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    PEREZ Won VS. Wack Wack Golf and Country Club

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    Allen
    The plaintiff sued the defendant golf and country club after it refused to register the transfer of a membership certificate that had been assigned to the plaintiff in 1944. The defendant argued the suit was time-barred as more than 5 years had passed since the plaintiff's right of action accrued in 1944. However, the court found that the certificate did not require registration within a fixed period, so the plaintiff's right of action arose when the club refused registration in 1955, not in 1944. As the suit was filed shortly after the refusal in 1955, it was not time-barred. The court reversed the order dismissing the case and remanded it for further proceedings.

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    PEREZ Won VS. Wack Wack Golf and Country Club

    Uploaded by

    Allen
    50 views2 pages
    The plaintiff sued the defendant golf and country club after it refused to register the transfer of a membership certificate that had been assigned to the plaintiff in 1944. The defendant argued the suit was time-barred as more than 5 years had passed since the plaintiff's right of action accrued in 1944. However, the court found that the certificate did not require registration within a fixed period, so the plaintiff's right of action arose when the club refused registration in 1955, not in 1944. As the suit was filed shortly after the refusal in 1955, it was not time-barred. The court reversed the order dismissing the case and remanded it for further proceedings.

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    The plaintiff sued the defendant golf and country club after it refused to register the transfer of a membership certificate that had been assigned to the plaintiff in 1944. The defendant argued the suit was time-barred as more than 5 years had passed since the plaintiff's right of action accrued in 1944. However, the court found that the certificate did not require registration within a fixed period, so the plaintiff's right of action arose when the club refused registration in 1955, not in 1944. As the suit was filed shortly after the refusal in 1955, it was not time-barred. The court reversed the order dismissing the case and remanded it for further proceedings.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as docx, pdf, or txt
    50 views2 pages

    PEREZ Won VS. Wack Wack Golf and Country Club

    Uploaded by

    Allen
    The plaintiff sued the defendant golf and country club after it refused to register the transfer of a membership certificate that had been assigned to the plaintiff in 1944. The defendant argued the suit was time-barred as more than 5 years had passed since the plaintiff's right of action accrued in 1944. However, the court found that the certificate did not require registration within a fixed period, so the plaintiff's right of action arose when the club refused registration in 1955, not in 1944. As the suit was filed shortly after the refusal in 1955, it was not time-barred. The court reversed the order dismissing the case and remanded it for further proceedings.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as docx, pdf, or txt
    of 2

    Won VS.

    Wack Wack Golf & Country Club


    Facts:
    On December 2, 1942, the defendant (a non-stock corporation) issued to Iwao Teruyama
    Membership Certificate No. 201 which was assigned to M. T. Reyes on April 22, 1944. Subsequently in
    the same year 1944, M. T. Reyes transferred and assigned said certificate to the plaintiff. On April 26,
    1955, the plaintiff filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the defendant, alleging
    that shortly after the rehabilitation of the defendant after the war, the plaintiff asked the defendant to
    register in its books the assignment in favor of the plaintiff and to issue to the latter a new certificate,
    but that the defendant had refused and still refuses to do so unlawfully; and praying that the plaintiff be
    declared the owner of one share of stock of the defendant and that the latter be ordered to issue a
    correspondent new certificate. On June 6, 1955, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that
    from 1944, when the plaintiff's right of action had accrued, to April 26, 1955, when the complaint was
    filed, eleven years have elapsed, and that therefore the complaint was filed beyond the 5-year period
    fixed in Article 1149 of the Civil Code. On July 30, 1955, the Court of First Instance of Manila issued an
    order dismissing the complaint. As plaintiff's motion for reconsideration filed on August 27, 1955 and
    second motion for reconsideration filed on September 13, 1955, were both denied, the plaintiff has
    taken the present appeal.
    The certificate in question contains a condition to the effect that no assignment thereof "shall
    be effective with respect to the club until such assignment is registered in the books of the club, as
    provided in the By-Laws."

    Issue:
    W/N the plaintiff was bound, under said condition and By-Laws of the defendant or any
    statutory rule for that matter, to present and register the certificate assigned to him in 1944 within any
    definite or fixed period.

    Ruling:
    No.
    The existence of a right is one thing, and the duration of said right is another.
    A stipulation on the stock certificate that any assignment would not be binding on the
    corporation unless registered in the corporate books as required under the by-laws and without
    providing when registration should be made, would mean that the cause of action and the
    determination of prescription period would begin only when demand for registration is made and not at
    the time of the assignment of the certificate.
    It is stated in the appealed order of dismissal that the plaintiff sought to register the assignment
    on April 13, 1955; whereas in plaintiff's brief it is alleged that it was only in February, 1955, when the
    defendant refused to recognize the plaintiff. If, as already observed, there is no fixed period for
    registering an assignment, how can the complaint be considered as already barred by the Statute of
    Limitations when it was filed on April 26, 1955, or barely a few days (according to the lower court) and
    two months (according to the plaintiff), after the demand for registration and its denial by the
    defendant. Plaintiff's right was violated only sometime in 1955, and it could not accordingly have
    asserted any cause of action against the defendant before that.
    The defendant seems to believe that the plaintiff was compelled immediately to register his
    assignment. Any such compulsion is obviously for the benefit of the plaintiff, because it is only after
    registration that the transfer would be binding against the defendant. But we are not here concerned
    with a situation where the plaintiff claims anything against the defendant allegedly accruing under the
    outstanding certificate in question between the date of the assignment to the plaintiff and the date of
    the latters demand for registration and issuance of a new certificate.
    Appealed order is hereby reversed and the case is remanded to the court of origin.

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