mindanao in partnership with the AFP. It is headquartered in Based at Camp Bautista, Jolo Island, Sulu Province.
242
Lt. Col. Brian Petit, “OEF Philippines: Thinking COIN, Practicing FID,” in 11-34--Irregular Warfare-A SOF
Persepctive Newsletter, June 2011. Available at: http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/docs/11-34/. Accessed
November 17, 2012.
243
AFP report, “Major General Juancho M. Sabban 0-7709,” July 7, 2009.

251
especially in gaining intelligence to launch precision or surgical operations.244 Still, the increased role of
CMO did not mean a letup in the tempo of combat operations. In fact they were intensified as major
offensives against the ASG continued, in pursuing the goal of completely eradicating them.245

7.5.3 An Analysis on Basilan and Sulu

An analysis on military operations that has transpired on the islands of Basilan and Sulu points
out to a campaign strategy known as “gradual constriction.” Its fundamentals lie in gaining mobile parity
with the opposing force through a series of small-unit action, improved intelligence, and securing the
human terrain. Once the counterinsurgent begins to gain mobility, the insurgent is gradually denied of their
246
room to maneuver over the battlespace, and ultimately lose their freedom of action. It is an adaptation of
what has been developed by Special Operation Teams (SOTs) against the communist strongholds that
involved the use of CMO to remove communist control over the villages incrementally, and gradually
tightening the ring of encirclement around the enemy strongholds.
In the case of Basilan and Sulu, the combined forces of the AFP and U.S. forces have
increasingly constricted the ASG, with the success outcome of many of their CMO projects. An improved
partnership with the local government units and civilian agencies has helped the military to tailor programs
that better fit the needs of the target community. Consequently, the severance of ties between the population
and the ASG has had the effect of flushing the ASG out of these settlements. With fewer areas that the ASG
could freely operate in, it has helped the military to pinpoint the enemy and apply precision-based and
247
surgical strikes.
In both these cases, the AFP was effectively able to use CMO as a form of maneuver to penetrate
the depth of the battlespace. At a tactical level, CMO operations on the ground had the effect of not so
much spurring development, but reaching military objectives in changing the perceptions of the people. At
the operational level, the successful sequencing of these actions in conjunction with security operations
shaped the battlespace so that it denied the ASG of their original vantage points. A reflection on the
activities that transpired in these provinces, revealed that the AFP’s efforts of institutionalizing CMO has
helped the AFP to effectively use lessons from its past and adapt CMO to the contemporary security
environment.

7.6 Summary
Chapter seven uses a case study to provide insight on how CMO has transpired on the ground
upon institutionalization and whether institutionalization has helped the AFP absorb lessons from its past in

244
Col. Mitra, October 27, 2010.
245
“Dolorfino vows to defeat NPA, Abu Sayyaf,” ZamboTimes, July 18, 2009. Available at:
http://www.zambotimes.com/index.php?/archives/13967-Dolorfino-vows-to-defeat-NPA,-Abu-Sayyaf.html#exte
nded. Accessed August 13, 2009.
246
Alfredo L. Filler, “The Abu Sayyaf Group: A Growing Menace to Civil Society,” South Asia Terrorism
Portal, undated. Available at: http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/books/global/filler.htm. Accessed
December 26, 2012.
247
Maj. Batara, July 29, 2009; Col. Mitra, October 27, 2010.

252
helping the soldiers bolster COIN operations.
In drawing together the findings, it can be determined that at least within the AOR of
WestMinCom, institutionalization has one, helped propagate CMO’s principles to the military audience.
This was largely reflected in the perceptions of the beneficiaries and civilian partners who have noted the
overall improvement in troop behavior. It shows that the command has been quite successful in transmitting
through the chain of command, that proper conduct towards the people is important in achieving mission
success. From another level of understanding, it can be said that some of the best practices stemming from
the Magsaysay era, where the importance of the left-hand approach was instilled in the minds of the
soldiers, was more effectively replicated than in any other period in AFP history.
Two, findings from both conflict and non-conflict areas brought to light that CMO was not
simply about doing “good works” for the sake of “good works.” These activities were carefully calibrated
to manage battlespace. In effect, the plan and implementation of CMO was based on the tenets of maneuver,
where soldiers were able secure mobility and presence over the human terrain. In the city, this has worked
as a deterrent and in conflict areas; it has helped to constrict the space the threat groups could operate in by
winning over the communities. And these ideas have been drawn from the “Campaign of Gradual
Constriction” developed during the Corazon Aquino administration.
And third, an unexpected factor came from the entry of the U.S. forces. The Philippine
government and the United States were able to set strict terms for their role, which has helped limit public
backlash. Their efforts on the ground, mainly through CMO have in turn boosted the AFP’s capabilities in
reaching more communities. In effect, the AFP was adept in making use of American presence to facilitate
their entry into communities.
In sum, a basic overview on the development of CMO in Western Mindanao has reinforced the
view that institutionalization has helped laid down the groundwork for an improved application of CMO.

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Chapter 8. Conclusion and Findings
8.1 Re-examining the Objectives
The central objectives of the thesis were one, tracing the evolvement of CMO in Philippine
military history. At the same time, while tracking its development, the study sought to assess the role of
CMO in the AFP’s campaigns. It aimed at looking into factors that brought about its success in bolstering
COIN operations and vice versa. The conceptual framework used to study its effects on the ground drew
theories from maneuver warfare where CMO plays a critical role in allowing soldiers to penetrate and
subsequently manage the depth of insurgent battlespace. Two, as the institutionalization of CMO in 2006
was considered to mark a new turning point for its operations, a case study was used to determine whether
the event has been successful in internalizing its past lessons and laying down the groundwork for an
improved application of CMO.

8.2 Summarizing Findings

8.2.1 Historical Analysis: Tracing CMO’s Development
The history of CMO dates back to the American colonial period. American soldiers used civic
action to legitimize colonial control over the Philippines and facilitate military operations by winning over
the population. In the process, native auxiliary forces became acquainted to such practices. These forces
consisted of Filipino soldiers that joined the officer corps of the newly established Philippine Army in 1936.
Therefore, it was no coincidence that the type of civic action work carried out later drew from these
experiences. In the post-independence era, Secretary of National Defense, Ramon Magsaysay developed
the left-hand approach (friendly persuasion through CMO) and the right-hand approach (lethal force),
which remain the guiding principles for internal security operations today. Under President Ferdinand
Marcos, soldiers became exposed to extra-military activities to unprecedented levels. At this stage, CMO
was largely shaped by a developmental orientation that continues to characterize an aspect of current CMO.
Nonetheless, in the last years of his regime, CMO switched gears and became more focused on maximizing
its utility in COIN operations. A clear-hold-consolidate-develop methodology was established in order to
sustain military gains. By promoting the entry of government agencies with the assistance of CMO in an
insurgent-cleared area, it was hoped that communities would not revert back to insurgent control. Though
largely ineffective because of declining military capabilities and the poor legitimacy of the government, the
idea was still carried over to succeeding generations. Under the administration of Corazon Aquino, further
improvisation on CMO was made to deal more effectively in the remote strongholds of the communists.
Here, CMO was geared towards “mirroring” the activities of the communists. These tactics have been
preserved within the continuing existence of the Special Operations Teams (SOT), organized to penetrate
the depth of communist-controlled areas. By the time the AFP came out with its first doctrine in 2006,
operational principles and practices of these periods have been revived and incorporated within its lines of
operation.
A point that can be overlooked when examining its history is that CMO did not emerge from the
context of conventional war. Rather, it was developed in response to guerrillas that were fighting a mobile

254
warfare. For the AFP, their advantage in conventional capabilities could not obtain results against an enemy
that prioritized freedom of movement over defending a fixed territory. In particular, the population was a
significant enabler for the insurgents to survive and sustain their military operations; and the group that was
most adept in mobilizing the population was the communist armed movement. Thereupon, the AFP
developed CMO in response to the way the communists managed the populated depth of the battlespace. It
was only at the turn of the millennium, when various Muslim armed groups began to shift to mobile
warfare, that CMO was modified to match this theater.

8.2.2 Historical Analysis: Contributing Factors behind CMO Success

Successful Factors
In assessing CMO in its history, the first and foremost factor behind the cases where it
demonstrated the most success came with strong leadership (civilian and/or military). Good leadership has
a combination of different elements. The first element lies in the ability of the leader to demonstrate
political will. Even though, in an insurgency in the Philippines, the AFP is used as an “instrument for
securing the support of their people for their government,”1 it has to be backed by strong intent by the
government. This intent or will is demonstrated by the leader mobilizing the nation’s resources to fight the
threat group, tackle the roots of armed dissent by instituting reform, and if threat groups are considered to
have legitimate grievances, promote a political solution to the conflict. Without political will, it is far more
challenging to implement CMO effectively or even have any of its success registered at the operational and
tactical levels reverberate to the strategic level. This problem was especially pronounced in the last years of
Marcos’ reign. Though a COIN plan with CMO as its central fixture was developed, Marcos did not have
the political will to devote the nation’s resources accordingly. In contrast, the periods that were marked
with strong political will came from the American and the Magsaysay Period. Civic action did help
improve the legitimacy of American control over the Philippine Islands. It was largely successful because
the colonial power assured the people through action that they were preparing the Philippines for eventual
statehood. American soldiers working on civic action projects were on in the forefront in demonstrating
government intentions in their civic action projects. The left-hand approach under Magsaysay was also
successful because it was backed by government intent to alleviate the lives of the agrarian poor.
Another element in determining good leadership is having a sound understanding of military
affairs, especially in comprehending the complexities of waging COIN warfare. Interestingly enough, even
if the civilian executive did not have such expertise, it was important that they appoint qualified people to
military leadership positions. Those examples are found in instances when President Quirino appointed
Magsaysay as Secretary of National Defense and when President Aquino, appointed Ramos as Chief of
Staff, and later as Secretary of National Defense. The significance in having qualified leaders to oversee
military operations is one, ensuring the military is behind the civilian government. This is particularly
important in the context of the Philippines since the military has been prone to step out of the boundaries of

1
Valeriano and Bohannan, Counter-Guerrilla Operations, p. 190.

255
civilian control when the executive was perceived to be inept or weak. Two, something seen as abstract and
falling outside of the usual remit of military responsibilities which needed a leader that could propagate the
validity of CMO in a top-down approach.
Strong leadership is followed by the second factor, which lies in its implementation. From the
findings, CMO achieved the most success when it was incorporated into the military campaign based on the
principles of warfare. An understanding of its utility as a form of maneuver to operate in the depth of
insurgent battlespace was evident in the American era, the Ramon Magsaysay period, and the Corazon
Aquino administration. In all three periods, the military downsized their units and abandoned static defense
in place of gaining mobility over the physical terrain. Nonetheless, maneuver limited in the physical sense
could not have achieved the same level of success without the population being taken into consideration. As
the insurgents’ survival hinged on a sympathetic population, CMO was devised to deny the enemy their
vantage points generated from population support. In the American period, constables were able to negate
the armed groups’ ability to continue unhampered over the battlespace by initiating activities to foster
friendly relations with the people. The people reciprocated with information regarding enemy movements.
In the Magsaysay period, the left-hand approach had the psychological effect of dislodging the Huks from
their pedestal of moral superiority over their base of support (the agrarian poor). Finally, during the Aquino
administration, CMO was effectively used to deny the space (remote communities) in which the
Communist Party of the Philippines – New People’s Army (CPP-NPA) could freely operate. This was a
method where CMO played a key role in removing communist political infrastructure and filling the void
with counter-organizations and jump-starting government services (See graph 8.1, graph 8.2, and graph 8.3
for the drop in CPP-NPA strength after CMO was integrated in the Campaign of Gradual Constriction in
1988).
The third factor is having qualified midlevel officers to implement CMO on the ground. This can
either be achieved through one, CMO specialists that can guide commanders in their areas of
responsibilities in the planning and execution of such operations or two, developing small unit leadership
that has the capabilities to respond to the unique challenges of COIN and use CMO accordingly. In the
former, Magsaysay had at his disposal 200 Civil Affairs officers to dispense advice to local commanders. In
the latter, select but experienced COIN officers tackling a growing communist presence in the early 1980s,
were able to absorb and understand the way the communists managed the battlespace and used lateral
thinking to develop a type of CMO that could counter communist advantages over the rural population. It
took into account that no single military operation (combat, intelligence, and CMO) could achieve effects
without them being fused into a whole.
The fourth factor is avoiding as much as possible, the negative impact military operations has on
the population. Even though, there is an undeniably a normative element to this approach, where soldiers
are expected to follow rules of engagement and tend to humanitarian concerns, it also serves military
interests. CMO is based on seeking a civilian response that denies the insurgents their source of power.
Therefore, when the military uses indiscriminate firepower and engages in abusive behavior towards the
people, as seen during the early phases of the Huk rebellion, Marcos period, and in the first few years of

256
both the Aquino and Arroyo administration, it only adds fuel to the insurgents’ cause.
The fifth factor involves civilian-military efforts. Cooperation with the civilian sector
dramatically increased, inclusive of government agencies, NGOs, aid agencies, and the business sector
under President Arroyo, but this is not entirely a new endeavor. The American period demonstrated a close
relationship between the military and civilian authorities (inclusive of Filipino administrators) that helped
stabilize American control. During Magsaysay’s tenure as Secretary of National Defense, he involved other
government agencies in promoting socio-economic works. And in the Aquino administration, her efforts in
drawing out the potential of NGOs to assist the welfare of the nation laid down the track for including
NGOs in civil-military cooperation. Civilian partnership is a necessity for the following reasons: one, to
avoid over-burdening the military with socio-economic tasks; two, civilian partners are better equipped to
understand the needs of the population and advise the military accordingly; and three, to ensure a smooth
transfer of responsibilities to the civilian sector after an area is stabilized; and finally, fighting an
insurgency registers little success if it only serves one party’s interests. Rather, it has to be conducted in a
combined effort that allows all stakeholders to take ownership of the problem.

