AGNO V. CAGATAN A.C. NO.

4515 July 14, 2008 | 1

EN BANC
[A.C. No. 4515. July 14, 2008.]
CECILIA A. AGNO, complainant, vs. ATTY. MARCIANO J. CAGATAN, respondent.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J p:
This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Cecilia A. Agno against respondent Atty. Marciano
J. Cagatan for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The record shows that respondent was the President of International Services Recruitment
Corporation (ISRC), a corporation engaged in the recruitment of Filipino workers for overseas employment.
On July 12, 1988, ISRC's recruitment license was cancelled by the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) for violation of labor law provisions and subsequently, on August 9, 1988, ISRC was forever
banned from participating in overseas recruitment. 1
On September 19, 1988, the respondent appealed the DOLE's cancellation of ISRC's license with
the Office of the President. The appeal was resolved by the said office in respondent's favor in the
Resolution dated March 30, 1993 2 which set aside the order of cancellation and directed both the DOLE
and the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) to renew the recruitment license of ISRC subject
to the payment of a guarantee bond which was double the amount required by law.
Since ISRC's recruitment license had already expired on September 17, 1989, ISRC filed on April
12, 1994, an application for renewal of its recruitment license with the POEA. 3
However, during the pendency of the aforementioned appeal with the Office of the President,
particularly on August 9, 1992, the respondent entered into a Memorandum of Agreement 4 with a United
Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) national, Mr. Khalifa H. Juma, 5 the husband of herein complainant, Cecilia
A. Agno. The Memorandum of Agreement is quoted in toto hereunder:
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That the undersigned, Mr. JOMA HUMED KHALIFA, U.A.E. national, and Mr.
MARCIANO J. CAGATAN, Filipino citizen, have entered into this Memorandum of
Agreement this 9th day of August 1992, at Manila, Philippines, concerning the joint
ownership and operation of INTERNATIONAL SERVICING AND RECRUITMENT
CORPORATION (ISRC) and have mutually agreed, in connection therewith, as follows:
1. That ISRC shall be jointly owned by the herein parties on a 50-50 basis and
accordingly, immediate steps shall be taken to submit the necessary documents to the
Securities and Exchange Commission to legalize the arrangement and to cause the
issuance of the corresponding certificate of stocks to Mr. Khalifa and his group; DICSaH
2. That likewise, the sharing of the profits shall be on an equal basis (50-50) after
deducting all the pertinent expenses that the officers of the corporation shall be: Chairman
of the Board of Directors — Mr. JOMA HUMED KHALIFA, President and General Manager,
Mr. MARCIANO J. CAGATAN or his designated representative, Treasurer, Ms.
Cecilia Agno all of whom shall be members of the Board of Trustees together with two
others;
3. That for and in consideration of the above joint ownership of the corporation, Mr.
KHALIFA undertakes as his contribution to the stock ownership thereof, the following:
(a) To pay the amount of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P250,000.00) initially on or before AUGUST 25, 1992, said amount to be used to have
the license of ISRC reinstated;
(b) Upon the release of the license, to pay the additional amount of TWO
HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P250,000.00) to start the business
operations of the corporation and to liquidate pending government and other
obligations, if any;
4. The management of the corporation shall be handled by Mr. KHALIFA and his
group while the legal and government liaisonship shall be the responsibility of
Mr. CAGATAN; mutual consideration with each other in the course of the business
operations shall be maintained in order to avoid problem with the government, the workers
and the employers;
 AGNO V. CAGATAN A.C. NO. 4515 July 14, 2008 | 2

5. There shall be a regular accounting of the business every month, with the
assistance of a qualified accountant and each of the herein parties shall be furnished copy
thereof; the share of the parties may be released to each of them as often as the parties
agree, however, advances against the share of each may be agreed upon by the parties;
6. Any claim of workers or other parties against the ISRC before the signing of this
agreement shall be the sole responsibility of Mr. CAGATAN and Mr. KHALIFA or his 50%
ownership shall be free from such claims. SCcHIE
Manila, August 9, 1992.

