The RTC Ruling

In its decision, the RTC ruled in favor of James. It explained that the burden of proof shifted from James to PNB
when the latter asserted an affirmative defense – that the loan proceeds were released to James and, thus, PNB
properly applied his time deposit as payment of his unpaid loan in accordance with the provisions of the promissory
note. PNB, however, failed to substantiate this affirmative defense.

The trial court observed that aside from Edna's bare testimony, no other evidence was presented to prove that the
proceeds of the loan subject of the pre-signed loan application were released to and duly received by James. It did
not give evidentiary weight to the miscellaneous ticket presented by PNB because it did not bear James' signature.
The trial court did not also give any evidentiary value to PN No. 0011628152240006, dated 26 February 2002,
noting that the promissory note it purportedly renewed was not presented in evidence.

Since it has not been established that James had an outstanding debt to PNB, the latter's application of the
former's time deposit to the alleged loan is improper. Necessarily, James is entitled to the return of his dollar time
deposit. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision provides:

WHEREFORE, defendant is directed to pay plaintiff the following:

1. The amount of US$50,860.53 or its peso equivalent plus interest of 1.09375% per annum from
December 14, 2004 until fully paid;

2. Attorney's fees in the amount of P500,000.00 plus appearance fee of P2,000.00 per hearing; and

3. Costs of suit.

Defendant's counter-claims are dismissed for lack of merit. 16

PNB moved for reconsideration, 17 but the same was denied by the RTC in its Order,18 dated 28 April 2008.

Undaunted, PNB elevated an appeal before the CA.19

The CA Ruling

In its appealed decision, the CA affirmed with modification the 28 November 2007 decision and 28 April 2008 order
of the RTC.

The appellate court concurred with the trial court that the burden of proof shifted to PNB. Unfortunately, PNB failed
to substantiate its claims. The appellate court, thus, found no reversible error in the trial court's disquisition that
PNB should be held liable to James.

The appellate court, however, modified the RTC decision by reducing the amount of attorney's fees to P50,000.00
from the original award of P500,000.00 finding the latter to be exorbitant.

The fallo of the appealed decision provides:

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 28 November 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Paranaque City,
Branch 195, in Civil Case No. 05-0066, is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION in that the
award of attorney's fees is reduced to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00). 20

Hence, this petition for review where PNB raised the following issues:

ISSUES

I.

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE
SHOWING THAT RESPONDENT RECEIVED THE PROCEEDS OF SUBJECT LOAN, THUS, IGNORING
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT HOLDING THAT THE PROMISSORY NOTE IS
THE BEST EVIDENCE THAT THE BORROWER HAS RECEIVED THE LOAN PROCEEDS.
 II.

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE CONTENTS OF THE
NOTARIZED PROMISSORY NOTES, DESPITE THE DEARTH OF CLEAR AND CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE
SUFFICIENT TO OVERTHROW THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE AND THE PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF
PUBLIC DOCUMENTS UNDER RULE 132, SECTION 23 OF THE RULES OF COURT.

III.

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT RULE THAT RESPONDENT
WAS BOUND BY HIS PROMISSORY NOTES, EVEN IF THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE TO OVERCOME THE
PRESUMPTION THAT EVERY PERSON TAKES ORDINARY CARE OF HIS CONCERNS, ON THE CONTRARY,
THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD SHOWS THAT RESPONDENT VOLUNTARILY AND INTELLIGENTLY
EXECUTED SUCH PROMISSORY NOTES.21

Essentially the issue in this case is whether PNB sufficiently established James' receipt of the loan proceeds.

THE COURT'S RULING

The appeal is meritorious.

Before going into the merits of the case, it must be underscored that the loan subject of this case is the loan
secured by CTD No. B-658788 which was later replaced by CID No. B-630178. Although PNB insists that the
subject loan and the 14 February 2001 loan are one and the same, the documentary evidence it submitted does not
support this point.

There is no indication that PN No. 0011628152240006 dated 26 February 2002 is a renewal of PN No.
0011628152240004 dated 14 February 2001. Instead, PN No. 0011628152240006 clearly indicates that it is a
renewal of PN No. 0011628152240005.

Furthermore, a reading of PN No. 0011628152240006 dated 26 February 2002 plainly states that it is secured by
CTD No. B-658788 (now CTD No. B-630178). In contrast, PN No. 0011628152240004 dated 14 February 2001
states that it is secured by CTD No. 629914. Although PNB's witness, Edna, testified that CTD No. 629914 and CTD
No. B-630178 represent the same time deposit account, the latter being a mere replacement of the former, nothing
on record would support this claim. Indeed, it is clear from the annotation on CTD No. B-630178 that it replaced
CTD No. B-658788, not CTD No. 629914.