Graph 8.1: Estimated CPP-NPA Strength (1977-2011)

Source: For years 1977-2006, statistics come from Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon, “Perspective from the
Military,” Digest: A Forum for Security and Defense Issues, 4th Quarter 2006, p.5. For the remaining years

257
see footnote.2
3
Graph 8.2: CPP-NPA Affected Barangays (1981-2011)

2
For year 2007, figures extracted from Office of Deputy of Staff for Operations, OJ3, General Headquarters
Armed Forces of the Philippines cited in Lieut. Col. Eugenio V. Hernandez (Philippine Navy), “Assessing the
Parameters for Determining Mission Accomplishment of the Philippine Marine Corps in Internal Security
Operations,” MMSS, Marines Corps University: Quantico, Virginia, August 2009, p. 26; For year 2008, figures
extracted from Robert Karniol, “Communist threat still a priority,” The Strait Times, December 15, 2008.
Available at: http://www.asianewsnet.net/news.php?id=3124&sec=3&t=. Accessed Jan 8, 2009; For year 2009
from Gilbert Bayoran, “Insurgency decline irreversible” Visayan Daily Star, March 18, 2010. Available at:
http://www.visayandailystar.com/2010/March/18/topstory12.htm. Accessed April 10, 2010; For year 2010,
figures extracted from Dona Pazzibugan, “AFP says CPP armed strength down to 4,700 fighters, Philippine
Daily Inquirer, December 27, 2010. Available at:
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view/20101227-311107/AFP-says-CPP-armed-strength-do
wn-to-4700-fighters. Accessed December 28, 2012; For year 2011, figures extracted from Jay Ruiz, “APF belies
CPP-NPA’s claim of 16,000 armed rebels,”ABS-CBN News, December 26, 2011. Available at:
http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/12/26/11/afp-belies-cpp-npas-claim-5000-armed-rebels. Accessed May 31,
2012.
3
Affected barangays are areas where the CPP-NPA has established influence through the organization of their
own political units. Col. Roy Devesa, “An Assessment of the Philippine Counterinsurgency Operational
Methodology,” MMAS thesis, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: US Army Command and General Staff College, 2005,
p. 9. It is also important to note that “affected” can range from where the CPP-NPA have minimal influence to
one where a CPP-NPA political structure has been established and operates like a shadow government. See Maj.
Adolfo B. Espuela, Jr. “Examining the Capacity of the Philippine Army’s Enlisted Corps to Accomplish the
Government’s Counterinsurgency Strategy: Sharpening the Tool,” MMAS theses. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas:
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2008, p. 96.

258
Source: From years 1981-2004, figures extracted from General Headquarters Armed Forces of the
Philippines cited in Caroline G. Hernandez, “Institutional Responses to Armed Conflict: The Armed Forces
of the Philippines,” background paper submitted to the Human Development Network Foundation, Inc. for
4
the Philippine Human Development Report 2005. For the remaining years, see footnote.

5
Graph 8.3: CPP-NPA Guerrilla Fronts (1981-2011)

Source: For years 1981-2004, figures extracted from General Headquarters Armed Forces of
the Philippines cited in Caroline G. Hernandez, “Institutional Responses to Armed Conflict:
The Armed Forces of the Philippines,” background paper submitted to the Human
Development Network Foundation, Inc. for the Philippine Human Development Report 2005.
6
For years 2005- 2010 see footnote.
4
For years 2005-2007, figures extracted from Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, OJ3, General
Headquarters Armed Forces of the Philippines cited in Lt. Col. Eugenio V. Hernandez, “Assessing the
Parameters for Determining Mission Accomplishment of the Philippine Marine Corps in Internal Security
Operations, master’s thesis, United Corps University, Quantico, Virginia: United States Marine Corps Command
and Staff College, August 2009, p.25. For year 2008, figure extracted from Public Affairs Office, AFP, “2008
Internal Security Operations Successful; AFP is on Track,” AFP website. Available at:
http://www.afp.mil.ph/index.php?start=530. Accessed January 20, 2012; For years 2009-2010, figures extracted
from “AFP: Weaker NPA, ASG; MILF contained in 2010,” ABS-CBN News, December 31, 2010. Available at:
www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/12/31/10/afp-weaker-npa-asg-milf-contained-2010. Accessed January 20, 2013.
5
A guerrilla front for the CPP-NPA covers a physical area, usually in remote areas that is located along
provincial boundaries and forested and mountainous areas. In the fronts, there is a political and military
organization. Col. Roy Devesa, “An Assessment of the Philippine Counterinsurgency Operational
Methodology,” MMAS thesis, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: US Army Command and General Staff College, 2005,
p. 9.
6
For year 2005, figure extracted from Elena L. Aben, “AFP ‘on track’ in resolving insurgency problem by
2010,” The Manila Bulletin, December 25, 2009. Available at:
http://www.mb.com.ph/articles/235650/afp-track-resolving-insurgency-problem-2010#.UPyzlvLAFIs. Accessed
January 20, 2013; For year 2006, figure extracted from “Only 4 guerilla fronts remain in East Visayas, 8 th ID
chief says,” Philippine Information Agency, June 18, 2009. Available at:
http://www.samarnews.com/news2009/jun/f2265.htm. Accessed January 20, 2013; For years 2007- 2008, figure
extracted from Public Affairs Office, AFP, “2008 Internal Security Operations Successful; AFP is on Track,”
AFP website. Available at: http://www.afp.mil.ph/index.php?start=530. Accessed January 20, 2012; For year
2009, figure extracted from International Crisis Group (ICG). The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines:

259
Delimiting Factors
In turning to the delimiting factors, CMO has also experienced major challenges in its
implementation. The first is the military’s preference to conduct what they know best, which is relying on
conventional fire power to produce immediate results. The second is, due to its abstract nature, CMO has
presented a steep learning curve for the average soldier.
This begs the question: how these obstacles can be overcome? In the previous section, a list of
factors contributing to its success in history was drawn up. While it appears good leadership from the top
played a determining role in its successful outcome, they came with exceptional leadership. Having said
7
that, not all administrations can produce leaders of that caliber. What has typically been seen in its history
was that by the time the security situation has returned to a certain level of stability, these leaders have
retired from the scene. Consequently, CMO was brushed aside, usually under the domain of developmental
assistance. As it lacked the same recognition as other military operations, its lessons were not internalized
and studied to the extent where they could be applied effectively when a situation called for it. Therefore,
the AFP had to undergo a painful relearning process, and CMO was only adopted in earnest when
conventional military methods failed to make inroads. Thus, CMO has had an uneven track record in its
history, where the smooth transfer of its best practices was hampered because there was no doctrine or
formalization of CMO.
A doctrine is critical for a military organization to preserve and internalize its lessons from the
past and prepare for the future by subjecting CMO to intellectual rigor. It also ensures that the entire
military audience has a common understanding on its principles and practices, which is supported by
official guidelines and training. In other words, even though good leadership is a key factor in realizing
effective COIN, the existence of a doctrine can assist the implementation of these operations. In this aspect,
the thesis sees the 2006 institutionalization as a significant event for CMO.

8.2.3 Case Study Findings: CMO after Institutionalization in 2006

In what strongly suggests as attempts by the military establishment to deal with the issues listed
in the preceding section, CMO was institutionalized for the first time in 2006. Generally speaking, one of
the main catalysts in prompting its institutionalization came with President Arroyo’s security policy that
called for a “holistic” approach to the insurgencies. At the same time she stepped-up military operations,
she also encouraged the expansion of the left-hand approach or persuasive measures to target the roots of
insurgencies. In close line with the president’s initiatives, the AFP built a COIN plan that included CMO as

Tactics and Talks, February 14, 2011, Asia Report No. 202, p.1; For year 2010, figure extracted from “AFP:
Weaker NPA, ASG; MILF contained in 2010,” ABS-CBN News, December 31, 2010. Available at:
www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/12/31/10/afp-weaker-npa-asg-milf-contained-2010. Accessed January 20, 2013.
7
The American period produced stellar generals, one even frequenting the top 10 American generals’ list (Gen.
John Pershing who was noted for his role as commander and governor of the Moro Provinces). Ramon
Magsaysay was an excellent guerrilla leader during the Japanese occupation. He gained so much popularity
during the Huk campaign that he went on to became the next president of the Philippines. Fidel Ramos was the
first person to be promoted to a 5-star general. He also went on to become president and negotiated a peace
agreement with the main Muslim separatist movement of this period.

260
an inseparable component of military action.
Against the backdrop of these events, the final question to this thesis was whether
institutionalization has improved its overall implementation on the ground. A case study on Western
Mindanao was used to probe for answers.
The main finding extracted from an in-depth look on its ground operations was that CMO drew
its best lessons from its past military campaigns and implemented them within the scheme of maneuver
warfare. CMO was carefully calibrated to help shape conditions in the insurgent depth, in particular the
human terrain, for the purpose of securing positional advantages over the threat groups.
In the case of Western Mindanao, an examination was made on both non-conflict and conflict
areas. In regards to the former, the research revealed that the AFP treated a relatively insurgent-free zone
such a Zamboanga City, as an extension of the battlespace. In the city, CMO was utilized for the purpose of
deterring the entry of threat groups in populated areas, which could potentially compromise the security of
existing military bases. Moreover, it was to ensure that any sort of enticements by the threat groups would
not influence the city dwellers. In the process, the AFP also made serious note that their ill-reputed past
made them unwelcome in the communities. Therefore, CMO became a tool in making the first step to
bridge the rift between themselves and the people. The demonstration of good will through community
outreach programs has helped improve trust and has allowed the soldiers to maneuver in the populated
portions of a non-conflict zone.
Concerning whether CMO has prevented the infiltration of the communities by threat groups is
difficult to measure. For the most part, the security remains unchanged, signifying either CMO has helped
prevent the armed movements from setting up a significant presence in Zamboanga City, or more simply,
the presence of military bases in the area, has been sufficient in providing deterrence (see Graph 8.6).
In conflict areas such as Basilan and Sulu, CMO is fused with standard military operations to
deny threat groups mobility over the battlespace and constrict them. What was applied in these provinces
were the operational and tactical maneuvers developed in response to the communist threat in the late
1980s. CMO once again played a central role in denying the space in which the insurgents could move
freely. CMO was geared towards winning the hearts and minds of the people for the purpose of flushing out
armed elements in their communities and gaining intelligence from the residents. This form of cooperation
has been instrumental in ferreting out obscure enemy positions hidden in jungle terrain and remote
communities. Concurrently, human intelligence has also allowed the AFP to switch from directing
wide-scale sweeps to surgical strikes on ASG concentrations. This has proved to be more resource-efficient,
8
less destructive on civilians and their property, and effective in attacking core ASG fighters. Evidence also
shows that CMO has helped to deny the ASG the freedom of movement, and thereby has effectively
constricted the areas in which they could operate in freely.
The graph below (graph 8.4) shows the drop in ASG numbers. The downward trend begins in
2001. This can be imputed largely to the increased American presence and the culmination of the Balikatan

8
Col. Wilson O. Mitra, spokesperson for Western Mindanao Command and CMO officer, interview with author,
Western Mindanao Command, Zamboanga City, Philippines, October 27, 2010.

