CENTER FOR Massachusetts

INFORMATION Institute of
SYSTEMS Technology
RESEARCH

Sloan School Cambridge

of Management Massachusetts

Transforming the LEGO Group for the Digital Economy

Peter Andersen and Jeanne W. Ross
March 2016

CISR WP No. 407

 2016 Massachusetts Institute of Technology. All rights reserved.

Research Article: a completed research article drawing on one or
more CISR research projects that presents management frameworks,
findings and recommendations.
Research Summary: a summary of a research project with
preliminary findings.
Research Briefings: a collection of short executive summaries of key
findings from research projects.
Case Study: an in-depth description of a firm’s approach to an IT
management issue (intended for MBA and executive education).
Technical Research Report: a traditional academically rigorous
research paper with detailed methodology, analysis, findings and
references.
CISR Working Paper No. 407

Title: Transforming the LEGO Group for the Digital Economy

Author: Peter Andersen and Jeanne W. Ross
Date: March 2016
Abstract: To avert bankruptcy, the LEGO Group had transformed itself starting in 2004. As it
entered 2016, the company was poised for a new transformation. This time the trans-
formation builds on the strength of an enterprise platform the company developed to
provide needed discipline around core business processes. The goal of the new trans-
formation is “to become a digital company.” Although the company already looked
digital in 2016, management felt it had not become digital—in its products and
processes. This case describes the LEGO Group’s journey to become a successful
digital company.
Keywords: Enterprise platform, engagement platform, architecture, transformation, IT governance,
digital workforce
14 Pages
 Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Sloan School of Management

Center for Information Systems Research

Transforming the LEGO Group

for the Digital Economy

In early 2016, the LEGO Group was benefiting from digitalization in many ways. Consumer demand for
digital toys was feeding sales of LEGO blocks packaged with video games and programmable LEGO
robots, while consumer demand for online connection had led to widespread enrollment in LEGO online
communities and a growing library of fan-produced LEGO YouTube videos. Internally, highly inte-
grated supply chain and product lifecycle management systems were accelerating product to stores on an
as-needed basis.
One of the things people often overlook is the massive system integration and to what degree the
LEGO Group is actually an IT-driven company as much as a brand-driven company.
—Jørgen Vig Knudstorp,
Chief Executive Officer
Despite the company’s early success with digital innovation, management felt that the LEGO Group was
at risk of failing to respond quickly enough to the opportunities and threats the digital economy posed.
The LEGO Group was still in the midst of transforming from a traditional brick and mortar company—
famous for the iconic LEGO brick—into a digital company producing digitalized toys that accompany
LEGO bricks and developing multichannel relationships with consumers, shoppers, and customers.
Where we’re not savvy enough is in where software development is going now, like smaller
applications, disruptive business models, omni-channel landscapes, e-commerce, web-based
services, cloud-based services, and so on. We’re not nimble enough there. And we could risk
ending up with a legacy platform instead of an advantage platform. —Jørgen Vig Knudstorp
The LEGO Group had been through earlier business transformations, but the transformation to a digital
company posed unique adaptive challenges. In particular, the end state was less well defined and critical
success factors were less clear. The LEGO Group had built a powerful enterprise platform that had
positioned the company for this next evolution, but much of the transformation lay ahead.

