Mononationals, Hyphenationals, and Shadow-Nationals: Multiple Citizenship As Practice
Mononationals, Hyphenationals, and Shadow-Nationals: Multiple Citizenship As Practice
Mononationals, Hyphenationals, and Shadow-Nationals: Multiple Citizenship As Practice
To cite this article: Jussi Kasperi Ronkainen (2011) Mononationals, hyphenationals, and
shadow-nationals: multiple citizenship as practice, Citizenship Studies, 15:02, 247-263, DOI:
10.1080/13621025.2011.549723
Introduction
Even though multiple/dual citizenship1 was part of state policies since mid-nineteenth
century (Spiro 2002, p. 24), due, e.g. to linkages created by colonialism, it was generally
thought to be a detrimental status. Multiple citizenship was argued to create problems for
(inter)national relations, policies, and security in cases of military service, voting,
taxation, and diplomatic protection (Martin and Hailbronner 2003, p. 4). A fundamental
reason for objecting to dual citizenship ‘in the world of nation-states’ was the shared
conception to require undivided loyalty from the citizens toward their state.
Globalization, increased international migration, and end of Cold War have shifted the
political and socio-cultural foundations of citizenship and conceptions about national
loyalty and belonging. Also, attitudes toward multiple citizenship have altered. Dual
citizenship has in recent decades become an important focus of research and discussions
about integration, immigration, and citizenship policies (Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer 2002,
Hansen and Weil 2002, Martin and Hailbronner 2003, Faist 2007, Faist and Kivisto 2007a,
Nyers 2010). As Faist (2007, p. 5) had summed up, multiple citizenship is connected with
blurring of different modern borders: on the one hand blurring borders of rights between
citizens and foreigners (denizens) and on the other hand equalizing? rights connected to
gender. As political, cultural, and social phenomena, transnationalism blurs national
*Email: [email protected]
borders of citizenship. Overall, objecting to multiple citizenship is hard in a world that has
been tied together in new ways due to renewing technology (communication, travel,
and advertising) and transnational investments and trade (Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer
2002, p. 23).
So far, studies covering dual citizenship have mainly concentrated on comparing state
policies and juridical pondering to what extent and on what restrictions should citizen
rights be granted to different groups of people and what should dual citizenship’s role be
in this. Also, the most recent extensive and laudable international publications have
concentrated on policy analysis comparisons between different countries’ nationality
legislation (e.g. Faist 2007). Although this is vital and forms the basis for citizenship as
juridical – political status, much less notice was given to actual dual citizens’ citizen
participation and construction of citizens’ identities.2 Only when citizenship is studied as
preceding practices (Oldfield 1990, Isin and Wood 1999, Lister 2003) do the
hypothetically associated possibilities and problems to this status get their meanings
and contents.
This article studies how dual citizens identify with their citizenships and how it is
transferred to citizenship participation in practice. This is done by means of two different
empirical data: a survey sent in 2002 to 16– 26-year-old multiple citizens who live in
Finland and have Finnish citizenship (n ¼ 335) and 48 thematic interviews carried out in
2005 to people with multiple citizenship status living in Finland. I proceed by first
presenting the contextual standpoints and methodology and then move on to the results.
citizenship. Therefore, political context (state of residence) and national jurisdiction also
have to be borne in mind, even though they are not in the core of the analysis.
This study also aims to participate in the discussion referred by Conway et al. (2008,
p. 378):
Our lack of understanding of notions such as ‘transnational belonging’, multiple nation-state
membership patterns, or of the interlinked trio of ‘dual citizenship’, ‘dual identity formation’
and ‘dual nationality’, is in large part due to a lack of empirical data and suitably focused
research.
Thus, to study identification to citizenship, one has to clarify the varying, inconsistent, and
partly overlapping use and understanding of citizenship and nationality. This is vital for
the reason alone that while interviewees and respondents in this study were asked solely
about the importance of citizenship, they often responded by pondering the meaning
and contents of nationality and national identification. For example, in English nationality
and in France, nationalité refers to formal citizenship/legal membership and citizenship
and citoyennetté refer to substantial citizenship (rights and duties attached to
membership). In addition, in international law, well-established custom is to use
nationality to refer to legal membership and all the international agreements use the term
in this sense (Kondo 2003, pp. 2, 8). Nationality refers also to national identity and ethnic
and/or cultural membership of nation. This kind of usage of concepts can be seen to be in
accordance with traditional nation-state ideology and national citizenship, where
citizenship and nationality were wished to coincide. This nevertheless causes incoherence
in practical contemporary context: not only that formal citizens can be deprived from and
denied access (Castles 1994) to actual substantial citizenship and aliens/denizens
(Hammar 1990) can have substantial rights even though they are not formal citizens, but
also that citizens’ national identity, sense of belonging, feelings of allegiance, and loyalty
can be addressed to very different locations and nations than what their citizenship might
refer to, or the feeling of national identification could be missing at all.