261
Exercise in 2002 in Basilan which has helped flush the ASG out of their original strongholds on the island.
Continued and combined efforts by the AFP and U.S. forces have managed to keep the numbers down. The
focal point of these efforts lay in CMO activities as a means to deny the ASG and other terror groups the
operational environment that have allowed them to thrive which primarily stems from government neglect
in areas to provide security and basic services to the people.
It is also important to note during this period, the AFP was intensifying efforts to institutionalize
CMO, meaning these activities did not suddenly reappear with the entry of the Americans. In 2002, a CMO
field manual for the Philippine Army had already been published. Furthermore, an assessment on existing
AFP capabilities produced jointly by the Philippines and the United States revealed that CMO was one of
the components that needed strengthening in (Philippine Defense Reform 2003). Therefore, it can be
determined, that by the time Balikatan 2002 was launched, the AFP was already on track in attaching more
importance to CMO.

Graph 8.4: Estimated ASG Strength (1993-2012)

1400

1200
1270
1000 1150
1100
1030
800
895
800
600
650
400 580
510
460 480 420 452
200 383 370 390 400 379
300
0 150
93

94

95

96

97

98

99

00

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

10

11

12
19

19

19

19

19

19

19

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

Source: For years 1993 to 2000, figures extracted from Alfredo L. Filler, “The Abu Sayyaf Group: A Growing
Menace to Civil Society.” The South Asia Terrorism Portal, undated. Available at:
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/books/global/filler.htm#. Accessed November 3, 2012. For remaining
figures see footnote.9

9
Figures for 2001 to 2007 from Office of Deputy of Staff for Operations, OJ3, General Headquarters Armed
Forces of the Philippines cited in Lieut. Col. Eugenio V. Hernandez (Philippine Navy), “Assessing the
Parameters for Determining Mission Accomplishment of the Philippine Marine Corps in Internal Security
Operations,” MMSS, Marines Corps University: Quantico, Virginia, August 2009, p. 26. For year 2008, figures
extracted from “Ransom, politics embolden Philippine kidnappers,” Xinhua, February 8, 2009. Available at:
http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90777/90851/6587936.html/. Accessed January 20, 2013; Figures for 2009
extracted from Fabio Scarpello, “US, Philippine rethink anti-terror tactics,” Asia Times, July 19, 2010. Available
at: http://atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/LF19Ae01.html. Accessed January 20, 2013; Figures for 2010 and
June 2011 extracted from Alexis Romero, “AFP: Abu Sayyaf losing strength,” The Philippine Star, September
20, 2011. Available at: http://www.philstar.com/nation/728539/afp-abu-sayyaf-losing-strength. Accessed January
20, 2013; Figures for 2012 extracted from “Amid protests vs. anti-Islam film, AFP keeping an eye on Abu
Sayyaf.” GMA News, September 18, 2012. Available at:
http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/274545/news/regions/amid-protests-vs-anti-islam-film-afp-keeping-an-
eye-on-abu-sayyaf. Accessed September 28, 2012.

262
 The graph below shows the number of violent incidents in the areas researched for the case study.
While violent incidents in Zamboanga City maintained a steady low, there has been a sharp drop in violent
incidents starting from 2006 in Sulu. This has been attributed to the success of CMO in securing the
cooperation of the people, especially in collecting intelligence about the ASG. In the case of Basilan, there
has been a small rebound in numbers, as the AFP and U.S. forces have had difficulty in sustaining their
gains from the Balikatan Exercises (2002) after the pullout of the troops. Nonetheless, the continued efforts
by both militaries have managed to stave off the ASG and keep them within the 400-member range.

Graph 8.5: Frequency of Conflict-Related Violent Incidents in Zamboanga City, Basilan, and Sulu from
January 2005 to August 2008.

36
34
32 33
30
28
26
24
22 23
20 Zamboanga City
18 Basilan
16
Sulu
14 11
12 13 9
10
8
6
4
4
2 5
2 3 3
0 3 1
2005 2006 2007 2008

Location / Year 2005 2006 2007 2008

Zamboanga City 3 1 3 3
Basilan 11 2 4 9
Sulu 23 33 13 5

Source: Report to the Delegation of the European Commission in the Philippines, contract no.
2007/147-653, A Survey Mapping of the Conflict in Mindanao: 1st January 2005 –20the August 2008,
Technical Assistance to the Mindanao Health

263
 Interestingly enough, CMO has also helped the AFP to maneuver in the battlespace that has an
assortment of threat groups, all requiring a different response. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)
has posed a different set of challenges especially since both the government and this armed group have
been preparing the groundwork for a final peace agreement. As a result, it has complicated the military
approach. Under the terms of the ceasefire, the AFP is not allowed to enter MILF camps even when
pursuing the ASG. Nevertheless, it appears that CMO has provided the military with a method to work
around this problem. The main method being that it has allowed the AFP to maintain some sort of presence
in the vicinity surrounding MILF camps through CMO. By organizing outreach programs to the Muslim
people, the extension of goodwill by the military was something that the MILF could not entirely brush off.
In other words, it demonstrated to the MILF, up to a certain degree, that the AFP was supporting the
government’s efforts to bring forth a peaceful resolution to the Muslim aspirations. Graph 8.6 provides the
number of armed skirmishes in the years leading up to a peace deal. Though it does not directly corroborate
the theory that CMO was instrumental in reducing these armed encounters, as other factors, such as
ceasefire mechanisms, international support in monitoring the peace process, and peace talks moving
forward at the national level with the MILF, have played a bigger role; it does reflect an improving security
situation. 2003 was the last incident in which the government forces launched an offensive on a MILF
camp but it did not completely detract the two parties from re-launching peace talks. In the years that
followed, though marred by periodic accusations of truce violations on both sides, the number of
skirmishes declined dramatically until 2008. In this year, the MILF launched simultaneous attacks across
Mindanao that left about 750,000 people displaced and nearly 400 dead on both sides. The trigger that led
to this outbreak came when the Supreme Court declared a draft agreement between the MILF and the
10
government as unconstitutional, basically stemming from its interpretation of the Muslim homeland.
This led to renewed fighting. Nonetheless, despite such setbacks, both parties remained steadfast in pursing
peace, which finally led to a breakthrough in 2012 when an agreement on the framework of peace was
signed. In sum, CMO registered some success in this aspect because it has helped the AFP to manage a
battlespace with various threat groups, each requiring a different response and at the same time,
demonstrate government intent in pursuing peace with a threat group seen to have legitimate grievances.

10
This concerned the signing of the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA). This was an
agreement, which was supposed to set the track for the signing of a final peace treaty with the MILF. The
contention was over the clause that recognized the ancestral domain of the Muslim people. This angered local
politicians since these domains included their lands recognizing the homeland for the Muslim people. See Group
Asia Briefing No. 83, The Philippines: The Collapse of Peace in Mindanao, October 23, 2008; “Philippines:
Government, Muslim rebels move closer to peace deal,” IRIN, Humanitarian News and Analysis, May 8, 2012.
Available at:
http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95419/PHILIPPINES-Government-Muslim-rebels-move-closer-to-peace-deal/
Accessed May 30, 2012.

264
Graph 8.6: Annual Trend of Government of the Philippines (GPH)-Moro Islamic Liberations Front (MILF)
Armed Skirmishes (2002-2011)

Source: Bgen Ariel B. Bernardo (AFP), “Peaceful Approaches to the Mindanao Conflict: Management and
Resolution,” Army Troopers Newsmagazine, December 2011. Available at:
http://www.army.mil.ph/e_publications/ATN%202011/4th_qtr.pdf. Accessed November 5, 2012.

The above findings reveal that institutionalization of CMO has helped the AFP to internalize
lessons from its past in using CMO as a form of maneuver warfare, and improvising them to match the
current realities of the battlespace.
Nonetheless, other factors cannot be overlooked, when considering its overall effect. The first is
that the institutionalization process kicked in with President Arroyo’s declaration to end the insurgency
problem using both the right-hand and the left-hand approach. She also helped promote the military-civilian
partnership with an executive order (EO) to engage all government agencies in working in a concerted
effort to re-establishing security in the nation. Mechanisms such as the Peace and Order Council, further
helped establish a framework to involve multiple agencies (local government, government agencies, police,
NGOs, and the military) in making decisions over local security concerns.
Another factor was the AFP leadership’s steps to promote its importance within its establishment.
These have led to formal CMO guidelines for the soldiers, an expanded training course in the military
curriculum, motivating soldiers in this field by giving promotions based on merit earned in this field, and
securing increased funding (see table 8.1). By also turning CMO into an occupational specialty, military
units in the chain of command (from headquarters down to the company-level) benefited from having CMO
specialists assist them in organizing CMO activities.
Thus, the success of CMO operations in the Western Mindanao Command can be attributed to the
factors listed above. Even though it would be far-fetched to say strategic victory is near, especially since the

265
country has passed its second deadline that it had set itself (for the complete eradication of all threat groups
by 2010), military operations have experienced some localized success indicated by the gradual drop in
11
enemy strength for all threat groups. There is also the argument that the effects of CMO cannot be felt
overnight. It is not easy to measure within a short-time span, and numerical strengths can only reflect a
trend. CMO is really directed towards seeking an attitudinal change, which is generally perceived to be
more difficult to gauge, especially in determining its impact on deterring people from throwing in their
12
support for the insurgents. Therefore, more time is needed to determine the full effects of CMO by
following the outcome of government initiatives and military operations against threat groups.

Table 8.1: Budget Appropriations for CMO and National Development 2003-2010 (Pesos)

CMO CMO National National National National

Development Development Development Development
Year 2003 2005 2007 2008 2009 2010
Philippine Army P 56,835,000 P 75,780,000 P 1,197,836,000 P 1,197,606,000 P 1,377,596,000 P 1,382, 450,000

Philippine Navy P 7,480,000 P 9,973,000 P 323,277,000 P 320,987,000 P 377,610,000 P 377,610,000

Philippine Air Force P 7,137,000 P 7,984,000 P 254,574,000 P 352,288,000 P 380,696,000 P 380,696,000

Total for 3

services as %

of DND

appropriations 0.18% 0.20% 3.60% 3.70% 3.80% 3.70%

DND total

appropriations P 40,038,541,000 P 46,036,935,000 P 49,341,721,000 P 50,927,127,000 P 56,483,128,000 P 57,670,250,000

Source: Compiled from the Department of Budget and Management, General Appropriations Act.
Available online at: http://www.dbm.gov.ph/. Accessed April 16, 2013.

8.3 Challenges and Limitations to CMO

8.3.1 Operations on the Ground: Maneuvering over Human Terrain
One of the largest challenges in fighting guerrilla warfare from the side of the government forces
is maneuvering over the populated depth of the insurgent battlespace. Insurgents blend in with civilians that
inevitably invite military presence. Even if there are no overt clashes between the opposing forces, the mere
presence of the military encroaches on the everyday space of the civilians. And when full-scale military

11
“AFP: Weaker NPA, ASG; MILF contained in 2010,” ABS-CBN News, December 31, 2010. Available at:
http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/12/31/10/afp-weaker-npa-asg-milf-contained-2010. Accessed January 27,
2011. Despite the fact that Oplan Bantay Laya II did not reach government-set deadlines to eradicate the internal
security problem by 2010, the AFP claim that all threat groups have been contained or have decreased to
manageable numbers
12
Col. Regencia, October 8, 2007.

