Evidence - Performance Task Answer-Jim

April 30, 2020 [EVIDENCE- PERFORMANCE TASK]
EVIDENCE
SY 2020-2021
PERFORMANCE TASK
MEMBERS:
1. JIM PETERICK G. SISON
2. MARK ANTHONY DELMO
3. PAUL VINCENT VILLEGAS
4. RICHAN JUMADLA
1. Relevance, Materiality, Admissibility
Reyes vs. Court of Appeals

216 SCRA 25 (1993)
Rule 128, Sec. 1-4
“Rules of Court shall not be applicable in agrarian cases even in a

suppletory character.” The same provision states that “In the hearing,
investigation and determination of any question or controversy, affidavits
and counter-affidavits may be allowed and are admissible in evidence,”
Moreover, in agrarian cases, the quantum of evidence required is no more
than substantial evidence. Thus, this case is an application of the rule
with regard the scope of the Rules on Evidence which states that “The
rules of evidence shall be the same in all courts and in all trials and
hearings except as otherwise provided by law (ex. Section 16 of P.D. No.
946) or these rules.”
Bautista vs. Aparece

51 O.G. 805 (1995)
Relevance
“The test for the admissibility or inadmissibility of a certain document is

whether or not it is relevant, material or competent. The public document
is not only relevant, but is also material and competent to the issue of
ownership between the parties’ litigants. Relevant evidence is one that
has any value in reason as tending to prove any matter probable in ac
action. And evidence is said to be material when it is directed to prove a
fact in issue as determined by the rules of substantive law and pleadings,
while competent evidence is one that s not excluded by law in a particular
case.”
BARRETO v. AREVALO
G.R. No. L-7748
August 27, 1956
“Section 3 Rules of Court. Admissibility of evidence- Evidence is

admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by law or
these rules.
Admissibility is the character or quality which any material must

necessarily possess for it to be accepted and allowed to be presented or
introduced as evidence in court. It answers the question: should the court

allow the material to be used as evidence by the party?
Weight is the value given or significance or impact, or importance given to

the material after it has been admitted; its tendency to convince or
persuade. Hence particular evidence may be admissible but it has no
weight. Conversely, evidence may be of great weight or importance but it
is not admissible.
A Condition for admissibility is relevancy.
RELEVANCY states that none but facts having rational probative value
are admissible. Per section 4, “Evidence must have such a relation to the
fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence”.
The material presented as evidence must affect the issue or question. It
must have a bearing on the outcome of the case. It requires both:
a). rational or logical relevancy in that it has a connection to the issue

and therefore it has a tendency to establish the fact which it is offered to
prove. The evidence must therefore have probative value
b). legal relevancy is that the evidence is offered to prove a matter which
has been properly put in issue as determined by the pleadings in civil
cases, or as fixed by the pretrial order, or as determined by substantive
law. If so the matter has materiality.”
2. Best Evidence and Parol Evidence
Meyers vs. United States

171 F.2d 800 (1948)
Best Evidence Rule
“The best evidence rule applies only when contents of a writing are to be
proved which does not obtain in the case at bar.
In prosecution for perjured testimony given before the Senate committee, the
testimony by chief counsel of the senatorial committee as to what witnesses
had sworn to was not barred under the best evidence rule, and it was not
unfair or prejudicial to permit transcript of testimony given before the
subcommittee to be introduced after chief counsel had testified, though
counsel testified early in protracted trial and transcript was introduced near its
close, since both methods of proving the perjury were permissible, and
prosecution could present its proof in any order it chose.
Here, there was no attempt to prove the contents of a writing. The issue
was what Lamarre had said, not what the transcript contained. The transcript
was evidence of what he had said but it was not the only admissible evidence
concerning it. The testimony of Rogers, chief counsel to the committee, was
equally competent and admissible whether given before or after the transcript
was received in evidence. Statements alleged to perjuries may be proved by
any person who heard them, as well as, by the reporter who recorded them
in shorthand.”
People vs. Tan

105 Phil. 1242 (1959)
Best Evidence Rule
“The Court said that the admissibility of duplicates or triplicates has long been
a settled question. It quoted with approval the opinion of Moran, a
commentator on the Rules of Court. When carbon sheets are inserted
between two or more sheets of writing paper so that the writing of a contract
upon the outside sheet, including the signature of the party to be charged
thereby, produces a facsimile upon the sheets beneath, such signature
being thus reproduced by the same stroke of the pen which made the
surface or exposed the impression, all of the sheets so written on are
regarded as duplicate originals and either of them may be introduced in
evidence as such without accounting for the non-production of the
others.”
Dela Rama v. Ledesma

G.R. No. 28608
Parol Evidence Rule
“It is a well-accepted principle of law that evidence of a prior or

contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not admissible to vary,
contradict or defeat the operation of a valid instrument.
While parol evidence is admissible in a variety of ways to explain the meaning
of written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the
contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at
all in the writing, unless there has been fraud or mistake. “
NORTON RESOURCES AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

vs. ALL ASIA BANK CORPORATION

G.R. No. 162523
Parol Evidence Rule
“The "parol evidence rule" forbids any addition to or contradiction of the

terms of a written instrument by testimony or other evidence purporting to
show that, at or before the execution of the parties' written agreement, other
or different terms were agreed upon by the parties, varying the purport of the
written contract.
When an agreement has been reduced to writing, the parties cannot be

permitted to adduce evidence to prove alleged practices which, to all
purposes, would alter the terms of the written agreement.
Whatever is not found in the writing is understood to have been waived and
abandoned.”
3. Real (Object), Documentary, Testimonial Evidence
PEOPLE VS. BARDAJE

G.R. No. L-29271 August 29, 1980
“Physical evidence is of the highest order and speaks more eloquently

than witnesses put together. The “old healed laceration” in the hymen,
according to the testimony of the physician, would have occurred two weeks
or even 1 month before. This shows that Marcelina and Adelino had amorous
relationship”
SISON VS. PEOPLE

G.R. Nos. 108280-83 November 16, 1995
“The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when presented in evidence,

must be identified by the photographer as to its production and testified as to
the circumstances under which they were produced. The correctness of the
photograph as a faithful representation of the object portrayed can be proved
prima facie, either by the testimony of the person who made it or by other
competent witnesses, after which the court can admit it subject to
impeachment as to its accuracy”
People v. Negosa
G.R. No. 142856-57

Testimonial Evidence
“the testimony of a witness may be partly believed or disbelieved, depending

on the corroborative evidence and intent on the part of the witness to pervert
the truth. The principle falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is not strictly
applied in this jurisdiction. The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus
deals only with the weight of evidence and is not a positive rule of law; the
rule is not an inflexible one of universal application. Modern trend in
jurisprudence favors more flexibility when the testimony of a witness may be
partly believed and partly disbelieved depending on the corroborative
evidence presented at the trial. Thus, where the challenged testimony is
sufficiently corroborated in its material points, or where the mistakes arise
from innocent lapses and not from an apparent desire to pervert the truth, the
rule may be relaxed. It is a rule that is neither absolute nor mandatory and
binding upon the court, which may accept or reject portions of the witness’
testimony based on its inherent credibility or on the corroborative evidence in
the case.”
4. Affidavit of Desistance
XXX v. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 242101,
September 16, 2019
“ The affidavit of recantation executed by a witness prior to the trial cannot

prevail over the testimony made during the trial. Jovencio effectively
repudiated the contents of the affidavit of recantation. The recantation would
hardly suffice to overturn the trial court's finding of guilt, which was based on
a clear and convincing testimony given during a full-blown trial. As held by
this Court, an affidavit of recantation, being usually taken ex parte, would be
considered inferior to the testimony given in open court. A recantation is
exceedingly unreliable, inasmuch as it is easily secured from a poor and
ignorant witness, usually through intimidation or for monetary consideration.”
5. Credibility of witness who is related to an accused
People vs. Camat 2012

"Minor inconsistencies in the narration of facts by the witnesses do not detract

from their essential credibility as long as their testimonies on the whole are
coherent and intrinsically believable."
6. Mental Incapacity
PEOPLE VS. SOLOMON

229 SCRA 403
“A mental retardate is not for this reason alone disqualified from being a
witness. As in the case of other witnesses, acceptance of his testimony
depends on its nature and credibility or, otherwise put, the quality of his
perceptions and the manner he can make them known to the court.”
PEOPLE VS. MACAPAGAL

254 SCRA 18
“Mental retardation per se does not affect credibility. A mentally retarded may
be a credible witness. The acceptance of his or her testimony depends on the
quality of his or her perceptions and the manner he or she can make them
known to the court.”
7. Marital Privilege and Disqualification
PEOPLE VS CARLOS
47 Phil 626 (1925)
“Where a privileged communication from one spouse to the other comes into
the hands of a third party, whether legally or not, without collusion and
voluntary disclosure on the part of either spouse, the privilege is thereby
extinguished and the communication, if otherwise competent, becomes
admissible.”
ORDONO VS. DAQUIGAN

62 SCRA 270
“When an offense directly attack or directly and vitally impairs, the conjugal
relation, it comes within the exception to the statute that one shall not be a
witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime
committed (by) one against the other.”
PEOPLE VS. CASTANEDA

G.R. No. L-46306 February 27, 1979
“In this case, the same principle should be applied because the person who
stands to be prejudiced by the forgery is not a third person but his wife. Also,
it directly and vitally impairs the conjugal relation. By reason of public policy,
the wife should not be disqualified because to do otherwise would set a
dangerous precedent where the husband may conjure as many falsifications
as possible with impunity.”
8. Minority of a witness
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RUBIO

G.R. No. 220884, February 21, 2018
“The basic rule is that when a victim's testimony is credible and sufficiently
establishes the elements of the crime, it may be enough basis to convict an
accused of rape.25 The records reveal that the testimony of AAA, though she
was only a child, was full of details which she credibly narrated because these
were the truth. Mindful that the identity of the offender is crucial in the success
of the prosecution of an offense, 26 the Court notes AAA's unshakable and
consistent positive identification of the accused-appellant as the one who
raped :her despite the gruelling cross-examination by the defense.”
9. Dead Man's Statute
GUERRERO VS. ST. CLAIRE REALTY

G.R. No. L-58164, September 2, 1983
“Dead Man’s Rule inapplicable when there is no claim or demand against the
estate of the deceased Manuel Guerrero”
LICHUACO v. ATLANTIC GULF AND PACIFIC

G.R. No. L-¬2016 August 23, 1949
“Officers and/or stockholders of a corporation are not disqualified from

testifying, for or against the corporation which is a party to an action upon a
claim or demand against the estate of a deceased person, as to any matter of

fact occurring before the death of such deceased person”
10. Witness with disability (deaf, mute or blind)
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. DANIEL HAYAG

G.R. No. L-38635 November 17, 1980
“The modern rule is to the effect that deaf and dumb persons are not
incompetent as witnesses merely because they are deaf and dumb if they are
able to communicate the facts by a method which their infirmity leaves
available to them, and are of sufficient mental capacity to observe the matters
as to which they will testify and to appreciate the obligation of an oath; but
where the person is not so educated as it is possible to make him understand
the questions which are put to him he is not competent (97 C.J.S. 454).”
11. Flight of a witness: admission of guilt or not?
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,v. EMETERIO MEDINA Y DAMO

G.R. No. 214473, June 22, 2016
“Mention-worthy is appellant's immediate flight from his home shortly after the
incident26 and his evasion of arrest for more than six (6) years.
Jurisprudence has repeatedly declared that flight is an indication of guilt. The
flight of an accused, in the absence of a credible explanation, would be a
circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be established for a truly
innocent person would normally grasp the first available opportunity to defend
himself and assert his innocence.27 In the case at bar, appellant's flight
incontestably evidenced guilt.”
12. Offer of compromise
THE UNITED STATES vs. JUAN MAQUI

G.R. No. L-8931 March 14, 1914
“The question as to the admissibility of offers to compromise in criminal cases

has frequently been discussed in the courts of the United States, and the
practice there does not appear to be wholly uniform. We think, however, that
the weight both of authority and of reason sustains the rule which admits
evidence of offers to compromise, but permits the accused to show that such
offers were not made under a consciousness of guilt, but merely to avoid the
inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other reason which would justify a
claim by the accused that the offer to compromise was not in truth an
admission of his guilt and an attempt to avoid the legal consequences which
would ordinarily ensue therefrom.”
13. Receipt of stolen item
IRENEO CAHULOGAN vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 225695, March 21, 2018
“Before P.D. No. 1612, a fence could only be prosecuted for and held liable
as an accessory, as the term is defined in Article 19 of the Revised Penal
Code. The penalty applicable to an accessory is obviously light under the
rules prescribed in Articles 53, 55, and 57 of the Revised Penal Code, subject
to the qualification set forth in Article 60 thereof. Noting, however, the reports
from law enforcement agencies that "there is rampant robbery and thievery of
government and private properties" and that "such robbery and thievery have
become profitable on the part of the lawless elements because of the
existence of ready buyers, commonly known as fence, of stolen properties,"
P.D. No. 1612 was enacted to "impose heavy penalties on persons who profit
by the effects of the crimes of robbery and theft." Evidently, the accessory in
the crimes of robbery and theft could be prosecuted as such under the
Revised Penal Code or under P.D. No. 1612. However, in the latter case, he
ceases to be a mere accessory but becomes a principal in the crime of
fencing. Elsewise stated, the crimes of robbery and theft, on the one hand,
and fencing, on the other, are separate and distinct offenses. The state may
thus choose to prosecute him either under the Revised Penal Code or P.D.
No. 1612, although the preference for the latter would seem inevitable
considering that fencing is a malum prohibitum, and P.D. No. 1612 creates a
presumption of fencing and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of
the property.”
14. Hearsay Evidence
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.CARMEN SANTORIO GALENO

G.R. No. 215009 January 23, 2017
“The general rule is that hearsay evidence is not admissible. However, the
lack of objection to hearsay testimony may result in its being admitted as
evidence. But one should not be misled into thinking that such declarations
are thereby impressed with probative value. Admissibility of evidence should
not be equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected
to or not cannot be given credence for it has no probative value.”
15. Exception to Hearsay Evidence

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs EUGENIO TOLEDO

G.R. No. 28655. August 6, 1928
“Hearsay evidence, with a few well recognized exceptions, it has been said
on high authority, is excluded by courts in the United States that adhere to the
principles of the common law. One universally recognized exception concerns
the admission of dying declarations. Another exception permits the reception,
under certain circumstances, of declarations of third parties made contrary to
their own pecuniary or proprietary interest. But the general rule is stated to be
that the declarations of a person other than accused confessing or tending to
show that he committed the crime are not competent for accused on account
of the hearsay doctrine.”
16. Sufficiency of sole testimony to convict
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs JOEMARIE JALBONIAN

G.R. No. 180281 July 01, 2013
"Well-settled is the rule that the testimony of a lone prosecution witness, as

long as it is credible and positive, can prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt."
17. Doctrine of Independently Relevant Statement
JOSE ESPINELI VS PEOPLE OF THE PHLIPPINES

G.R. No.179535
June 9, 2014
“Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends in whole or in part on

the competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom it is
sought to produce. However, while the testimony of a witness regarding a statement
made by another person given for the purpose of establishing the truth of the fact
asserted in the statement is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of
placing the statement on the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement, or
the tenor of such statement, was made. Regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement,
when what is relevant is the fact that such statement has been made, the hearsay rule
does not apply and the statement may be shown. As a matter of fact, evidence as to the
making of the statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may
constitute a fact in issue or is circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a
fact.34 This is known as the doctrine of independently relevant statements.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS JOSE BELMAR UMAPA

G.R. No. 215742
March 22, 2017
“Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends in whole or in part on

the competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness by
whom it is sought to produce. However, while the testimony of a witness
regarding a statement made by another person given for the purpose of
establishing the truth of the fact asserted in the statement is clearly hearsay
evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement on the record
is merely to establish the fact that the statement, or the tenor of such
statement, was made. Regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, when
what is relevant is the fact that such statement has been made, the hearsay
rule does not apply and the statement may be shown. As a matter of fact,
evidence as to the making of the statement is not secondary but primary, for
the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or is circumstantially
relevant as to the existence of such a fact. This is the doctrine of
independently relevant statements. Thus, all these requisites to support a
conviction based on circumstantial evidence, not to mention the dying
declaration of the deceased victim herself, are existing in the instant case.’
18. Res Gestae
PEOPLE VS LUNGAYAN
162 SCRA 100
“Res Gestae requires that the statement be spontaneous and made at a time
when there was no opportunity to concoct or develop a story.”
PEOPLE V PUTIAN
74 SCRA 133
“Although a declaration does not appear to have been made by the declarant
under the expectation of a certain and impending death, and for this reason,
is not admissible as a dying declaration, such declaration can fall squarely in
the rule on res gestae.”
PEOPLE V TOLENTINO
218 SCRA 337
Requisites for res gestae:

1. That the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence ;
2. that the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive
or devise;
3. and that the statements made must concern the occurrence in question
and their immediately attending circumstances.
19. Dying Declaration
PEOPLE vs UMAPAS
G.R. No. 215742; March 22, 2017
PERALTA, J.
Conviction based on dying declaration:
“While witnesses in general can only testify to facts derived from their own
perception, a report in open court of a dying person's declaration is recognized
as an exception to the rule against hearsay if it is "made under the
consciousness of an impending death that is the subject of inquiry in the case." It
is considered as "evidence of the highest order and is entitled to utmost credence
since no person aware of his impending death would make a careless and false
accusation."
“Four requisites must concur in order that a dying declaration may be

admissible, thus: First, the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding
circumstances of the declarant's death. This refers not only to the facts of the
assault itself, but also to matters both before and after the assault having a direct
causal connection with it. Statements involving the nature of the declarant's injury
or the cause of death; those imparting deliberation and willfulness in the attack,
indicating the reason or motive for the killing; justifying or accusing the accused;
or indicating the absence of cause for the act are admissible. Second, at the time
the declaration was made, the declarant must be under the consciousness of an
impending death. The rule is that, in order to make a dying declaration
admissible, a fixed belief in inevitable and imminent death must be entered by
the declarant. It is the belief in impending death and not the rapid succession of
death in point of fact that renders the dying declaration admissible. It is not
necessary that the approaching death be presaged by the personal feelings of
the deceased. The test is whether the declarant has abandoned all hopes of
survival and looked on death as certainly impending. Third, the declarant is
competent as a witness. The rule is that where the declarant would not have
been a competent witness had he survived, the proffered declarations will not be
admissible. Thus, in the absence of evidence showing that the declarant could
not have been competent to be a witness had he survived, the presumption must
be sustained that he would have been competent. Fourth, the declaration must
be offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the

declarant is the victim.”
PEOPLE vs. DEVARAS

37 SCRA 697 (1971)
FERNANDO, J.
The other error assigned is that the lower court should not have
considered the declaration as part of the res gestae. A majority of this court feels
that such a defense is not entirely lacking in merit considering the lapse of time
that occurred between commission of the offense and the taking of the
statement, namely eleven hours or so. It is to be noted that in many of our
decisions where the doctrine of res gestae has found acceptance, the imputation
of the guilt of the accused was made immediately after the commission of the
criminal act. It does not mean, however, that appellant is thus entitled to be
absolved of criminal liability. In the first place, the positive identification by the
widow is an obstacle too formidable to overcome.
PEOPLE vs. LAQUINON

135 SCRA 91 (1985)
CONCEPCION, JR., J.
Dying declaration was DENIED
"“But the dying declaration of the deceased Pablo Remonde is not

admissible as an ante-mortem declaration since the deceased was in doubt as to
whether he would die or not. The declaration fails to show that the deceased
believed himself in extremist, "at the point of death when every hope of recovery
is extinct, which is the sole basis for admitting this kind of declarations as an
exception to the hearsay rule."
“It may be admitted, however, as part of the res gestae since the
statement was made immediately after the incident and the deceased Pablo
Remonde had no sufficient time to concoct a charge against the accused.”
20. Expert Opinions

MILAGROS ILAO vs. MAPILE

G.R. No. 154087; October 25, 2005
Tinga, J.
“Indeed, courts are not bound by expert testimonies. They may place
whatever weight they choose upon such testimonies in accordance with the facts
of the case. The relative weight and sufficiency of expert testimony is peculiarly
within the province of the trial court to decide, considering the ability and
character of the witness, his actions upon the witness stand, the weight and
process of the reasoning by which he has supported his opinion, his possible
bias in favor of the side for whom he testifies, and any other matters which serve
to illuminate his statements. The opinion of an expert should be considered by
the court in view of all the facts and circumstances of the case. The problem of
the evaluation of expert testimony is left to the discretion of the trial court whose
ruling thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of an abuse of that discretion.”
In the matter of the petition for the probate of the will of the deceased Pablo
M. Roxas
G.R. No. L-2396. December 1, 1950.
“The positive testimony of the three attesting witnesses ought to prevail

over the expert opinions.” We do not venture to impute bias to the experts
introduced during the trial, but we hasten to state that the positive testimony of
the three attesting witnesses ought to prevail over the expert opinions which
cannot be mathematically precise but which, on the contrary, are "subject to
inherent infirmities." In the instant case, it is significant that while Amadeo M.
Cabe observed that four different fountain pens were used in signing the will,
Jose C. Espinosa was unable to determine whether the same pen was used for
all the signatures. Upon the other hand, Prof. H. Otley Beyer believes that one
pen was used for the testator’s signature, and another pen for the signatures of
witnesses.
“Too much emphasis and effort, through experts Cabe and Espinosa, had
been placed on the supposition that after the body of the will had been
typewritten, the sheet was removed from the machine and, after having been
folded and crumpled, it was replaced in the typewriter for the insertion of the
attestation clause. The law does not require that the will should be written in one
continuous act; and the supposition does not necessarily, much less
conclusively, prove that the signing was not done on one occasion. For the
difference in the ink diffusions and penetrations between the signatures of the
testator and those of the three attesting witnesses may not be due solely to the
folding and crumpling of the sheet on which the will is written, but on such other
factors as class of ink, class of pens, habit of writing, condition of paper, and the
use of blotter. Speculations on these matters should give way to the positive
declarations of the attesting witnesses. The law impliedly recognizes the almost
conclusive weight of the testimony of attesting witnesses when it provides that "if
the will is contested, all the subscribing witnesses present in the Philippines and
not insane, must be produced and examined, and the death, absence, or insanity
of any of them must be satisfactorily shown to the court." (Section 11, Rule 77,
Rules of Court.) .
21. Ordinary Opinions
DELA LLANA v. BIONG

G.R. No. 182356; December 4, 2013
BRION, J
The plaintiff’s medical opinion was not given probative value for the reason
that she was not presented as an expert witness. As an ordinary witness,
she was not competent to testify on the nature, and the cause and effects
of whiplash injury.
“Interestingly, the present case is peculiar in the sense that Dra. dela Llana, as
the plaintiff in this quasi-delict case, was the lone physician-witness during trial.
Significantly, she merely testified as an ordinary witness before the trial court.
Dra. dela Llana essentially claimed in her testimony that Joel’s reckless driving
caused her whiplash injury. Despite the fact that Dra. dela Llana is a physician
and even assuming that she is an expert in neurology, we cannot give weight to
her opinion that Joel’s reckless driving caused her whiplash injury without
violating the rules on evidence.
Under the Rules of Court, there is a substantial difference between an ordinary

witness and an expert witness. The opinion of an ordinary witness may be
received in evidence regarding: (a) the identity of a person about whom he has
adequate knowledge; (b) a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity;
and (c) the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.
Furthermore, the witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion,
behavior, condition or appearance of a person. 43 On the other hand, the opinion
of an expert witness may be received in evidence on a matter requiring special

knowledge, skill, experience or training which he shown to possess.
However, courts do not immediately accord probative value to an admitted expert

testimony, much less to an unobjected ordinary testimony respecting special
knowledge. The reason is that the probative value of an expert testimony does
not lie in a simple exposition of the expert’s opinion.
In the present case, Dra. dela Llana’s medical opinion cannot be given probative
value for the reason that she was not presented as an expert witness. As an
ordinary witness, she was not competent to testify on the nature, and the cause
and effects of whiplash injury. Furthermore, we emphasize that Dra. dela Llana,
during trial, nonetheless did not provide a medical explanation on the nature as
well as the cause and effects of whiplash injury in her testimony.”
PEOPLE vs. CASTILLO

G.R. No. 186533; August 9, 2010
PEREZ, J.
“Section 50, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence explicitly

provides:
SEC. 50. Opinion of ordinary witnesses. – The opinion of a witness for which
proper basis is given, may be received in evidence regarding-
(c) The mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.
The witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion, behavior,
condition or appearance of a person. [Emphasis supplied].
Accordingly, it is competent for the ordinary witness to give his opinion as

to the sanity or mental condition of a person, provided the witness has had
sufficient opportunity to observe the speech, manner, habits, and conduct of the
person in question. Commonly, it is required that the witness details the factors
and reasons upon which he bases his opinion before he can testify as to what it
is. As the Supreme Court of Vermont said: "A non-expert witness may give his
opinion as to the sanity or insanity of another, when based upon conversations or
dealings which he has had with such person, or upon his appearance, or upon
any fact bearing upon his mental condition, with the witness’ own knowledge and
observation, he having first testified to such conversations, dealings, appearance

or other observed facts, as the basis for his opinion."
The mother of an offended party in a rape case, though not a psychiatrist, if she
knows the physical and mental condition of the party, how she was born, what
she is suffering from, and what her attainments are, is competent to testify on the
matter. Thus, even though the Guidance Psychologist who examined AAA may
not qualify as an expert witness, though the psychological tests conducted by her
on AAA may not be accurate to determine AAA’s mental capacity, such
circumstance is not fatal to the prosecution’s cause.”
22. Impugning Character
PEOPLE vs. LEE

G.R. No. 139070; May 29, 2002
PUNO, J.
“Accused-appellant makes capital of Joseph’s bad reputation in their

community. He alleges that the victim’s drug habit led him to commit other crimes
and he may have been shot by any of the persons from whom he had
stolen.30 As proof of Joseph’s bad character, appellant presented Herminia’s
letter to Mayor Malonzo seeking his assistance for Joseph’s rehabilitation from
drugs. On rebuttal, Herminia admitted that she wrote such letter to Mayor
Malonzo but denied anything about her son’s thievery.”
Character evidence is governed by Section 51, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence, viz:
"Section 51. Character evidence not generally admissible; exceptions:--
(a) In Criminal Cases:
(1) The accused may prove his good moral character which is pertinent to
the moral trait involved in the offense charged.
(2) Unless in rebuttal, the prosecution may not prove his bad moral
character which is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense
charged.
(3) The good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved
if it tends to establish in any reasonable degree the probability or
improbability of the offense charged.”
“Character is defined to be the possession by a person of certain qualities

of mind and morals, distinguishing him from others. It is the opinion generally
entertained of a person derived from the common report of the people who are
acquainted with him; his reputation. "Good moral character" includes all the
elements essential to make up such a character; among these are common
honesty and veracity, especially in all professional intercourse; a character that
measures up as good among people of the community in which the person lives,
or that is up to the standard of the average citizen; that status which attaches to a
man of good behavior and upright conduct.
The rule is that the character or reputation of a party is regarded as legally

irrelevant in determining a controversy, so that evidence relating thereto is not
admissible. Ordinarily, if the issues in the case were allowed to be influenced by
evidence of the character or reputation of the parties, the trial would be apt to
have the aspects of a popularity contest rather than a factual inquiry into the
merits of the case. After all, the business of the court is to try the case, and not
the man; and a very bad man may have a righteous cause. There are exceptions
to this rule however and Section 51, Rule 130 gives the exceptions in both
criminal and civil cases.
In criminal cases, sub-paragraph 1 of Section 51 of Rule 130 provides that

the accused may prove his good moral character which is pertinent to the moral
trait involved in the offense charged. When the accused presents proof of his
good moral character, this strengthens the presumption of innocence, and where
good character and reputation are established, an inference arises that the
accused did not commit the crime charged. This view proceeds from the theory
that a person of good character and high reputation is not likely to have
committed the act charged against him. Sub-paragraph 2 provides that the
prosecution may not prove the bad moral character of the accused except only in
rebuttal and when such evidence is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the
offense charged. This is intended to avoid unfair prejudice to the accused who
might otherwise be convicted not because he is guilty but because he is a person
of bad character. The offering of character evidence on his behalf is a privilege of
the defendant, and the prosecution cannot comment on the failure of the
defendant to produce such evidence. Once the defendant raises the issue of his
good character, the prosecution may, in rebuttal, offer evidence of the
defendant’s bad character. Otherwise, a defendant, secure from refutation, would

have a license to unscrupulously impose a false character upon the tribunal.
In the Philippine setting, proof of the moral character of the offended party
is applied with frequency in sex offenses and homicide. In rape and acts of
lasciviousness or in any prosecution involving an unchaste act perpetrated by a
man against a woman where the willingness of a woman is material, the
woman’s character as to her chastity is admissible to show whether or not she
consented to the man’s act. The exception to this is when the woman’s consent
is immaterial such as in statutory rape or rape with violence or intimidation. 47 In
the crimes of qualified seduction or consented abduction, the offended party
must be a "virgin," which is "presumed if she is unmarried and of good
reputation," or a "virtuous woman of good reputation." The crime of simple
seduction involves "the seduction of a woman who is single or a widow of good
reputation, over twelve but under eighteen years of age x x x." The burden of
proof that the complainant is a woman of good reputation lies in the prosecution,
and the accused may introduce evidence that the complainant is a woman of bad
reputation.
In homicide cases, a pertinent character trait of the victim is admissible in

two situations: (1) as evidence of the deceased’s aggression; and (2) as
evidence of the state of mind of the accused. The pugnacious, quarrelsome or
trouble-seeking character of the deceased or his calmness, gentleness and
peaceful nature, as the case may be, is relevant in determining whether the
deceased or the accused was the aggressor. When the evidence tends to prove
self-defense, the known violent character of the deceased is also admissible to
show that it produced a reasonable belief of imminent danger in the mind of the
accused and a justifiable conviction that a prompt defensive action was
necessary.”
PEOPLE vs. SOLIMAN

G.R. No. L-9723; June 28, 1957
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J
“A murder case, the defense tried to prove the violent, quarrelsome or

provocative character of the deceased. where the killing of the victim was
attended by treachery, proof of the victim’s bad character is not necessary. The
presence of this aggravating circumstance negates the necessity of proving the
victim’s bad character to establish the probability or improbability of the offense
charged and, at the same time, qualifies the killing of Joseph Marquez to
murder.”
"x x x While good or bad moral character may be availed of as an aid

to determine the probability or improbability of the commission of an
offense (Section 15, Rule 123), such is not necessary in the crime of
murder where the killing is committed through treachery or
premeditation. The proof of such character may only be allowed in homicide
cases to show "that it has produced a reasonable belief of imminent danger in
the mind of the accused and a justifiable conviction that a prompt defensive
action was necessary (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1952 ed., Vol. 3,
p. 126). This rule does not apply to cases of murder."
23. Good Moral Character
ARRIOLA v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. L-10286; May 23, 1958.
“One of the cardinal qualifications for naturalization provided by law is that

the applicant must be of good moral character and must have conducted himself
in a proper and irreproachable manner during the period of his residence in the
Philippines, in his relations with the constituted government as well as with the
community in which he is living (Sec. 2, paragraph 3, Revised Naturalization
Law). In general, what constitutes "good moral character" is such character that
measures to the standard of the average citizen where the applicant resides. The
word "character" though is not synonymous with "reputation." It simply means
what a person really is, not what he is supposed to be. In other words, the inquiry
of proof in naturalization proceedings is not so much as to the good reputation of
the applicant, but as to his good behavior as an index of actual good moral
character, so that specific acts of bad behavior are material and competent.
Needless to state, this requirement of good moral character applies to the period
up to the date of the hearing (2 Am. Jur. 569; In re Boomer [D. C. Mont. 1922] 79
F. 789, cited in USCA, Title 8, footnote No. 21, p. 436-37). The Court, therefore
can and should consider any act of misconduct which militates against the
applicant in relation to his petition for naturalization."
“After weighing carefully the arguments adduced by the Solicitor General,

We cannot find anything wrong in the behavior of the petitioner or that he is not of
good moral character by reason of the alleged correction of his aforementioned
certificate of residence. There is ample proof on record that the petitioner
presented himself as a Chinese national and when his attention was called to the
fact that in his residence certificate for 1955, which was procured through an
agent, he appeared as a Filipino, which is a false statement of his nationality, he
took the necessary steps to rectify that mistake, and instead of doing it by himself
he went to the person whom he believed to be vested with authority to
accomplish the proper change desired, namely, the Chief of the Residence
Certificate Section, City Treasurer’s Office, Manila, Mr. Rufino Cervantes.”
24. Burden of Proof of Criminal Cases
CRIMINAL CASE REQUIRES PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
MALANA vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 175842; March 18, 2015
LEONEN, J.
“In criminal cases, the prosecution has the onus probandi of establishing
the guilt of the accused. Ei incumbit probatio non qui negat. He who asserts - not
he who denies - must prove. The burden must be discharged by the prosecution
on the strength of its own evidence, not on the weakness of that for the defense.
Hence, circumstantial evidence that has not been adequately established, much
less corroborated, cannot be the basis of conviction. Suspicion alone is
insufficient, the required quantum of evidence being proof beyond reasonable
doubt. Indeed, "the sea of suspicion has no shore, and the court that embarks
upon it is without rudder or compass."
“It must be stressed that in our criminal justice system, the overriding
consideration is not whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused, but
whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to their guilt. Where there is no moral
certainty as to their guilt, they must be acquitted even though their innocence
may be questionable. The constitutional right to be presumed innocent until

proven guilty can be overthrown only by proof beyond reasonable doubt.”
PEOPLE vs. GANGUSO