While there is a possibility that when Edna testified that CTD No. B-630178 replaced CTD No. 629914, she meant
that CTD No. 629914 was first replaced by CTD No. B-658788 which was in turn replaced by CTD No. B-630178, no
concrete evidence was offered to prove this point. Thus, the Court opines that the subject loan, which was renewed
on 26 February 2002, is independent and distinct from the 14 February 2001 loan. Consequently, and as aptly
stated by the trial court, PN No. 0011628152240004 dated 14 February 2001 is immaterial to the present case.

For the same reason, the Court shares the trial court's observation that the original promissory note evidencing the
subject loan, and which was renewed by PN No. 0011628152240006, dated 26 February 2002, was not presented
in evidence. The trial court, however, is mistaken when it ruled that this fact made PN No. 0011628152240006
dated 26 February 2002 devoid of any evidentiary value.

Promissory note is the best evidence of the existence of the loan.

In this case, James does not deny that he executed several promissory notes in favor of PNB. In fact, during the
pre-trial24 as well as in his Comment/Opposition, 25 dated 18 July 2007, to PNB's formal offer of documentary
evidence, James admitted the genuineness of his signatures as appearing on several promissory notes, including
PN No. 0011628152240006, dated 26 February 2002, albeit with the caveat that the same were pre-signed for pre-
arranged loans which he allegedly never availed of.

The trial court apparently believed James' claim that the loan documents were just pre-signed for pre-arranged
loans despite the absence of any corroborating evidence to support it. As a result, it ruled that PNB, indeed, failed
to prove that the proceeds of the loan subject of the pre-signed loan application were released to James. The trial
court's reliance on James' self-serving allegation, however, is erroneous.

Nothing in PN No. 0011628152240006 dated 26 February 2002 would suggest that it was executed merely to
secure future loans. In fact, it is clear from the wordings used therein that James acknowledged receipt of the
proceeds of the loan. The said promissory note provides:

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, I/We, solidarily promise to pay to the order of the PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
BANK (the "BANK") on the stipulated due date/s the sum of Pesos DOLLARS: FIFTY THOUSAND
ONLY (P $50,000.00 ) (the "Loan"), together with interest at 3.85% p.a. per annum.26 x x x
(emphasis supplied)

In Ycong v. Court of Appeals,27 the petitioners alleged that they did not receive the proceeds of the loan despite
executing a promissory note containing the words "for a loan received today xxx." The trial court ruled in favor of
the petitioners holding that they were merely intimidated, pressured and coerced into signing the promissory note.
On appeal, the appellate court reversed the factual findings by the trial court. In sustaining the reversal by the
appellate court, the Court ratiocinated that the promissory note is the best evidence to prove the existence of the
loan and there was no need for the respondent to submit a separate receipt to prove that the petitioners received
the proceeds thereof.

Similarly, by affixing his signature on PN No. 0011628152240006, dated 26 February 2002, which contained the
words "FOR VALUE RECEIVED," James acknowledged receipt of the proceeds of the loan in the stated amount and
committed to pay the same under the conditions stated therein. As a businessman, James cannot claim
unfamiliarity with commercial documents. He could not also pretend not understanding the contents of the
promissory note he signed considering that he is a lettered-person and a college graduate. He certainly understood
the import and was fully aware of the consequences of signing a promissory note. Indeed, no reasonable and
prudent man would acknowledge a debt, and even secure it with valuable assets, if the same does not exist.

The fact that PN No. 0011628152240006, dated 26 February 2002, is only a renewal of a previous promissory note
identified as PN No. 0011628152240005 does not adversely affect the fact that it is an acknowledgment of a loan
duly received. It would be inconceivable for a reasonably diligent person to renew a promissory note if the loan it
purportedly evidences is inexistent. As such, the Court rules that PNB sufficiently established that James received
the proceeds of the loan subject of PN No. 0011628152240006 (originally PN No. 0011628152240005).

Parol evidence must be clear and convincing.

Rule 130, Section 9 of the Rules of Court provides for the parol evidence rule which states that when the terms of
an agreement have been reduced into writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there
can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of
the written agreement.

This rule admits of exceptions. A party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of a written
agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading any of the following: (a) an intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or
imperfection in the written agreement; (b) the failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties thereto; (c) the validity of the written agreement; or (d) the existence of other terms
agreed to by the parties or their successors-in-interest after the execution of the written agreement.

However, to overcome the presumption that the written agreement contains all the terms of the agreement, the