266
operations occur there is a greater chance for civilians to get hurt or killed in the crossfire, experience
13
displacement, undergo emotional trauma, and face property damage.
In regards to the Muslim armed groups, military operations tend to culminate into large-scale
military confrontations as the Muslim fighters fight to defend fixed positions. AFP operations are
frequently accompanied by air strikes, bombings, and artillery bombardments. As a consequence,
Mindanao suffers from a higher number of displacements than any other region. Between January 2012 and
14
October 2012, conflict and other forms of violence have displaced a total of 164,228 people in Mindanao.
Having suffered from a cycle of military disruptions, the people cannot entirely be won over even with
extensive CMO unless the AFP intervenes on behalf of the population during a military operation. These
typically require protection, evacuation, and also rehabilitation in the post-conflict stage.
In dealing with the communist front, armed clashes tend to be shorter in duration since the
insurgents engage in hit and run tactics. Though they do not evolve into large land battles, they are no less
destructive. The AFP has often used “violent efforts…to undermine or discourage civilian support for the
15
NPA,” underlining the difficulty the AFP has in differentiating the core combatants from non-combatants.
One such reason is because the insurgents are adept in blending in with the population. The second reason
16 17
is that the AFP retains a fixed mindset on the “left,” where they “lump” together all left-leaning groups
(peasant associations, labor groups, and student groups), and perceiving them to be interconnected with the
18
armed component of the communist party. A serious downside to the latter reason is that any individual
or group suspected to have leftist-leanings could be subjected to harassment from the military, or even
19
worse, experience detention, torture, and extrajudicial killings. Even an AFP official admits the difficulty
of having people freely expressing left-leaning views. He said, “We as much as possible tell the people not

13
For a comprehensive overview on how conflict affects people see IBON Foundation in Cooperation with
Children’s Rehabilitation Center (CRC) and Center for Women’s Resources (CWR). “Uncounted Lives: Children,
Women and Conflict in the Philippines.” A Needs Assessment of Children and Women Affected by Armed Conflict
for the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). 2006, pp. 14-16. Available at:
http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/%28httpDocuments%29/4195F736A00885CCC125
7289005B3781/$file/Uncounted+Lives+-Oct+2006.pdf. Accessed July 19, 2012. Hereafter cited as “Uncounted
Lives: Children, Women and Conflict in the Philippines.”
14
“At least 7,000 people remain displaced in Mindanao due to armed conflict and clan violence (9 November
2012),” Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, November 9, 2012. Available at:
http://www.internal-displacement.org/idmc/website/countries.nsf/%28httpEnvelopes%29/A01DB3AC980C9A22
C125772600312329?OpenDocument. Accessed December 18, 2012.
15
“Uncounted Lives: Children, Women and Conflict in the Philippines,” pp. 34-35.
16
Prof. Edgar Araojo, faculty of political science, Western Mindanao University and member of party-list group,
Akbayan, interview with author, Baliwasan Central School, Zamboanga City, Philippines, October 25, 2010.
Hereafter cited as Araojo and date of interview.
17
Prof. Edgar Araojo, faculty of political science, Western Mindanao University and member of party-list group,
Akbayan, interview with author, Western Mindanao State University, Zamboanga City, Philippines, July 31,
2009. Hereafter cited as Araojo and date of interview.
18
“Uncounted Lives: Children, Women and Conflict in the Philippines,” p. 35; Spokeswoman for Karapatan,
July 24. 2008.
19
An IBON study criticized the AFP for not having directives in their field manuals or doctrines to help soldiers
differentiate combatants from non-combatants “Uncounted Lives: Children, Women and Conflict in the
Philippines,” p. 35.

267
 20
to get involved in the communist movement so that they do not get themselves caught in the danger.”
This leaves the AFP with the limited option of using information campaigns, a component of CMO, to
21
dissuade people from getting involved in the communist movement.”
Another difficulty regarding the use of CMO in de-linking the people from the communists is
competition. The communists have their own version of CMO, which has been instrumental in developing
their support base. In a study produced by IBON Foundation, a non-profit development organization, it was
revealed that women and children in certain communist-influenced zones, tended to favor the presence of
armed groups despite the chances of attracting the AFP into their communities. The reason not only stems
from perceptions that insurgents were far more disciplined and better behaved than the AFP, but because
the communists took action in showing their genuine concern for the plight of the impoverished people. For
instance, the CPP-NPA provided rudimentary medical services and livelihood assistance, helped vocalize
the grievances of the poor, and shared similar sentiments in fighting exploitive practices by powerful
22
businesses and landowners.
In contrast, the people view the AFP’s CMO as more self-serving than truly working for the
interests of the people. As one researcher noted that the fundamental problem with the AFP’s CMO is that it
23
is geared towards neutralizing the armed communist movement. As a result, the AFP’s CMO is
perceived to be more disruptive than helpful. In one such case, residents in a remote locality in Mindoro, a
traditional hotbed of armed communist activity, expressed distress over the AFP’s CMO activities. The
dialogue or consultation meetings that the AFP set up were endless. To make things worse, attendance was
taken. Relief goods were doled out but only under the condition that villagers submitted themselves to
interviews conducted by the AFP, upon which they were questioned about whether they had any affiliations
24
to the NPA. Other complaints that accompanied the AFP’s CMO projects were that the soldiers took food
25
from community, demanded shelter, and delegated work to civilians, such as manning sentry posts.
Such problems were more visible during the first term of President Arroyo (2001-2006) when
COIN operations were particularly intensive in communist strongholds and it highlighted many of the
issues that the AFP attempted to clear up with the institutionalization of CMO. These involved exercising
more sensitivity to civilians, improving discipline within the ranks, human rights awareness, and bringing
their own supplies into communities so as not to antagonize relations with the people. Nonetheless, as
recent as 2012, some problems were carried over. The AFP was still helping themselves to community
resources, especially in using public faculties. Even though the AFP maintains that it strictly prohibits

20
Lt. Col. Ferozaldo Paul T. Regencia, interview with author, AFP National Development Support Command,
Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City, Philippines, November 4, 2010. Hereafter cited Lt. Col.
Regencia.
21
Maj. Eugenio S. Batara, Asst Chief of Unified Command Staff for CMO, U7, Western Mindanao Command,
Camp Don Basilio Navarro, Calarian, Zamboanga City, October 3, 2007. Hereafter cited as Maj. Batara.
22
“Uncounted Lives: Children, Women and Conflict in the Philippines,” pp. 46-48.
23
Ibid., p. 47; Arnold Padilla, senior researcher, Reality of Aid/Ibon Foundations, interview with the author,
IBON office, Manila. Philippines, September 11, 2006.
24
Ibid., pp. 157; 159.
25
Ibid., pp. 157; 178;

268
soldiers from encamping in public spaces such as schools and barangays halls, it has been reported from
time to time, that adherence to this directive has been spotty. For instance, soldiers under the pretext of
conducting structural repairs of a school were using its facilities as barracks during their deployment in
26
remote barangays.
Despite attempts to deal with the challenges given in the previous paragraphs, the overall nature
of COIN alienates the population, since the military entry into a community is frequently associated with
trouble. This brings to light that CMO has to come hand in hand with the soldiers’ adherence to rules of
engagement, inclusive of human rights. Concurrently, it is also necessary for the government to
constructively deal with leftist opposition and their legitimate grievances, and not categorize them under
groups with extremist/revolutionary tendencies. Otherwise, under these circumstances, there are always
limitations imposed on the AFP in trying to shape people’s perceptions in the favor of the military and the
government.

8.3.2 Striking the Balance between Combat and Persuasive Measures

While the AFP has made efforts to make CMO an integral part of its COIN program by giving it
official recognition through institutionalization and increasing training modules for this particular operation,
it is still not without its opponents from military circles. In July 2012, an article titled “Militum Phasellus:
27
Developing an outlook of professionalism in the AFP” was published in The Air Force Way 2012, a
Philippine Air Force journal. In this un-authored article, a critical look is made on the current state of affairs
concerning the AFP’s approach to internal security. Without making any explicit references to President
Aquino’s Bayanihan strategy, an extension of former president, Arroyo’s COIN plan (Oplan Bantay Laya
II) that was designed to defeat insurgency with a stronger emphasis on CMO and development projects, it
laments this shift in operations has weakened the AFP’s “critical combat capabilities.” Resources that
should have gone into training and combat preparedness have been utilized to support the AFP’s secondary
function of supporting other government agencies. It states that soldiers now “perceive themselves as
policemen, relief workers, educators, builders, health care providers, politicians – everything but
war-fighters.” Tied into the problem of the military’s sub-standard combat abilities, the article also blames
that the very nature the COIN program inevitably places the AFP in civilian roles, largely due to the
28
inability of civilian agencies to perform their expected mandate.

26
Judy G. Quiros, “Troops not allowed to use public places as military camps?,” ZamboTimes, July 7, 2012.
Available at:
http://www.zambotimes.com/archives/49129-Troops-not-allowed-to-use-public-places-as-military-camps8207;.h
tml. Accessed July 19, 2012; Bede Sheppard, “Some things don’t mix,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 24, 2012.
Available at: http://opinion.inquirer.net/27467/some-things-don%e2%80%99t-mix. Accessed April 25, 2012;
27
Articles concerning this Air Force journal submission have not been able to find the literal translation of
“Militum Phasellus.”
28
Copies of “Militum Phasellus: Developing an outlook of professionalism in the AFP,” The Air Force Way
2012 were distributed at the 65th anniversary of the Air Force. As the original could not be retrieved, the
summary of contents extracted from the following newspaper articles: Mario J. Mallari, “Role shift upsetting
military combat power – PAF paper,” The Daily Tribune, July 10, 2012. Available at:
http://www.tribune.net.ph/index.php/headlines/item/1356-role-shift-upsetting-military-combat-power-%E2%80

269
 Detailed indices on the decline in combat capabilities were not offered in the article, but there are
several incidents that reveal the complexity of striking the balance between friendly persuasive measures
and combat. Soldiers conducting CMO in rural areas influenced by communists have been the frequent
targets of attacks by the NPA. It is possible that when soldiers are not in combat-mode, they are easier to
launch ambushes against. In March 2007, an army officer was killed in an encounter when the platoon he
29
was traveling in was attacked en route to a remote area in Negros Occidental to conduct CMO. In
October 2012, heavy fighting erupted in Compostela Valley (Mindanao) when the NPA fired upon a Peace
and Development Team (PDT) conducting a dialogue with villagers. As a result, 7 soldiers and 2 civilians
30
were wounded. In the same period, 4 more soldiers were killed in NPA attacks in Samar, when
31
conducting CMO activities.
In response to the attention the article received, the AFP headquarters strongly defended its role
in civilian functions, stating that it is within their mandate to serve people, which include helping the
government deliver basic services. Moreover, it was stated that when the soldiers are not involved in
combat, they should not “sit and remain idle” and that there is no better way for soldiers to make
32
themselves busy but by helping the people.
From what can be gathered from the article, it appears the bulk of criticism is directed towards
overburdening the AFP with developmental work. Once again, it brings to light the problems that CMO has
repeatedly faced in its long history. Even with institutionalization, the non-combat aspects of the operation
still make CMO contentious within the military. Its strong association with developmental work obscures
its more complex function in COIN and underlines the remaining challenges in propagating its function and
importance due to this mindset.

8.3.3 Translating the Effects of CMO into Strategic Success: the Peace Process
Another challenge in CMO-integrated military operations is making sure that it reverberates at
the strategic level. CMO ultimately has to be linked coherently with national policies. Achieving success in
an operational and tactical level can achieve some gains as a COIN measure, but it cannot be sustained

%94-paf-paper. Accessed July 15, 2012. Frances Mangosing, “‘Civilianization’ of military diminishing AFP
combat power,’ Inquirer.net, July 9, 2012, Available at:
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/226028/%E2%80%98civilianization%E2%80%99-of-military-diminishing-afp-comb
at-power-%E2%80%93-article. Accessed July 15, 2012.
29
Frances Mangosing, “Army Officer Killed in a Clash With NPA in Negros Occidental,” Inquirer Net, March 7,
2012. Available at:
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/157525/army-officer-killed-in-clash-with-npa-in-negros-occidental. Accessed March
9, 2012.
30
Al Jacinto, “Mindanao firefight leaves 11 casualties,” The Manila Times, October 23, 2012. Available at:
http://manilatimes.net/index.php/news/regions/33782-mindanao-firefight-leaves-11-casualties/ Accessed
November 19, 2012.
31
“4 soldiers killed, 2 hurt in NPA clash in Samar,”ABS-CBNnews, October 22, 2012. Available at:
http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/regions/10/22/12/4-soldiers-killed-2-hurt-npa-clash-samar. Accessed
November 19, 2012.
32
Mario J. Mallari, “AFP defends non-combat missions,” The Daily Tribune, July 11, 2012. Available at:
http://www.tribune.net.ph/index.php/nation/item/1367-afp-defends-no-combat-missions. Accessed: July 15,
2012.