G.R. No. 115430; November 23, 1995
“An accused has in his favor the presumption of innocence which the Bill
of Rights guarantees. Unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt, he
must be acquitted. This reasonable doubt standard is demanded by the due
process clause of the Constitution which protects the accused from conviction
except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute
the crime with which he is charged. The burden of proof is on the prosecution,
and unless it discharges that burden the accused need not even offer evidence in
his behalf, and he would be entitled to an acquittal. Proof beyond reasonable
doubt does not, of course, mean such degree of proof as, excluding the
possibility of error, produce absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or
that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The
conscience must be satisfied that the accused is responsible for the offense
charged.
Well-entrenched in jurisprudence is the rule that the conviction of the

accused must rest, not on the weakness of the defense, but on the strength of
the prosecution. The burden is on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, not on the accused to prove his innocence.”
DAAYATA vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 205745; March 8, 2017
“Conviction in criminal actions demands proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Rule 133, Section 2 of the Revised Rules on Evidence states:
Section 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. - In a criminal case, the

accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable
doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as,
excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is
required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced
mind.”
“While not impelling such a degree of proof as to establish absolutely

impervious certainty, the quantum of proof required in criminal cases
nevertheless charges the prosecution with the immense responsibility of
establishing moral certainty, a certainty that ultimately appeals to a person's very
conscience. While indeed imbued with a sense of altruism, this imperative is
borne, not by a mere abstraction, but by constitutional necessity.”
“This rule places upon the prosecution the task of establishing the guilt of
an accused, relying on the strength of its own evidence, and not banking on the
weakness of the defense of an accused. Requiring proof beyond reasonable
doubt finds basis not only in the due process clause of the Constitution, but
similarly, in the right of an accused to be "presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved." "Undoubtedly, it is the constitutional presumption of innocence that lays
such burden upon the prosecution." Should the prosecution fail to discharge its
burden, it follows, as a matter of course, that an accused must be acquitted.”
25. Burden of Proof of Civil Cases
BP OIL AND CHEMICALS INTERNATIONAL PHILIPPINES vs. TOTAL

DISTRIBUTION & LOGISTIC SYSTEMS, INC.
G.R. No. 214406; February 6, 2017
“It is basic that whoever alleges a fact has the burden of proving it
because a mere allegation is not evidence. In civil cases, the burden of proof is
on the party who would be defeated if no evidence is given on either side. 18 The
RTC's denial of TDLSI's Demurrer to Evidence shows and proves that petitioner
had indeed laid a prima facie case in support of its claim. Having been ruled that
petitioner's claim is meritorious, the burden of proof, therefore, was shifted to
TDLSI to controvert petitioner's prima facie case.”
“Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court mandates that in civil cases, the
party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of
evidence. By preponderance of evidence, according to Raymundo v. Lunaria,
means that the evidence as a whole adduced by one side is superior to that of the
other. It refers to the weight, credit and value of the aggregate evidence on either
side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term “greater weight of
evidence” or “greater weight of the credible evidence.” It is evidence which is
more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in
opposition thereto. “
RAYMUNDO vs. LUNARIA

G.R. No. 171036; October 17, 2008
QUISUMBING, J.
“Respondents counter that the appellate court did not require petitioners to
prove the existence of the subsequent oral agreement by more than a mere
preponderance of evidence. What the appellate court said is that the
petitioners failed to prove and establish the alleged subsequent verbal
agreement even by mere preponderance of evidence.
Petitioners’ above-cited allegation has no merit. By preponderance of

evidence is meant that the evidence as a whole adduced by one side is superior
to that of the other. It refers to the weight, credit and value of the aggregate
evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the
term "greater weight of evidence" or "greater weight of the credible
evidence". It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of
belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.”
26. Burden of Proof in Administrative Cases
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE REQUIRES ONLY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
MIRO vs. MENDOZA

G.R. Nos. 172532 172544–45 / November 20, 2013
BRION, J.
“Substantial evidence is defined as such amount of relevant evidence

which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It is
more than a mere scintilla of evidence. The standard of substantial evidence is
satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe, based on the evidence
submitted, that the respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of. It
need not be overwhelming or preponderant, as is required in an ordinary civil
case, or evidence beyond reasonable doubt, as is required in criminal cases, but
the evidence must be enough for a reasonable mind to support a conclusion.
GARCISO vs. OCA

(AM No. P-11–3019 — Supreme Court of the Philippines / March 2012)
“In the hierarchy of evidentiary values, substantial evidence, or that

amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable man might accept as adequate
to justify a conclusion, is the lowest standard of proof provided under the Rules of
Court.”
PRIMO C. MIRO vs. REYNALDO M. DOSONO

G.R. No. 170697; April 30, 2010
“As an administrative proceeding, the evidentiary bar against which the

evidence at hand is measured is not the highest quantum of proof beyond
reasonable doubt, requiring moral certainty to support affirmative findings.
Instead, the lowest standard of substantial evidence, that is, such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind will accept as adequate to support a conclusion,
applies. Because administrative liability attaches so long as there is some
evidence adequate to support the conclusion that acts constitutive of the
administrative offense have been performed (or have not been performed),
reasonable doubt does not ipso facto result in exoneration unlike in criminal
proceedings where guilt must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. This
hornbook doctrinal distinction undergirds our parallel findings of administrative
liability and criminal acquittal on reasonable doubt for charges arising from the
same facts.”
DE JESUS vs. GUERRERO

G.R. NO. 171491 : September 4, 2009
QUISUMBING, J.
“In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a

finding of guilt is substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Further,
the complainant has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the
allegations in his complaint. The basic rule is that mere allegation is not evidence
and is not equivalent to proof. Charges based on mere suspicion and speculation
likewise cannot be given credence. Hence, when the complainant relies on mere
conjectures and suppositions, and fails to substantiate his allegations, the
administrative complaint must be dismissed for lack of merit.”
“To further persuade us that his complaint was wrongly dismissed,

petitioner argues that he had in his petition established the existence of probable
cause to hold respondents liable for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No.
3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. He then concludes that "if
there is sufficient basis to indict the respondents of a criminal offense then with
more reason that they should be made accountable administratively considering
the fact that the quantum of evidence required in administrative proceedings is
merely substantial evidence."
“More importantly, an administrative proceeding is different from a criminal

case and may proceed independently thereof. Even if respondents would
subsequently be found guilty of a crime based on the same set of facts obtaining
in the present administrative complaint, the same will not automatically mean that
they are also administratively liable.”
“It must be stressed that the basis of administrative liability differs from
criminal liability. The purpose of administrative proceedings is mainly to protect
the public service, based on the time-honored principle that a public office is a
public trust. On the other hand, the purpose of criminal prosecution is the
punishment of crime. To state it simply, petitioner erroneously equated criminal
liability to administrative liability.”
27. Burden-Shifting (or when does burden shift?)
PEOPLE vs. VILLANUEVA

506 SCRA 280
“… when the prosecution has succeeded in discharging the burden of

proof by presenting evidence sufficient to convince the court of the truth of the
allegations in the Information, or has established a prima facie case against the
accused, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused making it incumbent upon
him to adduce evidence in order to meet and nullify, if not overthrow, that prima
facie evidence.”
DE LEON vs. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 184565; November 20, 2013
The party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it.
“Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court defines "burden of proof" as

"the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to
establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law." In civil
cases, the burden of proof rests upon the plaintiff, who is required to establish his
case by a preponderance of evidence. Once the plaintiff has established his
case, the burden of evidence shifts to the defendant, who, in turn, has the
burden to establish his defense.”
“In this case, respondent BPI, as plaintiff, had to prove that petitioner-
spouses failed to pay their obligations under the Promissory Note. Petitioner-
spouses, on the other hand, had to prove their defense that the obligation was
extinguished by the loss of the mortgaged vehicle, which was insured.”
28. Weak defenses: Denial and Alibi
PEOPLE vs. PALOMAR

G.R. Nos. 108183-85; August 21, 1997
Alibi as a Defense
“Alibi is one of the weakest defenses not only because it is inherently frail
and unreliable, but also because it is easy to fabricate and difficult to check or
rebut. It cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by
eyewitnesses who had no improper motive to testify falsely. Appellant Dione
Palomar was positively identified by Susan Cadiente as the culprit who
mercilessly hacked her two younger brothers. 56 She also pointed to Hermie
Ceriales as the killer of her father 57 and to Jose Ceriales as a member of the
group who ganged up on her husband, Gaudencio Cadiente. 58
Appellant Jose Ceriales testified that on April 30, 1985, the day of the
massacre, he was in Sitio Lumantao. 59 Appellant Hermie Ceriales also testified
that he was sowing rice in Sitio Lumantao at that time. 60 Well-settled is the rule
that alibi can prevail only if it is shown that it was physically impossible for the
accused to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.
Whether the walking time from Sitio Lumantao to Sitio Mamok where the crime
was committed was one hour as testified to by Hermie, or 30 minutes as stated
by Jose, appellants clearly failed to prove the physical impossibility of their
presence at the crime scene. Under the circumstances, appellants’ alibis are
clearly untenable.”
PEOPLE v. ALBERTO FORTUNA ALBERCA

G.R. No. 217459, June 07, 2017
“Denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses and must be brushed aside
when the prosecution has sufficiently and positively ascertained the identity of
the accused. And as often stressed, a categorical and positive identification of an
accused, without any showing of ill-motive on the part of the witness testifying on
the matter, prevails over denial, which is a negative and self-serving evidence
undeserving of real weight in law unless substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence.”
PEOPLE vs. PENASO

G.R. No. 121980. February 23, 2000
“We find complainant’s testimony credible, while appellant’s defenses of

alibi and denial are lacking in truth and candor. Nothing is more settled in criminal
law jurisprudence than that alibi and denial cannot prevail over the positive and
categorical testimony of the complainant. Alibi is an inherently weak defense,
which is viewed with suspicion and received with caution because it can easily be
fabricated. Denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be buttressed with
strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility. We find that despite his
stance that several persons watched him demonstrate how to cook banana chips
in Ubay, Bohol in the morning of November 16, 1989, appellant failed to present
any disinterested witness to support his claim. For alibi to prosper, it is not
enough that accused show he was elsewhere at the time the crime was
committed, but there must also be clear and convincing proof that it was
impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of its commission.
With respect to the appellant’s claim that the victim was attending her
classes at the time she was raped, we note that complainant’s explanation that it
was their vacant period, was not rebutted by the defense. All told, we see no
reason to depart from the rule that positive identification of the malefactor prevails
over the defenses of alibi and denial.”
29. Presumption of Innocence: Denial and Alibi
PEOPLE V. ABARIDES
G.R. No. 235778, November 21, 2018
“In criminal prosecutions, a person who stands charged of a crime enjoys

the presumption of innocence, as enshrined in the Bill of Rights. He is designated
as the accused precisely because the allegations against him have to be proven
beyond reasonable doubt. Due process dictates that an accused is entitled to a
fair trial where both the prosecution and defense can present their respective
versions of the events, and submit proof thereon. Accusation does not amount to
conviction. Only when the prosecution has established guilt beyond reasonable
doubt shall the presumption of innocence be overturned. In this case, the
prosecution did not overcome the burden of proof.
It is well settled that in the absence of facts or circumstances of weight and

substance that would affect the result of the case, appellate courts will not
overturn the factual findings of the trial court. A factual question would necessitate
the reevaluation of the evidence submitted before the trial court. However, this is
allowed in the exceptional circumstance where the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of the facts. Such is the situation in this case.”
Positive identification v. denial and alibi
While positive testimony is generally given more weight than the defenses
of denial and alibi which are held to be inherently weak defenses because they
can be easily fabricated, this does not mean that the defense of denial and alibi
should be easily dismissed by the Court as untrue.
Thus, if found credible, the defenses of denial and alibi may, and should,
be considered complete and legitimate defenses. The burden of proof does not
shift by the mere invocation of said defenses; the presumption of innocence
remains in favor of the accused.”
LEJANO vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 176389; December 14, 2010
“But not all denials and alibis should be regarded as fabricated.

Indeed, if the accused is truly innocent, he can have no other defense but
denial and alibi. So how can such accused penetrate a mind that has been
made cynical by the rule drilled into his head that a defense of alibi is a
hangman's noose in the face of a witness positively swearing, "I saw him do it."?
Most judges believe that such assertion automatically dooms an alibi which is so
easy to fabricate. This quick stereotype thinking, however, is distressing. For how
else can the truth that the accused is really innocent have any chance of
prevailing over such a stone-cast tenet?
There is only one way. A judge must keep an open mind. He must guard
against slipping into hasty conclusion, often arising from a desire to quickly finish
the job of deciding a case. A positive declaration from a witness that he saw the
accused commit the crime should not automatically cancel out the accused's
claim that he did not do it. A lying witness can make as positive an identification
as a truthful witness can. The lying witness can also say as forthrightly and
unequivocally, "He did it!" without blinking an eye.”
PEOPLE vs. MAGUING y SALIGUMBA

G.R. No. 144090. June 26, 2003
When Positive Identification

Does Not Prevail Over Alibi
“In passing, we shall discuss the jurisprudential rule regarding the defense
of alibi vis--vis the positive identification made by a credible witness. Although
such defense is inherently weak, the prosecution is not released from its burden
of establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. More important,
before a court can apply the rule that positive identification prevails over alibi, it is
necessary to first establish beyond question the credibility of the eyewitness as to
the identification of the accused. In the present case, such credibility was not
established. Hence, there can be no positive identification to speak of, and no
application of the aforementioned rule.
The defense of alibi becomes irrelevant when the prosecution fails to

establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. A conviction for the
crime of murder cannot be based on the appellants inherently weak defenses of
denial and alibi. Rather, guilt should be premised on the strength of the
prosecutions evidence.”
“While the defenses of denial and alibi are concededly weak, appellants
conviction cannot be based thereon. It is a well-settled doctrine that it is
incumbent upon the prosecution to uphold the Peoples cause based on the
strength of its own evidence on the guilt of the accused. The burden of proof is on
the prosecution to show to the court to the point of moral certainty that the
accused indeed committed the offense charged. In the case at hand, the
prosecution, armed with evidence secured by police investigators, failed to
discharge its appointed task of proving the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. Hence, by constitutional mandate, appellant deserves

exoneration.
In our criminal justice system, the overriding consideration is whether the

court reasonably doubts, not the innocence, but the guilt of the accused. Unless
the identity of the culprit is established beyond reasonable doubt to the exclusion
of all others, the charge must be dismissed on the ground that the constitutional
presumption of innocence has not been overcome. While proof beyond
reasonable doubt does not mean absolute certainty, it connotes that degree of
proof which, after an investigation of the whole record, produces in an
unprejudiced mind the moral certainty that the accused is culpable.”
“In this case, the quantum of proof required to justify a conviction for a
criminal offense was not satisfied by the prosecution. Thus, the Court has no
option but to uphold the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of
appellant.”
30. Motive
PEOPLE vs. BALLINAS

202 SCRA 516 (1991)
“At any rate, motive becomes relevant, and its absence may assume
determinative significance, only when the accused has not been positively
identified, and proof thereof becomes essential only when evidence of
commission of the crime is purely circumstantial or is inconclusive. This Court
has time and again ruled that lack of motive does not preclude conviction when
the crime and the participation of the accused therein are definitely established.
Furthermore, the appellant has not shown why these witnesses should falsely
charge him. No iota of evidence has been presented to suggest that there
existed any evil motive on the part of the witnesses to implicate the appellant.
Nor has it been shown that there was an existing animosity between the
appellant and the witnesses sufficient to motivate or impel the latter to perjure
themselves. We find no reason therefore for the witnesses to incriminate the
appellant other than to tell the truth as they had witnessed it.
Where there is no evidence, and nothing to indicate that the principal witness for
the prosecution was actuated by improper motives, the presumption is that he
was not so actuated and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.”
PEOPLE vs. CRONICO