Thus, terms like citizenship and nationality are tangled also in the context of dual
citizenship. First, dual citizenship and dual nationality are used often as synonymous (e.g.
Hansen and Weil 2002). On the other hand, dual citizenship is demarcated to mean
political status and rights, and dual nationality to refer to socio-cultural belonging and
identity (Kastoryano 2002, p. 158). Faist (1999, p. 16) again emphasized the juridical
differences: dual nationality refers to more strict rights than dual citizenship. Although
many states accept dual nationality as a legal status, they want to restrict the substantial
rights. Important to my own work is that the distinction by Faist refers only to dual
citizenship as status, and tells nothing about dual citizenship as practice.
In this article, nationality refers only to the sense of belonging to a nation and
individuals’ national identification (Verkuyten 2005).5 National identification becomes
apparent in feeling the similarity with fellow nationals, and feeling the loyalty, patriotism
toward nation, state, and territory (home country and natural features); knowing about
history, myths, language, and culture which also helps in doing and participating:
accepting and negotiating about societal values, norms, and social order. Knowledge about
language and culture give ways to understand oneself as part of the community, to
understand national identity, to follow it, and to participate in the discourse. Citizenship as
status is one clear testimony about being part of a nation with subjective implications to
national identifications, whereas participation in civil society exemplifies one form of
national identification. National identification also has aspects of instrumental belonging.
These can be both psychological (‘I want to spend summer in Finland, because it is bright
250 J.K. Ronkainen
and warm’) and material (social security, services, and economical benefits), where
citizenship as status nowadays still plays a certain role as access to resources (free
movement across national borders and security of not being deported for instance) (Anttila
2007).
As one can denote, national belonging and identification to citizenship conventionally
largely coincide. Citizenship was noticed to have important meaning for individuals when
they define who they are (Westin 2003, pp. 172 –173). Thus, citizenship works as an
important definer and constructor of identity. Citizenship-identity describes the social
relation between individual and state and the relations between fellow citizens that are
formed by different memberships and relations. Relations are learned, claimed, and
negotiated and thus fluid and flexible (e.g. Isin 2008, pp. 16 –17). How these relations are
understood reflect the national culture and context. Citizenship identity is not only being
part of the community but also feeling accepted as part of it. Only identification to
community brings along active participation (Painter 2002, p. 95). This way citizenship
represents cultural identity and belonging to ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 1983).
Thus, I understand the different indications of national identification as part of, as
expression of, as manifestation, or as basis for citizenship as practice. Citizenship as
practice is then again a much larger concept than nationality, as it covers implications of
being a member of self-governing community and source of democracy, multiform, and
level societal participation (social, economic, political) and possible identifications with
levels other than the national one (local, regional, global). The term national in this paper
refers in different ways to nation-state construction, because of which the distinctions
between nationality and citizenship are often hard to make or see. I move next to the
methodology and data.
any other ties there. Finland – Vietnam dual citizens were then again the children of
Vietnamese refugees who came to Finland in the 1970s, and thus are also children of
‘mononational’ families. Practically, all respondents spoke Finnish well and returned the
survey in Finnish, nine returned the survey that was made in Swedish,6 and three in
English. One third of the respondents had lived practically, all their lives in Finland and
40% since childhood. Ten percent had moved to Finland from another country as
teenagers. The remaining 20% consisted of people who had lived a lot or mainly in another
country, lived in many countries as ‘suit-case children’, or lived steadily in both of their
citizen states. Most of them spoke Finnish as mother tongue; many had two ‘home
languages’ and spoke also other languages. Different citizenships, languages, and
religions inside the family tell about their ‘multicultural roots.’ Dual citizens were also
well educated as were their parents. There were some differences, though especially,
Finland –USA dual citizens’ parents were well educated, but parents of Finland –Vietnam
dual citizens (also Finland – Spain and Finland –Italy) had usually only basic education.
The most important part of the analysis formed the following open-ended questions of
the survey. Open-ended questions were analyzed qualitatively and also transformed into
dependent variables by coding the responses into categories. These categories are seen in
italics after the question: what things in general do you see as important in your
citizenships? Which citizenship would you give up if you had to and why? (Other state’s,
Cannot decide, Finnish, or Either one depending on situation), Which citizenship do you
see as more important/more own and why? (Neither one is more own, Finnish, or Other
state’s), Where do you see yourself living in the future (10 years from now)? (In Finland,
Don’t know, Abroad, In my other citizen-state, In Finland or abroad, In Finland or in my
other citizen-state), Do you want your own children to have multiple citizenship and why?