270
indefinitely without proper backing by government initiatives, especially since a final resolution to the
conflict is difficult to achieve purely through military means. Achieving strategic defeat per se, involves
many factors such as the nation’s commitment for peace (inclusive of workable mechanisms for peace talks
and providing a political solution to those groups with legitimate grievances), improving governance, the
efficient delivery of government services to the disaffected people, and security sector reform.
Therefore, along with military operations, a mutually reinforcing peace process is needed to reach
a resolution with armed groups that have a legitimate cause. Concerning the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF), prospects are more positive with the signing of the Framework Agreement, which sets the stage for
the creation of a Bangsamoro region.
Nevertheless, the government still faces political and military obstacles in dealing with the
Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army. The CPP claims that they are operating on 100
guerrilla fronts, with plans to increase it to 180 by 2015. They have also expressed their determination to
raise their armed fighters to the 25,000 levels. At the moment, they also claim that their fighters have the
ability to move freely in 90 percent of the Philippines.33 The communist movement has dragged on for 44
years with no let up to the armed component of the struggle. While the integration of CMO in the
ground-level in campaign plans (especially during Lambat Bitag I and II and Oplan Bantay Laya II) has
reduced their numbers considerably, and recent arrests have been made of high-level NPA commanders
with the cooperation of civilians,34 political talks have stalemated. In December 2012, informal peace talks
were held in the Netherlands where both sides agreed to a 26-day nationwide Christmas ceasefire and
scheduled talks for peace, human rights, land reform, and national industrialization. Nonetheless, the main
sticking point appears to be that the government cannot give into the demands of the communist party,
which seeks a power-sharing arrangement with the government.35

8.4 Following Trends and Prospects for the Future

At the close of the investigation into CMO in 2010, it appeared that the military remained divided
over the long-term retention of CMO. On the one hand, some military officers expressed that CMO will
36
lose its relevancy once the internal security order is under control. On the other hand, other officers see
37
retention on a permanent basis where CMO expertise can be used in overseas peacekeeping operations.
On June 2010, Benigno Aquino III assumed presidency. President Aquino’s approach to internal
security problems did not depart far from his predecessor, where many of the concepts of integrating CMO

33
Artemio Dumlao, “CPP: NPA needs 25,000 fighters,” Philstar.com, December 25, 2012. Available at:
http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/regions/12/25/12/cpp-npa-needs-25000-fighters. Accessed January 8, 2013.
34
Alex Romero, “NPA leader nabbed in Negros Oriental,” The Philippine Star, December 25, 2012. Available
at: http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/regions/12/25/12/npa-leader-nabbed-negros-oriental/ Accessed January
8, 2013.
35
“Philippines rejects "coalition" with rebels,” Channel News Asia, December 22, 2012. Available at:
http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/1244077/1/.html. Accessed January 8, 2013.
36
Lt. Col. Jefferson S. Omandam, J7 office, interview with author, Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, Philippines,
July 25, 2008.
37
Lt. Col. Regenica, October 8, 2008.

271
with standard military operations remain in place. CMO still plays a role in shaping the battlespace through
winning hearts and minds of the people, gaining intelligence, and catalyzing development, in order to
38
achieve an end state of creating a physically and psychologically secure environment.
Nonetheless, to mark a difference with Arroyo, who sought to “make communities peaceful to
spur development,” and peace was seen as part of the intermediary process to achieve development, Aquino
has set his goals on achieving peace as the end-state, and the intermediary process to be measured through
developmental progress. The new internal security plan named Bayanihan (national or communal spirit)
has four key components:

1. Good governance
2. Delivery of basic services
3. Economic reconstruction and sustainable development
39
4. Security Sector Reform.

To put it another way, Aquino is trying to mark his difference from his predecessor, by shifting
from a COIN-oriented approach to one that places more emphasis on mobilizing soldiers for peace and
40
development activities. In the same year, Aquino assumed presidency, CMO evolved to guide soldiers in
multiple sectors (See table below).

38
Subramunya Das.“Revisiting the Code Team Concept,” Army Troopers Magazine, March 2011, p.27.
39
Lt. Col. Regencia, November 4, 2010; Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Internal Peace
and Security Plan: Bayanihan, Quezon City: Armed Forces of the Philippines, 2010
40
Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Internal Peace and Security Plan: Bayanihan, Quezon
City: Armed Forces of the Philippines, 2010, p. 24.

272
Table 8.2: Whole Mission Approach – 6 Lines of Operations

Combat 20 % Civil Military Operations 80 %

Military CMO to CMO to promote CMO to CMO for CMO for

operations to facilitate socio-economic promote cultural sustainable prompt delivery
promote peace good well-being. cohesiveness environment of truthful
and order. governance and harmony information

Military Political Socio-Economic Cultural Environm

mental Informational

Misapplication of -Poor -Poverty -Lack of cultural -Dwindling -Ignorance

force results in governance -Lack of education cohesion and Resources -Misinformation

collateral -Corruption -No delivery harmony -Poor waste -Disinformation

damage, -Absence of rule of basic services -Cultural management

displaced of law responsibility
civilians, abuses, -Ethnocentrism
and HR

violations.

Source: Reproduced from briefings made by Col. Mitra concerning the “Western Mindanao Campaign
Design”, October 27, 2010.

The dimensions are numerous, demanding multiple roles from the soldier. It was stated in a press
release that General Dolorfino wanted the AFP soldier to not only have skills in soldierly, but also “bridge
leadership, facilitate good governance and socio-economic development,” and assume roles as “conflict
41
manager, environmentalist and information specialist.” At the same time, it can also be discerned that
these efforts would be conducted in close collaboration with other civilian agencies. CMO would be
expanded to establish stronger collaborations with the local government units and other civilian agencies, in
42
an act to involve all stakeholders in achieving peace.
The shift is open to several possible interpretations in the direction that CMO is headed. The first
is that it may be a factor in the AFP’s transformation. Under the new administration of Aquino, the
Philippine Army unveiled the Army Transformation Roadmap (ATR) that sets the strategic direction for the
41
Apipa P. Bagumbaran, “Military pursues peace building efforts, says WESMINCOM commander,” PIA Press
Release, July 22, 2010. Available at: http://www.pia.gov.ph/?m=12&fi=p100722.htm&no=66. Accessed August
29, 2010.
42
Major General Ben Mohammad Doloifino, interview conducted by Bong Garcia in place of author, response
to questions e-mailed to author on August 20, 2009.

273
next 18 years. Instead of using the wording such as “the strategic defeat of insurgencies,” it uses slogans
such as “winning the peace through economic development” underlining that the Army plans to transform
43
with peacebuilding and peace-keeping at its core. In regards to its implications for the rest of the AFP,
CMO is seen for its potential in allowing the military to contribute in the regional and/or international
44
context, thus, paving way for its relevancy in international missions.
Having said that, a more realistic take on the trend leads to a second possible interpretation. With
the easing of internal security threats, the AFP is ready to wean itself from its responsibilities in internal
security operations, and move towards building its conventional capabilities. This has long been an elusive
goal for the AFP, especially since it has always been occupied with the protracted internal security
problems. In 2012, Chinese marine surveillance ships entered the waters around a disputed South China
Sea shoal, ringing alarm bells for the Philippines. At the end of December 2012, the president signed into
law a revised modernization act to help upgrade the capabilities of the military to defend the nation from
45
external threats.
Based on these events, it is more likely that defense priorities related to external contingencies
will outweigh AFP ideals to transform into a military with CMO playing a significant role. Some evidence
pointing to this trend has been discovered in the AFP’s attempts to reduce their overall internal security
obligations. For instance, the developmental work is gradually been transferred to military reservists and
militia. On May 2012, the AFP created the 1st Territorial Battalion which is composed of regular troops
from the Army’s 24th Infantry Battalion (IB), Army reservists and members of the civilian armed auxiliary
(CAA) in Zambales, known to be a former communist stronghold. The main purpose of this battalion is to
bolster personnel for Aquino’s Internal Peace and Security Plan (NISP) and actively engage reservists and
CAA in stabilized communities to prevent the re-infiltration of communists. As part of its operations, the
46
reservists and the CAA are tasked to conduct CMO activities. Such movements in this direction reveal
that the military is reducing the socio-economic aspect of their operations to military-trained personnel, so
that soldiers can concentrate on the security component of the operations.
Another telltale sign that the AFP was ready to unload its civilian-like responsibilities came with
the decision to deactivate National Development Support Command (NADESOM), even though the
command had aspirations to transform their command into a regional force, capable of conducting
47
international missions by the end of 2020 (see appendix G for the original roadmap). With its

43
Ben Cal, “Philippine Army Unveils Transformation Roadmap,” Zamboanga Today Online, January 25, 2012.
Available at:
http://www.zamboangatoday.ph/index.php/inside-stories/8275-philippine-army-unveils-transformation-roadmap.
html. Accessed January 8, 2013.
44
Lt. Col. Regencia, November 4, 2010.
45
Republic Act (RA) 10349. “Aquino signs into law AFP Modernization Act,” SunStar, December 11, 2012.
Available at:
http://www.sunstar.com.ph/breaking-news/2012/12/11/aquino-signs-law-afp-modernization-act-257793.
Accessed January 1, 2013.
46
“AFP Launches 1st Territorial Division,” The Daily Tribune, May 7, 2012. Available at
http://www.tribuneonline.org/nation/20120507nat3.html. Accessed May 12, 2012.
47
Lt. Col. Regencia, November 4, 2010.

274
deactivation, the existing engineering units were transferred back to the Army Chief of Engineers and the
remaining community development functions were transferred to the Office of the Presidential Adviser on
the Peace Process (OPAPP), a government office in charge of the peace process.
While no clear explanations were given to this sudden disbandment other than statements to the
48
effect that the AFP was trimming costs in low-priority areas, it also coincides with the timing of a
renewed emphasis at the AFP’s modernization program. The most likely explanation is that one, the AFP
and the government sees the threat levels are under control, and two, this was an opportune time for the
AFP to boost their conventional capabilities.

8.5 Remaining Issues and Recommendations for Further Research

This section will go into elaborating some issues in regards to this research and provide it with
recommendations for further study. While it was hoped to shed more light on its obscure orientation and
trace its evolvement in Philippine history, more work could have been done on detailing other factors that
can boost the effects of CMO. Resolving a conflict does not exclusively belong to the remit of the military
and this begs the question, how such operations can be integrated within the whole government approach. .
Another challenge was measuring the effects of CMO. Outside of directly linking CMO
outcomes with the reduction of enemy strength and their presence in communities, it is difficult to quantify
the impact CMO has had on helping the military reach its objectives. Moreover, it is difficult to measure
whether people’s change in perceptions towards the military translates into military success. Even though
attempts were made through interviews with CMO beneficiaries, for a more comprehensive understanding,
expanded population samples, reflecting a better cross-section of Filipino society in various conflict areas
and in conjunction with other statistics (unemployment rates, number of surrenderees, poverty incidence,
rate of development, number of unlicensed firearms, rate of convictions towards errant members of the
government forces, human rights violations, number of rebel surrenderees, etc.) is needed.
Another drawback to the research was that, findings from the Western Mindanao Command could
not be directly transplanted to other areas in the country. This is because each area command faces a
different set of threat dynamics and socio-economic, cultural, historical, and political factors that have
fueled unrest.
With these drawbacks to the research in mind, for those researchers and military practitioners
having interest in the subject the following can be recommended. This research was largely confined to the
study of CMO within the context of counterinsurgency, but it can be enlarged or shifted to peace studies.
The timing is appropriate also because the Philippine Army have articulated their aspirations to transform
themselves into “Peace Builders” in their ARMY Transformation Roadmap 2010. Here, a different set of
dynamics come into play where the focus shifts from a strongly military-oriented approach to one that

48
Alexis Romero, “Military abolishes development arm,” PhilStar, May 4, 2012. Available at:
http://www.philstar.com/metro/803028/military-abolishes-development-arm. Accessed January 8, 2013. It was
also stated in the article that President Aquino could have wanted to disassociate his internal security plan with
those of his predecessor.

275
involves the entire nation’s efforts to reform the security sector and deal with the threat comprehensively.
Another recommendation is applying a “design” methodology that can help commanders to
identify and frame complex variables emerging from cultural, historical, religious, and political aspects of
49
insurgencies, thereby allowing the military to design and plan for military missions more effectively.
And finally, conducting comparative studies can enlarge the study. For instance, Thailand and
Indonesia also have a wealth of experiences in activities that are related to CMO. They share some
resemblances, especially since they are directed towards their own internal security problems. Nonetheless,
their version of such operations is also shaped by their military tradition and unique circumstances.
Therefore, a comparison can place CMO within the broader concept of the regional studies.