G.R. No. 226158; November 8, 2017
CAGUIOA, J.
Motive is not an essential element of the crime and the absence

thereof does not preclude a finding of guilt.
“Finally, insisting on his innocence, Liberato makes the claim that the CA
erred in convicting him despite the prosecution's failure to establish a motive for
the killing. Liberato is gravely mistaken.
Motive pertains to the reason which prompts the accused to engage in a

particular criminal activity. It is not an essential element of a crime and need not
be proven by the State in criminal prosecutions. Hence, proof of motive alone will
not establish guilt in the same way that the absence thereof cannot establish
innocence. In previous occasions, the Court has held that the question of motive
only becomes material when there is doubt as to the identity of the malefactor
committing the offense charged. Here, the totality of circumstantial evidence on
record sufficiently dispels any doubt that Liberato was responsible for the ghastly
death of Vivian.”
PEOPLE v. RENDAJE
G.R. No. 136745. November 15, 2000
Lack of Motive
“Due to the lack of direct evidence to establish the identity of the assailant,
appellant insists that proof of motive becomes essential. However, as already
discussed, the Court believes that the prosecution has established his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. It was able to pinpoint him, to the exclusion of all other
persons, as the one responsible for the crime. Thus, the presence or the absence
of motive is not essential.”
31. Conclusive Presumption
ERMITAÑO v. PAGLAS
G.R. No. 174436; January 23, 2013
“The conclusive presumption found in Section 2 (b), Rule 131 of the Rules
of Court, known as estoppel against tenants, provides as follows:
Sec. 2. Conclusive presumptions. The following are instances of

conclusive presumptions:
(b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of
the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them.
(Emphasis supplied).
It is clear from the above quoted provision that what a tenant is estopped
from denying is the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the
landlord-tenant relation. If the title asserted is one that is alleged to have been
acquired subsequent to the commencement of that relation, the presumption will
not apply. Hence, the tenant may show that the landlord's title has expired or
been conveyed to another or himself; and he is not estopped to deny a claim for
rent, if he has been ousted or evicted by title paramount. In the present case,
what respondent is claiming is her supposed title to the subject property which
she acquired subsequent to the commencement of the landlord-tenant relation
between her and petitioner. Hence, the presumption under Section 2 (b), Rule
131 of the Rules of Court does not apply.”
OCAMPO vs. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES

591 SCRA 562, 571; 2009
“It is well settled that a document acknowledged before a notary public is a

public document that enjoys the presumption of regularity. It is a prima
facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated therein and a conclusive
presumption of its existence and due execution. To overcome this presumption,
there must be presented evidence that is clear and convincing. Absent such
evidence, the presumption must be upheld. In addition, one who denies the due
execution of a deed where one's signature appears has the burden of proving that
contrary to the recital in the jurat, one never appeared before the notary public
and acknowledged the deed to be a voluntary act. We have also held that a
notarized instrument is admissible in evidence without further proof of its due
execution and is conclusive as to the truthfulness of its contents, and has in its
favor the presumption of regularity.
32. Disputable Presumption

PEOPLE vs. LANURIAS

G.R. No. 207662, April 13, 2016
“The application of disputable presumption found in Section 3 (j), Rule 131

of the Rules of Court, that a person found in possession of a thing taken in the
doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and doer of the whole act, in this case
the alleged carnapping and the homicide/murder of its owner, is limited to cases
where such possession is either unexplained or that the proffered explanation is
rendered implausible in view of independent evidence inconsistent thereto. In the
instant case, accused-appellant set-up a defense of denial of the charges and
adhered to his unrebutted version of the story that the vehicle had been sold to
him by the brothers Alex and Ricky Bautista. Though the explanation is not
seamless, once the explanation is made for the possession, the presumption
arising from the unexplained possession may not anymore be invoked and the
burden shifts once more to the prosecution to produce evidence that would render
the defense of the accused improbable. And this burden, the prosecution was
unable to discharge.”
“Evidently, the disputable presumption cannot prevail over accused-

appellant’s explanation for his possession of the missing vehicle. The possession
having been explained, the legal presumption is disputed and thus, cannot find
application in the instant case. To hold otherwise would be a miscarriage of
justice as criminal convictions necessarily requires proof of guilt of the crime
charged beyond reasonable doubt and in the absence of such proof, should not
be solely based on legal disputable presumptions.
The carnapping not being duly proved, the killing of the victim may not be
treated as an incident of carnapping. Nonetheless, even under the provisions of
homicide and murder under the Revised Penal Code, the Court finds the guilt of
accused-appellant was not established beyond reasonable doubt.”
PEOPLE vs. SIPIN
G.R. No. 224290, June 11, 2018
“Presumption of regular performance of official duty and

preservation of the integrity of evidence –– Invocation of the disputable
presumptions that the police officers regularly performed their official duty and
that the integrity of the evidence is presumed to be preserved, will not suffice to
uphold appellant’s conviction; judicial reliance on the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duty despite the lapses in the procedures undertaken
by the agents of the law is fundamentally flawed because the lapses themselves
are affirmative proofs of irregularity; the presumption may only arise when there is
a showing that the apprehending officers/team followed the requirements of Sec.
21 or when the saving clause found in the IRR is successfully triggered; here, the
presumption of regularity had been contradicted and overcome by evidence of
non-compliance with the law.”
PEOPLE vs. TOMAWIS
G.R. NO. 228890, APRIL 18, 2018
“Public officers generally enjoy the presumption of regularity in the

performance of official functions; this is a disputable presumption provided under
Sec. 3(m) of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court; the presumption can be overturned
only if evidence is presented to prove that the public officers were not properly
performing their duty or they were inspired by improper motive; in drugs cases,
more stringent standards must be used for the presumption of regularity to apply.”
33. Suppressing evidence
PEOPLE vs. JALBUENA

G.R. No. 171163, July 4, 2007
“Failure of the prosecution to present a certain witness and to proffer a

plausible explanation does not amount to willful suppression of evidence since
the prosecutor has the discretion/prerogative to determine the witnesses he is
going to present.
PEOPLE vs. TORRES

G.R. NO. 82263 June 26,1992
“Well-established is the rule that when the inculpatory facts and

circumstances are capable of two (2) or more explanations, one of which is
consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his
guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not
sufficient to support a conviction. In the present case, accused-appellant's

version of the circumstances leading to his apprehension constitutes a total
denial of the prosecution's allegations. In this regard, this Court has ruled that
when there is such a divergence of accounts —
it becomes incumbent upon the prosecution to rebut appellant's

allegations by presenting . . . the alleged poseur-buyer. This it failed to do,
giving rise to the presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be
adverse if produced. (Rule 131, Sec. 5[e]). This failure constitutes a total
flaw in the prosecution's evidence since the so-called informant who was
never presented as a witness and never identified, is the best witness for
the prosecution. . .."(emphasis supplied)
34. Presumption of Regularity in Performing Official Functions
YAP vs. LAGTAPON

G.R. No. 196347; January 23, 2017
“The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties is an aid

to the effective and unhampered administration of government functions. Without
such benefit, every official action could be negated with minimal effort from
litigants, irrespective of merit or sufficiency of evidence to support such challenge.
To this end, our body of jurisprudence has been consistent in requiring nothing
short of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary to overthrow such
presumption.
It is axiomatic that a public official enjoys the presumption of regularity in

the discharge of one's official duties and functions. Here, in the absence of clear
indicia of partiality or malice, the service of Summons on petitioner Yap is
perforce deemed regular and valid.
Hence, as far as the circumstances attendant to the service of Summons

are concerned, the Court has the right to rely on the factual representation of
Precio so that service had indeed been made on petitioner Yap in person. A
contrary rule would reduce the Court to a mere fact-finding tribunal at the expense
of efficiency in the administration of justice, which, as mentioned earlier, is
beyond the ambit of the Court's jurisdiction in a Rule 45 petition.
To successfully overcome such presumption of regularity, case law

demands that the evidence against it must be clear and convincing; absent the
requisite quantum of proof to the contrary, the presumption stands deserving of

faith and credit. In this case, the burden of proof to discharge such presumption
lay with petitioner Yap.”
PEOPLE vs. BADARANG

G.R. No. 189351; April 10, 2013
“Further, the testimonies of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust
are generally accorded full faith and credit, in view of the presumption of regularity
in the performance of public duties. Hence, when lined against an
unsubstantiated denial or claim of frame-up, the testimony of the officers who
caught the accused red-handed is given more weight and usually prevails. In
order to overcome the presumption of regularity, jurisprudence teaches us that
there must be clear and convincing evidence that the police officers did not
properly perform their duties or that they were prompted with ill-motive.”
“In the case at bar, appellant did not cast any allegation of, much less
proved, any ill motive on the part of the police officers who conducted the buy-
bust operation that ensnared her. Thus, in view of the foregoing, this Court has no
other recourse but to affirm her conviction.”
PEOPLE vs. MENDOZA

G.R. No. 192432; June 23, 2014
“We have fittingly explained the superiority of the presumption of

innocence over the lesser presumption of regularity of performance of official
duty,as follows:
We have usually presumed the regularity of performance of their official

duties in favor of the members of buy-bust teams enforcing our laws against the
illegal sale of dangerous drugs. Such presumption is based on three fundamental
reasons, namely: first, innocence, and not wrong-doing, is to be
presumed; second, an official oath will not be violated; and, third, a republican
form of government cannot survive long unless a limit is placed upon
controversies and certain trust and confidence reposed in each governmental
department or agent by every other such department or agent, at least to the
extent of such presumption. But the presumption is rebuttable by affirmative
evidence of irregularity or of any failure to perform a duty. Judicial reliance on the
presumption despite any hint of irregularity in the procedures undertaken by the

agents of the law will thus be fundamentally unsound because such hint is itself
affirmative proof of irregularity.
The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty stands only

when no reason exists in the records by which to doubt the regularity of the
performance of official duty. And even in that instance the presumption of
regularity will not be stronger than the presumption of innocence in favor of the
accused. Otherwise, a mere rule of evidence will defeat the constitutionally
enshrined right to be presumed innocent.”
PEOPLE vs. CATALAN

G.R. No. 199689; March 12, 2014
“We remind the lower courts that the presumption of regularity in the
performance of duty could not prevail over the stronger presumption of innocence
favoring the accused. Otherwise, the constitutional guarantee of the accused
being presumed innocent would be held subordinate to a mere rule of evidence
allocating the burden of evidence. Where, like here, the proof adduced against
the accused has not even overcome the presumption of innocence, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of duty could not be a factor to
adjudge the accused guilty of the crime charged.
Moreover, the regularity of the performance of their duty could not be

properly presumed in favor of the policemen because the records were replete
with indicia of their serious lapses. As a rule, a presumed fact like the regularity of
performance by a police officer must be inferred only from an established basic
fact, not plucked out from thin air. To say it differently, it is the established basic
fact that triggers the presumed fact of regular performance. Where there is any
hint of irregularity committed by the police officers in arresting the accused and
thereafter, several of which we have earlier noted, there can be no presumption of
regularity of performance in their favor.”
35. Leading Questions
PEOPLE vs. LIMBO

G.R. No. L-24810; March 29, 1926
“In this case the mind, incapable of reasoning, only reflects, like an echo,
the idea suggested. Professor Ed. Claparede, Director of the Psychological
Laboratory of the University of Geneva in his work "What is the Value of

Evidence" says: "'In the giving of evidence suggestion plays a most important
part. The simple fact of questioning a witness, of pressing him to answer,
enormously increases the risk of errors in his evidence. The form of the question
also influences the value of the reply that is made to it. Let us suppose, for
instance, that some persons are questioned about the color of a certain dog. The
replies are likely to be much more correct if we ask the witnesses, "What is (was)
the color of the dog?" than if we were to say to them, "Was the dog white, or was
it brown?" The question will be positively suggestive if we ask, "Was the dog
white?" . . . A leading question propounded to a witness may, by creating an
inference in his mind, cause him to testify in accordance with the suggestion
conveyed by the question; his answer may be "rather an echo to the question"
than a genuine recollection of events . . . ." (Moore on Facts, vol. II, p. 913, 914.)”
“This same thing that happens to ordinary witnesses is far worse when the
witnesses are aged and ignorant and therefore we should not discredit the
testimony of a witness who is old just because he has made some contradictions
during a long and tedious cross-examination. (Op. Cit., pp. 810-1410.) This is
exactly what happened to the government witnesses Calixto Macaraig and Petra
Vergara. These witnesses were subjected to a long series of questions on cross-
examination, the majority of which were leading. Old age and ignorance, together
with weariness, could not resist the psychological influence of those leading
questions which, as will be seen by their answers, are but the echo of such
questions.”
SUAREZ vs. JUDGE TENGCO

G.R. No. L-17113; May 23, 1961
“We think the lower court did not err in directing petitioner to take the
witness stand. No legal impediment exists against a litigant calling any of the
adverse parties to be his witness. In fact, Section 83, Rule 123 of the Rules
provides —
A party may interrogate any unwilling or hostile witness by leading questions. A

party may call an adverse party . . ., and interrogate him by leading questions
and contradict and impeach him in all respects as if he had been called by the
adverse party, and the witness thus called may be contradicted and impeached
by or on behalf of the adverse party also, and may be cross-examined by the
adverse party only upon the subject-matter of his examination in chief.”
(Emphasis supplied)
36. Misleading Questions
PEOPLE vs. JUDGE ESTENZO

G.R. No. L-41166 August 25, 1976
“There is an additional advantage to be obtained in requiring that the direct

testimony of the witness be given orally ill court. Rules governing the examination
of witnesses are intended to protect the rights of litigants and to secure orderly
dispatch of the business of the courts. Under the rules, only questions directed to
the eliciting of testimony which, under the general rules of evidence, is relevant to,
and competent to prove, the issue of the case, may be propounded to the
witness. A witness in testify only on those facts which he knows of his own
knowledge.
Thus, on direct examination, leading questions are not allowed, except or,
preliminary matters, or when there is difficult in getting direct and intelligible
answer from the witness who is ignorant, a child of tender years, or feebleminded,
or a deaf mute. It is obvious that such purpose may be subverted, and the orderly
dispatch of the business of the courts thwarted if trial judges are allowed, as in the
case at bar, to adopt any procedure in the presentation of evidence other than
what is specifically authorized by the Rules of Court.”
37. IMPEACHING A WITNESS’ TESTIMONY
G.R. No. 126781

September 13, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CALIXTO ZINAMPAN, ARTEMIO APOSTOL, ROGER ALLAN (all at large), and ELVIS
DOCA, accused.
ELVIS DOCA, accused-appellant.
The appellant may not validly impeach the credibility of MarlynCalaycay on the basis of
the entry in the police blotter of the Tuguegarao, Cagayan police pertaining to the
robbery and killing on December 8, 1988. Appellant claimed that the pertinent entry in
the said police blotter which was elicited from prosecution witness Calaycay does not
reflect any names of the alleged perpetrators of the crime contrary to her testimony
during the trial of the instant criminal case that she knew the names of the malefactors
even prior to December 8, 1988. In impeaching a witness by evidence of prior
inconsistent statements, Section 13, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court provides
that:
SEC. 13. How witness impeached by evidence of inconsistent statements — Before a
witness can be impeached by evidence that he has made at other times statements
inconsistent with his present testimony, the statements must be related to him, with the
circumstances of the times and places and the persons present, and he must be asked
whether he made such statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the statements
be in writing they must be shown to the witness before any question is put to him
concerning them.
The Solicitor General correctly noted that appellant's counsel never confronted
MarlynCalaycay during the proceedings in the trial court regarding the entries in the
police blotter to give her the opportunity to confirm or deny authorship thereof, and in
case of the former, to explain the alleged discrepancy. It has been held that previous
inconsistent statements cannot serve as bases for impeaching the credibility of a
witness unless his attention was first directed to the discrepancies and he was then
given the opportunity to explain them.
G.R. No. 122740

March 30, 1998

vs.
WINSTON DE GUZMAN, accused-appellant.
The records disclose that at the trial, counsel for appellant tried to utilize the testimony
of complainant given in the preliminary investigation before Judge Rodolfo A. Castro to
impeach her through statements therein supposedly different from what she gave in
court.Alluding to her answer to Judge Castro's questions numbered 28 and 29,20
appellant's counsel asked complainant if she first reported the rape to one
DionesonBayno. Complainant duly corrected that statement and clarified that it was
Mauricia and Hugo Bayno whom she first told about the incident.
However, complainant was never confronted during the proceedings in the trial court
with her answers allegedly given in the same testimony at the preliminary investigation
regarding appellant's resort to sleep-including chemicals. In fact, no sub-markings for

such particular answers as exhibits were made in the records of her testimony in the
preliminary investigation, much less offered by the counsel of appellant for that purpose
during the trial of the case.
It is universally accepted that a witness cannot be impeached by evidence of
contradictory or prior inconsistent statements until the proper foundation or predicate
has been duly laid by the party against whom said witness was called.22 The American
rule on laying the predicate is embodied in Rule 132 of our own Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 13. How witness impeached by evidence of inconsistent statements. Before a

witness can be impeached by evidence that he has made at other times statements
inconsistent with his present testimony, the statements must be related to him, with the
circumstances of the times and places and the persons present, and he must be asked
whether he made such statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the statements
be in writing they must be shown to the witness before any question is put to him
concerning them.
Although the whole record of the testimony of complainant at the preliminary

examination was offered in evidence by the defense and admitted by the trial court,
complainant cannot now be discredited through any of her extrajudicial statements
which were not brought to her attention during the trial. Thus, it has been held that
granting arguendo the alleged contradictions, previous statements cannot serve as
bases for impeaching the credibility of a witness unless his attention was first directed to
the discrepancies and he was then given an opportunity to explain them.
38. IRREGULARITIES IN A TESTIMONY
G.R. No. 202206

March 05, 2018
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
TENG MONER Y ADAM, Accused-Appellants.
Inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that were pointed out by
Moner consist merely of minor variances that do not deviate from the main narrative
which is the fact that Moner sold illegal drugs to a poseur-buyer. It has been held, time
and again, that minor inconsistencies and contradictions in the declarations of
witnesses do not destroy the witnesses' credibility but even enhance their truthfulness
as they erase any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony.11 It bears stressing, too, that the
determination by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses, when affirmed by the
appellate court, is accorded full weight and credit as well as great respect, if not
conclusive effect.
39. FOREIGN JUDGMENT
G.R. No. 196049