JOMA HUMED KHALIFA MARCIANO J. CAGATAN

   

  CECILIA AGNO

WITNESSES:  

__________________ _________________

On December 26, 1995, which was more than three (3) years after the execution of the aforesaid
agreement, a Complaint-Affidavit 6 for disbarment was filed with this Court by the complainant against the
respondent claiming that the latter used fraud, deceit and misrepresentation, in enticing her husband,
Khalifa, to join ISRC and invest therein the amount of P500,000.00 and that although the respondent
received the aforesaid amount, the complainant learned from her inquiries with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and the POEA that the respondent failed to comply with the terms of the
Memorandum of Agreement. The complainant found out that the said Memorandum of Agreement could
not be validated without the approval of the Board of Directors of ISRC. While respondent even had the
complainant sign an affidavit stating that she was then the acting Treasurer of ISRC, her appointment as
Treasurer was not submitted to the SEC. The records of the SEC showed that the Board of Directors,
officers and stockholders of ISRC remained unchanged and her name and that of her husband did not
appear as officers and/or stockholders thereof. From the POEA, on the other hand, the complainant
learned that ISRC's recruitment license was yet to be reinstated.
The complainant claimed that respondent used for his own personal benefit the P500,000.00 that
she and her husband invested in ISRC. When she demanded that respondent return the said sum of
money, respondent issued a bank check dated March 30, 1994 7 in favor of the complainant in the amount
of P500,000.00 which was dishonored for being drawn against a closed account. Despite repeated
demands by complainant, the respondent failed to settle his obligation or redeem his dishonored check,
prompting the complainant to file a case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against the respondent.
An information was filed before the Municipal Trial Court of Cainta, Rizal, charging the respondent with the
said offense and a warrant of arrest was issued against respondent after the latter failed several times to
attend his arraignment. The complainant prayed for the disbarment of the respondent for issuing a
bouncing check and for his act of dishonesty in assuring her and her husband that the Memorandum of
Agreement would suffice to install them as stockholders and officers of ISRC which induced them to invest
in said corporation the amount of P500,000.00. TaDAIS
In his Comment, 8 respondent denied the charges against him and averred that while ISRC's
recruitment license was cancelled by the DOLE in 1988, such cancellation was lifted by the Office of the
President on March 30, 1993, on appeal. During the pendency of the said appeal, he and complainant's
husband Khalifa entered into a Memorandum of Agreement because the latter offered to buy shares of
stock of ISRC in order to finance the then pending appeal for the reinstatement of the ISRC license and for
Khalifa and the complainant to undertake the full management and operation of the corporation. The
respondent further alleged that Khalifa H. Juma, through the complainant, paid on various dates the total
amount of P500,000.00, which respondent claimed he used to reimburse borrowed sums of money to
pursue the appeal with the Office of the President. According to the respondent, while there were still legal
procedures to be observed before the sale of shares of ISRC to non-stockholders, Khalifa and complainant
were in a hurry to start the business operation of ISRC. Consequently, respondent sold and assigned his
own shareholdings in ISRC for P500,000.00 to Khalifa as evidenced by a Deed of Assignment 9 dated April
26, 1993. The respondent, in turn, issued a check in the amount of P500,000.00, which was not intended to
be encashed but only to guarantee the reimbursement of the money to Khalifa and the complainant in case
the appeal would be decided adversely against ISRC. Conversely, the check would be returned to
respondent if the appeal is resolved in favor of ISRC. The respondent denied employing fraud or
misrepresentation since allegedly, Khalifa and the complainant decided to buy his shares after being told,
upon inquiry in Malacañang, that ISRC had a good case. The respondent averred that complainant was
 AGNO V. CAGATAN A.C. NO. 4515 July 14, 2008 | 3