This case study was prepared by Peter Andersen of Aarhus University and Jeanne W. Ross of the MIT Sloan Center for
Information Systems Research (CISR). This case was written for the purposes of class discussion, rather than to illustrate
either effective or ineffective handling of a managerial situation. The authors would like to thank Anders Lerbech Vinther
and Henrik Amsinck for their substantial input, as well as Jørgen Vig Knudstorp and other leaders of the LEGO Group for
their participation in the case study.
© 2016 MIT Sloan Center for Information Systems Research. All rights reserved to the authors.
Background
The LEGO Group was founded in 1932 in Billund, a small, remote town in Denmark. Its founding
father, Ole Kirk Christiansen, put together the two Danish words “leg godt” (play well) to form the
name of the company. At the time the company focused on making wooden toys for children; in 1958
the LEGO Group launched the brick that became the company’s core product. The seemingly infinite 1
possibilities for play and creativity offered by the brick transformed the LEGO Group from a small local
carpenter’s workshop into an international manufacturer of toys for children. But around 1995, the growth
stalled.
Patent protection for the iconic LEGO brick expired in 1988, which quickly led to the introduction of
similar toys by companies like TYCO. Soon thereafter, electronic games and toys such as PlayStation
and Xbox came out and children became absorbed with computers and video games. Consultants,
scholars, media, and the LEGO Group itself questioned the long-term viability of the brick.
The LEGO Group management responded to new competitive challenges by diversifying its product
portfolio—moving away from its core product into the video game and television industry. Also,
between 1996 and 2002, the LEGO Group opened theme parks in England, California, and Germany as
management attempted to strengthen the LEGO brand by promoting the sale of a wide range of different
products and experiences that were not necessarily centered on the brick.
But these efforts did not have the desired effect. In trying to diversify itself out of the crisis, the LEGO
Group had grown the number of SKUs from 6,000 in 1997 to over 14,000 by 2004. This diverse product
portfolio involved complex and expensive production processes. Production was rigid and slow, and
many of the LEGO Group’s new product launches and innovations failed.
Meanwhile, LEGO Group designers had not considered the cost of materials in their designs. As the
designers introduced new products requiring different materials, they formed relationships with new
suppliers. By 2004 the LEGO Group was ordering specialized materials in small quantities from more
than 11,000 different suppliers. 2
At the other end of the supply chain, large chains such as Walmart were accounting for more than two-
thirds of the company’s sales. But the LEGO Group had not developed transparency in regards to store
demand and inventory levels. Ultimately, supply chain issues resulted in lost sales.
Christmas sales are a big part of our revenue (approximately 50 percent) and we had, for
example, pirate ships in demand in Germany, and we actually had too many in France. But we
weren’t able to see that! And those big boxes, they don’t sell very well the following nine months!
—Henrik Weis Aalbæk,
Vice President, Corporate Finance
In 2003 the LEGO Group reported an operating loss of $228 million on sales of just over $1 billion. The
company had a negative cash flow, and industry analysts were predicting the demise of the LEGO Group. 3

1
Six eight-stud LEGO bricks (2x4) can be combined in 915,103,765 different ways.
2
This was nearly twice the number of suppliers as Boeing used to build airplanes. See K. Oliver, E. Samakh, and P.
Heckmann, “Rebuilding LEGO, Brick by Brick,” strategy+business, August 29, 2007, http://www.strategy-
business.com/article/07306.
3
Rosie Murray-West, “Lego wobbles as Star Wars and Harry Potter sales tumble,” The Telegraph, December 30, 2003,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/2872600/Lego-wobbles-as-Star-Wars-and-Harry-Potter-sales-tumble.html.

Andersen and Ross Page 2 CISR Working Paper No. 407

Architecting a Business Transformation
In early January 2004, Kjeld Kirk Kristiansen, owner of the LEGO Group and a member of the founding
family, invested a substantial portion of his own fortune into the dying company, stepped down as CEO,
and appointed former McKinsey consultant Jørgen Vig Knudstorp as the new CEO. Knudstorp was just
thirty-five years old at the time, had been with the LEGO Group for only three years, and had no
executive experience. But as he took the reins of the struggling company, he quickly identified supply
chain issues as a competitive disadvantage.
One of the things that dawned on me when I arrived at the LEGO Group was that basically you
have an allocation problem. You are producing 100,000 components every minute, twenty-four
hours a day, 365 days a year. And you have to allocate them in optimal quantities at different
sites, so that you can deliver a set of finished products at Walmart in Arkansas on Tuesday at
5:00 p.m. (and not 5:00 a.m.) in optimal order quantity, optimal transportation quantity, optimal
manufacturing batches, and so on. —Jørgen Vig Knudstorp,
Chief Executive Officer
Knudstorp learned that many of the LEGO Group’s supply chain issues had grown out of the company’s
commitment to innovation. Knudstorp knew there was no shortage of innovation at the LEGO Group but
also that much of the innovation was not profitable. Allowing product development staff free rein to
innovate had led to gross inefficiencies in purchasing, production planning, and distribution. For
example, product innovations involving new colors that were only slightly different from the old colors
added a great deal of cost but no real value.
What happened was that out of our design departments we were creating too many variants of
new bricks and too many different new color variants. —Erik Hansen,
Senior Director, Technology & Open Innovation
Knudstorp focused the company initially on cost-cutting and efficiency, particularly related to supply
chain processes. In 2005, just a year after he took over as CEO, the LEGO Group turned a profit. But
Knudstorp believed that the LEGO Group needed to radically improve its core business.
Building a Core Enterprise Platform
Around 2000 the LEGO Group had instituted a business initiative called “LEGO Light” to implement
SAP and underlying technology infrastructure as a common technology platform across the business.
The main objective of LEGO Light had been to induce globally consistent and reliable information by
standardizing processes primarily within finance and sales. Early on the project was more successful at
implementing enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems than at creating standardized processes and
shared data. Knudstorp insisted that the company take advantage of the SAP infrastructure and adopt
standard supply chain processes.
Since 2004, we’ve been very focused on getting the best out of the SAP platform and building a
team that’s capable of understanding it. —Jørgen Vig Knudstorp
To implement the business changes needed to effectively deliver value from the SAP platform, Knudstorp
deputized an operational team of logistics, sales, IT, and manufacturing managers that met regularly for
a year to revamp operations. This team identified thirteen interdependent processes (e.g., order to cash,
procure to pay, manufacturing, quality) comprising the global supply chain. The LEGO Group then
implemented process changes that simplified distribution, cut down on suppliers, and reduced the

