VOL.

328, MARCH 14, 2000 69

Castillo vs. Sandiganbayan

*
G.R. No. 109271. March 14, 2000.

RICARDO CASTILLO, DEMETRIO CABISON, JR., and

RODOLFO AGDEPPA, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION), and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by HONORABLE
CONRADO VASQUEZ, OMBUDSMAN, respondents.

Criminal Procedure; Ombudsman; Sandiganbayan; There

was no need for the Ombudsman to conduct another preliminary
investigation as the one conducted by the former Tanodbayan was
valid and legal.—Petitioners’ contention is misleading. In the
aforecited case, this Court clearly held that the authority of the
Tanodbayan to conduct preliminary investigations and to direct
the filing of criminal cases was lost effective February 2, 1987.
The inference, therefore, of such holding is that the Tanodbayan
had such authority prior to February 2, 1987. In this case, the
Tanodbayan issued petitioners a subpoena on September 22, 1986
directing them to file their counter-affidavits, which the latter
complied with on September 30, 1986. In short, the preliminary
investigation was conducted by the Tanodbayan before he lost his
authority to do so. Hence, there was no need for the Ombudsman
to conduct another preliminary investigation as the one conducted
by the former Tanodbayan was valid and legal. Presumably, the
new Ombudsman recognized the results of the preliminary
investigation conducted by the then Tanodbayan and adopted the
conclusions reached therein when he ordered the filing of an
Information against petitioners.
Same; Constitutional Law; The right to a speedy disposition of
a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when
the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delays.—In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, this Court has held
that the constitutional guarantee set forth in Section 16, Article
III of the 1987 Constitution, of “(t)he right to a speedy disposition
of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only
when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays.” “x x x (T)he concept of speedy disposition of
cases is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.
Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the determination of whether
that right has been violated,
________________

* FIRST DIVISION.

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70 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Castillo vs. Sandiganbayan

he factors that may be considered and balanced are the length of

delay, the reason for such delay and the assertion or failure to
assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the
delay.”
Same; Same; Court has taken judicial cognizance of the fact
that the ever increasing caseload of courts has affected the speedy
disposition of cases pending before the Sandiganbayan.—In
addition, it is clearly apparent from the figures cited by
petitioners that the Sandiganbayan was burdened with a heavy
caseload. Parenthetically, this Court has taken judicial
cognizance of the fact that the ever increasing caseload of courts
has affected the speedy disposition of cases pending before the
Sandiganbayan.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

Certiorari and Prohibition.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Leonardo G. Padilla for petitioner R. Castillo.
     Santiago D.R. Agdeppa for petitioner R. Agdeppa.
     Domingo and D.R. Agdeppa for petitioner.
     The Solicitor General for respondents.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for

1
Certiorari assailing
2
two
Orders dated February 18, 1993 and March 8, 1993 of the
Sandiganbayan’s Second Division denying petitioners’
Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Reconsideration.
On August 25, 1986, concerned employees of the
Commission 3on Audit (COA) filed a Complaint before the
Tanodbayan, against petitioners Ricardo Castillo, Rodolfo
Agdeppa and Demetrio Cabison, Jr., COA Auditor VIII,
COA Auditor II, and COA Auditor III, respectively, all
assigned at the Na-

________________

1 Annex “A,” Rollo, p. 25.

2 Annex “B,” Rollo, p. 26.
 3 Now the Ombudsman.

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Castillo vs. Sandiganbayan

tional Housing Authority (NHA), for alleged “submittal of

initial very derogatory reports which became the basis for
the filing of cases with the Tanodbayan and the reversals of
their initial recommendations for selected contractors.”
Petitioners were notified of the Complaint on September
22, 1986 when they were directed by the Tanodbayan to file
their counter-affidavits, which they did on September 30,
1986.
In a resolution dated October 30, 1987, the Tanodbayan
found a prima facie case against petitioners and
accordingly recommended the filing of an Information
against them for violation of Section4 3(e) of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019).
On November 27, 1987,5 petitioners promptly filed a
Motion for Reinvestigation. On March 21, 1988, they 6
filed
a Motion to Resolve their Motion for Reinvestigation.
Without acting upon the Motion for Reinvestigation and
Motion to Resolve Motion for Reinvestigation, an
Information was filed on November 5, 1990, before the
Sandiganbayan, which reads:

“That on or about August 5, 1986 or prior and subsequent thereto,

in Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused namely, Ricardo R.
Castillo, Rodolfo M. Agdeppa and Demetrio M. Cabison, Jr., all
public officers being then COA Auditor VIII, COA Auditor II and
COA Auditor III, respectively, taking advantage of their official
positions, while in the performance or discharge of their
administrative official functions, with evident bad faith and
manifest partiality, conspiring, confederating and confabulating
with each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
fraudulently cause undue injury, damage and prejudice to the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, to wit: that two
contracts were entered into by the NHA management with two
private contractors relative to the complete development of Phase
V-A Packages 3 & 4 which is being constructed by Sarmiento
Construction Co., and likewise Phase IX

_______________

4 Rollo, pp. 63-71.

5 Rollo, pp. 72-73.
6 Rollo, pp. 74-75.

72
72 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Castillo vs. Sandiganbayan

Packages 7 & 7-A which is being constructed by the Supra

Construction Co., both constructions are located at the Tala
Estate Sites & Services, by causing to prepare, submit, issue and
sign in the different inventory reports/recommendation on various
occasions that Sarmiento Construction had an overpayment in the
amount of P362,591.98 for Phase V-A Packages 3 & 4 but later on
said accused changed their inventory reports/recommendation
and subsequently readjusted this as overpayment on physical
work thereby prejudicing the government on account of accused’s
constant changes/reversals in the inventory reports prepared,
signed and submitted by them; whereas in the second contract
with Supra Construction, accused issued an inventory report by
stating thereon that said contractor had a work deficiency in the
amount of P788,806.94 but refraining from taking appropriate
action on account of P1,873,091.40 withheld on Tala to pay a
refund order on a Tondo contract issued by the COA main office.
The said accused raised the deficiency in the amount of
P855,281.50. Later on, another inventory report was issued and
prepared by a Tri-Partite Team Committee composed of COA,
NHA and the contractors stating a work deficiency in the amount
of P352,121.40 only. Despite previous inventory
reports/recommendation by the accused citing different amounts
and another amount by the Tri-Partite Team Committee said
accused later stated that the final deficiencies of Supra
Construction is no longer P855,281.58 but was reduced only to
P70,596.37, which reductions in the contractors’ final deficiencies
were not justified thereby giving unwarranted benefits,
preference and advantage to the above-mentioned contractor to
the damage and prejudice of the government in the amount of
P231,523.00 and to the Sarmiento Construction for inventoried7
accomplishment were not duly credited by the said accused.”

Trial on the merits thereafter ensued. After the prosecution

rested its case, petitioners filed a Demurrer to Evidence
but the same was denied by the Sandiganbayan
8
in a
Resolution dated December 11, 1992. Petitioners’ Motion
for Reconsideration was9 likewise denied in a Resolution
dated January 20, 1993.

________________

7 Rollo, pp. 87-89.

8 Rollo, pp. 90-91.
9 Rollo, pp. 92-93.

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Castillo vs. Sandiganbayan
 10
Thereafter, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss dated
February 15, 1993 citing lack of jurisdiction and violation
of due process, but the same was denied by the 11
Sandiganbayan. Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration
was also denied.
Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition,
raising the following grounds:

The Honorable Respondent Sandiganbayan committed grave

abuse of discretion in not dismissing the Information
notwithstanding that there was a violation of petitioners’
constitutional rights of “due process” and “speedy disposition of
cases” and there was use of the strong arm of the law in an
oppressive and vindictive manner against the petitioners.

1. Unexplained and unjustified delay of three (3) years

before an Information is filed before the Honorable
Respondent Sandiganbayan counting from the date of the
resolution of the Ombudsman recommending the
prosecution of the petitioners for violation of Rep. Act No.
3019 (or a total of four [4] years from initial investigation
up to filing of information);
2. Motion for Reinvestigation and Motion to Resolve the
Motion for Reinvestigation filed by the petitioners before
the Office of the Honorable Respondent Ombudsman were
not acted upon;
3. No reason or explanation was made by the prosecution on
the delay in the filing of Information;
4. With no plausible explanation on hand, the petitioners are
thus inclined to reason out, or even suspect, that there is
connection between such delay and their past and
contemporaneous official acts;
5. The lapse of three (3) years or a total of four (4) years from
start of investigation up to filing of Information may
result in the destruction of affirmative evidence tending to
establish the innocence of the petitioners and that the
passage of time may have produced an unfavorable effect
on their defense;
6. Violation of constitutional rights divests the court of
jurisdiction;
7. Lack of jurisdiction of the court may be raised at any time;

_______________

10 Rollo, pp. 94-101.

11 Rollo, pp. 102-105.

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74 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Castillo vs. Sandiganbayan
 8. Criminal prosecution may be enjoined in order to afford
adequate protection to constitutional rights and to prevent
the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and
vindictive manner;
9. Subject of instant petition are the Orders of the Honorable
Respondent Sandiganbayan denying the Motion to
Dismiss of petitioners for violation of their constitutional
rights and the use against them of the strong arm of the
law in an oppressive and vindictive manner.