(Yes, Cannot say, No, or Makes no difference), Which country’s citizen do you represent to
be and which passport do you hold/use when traveling and why? (Finnish, Depends on the
situation, Other country’s, or Both). Associations and statistically significant differences
between these dependent and set of independent variables7 were then examined using
traditional cross-tabulation and chi square test (as all variables were nominal scale) to
analyze what kind of dual citizens responded in what ways. If assumptions were not
fulfilled, Monte Carlo simulation was applied (Mehta and Patel 1996). In addition,
respondents’ attitudes were examined by reducing large set of statements into scales.8
Noteworthy for Finland’s historical foreign and domestic politics was the geopolitical
position between east and west, especially near Soviet Union/Russia. Immigration politics
were cautious and strict partly due to foreign political pressure. General global changes,
the collapse of the Soviet Union, Finland joining the European Union in 1995, and other
international agreements have changed Finland into a rapidly growing country of
immigration, which have also caused challenges for citizenship policy (e.g. Ronkainen
et al. 2007). In 2003, the picture of multiple citizenship in Finland changed: the new
Nationality Act (359/2003) came into force, where dual citizenship was openly allowed.
The change was affected by an overall generalization of dual citizenship, Sweden’s
example to allow dual citizenship since 2001, and the wish to join into European
Convention on Nationality (1997) without clauses or reservations. In this convention, a
majority of the European states took for the first time a rather neutral, instead of negative,
stance toward allowing dual citizenship. Due to these general changes, Finland could also
fulfill the long-term wishes of many of the Finnish expatriates to help acquiring multiple
citizenship. Thus, the interviewed dual citizens in 2005 came from all different ages and
had received their citizenships through parents (jus sanguinis), by birthplace (jus soli), or
by naturalization. Interviewees (n ¼ 48, 31 women and 17 male) had an age distribution
252 J.K. Ronkainen
from 18 to 72. They had 29 different citizenship combinations with three being triple
citizens. Most common citizenship in addition to Finnish was USA and Russia 5 and
Germany and Turkey 4. Seven had lived only in Finland, 8 had been born in Finland but
lived also in other countries, 16 had migrated to Finland as a child with parent(s), and 10
had moved to Finland as an adult for work, family, or military service reasons. In addition,
there were three refugees and four returning migrants. Fourteen had received dual
citizenship at birth, 21 based on application before dual citizenship was openly allowed
and 12 had gained dual citizenship recently through naturalization after the new
Nationality Act. Most of the interviewees spoke Finnish as mother tongue, well, or at least
had adequate knowledge. Only five interviews were carried out in English.
A main theme of the interviews was to examine how dual citizens define the meaning
and importance of multiple citizenship. Interviewees were asked thematically about their
general interests toward dual citizenship, possible benefits, and disadvantages of the status,
interests in political participation, identification and belonging to states and nations (also
local, EU, and global level), experiences about social integration, and multiple citizenship
as part of education. Now, as the data have been described, I move on to results.
feelings of acceptance that unites the individual to the national collective. International
politics divides nations into unequal positions and the citizen is also the bearer and
member of a certain collective with the stereotypical risks and possibilities of this
membership. Because of citizenship ties, an individual becomes partly responsible for a
state’s present, future and also history, part of ‘national shame’ (Ahmed 2004, pp. 107–113)
or glory. For example, bullying because of citizenship status attaches international history
and international politics to personal experiences of belonging. Also, reflections of
national character (expected national features, habits, and behavior) bound and embody
citizenship and identification. By representing several states and national characters, dual
citizen can remain always a bit different. People have a tendency to categorize others into
understandable, learned exclusive national contexts, and this way make dual citizens
exotic or in-between and contextualize their? identification:
In Finland I feel to be Algerian and in Algeria I feel to be Finnish. (Finland – Algeria, female
24)
This renewal of the ‘naturalness’ of national level – methodological nationalism
(Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002, Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2009) – has to be
remembered. Identification is always situational: affected by social, spatial, and emotional
location (residence) and interaction with others. Identification is also often attached to
local rather than national level. Identifying and feeling the proximity of local surroundings
can, nevertheless, also be one way to make the abstract nation alive and thus be part of
national identification (Anttila 2007, p. 121). On the other hand, different social relations
also create experiences about ‘own place’ that cross the local and national level. Thus,
people have bilocal, translocal, or bidomestical (Harinen and Ronkainen 2003) affiliations.
