NARVASA, 

J.:

The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court affirming a
decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, which ordered registration in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of five
parcels of land measuring 481, 390 square meters, more or less, acquired by it from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the
Dumagat tribe.

The registration proceedings were for confirmation of title under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (The Public Land Act).
as amended: and the appealed judgment sums up the findings of the trial court in said proceedings in this wise:

1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario is a corporation duly organized in
accordance with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines and registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission
on December 23, 1959;

2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario can acquire real properties pursuant to
the provisions of the Articles of Incorporation particularly on the provision of its secondary purposes (paragraph (9),
Exhibit 'M-l');

3. That the land subject of the Land Registration proceeding was ancestrally acquired by Acme Plywood & Veneer Co.,
Inc., on October 29, 1962, from Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, both members of the Dumagat tribe and as such are
cultural minorities;

4. That the constitution of the Republic of the Philippines of 1935 is applicable as the sale took place on October 29,
1962;

5. That the possession of the Infiels over the land relinquished or sold to Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., dates back
before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan as the ancestors of the Infiels have possessed and occupied the land
from generation to generation until the same came into the possession of Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel;

6. That the possession of the applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., is continuous, adverse and public from 1962
to the present and tacking the possession of the Infiels who were granted from whom the applicant bought said land on
October 29, 1962, hence the possession is already considered from time immemorial.

7. That the land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 3872 granting
absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether
with the alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain;

8. That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than Forty-Five Million (P45,000,000.00) Pesos
worth of improvements, said improvements were seen by the Court during its ocular investigation of the land sought to
be registered on September 18, 1982;

9. That the ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered by the applicant was duly recognized by the
government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela, have negotiated for the donation of the townsite from
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., and this negotiation came to reality when the Board of Directors of the Acme Plywood
& Veneer Co., Inc., had donated a part of the land bought by the Company from the Infiels for the townsite of Maconacon
Isabela (Exh. 'N') on November 15, 1979, and which donation was accepted by the Municipal Government of
Maconacon, Isabela (Exh. 'N-l'), during their special session on November 22, 1979.

The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these findings except as to the applicability of the 1935 Constitution to the
matter at hand. Concerning this, he asserts that, the registration proceedings have been commenced only on July 17, 1981, or
long after the 1973 Constitution had gone into effect, the latter is the correctly applicable law; and since section 11 of its Article
XIV prohibits private corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease not to
exceed 1,000 hectares (a prohibition not found in the 1935 Constitution which was in force in 1962 when Acme purchased the
lands in question from the Infiels), it was reversible error to decree registration in favor of Acme Section 48, paragraphs (b) and
(c), of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, reads:

SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any
such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title
therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
 prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential
to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

(c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open. continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to
agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the
rights granted in subsection (b) hereof.

The Petition for Review does not dispute-indeed, in view of the quoted findings of the trial court which were cited and affirmed by
the Intermediate Appellate Court, it can no longer controvert before this Court-the fact that Mariano and Acer Infiel, from whom
Acme purchased the lands in question on October 29, 1962, are members of the national cultural minorities who had, by
themselves and through their progenitors, possessed and occupied those lands since time immemorial, or for more than the
required 30-year period and were, by reason thereof, entitled to exercise the right granted in Section 48 of the Public Land Act to
have their title judicially confirmed. Nor is there any pretension that Acme, as the successor-in-interest of the Infiels, is
disqualified to acquire and register ownership of said lands under any provisions of the 1973 Constitution other than Section 11
of its Article XIV already referred to.

Given the foregoing, the question before this Court is whether or not the title that the Infiels had transferred to Acme in 1962
could be confirmed in favor of the latter in proceedings instituted by it in 1981 when the 1973 Constitution was already in effect,
having in mind the prohibition therein against private corporations holding lands of the public domain except in lease not
exceeding 1,000 hectares.

The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at the time of institution of the registration proceedings in
1981. If they were then still part of the public domain, it must be answered in the negative. If, on the other hand, they were then
already private lands, the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or associations obviously does
not apply.