motivated by bad faith and malice in allegedly fabricating criminal charges against him instead of seeking
rescission of the Deed of Assignment and refund of the consideration for the sale of the shares of stock.
The respondent surmised that they decided not to proceed with the Memorandum of Agreement when
complainant had secured her own license after she had received the Deed of Assignment and assumed
the position of acting treasurer of the ISRC. The respondent justified the non-submission of copies of the
Memorandum of Agreement, Deed of Assignment and complainant's appointment as Acting Treasurer with
the SEC because of the cancellation of ISRC's license to recruit and the pendency of the appeal for
reinstatement since 1989. Aside from a copy of the Deed of Assignment in favor of the complainant and
her husband Khalifa regarding the five hundred shares of stock, respondent also presented in support of
his allegations copies of 1) his Letter 10 dated April 12, 1994 to the POEA requesting the renewal of
ISRC's license, and 2) a Letter 11 dated May 24, 1994 from the Licensing and Regulation Office of the
POEA requiring him: (1) to submit an escrow agreement with a reputable commercial banking corporation
in the amount of P400,000.00 to answer for any valid and legal claim of recruited workers; cash bond
deposit of P200,000.00; and surety bond of P100,000.00; and (2) to clear ISRC's pending cases with said
agency before respondent's request for reinstatement of ISRC's license as a land based agency. SEcTHA
In a Resolution 12 dated May 22, 1996, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), through Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, held
several hearings, the last of which was on November 13, 2003. During those hearings, the complainant
presented her evidence. For his part, the respondent, instead of presenting his defense before the CBD in
open court, opted to present a position paper which was allowed by the Order dated April 20, 2004 13 of
Commissioner San Juan. However, in lieu of said position paper, the respondent submitted a
Memorandum 14 after the complainant had filed her formal offer of evidence. Eventually, on October 12,
2004, Commissioner San Juan submitted her Report and Recommendation. 15 Said the Commissioner in
her report:
There is no question that the Memorandum of Agreement between the parties was
executed on 9 [August] 1992. In said Memorandum, no mention was made of the
assignment of shares of stock in favor of the complainant and her husband. The conditions
stated therein was that the amount to be contributed by the complainant shall be used for
the reinstatement of the license of the ISRC. No mention was made regarding the
assignment of shares in favor of the complainant and her husband. Respondent presented a
Deed of Assignment of shares of stock in favor of the complainant and her husband worth
P500,000.00 dated 26 April 1993, however, it is noted that there is a super imposed date of
24 November 1994 in a notarial series of 1993 of Mario S. Ramos, Notary Public, which
raises doubt as to the date it was executed. Apparently, the Deed of Assignment was
executed when the complainant started her investigation regarding the true condition of the
corporation. Anent the reinstatement of the license of the company there is no showing that
the respondent used the amount he received from the complainant in compliance with the
respondent's undertakings in the Memorandum of Agreement. The accusation of enticement
employed by respondent is supported by the fact that complainant was made to appear that
she will be appointed as treasurer of the corporation, however there was no action on the
part of the respondent to change the composition of the Board of Directors and the treasurer
in the records of the corporation on file with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The
respondent did not fully reveal the true condition of the corporation regarding the
reinstatement of the corporation's license to operate. Likewise the issuance of a check in
favor of the complainant on 30 March 1994 against a closed account shows the respondent
had no desire to return the money entrusted to him for the reinstatement of the license of the
corporation. The letter of the POEA dated 24 May 1994 . . . clearly show that the payment of
surety bond will not suffice to reinstate the license of the corporation in view of several
cases of violations of recruitment pending before the POEA against said corporation. This
fact was not disclosed to complainant when the Memorandum of Agreement was entered
into by the parties. SACEca
Thus, the Commissioner's recommendation:
Given all the foregoing, it is submitted that respondent manifested lack of candor,
when he knowingly failed to provide the complainant with accurate and complete information
due her under the circumstances. It is respectfully recommended that respondent
be SUSPENDED from the practice of law in the maximum period prescribed by law and to
return the money received from the complainant.
On October 22, 2005, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed Resolution No. XVII-2005-
102 16 adopting and approving, with modification, the afore-quoted report and recommendation of the
investigating commissioner, to wit:
 AGNO V. CAGATAN A.C. NO. 4515 July 14, 2008 | 4