Andersen and Ross Page 3 CISR Working Paper No. 407

number of logistics providers. The company also established close collaboration with the largest retailers
to conduct joint forecasting, inventory management, and product customization. 4
Most of the processes in the supply chain business area also needed to be integrated into one or more of
the LEGO Group’s other four business areas: Corporate Finance; Corporate Center; Markets and
Products; and Community, Education, and Direct. To ensure further standardization and integration of
the processes in these business areas, the company established formal process teams. These process
teams, consisting of key users and often an application architect, optimized processes across the five
business areas.
Improvements in supply chain processes helped lead to an 11 percent increase in revenues—more than
double earnings year over year—from 2005 to 2006. In the company’s 2006 annual report, Knudstorp
stated that one of the most important reasons for the growth was that “inventories held by retailers at the
beginning of 2006 were extraordinarily low.” 5 Those low inventory levels were the result of close
collaboration with the retailers and optimized production and distribution.
Extending the Platform
The ERP platform underlying supply chain processes was just one of several key platforms critical to the
LEGO Group’s core business. In 2008 the LEGO Group consolidated multiple HR platforms into a
single global platform. In 2009 the company started implementation of a global manufacturing platform
called Combi 2 (see exhibit 1 for a timeline of platform development). These investments helped
consolidate and integrate the LEGO Group’s global operations.
LEGO Enterprise Platform, which is a term we gave birth to, is the IT below all the business
processes that run the LEGO Group end to end. It is all the software and hardware and the
wiring that run the LEGO Group beneath the human interaction. That understanding and that
concept and the proven success of that platform—in terms of where other companies have failed
and we have succeeded—has very few business issues. —Henrik Amsinck,
Chief Information Officer
The LEGO Group’s leaders credited its enterprise platform with elevating the efficiency and effective-
ness of daily operations. The company’s financial performance further demonstrated the value of the
platform. In 2008–9, while much of the world was dealing with a global recession, the LEGO Group
reported surging profits.
In 2011 the LEGO Group further extended its enterprise platform with a new product lifecycle
management (PLM) system. PLM influenced more than 80% of the business processes at the LEGO
Group, and effective PLM was essential in accelerating the company’s ability to quickly bring new
products to market. The company targeted an increase in its product pipeline from around 200 products
in 2010 to between 250 and 300 in 2012.
Expanding the LEGO Enterprise Platform with the new PLM system supported better master data
management in the supply chain. Together, the PLM and improved master data management increased
process automation, which improved product output an estimated 50%. 6 More importantly, the new
PLM system exposed the cost and manufacturing implications of a new product early in its lifecycle,
which enabled more informed decision making.

4
Oliver, Samakh, and Heckmann, “Rebuilding LEGO, Brick by Brick,” 2.
5
“Annual Report 2006, LEGO Group,” http://cache.lego.com/downloads/aboutus/annualreport2006UK.pdf.
6
Dave Hannon, “LEGO Builds a Broader Product Line with SAP PLM,” SAPinsider, April 1, 2012,
http://sapinsider.wispubs.com/Assets/Case-Studies/2012/April/LEGO-Builds-A-Broader-Product-Line-With-SAP-PLM.

Andersen and Ross Page 4 CISR Working Paper No. 407

 Part of our innovation process is that everyone—all the big players—are present and part of the
discussions. Already at the early stages of our innovation process, we talk about what are the
risks from a supply chain point of view and what new materials do we need for solving this or
that so that everyone is aware of what is coming up and we have that dialogue a little bit earlier
than we normally had. —Erik Hansen,
Senior Director, Technology & Open Innovation
Implementing the LEGO Group’s Enterprise Platform took nearly a decade, and it created a culture of
continuous improvement in all key business processes. Management often points to the systems as a
huge development at the company, but the LEGO Group had experienced far more than technology
change: Through building its enterprise platform, the company had fundamentally transformed.