8.6 Concluding Remarks

As views for retaining CMO remain divided, the issue over CMO’s relevancy in military
operations comes to light once again. Unarguably, CMO needs to be dynamic and evolve to meet different
security needs and to match the different phases in a conflict. With prospects of peace, especially towards
the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), it is natural that CMO shifts from its utility in COIN warfare
and be included in peacebuilding, especially in regards to this front. Still, it appears that with the military
assuming too many roles outside of its core capabilities, it has the negative effect of distracting the military
from its main focus of defense. At the same time, the military has also made clear its intentions to
modernize by placing more focus on building conventional capabilities. As history has shown repeatedly,
once internal security problems were considered to be under control, CMO was the first to be downgraded,
leaving little room to instill further intellectual rigor. While this would be not a problem if the internal
security problems cease to be a threat, it does not appear likely that a final resolution to the protracted
nature of the communist front and the continuing existence of other Muslim groups that do not identify
with the MILF, will come anytime soon. Therefore, it is hoped that the institutionalization of CMO has left
a mark in allowing the AFP to recognize the importance of preserving and enhancing its operational rigor,
so that CMO can be called upon and used effectively in times of contingencies.

49
For details about the design concept see Dan McCauley, “Design and Joint Operation Planning,” Canadian
Military Journal, Vol. 12, No.1, Winter 2011.

276
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[389] “Mixed Reaction to AFP ‘human offensive.” The PCIJ Blog. August 28, 2007. Available at:
http://www.pcij.org/blog/?p=1919.
[390] Montilla, Elmo C. “18 Former Rebels get OPAPP-SIP Immediate Assistance.” Philippine
Information Agency, September 19, 2008. Available
at:http://www.pia.gov.ph/?m=12&fi=p080919.htm&no=52.
[391] “New Structure of the AFP Organization” from the Armed Forces Philippines official website.
Available at: http://www.afp.mil.ph/archives/afp_org.htm.
[392] Oliveros, Benjie. “Oplan Bantay Laya as Arroyo’s Inhumane War.” Bulatlat, Vol. VI, No. 20, June 25
– July 1, 2006. Available online at: http://www.bulatlat.com/news/6-20/6-20-obl.htm.
[393] “Only 4 guerilla fronts remain in East Visayas, 8th ID chief says.” Philippine Information Agency,
June 18, 2009. Available at : http://www.samarnews.com/news2009/jun/f2265.htm.

293
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2004. Available at: http://www.philstar.com/philstar/NEWS200406280405.htm.
[395] Pazzibugan, Dona. “AFP says CPP armed strength down to 4,700 fighters.” Philippine Daily Inquirer,
December 27, 2010. Available at:
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view/20101227-311107/AFP-says-CPP-arm
ed-strength-down-to-4700-fighters.
[396] Petit, Brian (LTC). “OEF Philippines: Thinking COIN, Practicing FID.” 11-34--Irregular Warfare-A
SOF Perspective Newsletter, June 2011. Available at:
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/docs/11-34/.
[397] “Philippine Forces Capture Abu Sayyaf Militant Suspected of Beheading Marines.” International
Herald Tribune, January 21, 2008.
[398] “Philippines: Government, Muslim rebels move closer to peace deal.” IRIN, Humanitarian News and
Analysis, May 8, 2012. Available at:
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ce-deal/.
[399] “Philippine Military Put Up P1-M bounty for MNLF Commander Ustadz Habier Malik in Sulu.”
AJLPP-USA, April 18, 2007. Available at:
http://www.indybay.org/newsitems/2007/04/18/18401079.php.
[400] “Philippine Military sets up anti-terrorism text campaign.” Business Online, October 5, 2009.
Available at: http://www.textually.org/textually/archives/2009/10/024660.htm.
[401] “Philippines rejects "coalition" with rebels.” Channel News Asia, December 22, 2012. Available at:
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[402] “Protest permanent presence of US Military forces in the Philippines—CPP,” Communist Party of
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[403] Quiros, Judy G. “Troops not allowed to use public places as military camps?” ZamboTimes, July 7,
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[404] “Ransom, politics embolden Philippine kidnappers.” Xinhua, February 8, 2009. Available at:
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[405] Romero, Alexis. “AFP: Abu Sayyaf losing strength.” The Philippine Star, September 20, 2011.
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[408] Rosca, Ninotchka. “Rape case exposes U.S. dominion of Philippine government.” Socialism and
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[409] Ruiz, Jay. “APF belies CPP-NPA’s claim of 16,000 armed rebles.”ABS-CBN News, December 26,
2011. Available at:
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[410] “Salaam Police Center and Counter-Radicalization Aspects.” Police Regional Office 9 official
website. Available at:
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[411] Santolan, Joseph. “Corazon Conjuangco Aquino, 1933-2009.” Part 2. International Committee of
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[412] Scarpello, Fabio.“US, Philippine rethink anti-terror tactics.” Asia Times, July 19, 2010. Available at:
http://atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/LF19Ae01.html.
[413] Shanker, Tom. “U.S. Military to Stay in Philippines.” The New York Times, August 20, 2009.
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294
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http://opinion.inquirer.net/27467/some-things-don%e2%80%99t-mix.
[415] Simbajon, Bhong. “MILF establishes camp in Limpapa.” ZamboTimes, July 24, 2008. Available at:
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[416] Tupas, Jeffrey M. and Zonio, Aquiles Z. “Gov’t troops take over “mansion” of top MILF leader.”
PDI Mindanao, February 17, 2003. Reprinted in AFP website:
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html/.
[417] Usmann, Edd K. “ATS no longer exists?” The Manila Bulletin, November 8, 2011. Available at:
http://www.mb.com.ph/articles/340568/ats-no-longer-exists-milf.
[418] “US military to implement civic projects in Jolo.” INQ7.net, April 12, 2005. Available at
http://news.inq7.net/breaking/index.php?index=2&story_id=33467.
[419] “USNS Mercy Arrives in Southern Philippines.” The Mindanao Examiner. May 26, 2006. Available
at: http://zamboangajournal.blogspot.jp/2006/05/usns-mercy-arrives-in-southern.html.
[420] Vargas, Anthony. “RP, US troops to train in Central Mindanao.” ABS-CBN News, July 20, 2006.
Available at: http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/storypage.aspx?StoryId=44884.
[421] Wee, Darwin Wally. “AFP forsaking guns increasingly for the bow and arrow of peace-making.”
PeaceWorks, Vol. VI No. 11, December 2007.
[422] “What the future holds for Bangsamoro.” Agora Business Intelligence, October 25, 2012. Available
at: http://www.agora.ph/country.php?id=795.
[423] “Zamboanga City to Resist Inclusion of 8 villages to Muslim Ancestral Domain.” The Mindanao
Examiner. August 6, 2008. Available at:
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[424] “3 dead, 27 injured in Zamboanga City explosion.” ABS CBN News, November 28, 2012. Available
at http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/regions/11/27/11/23-injured-zamboanga-city-explosion.
[425] “4 soldiers killed, 2 hurt in NPA clash in Samar.”ABS-CBNnews, October 22, 2012. Available at:
http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/regions/10/22/12/4-soldiers-killed-2-hurt-npa-clash-samar.
[426] “5 years under Arroyo: A New Dictator Arises.” Davao Today, July 24, 2006. Available at:
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[427] “6 die, 20 hurt in ambush, blast.” SunStar, July 11, 2012. Available at:
http://www.sunstar.com.ph/zamboanga/local-news/2012/07/11/.
[428] “2008 Internal Security Operations Successful; AFP is on Track.” Public Affairs Office, AFP website.
Available at: http://www.afp.mil.ph/index.php?start=530.

Laws and Decrees

[429] Administrative Order No. 169, S. 2007. “Amending the Implementing Guidelines, Rules and
Regulations of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Modernization Program.” Available at:
http://www.gov.ph/2007/01/30/administrative-order-no-169-s-2007/.
[430] Affadavit. Mary Nancy P. Gadian, affidavit, August 26, 2009. Available at:
http://ja.scribd.com/doc/40149967/Nancy-Gadian-Affidavit.
[431] Commonwealth Act no.1 or National Defense Act, 1936. Available at:
http://www.chanrobles.com/commonwealthacts/commonwealthactno1.html.
[432] Executive Order. No. 21, S-2001, Creating a Coordinative and Integrative System in Internal
Security. Available at:
http://www.chanrobles.com/executiveorders/2001/executiveorderno21-2001.html/.
[433] Executive Order No. 34, September 17, 2001, “Reconstituting the National Security Council and for
Other purposes.” Available at:
http://www.chanrobles.com/executiveorders/2001/executiveorderno34-2001.html#.UQDlh_LAFI
t.
[434] Executive Order No. 739, August 19, 2008, “Reorganizing the Peace and Order Council.” Available
at:
http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/index10.php?doctype=Executive%20Orders&docid=1226970149
1409813034.
[435] Executive Order No. 773, January 5, 2009, “Further Reorganizing the Peace and Order Council.”
Available at: http://www.lawphil.net/executive/execord/eo2009/eo_773_2009.html.

295
[436] Philippine Defense Reform (PDR). Available at:
http://www.dnd.gov.ph/DNDWEBPAGE_files/html/pdrpage.htm.
[437] Republic Act No. 1700 “Anti-Subversion” 1957. Available online at
http://www.chanrobles.com/republicactno1700.htm#.UICDyGdEXKQ.
[438] Republic Act No. 6975 “An Act Establishing the Philippine National Police under a reorganized
Department of the Interior and Local Government and Other Purposes as amended by RA 8551.
[439] Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998 and further amended by RA
9708.
[440] Republic Act No. 7898 “AFP Modernization Act.” Available at:
http://www.gppb.gov.ph/laws/RA_7898.pdf.

Agreements

[441] Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement
On Peace of 2001. Available at:
http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/%28httpDocuments%29/5487E98B6
2DA0FD1C125756700307D5D/$file/Memorandum+of+Ancestral+Domain+-+August+2008.pdf
.

296
 Appendix A

Coup Attempts 1986-1987

Coup Attempt Members Objectives Grievances Concessions
㼀㼔㼑㻌㻹㼍㼚㼕㼘㼍㻌㻴㼛㼠㼑㼘㻌㻵㼚㼏㼕㼐㼑㼚㼠㻌 㻌 㻭㻲㻼㻌㻹㼍㼞㼏㼛㼟㻌㻸㼛㼥㼍㼘㼕㼟㼠㼟㻌 㻾㼑㼕㼚㼟㼠㼍㼘㼘㻌㻹㼍㼞㼏㼛㼟㻌㼍㼟㻌 㻝㻚㻌㻴㼡㼙㼍㼚㻌㻾㼕㼓㼔㼠㼟㻌㻼㼞㼛㼎㼑㻌 㻝㻚㻼㼍㼥㻌㼞㼍㼕㼟㼑㻌㼒㼛㼞㻌㼙㼕㼘㼕㼠㼍㼞㼥㻌

㻶㼡㼘㼥㻌㻢㻘㻌㻝㻥㻤㻢㻌 㻌㻌 㻼㼞㼑㼟㼕㼐㼑㼚㼠㻌㼣㼕㼠㼔㻌㻭㼞㼠㼡㼞㼛㻌 㻞㻚㻌㻵㼚㼏㼘㼡㼟㼕㼛㼚㻌㼛㼒㻌㼘㼑㼒㼠㻙㼘㼑㼍㼚㼕㼚㼓㻌 㻞㻚㻼㼞㼛㼙㼛㼠㼕㼛㼚㼟㻌

㻌㻌 㻌㻌 㼀㼛㼘㼑㼚㼠㼕㼚㼛㻌㼍㼟㻌㼕㼚㼠㼑㼞㼕㼙㻌 㻌 㼙㼑㼙㼎㼑㼞㼟㻌㼕㼚㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼏㼍㼎㼕㼚㼑㼠㻌 㻟㻚㻼㼍㼥㻌㼞㼍㼕㼟㼑㻌㼒㼛㼞㻌㼙㼕㼘㼕㼠㼍㼞㼥㻌

㻌㻌 㻌㻌 㼘㼑㼍㼐㼑㼞㻌 㻟㻚㻌㻯㼑㼍㼟㼑㼒㼕㼞㼑㻛㻺㼑㼓㼛㼠㼕㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㼟㻌 㻌 㻠㻚㻼㼞㼛㼙㼛㼠㼕㼛㼚㼟㻌