Petitioners submit that the Ombudsman oppressed and

discriminated against them by not issuing any notice, reply
or order denying their Motion for Reinvestigation as well as
their Motion to Resolve their Motion for Reconsideration.
They argue that the Ombudsman should have granted
outright their Motion for Reinvestigation
12
in view of the
ruling in Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan wherein this Court
held, thus:

Under the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman (as distinguished

from the incumbent Tanodbayan) is charged with the duty to:
“Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act
or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when
such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient.” (citation omitted)
x x x      x x x      x x x
Now then, inasmuch as the aforementioned duty is given to the
Ombudsman, the incumbent Tanodbayan (called Special
Prosecutor under the 1987 Constitution and who is supposed to
retain the powers and duties NOT GIVEN to the Ombudsman) is
clearly without authority to conduct preliminary investigations
and to direct the filing of criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan,
except upon orders of the Ombudsman. This right to do so was
lost effective February 2, 1987. From that time, he has been
divested of such authority.

Petitioners’ contention is misleading. In the aforecited case,

this Court clearly held that the authority of the
Tanodbayan to conduct preliminary investigations and to
direct the filing of criminal cases was lost effective
February 2, 1987. The

_______________

12 160 SCRA 843 (1988).

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VOL. 328, MARCH 14, 2000 75

Castillo vs. Sandiganbayan
inference, therefore, of such holding is that the
Tanodbayan had such authority prior to February 2, 1987.
In this case, the Tanodbayan issued petitioners a subpoena
on September 22, 1986 directing them to file their counter-
affidavits which the latter complied with on September 30,
1986. In short, the preliminary investigation was
conducted by the Tanodbayan before he lost his authority
to do so.
Hence, there was no need for the Ombudsman to
conduct another preliminary investigation as the one
conducted by the former Tanodbayan was valid and legal.
Presumably, the new Ombudsman recognized the results of
the preliminary investigation conducted by the then
Tanodbayan and adopted the conclusions reached therein
when he ordered the filing of an Information against
petitioners.
Consequently, there was no need for the Ombudsman to
act on the petitioners’ Motion for Reinvestigation. As
stated, there was no need for the Ombudsman to conduct
another preliminary investigation.
Petitioners also submit that they were deprived of their
constitutional right to a speedy trial by reason of the delay
in the filing of the Information by the Ombudsman. They
contend that the Sandiganbayan abused its discretion in
not dismissing the Information filed against them on the
ground that “there was unexplained and unjustified delay
of more than three (3) years before an information was filed
against them from the filing of the complaint on August 25,
1986 up to the filing of the Information on November 5,
1990.” In fine, they point out that considering that the
preliminary investigation was concluded as early as
October 30, 1987, the first Ombudsman constituted under
the 1987 Constitution should have filed the Information as
soon as he was appointed on June 6, 1988. Instead, it took
more than two years and 3,386 cases before Criminal Case
No. 16240 was filed against them on November 5, 1990. In
other words, petitioners argue that since the Resolution of
the Ombudsman recommending the filing of the
Information was issued on October 30, 1987, then the
Information should have been filed immediately thereafter,
considering that even before the promulgation of the
76

76 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Castillo vs. Sandiganbayan

Zaldivar case on13

April 27, 1988, thousands of Informations
had been filed.
Petitioners’ contention is without merit.14
In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, this Court has
held that the constitutional guarantee set forth in Section
 15
16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, of “(t)he right to a
speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is
deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays.” “x x x (T)he
concept of speedy disposition of cases is a relative term and
must necessarily be a flexible concept. Hence, the doctrinal
rule is that in the determination of whether that right has
been violated, the factors that may be considered and
balanced are the length of delay, the reason for such delay
and the assertion or failure to assert such right 16
by the
accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay.”
As pointed out by petitioners, the complaint was filed
before the Tanodbayan on August 25, 1986. On October 30,
1987, a Resolution was issued finding a prima facie case
against petitioners and recommending the filing of an
Information with the Sandiganbayan. However, it was only
on November 5, 1990 when the Information was filed.
Admittedly, it took three (3) years for the Ombudsman to
file the Information against petitioners from the date of the
Resolution recommending the filing thereof.
In explaining the delay in the filing of the Information,
however, the Office of the Solicitor General averred, as
follows:

It will be noted that the normal operations of the Office of the

Special Prosecutor was affected by the Decision of this Honorable

_______________

13 Memorandum for Petitioners, Rollo, pp. 180-182.

14 300 SCRA 367 [1998].
15 “All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before
all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.” (Italics supplied).
16 Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan, 220 SCRA 55 [1993].

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Castillo vs. Sandiganbayan

Court in Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan and Zaldivar v. Gonzalez, 160

SCRA 843 dated April 27, 1988, where it was ruled that the
incumbent Tanodbayan lost his right to conduct preliminary
investigation and to direct the filing of criminal cases with the
Sandiganbayan effective February 2, 1987. As a result,
complaints (including that involved in the present petition),
resolutions and other legal papers awaiting action during that
period remained pending the appointment of an Ombudsman.
When the Ombudsman was appointed in 1988, it took some
time still before his Office could become fully constituted and
operational. Because of the unavoidable delay caused by the
aforementioned circumstances, the corresponding Information in
the criminal case involved was filed and approved only in 1990.

Prescinding from the foregoing, this Court finds no

violation of petitioners’ right to a speedy disposition of their
case. The delay was not vexatious, capricious, nor
oppressive, considering the factual milieu of this case,
namely the structural reorganizations and procedural
changes brought about by frequent amendments of
procedural laws in the initial stages of this case. The
complaint was filed on August 25, 1986. On October 30,
1987, the Ombudsman issued a Resolution finding a prima
facie case and recommending the filing of an Information.
Meanwhile, on April 27, 1988, the Zaldivar case was
promulgated holding that the Tanodbayan lost his
authority to conduct preliminary investigations and to
direct the filing of Informations with the Sandiganbayan
effective February 2, 1987. Then on November 5, 1990, the
Information against petitioners was filed.
In the case Binay
17
v. Sandiganbayan and Magsaysay v.
Sandiganbayan, this Court has held that:

A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore,

would not be sufficient. In the application of the constitutional
guarantee of the right to speedy disposition of cases, particular
regard must also be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar
to each case.

________________

17 G.R. Nos: 120681-83, G.R. No. 128136, October 1, 1999, 316 SCRA
65.

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Castillo vs. Sandiganbayan

18
In Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan, this Court has reiterated
that it has taken judicial cognizance of the frequent
amendments of procedural laws by presidential decrees,
the structural reorganizations in existing prosecutorial
agencies and the creation of new ones by executive fiat,
resulting in changes of personnel, preliminary jurisdiction,
functions and powers of prosecuting agencies.
In addition, it is clearly apparent from the figures cited
by petitioners that the Sandiganbayan was burdened with
a heavy caseload. Parenthetically, this Court has taken
judicial cognizance of the fact that the ever increasing
caseload of courts has affected the speedy19
disposition of
cases pending before the Sandiganbayan.
 While petitioners certainly have the right to a speedy
disposition of their case, the structural reorganization of
the prosecutorial agencies, the procedural changes brought
about by the Zaldivar case as well as the Sandiganbayan’s
heavy caseload certainly are valid reasons for the delay in
the disposition of petitioners’ case. For those reasons, the
delay certainly cannot be considered as vexatious,
capricious and oppressive. Neither is it unreasonable nor
inordinate.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant
petition is DENIED and the two Orders dated February 18,
1993 and March 8, 1993 of the Sandiganbayan’s Second
Division in Criminal Case No. 16240 are AFFIRMED. The
Sandiganbayan is DIRECTED to proceed with dispatch in
the disposition of this case.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

     Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Puno and Kapunan,

JJ., concur.
     Pardo, J., On official business abroad.

________________

18 Supra.
19 See note 4.

79

VOL. 328, MARCH 14, 2000 79

Millares vs. National Labor Relations Commission

Petition denied, orders affirmed.

Note.—The Constitution guarantees the right of

persons against unreasonable delay in the disposition of
cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative
bodies. (Matias vs. Plan, 293 SCRA 532 [1998])

——o0o——

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