In this regard, attention has been invited to Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, et al, 1 where a similar set of facts
prevailed. In that case, Manila Electric Company, a domestic corporation more than 60% of the capital stock of which is Filipino-
owned, had purchased in 1947 two lots in Tanay, Rizal from the Piguing spouses. The lots had been possessed by the vendors
and, before them, by their predecessor-in-interest, Olimpia Ramos, since prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941. On
December 1, 1976, Meralco applied to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch, for confirmation of title to said lots. The
court, assuming that the lots were public land, dismissed the application on the ground that Meralco, a juridical person, was not
qualified to apply for registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act which allows only Filipino citizens or natural persons
to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect titles to public land. Meralco appealed, and a majority of this Court upheld the
dismissal. It was held that:

..., the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public land only upon the issuance of the certificate of title to any
Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b). Because it is still public land and the Meralco, as a juridical person, is
disqualified to apply for its registration under section 48(b), Meralco's application cannot be given due course or has to
be dismissed.

Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition makes no distinction between (on the one hand) alienable
agricultural public lands as to which no occupant has an imperfect title and (on the other hand) alienable lands of the
public domain as to which an occupant has on imperfect title subject to judicial confirmation.

Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not make any distinction or qualification. The prohibition
applies to alienable public lands as to which a Torrens title may be secured under section 48(b). The proceeding under
section 48(b) 'presupposes that the land is public' (Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L-19535, July 30, 1967, 20 SCRA
641, 644).

The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous dissent, tracing the line of cases beginning with Carino in 1909 2 thru Susi in
1925 3 down to Herico in 1980, 4 which developed, affirmed and reaffirmed the doctrine that open, exclusive and undisputed
possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of
the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private
property. That said dissent expressed what is the better — and, indeed, the correct, view-becomes evident from a consideration
of some of the principal rulings cited therein,

The main theme was given birth, so to speak, in Carino involving the Decree/Regulations of June 25, 1880 for adjustment of
royal lands wrongfully occupied by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. It was ruled that:

It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 5 attributes title to those 'who may prove' possession for the necessary time
and we do not overlook the argument that this means may prove in registration proceedings. It may be that an English
conveyancer would have recommended an application under the foregoing decree, but certainly it was not calculated to
convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had read every
word of it. The words 'may prove' (acrediten) as well or better, in view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean
when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications that registration was expected from all but none
sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made,
was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. ...

That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character because expressed in more categorical language, in Susi:
 .... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption  juris et de jure established in paragraph (b) of section
45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were
complied with, for he has been in actual and physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an
agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1984, with a right to a
certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the
grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the
Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned
by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction,
Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain
and had become private property, at least by presumption,  of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands.
Consequently, in selling the land in question of Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he
had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby
acquire any right. 6

Succeeding cases, of which only some need be mentioned, likeof Lacaste vs. Director of Lands, 7 Mesina vs. Vda. de
Sonza, 8 Manarpac vs. Cabanatuan, 9 Miguel vs. Court of Appeals 10 and Herico vs. Dar, supra, by invoking and affirming the
Susi doctrine have firmly rooted it in jurisprudence.

Herico, in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative: 11

.... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the respondent Court held to be inapplicable to the
petitioner's case, with the latter's proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by
his predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land from the mass of
public land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by free patent. ....

xxx xxx xxx

As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are complied with, the
possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity
of a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and beyond the authority of
the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect
the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength
of said patent. 12

Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public land which is of the character
and duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the State than the dictum of the statute itself 13 that
the possessor(s) "... shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title .... " No proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation
proceedings would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of
the required character and length of time; and registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already
vested. The proceedings would not originally convert the land from public to private land, but only confirm such a conversion
already affected by operation of law from the moment the required period of possession became complete. As was so well put
in Carino, "... (T)here are indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it,
ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it,
as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."

If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable
title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to
make such acquisition, there being nothing in the 1935 Constitution then in force (or, for that matter, in the 1973 Constitution
which came into effect later) prohibiting corporations from acquiring and owning private lands.

Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" land, despite immemorial possession of the Infiels and their
ancestors, until title in their favor was actually confirmed in appropriate proceedings under the Public Land Act, there can be no
serious question of Acmes right to acquire the land at the time it did, there also being nothing in the 1935 Constitution that might
be construed to prohibit corporations from purchasing or acquiring interests in public land to which the vendor had already
acquired that type of so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect" title. The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not
acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares. The purely accidental circumstance that confirmation
proceedings were brought under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution which forbids corporations from owning lands of the public
domain cannot defeat a right already vested before that law came into effect, or invalidate transactions then perfectly valid and
proper. This Court has already held, in analogous circumstances, that the Constitution cannot impair vested rights.

We hold that the said constitutional prohibition 14 has no retroactive application to the sales application of Binan
Development Co., Inc. because it had already acquired a vested right to the land applied for at the time the 1973
Constitution took effect.

That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by the new Constitution. Section 2, Article XIII of the
1935 Constitution allows private corporations to purchase public agricultural lands not exceeding one thousand and
twenty-four hectares. Petitioner' prohibition action is barred by the doctrine of vested rights in constitutional law.

xxx xxx xxx

 The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. 'A state may not impair vested rights by legislative
enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of
the State, except in a legitimate exercise of the police power'(16 C.J.S. 1177-78).

xxx xxx xxx

In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution the right of the corporation to
purchase the land in question had become fixed and established and was no longer open to doubt or controversy.

Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for the issuance of a patent had the effect of segregating
the said land from the public domain. The corporation's right to obtain a patent for the land is protected by law. It cannot
be deprived of that right without due process (Director of Lands vs. CA, 123 Phil. 919).<äre||anº•1àw>  15

The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by Acme in its own name must be regarded as simply
another accidental circumstance, productive of a defect hardly more than procedural and in nowise affecting the substance and
merits of the right of ownership sought to be confirmed in said proceedings, there being no doubt of Acme's entitlement to the
land. As it is unquestionable that in the light of the undisputed facts, the Infiels, under either the 1935 or the 1973 Constitution,
could have had title in themselves confirmed and registered, only a rigid subservience to the letter of the law would deny the
same benefit to their lawful successor-in-interest by valid conveyance which violates no constitutional mandate.

The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that the majority ruling in Meralco must be reconsidered and
no longer deemed to be binding precedent. The correct rule, as enunciated in the line of cases already referred to, is that
alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and
exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under The Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property
by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure. Following that rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land
subject of this appeal was already private property at the time it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a
registrable title, there being at the time no prohibition against said corporation's holding or owning private land. The objection
that, as a juridical person, Acme is not qualified to apply for judicial confirmation of title under section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
is technical, rather than substantial and, again, finds its answer in the dissent in Meralco:

6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the Public Land Act allows only
citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title would be impractical and would
just give rise to multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was a technical error not having filed the application for
registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors, still it is conceded that there is no
prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco and neither is there any prohibition against the
application being refiled with retroactive effect in the name of the original owners and vendors (as such natural persons)
with the end result of their application being granted, because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation
of law and the conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor. It should not be necessary to go through all the
rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such applications in their names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets
when the Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now. (See Francisco vs. City of Davao)

The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for confirmation as amended to
conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to
apply for formal confirmation of the title that they had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public
Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to
hold and own private lands) and granting the applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and
sold or exchanged.

There is also nothing to prevent Acme from reconveying the lands to the Infiels and the latter from themselves applying for
confirmation of title and, after issuance of the certificate/s of title in their names, deeding the lands back to Acme. But this would
be merely indulging in empty charades, whereas the same result is more efficaciously and speedily obtained, with no prejudice to
anyone, by a liberal application of the rule on amendment to conform to the evidence suggested in the dissent in Meralco.

While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of comparatively recent vintage, in a real sense, it breaks no precedent,
but only reaffirms and re-established, as it were, doctrines the soundness of which has passed the test of searching examination
and inquiry in many past cases. Indeed, it is worth noting that the majority opinion, as well as the concurring opinions of Chief
Justice Fernando and Justice Abad Santos, in Meralco  rested chiefly on the proposition that the petitioner therein, a juridical
person, was disqualified from applying for confirmation of an imperfect title to public land under Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act. Reference to the 1973 Constitution and its Article XIV, Section 11, was only tangential limited to a brief paragraph in the
main opinion, and may, in that context, be considered as essentially obiter. Meralco, in short, decided no constitutional question.

WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court, the same is hereby
affirmed, without costs in this instance.