Executing Strategy Digitally

In June 2015, CEO Jørgen Vig Knudstorp posted a blog post for all employees in which he mandated
that the company approach digital and business matters the same way. “No more digital strategy,” he
pronounced. Instead, a directive made leveraging digitalization one of the LEGO Group’s four strategic
priorities. The transformation that had accompanied the implementation of the LEGO Enterprise Platform
had developed important capabilities that positioned the company to leverage digitalization. These capa-
bilities touched three major areas within the company: (1) streamlined decision making, (2) direction for
future IT development, and (3) global collaborative culture.
Streamlined Decision Making
The LEGO Group had emphasized the importance of business process integration with every major
systems implementation. Business process integration at the company was the responsibility of networks
of process experts, composed of leaders drawn from each of the process teams. The goal of a Process
Expert Network or PEN was to ensure the creation of end-to-end global processes. Leaders who
represented processes such as order to cash, manufacturing, finance support, and innovation and
development met regularly to discuss interdependencies. Five such networks were established, one for
each LEGO Group business area—Corporate Finance; Corporate Center; Global Supply Chain; Markets
and Products; and Community, Education, and Direct—and together these comprised the LEGO
Group’s PEN network (see exhibit 2).
The PENs make sure that we think global… [The members] are close to process owners and that
is something we are focusing on: make sure that these people meet colleagues from other
locations because that is something we tend to forget every now and then.
—Edwin Van Kouwen,
Chief Enterprise Architect
PENs governed overall process optimization through formal audits and reviews, approval of a project’s
process documentation, and input to business cases. However, the PENs also ensured knowledge sharing
across the organization and delivered business process training to produce understanding and buy-in
across the business areas. Finally, PENs served as think tanks to guarantee that line functions in the
business units were compliant with architectural principles. Through these activities, PENs helped
bridge the functional and organizational gaps within and across business units.
Over time, the LEGO Group reorganized from the five business areas in exhibit 2 to just three:
• Operations: responsible for procurement, planning, manufacturing, distribution, and operations
across the LEGO Group

Andersen and Ross Page 5 CISR Working Paper No. 407

 • Marketing: responsible for all commercial functions such as product development, innovation,
marketing, and sales 7
• Business Enabling: responsible for supporting the overall business of the LEGO Group;
consisting mainly of areas previously owned by Corporate Center and Corporate Finance
To enable faster decision making, the CEO expanded the Corporate Management (CM) team from five
members to more than twenty (see exhibit 3 for the new management structure). The new management
structure helped to break down what had traditionally been siloed thinking and to focus everyone in the
company on fewer strategic goals.
The enlarged Corporate Management team enabled Knudstorp to eliminate nine out of ten formal
governing boards. For example, he cut a board that addressed IT issues, but in placing the CIO on the
CM team, Knudstorp provided it with all necessary expertise available to address IT. This also meant
that the CIO would be equipped to leverage any emerging business problem to argue for architecture and
for making the necessary IT investments. The CEO, COO, CMO, CFO, and CCO (chief commercial
officer) together continued to serve as the more senior Management Board (MB), but the CM team ran
the operations of the LEGO Group by making cross-functional decisions and leading implementation of
those decisions.
With clearer goals, management felt that leaders below the CM team could be empowered to jointly make
many decisions that did not require corporate management approval. By empowering business leaders
and restructuring the organization, the hope was that business leaders would collaborate directly with
each other to make the LEGO Group more responsive while also driving innovation through collaboration.
Direction for Future IT
When Henrik Amsinck became CIO in 2007, he introduced a set of IT principles intended to protect and
continuously build out the LEGO Group’s Enterprise Platform (see exhibit 4). He also set out to
establish closer collaboration between IT and business professionals. That collaboration involved
exploring new innovative solutions together.
Amsinck insisted that IT leaders look beyond IT efficiencies and focus on the value added to the
business. Instead of deep, functional experts in narrow areas, he organized IT to align with the business
verticals of Marketing, Operations, and Business Enabling (see exhibit 5). Enterprise architects, business
relationship managers, project managers, and solution developers were assigned to one of the three
domains. (A fourth leg of the Corporate IT organization—Technology and Security—provided
infrastructure and operations services across the three business-oriented verticals.)
The size of the three verticals was such that the benefits of specializing within a vertical were much
greater than the potential costs of reduced enterprise focus. Thus, architects gained a deep understanding
of their business area. Additionally, this focus meant that the enterprise architects could proactively
shape the portfolio of their business area.
It is about shaping the decisions and being proactive early. You get the good results, not by
having a theoretical mandate and saying this is how things are, but by being involved with the
business early on—making them understand the rationales that you have. —Søren Nørgaard,
Chief Enterprise Architect

7
In late 2014, Marketing was split into two departments: Product & Marketing Development (Chief Marketing Officer) and
Market Management and Development (Chief Commercial Officer). The IT organization, however, continued to have just
one chief architect responsible for marketing systems.

