Name: Alishba Ali Roll No: F2017117068 Assignment North Sea Continental Shelf Cases Facts

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Name : Alishba ali

Roll no : F2017117068
Assignment
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases
Facts
a. The International Court of Justice delivered judgment, by 11 votes to 6.
b. Both Denmark and the Netherlands submitted an individual dispute with
Germany to the ICJ involving claims to the North Sea Continental Shelf. These two
separate claims were joined by the ICJ, and decided as one case. The parties
sought a method by which the Continental Shelf could be fairly delimited. All
parties agreed the Court was not to physically apportion claims, but merely
prescribe a method of delimitation for the parties to follow.
c. Denmark and the Netherlands argued that the method of equidistance should
be implemented. This is that each State claimed all areas that are closer to itself
than any other state. They claimed that the Geneva Convention supported this
method. Moreover, it was alleged to have been an a priori rule of law, a rule of
customary international law, and a general rule of conventional practicality.
d. Germany, who had not ratified the Geneva Convention, claimed that the rule
of equidistance was unfair. The State also argued for an apportionment of the
shelf that was proportional to the size of each state’s adjacent land.

Issues
a. Is the Geneva Convention binding on a State that has not ratified it?
b. Is the equidistance rule international law?

Decisions
a. The Court found that the Geneva Convention is not binding on German, as it
did not ratify it.
b. While the Geneva Convention does call for the rule of equidistance, the Court
found that the Geneva Convention was not binding upon Germany. Moreover,
the stipulations outlined in the Geneva Convention would have allowed Germany
to opt out in this area, so its membership in the treaty is a moot point. Upon
inspection of the language of both the Geneva Convention and the Truman
Proclamation, equidistance was found to be a last resort rather than an a priori
rule. Also looking to these sources, the Court rejected claims which included
equidistance in customary international law. Theses texts which originally
included the rule of equidistance only did so for secondary purposes, and the
utilization of it was insufficient to prove it to be either customary international
law, or a general law of practicality. The Court also pointed out mathematical
problems of contradiction under the rule.
The Court rejected Germany’s claim of proportional apportionment because
doing so would intrude upon the natural claims due to States based on natural
prolongations of land. Also, the Court’s role was to outline a mechanism of
delimitation only.
The Court found, therefore, that the two parties must draw up an agreement
taking both the maximization of area and proportionality into account. These
were to be based upon “equitable principles.” The holding here is somewhat
inconclusive, but the opinion is significant to international law, regardless.

Principles
a. The international law elements of the case are the power of treaties, customary
international law, and the principle of equidistance in claims to sea territory.
b. The rule of law upheld in this case is the Geneva Convention.
c. There are several principles in this case manifested in the Geneva Convention.
The court rejected the principle of equidistance. It upheld, rather, the idea of
“equitable principles,” which is only defined as those which maximizes land claims
based on several cooperative factors. The Court also upholds the principle of
customary international law by using the text of the Geneva Convention and its
purpose to exclude the mechanism of equidistance.

Conclusion
The Court’s ruling has a terminal impact on the principle of equidistance and its
utilization through the Geneva Convention. The Court does not proscribe its use,
but eliminates its legal credibility. This, of course, has no impact on the rest of the
Geneva Convention. As the holding does not prescribe any specific remedy, this
case does not significantly aid in any future decisions, other than for the purpose
of denying the equidistance principle legal weight. If this case were used as
precedent otherwise, it would merely direct the disputing states to look to
customary international law and cooperative action.

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