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and

APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A",
and finding, the Recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent's lack of candor when he knowingly
failed to provide complainant with the accurate and complete information due her, Atty.
Marciano J. Cagatan is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years
and Restitution of the money received from complainant.
Two (2) days later, or on November 24, 2005, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline transmitted to
this Court the Notice of Resolution together with the records of Administrative Case No. 4515. 17 IEHDAT
On January 4, 2006, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration 18 of the Investigating
Commissioner's Report and Recommendation with the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline. In IBP Resolution
No. XVII-2006-83 19 dated January 28, 2006, the IBP Board of Governors denied respondent's motion on
the ground that it has no more jurisdiction to consider and resolve a matter already endorsed to the
Supreme Court pursuant to Section 12 (b) of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.
After this Court noted the aforementioned IBP Resolution on June 28, 2006, a Motion for
Reinvestigation 20 was filed by the respondent on September 12, 2006.
Subsequently, on November 15, 2006, the parties were required to manifest within ten (10) days
from notice, if they were willing to submit this case for resolution based on the pleadings filed. 21
In our Resolution 22 dated March 5, 2007, we noted without action respondent's motion for
reinvestigation in view of respondent' subsequent compliance and Manifestation dated December 27, 2006.
In the same resolution, the Court noted (1) the said respondent's compliance and manifestation of
December 27, 2006 relative to the aforementioned November 15, 2006 Resolution; (2) complainant's
Manifestation dated December 19, 2006, stating that she was willing to submit the case for resolution
based on the pleadings filed and the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors; (3) respondent's Comment
on Complainant's Manifestation dated January 4, 2007; and (4) complainant's Manifestation dated January
10, 2007.
At the outset, the Court shall resolve respondent's challenge as to complainant's personality to file
this complaint. In his Motion for Reconsideration 23 of the IBP Investigating Commissioner's Report and
Recommendation of October 12, 2004, respondent contends that complainant, not being a party-in-interest
in the agreement between respondent and Mr. Khalifa H. Juma, has no legal standing to file the instant
complaint.
Respondent's argument lacks merit.
Section 1, Rule 139-B 24 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that proceedings for disbarment,
suspension or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the IBP upon
the verified complaint of any person. Accordingly, we held in Navarro v. Meneses III, 25 as reiterated
in Ilusorio-Bildner v. Lokin, 26 that:
The argument of respondent that complainant has no legal personality to sue him is
unavailing. Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides that proceedings for the
disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu
propio or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any
person. The right to institute a disbarment proceeding is not confined to clients nor is
it necessary that the person complaining suffered injury from the alleged
wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings are matters of public interest and the only basis for
judgment is the proof or failure of proof of the charges. The evidence submitted by
complainant before the Commission on Bar Discipline sufficed to sustain its resolution and
recommended sanctions. (Emphasis ours)
The rationale was explained by us in Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos, 27 viz.:
[The] rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for
suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is a
plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no
private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and
prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving
courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The
attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The
complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged
misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all
good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. (Word in brackets ours)
 AGNO V. CAGATAN A.C. NO. 4515 July 14, 2008 | 5