Andersen and Ross Page 6 CISR Working Paper No. 407

To limit siloed thinking within the three verticals, the CIO created overarching excellence teams in
charge of IT functions like enterprise architecture. The excellence teams were responsible for ensuring
synergies and collaboration across the verticals. They were also in charge of developing governance
approaches to coordinate the efforts of the three verticals. For example, the chief enterprise architects of
the three verticals took turns serving for a year as head of company-wide enterprise architecture to
define common practices and share enterprise-wide solutions.
To ensure that each vertical’s portfolio of projects was in line with the IT platform and operating model
of the company, management instituted “enterprise architecture challenge sessions.” These sessions
engaged a network of architects, along with representatives from IT management and the business, to
challenge the architectural impacts of major projects. By involving architects from each business area in
the challenge sessions, discussions could look beyond the goals of a single business area.
Global Collaborative Culture
The LEGO Group embraced globalization by establishing a number of hubs outside of Billund,
Denmark: Enfield, CT in the US; London; Shanghai; and Singapore. In Singapore and London the
LEGO Group was experimenting with open office spaces to facilitate collaboration. Everybody up to the
EVP level had no fixed desk but was given the newest collaboration tools. From an IT perspective, there
was a continuous focus on how to facilitate collaboration within and between the hubs and the
headquarters in Billund.
By 2016 leaders believed that both collaboration and coherence had become integral parts of the
company’s DNA. The CIO noted that this culture made it easy to argue for architecture.
We have hardly any politics in this company, which is really unusual for a company our size. But
it is because of the level of collaboration we have. So for me it is like Christmas every day. If a
company with different departments cannot collaborate, you kill architecture. So for me, the
greatest gift is this fostering and nurturing collaboration and coherence. It is screaming
architecture. —Henrik Amsinck,
Chief Information Officer
The CEO noted that the LEGO Group’s collaborative culture made it possible to execute an overall
strategy. One problem with the more collaborative approach, however, was that it took a good deal of
time and effort. But this was seen as time well spent.
We emphasize collaboration, cohesiveness, and coherent choices to a very large extent—to such
a large extent that many of our employees and leaders call it extremely complex. When you strive
for coherency, it sounds so nice in theory. But the reality is that it means people really need to
include many more variables in the equation when they make a decision because they can’t make
decisions in isolation. But we actually stress to our managers that you can’t run a manufacturing
site in China or a business in China without considering what the global operating model is and
what the global system requirements are. —Jørgen Vig Knudstorp,
Chief Executive Officer
The LEGO Group’s leaders were generally convinced that the investment of their time in collaboration
generated significant benefits.
It looks like we are taking less action because we are talking about a decision or change for a
long time, but when you finish with that and everybody nods and says, “I am on board,” you
execute in like a flash of a second! That is what you have to learn when you are on board here.
You have to respect the networks and talk to everybody whether they are high or low. You have
to onboard everybody and get their feedback and adjust your decision and do timely changes,
etc. But then when you execute, you feel no resistance. —Henrik Amsinck

Andersen and Ross Page 7 CISR Working Paper No. 407

Growing Digital Engagement
In 2016, the LEGO Group was reaping significant benefits from its enterprise platform, including faster
innovation, enhanced customer relationships, and efficient supply chain processes. The company had
also started to offer digital enhancements to its toys and to engage digitally with end consumers. These
efforts had exposed both the vast opportunities and the unique challenges of increasing digitization.
Digitalized Products
The LEGO Group’s product portfolio has increasingly bridged the physical and digital worlds. In 2011,
the company launched a game called Life of George involving a physical LEGO set and a mobile app to
challenge kids to solve problems by combining physical and digital play. In 2014, the company rolled
out LEGO FUSION as a pilot in the US. LEGO FUSION allowed kids to use physical LEGO brick
designs in a digital game on mobile devices by scanning brick designs with the LEGO FUSION app.
This pilot project led to the 2015 global rollout of LEGO DIMENSIONS, a science fiction action-
adventure video game featuring the characters and contexts of franchises such as Back to the Future,
Ghostbusters, and The Simpsons. LEGO DIMENSIONS is in the toys-to-life genre, in which players
build LEGO figures to accompany use of the video game. 8
Digitalization offered seemingly infinite opportunities to incorporate traditional LEGO products into
new digital toys, games, teaching tools, and scientific experiments. Looking to capitalize on these
opportunities, the LEGO Group tapped the legions of passionate LEGO consumers for new product
ideas. This involved extending its internal product development platform to introduce LEGO Ideas, an
online platform that allowed customers to propose new products using existing LEGO components.
The process around LEGO Ideas is to put innovation upside down. It is not product push but
product pull from the markets, from our users. [A consumer] suggested LEGO Minecraft and
within forty eight hours we had 10,000 people saying “if this product was out there I would buy
it.” And by the way, they crashed our server two or three times during that weekend.
—Erik Hansen,
Senior Director, Technology & Open Innovation
This new approach to product development accelerated time to market. The normal product innovation
cycle at the LEGO Group was two years, involving idea generation, design, tests, and engaging with
consumers. With the LEGO Ideas platform, fan participation eliminated the need for some of those
steps. Additionally, fans were incentivized to propose projects by a small share of revenues from any
product that achieved at least 10,000 supporters and went on to be approved and developed by the
LEGO Group.
You don't have to do all the market research. It's all done for you. The consumers are also doing
the models and we just have to brush it up a bit and then put it on the shelves—because we can
do the math. We know based on how many people online sign up for these things, what size the
market is more or less. —Erik Hansen
Marketing and Sales
The LEGO Group was finding that the rapid emergence of social media and networking tools created
enormous opportunities to engage with end consumers. The company used fan pages, groups, and
networks to grow and strengthen its fan base. The CEO estimated that once online communities had
started growing, the number of big fan-based gatherings of between 500 and 1,000 people increased