June 26, 2013
MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,
vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF
QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF

THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, RESPONDENTS.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of

Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen
of a foreign country.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to
prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a
copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under
Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of
Court. Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official
publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the
judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the
certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine
foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign
judgment would mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions,
including the form and contents of the petition,theservice of summons, the investigation
of the public prosecutor,the setting of pre-trial,the trial and the judgment of the trial
court. This is absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of
recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and
issues."
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition
and legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not
automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine
courts must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy
and other mandatory laws. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese
Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous
marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code.
Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove
the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132,
Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
40. UNOFFERED PIECES OF EVIDENCE
G.R. No. 174673

January 11, 2016
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

VS.
FE ROA GIMENEZ AND IGNACIO B. GIMENEZ, Respondents.
ACCORDINGLY, there being no valid and cogent justification shown by the plaintiff for
the Court to Grant its Motion for Reconsideration and admit its Formal Offer of
Evidence, the plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Formal Offer
of Evidence is DENIED. The Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence filed by the
defendant Ignacio B. Gimenez and adopted by defendant Fe Roa Gimenez is
GRANTED. The case is then DISMISSED.
G.R. No. 182805

April 22, 2015
HEIRS OF SERAPIO MABBORANG: LAURIANO MABBORANG, DOMINGO

MABBORANG, ENCARNACION MABBORANG, FELIX MABBORANG, FAUSTINA
MABBORANG, ELIAS MABBORANG, ALBERTA MABBORANG; HEIRS OF REGINO
MABBORANG: JOSE MABBORANG, DIONICIA MABBORANG, SOTERA
MABBORANG, MARIANO MABBORANG; HEIRS OF SUSANA MABBORANG:
CECILIA UBIÑA-OCAB and CANDIDA U. TAGUIGA; SEGUNDA MABBORANG;
HEIRS OF VICTORINO MABBORANG: JUAN MABBORANG, JR., SERVANDO
MABBORANG; AND HEIRS OF VICENTE MABBORANG: MARIANO MABBORANG,
MARTIN MABBORANG, LUZ MABBORANG-CARILLO, Petitioners,
vs.
HERMOGENES MABBORANG and BENJAMIN MABBORANG, Respondents
Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that "the court shall consider no
evidence which has not been formally offered." This is to enable the trial judge to know
the purpose or purposes for which the proponent is presenting the evidence. Also, it
allows opposing parties to examine the evidence and object to its admissibility. A formal
offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their findings of facts and
judgment strictly and only upon the evidence offered by the parties at trial.
Consequently, review by the appellate court is facilitated for it will not be required to
review documents not previously scrutinized by the trial court. Hence, strict adherence
to this basic procedural rule is required, lest evidence cannot be assigned any
evidentiary weight or value:
Thus, the trial court is bound to consider only the testimonial evidence presented and
exclude the documents not offered. Documents which may have been identified and
marked as exhibits during pre-trial or trial but which were not formally offered in
evidence cannot in any manner be treated as evidence. Neither can such unrecognized
proof be assigned any evidentiary weight and value. It must be stressed that there is a
significant distinction between identification of documentary evidence and its formal
offer. The former is done in the course of the pre-trial, and trial is accompanied by the
marking of the evidence as an exhibit; while the latter is done only when the party rests
its case. The mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit
does not mean that it has already been offered as part of the evidence. It must be
emphasized that any evidence which a party desires to submit for the consideration of
the court must formally be offered by the party; otherwise, it is excluded and rejected.
In certain instances, however, this Court has relaxed the procedural rule and allowed
the trial court to consider evidence not formally offered on the condition that the
following requisites are present: (1) the evidence must have been duly identified by
testimony duly recorded; and (2) the same must have been incorporated in the records
of the case.
None of the conditions are present in this case.
G.R. No. 167454

September 24, 2014
EMERITU C. BARUT, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
The CA’s negative treatment of the declaration contained in Villas’ extra-judicial sworn
statement was inaccord with prevailing rules and jurisprudence. Pursuant to Section 34,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the RTC as the trial court could consideronly the
evidence that had been formally offered; towards that end, the offering party must
specify the purpose for which the evidence was being offered. The rule would ensure
the right of the adverse party to due process of law, for, otherwise, the adverse party
would not be put in the position to timely object to the evidence, as well as to properly
counter the impact of evidence not formally offered. As stated in Candido v. Court of
Appeals:
It is settled that courts will only consider as evidence that which has been formally
offered. x xx
A document, or any article for that matter, is not evidence when it is simply marked for
identification; it must be formally offered, and the opposing counsel given an opportunity
toobject to it or cross-examine the witness called upon to prove or identify it. A formal
offer is necessary since judges are required to base their findings of fact and judgment
only— and strictly—upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. To allow a
party to attach any document to his pleading and then expect the court to consider it as
evidence may draw unwarranted consequences. The opposing party will be deprived of
his chance to examine the document and object to its admissibility. The appellate court
will have difficulty reviewing documents not previously scrutinized by the court below.
The pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules of Court on the inclusion on appeal of
documentary evidence or exhibits in the records cannot be stretched as to include such
pleadings or documents not offered at the hearing of the case.
The rule that only evidence formally offered before the trial court can be considered is
relaxed where two requisites concur, namely: one, the evidence was duly identified by
testimony duly recorded; and, two, the evidence was incorporated inthe records of the
case.12 Furthermore, the rule has no application where the court takes judicial notice of
adjudicative facts pursuant to Section 2,13 Rule 129 of the Rules of Court; or where the
court relies on judicial admissions or draws inferences from such judicial admissions
within the context of Section 4,14 Rule 129 of the Rules of Court; or where the trial
court, in judging the demeanor of witnesses, determines their credibility even without
the offer of the demeanor as evidence.
41. FORGERY OR TAMPERING EVIDENCE
G.R. No. 207992

August 11, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROBERTO HOLGADO Y DELA CRUZ AND ANTONIO MISAREZ Y ZARAGA,

Accused-appellants
In Malilin v. People, this court explained that the exactitude required by Section 21 goes
into the very nature of narcotics as the subject of prosecutions under Republic Act No.
9165:
Indeed, the likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake with respect to an exhibit is greatest
when the exhibit is small and is one that has physical characteristics fungible in nature
and similar in form to substances familiar to people in their daily lives. Graham vs.
Statepositively acknowledged this danger. In that case where a substance later
analyzed as heroin was handled by two police officers prior to examination who
however did not testify in court on the condition and whereabouts of the exhibit at the
time it was in their possession was excluded from the prosecution evidence, the court
pointing out that the white powder seized could have been indeed heroin or it could
havebeen sugar or baking powder. It ruled that unless the state can show by records or
testimony, the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came
into the possession of police officers until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its
composition, testimony of the state as to the laboratory’s findings is inadmissible. A
unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily identifiable as in
fact they are subject to scientific analysis to determine their composition and nature.The
Court cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the likelihood, or at least the possibility, that at
any of the links in the chain of custody over the same there could have been tampering,
alteration or substitution of substances from other cases—by accident or otherwise—in
which similar evidence was seized or in which similar evidence was submitted for
laboratory testing. Hence, in authenticating the same, a standard more stringent than
that applied to cases involving objects which are readily identifiable must be applied,a
more exacting standard that entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient
completeness if only to render it improbable that the original item has either been
exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered with.
Compliance with the chain of custody requirement provided by Section 21, therefore,
ensures the integrity of confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered drugs and/or
drugparaphernalia in four (4) respects: first, the nature of the substances or items
seized; second, the quantity (e.g., weight) of the substances or items seized; third, the
relation of the substances or items seized to the incident allegedly causing their seizure;
and fourth, the relation of the substances or items seized to the person/s alleged to
have been in possession of or peddling them. Compliance with this requirement
forecloses opportunities for planting, contaminating, or tampering of evidence in any
manner.
By failing to establish identity of corpus delicti, non-compliance with Section 21 indicates

a failure to establish an element of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs. It
follows that this non-compliance suffices as a ground for acquittal.
42. USING OF EVIDENCE IN ANOTHER PROCEEDING
G.R. No. 145391

August 26, 2002
AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO CAPITULO, petitioners,

vs.
MARIO LLAVORE LAROYA,
Under Section 2, Rule 111 of the amended 1985 Rules, a separate civil action, if
reserved in the criminal action, could not be filed until after final judgment was rendered
in the criminal action. If the separate civil action was filed before the commencement of
the criminal action, the civil action, if still pending, was suspended upon the filing of the
criminal action until final judgment was rendered in the criminal action. This rule applied
only to the separate civil action filed to recover liability ex-delicto. The rule did not apply
to independent civil actions based on Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code,
which could proceed independently regardless of the filing of the criminal action.
The amended provision of Section 2, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules continues this
procedure, to wit:
"SEC. 2. When separate civil action is suspended. – After the criminal action has been
commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final
judgment has been entered in the criminal action.
If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been instituted, the
latter shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found before judgment on the
merits. The suspension shall last until final judgment is rendered in the criminal action.
Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits is rendered in the civil action, the same
may, upon motion of the offended party, be consolidated with the criminal action in the
court trying the criminal action. In case of consolidation, the evidence already adduced
in the civil action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal action
without prejudice to the right of the prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses
presented by the offended party in the criminal case and of the parties to present
additional evidence. The consolidated criminal and civil actions shall be tried and
decided jointly.
During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the period of prescription of
the civil action which cannot be instituted separately or whose proceeding has been
suspended shall be tolled.
x xx." (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, Section 2, Rule 111 of the present Rules did not change the rule that the separate
civil action, filed to recover damages ex-delicto, is suspended upon the filing of the
criminal action. Section 2 of the present Rule 111 also prohibits the filing, after
commencement of the criminal action, of a separate civil action to recover damages ex-
delicto.
43. FAILURE TO TIMELY OBJECT (WAIVER)
G.R. No. 105813

September 12, 1994
CONCEPCION M. CATUIRA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
The reason for requiring that evidence be formally introduced is to enable the court to
rule intelligently upon the objection to the questions which have been asked. As a
general rule, the proponent must show its relevancy, materiality and competency.
Where the proponent offers evidence deemed by counsel of the adverse party to be
inadmissible for any reason, the latter has the right to object. But such right is a mere
privilege which can be waived. Necessarily, the objection must be made at the earliest
opportunity, lest silence when there is opportunity to speak may operate as a waiver of
objections.
Thus, while it is true that the prosecution failed to offer the questioned testimony when
private respondent was called to the witness stand, petitioner waived this procedural
error by failing to object at the appropriate time, i.e., when the ground for objection
became reasonably apparent the moment private respondent was called to testify
without any prior offer having been made by the proponent.
44. RIGHTS OF A WITNESS
G.R. No. 200630

June 04, 2018
KIM LIONG, Petitioner,
VS.
Rule 115 of the Rules of Court with its lone section is devoted entirely to the
rights of the accused during trial. Rule 115, Section 1(f) on the right to cross-examine
provides:
Section 1. Rights of accused at the trial. — In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall be entitled to the following rights:
....
(f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Either party
may utilize as part of its evidence the testimony of a witness who is deceased, out of
or can not with due diligence be found in the Philippines, unavailable, or otherwise
unable to testify, given in another case or proceeding, judicial or administrative,
involving the same parties and subject matter, the adverse party having the
opportunity to cross-examine him.
Denying an accused the right to cross-examine will render the testimony of the witness
incomplete and inadmissible in evidence. "[W]hen cross-examination is not and cannot
be done or completed due to causes attributable to the party offering the witness, the
uncompleted testimony is thereby rendered incompetent."
However, like any right, the right to cross-examine may be waived. 43 It "is a personal
one which may be waived expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting to a
renunciation of the right of cross-examination." When an accused is given the
opportunity to cross-examine a witness but fails to avail of it, the accused shall be
deemed to have waived this right.45 The witness' testimony given during direct
examination will remain on record.46 If this testimony is used against the accused, there
will be no violation of the right of confrontation.
45. DIRECT, CROSS, RE-DIRECT, RE-CROSS EXAMINATION
G.R. No. 230429
LARA'S GIFT AND DECORS, INC., Petitioner

vs.
PNB GENERAL INSURERS CO., INC. and UCPB GENERAL INSURANCE CO., INC.,
Respondents
The JA Rule, which took effect on January 1, 2013, was promulgated to address
congestion and delays in courts. Designed to expedite court proceedings, it primarily
affects the manner by which evidence is presented in court,21 particularly with regard to
the taking of the witnesses' testimonies. Consequently, in lieu of direct testimony in
court, the parties are required to submit the judicial affidavits of their witnesses within a
given period. Nevertheless, the JA Rule was not devised to supplant or amend existing
procedural rules; rather, it is designed to supplement and augment them. In this regard,
reference must be made to the Guidelines on Pre-Trial in relation to the Rules on Pre-
Trial, which, interestingly, both parties invoke in support of their respective arguments.
G.R. No. 200630

June 04, 2018
KIM LIONG, PETITIONER

VS.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
The right to confront and cross-examine witnesses is a basic, fundamental human right
vested inalienably to an accused. This right ensures that courts can confidently ferret
out the facts on the basis of which they can determine whether a crime occurred and
the level of culpability of the accused. It is a basic requirement of criminal justice.
However, this right does not exist in isolation. The State, representing the people that
may have been wronged by a crime, also has the right to due process. This means that
the prosecution must not be denied unreasonably of its ability to be able to prove its
case through machinations by the accused.
When the accused abuses its option to choose his counsel as in this case, he can be
deemed to have waived his right to confrontation and cross-examination. The pattern of
postponements and changes of counsel in this case is so obvious and patent. Petitioner
should have been dissuaded by any of the lawyers, unless they, too, connived in such
an amateurish strategy, which wastes the time and resources of our judicial system.
46. REPETITIVE OBJECTIONS
G.R. No. 86062 June 6, 1990
INTERPACIFIC TRANSIT, INC., petitioner,

vs.
RUFO AVILES and JOSEPHINE AVILES, respondents.
Balane, Barican, Cruz, Alampay Law Office for petitioner.

Francisco G. Mendoza private respondents.
In the case at bar, the photocopies of the airway bills were objected to by the private
respondents as secondary evidence only when they, were being Identified for marking
by the prosecution. They were nevertheless marked as exhibits upon the promise that
the original airway bills would be submitted later. it is true that the originals were never
produced. Yet, notwithstanding this omission, the defense did not object when the
exhibits as previously marked were formally offered in evidence. And these were
subsequently admitted by the trial court. 7
In People v. Teodoro, 8 a document being Identified by a prosecution witness was

objected to as merely secondary, whereupon the trial judge ordered the testimony
stricken out. This Court, in holding the objection to be premature, said:
It must be noted that the Fiscal was only Identifying the official records of service of the
defendant preparatory to introducing them as evidence. ... The time for the presentation
of the records had not yet come; presentation was to be made after their Identification.
For what purpose and to what end the Fiscal would introduce them as evidence was not
yet stated or disclosed. ... The objection of counsel for the defendant was, therefore,
premature, especially as the Fiscal had not yet stated for what purpose he would
introduce the said records. ...
The time for objecting the evidence is when the same is offered. (Emphasis supplied).
The objection of the defense to the photocopies of the airway bins while they were
being Identified and marked as exhibits did not constitute the objection it should have
made when the exhibits were formally offered in evidence by the prosecution. No valid
and timely objection was made at that time. And it is no argument to say that the earlier
objection should be considered a continuing objection under Sec. 37 of Rule 132, for
that provision obviously refers to a single objection to a class of evidence (testimonial or
documentary) which when first offered is considered to encompass the rest of the
evidence. The presumption is, of course, that there was an offer and a seasonable
objection thereto. But, to repeat, no objection was really made in the case before us
because it was not made at the proper time.
It would have been so simple for the defense to reiterate its former objection, this time
seasonably, when the formal offer of exhibits was made. It is curious that it did not,
especially so since the objections to the formal offer of exhibits was made in writing. In
fact, the defense filed no objection at all not only to the photocopies but to all the other
exhibits of the prosecution.
The effect of such omission is obvious. The rule is that evidence not objected to is
deemed admitted and may be validly considered by the court in arriving at its judgment.
9 This is true even if by its nature the evidence is inadmissible and would have surely
been rejected if it had been challenged at the proper time.
The records certainly would have been the, beet proof of such former conviction. The
certificate was not the best proof. There seems to be no justification for the presentation
of proof of a character. ... Under an objection upon the ground that the said certificate
was not the best proof, it should have been rejected. Once admitted, however, without
objection, even though not admissible under an objection, we are not inclined now to
reject it. If the defendant had opportunely presented an objection to the admissibility of
said certificate, no doubt the prosecution would have presented the best proof upon the
questions to which said certificate relates. 10
(It) is universally accepted that when secondary or incompetent evidence is presented

and accepted without any objection on the part of the other party, the latter is bound
thereby and the court is obliged to grant it the probatory value it deserves. 11
We hold therefore that it was erroneous for the lower courts to reject the photocopies of
the airway bills to prove the liability of the private respondents to the petitioner. While
we may agree that there was really no criminal liability that could attach to them
because they had no fiduciary relationship with ITI, the rejected evidence sufficiently
established their indebtedness to the petitioner. Hence, we must reverse the ruling
below that "on account of the inadmissibility of the prosecution's Exhibits 'B' and 'OO',
coupled with the denial made by the accused, there appears to be no concrete proof of
such accountability."
47. EQUIPOISE DOCTRINE
G.R. No. 207662

April 13, 2016
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff and Appellee,

vs.
FABIAN URZAIS Y LANURIAS, ALEX BAUTISTA, AND RICKY BAUTISTA, Accused.