As Grillo (2001) had pointed out, multiple citizenship is usually an example of this kind of
transnationality/locality and also a public recognition and approval to have this kind of
relation to more than one state. One level of citizenship can also create space and
circumstances for other levels of citizenship. For example, experiences about local
citizenship can lead to strong national participation, regional affiliation (e.g. EU-
citizenship), and/or global activity, and form a truly nested citizenship (Faist and Kivisto
2007b). These constraining, changing, and contextual points about identification are
important to mention also, because they put into perspective the rather static dual citizens’
ideal-type identifications to their citizenships which I present next.
otherwise formed. Also focal to note is that citizenship, besides being seen as formal state
membership (status), includes experiences about national identification and participation
(practice) (Figure 1).9
Resident-mononationals
It’s enough for me to be a Finnish citizen, everything in it is important . . . . (Finland – Italy,
male 18)
For ‘resident-mononationals,’ only the citizenship of the state of residence (Finland) is
important. The meaning of other citizenship can be part of personal identity and life-
history but without symbolizing or representing collective identity or national belonging.
Mononationals feel that they are citizens and nationals of only one state and nation (in this
case Finland) and renew the traditional understanding of modern nation-state ideology,
where citizenship and nationality do not have principled difference. A majority of the
young dual citizens who responded to the survey represented their citizenship this way.
Common for them was that they had studied and lived mostly or only in Finland, spoke
Finnish as a mother tongue, and received their other citizenship through their father10 or by
being born in another state. A lot of Finnish– Swedish dual citizens had resident-
mononational orientation. Most importantly, this was because they did not have any
concrete ties, living history, or networks to this other country. They did not see much
practical value in their dual citizen status either, as due to bilateral agreements they already
have passport-free movement in Nordic countries (Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and
Iceland) based on solely Finnish citizenship.
Well, I haven’t seen any advantages [in having dual citizenship] at least yet . . . I mean I
haven’t felt it as any kind of benefit, this other citizenship [Swedish]. It’s just a kind of relic
from the past, I just don’t find time to give it away, cause there’s no trouble in having it.
(Finland –Sweden, female, 25)
Noteworthy was that resident-mononationals, although being quite moderate toward
ideas of multiculturalism and transnationality, took a more negative stance toward them
than other groups.11 Thus, based on these data, people who had ties only to Finland were
less positive than others toward ideas about opening national borders, having more
foreigners in Finland, or traveling themselves more abroad. They also did not have much
‘Resident-mononationals’ ‘Hyphenationals’
‘Expatriate-mononationals’
Finnish Other
national national
citizenship citizenship
(State of
Residence)
‘Shadow-nationals’
Expatriate-mononationals
Expatriate-mononationals recognized that Finnish citizenship is important as a political –
juridical status, but felt their other citizenship’s emotional meaning to surpass the
importance of their citizenship in the country of residence.
[Important in Finnish citizenship:] I can get citizen’s rights and duties and so on . . .
[Which citizenship would you give up, if you had to?] Finnish, because fatherland is
nevertheless really important thing for a human being. (Finland – Vietnam, male, 17)
As Finland is one of the countries where the majority of citizens’ rights are connected
to permanent residence and social security and not to formal citizenship status, holding on
to other citizenship is possible and understandable. The only main difference between a
citizen and permanent resident/denizen (Hammar 1990) in Finland is that permanent
residents do not have national voting right. Citizens enjoy also principled security of not
being deported that permanent residents do not have.12 Thus, Finnish citizenship was seen
to be important to have in order to attain equal formal status, feeling of security, and
possibilities for full participation. Identification with other citizenship and its symbolic
and emotional meaning were felt still more important. This again emphasizes that
citizenship should be understood widely and essentially connected to identity and sense of
belonging. Expatriate-mononationals in the survey were, especially, Finland –Vietnam
dual citizens and dual citizens from certain Muslim led states in the Middle-East. In the
interviews, especially, dual citizens who had migrated to Finland as adults felt their
citizenship of country of origin to be the only real one and emotionally important, whereas
citizenship gained through naturalization had more narrow meaning connected to work
and the political sphere. Thus, reasons for identification result from broad cultural issues
and period of migration. During long living history and childhood, individuals are
socialized strongly and perhaps permanently into one specific ‘national sphere.’ There are
differences between generations and distinctive features as to what kind of ‘reality of
nation-states’ you are socialized into, but also differences related to cultural and societal
upbringing at home. Identifying with and feeling other citizenship to be more important
than the one of the country of residence can also result from the everyday social interaction
processes where ‘wrong’ ethnicity and cultural distances (Bhabha 1994) may play a
relevant role in how much of an approved citizen – ‘one of us’ – you feel to be (cf.
