MANU/SC/0043/1987

Equivalent Citation: AIR1987SC 1242, JT1987(2)SC 76, 1987-100-LW1102, 1987(1)SC ALE700, (1987)2SC C 555, [1987]2SC R805, 1987(2)UJ162

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 638 of 1980
Decided On: 08.04.1987
Appellants: Ram Sarup Gupta (Dead) by Lrs.
Vs.
Respondent: Bishun Narain Inter College and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
K.N. Singh and Sabyasachi Mukherjee, JJ.
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: S.N. Kacker, G.C. Mathur and C.P. Lal, Advs
For Respondents/Defendant: U.R. Lalit, K.K. Gupta, P.H. Parekh and P.K. Manohar,
Advs. and Soli J. Sorabjee, Adv. for Respondent Nos. 10 to 16
Case Note:
Civil - licence - Section 60 of Easement Act, 1882 - appellant granted
license to school in respect of building and land attached to it - sought
revocation of license and eviction - facts revealed that additional buildings
constructed and expenses incurred on repairs of existing building - no
record to show that he retained right to revoke license nor raised any
objection on new constructions - person who granted license to another to
build on his land in furtherance of purpose for which he was granted license
cannot turn around later on to revoke license - held, appellant had no right
to revoke license.
JUDGMENT
K.N. Singh, J.
1. This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the High Court of
Allahabad dated 18th February, 1978 dismissing the appeal preferred by the appellant
against the judgment and decree of the Additional Civil Judge, Lucknow, dismissing
the suit instituted by him for possession of the property in dispute.
2 . The property in dispute situate at Nawal Kishore Road, Lucknow, consists of
buildings and land which have been in the occupation of the Bishun Narain School. In
1938, certain public spirited persons of Lucknow city formed a society registered as
the Progressive Education Society for establishing educational institution for
imparting education. Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava who owned considerable property, in
the Lucknow city, was elected Chairman of the Society. He permitted the society to
run an English Middle School on rent in his building which stood on the site in
dispute, the school was commonly known as the "Narhi Middle School". The school
was not recognised by the Education Department of the Government as it had no
endowment and no building of its own. After protected correspondence with the
authorities of the Education Department Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava president of the

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 Society by his letter dated November 26, 1941 (Exhibit C-B-6) informed the Inspector
of Schools Lucknow that he has given away the premises occupied by the school free
of rent which may be considered his permanent contribution to the cause of the
school. In pursuance to the declaration made by Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava the
Education Department of the State Government recognised the institution. The
members of the Committee of Management felt obliged to the Raja for his charitable
disposition in donating the building to the school, accordingly, they unanimously
passed a resolution expressing their gratitude to the Raja and they further resolved to
change the name of the institution as the "Bishun Narain Anglo Vernacular School" to
perpetuate the memory of late Bishun Narain Bhargava, the father of Raja Ram Kumar
Bhargava. This meeting was presided over by Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava himself as
the President of the Society. Thereafter Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava did not realise rent
from the school and he allowed the school to occupy the building and the open land
attached to it for the use of the school. With the passage of time the school
progressed, it was raised to the status of a High School and then to the status of an
Intermediate College which was also named after Bishun Narain Bhargava.
Subsequently, the primary section of the institution was separated from the College
section and it was given the name as "Bishun Narain Basic School" This school has
been occupying the property in dispute, however, the school and the college both
were managed by committee of management of which Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava
continued to be the President till 1961 and thereafter his wife Rani Lila Bhargava
became the President, which office she continued to occupy since then. As there was
considerable increase in the number of students, the institution felt short of
accommodation. To meet the need for additional accommodation, the management
made permanent constructions on the open land attached to the main building, to
provide three class rooms and other facilities including bathroom to the students
without any objection by the Raja or any of his family members.
3 . It appears that Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava had taken considerable amount of
money as loan from Central Bank of India and to secure the loan he executed a
mortgage deed, on March 27, 1957 mortgaging a number of properties including the
property in dispute occupied by the school, in favour of the Central Bank of India.
The loan, however, could not be repaid. Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava offered to sell the
mortgaged property and on negotiations, the Bank agreed to release the property
from mortgage to enable Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava to sell the same for raising
money to pay off the loan. The Bank released the property under a written agreement
dated 27th June, 1961 and in pursuance thereof Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava along
with his three minor sons executed a Sale Deed on 27th June, 1961 transferring the
property in dispute occupied by the school along with other property to Ram Sarup
Gupta, the plaintiff-appellant. In the registered sale deed the property in dispute was
described as Portion II of ITD Block in Hazratganj, Lucknow, bearing house No. C-
43/III in the occupation of Bishun Narain High School. Ram Sarup Gupta the
appellant after purchasing the property served notice on the school and its managing
committee terminating their license and directing them to restore the possession of
the property to him within a specified period. Since the property was not restored to
him, he filed a suit for possession against Bishun Narain Inter College, members of
the committee of management of the college and the Progressive Education Society in
the court of Civil Judge, Lucknow. Subsequently under the order of the trial court the
members of the committee of the management of the Bishun Narain Basic School
were also impleaded as defendants 11 to 17. The defendants inter alia pleaded that
the Raja had donated the property in dispute to the school permanently and the
school had made permanent constructions by incurring expenses for that reason
license was irrevocable.