FABIAN URZAIS Y LANURIAS, Accused-Appellant.
The carnapping not being duly proved, the killing of the victim may not be treated as an
incident of carnapping. Nonetheless, even under the provisions of homicide and murder
under the Revised Penal Code, the Court finds the guilt of accused-appellant was not
established beyond reasonable doubt.
There were no eyewitnesses to the killing of the victim, Mario Magdato. Again, both
courts relied only on the circumstantial evidence of accused-appellant's possession of
the missing vehicle for the latter's conviction. Shirley, the widow, testified that her
husband and their vehicle went missing on 12 November 2002. Dr. Concepcion gave
testimony on the cause of death of Mario Magdato and the injuries he had sustained.
Most glaringly, no connection had been established between the victim's gunshot
wound which caused his death and the firearm found in the person of accused-
appellant. Only SPO2 Figueroa's testimony gave light on how allegedly accused-
appellant was found to have been in possession of the missing vehicle of the victim. But
even if this uncorroborated testimony was true, it does not link accused-appellant to the
carnapping, much less, the murder or homicide of the victim. And it does not preclude
the probability of accused-appellant's story that he had merely bought the vehicle from
the Bautista brothers who have themselves since gone missing.
The equipoise rule states that where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are
capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of
the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfil the
test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. The equipoise rule
provides that where the evidence in a criminal case is evenly balanced, the
constitutional, presumption of innocence tilts the scales in favor of the accused.30In the
final analysis, the circumstances narrated by the prosecution engender doubt rather
than moral certainty on the guilt of accused-appellant.
48. CORPUS DELICTI
G.R. No. 146481

April 30, 2003
ARTURO G. RIMORIN, SR., petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Corpus delicti in its legal sense refers to the fact of the commission of the crime,
not to the physical body of the deceased or to the ashes of a burned building or — as in
the present case — to the smuggled cigarettes. The corpus delicti may be proven by the
credible testimony of a sole witness, not necessarily by physical evidence such as those
aforementioned.
49. TENDER OR PROFFER OF EVIDENCE
G.R. No. 192024

FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.
It has been repeatedly ruled that where documentary evidence was rejected by the
lower court and the offeror did not move that the same be attached to the record, the
same cannot be considered by the appellate court, as documents forming no part of
proofs before the appellate court cannot be considered in disposing the case. For the
appellate court to consider as evidence, which was not offered by one party at all during
the proceedings below, would infringe the constitutional right of the adverse party to due
process of law.In this case, petitioner utterly failed to not only comply with the basic
procedural requirement of presenting only the original copies of its documentary
evidence, but also to adhere to the requirement to properly make its offer of proof or
tender of excluded evidence for the proper consideration of the appellate tribunal.
50. OFFER OF EVIDENCE
G.R. No. 167454

September 24, 2014
EMERITU C. BARUT, Petitioner,

vs.
It is settled that courts will only consider as evidence that which has been formally
offered. x xx
A document, or any article for that matter, is not evidence when it is simply marked for
identification; it must be formally offered, and the opposing counsel given an opportunity
toobject to it or cross-examine the witness called upon to prove or identify it. A formal
offer is necessary since judges are required to base their findings of fact and judgment
only— and strictly—upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. To allow a
party to attach any document to his pleading and then expect the court to consider it as
evidence may draw unwarranted consequences. The opposing party will be deprived of
his chance to examine the document and object to its admissibility. The appellate court
will have difficulty reviewing documents not previously scrutinized by the court below.
The pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules of Court on the inclusion on appeal of
documentary evidence or exhibits in the records cannot be stretched as to include such
pleadings or documents not offered at the hearing of the case.
The rule that only evidence formally offered before the trial court can be considered is
relaxed where two requisites concur, namely: one, the evidence was duly identified by
testimony duly recorded; and, two, the evidence was incorporated inthe records of the
case.12 Furthermore, the rule has no application where the court takes judicial notice of
adjudicative facts pursuant to Section 2,13 Rule 129 of the Rules of Court; or where the
court relies on judicial admissions or draws inferences from such judicial admissions
within the context of Section 4,14 Rule 129 of the Rules of Court; or where the trial
court, in judging the demeanor of witnesses, determines their credibility even without
the offer of the demeanor as evidence.
51. DIRECT EVIDENCE AND REBUTTAL EVIDENCE
G.R. No. 133025.

February 17, 2000

VS.
RADEL GALLARDE, Accused-Appellant.
Direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial
court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt.18 The prosecution is not always
tasked to present direct evidence to sustain a judgment of conviction; the absence of
direct evidence does not necessarily absolve an accused from any criminal liability.
G.R. No. 106274

September 28, 1993

vs.
HENRY PADERO, accused-appellant.
The function of the rebuttal evidence is to explain, repel, counteract, or disprove the
evidence of the adversary. 25 Its office is "to meet the new facts put in by the opponent
in his case in reply" and is "necessary only because, on a plea in denial, new
subordinate evidential facts have been offered, or because, on an affirmative plea, its
substantive facts have been put forward, or because, on any issue whatever, facts
discrediting the proponent's witnesses have been offered." 26 While the presentation of
rebuttal evidence is discretionary with the prosecution in a criminal action, 27 in the
instant case, the overwhelming import of the new facts disclosed by the accused which
have a damaging effect on the complainant's version made it imperative for the
prosecution to present rebuttal evidence. Relegating the complainant to the background
and presenting other witnesses to rebut minor or trivial matters brought out in the
evidence in chief for the defense engender serious doubts on the integrity of her story
52. CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
G.R. No. 226158

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
LIBERA TO PENTECOSTES y CRONICO, Accused-appellant
Direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not indispensable to criminal

prosecutions; a contrary rule would render convictions virtually impossible given that
most crimes, by their very nature, are purposely committed in seclusion and away from
eyewitnesses. Thus, our rules on evidence and jurisprudence allow the conviction of an
accused through circumstantial evidence alone, provided that the following requisites
concur:(i) there is more than one circumstance;
(ii) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(iii) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
Simply put, an accused may be convicted when the circumstances established form an
unbroken chain leading to one fair reasonable conclusion and pointing to the accused -
to the exclusion of all others - as the guilty person
53. CIRCUMSTANTIAL, CORROBORATING EVIDENCE AND DIRECT EVIDENCE
G.R. No. 210760

January 26, 2015
KYLE ANTHONY ZABALA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
It is a settled rule that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a conviction, and

that direct evidence is not always necessary. This is but a recognition of the reality that
in certain instances, due to the inherent attempt to conceal a crime, it is not always
possible to obtain direct evidence. In Bacolod v. People, this Court had the occasion to
say:
The lack or absence of direct evidence does not necessarily mean that the guilt of the
accused cannot be proved by evidence other than direct evidence. Direct evidence is
not the sole means of establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, because
circumstantial evidence, if sufficient, can supplant the absence of direct evidence. The
crime charged may also be proved by circumstantial evidence, sometimes referred to as
indirect or presumptive evidence. Circumstantial evidence has been defined as that
which "goes to prove a fact or series of facts other than the facts in issue, which, if
proved, may tend by inference to establish a fact in issue."
G.R. No. 180281

July 01, 2013

vs.
JOEMARIE JALBONIAN alias "Budo", Accused-Appellant.
Likewise, untenable is appellant’s contention that Valenciano’s testimony cannot be

relied upon since it was not corroborated by other witnesses to the crime. Finding of
guilt based on the testimony of a lone witness is not uncommon.36 "For although the
number of witnesses may be considered a factor in the appreciation of evidence,
preponderance is not necessarily with the greatest number and conviction can still be
had on the basis of the credible and positive testimony of a single witness.
Corroborative evidence is deemed necessary ‘only when there are reasons to warrant
the suspicion that the witness falsified the truth or that his observation had been
inaccurate.
54. CLASSES OF DOCUMENTS
The matter of authenticity of the Deed of Sale being disputed, the identity of the progenitor of
this all-important document is a material evidentiary point. It is disconcerting that the very two
witnesses of the respondent offered to prove the Deed of Sale, flatly contradict each other on
the basis of their own personal and sensory knowledge. Worse, the purported author of the
Deed of Sale disavowed having drafted the document, notwithstanding the contrary testimony
grounded on personal knowledge by the documentary witness.
Establishing the identity of the person who wrote the Deed of Sale would not ordinarily be
necessary to establish the validity of the transaction it covers. However, since it is the
authenticity of the document itself that is disputed, then the opposing testimonies on that point
by the material witnesses properly raises questions about the due execution of the document
itself. The inconsistencies in the testimonies of Judge Cariño and De Francia are irreconcilable.
It is not possible to affirm the testimony of either without denigrating the competence and
credibility of the other as a witness. If Judge Cariño was truthful in testifying that he did not write
the Deed of Sale, then doubt can be cast as to the reliability of the notarial witness De Francia.
It takes a leap of imagination, a high level of gumption, and perverse deliberation for one to
erroneously assert, under oath and with particularities, that a person drafted a particular
document in his presence.
(Tigno v. Aquino et al., G.R. No. 12946, November 25, 2004)
The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the documents may be
presented as evidence in court. A public document, by virtue of its official or sovereign
character, or because it has been acknowledged before a notary public (except a notarial will) or
a competent public official with the formalities required by law, or because it is a public record of
a private writing authorized by law, is self-authenticating and requires no further authentication
in order to be presented as evidence in court. In contrast, a private document is any other
writing, deed, or instrument executed by a private person without the intervention of a notary or
other person legally authorized by which some disposition or agreement is proved or set forth.
Lacking the official or sovereign character of a public document, or the solemnities prescribed
by law, a private document requires authentication in the manner allowed by law or the Rules of
Court before its acceptance as evidence in court.
(Patula v. People, G.R. No. 164457, April 11, 2012, 669

SCRA 135, 156 [Per J. Bersamin, First Division])
Neither did petitioner present as witnesses the affiants of these Affidavits or Memoranda
submitted to the court. Basic is the rule that, while affidavits may be considered as public
documents if they are acknowledged before a notary public, these Affidavits are still classified
as hearsay evidence. The reason for this rule is that they are not generally prepared by the
affiant, but by another one who uses his or her own language in writing the affiant’s statements,
parts of which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them. Moreover,
the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiants. For this reason,
affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are placed on
the witness stand to testify thereon.
(Republic v. Marcos-Manotoc, et al., 681 Phil. 380 (2012)

[Per J. Sereno (now C.J.), Second Division])
55. MACHINE COPIES AS EVIDENCE
The best evidence rule requires that when the subject of inquiry is (sic) the contents of a
document, no evidence is admissible other than the original document itself except in the
instances mentioned in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court. As such, mere
photocopies of documents are inadmissible pursuant to the best evidence rule. Nevertheless,
evidence not objected to is deemed admitted and may be validly considered by the court in
arriving at its judgment. Courts are not precluded to accept in evidence a mere photocopy of a
document when no objection was raised when it was formally offered.
(Lorenzana v. Lelina, G.R. No. 187850, August 17, 2016)
Indeed, for all intents and purposes, a "certified Xerox copy" is no different from a "certified true
copy" of the original document. The operative word in the term "certified true copy" under
Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court is "certified". The word means "made certain." It comes
from the Latin word certificare – meaning, to make certain. Thus, as long as the copy of the
assailed judgment, order, resolution or ruling submitted to the court has been certified by the
proper officer of the court, tribunal, agency or office involved or his duly-authorized
representative and that the same is a faithful reproduction thereof, then the requirement of the
law has been complied with. It is presumed that, before making the certification, the authorized
representative had compared the Xerox copy with the original and found the same a faithful
reproduction thereof.
(Quintano v. NLRC, G.R. No. 144517, 13 December 2004, 446 SCRA 193, 202-203)
In this case, there is no dispute that the RTC had jurisdiction over the cases filed by the public
respondent against the petitioner for estafa. The Order admitting in evidence the photocopies of
the charge invoices and checks was issued by the RTC in the exercise of its "jurisdiction. Even
if erroneous, the same is a mere error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. Additionally, the
admission of secondary evidence in lieu of the original copies predicated on proof of the offeror
of the conditions sine qua non to the admission of the said evidence is a factual issue
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Unless grave abuse of discretion amounting
to excess or lack of jurisdiction is shown to have been committed by the trial court, the
resolution of the trial court admitting secondary evidence must be sustained. The remedy of the
petitioner, after the admission of the photocopies of the charge invoices and the checks, was to
adduce his evidence, and if after trial, he is convicted, to appeal the decision to the appropriate
appellate court. Moreover, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, only questions of
law may be properly raised.
(Johnson Lee v. People of the Philippines 483 Phil. 684, 701 [2004])
56. ANCIENT DOCUMENT RULE
Under the "ancient document rule," for a private ancient document to be exempt from proof of
due execution and authenticity, it is not enough that it be more than thirty (30) years old; it is
also necessary that the following requirements are fulfilled; (1) that it is produced from a custody
in which it would naturally be found if genuine; and (2) that it is unblemished by any alteration or
circumstances of suspicion.
(Francisco, Vicente J., The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines. Volume III, Part II, 1973
Edition, p. 432. cited in Heirs of Demetria Lacsa v. CA et al., G.R. No. 79597-98, May 20, 1991)
The appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court. It ruled that the trial court erred in
admitting the Deed of Partition as evidence without proof of its authenticity and due execution. It
held that said Deed cannot be considered as an ancient document whose authenticity and due
execution need not be proved as the respondents have presented evidence that cast doubt on
its authenticity and due execution. The respondents presented the testimonies of Ramona
Tacang and Filomena Pareja who testified that Simplicia Cavili, one of the signatories in the
Deed, resided in Mindanao from 1934 until 1947. It further observed that the supposed
thumbprint of Simplicia Cavili imprinted on the document appeared more like an inkblot than a
thumbmark. The Court of Appeals thus directed the trial court "to immediately appoint and
constitute the necessary number of commissioners who shall expeditiously effect the partition
and accounting of the subject properties in accordance with Rule 69 of the Rules of Court of the
Philippines."
(Marille Mayang Cavile et al. v. Heirs of Clarita Cavile, et al., G.R. No. 148635, April 01, 2003)
Ancient documents are considered from proper custody if they come from a place from which
they might reasonably be expected to be found. Custody is proper if it is proved to have had a
legitimate origin or if the circumstances of the particular case are such as to render such an
origin probable. If a document is found where it would not properly and naturally be, its absence
from the proper place must be satisfactorily accounted for (29A Am Jur 2d Evidence § 1204
citing McGuire v. Blount, 199 U.S. 142, 26 S. Ct. 1, 50 L. Ed. 125 (1905); Nicholson v. Eureka
Lumber Co., 156 N.C. 59, 72 S.E. 86 (1911); Gibson v. Poor, 21 N.H. 440, 1850 WL 2344
(1850). See Herrera, Remedial Law Vol. V, 1999 Edition, pp. 186-187.)
(Simplicia Cercado-Siga, et al. v. Vicente Cercado, Jr. et al, G.R. No. 185374, March 11, 2015)
57. FRUIT-OF-THE-POISONOUS-TREE RULE
Considering that the warrantless arrest of Ambre was valid, the subsequent search and seizure
done on her person was likewise lawful. After all, a legitimate warrantless arrest necessarily
cloaks the arresting police officer with authority to validly search and seize from the offender (1)
dangerous weapons, and (2) those that may be used as proof of the commission of an offense.
(Cayuni v. People, G.R. No. 191532, August 15, 2012)