Modood 2007, pp. 150 – 151).
Hyphenationals
You have one leg in one country and one leg in the other, that’s the way it goes. (Finland–
Spain, male, 26)
256 J.K. Ronkainen
‘Hyphenationals’ have strong and meaningful ties in multiple dimensions to both of their
‘home-countries.’ They have lived in-between cultures, but have not remained in the
middle (cf. Bhabha 1994) and identify and attach ‘both-and’ to both of their citizenships.
Nevertheless, the traditional content of national citizenship does not change, but rather
doubles: they are national citizens of two societies, with somewhat equal emotional and
practical meaning (possible change of residence to ‘third country’ might affect this).
Hyphenationals have strong and long living history ties to both states. In a survey, this
other state than Finnish was usually a ‘western’ state from North-America or Europe.
Common features in this typology were a home where parents have deliberately raised
children into multiple membership and spoken several languages, going against the former
‘Zeitgeist’, where teaching more than one language to a child was considered harmful, and
living and going to school in both ‘home-countries.’ Hyphenationals’ hyphenated (see
Caglar 1997, pp. 160– 185) national identity could be called also as bihomey (Harinen and
Ronkainen 2003). Seeing the importance of and identifying with both citizenships is also
partly connected to the practical value of the citizenship other than the one of main
residence. This was apparent, especially, in case of many Finland – USA dual citizens who
saw major practical (free traveling, living, and working in EU and USA) and emotional
values in their status.
A majority of the interviewed dual citizens could be labeled hyphenationals (or
‘shadow-nationals’ which are covered in the next section). As mentioned, this is because
interviewees were selected on the basis that their backgrounds would be transnational.
Hyphenationals fit best into the picture about dual citizenship framed and formed by
transnationality and new migration. Using Grillo’s (2001) migrant categories, one can
denote that hyphenational multiple citizens have enduring orientation to both of their
countries being ‘both here and there.’ In some cases, too frequent shuttling between two
home states can cause negative feelings of eternal adaptation and struggles to create the
ties over and over again. Thus, having a hyphenational orientation does not totally erase
the aspects of identity struggle at times and in different situations. Although identity
should be understood as an ongoing process, according to Maffesoli (1996, p. 65), identity
in all its forms is first and foremost still willingness to be something that is decided or
settled. As all growing people have ‘identity struggles,’ many dual citizens have to balance
and sort out the extra pressure and cross-pull of ‘national’ cultures, that can emphasize the
unreadiness of identity negotiations, which came up often in interviews (cf. Verkuyten
2005, pp. 170– 173).
Now, when you have been a dual citizen, can you tell me, or what comes to your mind, what
has been the most important thing?
Kind of strange when you asked what comes to mind. First word that came to my mind was
acceptance. I was surprised myself, that how come, have I sought for this, that I would be
accepted in both and [ . . . ] Maybe I have put in the symbolic meaning, that when I have the
passports and citizenships in concrete, then I belong to these communities [ . . . ] At present, I
have this little identity crisis in my life, that I think a lot what I could keep in my life from the
Finnish culture and what from the Arabic and how I could combine them [ . . . ] as we don’t
even know where we are going to live [with boyfriend] and how I could transmit forward it
for example to own children or how I could preserve this identity . . . . (Finland – Jordan,
female, 25)
Shadow-nationals
Sometimes I feel I am a tourist no matter where I am. A kind of rootless state. (Finland–
Germany, female, 21)
Citizenship Studies 257
the forms and contents of the preceding dual citizens’ ‘ideal-types.’ The purpose is not to
cover extensively different kinds of citizens’ participation possibilities, but to examine
how the ideal types of national belonging transfer to possible citizenship participation. It is
to be remembered that the concepts introduced next can have very different individual
emphasis, interconnection, and convergence.
THIN – THICK-division refers to Tilly’s (1995) theory and aims to describe how
frequent or strong dual citizens’ citizenship ties are.
VOICE ¼ Voting or political participation. The survey and interviews contained
questions about voting, views about political and societal issues in different states, and
interests shown in following them and world politics, organizational activities, etc.
I elaborate in the analysis only the points that came up as most relevant and characteristic
for the ideal types.
ROOTS ¼ feeling of belonging and identification into national collective. These
become apparent also in honoring family and cultural background and roots.