Prescinding therefrom, it is, therefore, immaterial whether or not complainant herein was a party to
the subject transaction. In any event, complainant is actually a party-in-interest thereto because she is
mentioned as the treasurer of ISRC in the Memorandum of Agreement; 28 as well as one of the assignees
in the Deed of Assignment of shares of ISRC stocks which respondent alleged to have executed; 29 and
as the payee in the bank check issued by the respondent for the amount of P500,000.00. 30
We shall now proceed to the merits of the case.
The pivotal issue herein is whether respondent employed fraud, deceit or misrepresentation when
he entered into the Memorandum of Agreement with Khalifa and received from the latter a sum of money in
the amount of P500,000.00.
We rule in the affirmative.
The complainant contends that pursuant to their agreement, she gave the amount of P500,000.00
to the respondent to be used for the reinstatement of ISRC's recruitment license as well as to start the
business operation of the corporation. The respondent, however, claims that complainant misinterpreted
their agreement because the P500,000.00 the latter gave him was in payment of his personal shares of
ISRC stock, as evidenced by a Deed of Assignment.
We are constrained to give credence to the complainant's contention. The due execution and
authenticity of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the parties are undisputed. Moreover, the
terms thereof are clear and explicit that for and in consideration of the joint ownership of ISRC, the
husband of the complainant, Mr. Khalifa Juma, would pay the amount of P500,000.00, P250,000.00 of
which would be used for the reinstatement of ISRC's license, while the other P250,000.00 was for the start
of the operation of the corporation and to liquidate pending government and other obligations, if
any. 31 Nowhere in said MOA is the alleged assignment of shares mentioned. The testimony of the
complainant 32 on this score is more credible than that of the respondent because it conforms with the
written stipulations in the MOA. In contrast, the respondent's explanations with respect to the P500,000.00
in question had been inconsistent. The respondent averred in his Comment that the P500,000.00 was
given to him initially for the purpose of pursuing the appeal with the Office of the President and that he
used the same to pay loans or to "reimburse borrowed money" spent for the said purpose. However,
respondent also alleged that since the complainant was in a hurry to start the business operation of ISRC,
the money was used to buy his own shareholdings in the corporation for which he executed a Deed of
Assignment in complainant's favor, which respondent claimed he could validly do without the approval of
ISRC's Board of Directors. His subsequent Memorandum 33 submitted to the IBP contained new
allegations that aside from the P500,000.00 paid by the complainant for his personal shares of ISRC
stocks, an additional P500,000.00 should have been given to him as fresh capital of the corporation and
because of this failure of complainant to put up the alleged fresh capital, ISRC was not able to put up the
deposits required by the POEA resulting in the non-renewal of the license of ISRC up to the
present. AcHaTE
Indeed, the deceit and misrepresentation employed by the respondent was seemingly evident right
at the outset when he entered into the MOA concerning the joint ownership and operation of ISRC with the
complainant's husband, knowing fully well that he could not do so without the consent of and/or authority
from the corporation's Board of Directors. The unilateral execution by respondent of the Deed of
Assignment is a lame excuse offered by the respondent. We agree with the observation of Commissioner
San Juan that the said deed, which was not at all mentioned in the MOA, was executed by the respondent
after the complainant had conducted her investigation of the true condition of the corporation. The so-called
"guarantee check" appears to have also been issued by respondent for the same reason.
Moreover, while the respondent made it appear in the MOA that the complainant would be
appointed treasurer and her husband Chairman of the Board of ISRC, the respondent had not complied
with the said undertaking as per the Certification 34 dated October 13, 1995 of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). The respondent could not justify his non-compliance with the terms of the
MOA by citing ISRC's inability to comply with other governmental requirements for the reinstatement of its
license for various reasons, since the respondent failed to disclose the same to the complainant and her
husband.
Particularly, the respondent failed to apprise the complainant as to the true state of ISRC's affairs
that the reinstatement of the corporation's recruitment license would require not only a favorable action by
the Office of the President on ISRC's appeal and the payment of a surety bond, but also ISRC's clearance
or exoneration in its other cases for recruitment violations pending with the POEA. 35 The respondent
could not pass the blame to the complainant because of his belated excuse that complainant failed to
infuse an additional amount of P500,000.00. This new defense is clearly an afterthought and not supported
by evidence.
In view of the foregoing, the Court holds that respondent has violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility as well as his attorney's oath.
 AGNO V. CAGATAN A.C. NO. 4515 July 14, 2008 | 6

The Code of Professional Responsibility specifically mandates the following:

Canon 1. A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes. aSAHCE
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
The afore-cited canons emphasize the high standard of honesty and fairness expected of a lawyer
not only in the practice of the legal profession but in his personal dealings as well. 36 A lawyer must
conduct himself with great propriety, and his behavior should be beyond reproach anywhere and at all
times. 37 For, as officers of the courts and keepers of the public's faith, they are burdened with the highest
degree of social responsibility and are thus mandated to behave at all times in a manner consistent with
truth and honor. 38 Likewise, the oath that lawyers swear to impresses upon them the duty of exhibiting the
highest degree of good faith, fairness and candor in their relationships with others. 39 Thus, lawyers may
be disciplined for any conduct, whether in their professional or in their private capacity, if such conduct
renders them unfit to continue to be officers of the court. 40
Hence, in this case, we are in accord with the findings of the IBP Commissioner, as affirmed by the
IBP Board of Governors. What is more, we find respondent to be guilty of gross misconduct for issuing a
worthless check.
In Sanchez v. Somoso, 41 the Court ruled that a lawyer who paid another with a personal check
from a bank account which he knew has already been closed exhibited an extremely low regard to his
commitment to the oath he took when he joined his peers, thereby seriously tarnishing the image of the
profession which he should hold in high esteem. In Moreno v. Araneta, 42 we held that the issuance of
worthless checks constitutes gross misconduct, as the effect transcends the private interests of the parties
directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. TCADEc
Respondent herein admitted having issued a check but claimed that it was only to guarantee the
reimbursement of the P500,000.00 given to him by the complainant in case of an adverse decision in
ISRC's appeal with the Office of the President. We note, however, that said check was issued on March 30,
1994 or one year after the appeal adverted to had already been favorably acted upon on March 30, 1993.
Hence, our conclusion is that the check was issued only after the complainant demanded the return of their
P500,000.00 investment in ISRC. In any event, respondent's act of issuing a guarantee check for
P500,000.00, when he was presumably aware that at the time of his issuance thereof his bank account
against which the check was drawn was already closed, clearly constitutes gross misconduct for which he
should be penalized.
In sum, the amount of P500,000.00 was received by the respondent for the reinstatement of the
license, but there is no showing that it was used for such purpose, as the respondent failed to give any
credible accounting or explanation as to the disbursement of the said amount in accordance with the
stipulations in the MOA. Respondent failed to disclose all the existing hindrances to the renewal of ISRC's
recruitment license, which enticed complainant and her husband to part with the aforesaid sum of money.
He also admittedly issued a check drawn against a closed account, which evinced his lack of intention to
return the money to the complainant pursuant to his supposed guarantee. It is thus proper for the Court to
order its restitution as recommended by the IBP.
We find the recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years by the
IBP Board of Governors to be too harsh considering that this is respondent's first administrative offense. It
is settled that the appropriate penalty which the Court may impose on an errant lawyer depends on the
exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts. 43 Accordingly, for employing deceit
and misrepresentation in his personal dealings as well as for issuing a worthless check, we rule and so
hold that the penalty of suspension for one (1) year and one (1) month from the practice of law is sufficient
to be meted out to respondent.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Marciano J. Cagatan is SUSPENDED FOR ONE (1) YEAR and
ONE (1) MONTH from the practice of law with warning that repetition of the same or similar acts will merit a
more severe penalty; and ordered to RESTITUTE the amount of P500,000.00 to the complainant.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of
the Bar Confidant and spread in respondent's personal records.
 AGNO V. CAGATAN A.C. NO. 4515 July 14, 2008 | 7

SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales,
Azcuna, Tinga, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Reyes and Brion, JJ., concur.
Chico-Nazario, J., is on leave.
 
Footnotes
1.POEA Certification dated June 29, 1995; rollo, p. 181. DcSEHT
2.Id., pp. 33-39.
3.Id., p. 45.
4.Id., p. 5.
5.Also referred to as Joma Humed Khalifa or Khalifa Humed Juma Al-Nasser.
6.Rollo, pp. 1-4.
7.Id., p. 15.
8.Id, pp. 23-29.
9.Id., p. 44.
10.Id., p. 45.
11.Id., pp. 42-43.
12.Id., p. 66.
13.Id., p. 194. ETDHSa
14.Id., pp. 195-211.
15.Id., pp. 512-516.
16.Rollo, p. 511.
17.Id., p. 510.
18.Id., pp. 518-526.
19.Id., p. 517. SHaIDE
20.Id., pp. 542-546.
21.Id., p. 547.
22.Id. p. 559.
23.Id., pp. 518-526.
24.In full, this provision reads:
SECTION 1. How instituted. — Proceedings for disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys
may be taken by the Supreme Court motu propio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
upon the verified complaint of any person. The complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts
complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts
therein alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts.
25.CBD A.C. No. 313, January 30, 1998, 285 SCRA 586.
26.A.C. No. 6554, December 14, 2005, 477 SCRA 634. TEDHaA
27.A.C. No. 2884, January 28, 1998, 285 SCRA 93.
28.Paragraph 2, Memorandum of Agreement; Rollo, p. 5.
29.Supra, at note 9.
30.Supra, at note 7.
31.Paragraph 3, Memorandum of Agreement; rollo, p. 5.
 AGNO V. CAGATAN A.C. NO. 4515 July 14, 2008 | 8

32.TSN, 19 April 2002, pp. 264, 269 & 283.

33.Rollo, pp. 195-211.
34.Id., p. 177.
35.Letter from POEA; rollo, p. 45.
36.Sanchez v. Somoso, A.C. No. 6061, October 3, 2003, 412 SCRA 569, 571.
37.Id.
38.Olbes v. Deciembre, A.C. No. 5365, April 27, 2005, 457 SCRA 341, 352.
39.Id.
40.Id.
41.Supra at note 17, p. 572.
42.A.C. No. 1109, April 27, 2005, 457 SCRA 329, 337.
43.Soriano v. Reyes, A.C. No. 4676, May 4, 2006, 489 SCRA 328, 343. ASTcaE
||| (Agno v. Cagatan, A.C. No. 4515, [July 14, 2008], 580 PHIL 1-19)