3GPP SA3: Mobile Communications Security Specification Group

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3GPP‐SA3

Mobile communications security specification group

Dr. Anand R. Prasad, NEC Corporation, Chairman 3GPP SA3

© ETSI 2015. All rights reserved
3GPP SA3 makes mobile
business happen!
Cyber 2050 is in 5 Years!
(7 cyber years is 1 human year)
3GPP TSG SA WG3 (Security) Terms of Reference

The WG has the overall responsibility for security and privacy 
in 3GPP systems
• performs analysis of potential threats to these systems
• determines the security and privacy requirements for 3GPP 
systems
• specifies the security architectures and protocols
• ensures the availability of cryptographic algorithms which need to be 
part of the specifications
http://www.3gpp.org/Specifications‐groups/sa‐plenary/54‐sa3‐security

3GPP SA3 specification location:


http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/html-info/33-series.htm
Finding specific specification:
http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/html-info/xxyyy.htm
Replace xxyyy by specification number, e.g., 33401 for TS 33.401
3GPP SA3 Work Items

Security Aspects of Proximity‐based Services (ProSe)
Mission Critical Push to Talk over LTE (MCPTT)
Security Assurance Specification for 3GPP Network Products 
(SCAS)
IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) Security
• Security Aspects of Web Real Time Communication (WebRTC) Access 
to IMS etc.
Security Aspects related to Machine‐Type Communication 
(MTC)
Network Domain Security (NDS)
Multimedia Broadcast/Multicast Service (MBMS)
SAE/LTE Security etc.
3GPP SA3 Study Items

Security for Proximity‐based Services
Security Aspects of Isolated E‐UTRAN Operation for Public 
Safety
Cellular IOT
• EGPRS access security enhancements with relation to Cellular IoT
• Battery Efficient Security for very low Throughput Machine Type 
Communication Devices
Security Assurance Methodology for 3GPP Network Elements 
(SECAM)
Subscriber Privacy Impact in 3GPP
IMS Enhanced Spoofed Call Prevention and Detection
Mission Critical Push to Talk (MCPTT)

MCPTT brings several new services that could potentially be 
used for commercial purposes, e.g. ambient listening, discreet 
listening etc.
• Commercial use of MCPTT services can have serious implications
• Current activity is based on the assumption that MCPTT is only meant 
for public safety
Besides that of services, several security issues needs to be 
tackled in MCPTT. A known example is authentication

MCPTT MCPTT
MCPTT MCPTT PLMN Service Application
User UE Access Access Registration

Where and what to authenticate?


Ref.: S3-151461, TR 33.879, and S3-151444
Isolated E‐UTRAN Operation for Public Safety 
(IOPS)

eNodeB does not have 
any backhaul connectivity 
Local EPC is available

Ref.: S3-151513, TR 33.997 Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access


Network (E-UTRAN)
Proximity based Services (ProSe)

Work on security for ProSe discovery, configuration and 
communication
Focus is currently on UE as relay which brings obvious security 
requirements of authentication, key management etc.
Out‐of‐network

ProSe UE‐to‐ Public 
Remote
Network  eNB Safety
UE EPC
Relay Uu AS
PC5 SGi

Ref.: S3-151530, TR 33.833, and TS 33.303


Cellular IOT (cIoT)

There are two topics:
• EGPRS access security enhancements with relation to 
Cellular IoT
Ref.: S3‐151520, TR 33.860
• Enhancement of GPRS while keeping the current architecture
• Battery Efficient Security for very low Throughput Machine 
Type Communication Devices
Ref.: S3‐151521, TR 33.863
• Allows modification of current architecture (GPRS)
• Requires very low data‐rate (few bps) and long battery life (upto 10 yrs.)
Security Assurance

Phase 1: Security Assurance Methodology (SECAM) in 3GPP – 2012
• Study existing methodologies & adapt them to 3GPP needs
• Goal to have only testable requirements
Phase 2: Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) – 2014
• Use methodology agreed in phase 1 (TR 33.805 cleaned up into TR 33.916)
• Developing test‐cases and SCAS, started from MME (TR 33.806 and TS 33.116, 
general test‐cases in TS 33.117)
3GPP Evaluator Operator
Security
Assurance
Legend: Operator
Specification Evaluation (Self) security
s (SCAS) Evaluation
Product / Report Declaration acceptance
Documentation decision
Vendor
Role
Network
Product

Process
GSMA Security Assurance Makes the final decision based on
Group (SECAG) output documents and internal
Accreditation
policies
© ETSI 2015. All rights reserved
Contact Details: 
Anand R. Prasad
[email protected]
https://jp.linkedin.com/in/arprasad
http://www.prasad.bz/

Thank you!

© ETSI 2015. All rights reserved

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