LOYALTY ¼ feelings of loyalty and solidarity toward the state and political
community, feelings of allegiance, and willingness to fulfill citizens’ duties (e.g. views
about military service). Roots and loyalty partly overlap, but aim to describe different
aspects of identification to citizenship: ROOTS emphasize the meaning of national or
family culture(s), whereas LOYALTY is directed more at state and political community.
Thus, both describe emotional affiliations to citizenship that affect the use of voice or the
actual breaking of citizenship ties. Nevertheless, as LOYALTY is directed at the state, I
also depict it to contain forms of actual participation (e.g. traditional ‘loyalty-indicator’ of
citizenship: Military service), whereas ROOTS represents only emotional affiliations. The
difference is shown, e.g. in case of expatriate mononationals.
EXIT ¼ no notable use of citizenship tie or the tie has been broken in practice (Table 1).
For resident-mononationals, the other citizenship does not mean anything in practice
and, therefore, is not funneled into any kind of citizen participation. Resident-
mononationals, e.g. do not use their voting rights in the other country even though they
would have it. The other citizenship was acquired through birth place or from parents, but
actual citizenship ties were broken later on or were never formed, as all the emotional and
practical ties are connected to Finland. In Finland loyalty, national identification, and
possible voting/other political participation are intertwined and alter as ties from thick-to-
thin, individually depending on education, upbringing, and subjective choices on the
whole.
Expatriate-mononationals’ national roots are strongly connected to the country of
origin. Citizenship ties in the form of voice, for example voting right, are nevertheless
often broken in practice, as voting is difficult or thought to be meaningless because of
living in another country. Some people refuse to vote because of refugee background or
the level of democracy or current situation in the other country makes voting difficult or
impossible. In Finland, citizenship ties are activated, especially, through voting and
organizational activities, varying subjectively from thin-to-thick. For many refugees, ties
to Finnish citizenship are defined also through loyalty, as some think that they owe Finland
a debt, because it has given them a new chance to start life. Loyalty in practice is shown for
example as willingness to join the army in Finland.
[Finnish citizenship is important because] I can live in Finland and go to army – participate in
defending Finland if necessary. Finland has helped me and I want to do something for Finland.
(Finland –Vietnam, male, 20)
In general (based on the whole data), a majority of the interviewed dual citizens were
interested in following the societal issues of both states. Based on the survey, one can say
that the level of interest in core political and historical issues was mostly related to higher
education and not, e.g. to living history or citizenship combinations. Future plans and
family ties keep the relation to other state alive and Internet and satellite-TV have made
contact in principle easy in a way, that one can feel always present, even though not
physically. Transnationality is nevertheless seen mostly in the micro level, in family
relations that strengthen people’s ties to country and perhaps nation, but not to the state.
My mother calls me, my two sisters live there also, we call all the time. (Philippines – Finland,
female, 35)
Societal issues of the other society are followed for family reasons, but citizen
participation is often thought to be useless or impossible because of the ‘nature’ of the
state government, own experiences and own current residence. Economic factors usually
form the reason for not visiting the other country as often as wanted, which can also lead to
debasement of language skills and familiarity of culture. Thus, also the citizenship tie and
competence are weakened. Although people were, in general, interested in voting if that
was possible, already minor bureaucratic problems and going to the embassy might form a
reason and obstacle for postponing the activation of citizenship tie. It should be
remembered, as in the case of all typologies, that state policies can restrict or enable the
use of ties in different ways, which affects the possibilities of using citizens’ rights,
participating as a citizen, and also identifying with citizenship.
Hyphenationals’ citizenship ties are mostly similar to both of their citizen-states and
societies. Understandably, thickness of the tie has individual alternations. Many young
dual citizens find it strange, conservative, and even little bit frightening to amalgamate
citizenship with national loyalty, as they connected it with vilified nationalism. One can,
nevertheless, still say that hyphenationals have certain loyalty ties to both of their citizen
states, as political community and sense of belonging are felt as important.
Understandably, the citizenship of the country of residence is in more active use, but
hyphenationals used for example their voting rights in both countries where possible. One
can assume that usually only the dual citizens who have ‘genuine’ ties to their states have
also the will for political transnationalism by voting and participating from abroad.
Division between hyphenationals and shadow-nationals might be too aggravated if one
argues that shadow-nationals have broken citizen ties completely when it comes to loyalty
and roots, even though shadow-nationals themselves would emphasize the mean-
inglessness of national level. In everyday life, certain kinds of citizenship bond are still in
use. Previously mentioned ‘vilified nationalism’ is nevertheless one cogent reason for
shadow-nationals not to long for national identification. Interesting for shadow-nationals
is the use of voice that I have defined to be thin. This means that shadow-nationals may
vote in national elections if they want to influence more global issues (as nationally elected
260 J.K. Ronkainen
Summary
Gustafsson (2005) examined discussions about dual citizenship in Swedish media when a
new law which was to approve dual citizenship was under preparation (law came into
force in 2001). According to Gustafson, people who wrote for dual citizenship used global,
international, and individual arguments stating that accepting it would also strengthen
immigrants’ integration. People who were against dual citizenship took national and
collective viewpoint, and raised political and legal problems that accepting dual
citizenship would cause to the harmony of the nation-state. For them, citizenship would
then become too individual, optional, and weakening the integration of immigrants.