8
Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, s.v. “Lego Dimensions,” (accessed January 2016),
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lego_Dimensions.

Andersen and Ross Page 8 CISR Working Paper No. 407

from around ten major conferences to more than five hundred different conferences. On YouTube the
LEGO Group became the second-most watched brand, with almost all its content generated by users.
The LEGO Click campaign 9 integrated online networks, video, and mobile technologies. The campaign
included a short video that quickly went viral and referred consumers to an online platform where con-
sumers could share ideas and use hashtags for social media.
Consumers want to engage, they want to have a dialogue, they want to talk to each other,
and they want to talk to the brand and the company. That has always been a strength of the
brand, but that strength has been so much increased on the back of the digital technology.
—Jørgen Vig Knudstorp,
Chief Executive Officer
By leveraging fan communities and social media, the LEGO Group managed to reconnect with its adult
fans that had grown up playing with LEGO bricks and still had an urge to build. This resulted in the
highly successful LEGO Architecture product line that featured iconic buildings made out of LEGO bricks.
The LEGO Group was attuned to changing marketing requirements. The company introduced 3D catalogs
with entertaining animations of LEGO products to entice owners of tablets. Marketing innovations were
just one way that LEGO Group was responding to the growing demands of its retail customers. These
customers were going digital and demanding omni-channel capabilities that combined traditional and
digital marketing/sales approaches.
Over the past five years, Amazon, for instance, has become a global top-ten customer for us, and
has become the most globally integrated customer that we have. —Jørgen Vig Knudstorp
Although the LEGO Group was generating some great benefits from increasing digitalization, manage-
ment was intent on developing the company’s digital capabilities.

Becoming a Digital Enterprise

The LEGO Group greeted 2016 attempting to better understand and position itself as a digital enterprise.
Company leaders were concerned that their technology base and understanding could limit future success.
There are new spaces where software development is still at the edge and revolutionary—areas
like consumer interaction and new products. What is the next upcoming disruptive gaming or
consumer-engaging technology that could really impact our business and our business model?
That evolution is unlikely to take place anywhere near our development center, and they are
quite concerned about how long it will be for us to catch the trend in that landscape because
we’re not part of the clusters. We’re not part of where all the solution is taking place.
—Jørgen Vig Knudstorp
The LEGO Group was looking to ensure that the company would be able to recognize and adopt
important new technologies and business opportunities quickly. Leaders were particularly focused on
requirements for new systems and processes, and new skills and mindsets in its workforce.
Systems and Processes
One area of concern was the limitations of the company’s enterprise platform. Digital engagement
involved more immediate, fast-changing, personalized interaction than traditional customer engagement.
This meant that LEGO Group systems needed to provide 24/7 uptime, omni-channel access, and rapid
delivery of new functionality. On the product side, digitalized toys entailed ongoing engagement between

9
Christina Warren, “LEGO Click: Building Blocks Meet Social Media,” Mashable, “January 11, 2010, http://mashable.com/
2010/01/11/lego-click/.