This rule prohibits the issuance of general warrants that encourage law enforcers to go on
fishing expeditions. Evidence obtained through unlawful seizures should be excluded as
evidence because it is "the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction
against unreasonable searches and seizures."
(Stonehill v. Diokno, 126 Phil. 738 (1967) [Per C.J. Concepcion, En Banc])
Obviously, this is an instance of seizure of the 'fruit of the poisonous tree', hence, the
confiscated item is inadmissible in evidence consonant with Article III, Section 3(2) of the 1987
Constitution, 'any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding'.
Without the confiscated shabu, appellant's conviction cannot be sustained based on the

remaining evidence. Thus, an acquittal is warranted, despite the waiver of appellant of his right
to question the illegality of his arrest by entering a plea and his active participation in the trial of
the case. As earlier mentioned, the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court
over the person of the accused. A waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest does not carry with it a
waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.
(People v. Racho, 640 Phil. 669, 681 [2010])
58. DNA EVIDENCE AND FORENSIC EVIDENCE
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the
following factors: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of
contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the
proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of
the analyst who conducted the tests.
(People v. Vallejo, G.R. No. 144656, 9 May 2002, 382 SCRA 192, 209)
x x x [F]or too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers who choose to deny
their existence. The growing sophistication of DNA testing technology finally provides a much
needed equalizer for such ostracized and abandoned progeny. We have long believed in the
merits of DNA testing and have repeatedly expressed as much in the past. This case comes at
a perfect time when DNA testing has finally evolved into a dependable and authoritative form of
evidence gathering. We therefore take this opportunity to forcefully reiterate our stand that DNA
testing is a valid means of determining paternity.
(Agustin v. Court of Appeals, 468 Phil. 421 [2004])
DNA is the fundamental building block of a person’s entire genetic make-up. DNA is found in all
human cells and is the same in every cell of the same person. Genetic identity is unique. Hence,
a person’s DNA profile can determine his identity.
(Herrera v. Alba, G.R. No. 148220, 15 June 2005, 460 SCRA 197)

59. DIGITAL OR ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE
The picture images of the ballots are electronic documents that are regarded as the equivalents
of the original official ballots themselves. 6 In Vinzons-Chato v. House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal,7 the Court held that "the picture images of the ballots, as scanned and
recorded by the PCOS, are likewise ‘official ballots’ that faithfully capture in electronic form the
votes cast by the voter, as defined by Section 2(3) of R.A. No. 9369. As such, the printouts
thereof are the functional equivalent of the paper ballots filled out by the voters and, thus, may
be used for purposes of revision of votes in an electoral protest."
That the two documents—the official ballot and its picture image—are considered "original
documents" simply means that both of them are given equal probative weight. In short, when
either is presented as evidence, one is not considered as weightier than the other.
But this juridical reality does not authorize the courts, the COMELEC, and the Electoral
Tribunals to quickly and unilaterally resort to the printouts of the picture images of the ballots in
the proceedings had before them without notice to the parties. Despite the equal probative
weight accorded to the official ballots and the printouts of their picture images, the rules for the
revision of ballots adopted for their respective proceedings still consider the official ballots to be
the primary or best evidence of the voters’ will. In that regard, the picture images of the ballots
are to be used only when it is first shown that the official ballots are lost or their integrity has
been compromised.
(Maliksi v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 203302, April 13, 2013)
Even if examined under the Rules on Electronic Evidence, which took effect on August 1, 2001,
and which is being invoked by Aznar in this case, the authentication of Exh. "G" would still be
found wanting.
Pertinent sections of Rule 5 read:
Section 1. Burden of proving authenticity. – The person seeking to introduce an electronic

document in any legal proceeding has the burden of proving its authenticity in the manner
provided in this Rule.
Section 2. Manner of authentication. – Before any private electronic document offered as

authentic is received in evidence, its authenticity must be proved by any of the following means:
(a) by evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person purported to have signed
the same;
(b) by evidence that other appropriate security procedures or devices as may be

authorized by the Supreme Court or by law for authentication of electronic documents
were applied to the document; or
(c) by other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the satisfaction of the judge.
Aznar claims that his testimony complies with par. (c), i.e., it constitutes the "other evidence
showing integrity and reliability of Exh. "G" to the satisfaction of the judge." The Court is not
convinced. Aznar’s testimony that the person from Ingtan Agency merely handed him the
computer print-out and that he thereafter asked said person to sign the same cannot be
considered as sufficient to show said print-out’s integrity and reliability. As correctly pointed out
by Judge Marcos in his May 29, 1998 Decision, Exh. "G" does not show on its face that it was
issued by Ingtan Agency as Aznar merely mentioned in passing how he was able to secure the
print-out from the agency; Aznar also failed to show the specific business address of the source
of the computer print-out because while the name of Ingtan Agency was mentioned by Aznar, its
business address was not reflected in the print-out.
(Aznar v. Citibank, G.R. No. 164273, March 28, 2007)
The copies of the said pro-forma invoices submitted by the appellee are admissible in evidence,
although they are mere electronic facsimile printouts of appellant's orders. Such facsimile
printouts are considered Electronic Documents under the New Rules on Electronic Evidence,
which came into effect on August 1, 2001. (Rule 2, Section 1 [h], A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC).
"(h) 'Electronic document' refers to information or the representation of information, data,

figures, symbols or other modes of written expression, described or however
represented, by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a
fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored,
processed, retrieved or produced electronically. It includes digitally signed documents
and any printout or output, readable by sight or other means, which accurately reflects
the electronic data message or electronic document. For purposes of these Rules, the
term 'electronic document' may be used interchangeably with 'electronic data message'.
An electronic document shall be regarded as the equivalent of an original document under the
Best Evidence Rule, as long as it is a printout or output readable by sight or other means,
showing to reflect the data accurately. (Rule 4, Section 1, A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC)
(MCC Industrial Sales Corporation v. Ssangyong Corporation, G.R. No. 170633, October 17,
2007)
60. POLYGRAPH OR LIE DECTECTOR TEST
One last point raised by the able counsel of appellant, Atty. Braulio D. Yaranon, who at the time
of the trial in 1965 was the Vice-Mayor of Baguio City, was that appellant voluntarily submitted
to a lie detector test with the National Bureau of Investigation and the report of the lie detector
examiner is in appellant's favor, that is, the latter was telling the truth on the questions
propounded to him one of which was whether he forced Margarita Paleng into having sexual
intercourse with him and the reply was "No". 25
On this matter We find the trial Judge's observations and conclusions meritorious and We quote
from his decision the following:
As to the N.B.I. lie detector test report, the Court does not put much faith and
credit on it. It is well known that the same is not conclusive. Its efficacy depends
upon the time, place and circumstances when taken and the nature of the
subject. If subject is hard and the circumstances, as in this instant, were not
conducive to affect the subject emotionally, the test will fail. The subject had
nothing more to fear because the trial was over. He was not confronted by the
victim or other persons whom he had a reason to fear. Naturally, his reaction to
the questions propounded was normal and unaffected and the apparatus could
not detect it. (pp. 172-173, CFI record)
(People v. Daniel, G.R. No., L-40330, November 20, 1978)
A polygraph is an electromechanical instrument that simultaneously measures and records

certain physiological changes in the human body that are believed to be involuntarily caused by
an examinee's conscious attempt to deceive the questioner. 30 The theory behind a polygraph or
lie detector test is that a person who lie deliberately will have rising blood pressure and a
subconscious block in breathing, which will be recorded on the graph. 31 However, American
courts almost uniformly reject the results of polygraphs tests when offered in evidence for the
purposes of establishing the guilt or innocence of one accused of a crime, whether the accused
or the prosecution seeks its introduction, for the reason that polygraph has not as yet attained
scientific acceptance as a reliable and ascertaining truth or deception. 32 The rule is no different
in this jurisdiction. Thus, in People v. Daniel, 33 stating that much faith and credit should not be
vested upon a lie detector test as it is not conclusive. Appellant, in this case, has not advanced
any reason why this rule should not apply to him.
(People v. Adoviso, GR. No. 116196, June 23, 1999)
A lie detector test is based on the theory that an individual will undergo physiological changes,
capable of being monitored by sensors attached to his body, when he is not telling the truth. The
Court does not put credit and faith on the result of a lie detector test inasmuch as it has not
been accepted by the scientific community as an accurate means of ascertaining truth or
deception.14
(People v. Reanzares, G.R. No. 130656, 29 June 2000; People v. Adoviso, G.R. Nos. 116196-
97, 23 June 1999, 309 SCRA 1)
61. VOICE RECOGNITION AND SIGN LANGUAGE
Finally, Ligaray’s declaration that it was Wagas who had transacted with him over the telephone
was not reliable because he did not explain how he determined that the person with whom he
had the telephone conversation was really Wagas whom he had not yet met or known before
then. We deem it essential for purposes of reliability and trustworthiness that a telephone
conversation like that one Ligaray supposedly had with the buyer of rice to be first authenticated
before it could be received in evidence. Among others, the person with whom the witness
conversed by telephone should be first satisfactorily identified by voice recognition or any other
means.
(People v. Wagas, G.R. No. 157943, September 04, 2013)
We view AAA’s testimony to be clear, convincing and credible considering especially the
corroboration it received from the medical certificate and testimony of Dr. Simeon. Our
examination of the records shows no indication that we should view the victim’s testimony in a
suspicious light. It bears stressing that identification of an accused by his voice has been
accepted, particularly in cases where, as in this case, the victim has known the perpetrator for a
long time;7 for the blind voice recognition must be a special sense that has been developed to a
very high degree. Besides, it is inconceivable that a blind woman would concoct a story of
defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and subject herself to public trial or ridicule
if she has not, in truth, been a victim of rape and impelled to seek justice for the wrong done to
her. Thus, to us, the prosecution positively established the elements of rape required under
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code. First, the appellant and Kino succeeded in having
carnal knowledge with the victim. AAA was steadfast in her assertion that both the appellant and
Kino had raped her, as a result of which, she felt pain. She also felt that something "sticky"
came out of the appellant’s and Kino’ private parts. Second, the assailants employed force,
threat and intimidation in satisfying their bestial desires. According to AAA, the appellant and
Kino threatened to kill her if she refused to obey them.
(People v. Lascano, G.R. No. 192180, March 21, 2012)
The absence of an interpreter in sign language who could have conveyed to the accused a
deaf-mute, the full facts of the offense with which he was charged and who could also have
communicated the accused’s own version of the circumstances which led to his implication in
the crime, deprived the accused of a full and fair trial and a reasonable opportunity to defend
himself. Not even the accused’s final plea of not guilty can excuse these inherently unjust
circumstances.
The absence of a qualified interpreter in sign language and of any other means, whether in
writing or otherwise, to inform the accused of the charges against him denied the accused his
fundamental right to due process of law. The accuracy and fairness of the factual process by
which the guilt or innocence of the accused was determined was not safeguarded. The accused
could not be said to have enjoyed the right to be heard by himself and counsel, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him in the proceedings where his life
and liberty were at stake.
(People v. Crisologo, 150 SCRA 656)
62. WIRE-TAPPED EVIDENCE
Indeed, Jalbuena's testimony is confirmed by the voice recording had made. It may be asked
whether the tape is admissible in view of R.A. No. 4200, which prohibits wire tapping. The
answer is in the affirmative. The law provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any
private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other
device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or
spoken word by using a device commonly known as dictaphone or dictagraph of
dectectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described:
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts
penalized in the next preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire
record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or
spoken word secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner
prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other person or persons; or to
communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish
transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, That
the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal
investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by
this prohibition.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance,

purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein
contained obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of
this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or
administrative hearing or investigation.
Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private

communications.29 Since the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private,
its tape recording is not prohibited.
(Navarro v. CA and People, G.R. No, 120187, August 26, 1999)
The root cause of the matter, as was made plain before, was the replay of the taped telephone
conversation between Adelina Velasco and complainant. The accusation is that in so allowing it,
respondent violated the Anti-Wire Tapping Act. 18 In his answer to this Court, respondent Judge
to refute such a contention relied on the second paragraph of its first section with this proviso:
"That the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation
or trial of offense mentioned in Sec. 3 hereof shall not be covered by this prohibition." 19 He
further justified the action taken by him thus: "I may be further stated that, * * * the tape replay
and the admission in evidence of the transcript thereof * * * were objected to on the other
grounds, but never on the ground that they were in violation of the anti-wire tapping law, RA
4200. Apparently, Solicitor Kilayko, representing the respondent officials, [in Civil Case No.
946987] was satisfied, after hearing testimony that Adelina Velasco, with whom complainant
had the tape recorded telephone conversation, was the one who "initiated" or took a recording
of the conversation, that there was no violation of the prohibition of sections 1 to 3 of RA 4200
because the recording was taken by one of the parties to the conversation or that the use of the
tapes was authorized by the above-quoted proviso of section 1. The failure of Solicitor Kilayko
to object to the replay of the tape recording or the transcripts thereof on the ground that they
were in violation of the anti-wire tapping law, cannot be imputed to his ignorance of that law
because he tried to cross-examine Adelina Velasco precisely for the reason, as he manifested,
that "we were trying to find out whether there was any violation of any law in the tape recording
of telephone conversation" * * * In the circumstances mentioned above, and finding that the
grounds offered against the replay (to wit, that "it was sufficiently established that his voice is
that of Rolando Bartolome's voice," quoted on p. 2 of the complaint) and the grounds ("hearsay
and self-serving and immaterial") offered against the transcript * * * of the tape recording * * * to
be untenable, I believed that as a judge I had no alternative except to allow the replay and to
admit the transcript in evidence."
(Bartolome v. Hon. Juan De Borja, A.M. No. 1096-CFI, May 31, 1976)
The records of the case at bar, however, are confused and confusing, and respondents’
evidence falls short of satisfying the clear and present danger test. Firstly, the various
statements of the Press Secretary obfuscate the identity of the voices in the tape
recording. Secondly, the integrity of the taped conversation is also suspect. The Press
Secretary showed to the public two versions, one supposed to be a "complete" version and the
other, an "altered" version. Thirdly, the evidence of the respondents on the who’s and the how’s
of the wiretapping act is ambivalent, especially considering the tape’s different versions. The
identity of the wire-tappers, the manner of its commission and other related and relevant proofs
are some of the invisibles of this case. Fourthly, given all these unsettled facets of the tape, it is
even arguable whether its airing would violate the anti-wiretapping law.
(Chaves v. Gonzales, as DOJ Secretary; and NTC, G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008)
63. CCTV FOOTAGE AS EVIDENCE
With regard to Verdillo’s contention that he would be in a better position to defend himself if
confronted with the CCTV footage, we find the same to be without merit. There is more than
substantial evidence which proves that he indeed declared void transactions as valid on at least
eight occasions. We note that the CCTV footage is not the only evidence against him. Acting Pit
Supervisor Yang actually witnessed that several clearly void transactions were declared by
Verdillo as good and valid.24 Even Verdillo’s sworn statement reveals that he did not see the
dice hit the rubber wall. In fact, he mentioned in his statement that he used his sense of hearing
in determining whether or not the dice hit the rubber wall.
(Verdillo v. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 192287, June 18, 2013)
With respect to the video footage of the May 25, 2006 incident, Gala himself admitted that he
viewed the tape during the administrative investigation, particularly in connection with the
accusation against him that he allowed Llanes (binatilyong may kapansanan sa bibig) to board
the Meralco trucks.26 The choice of evidence belongs to a party and the mere fact that the video
was shown to Gala indicates that the video was not an evidence that Meralco was trying to
suppress. Gala could have, if he had wanted to, served a subpoena for the production of the
video footage as evidence. The fact that he did not does not strengthen his case nor weaken
the case of Meralco.
(Manila Electric Company v. Gala, G.R. Nos. 191288 & 191304, March 7, 2012)
It is clear that Judge Dumayas failed to hear and decide the subject case with the cold neutrality
of an impartial judge. As aptly found by the OCA after its exhaustive investigation, first, Judge
Dumayas downgraded the offense charged from murder to homicide. Second, he
inappropriately appreciated the privileged mitigating circumstance of self-defense and the
ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender despite the overwhelming testimonial
and physical evidence [and CCTV footage] to the contrary. Third, he sentenced Dela Paz and
Datu III to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years, two (2) months, and
one (1) day, as minimum, to six (6) years of prision correccional, as maximum, which made
them eligible for probation. Finally, he granted the separate applications for probation of Dela
Paz and Datu III, effectively sparing them from suffering the penalties they rightfully deserve.
The pattern of said acts appears to be deliberate, calculated, and meant to unduly favor the
accused, and at the same time, can be characterized as flagrant and indifferent to the
consequences caused to the other parties, including the State.
(OCA v. Judge Dumayas, A.M. No. rtj-15-2435, March 06, 2018)
64. FOOTPRINT EVIDENCE AND FINGERPRINT EVIDENCE
Contrary to Biong’s assertion, his failure to preserve evidence at the crime scene such as
fingerprints on the doors and objects inside the master’s bedroom where the bodies were found,
the bloodied floor of the toilet, the actual material used in gagging Carmela and Estrellita, the
bloodied blankets and bed sheets, the original condition of the broken glass panel of the main
door, the shoe print and foot prints on the car hood and at the back of the house, fingerprints on
the light bulb at the garage -- was a form of assistance to help the perpetrators evade
apprehension by confusing the investigators in determining initially what happened and the
possible suspects. Consequently, Biong’s unlawful taking of the jewelries and Carmela’s ATM
card and driver’s license, his act of breaking the larger portion of the main door glass, the
washing out of the blood on the toilet floor and permitting the relatives to burn the bloodied bed
sheets and blankets -- had in fact misled the authorities in identifying potential suspects. Thus,
the police had a difficult time figuring out whether it was robbers who entered the Vizconde
house and perpetrated the rape-slay, or drug-crazed addicts on the loose, or other persons
having motive against the Vizconde family had exacted revenge, or a brutal sexual assault on
Carmela by men who were not strangers to her which also led to the killings.
(People v. Biong, et al., G.R. No. 176864, December 14, 2010)
In addition, the brothers' footprints and fingerprints were lifted from the crime scene. Before they
fled they both tried to wipe out traces of their foot and handprints. Both admitted that they
ransacked the place for valuables after the spouses were slain. Lastly, on their way out of the
compound, a witness whom they threatened to be butchered like a hog, saw them with their
shirts bloodstained.
All the foregoing details presented as evidence by the prosecution more than suffices to show
that the brothers were united and had cooperated in a conspiracy to attack the spouses. In a
conspiracy, the act of one conspirator is the act of the other co-conspirator. Thus, Joey is
equally responsible as his brother, Mario for the death of the Sorianos.
(People v. Manlansing, G.R. No. 131736-37, March 11, 2002)
The physical evidence against the accused-appellant is also deficient and unconvincing. The
gun supposedly used by the accused-appellant was never produced in evidence nor is there
any showing that Macasinag had fired a gun at all. 17 The prosecution made much of the rubber
shoes the gunman was supposed to have been wearing, but there were no footprints to connect
Macasinag's own shoes to the killing. The prosecution simply said that the footprints had been
obliterated. 18 The shoes themselves are not distinctive they are just like any ordinary pair of
rubber shoes worn by any number of persons.
(People v. Macasinag, G.R. No. 74075 May 12, 1989)
65. ‘SILENCE MEANS YES’ ADMISSION
Galvez had not established through his testimony that all these requisites are present. He did
not state that the other appellants were present and heard the admissions against them; that
they had the opportunity to deny the same; that they must have understood the statement; and
that the facts are within their knowledge. Indeed, even appellant Ciobal who allegedly admitted
his participation denied the alleged imputation of appellant Lim that he placed gasoline in 2
containers. 7 Absent such evidence an admission by silence cannot be attributed to the other
appellants.
(People v. Ciobal, G.R. No. 86220, April 20, 1990)
It has also been held that while an accused is under custody, his silence may not be taken as
evidence against him as he has a right to remain silent; his silence when in custody may not be
used as evidence against him, otherwise, his right of silence would be illusory.
(People v. Tia Fong alias Ah Sam, L-7615, March 14, 1956, 98 Phil. 609)
It must be stressed here that even under a regime of martial law, the operations of our laws
governing the rights of an accused person are not open to doubt. Under the code for the
administration of detainees, all officers, civilian and military personnel are sworn to uphold the
rights of detainees. Among such fundamental rights are the right against compulsory testimonial
self-incrimination, the right, when under investigation for the commission of an offense, to
remain silent, to have counsel, and to be informed of his rights; the right not to be subjected to
force, violence, threats, intimidation and degrading punishment or torture in the course of one's
detention, and the safeguard that any confession obtained in violation of the foregoing rights
shall be inadmissible in evidence. 12 The 1973 Constitution gives explicit constitutional sanction
to the right to silence. Thus, in Section 20 of Article IV of the Constitution, there is this
categorical mandate: "Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force,
violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used
against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in
evidence."
(People v. Alegre, G.R. No., L-30423 November 7, 1979)
66. EXTRAJUDICIAL ADMISSION AND RA 7438
In providing that during the taking of an extrajudicial confession the accused's parents, older
brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, municipal judge, district school
supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel as chosen by the accused may be present, RA
7438 does not propose that they appear in the alternative or as a substitute for counsel without
any condition or clause. It is explicitly stated therein that before the above-mentioned persons
can appear two (2) conditions must be met: (a) counsel of the accused must be absent, and, (b)
a valid waiver must be executed. RA 7438 does not therefore unconditionally and unreservedly
eliminate the necessity of counsel but underscores its importance by requiring that a substitution
of counsel with the above-mentioned persons be made with caution and with the essential
safeguards.
Hence, in the absence of such valid waiver, the Parish Priest of Santol, the Municipal Mayor, the
relatives of the accused, the Chief of Police and other police officers of the municipality could
not stand in lieu of counsel's presence. The apparent consent of the two (2) accused in
continuing with the investigation was of no moment as a waiver to be effective must be made in
writing and with the assistance of counsel. 9 Consequently, any admission obtained from the two
(2) accused emanating from such uncounselled interrogation would be inadmissible in evidence
in any proceeding.
(People v. Ordoño, G.R. No. 132154, June 29, 2000)
While accused-appellant's improvident plea should be disregarded, nevertheless his conviction