According to this survey and interviews, the dual citizens who have strong ties to other
states and transnational networks and who also wish to have international affiliation in the
future, also see dual citizenship as important. They also seem to favor relatively open
national borders and openness toward cultural multiplicity. The dual citizens who have
tied themselves solely to Finland through living history, language, and schooling see
themselves in Finland also in the future. They are not usually against multiple citizenship,
but see it often as meaningless or irrelevant. Thus, dual citizenship is, especially,
meaningful for those who can and want to use and fulfill the arguments that are stated for
defending it (obtaining and upholding transnational and multicultural ties, individual
freedom of choice). The dual citizens who do not want to use these possibilities attach
themselves more to the national, local, and collective. In this respect, this study also attests
the relative nature of seeing multiple citizenship as an on-going transnational status. Thus
Citizenship Studies 261
and overall, the article wishes to pinpoint the importance of studying multiple citizenship
as a multifaceted practice. This also involves the studying of interconnections between
citizenship and nationality/national identification. As, e.g. resident-mononationals and
hyphenationals in this study understood citizenship and nationality/national identification
more or less as synonymous, hyphenationals attached this affiliation to both citizenships,
but resident mononationals only to one citizenship. Expatriate-mononationals associated
nationality more to their original citizenship, whereas through citizenship of the residence
state they gained consideration as full participants and member of political community.
Shadow-nationals then again wanted to detach from national connotations of citizenship
completely.
Notes
1. I use the terms multiple and dual citizenship interchangeably referring to people who have
more than one citizenship, although one could also point differences between the terms.
Multiple citizenship may refer to more than two state citizenships and is used more as formal
term. It should also be further researched as how having more than two citizenships affects
citizenship as practice.
2. Nevertheless, see ‘Dual Citizenship, Governance and Education: A Challenge to the European
Nation-State (DCE 2002– 2006)’ – project (e.g. Pitkänen and Kalekin-Fishman 2007, Kalekin-
Fishman and Pitkänen 2008). See also e.g. Smith and Bakker (2007) and Conway et al. (2008).
3. Besides state citizenship is the talk about ‘regional citizenship’ (like EU-citizenship), ‘new
citizenship’, or denizenship (Hammar 1990, Kondo 2003, pp. 2– 3). Contemporary varying
discussions alongside national citizenship can be seen through concepts like transnational
citizenship (e.g. Bauböck 1994, Faist 1999, Grillo 2001), postnational or denational citizenship
(e.g. Delanty 2000, Sassen 2002), ‘universal’ citizenship (Soysal 1994), cosmopolitan
citizenship (Delanty 2000, Vertovec and Cohen 2002), or global/world citizenship (e.g. Van
Steenbergen 1994, Heater 1999, Lister 2003).
4. See e.g. Isin (2008) and Weber (2008).
5. Belonging and identification are used to refer to the same kind of collective/national affiliation,
although one could also point to differences between the terms.
6. Swedish is another national language in Finland and Swedish-speaking Finns (about 300,000)
are a traditionally well-established language minority.
7. Independent variables consisted of respondent’s mother tongue, most own language, home
language, living history, education, current place of study, studying countries, religion, gender,
age, respondent’s parents’ age, education and religion, other country’s attitude toward dual
citizenship (approves, does not approve, or approves in certain cases), when had gained dual
citizenship (by birth, as a child, or as an adult), and how has gained dual citizenship
(birth/other, declared by parents, or applied him/herself). In addition ‘dual citizenship
combination’ – variable was used that consisted of 10 most common dual citizenship
combinations in the data.
8. Scales consisted of thematic issues about: ‘multiculturalism and transnationalism’, ‘active
societal knowledge’, ‘attitudes about Finland’, ‘attitudes about other country’, and
‘attitudes about dual citizenship’. The scales were formed from Likert-scale statements by
help of principal component analysis. Reliabilities of the scales were then examined by
Cronbach alpha-coefficient (Afifi and Clark 1996). Associations between scales and
explanatory variables and the statistically significant differences were studied by using
non-parametric Kruskall – Wallis test, as the data were not normally distributed and some
cells had small frequency (Conover 1999, pp. 288– 300). In these cases, Monte Carlo
simulation was also applied (Mehta and Patel 1996). In general, dual citizens’ attitudes
and experiences about issues like military service and voting were also examined by the
statements.