Andersen and Ross Page 9 CISR Working Paper No. 407

consumers and the LEGO Group. This engagement created demands for the LEGO Group to respond
when new technologies rendered old ones obsolete or simply less interesting. The production of digital
toys also necessitated that the inventory of LEGO products at retailers be monitored, because unlike
LEGO bricks, digital toys could become outdated. Additionally, rather than the LEGO Group producing
them itself, most of the company’s digital products were being developed by digital partners. LEGO
Group management wanted to have a technology base strong enough to take the lead in identifying
opportunities and developing new products.
The LEGO Group’s Enterprise Platform alone could not address new digital requirements. The platform
and global processes had been essential in the prior decade in enabling the company to attain enormous
growth—as factories, divisions, and products were rolled out globally—without having to make changes
to the underlying systems. These globally integrated process capabilities were still valuable, but the
LEGO Group could not rely on the same platform to meet emerging digital demands such as:
• Continuous delivery of functionality in days or weeks, rather than twelve to eighteen months,
with an emphasis on exploration, experience, and continuous improvement
• Insert and delete functionality that could be deployed quickly as interaction preferences and
user demands change
• 24/7 uptime with nearly unlimited as-needed scalability—to avoid outages during surges in
demand, such as when a movie on the LEGO website is a hit and is clicked simultaneously by
thousands of users—in contrast to scheduled maintenance windows
The characteristics the LEGO Group needed in an engagement platform were quite distinct from an
enterprise platform. For example, for its enterprise platform the company needed a tightly integrated,
bullet-proof production environment ensuring the reliability and security of business transactions. Its
engagement platform would support loosely coupled microservices providing digital functionality in a
flexible, scalable, 24/7 environment that would constantly adapt its interface to the individual consumer.
The reliability and security requirements of the enterprise platform suggested that development of new
features might continue to adhere to a twelve to eighteen month project delivery schedule. In contrast,
the engagement platform would rely on continuous delivery of functionality in days or weeks, applying
user-centric design and rapid iterations through self-governing teams and agile development. The
enterprise platform would facilitate efficiencies, and data integrity that is secure; the engagement
platform would facilitate innovation and customer intimacy.
The engagement platform was expected to deliver not just greater consumer, shopper, and customer
engagement, but also increased productivity and faster time to market. It would permit the more
personalized experience that the LEGO Group believed consumers and shoppers expected in the digital
economy—delivered at a speed consistent with the demands of the digital economy. Meanwhile the
enterprise platform was still essential to meeting the operational demands of high-volume manufacturing
and sales. Although the two platforms would provide different capabilities and operate in different modes,
they would co-exist and share data to facilitate seamless end-to-end transactions and interactions.
Digital Workforce
In addition to technology requirements, the LEGO Group’s leadership team was considering the workforce
requirements for a digital enterprise. The company’s consumers and customers were potentially outpacing
the LEGO Group’s people in the demand of digital services and in imagining digital opportunities. The
company had grown comfortable with the workplace practices of a traditional manufacturing company.
The enterprise transformation had produced more discipline in organizational processes and a better
understanding of end-to-end processes. But the transformation to a digital enterprise would require
employees to think differently about how they got work done. For example, for the LEGO Group to

Andersen and Ross Page 10 CISR Working Paper No. 407

leverage new digital capabilities, management would have to create a culture for data-driven decision
making for all employees. While many worked standard eight-hour days, increased globalization had
rendered these traditional work norms ineffective as global teams were brought together through mobile
and collaborative technologies. Such a change would require even less hierarchy, more portable work,
and new ways for employees to connect and create new networks. Becoming digital would be a
challenge for many employees who appreciated the stability of predictable standard processes. These
employees had not started thinking in terms of digital requirements, and the earlier transformation
designed to instill discipline in operational processes had not positioned them to think about experiments
and innovation.
To ensure a constant flow of innovative ideas for new products and services, to build and leverage a
powerful engagement platform, and to collaborate effectively with both colleagues and external
employees, the LEGO Group was considering a variety of initiatives to foster new mindsets and skills.
Ideas under consideration included digital “boot camps” to reskill employees, a portfolio approach to
risk management, hackathons, the introduction of an analytics teams, and development of new per-
formance metrics.
At the Threshold of Digital
Although the company could count more than a decade of annual performance improvements, the
LEGO Group’s management believed that the development of its people, processes, and platforms was
an ongoing commitment.
You have to understand that we have just begun; we are not done. It is a journey; as with Hans
Christian Andersen, it is a journey—not a destination. —Henrik Weis Aalbæk,
Vice President, Corporate Finance

In early 2016, the LEGO Group was positioned to become a digital business. The leadership challenge
was to navigate the company’s next transformation.

Andersen and Ross Page 11 CISR Working Paper No. 407

 Exhibit 1
Platform Development

©The LEGO Group. Not for reproduction without permission from the LEGO Group.

Exhibit 2
The LEGO Group’s PEN Network

©The LEGO Group. Not for reproduction without permission from the LEGO Group.

Andersen and Ross Page 12 CISR Working Paper No. 407

 Exhibit 3
The LEGO Group Management Structure as of 2013

©The LEGO Group. Not for reproduction without permission from the LEGO Group.

Andersen and Ross Page 13 CISR Working Paper No. 407

 Exhibit 4
IT Strategic Principles

©The LEGO Group. Not for reproduction without permission from the LEGO Group.

Exhibit 5
Corporate IT Management Structure as of 2015

©The LEGO Group. Not for reproduction without permission from the LEGO Group.