SO ORDERED

4. Chavez v PEA and AMARI, GR No. 133250

Facts: On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked
PEA "to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to develop, improve, acquire, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands."
On the same date, then President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the "lands reclaimed in the foreshore and
offshore of the Manila Bay" under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).

     On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, granting and transferring to PEA "the parcels of
land so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) containing a total area of one million nine
hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred ninety four (1,915,894) square meters." Subsequently, on April 9, 1988, the Register of Deeds of the
Municipality of Parañaque issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA, covering the three reclaimed
islands known as the "Freedom Islands" located at the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Parañaque City.

     PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without public bidding. On April 28, 1995, the Board of Directors of PEA, in its
Resolution No. 1245, confirmed the JVA. On June 8, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos, through then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres,
approved the JVA. 

     The Senate Committees reported the results of their investigation in Senate Committee Report No. 560 dated September 16, 1997. Among
the conclusions of their report are: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain which
the government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of title covering the
Freedom Islands are thus void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal.

     On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential Administrative Order No. 365 creating a Legal Task Force to
conduct a study on the legality of the JVA in view of Senate Committee Report No. 560. The members of the Legal Task Force were the
Secretary of Justice, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, and the Government Corporate Counsel. The Legal Task Force upheld the legality
of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions reached by the Senate Committees. 

     On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez ("Petitioner" for brevity) as a taxpayer, filed the instant Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for
the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Petitioner contends the government stands to lose billions of
pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the
JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II, and Section 7, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of the people to information on matters of
public concern. 

     Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the President, petitioner now prays that on "constitutional and statutory grounds
the renegotiated contract be declared null and void."

Issue: The issues raised by petitioner, PEA and AMARI are as follows:

     1. Whether the reliefs prayed for are moot and academic because of subsequent events; 
     2. Whether the petition should be dismissed for failing to observe the principle of governing the heirarchy of courts; 
     3. Whether the petition should be dismissed for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies;
     4. Whether petitioner has locus standi;
     5. Whether the constitutional right to information includes information on on-going neogtiations BEFORE a final agreement;
     6. Whether the stipulations in the amended joint venture agreement for the transfer to AMARI of certain lands, reclaimed and still to be
reclaimed violate the 1987 Constitution; and
     7. Whether the Court has jurisdiction over the issue whether the amended JVA is grossly disadvantageous to the government

Held: 1. We rule that the signing and of the Amended JVA by PEA and AMARI and its approval by the President cannot operate to moot the
petition and divest the Court of its jurisdiction. 

     PEA and AMARI have still to implement the Amended JVA. The prayer to enjoin the signing of the Amended JVA on constitutional grounds
necessarily includes preventing its implementation if in the meantime PEA and AMARI have signed one in violation of the Constitution.
Petitioner's principal basis in assailing the renegotiation of the JVA is its violation of the Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution, which prohibits
the government from alienating lands of the public domain to private corporations. The Amended JVA is not an ordinary commercial contract
but one which seeks to transfer title and ownership to 367.5 hectares of reclaimed lands and submerged areas of Manila Bay to a single private
corporation. 

     Also, the instant petition is a case of first impression being a wholly government owned corporation performing public as well as proprietary
functions. All previous decisions of the Court involving Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, or its counterpart provision in the 1973
Constitution, covered agricultural lands sold to private corporations which acquired the lands from private parties. 

     Lastly, there is a need to resolve immediately the constitutional issue raised in this petition because of the possible transfer at any time by
PEA to AMARI of title and ownership to portions of the reclaimed lands. Under the Amended JVA, PEA is obligated to transfer to AMARI the
latter's seventy percent proportionate share in the reclaimed areas as the reclamation progresses, The Amended JVA even allows AMARI to
mortgage at any time the entire reclaimed area to raise financing for the reclamation project. 

     2. The instant case, however, raises constitutional issues of transcendental importance to the public. The Court can resolve this case
without determining any factual issue related to the case. Also, the instant case is a petition for mandamus which falls under the original
jurisdiction of the Court under Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution. We resolve to exercise primary jurisdiction over the instant case.