9. It would be essential to argue how the change of residence country would affect identification
and possibilities of participation, but it is not possible in the limits of this article.
10. Due to changes in the former Nationality Act in Finland, most of the young people who were
dual citizens had Finnish mother and father with other citizenship.
262 J.K. Ronkainen
11. This was studied by a scale that contained statements ‘I have lot of friends and acquaintances
from different nationalities’, ‘It is easy for me to get along with people from different
countries’, I reckon myself as ‘world citizen’, ‘World without state borders would be good’,
‘Finns should travel more abroad’, and ‘It would be good, if more foreigners would come to
Finland’ (Cronbach’s a ¼ 0.6905).
12. In cases of dual citizens, this right has, nevertheless, become obscure at times, as they also have
another state where they could be sent.
References
Afifi, A. and Clark, V., 1996. Computer-aided multivariate analysis. London: Chapman and Hall.
Ahmed, S., 2004. The cultural politics of emotion. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Aleinikoff, T.A. and Klusmeyer, D., eds, 2002. Citizenship policies for an age of migration.
Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment.
Anderson, B., 1983. Imagined communities. London: Verso.
Anttila, J., 2007. Kansallinen identiteetti ja suomalaiseksi samastuminen. University of Helsinki:
Studies in social psychology, 14.
Bauböck, R., 1994. Transnational citizenship – membership and rights in international migration.
Aldershot: Edward Elgar.
Beck, U. and Beck-Gernsheim, E., 2009. Global generations and the trap of methodological
nationalism for a cosmopolitan turn in the sociology of youth and generation. European
sociological review, 1, 25 –36.
Bhabha, H., 1994. The location of culture. London: Routledge.
Caglar, A., 1997. Hyphenated identities and the limits of ‘Culture’. In: T. Modood and P. Werbner,
eds. Politics of multiculturalism in the New Europe: racism, identity and community. London:
Zed Books, 169– 185.
Castles, S., 1994. Democracy and multicultural citizenship: Australian debates and their relevance
for Western Europe. In: R. Bauböck, ed. From aliens to citizens. Aldershot: Avebury, 3 – 28.
Conover, W., 1999. Practical nonparametric statistics. New York: Wiley.
Conway, D., Potter, R.B. and St Bernard, G., 2008. Dual citizenship or dual identity? Does
transnationalism supplant nationalism among returning Trinidadians? Global networks, 4,
373– 397.
Deakin, N., 2001. In search of civil society. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Delanty, G., 2000. Citizenship in a global age: society, culture, politics. Buckingham: Open
University Press.
European Convention on Nationality (ETS no. 166, 6.12.1997), European Commission.
Faist, T., 1999. Transnationalisation in international migration: implications for the study of
citizenship and culture. Available from: http://www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk/working_papers.htm
[Accessed 2 March 2010].
Faist, T., ed., 2007. Dual citizenship in Europe: from nationhood to societal integration. Aldershot:
Ashgate.
Faist, T. and Kivisto, P., 2007a. Dual citizenship in global perspective: from unitary to multiple
citizenship. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Faist, T. and Kivisto, P., 2007b. Citizenship: discourse, theory and transnational prospects. Malden,
MA: Blackwell.
Grillo, R., 2001. Transnational migration and multiculturalism in Europe. Available from: http://
www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk/working_papers.htm [Accessed 2 March 2010].
Gustafsson, P., 2005. International migration and national belonging in the Swedish debate on dual
citizenship. Acta sociologica, 1, 5 – 19.
Hammar, T., 1990. Democracy and the nation state: aliens, denizens and citizens in a world of
international migration. Aldershot: Avebury.
Hansen, R. and Weil, P., eds, 2002. Dual nationality, social rights and federal citizenship in the US
and Europe: the reinvention of Europe. New York: Berghahn.
Harinen, P., 2001. Young dual citizens – people of the third space. Young, 3, 29 – 42.
Harinen, P. and Ronkainen, J., 2003. A suitcase and a couple of passports: dual citizenship as a form
of societal membership. In: P. Harinen, ed. Kamppailuja jäsenyyksistä. Etnisyys, kulttuuri ja
kansalaisuus nuorten arjessa. [Contested memberships. Ethnicity, culture and nationality in
young people’s everyday life]. Helsinki: The Finnish Youth Research Society, 302– 343.
Citizenship Studies 263