cannot be set aside as there is, in addition to his plea, other sufficient and credible evidence on
which the judgment of the trial court rests. 29 This evidence consists of accused-appellant's
extrajudicial confession, his testimony in open court, and the testimony of the other witnesses.
With respect to accused-appellant's extrajudicial confession, the Constitution, 30 R.A. No.

7438,31 and caselaw32 lay down four fundamental requirements for the admissibility of
extrajudicial confessions in general, to wit: (a) the confession must be voluntary; (b) it must be
made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (c) the confession must be
express; and (d) it must be in writing. In this case, after accused-appellant was read his rights in
Tagalog, he signified his intention to confess his participation in the rape and killing of Arlene.
He did this in the presence of his father and with the assistance of Atty. Cesar Villar, who had
been chosen by his father for him. In his confession, he stated categorically that he took Arlene
to an abandoned house near Best-Line Eatery, where he struck her on the head with a rock,
raped her, and afterwards dumped her body into the toilet bowl in order to hide it. Accused-
appellant's confession was placed in writing and it was signed by him, his counsel, and the
administering officer.
Accused-appellant acknowledged his extrajudicial confession in court. The court asked him if he
executed the extrajudicial confession voluntarily and in the presence of counsel, and he
answered in the affirmative. Accused-appellant testified with some relatives present in the
courtroom, including his grandmother. In addition, he was assisted by his
counsel de oficio, Atty. Victor Galang.
(People v. Principe, G.R. No. 135862, May 2, 2002)
After a careful examination of the evidence on hand, we hold that Nabilgas’ extrajudicial
confession is inadmissible in evidence. The Court has consistently held that an extrajudicial
confession, to be admissible, must satisfy the following requirements: "(1) the confession must
be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel,
preferably of the confessant's choice; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing."19
(People v. Cachuela et al, G.R. No. 191752, June 10, 2013)
67. ADMISSION BASED ON MEDIA INTERVIEW
Clearly, appellant's confessions to the news reporters were given free from any undue influence
from the police authorities. The news reporters acted as news reporters when they reported
when they interviewed appellant. They were not acting under the direction and control of the
police. They were to check appellant's confession to the mayor. They did not force appellant to
grant them an interview and reenact the commission of the crime. In fact, they asked his
permission before interviewing him . . . .
(People v. Andan, 269 SCRA 95 [1997])
Appellant's confessions to the media were likewise properly admitted. The confessions were
made in response to questions by news reporters, not by the police or any other investigating
officer. We have held that statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a
televised interview are deemed voluntary an are admissible in evidence. 37
(People v. Vizcarra, 115 SCRA 743, 752 [1982])
Indeed, there is no showing that the radio reporter was acting for the police or that the interview
was conducted under circumstances where it is apparent that accused-appellant confessed to
the killing our of fear. As already stated, the interview was conducted on October 23, 1996, 6
days after accused-appellant had already confessed to the killing to the police.
Accused-appellant's extrajudicial confession is corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti,

namely, the fact of death of Jennifer Domantay. In addition, the circumstantial evidence
furnished by the other prosecution witnesses dovetails in material points with his confession. He
was seen walking toward the bamboo grove, followed by the victim. Later, he was seen
standing near the bamboo grove where the child's body was found. Rule 133 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence provides:
§3. Extrajudicial confession, not sufficient ground for conviction. — An

extrajudicial confession made by an accused, shall not be sufficient ground for
conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti.
§4. Evidence necessary in treason cases. — No person charged with treason

shall be convicted unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt
act, or on confession in open court.
(People v. Domantay, G.R. No. 130612 May 11, 1999)
68. PLANTING OF EVIDENCE AND RA 9165
Compliance with the chain of custody requirement ... ensures the integrity of confiscated,
seized, and/or surrendered drugs and/or drug paraphernalia in four (4) respects: first, the nature
of the substances or items seized; second, the quantity (e.g., weight) of the substances or items
seized; third, the relation of the substances or items seized to the incident allegedly causing
their seizure; and fourth, the relation of the substances or items seized to the person/s alleged
to have been in possession of or peddling them. Compliance with this requirement forecloses
opportunities for planting, contaminating, or tampering of evidence in any manner.
(People v. Holgado, G.R. No. 207992, August 11, 2014)
Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link; hence, it is vital that the seized
contraband be immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the
markings as reference. The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence
from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from the
accused until they are disposed of at the end of the criminal proceedings, thus, preventing
switching, planting or contamination of evidence.
(People v. Dahil, 750 Phil. 212, 225 [2015])
In this connection, Eda had the burden of proof to defeat the presumption that the police officers
handled the seized drugs with regularity and that they properly perfonned their official duties. He
failed. No bad faith or planting of evidence was actually shown. He did not substantiate any illicit
motive on the part of the police officers, as to why they would choose to falsely implicate him in
a very serious crime that would cause his imprisonment for life. For this failure, the testimonies
of prosecution witnesses deserve full faith and credit.
(People v. Eda, G.R. No. 220715, August 4, 2006)
69.WEAPON: NECESSARY FOR CONVICTION?
The presentation of the weapon is not a prerequisite for conviction. Such presentation and
identification of the weapon used are not indispensable to prove the guilt of the accused much
more so where the perpetrator has been positively identified by a credible witness. Appellant’s
insistence, therefore, that the presentation of the two (2) knives would prove his innocence is
futile, irrelevant and immaterial, in the face of positive identification by two unbiased and
credible eyewitnesses. Positive identification where categorical and consistent and without any
showing of ill-motive on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the matter prevails over a
denial. Denial being negative evidence which is self-serving in nature, cannot prevail over the
positive identification of prosecution witnesses. More so in this case where the defense of denial
is not corroborated by disinterested and credible witnesses: the mother of the accused whose
presence in the crime scene was not sufficiently established and Edgar Erro whose testimony is
found to be doubtful and not without bias.
(Medina v. People, G.R. No. 161308, January 15, 2014)
The non-identification or non-presentation of the weapon used is not fatal to the prosecution's
cause where the accused was positively identified. 55 Thus, the CA correctly affirmed petitioner's
conviction for frustrated homicide despite the inadmissibility of the weapon presented in
evidence. Georgia positively identified petitioner as the person who hacked him. Her testimony
was corroborated by Fred who categorically declared that petitioner chased and hacked
Georgia. The testimonies of the witnesses were further buttressed by other evidence including
the photographs of Georgia's wounds and the medical certificate. The credibility of these
testimonies and evidence is now beyond dispute.
(Adlawan v. People, G.R. No. 197645, April 04, 2018)
Accused-appellant avers that late in the night of June 21, 1995 while riding in a tricycle, SPO1
Benjamin Bacunata, along with elements of the Navotas Police Station, arrested and detained
him at the Navotas Police Station; that he was arrested without a warrant and was apprehended
merely on the basis of a report of a certain Hector Domingo who did not have any personal
knowledge of the identity of the accused and also of the circumstances described in the
information charging him of the crime of murder; that both SPO1 Benjamin Bacunata and Hector
Domingo were not present at the scene of the alleged crime and that Hector Domingo was not
even presented as a witness by the prosecution; that at the time of the arrest, the accused was
not doing any act which would give the arresting officers any reasonable suspicion to cause his
arrest and/or to detain him; and that since his arrest is illegal, the bladed weapon which was
presented by the prosecution as the murder weapon, must have been seized as a result of an
illegal arrest and illegal search and therefore can not be presented as evidence against the
accused. In short, the court a quo allegedly never acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
accused-appellant.
(People v. Ayson, G.R. No. 124706, February 22, 2000)
70. PERPETUATION OF TESTIMONY
In proceedings for the perpetuation of testimony, the right to cross-examine a deponent is an

even more vital part of the procedure. In fact, the Revised Rules on Evidence provide that
depositions previously taken are only admissible in evidence against an adverse party who had
the opportunity to cross-examine the witness.47 Because depositions are an exception48 to the
general rule on the inadmissibility of hearsay testimony, the process of cross-examination is an
important safeguard against false statements.
(Martinez v. Ongsiako, G.R. No. 209057, March 15, 2017)
This contention on the part of the plaintiffs is absolutely unfounded. The perpetuation of
testimony in itself does not prove the existence of any right. By reason of its very nature it can
refer to nothing but facts, in consisting only of the mere declarations of witnesses. In
proceedings for the perpetuation of testimony no question of law is involved; the court makes no
decision therein; no right is recognized or declared in favor of or against anyone, and all that the
court has to do is to hear the witnesses and certify to their depositions. (Section 373, Code of
Civil Procedure.) The court can not even make any findings as to the credibility of the witnesses
or the probatory value of their testimony. The only time when this can be done is at the trial
where the testimony thus preserved is to be utilized or offered in evidence in such cases; and in
such manner as provided in section 375 of the code, being subject even then to any objection in
the same manner as the testimony of any other witness. (Section 376.) Therefore, properly
speaking, the testimony thus perpetuated is not in itself conclusive proof, either of the existence
of any right nor even of the facts to which they relate, as it can be controverted at the trial in the
same manner as though no perpetuation of testimony was ever had.
(Alfonso et al. v. Lagdameo, G.R. No. L-2835, November 27, 1906)
Finally, the Court takes note that prosecution witness Li Luen Ping had managed to attend the
initial trial proceedings before the MeTC of Manila on September 9, 2004. At that time, Li Luen
Ping's old age and fragile constitution should have been unmistakably apparent and yet the
prosecution failed to act with zeal and foresight in having his deposition or testimony taken
before the MeTC pursuant to Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court. In fact, it
should have been imperative for the prosecution to have moved for the preservation of Li Luen
Ping's testimony at that first instance given the fact that the witness is a non-resident alien who
can leave the Philippines anytime without any definite date of return. Obviously, the prosecution
allowed its main witness to leave the court's jurisdiction without availing of the court procedure
intended to preserve the testimony of such witness. The loss of its cause is attributable to no
other party.
(Go et al., v. People, G.R. No. 185527, July 18, 2012)

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April 30, 2020 [EVIDENCE- PERFORMANCE TASK]

1. Relevance, Materiality, Admissibility

Reyes vs. Court of Appeals

“Rules of Court shall not be applicable in agrarian cases even in a

Bautista vs. Aparece

“The test for the admissibility or inadmissibility of a certain document is

“Section 3 Rules of Court. Admissibility of evidence- Evidence is

Admissibility is the character or quality which any material must

introduced as evidence in court. It answers the question: should the court

Weight is the value given or significance or impact, or importance given to

A Condition for admissibility is relevancy.

a). rational or logical relevancy in that it has a connection to the issue

2. Best Evidence and Parol Evidence

Meyers vs. United States

People vs. Tan

Dela Rama v. Ledesma

“It is a well-accepted principle of law that evidence of a prior or

NORTON RESOURCES AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

vs. ALL ASIA BANK CORPORATION

“The "parol evidence rule" forbids any addition to or contradiction of the

When an agreement has been reduced to writing, the parties cannot be

3. Real (Object), Documentary, Testimonial Evidence

PEOPLE VS. BARDAJE

“Physical evidence is of the highest order and speaks more eloquently

SISON VS. PEOPLE

“The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when presented in evidence,

G.R. No. 142856-57

“the testimony of a witness may be partly believed or disbelieved, depending

XXX v. People of the Philippines

“ The affidavit of recantation executed by a witness prior to the trial cannot

5. Credibility of witness who is related to an accused

People vs. Camat 2012

"Minor inconsistencies in the narration of facts by the witnesses do not detract

PEOPLE VS. SOLOMON

PEOPLE VS. MACAPAGAL

7. Marital Privilege and Disqualification

ORDONO VS. DAQUIGAN

PEOPLE VS. CASTANEDA

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RUBIO

9. Dead Man's Statute

GUERRERO VS. ST. CLAIRE REALTY

LICHUACO v. ATLANTIC GULF AND PACIFIC

“Officers and/or stockholders of a corporation are not disqualified from

claim or demand against the estate of a deceased person, as to any matter of

10. Witness with disability (deaf, mute or blind)

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. DANIEL HAYAG

11. Flight of a witness: admission of guilt or not?

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,v. EMETERIO MEDINA Y DAMO

12. Offer of compromise

THE UNITED STATES vs. JUAN MAQUI

“The question as to the admissibility of offers to compromise in criminal cases

13. Receipt of stolen item

IRENEO CAHULOGAN vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

14. Hearsay Evidence

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.CARMEN SANTORIO GALENO

15. Exception to Hearsay Evidence

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs EUGENIO TOLEDO

16. Sufficiency of sole testimony to convict

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs JOEMARIE JALBONIAN