㻌㻌 㻌㻌 㻌㻌 㼣㼕㼠㼔㻌㻯㻼㻼㻙㻺㻼㻭㻌 㻌㻌

㻳㼛㼐㻌㻿㼍㼢㼑㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㻽㼡㼑㼑㼚㻌 㻌 㻶㼡㼍㼚㻌㻼㼛㼚㼏㼑㻌㻱㼚㼞㼕㼘㼑㻘㻌 㻌 㼀㼛㻌㼞㼑㼐㼡㼏㼑㻌㻭㼝㼡㼕㼚㼛㻓㼟㻌 㻌 㼀㼔㼑㻌㼓㼛㼢㼑㼞㼚㼙㼑㼚㼠㻓㼟㻌㼟㼛㼒㼠㻌 㻌 㻭㼝㼡㼕㼚㼛㻌㼒㼕㼞㼑㼟㻌㻱㼚㼞㼕㼘㼑㻌

㻺㼛㼢㼑㼙㼎㼑㼞㻌㻞㻞㻙㻞㻟㻘㻌㻝㻥㻤㻢㻌 㼠㼔㼑㻌㻰㼑㼒㼑㼚㼟㼑㻌㻹㼕㼚㼕㼟㼠㼑㼞㻌 㻌 㼜㼛㼟㼕㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌㼠㼛㻌㼍㻌㼚㼛㼙㼕㼚㼍㼘㻌 㻌 㼜㼛㼟㼕㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌㼛㼚㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌 㼎㼡㼠㻌㼍㼘㼟㼛㻌㼞㼑㼙㼛㼢㼑㼟㻌㼠㼣㼛㻌

㻌㻌 㼍㼚㼐㻌㻾㻭㻹㻘㻌㼘㼑㼐㻌㼎㼥㻌 㼔㼑㼍㼐㻌㼣㼔㼕㼘㼑㻌㼙㼕㼘㼕㼠㼍㼞㼥㻌 㼏㼛㼙㼙㼡㼚㼕㼟㼠㼟㻌 㼘㼑㼒㼠㼕㼟㼠㻌㼙㼑㼙㼎㼑㼞㼟㻌㼕㼚㻌 㻌

㻌㻌 㻯㼛㼘㻚㻌㻳㼞㼑㼓㼛㼞㼕㼛㻌 㼠㼍㼗㼑㼟㻌㼒㼡㼘㼘㻌㼏㼛㼚㼠㼞㼛㼘㻌 㻌㻌 㼔㼑㼞㻌㼏㼍㼎㼕㼚㼑㼠㻌

㻯㼔㼍㼚㼚㼑㼘㻌㻣㻌㼀㼂㻌 㻌 㻴㼛㼚㼍㼟㼍㼚㻘㻌㻾㻭㻹㻘㻌㼍㼚㼐㻌 㻌 㻳㼛㼢㼑㼞㼚㼙㼑㼚㼠㻌㼠㼍㼗㼑㼛㼢㼑㼞㻌 㻝㻚㻸㼑㼒㼠㼕㼟㼠㼟㻌㼟㼠㼕㼘㼘㻌㼞㼑㼙㼍㼕㼚㼕㼚㼓㻌 㻌 㻯㼑㼍㼟㼑㼒㼕㼞㼑㻌㼑㼚㼐㼟㻌

㻿㼠㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌㻵㼚㼏㼕㼐㼑㼚㼠㻌 㻹㼍㼞㼏㼛㼟㻌㼘㼛㼥㼍㼘㼕㼟㼠㼟㻌 㻌㻌 㼣㼕㼠㼔㼕㼚㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼓㼛㼢㼑㼞㼚㼑㼚㼠㻌 㼣㼕㼠㼔㻌㻺㻼㻭㻌㼍㼚㼐㻌㼒㼕㼓㼠㼕㼚㼓㻌

㼛㼞㻌㻳㻹㻭㻙㻣㻌㻵㼚㼏㼕㼐㼑㼚㼠㻌 㻌㻌 㻌㻌 㻞㻚㻌㻭㼝㼡㼕㼚㼛㻌㼕㼓㼚㼛㼞㼕㼚㼓㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌 㻌 㼞㼑㼟㼡㼙㼑㼟㻚㻌

㻶㼍㼚㼡㼍㼞㼥㻌㻞㻣㻘㻌㻝㻥㻤㻣㻌 㻌㻌 㻌㻌 㼍㼐㼢㼕㼏㼑㻌㼛㼒㻌㼙㼕㼘㼕㼠㼍㼞㼥㻌㼛㼢㼑㼞㻌 㻌㻌

㻌㻌 㻌㻌 㻌㻌 㼓㼛㼢㼑㼞㼚㼙㼑㼚㼠㻌㼍㼒㼒㼍㼕㼞㼟㻌 㻌㻌

㻮㼘㼍㼏㼗㻌㻿㼍㼠㼡㼞㼐㼍㼥㻌㻵㼚㼏㼕㼐㼑㼚㼠㻌 㻭㼞㼙㼥㻌㼞㼑㼎㼑㼘㼟㻌㼘㼑㼐㻌㼎㼥㻌㻯㼛㼘㻚㻌 㼀㼛㻌㼒㼞㼑㼑㻌㼞㼑㼎㼑㼘㼟㻌 㻌 㻳㼛㼢㼑㼞㼚㼙㼑㼚㼠㻓㼟㻌㼜㼛㼛㼞㻌 㻌 㻝㻚㻝㻡㻌㼜㼑㼞㻌㼏㼑㼚㼠㻌㼜㼍㼥㻌㼞㼍㼕㼟㼑㻌

㻭㼜㼞㼕㼘㻌㻝㻤㻘㻌㻝㻥㻤㻣㻌 㻌 㻯㼍㼎㼍㼡㼍㼠㼍㼚㻌 㼐㼑㼠㼍㼕㼚㼑㼐㻌㼕㼚㻌㼜㼞㼑㼢㼕㼛㼡㼟㻌 㼜㼑㼞㼒㼛㼞㼙㼍㼚㼏㼑㻌㼕㼚㻌㼟㼑㼏㼠㼛㼞㼟㻌㼟㼡㼏㼔㻌 㻞㻚㻼㼞㼛㼙㼛㼠㼕㼛㼚㼟㻌

㻌㻌 㻌㻌 㼏㼛㼡㼜㻌 㼍㼟㻌㼑㼏㼛㼚㼛㼙㼥㻌㼍㼚㼐㻌㼟㼑㼏㼡㼞㼕㼠㼥㻌 㻌㻌

㻹㻵㻭㻌㼀㼍㼗㼑㼛㼢㼑㼞㻌㻼㼘㼛㼠㻌 㻼㼘㼛㼠㻌㼘㼕㼚㼗㼑㼐㻌㼠㼛㻌㻱㼚㼞㼕㼘㼑㻌 㼀㼛㻌㼞㼑㼕㼚㼟㼠㼍㼘㼘㻌㻹㼍㼞㼏㼛㼟㻌㼍㼟㻌 㻌 㻌㻌 㻌㻌

㻶㼡㼘㼥㻌㻝㻥㻤㻣㻌 㼍㼚㼐㻌㻹㼍㼞㼏㼛㼟㻌㼘㼛㼥㼍㼘㼕㼟㼠㼟㻌 㻼㼞㼑㼟㼕㼐㼑㼚㼠㻌 㻌㻌 㻌㻌

㻌㻌 㻌㻌 㻌㻌 㻌㻌 㻌㻌

㻭㼡㼓㼡㼟㼠㻌㻯㼛㼡㼜㻌 㻸㼑㼐㻌㼎㼥㻌㻯㼛㼘㻚㻌㻳㼞㼑㼓㼛㼞㼕㼛㻌 㼀㼛㻌㼛㼢㼑㼞㼠㼔㼞㼛㼣㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌 㻌㻌 㻝㻚㻌㻢㻜㻌㼜㼑㼞㻌㼏㼑㼚㼠㻌㼜㼍㼥㻌㼞㼍㼕㼟㼑㻌

㻭㼡㼓㼡㼟㼠㻌㻞㻤㻘㻌㻝㻥㻤㻣㻌 㻴㼛㼚㼍㼟㼍㼚㻌㼍㼚㼐㻌㼔㼕㼟㻌㻾㻭㻹㻌 㻭㼝㼡㼕㼚㼛㻌㻳㼛㼢㼑㼞㼚㼙㼑㼚㼠㻌 㻌㻌 㻞㻚㻌㻾㼑㼟㼔㼡㼒㼒㼘㼑㼟㻌㼏㼍㼎㼕㼚㼑㼠㻌

㻌㻌 㼛㼒㼒㼕㼏㼑㼞㼟㻌 㻌㻌 㻌㻌 㻟㻚㻌㻾㼑㼢㼕㼢㼑㼟㻌㼙㼕㼘㼕㼠㼕㼍㻌

㻌㻌 㻌㻌 㻌㻌 㻌㻌 㻠㻚㻌㻱㼚㼐㼟㻌㻺㼑㼓㼛㼠㼕㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌㼣㼕㼠㼔㻌

㻌㻌 㻌㻌 㻌㻌 㻌㻌 㻯㻼㻼㻙㻺㻼㻭㻚㻌

㻌㻌 㻌㻌 㻌㻌 㻌㻌 㻌㻡㻚㻌㼁㼚㼢㼑㼕㼘㼕㼚㼓㻌㼛㼒㻌㻸㼍㼙㼎㼍㼠㻌㻮㼕㼠㼍㼓㻌

㻰㼑㼏㼑㼙㼎㼑㼞㻌㻝㻥㻤㻥㻌 㻌 㻸㼑㼐㻌㻮㼥㻌㻯㼛㼘㻌㻳㼞㼑㼓㼛㼞㼕㼛㻌 㻳㼛㼢㼑㼞㼚㼙㼑㼚㼠㻌㼠㼍㼗㼑㼛㼢㼑㼞㻌 㻵㼚㼍㼐㼑㼝㼡㼍㼏㼕㼑㼟㻌㼛㼒㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌 㻌 㻝㻚㻯㼛㼙㼙㼕㼟㼕㼛㼚㻌㼠㼛㻌㼕㼚㼢㼑㼟㼠㼕㼓㼍㼠㼑㻌 㻌

㻯㼛㼡㼜㻌㻭㼠㼠㼑㼙㼜㼠㻌 㻴㼛㼚㼍㼟㼍㼚㻌㼍㼚㼐㻌㻾㻭㻹㻌 㻌 㻌㻌 㼓㼛㼢㼑㼞㼚㼙㼑㼚㼠㻌㼕㼚㻌㼍㼐㼐㼞㼑㼟㼟㼕㼚㼓㻌 㼏㼍㼡㼟㼑㼟㻌㼛㼒㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼏㼛㼡㼜㻌 㻌

㻺㼛㼢㼑㼙㼑㼎㼞㻌㻞㻥㻌㼠㼛㻌 㼛㼒㼒㼕㼏㼑㼞㼟㻛㻹㼍㼞㼏㼛㻌 㻌 㻌㻌 㼟㼛㼏㼕㼛㻙㼑㼏㼛㼚㼛㼙㼕㼏㻌 㻌

㻰㼑㼏㼑㼙㼑㼎㼞㻌㻣㻘㻌㻝㻥㻤㻥㻌 㼘㼛㼥㼍㼘㼕㼟㼠㼟㻌 㻌㻌 㼕㼟㼟㼡㼑㼟㻌㼛㼒㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼚㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌 㻌

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 Appendix B

Sample of a Task Unit Disposition in Campaigns of “Gradual Constriction.”

Phase One: AFP mobile infantry units (Special Operations Teams) are deployed to the
perimeter of the CPP-NPA area of influence (guerrilla zone). Advances are made only when
barangays are cleared of the enemy and their political infrastructure is removed.

Phase Two: The advance is made to the base area after clearing the perimeter. It should be

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noted that it is not a “continuous advance” since units move back and forth, ensuring the
outer rings remain consolidated, while the advance is made in a series of waves.
Consolidation involves CMO and intelligence units to establish friendly relations with the
people, and setting up counter-organizations and barangays-level intelligence networks.

Phase three: The center of the CPP-NPA rebel bases is concentrated in mountainous areas.