     3. PEA was under a positive legal duty to disclose to the public the terms and conditions for the sale of its lands. The law obligated PEA
make this public disclosure even without demand from petitioner or from anyone. PEA failed to make this public disclosure because the original
JVA, like the Amended JVA, was the result of a negotiated contract, not of a public bidding. Considering that PEA had an affirmative statutory
duty to make the public disclosure, and was even in breach of this legal duty, petitioner had the right to seek direct judicial intervention.

     The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when the issue involved is a purely legal or constitutional question.
The principal issue in the instant case is the capacity of AMARI to acquire lands held by PEA in view of the constitutional ban prohibiting the
alienation of lands of the public domain to private corporations. We rule that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not
apply in the instant case.

     The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayer's suit because the petition seeks to compel PEA to comply with its constitutional duties.
There are two constitutional issues involved here. First is the right of citizens to information on matters of public concern. Second is the
application of a constitutional provision intended to insure the equitable distribution of alienable lands of the public domain among Filipino
Citizens. 
The thrust of the second issue is to prevent PEA from alienating hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the public domain in violation of the
Constitution, compelling PEA to comply with a constitutional duty to the nation. 
     4. Ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate and prosecute actions questioning the validity of acts or orders of government agencies or
instrumentalities, if the issues raised are of 'paramount public interest,' and if they 'immediately affect the social, economic and moral well being
of the people.'

     We rule that since the instant petition, brought by a citizen, involves the enforcement of constitutional rights — to information and to the
equitable diffusion of natural resources — matters of transcendental public importance, the petitioner has the requisite locus standi.

     5. The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public interest reinforces the people's right to information on matters of
public concern. This State policy is expressed in Section 28, Article II of the Constitution, thus: “Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by
law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest." 

     Contrary to AMARI's contention, the commissioners of the 1986 Constitutional Commission understood that the right to information
"contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction." Certainly, a consummated contract is not a
requirement for the exercise of the right to information. Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if no contract is consummated, and if
one is consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose its defects.

     Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the contract, which may be grossly disadvantageous to the
government or even illegal, becomes a fait accompli. 

     However, the right to information does not compel PEA to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like relating to the renegotiation of the
JVA. 34 The right only affords access to records, documents and papers, which means the opportunity to inspect and copy them. One who
exercises the right must copy the records, documents and papers at his expense. The exercise of the right is also subject to reasonable
regulations to protect the integrity of the public records and to minimize disruption to government operations, like rules specifying when and
how to conduct the inspection and copying. 

     6. Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889 defined property of public dominion as follows:
"Art. 339.    Property of public dominion is — 
     1.    That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, riverbanks, shores,
roadsteads, and that of a similar character;
     2.    That belonging exclusively to the State which, without being of general public use, is employed in some public service, or in the
development of the national wealth, such as walls, fortresses, and other works for the defense of the territory, and mines, until granted to
private individuals.

     Property devoted to public use referred to property open for use by the public. In contrast, property devoted to public service referred to
property used for some specific public service and open only to those authorized to use the property.Property of public dominion referred not
only to property devoted to public use, but also to property not so used but employed to develop the national wealth. This class of property
constituted property of public dominion although employed for some economic or commercial activity to increase the national wealth.

     "Art. 341.    Property of public dominion, when no longer devoted to public use or to the defense of the territory, shall become a part of the
private property of the State." This provision, however, was not self-executing. The legislature, or the executive department pursuant to law,
must declare the property no longer needed for public use or territorial defense before the government could lease or alienate the property to
private parties. 

     Act No. 2874 of the Philippine Legislature

     Sec. 55.    Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither timber nor mineral land, shall be classified as suitable for residential
purposes or for commercial, industrial, or other productive purposes other than agricultural purposes, and shall be open to disposition or
concession, shall be disposed of under the provisions of this chapter, and not otherwise.

     The rationale behind this State policy is obvious. Government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy public lands for non-agricultural purposes
retain their inherent potential as areas for public service. This is the reason the government prohibited the sale, and only allowed the lease, of
these lands to private parties. The State always reserved these lands for some future public service.

     However, government reclaimed and marshy lands, although subject to classification as disposable public agricultural lands, could only be
leased and not sold to private parties because of Act No. 2874.