Andersen and Ross Page 14 CISR Working Paper No. 407

 About the MIT Sloan Center for Information Systems Research 
 
CISR RESEARCH PATRONS 
 MIT SLOAN CISR MISSION 
AlixPartners 
The MIT Center for Information Systems Research (MIT CISR) 
The Boston Consulting Group, Inc. 
conducts field‐based research on issues related to how com‐
panies will design themselves and manage for success in the  L&T Infotech Limited 
digital economy. Established at the MIT Sloan School of  Microsoft Corporation 
Management in 1974, our mission is to develop concepts and  SAS Institute Inc. 
frameworks  to  help  executives  address  the  challenges  of  Tata Consultancy Services Limited 
leading  increasingly  dynamic,  global,  and  information‐
CISR SPONSORS
intensive organizations. The relevance of our research is  Aetna Inc. Fidelity Investments
ensured by the active participation of corporate sponsors  AGL Energy Limited (Australia)  FOXTEL (Australia) 
from a range of industries. Research results are shared with  Akamai Technologies  Genworth Financial 
our Patron/Sponsor community through working papers, re‐ Allianz SE (Germany)  Hitachi, Ltd. (Japan) 
search briefings, an annual conference, and sponsor forums.  Allstate Insurance Co.   ING Direct Spain 
Our research portfolio includes the following topics:  AMP Services Ltd. (Australia)  Insurance Australia Group 
ANZ Banking Group (Australia)  Johnson & Johnson 
 Big Data and Data Analytics 
APM Terminals (Denmark)  Level 3 Communications 
 Complexity  Australia Post  LKK Health Products Group Ltd. 
 Digital Business Models  Australian Taxation Office  (HK, China) 
 Digitized Platforms and Business Agility  AustralianSuper  MAPFRE (Spain) 
 Enterprise Architecture and Working Smarter  B2W Companhia Digital (Brazil)  McGraw‐Hill Education 
 Global Governance  Banco do Brasil S.A.  National Australia Bank 
 IT‐Enabled Business Innovation   Banco Santander (Spain)  National Disability Insurance 
Bank of Queensland (Australia)  Scheme (Australia) 
 IT Portfolios and IT Savvy  New Zealand Government—
Barclays (U.K.) 
 IT Unit Design and Leadership  GCIO office 
BB&T 
 Impacts of trends such as Cloud, Mobile Apps, and   BBVA (Spain) 
Nielsen 
Social Computing  Nomura Research  
Bemis Company, Inc.  Institute, Ltd. (Japan) 
The MIT CISR research staff consists of Kristine Dery,  Nils  Biogen  Northwestern Mutual 
Fonstad,  Susan  Krusell,  Leslie  Owens  (Executive  Director),  BNP Paribas (France)  Orange S.A. (France) 
Jeanne Ross (Research Director), Ina Sebastian, Peter Weill  BNY Mellon  Origin Energy (Australia) 
(Chairman), Barb Wixom, and Stephanie Woerner.  BP (U.K.)  Owens Corning 
BT Group (U.K.)  PepsiCo Inc. 
MIT  CISR  is  funded  by  Research  Patrons  and  Sponsors,  and  Canada Pension Plan  
we  gratefully  acknowledge  their  financial  support  and  their  Principal Financial Group, Inc. 
Investment Board 
many contributions to our work.    Procter & Gamble 
Canadian Imperial Bank  
of Commerce   Raytheon Company 
For  details  on  sponsorship  and  its  benefits,  please  visit  Reserve Bank of Australia 
Cardinal Health, Inc. 
http://cisr.mit.edu/community/sponsor‐and‐patron‐benefits/.  Royal Bank of Canada 
Caterpillar, Inc. 
Royal Philips (Netherlands) 
CONTACT INFORMATION  CEMEX (Mexico) 
Sabadell Bank 
Center for Information Systems Research  Charles Schwab & Co. 
Schindler Digital Business AG 
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245 First Street, E94–15th Floor  CHRISTUS Health   Schneider Electric Industries 
Cambridge, MA 02142  Chubb & Son  SAS (France) 
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Telephone: 617‐253‐2348 
Coles (Australia)  Standard Bank Group  
Email: [email protected]  Website: http://cisr.mit.edu 
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  Follow @MIT_CISR on Twitter  DBS Bank Ltd. (Singapore)  Sydney Water (Australia) 
DentaQuest  TD Bank 
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   Dunkin’ Brands  Tenet Health 
  Eaton Vance Management  Tetra Pak (Sweden) 
El Corte Inglés  TransUnion LLC 
EMC Corp.  Trinity Health 
ExxonMobil Global Services Co.  USAA 
Fairfax Media (Australia)  Westpac Banking Corp. (Australia)
Mission and Contact Information as of March 2016  Ferrovial Corporación (Spain)  World Bank