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Once the AFP mobile units reach the center, the enemy forces are “constricted” or denied of
maneuver room. Enemy units are believed to be concentrated here, making it easier for the
AFP to deliver a decisive blow.

Glossary

RES STRIKE COY Reserve Strike Company

SOT Special Operations Teams

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BN Battalion

Guerrilla Base Area: The most consolidated and stable area in the guerrilla front.
Guerrilla Zone: The less consolidated area of the guerrilla front. While infiltration has begun, capability to
influence people is still weak.

Source: Victor Corpus, Silent War, Quezon City: VNC Enterprises, 1989, pp. 169-175. Re-production of
images done by Chun-Hui Yu.

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 Appendix C

Military Units in the Philippine Army

Team (TM) 7 to 11 soldiers

Platoon (PLTN) 3 to 4 teams consisting of approximately 30 soldiers

Company (COY) 3 to 4 platoons consisting of approximately 100 soldiers

Battalion (BN) 4 or 5 companies consisting of soldiers between 400 and 600 men

Brigade (BDE) 3 battalions consisting of approximately 2,000 soldiers

Division 3 to 4 brigades consisting of approximately 6,000 soldiers.

Source: Criselda Yabes, The Boys from the Barracks: The Philippine Military After Edsa, updated version,
Pasig City: Anvil Publishing, Inc., 1991, 2009, p. 275

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 APPENDIX D

THE CMO AREA STUDY

I. History
a. Legend – Study the local legend and beliefs which have been handed down from
general to generation in the community. Identify heroes and significant events in
the legend. This is useful in understanding the local cultures’ themes and symbols.
b. Actual – Study the actual historical background of the community. This can be
found in official government records and interviews with elders or knowledgeable
people. Note prominent character and events which can be useful in understanding
as what the community is about today.

II. Geography
a. Topography – the physical feature for the area include:
1. Features – location, shape, size, of area
2. Physical Layout – residential, commercial, industrial areas
3. Relief – mountains, lowlands, valley
4. Drainages- swamps, rivers, lakes
5. Vegetation – forested area, barren and agriculture land
6. Coasts and beaches
7. Soil
b. Weather – season, temperature, ranges, rainfall.

III. Security and Law Enforcement Situation

a. Friendly Forces
1. Location and disposition of troops
2. Size of force
3. Profile of commanders, staff and troops
4. Type of unit (Philippines Army, Philippines Navy, Philippine Air Force,
Philippine National Police)
5. Areas of Responsibility
6. Activities/missions of units
7. Discipline and morale of troops
8. Weapons and equipments
9. Strength and weakness
b. Enemy Forces

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 1. Location and disposition
2. Profile of commanders staff and troops
3. Areas of responsibility
4. Type of unit
5. Tactical and propaganda activities
6. Source of financial and material support
7. Discipline and morale of troops
8. Weapons and equipment
9. Strength and weakness
c. Law Enforcement and Justice
1. Location and disposition of police units
2. Profile of police commanders, staff and police
3. “Tanod Bayan” groups (village guards)
4. Police activities/programs
5. Crime situation
a. Illegal drugs/drug addiction
b. Terrorism
c. Kidnapping
d. Other crimes
e. Gangs and groups
6. Profile of judicial personalities
a. Judges
b. Lawyers
c. Prosecutors
d. Clerks
7. Local courts
8. Prisons
9. Law enforcement strength and weaknesses
10. Problems concerning justice/judicial system

IV. Religious Factors

a. Different religions in the area
b. Religious organizations
c. Profile of people in each religion/organization
d. Beliefs and differences among religions
e. Churches and houses of worship
f. Religious leaders (pastor, parish priest, etc.)
g. Schedule of worship/masses

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 h. Political affiliation of religious groups
i. Religious personalities (priest, nuns, lay people)
j. Projects and activities of religious groups

V. Economic Factor
a. Income level of the people
b. Forms of livelihood in the area
c. Factories and industrial plants
1. Management staff
2. Products and processes
3. Size of labor/profile
4. Location
d. Investment (local and foreign)
e. Labor force (Employment, unemployed)
f. Effects of natural calamities
g. Logging concessions
h. Mining groups
i. Department stores/shopping malls
j. Labor unions
k. Progressive taxation on the people
l. Government agencies
m. Infrastructure (roads and bridges)
n. Real estate
o. Water sources
p. Electricity
q. Transportation (land, water, air)
r. Economic problems
s. Banks and sources of loans
t. Cooperatives
u. Land ownership (public, private, titled, mortgaged)
v. Rice, corn, sugar, mills to include schedule and fee

VI. Social Factors

a. Population
b. Caste system or social stratification (according to origin of birth, economic status,
family background, etc.
c. Family relations
1. Influential families

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 2. Relationship among family members
3. Family feuds/affiliation
d. Household ownership and management (patriarchal or matriarchal)
e. Places of origin and people
f. Ethnic organization and diversities
g. Language/dialects spoken
h. Organizations (Parent-Teachers Association, Parents Homeroom, Kabataang
(Youth) Barangay and others)
1. Purpose/Objectives of the Organizations
2. Leadership/Management staff and profile
3. Membership/Composition
4. Fees and dues
5. Projects/programs/activities
6. Sources of support (financial material)
7. Attitude towards of government/AFP
8. Relations between groups
i. Places of gathering (Public parks, sari-sari stores, beerhouse, nightclubs,
restaurants, etc.)
j. Hotels and inns
k. Forms of entertainment (drinking, gambling, cockfighting)
l.
VII. Political Factors
a. Profile of local leaders
1. Personal data (names, family, educational background, occupation, etc.)
2. Political affiliation
3. Projects/activities
4. Membership in political and non-political organizations
b. Profile of political parties
1. Leadership
2. Membership
3. Dues and fees
4. Political ideology/beliefs
5. Plans and programs/activities
c. Number of voters and voter’s profile (number of youth, male or female voters, etc.)
d. Attitude/Opinion of the populace towards the political parties and local leaders
e. Government and non-government agencies
1. Leadership/staff profile
2. Past, ongoing and future projects

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 3. Sources of support
f. Land reform and related programs

VIII. Educational Factors

a. School in the area
1. Levels of education
2. Ownership and management
3. Campus location
4. Educational standard
5. Facilities
b. Organizations in the school (Student Council, Student Catholic Action, Science
Clubs, etc.)
1. Leadership and management profile
2. Membership profile
3. Sources of Support
4. Plan programs
5. Political affiliation
c. Teachers and school personnel
1. Personal data
2. Political affiliation
3. Educational attainments
d. Educational Facilities (Community Library, reading rooms)
e.
IX. Culture/Lifestyle Factors
a. Daily routine in various occupations
1. Waking, working and sleeping hours
2. Me/cooking times
3. Recreation
4. Washing clothes
5. House cleaning
b. Customs and traditions
c. Cuisine
d. Fiesta and celebrations
e. Peculiar gesture/practices
f. Etiquette (forms of address, table manners, hospitality, salutations)
g. Marriage practices
h. Courtship
i. Sexual norms

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 j. Local heroes
k. Arts
l. Music
m. Death and mourning rites

X. Health and Sanitation

a. Prevalent diseases
b. Sanitation facilities (toilets, canals, bathing area, water pumps)
c. Health center/hospital
1. Location
2. Services rendered
3. Ownership and management
d. Doctors/nurses/midwives
1. Profile
2. Qualifications
e. Birthrate rate/ death rates
f. Availability of medicines
g. Pregnancy and childbirth
h. Local health practices
i. Family planning
j. Health and sanitation problems

XI. Media and Communication Factors

a. Printed materials (newspapers, comics, magazines, etc.)
1. Number of circulation
2. Publisher/owner/editorial staff
3. Languages/dialect used
4. Pries/subscription
5. Readers profile
6. Location of selling areas
b. Television and radio
1. Network, frequency, channel, power
2. Area serviced or broadcast reach
3. Ownership/management profile (including political affiliation)
4. Format of programs
5. Operating hours
6. Language/dialect used
7. Location studio and transmitters

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 8. Listeners or viewers
9. Market share of broadcast
10. Broadcast personalities (newscasters and commentators)
11. Commercial and rates for advertising
a. Movie houses
b. Telephone
c. Telegraph
d. Postal system
e. Fax facilities
f. Video and photo services
g. Printing presses

XII. Others
Any piece of information that helps to understand the target community and
help the military address issues in the area.

Source: PAM 7-00, pp. iii-ix.

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 APPENDIX E

A NADESCOM Medical Outreach Program

Location: Caloocan, National Capital Region of Metro Manila.

Target barangays: Barangay Tala and Barangay Sila
Expected number of beneficiaries: 1,200 people (600 per barangay)
Date: Planned for November 2010

Proposed Schedule
6:30am
‹ Soldiers participate in a cleanup drive
‹ Immediately followed by bamboo-planting
8:00am
‹ Medical Mission-NADESCOM partnering with other military doctors and nurses.
‹ Ophthalmology – i.e. administering eye drops
‹ Dental – i.e. tooth extraction
‹ De-worming for 30 children
‹ Feeding – information giving, follow-up session plans for 50 most undernourished
children
Simultaneously Conducted
‹ Distribution of wheelchairs
‹ Games
‹ Exhibition of basketball
‹ Donations
‹ Information Drives
‹ Livelihood information
‹ Inspection of sites that require engineering intervention. If construction materials
are available, the military can do the construction.
2:30pm Culmination of activities
3:30pm Termination and pullout

NOTE: Military personnel from the National Capital Region Command (NCRCOM)
conduct a security survey prior to the outreach program.

Source: From briefing slides provided to the author by LTC Paul Regencia, Philippine Army,
National Development Support Command, Camp Aguinaldo, November 4, 2010.

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 Appendix F

Top Ten Poorest Provinces in the Philippines (2006) in Terms of Poverty Incidence of Family

Province Poverty Incidence of Falling within

families The AOR of RANK
WestMinCOM
1. Tawi-tawi, Mindanao 78.9 % 9 1
2. Zamboanga del Norte, 63% 9 2
Mindanao
3. Magunidanao, Mindanao 62% 3
4. Apayao, Northern Luzon 57.5% 4
5. Surigao del Norte, Mindanao 53.2% 5
6. Lanao del Sur, Mindanao 52.5% 9 6
7. Northern Samar, Visayas 52.2% 7
8. Masbate, Southern Luzon 51% 8
9. Abra, Northern Luzon 50.1 % 9
10. Misamis Occidental, 48.8 % 10
Mindanao

Source: National Statistical Coordination Board, 2006. Created from “Ten Poorest Provinces
in 2000, 2003, and 2006.” Available at:
http://www.nscb.gov.ph/poverty/2006_05mar08/table_14.asp. Accessed November 18, 2012.

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 Appendix G

1
“NADESOM ROADMAP 2010-2010”
Short-term Goals -2010
‹ Presentation of AFP-NADESCOM Doctrine
‹ Communication of AFP-NADESCOM in AFP
‹ Establishment of AFP-NADESCOM in AFP

Medium-term Goals 2010-2014

‹ Expand the AFP-NADESCOM organizational structure based on the revised TOE
‹ Establish extension offices located strategically in different places in the Philippine
Islands
‹ Strengthen the role of the AFP-NADESCOM in AFP operations
‹ Institutionalize the regional force development plan
‹ Produce capable personnel

Long-term Goals 2011-2020

‹ Enhance operational capability as a regional force
‹ Modern equipage for regional operations
‹ Develop a capability on international legal affairs
‹ Acquire air and sea transport capability

1
“NADESCOM ROADMAP 2010-2020” presented by Lt. Col. Regencia to author, NADESCOM, Camp
Aguinaldo, Quezon City, Philippines, November 4, 2010.

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 Appendix H

Questions asked to CMO beneficiaries in Zamboanga City (2007-2010)

1. Can you introduce yourself to me?

2. Can you tell when the military appeared in your community to provide a community
outreach program?

3. Can you recount to me your experiences with the military during the outreach
program?

4. In which areas do you think your barangays services do not suffice?

5. What was your impression of the AFP and/or U.S.Forces when they entered your
community?

6. Do you know of any armed presence in your community?

7. Do you think the ASG or other groups are an immediate threat to you?

8. What was your image of the AFP before their entry? After their entry, how do you feel
about the military?

9. Do you know why your community was selected for an outreach program?

10. Has the military “humanitarian” intervention helped improve your lives?

11. Would you like the soldiers to come back again?

12. Are there any other thoughts or comments you would like to share?

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