     The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution banning private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable
land of the public domain. Like the 1973 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows private corporations to hold alienable lands of the public
domain only through lease. As in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the general law governing the lease to private corporations of reclaimed,
foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the public domain is still CA No. 141.

     Without the constitutional ban, individuals who already acquired the maximum area of alienable lands of the public domain could easily set
up corporations to acquire more alienable public lands. An individual could own as many corporations as his means would allow him. An
individual could even hide his ownership of a corporation by putting his nominees as stockholders of the corporation. The corporation is a
convenient vehicle to circumvent the constitutional limitation on acquisition by individuals of alienable lands of the public domain.

     PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino's actual issuance of a special patent covering the Freedom Islands, is equivalent to an official
proclamation classifying the Freedom Islands as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. Being neither timber, mineral, nor national
park lands, the reclaimed Freedom Islands necessarily fall under the classification of agricultural lands of the public domain. Under the 1987
Constitution, agricultural lands of the public domain are the only natural resources that the State may alienate to qualified private parties. All
other natural resources, such as the seas or bays, are "waters . . . owned by the State" forming part of the public domain, and are inalienable
pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

     In short, DENR is vested with the power to authorize the reclamation of areas under water, while PEA is vested with the power to undertake
the physical reclamation of areas under water whether directly or through private contractors. DENR is also empowered to classify lands of the
public domain into alienable or disposable lands subject to the approval of the President. On the other hand, PEA is tasked to develop, sell or
lease the reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain.

     Clearly, the mere physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore or submerged areas does not make the reclaimed lands alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA. Likewise, the mere transfer by the National Government of lands of
the public domain to PEA does not make the lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA.

     There is no express authority under either PD No. 1085 or EO No. 525 for PEA to sell its reclaimed lands. PD No. 1085 merely transferred
"ownership and administration" of lands reclaimed from Manila Bay to PEA, while EO No. 525 declared that lands reclaimed by PEA "shall
belong to or be owned by PEA." PEA's charter, however, expressly tasks PEA "to develop, improve, acquire, administer, deal in, subdivide,
dispose, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands . . .  owned, managed, controlled and/or operated by the government." 87 (Emphasis
supplied) There is, therefore, legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its lands, whether patrimonial or alienable lands of the public domain.
PEA may sell to private parties its patrimonial properties in accordance with the PEA charter free from constitutional limitations. The
constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain does not apply to the sale of PEA's patrimonial
lands.

     Moreover, under Section 79 of PD No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code, the government is required to sell
valuable government property through public bidding. Section 79 of PD No. 1445 mandates that:... "In the event that the public auction fails, the
property may be sold at a private sale at such price as may be fixed by the same committee or body concerned and approved by the
Commission." 

    However, the original JVA dated April 25, 1995 covered not only the Freedom Islands and the additional 250 hectares still to be reclaimed, it
also granted an option to AMARI to reclaim another 350 hectares. The original JVA, a negotiated contract, enlarged the reclamation area to
750 hectares. The failure of public bidding on December 10, 1991, involving only 407.84 hectares, is not a valid justification for a negotiated
sale of 750 hectares, almost double the area publicly auctioned. 

    Jurisprudence holding that upon the grant of the patent or issuance of the certificate of title the alienable land of the public domain
automatically becomes private land cannot apply to government units and entities like PEA. 
 
     The grant of legislative authority to sell public lands in accordance with Section 60 of CA No. 141 does not automatically convert alienable
lands of the public domain into private or patrimonial lands. The alienable lands of the public domain must be transferred to qualified private
parties, or to government entities not tasked to dispose of public lands, before these lands can become private or patrimonial lands. Otherwise,
the constitutional ban will become illusory if Congress can declare lands of the public domain as private or patrimonial lands in the hands of a
government agency tasked to dispose of public lands. 

     To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the
constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. This scheme can even be applied to
alienable agricultural lands of the public domain since PEA can "acquire . . . any and all kinds of lands." 

     The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are
alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to
private corporations. 

     7. Considering that the Amended JVA is null and void ab initio, there is no necessity to rule on this last issue. Besides, the Court is not the
trier of facts, and this last issue involves a determination of factual matters.

     WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Public Estates Authority and Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation are
PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from implementing the Amended Joint Venture Agreement which is hereby declared NULL and VOID ab
initio.