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 4 . On the pleading of the parties the trial court framed 8 issues and the parties
produced evidence in support of their case. The trial court recorded findings that the
property in dispute belonged to the joint family of which Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava
as Karta. Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava had donated the property in dispute to the
school, but no title passed to the school or to any of the defendants as the property
being Immovable could not be transferred except under a registered deed. In the
absence of transfer deed Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava continued to be owner and he
could transfer title in the property to the plaintiff. The defendants' plea that the civil
court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit or pass decree for possession was
negatived on the findings that under the U.P. Act III of 1947, no allotment could
validly be issued in favour of the school as there was no vacancy or likelihood of
vacancy. The trial court recorded findings that Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava had given
away the property to the school as his permanent contribution but in the absence of
registered deed the transaction amounted to a license only and since the defendants
had made permanent constructions on the premises in suit, the license was
irrevocable under Section 60(b) of the Indian Easements Act, 1882 (hereinafter
referred to as the Act). The trial court further held that Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava
himself had no power in law to revoke the license, consequently the plaintiff being
transferee from him could not acquire any better right, therefore he was not entitled
to revoke the license or to obtain possession of the property. On these findings the
trial court dismissed the suit. The appellant took the matter in appeal before the High
Court, the appeal came up for hearing before a Division Bench consisting of P.N. Jha
and K.S. Verma, JJ. There was difference of opinion between two learned Judges.
D.N. Jha, J. affirmed the findings of the trial court and opined that since license
granted to the school was irrevocable, the appellant was not entitled to any relief.
K.S. Verma, J. took a contrary view, according to him the defendants had failed to
raise requisite plea that the license granted to them was irrevocable as contemplated
by Section 60(b) of the Act and they had further failed to produce any positive
evidence to prove the terms and conditions of the license showing that the license
was irrevocable. The learned Judge held that the defendants plea that they had made
permanent constructions on the land in pursuance of the license incurring expenses,
could not be considered as the defendants had failed to plead the necessary facts in
their written statement, the evidence produced by them could not be considered. On
these findings the learned judge proposed to set aside the trial court's order and
decree the plaintiff's suit. Since there was difference of opinion the matter was
referred to a third Judge. The appeal was then heard by T.S. Misra, J. he discussed
the questions in respect of which the two judges had disagreed and by a detailed
order he concurred with the view expressed by D.N. Jha, J. as a result of which the
trial court's judgment was upheld and the appellant's suit was dismissed. The
appellant has preferred this appeal by special leave under Article 136 of the
Constitution.
5. Sh. S.N. Kacker, learned Counsel for the appellant contended that the trial court as
well as the High Court both erred in holding that the license was irrevocable under
Section 60(b) of the Indian Easement Act. He urged that the defendants had failed to
raise necessary pleadings on the question, no issue Was framed and no evidence was
produced by them. In the absence of requisite pleadings and issues it was not open
to the trial court and the High Court to make out a new case for the defendants,
holding the license irrevocable. He urged that the defendants had failed to produce
any evidence to prove the terms and conditions of the license. In order to hold the
license irrevocable, it was necessary to plead and further to prove that the defendants
had made construction, "acting upon the terms of the license". Shri Kackar further
urged that Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava being Karta of joint family, could not alienate

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 the property permanently to the detriment of the minor co-sharers. Sri. U.R. Lalit,
appearing on behalf of the defendant-respondents supported the findings recorded by
the trial court and the High Court and urged that both the courts have recorded
findings of facts on appreciation of evidence on record that the license granted by
Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava was irrevocable and that acting upon the license the
school had made construction for the purposes of running the school and the license
was irrevocable. He took us through the record to show that necessary pleadings had
been raised by the defendants and there was sufficient evidence in support of the
pleadings.
6 . The question which falls for consideration is whether the respondents in their
written statement have raised the necessary pleading that the license was irrevocable
as contemplated by Section 60(b) of the Act and, if so, is there any evidence on
record to support that plea. It is well settled that in the absence of pleading,
evidence, if any, produced by the parties cannot be considered. It is also equally
settled that no party should be permitted to travel beyond its pleading and that all
necessary and material facts should be pleaded by the party in support of the case set
up by it. The object and purpose of pleading is to enable the adversary party to know
the case it has to meet. In order to have a fair trial it is imperative that the party
should state the essential material facts so that other party may not be taken by
surprise. The pleadings however should receive a liberal construction, no pedantic
approach should be adopted to defeat justice on hair splitting technicalities.
Sometimes, pleadings are expressed in words which may not expressly make out a
case in accordance with strict interpretation of law, in such a case it is the duty of the
Court to ascertain the substance of the pleadings to determine the question. It is not
desirable to place undue emphasis on form, instead the substance of the pleadings
should be considered. Whenever the question about lack of pleading is raised the
enquiry should not be so much about the form of the pleadings, instead; the court
must find out whether in substance the parties knew the case and the issues upon
which they went to trial. Once it is found that in spite of deficiency in the pleadings
parties knew the case and they proceeded to trial on those issues by producing
evidence, in that event it would not be open to a party to raise the question of
absence of pleadings in appeal. In Bhagwati Prasad v. Shri Chandramaul [1956] 1
SCR 286 a Constitution Bench of this Court considering this question observed:
If a plea is not specifically made and yet it is covered by an issue by
implication, and the parties knew that the said plea was involved in the trial,
then the mere fact that the plea was not expressly taken in the pleadings
would not necessarily disentitle a party from relying upon if it is satisfactorily
proved by evidence. The general rule no doubt is that the relief should be
founded on pleadings made by the parties. But where the substantial matters
relating to the title of both parties to the suit are touched, though indirectly
or even obscurely in the issues, and evidence has been led about them, then
the argument that a particular matter was not expressly taken in the
pleadings would be purely formal and technical and cannot succeed in every
case. What the Court has to consider in dealing with such an objection is: did
the parties know that the matter in question was involved in the trial, and did
they lead evidence about it? If it appears that the parties did not know that
the matter was in issue at the trial and one of them has had no opportunity
to lead evidence in respect of it, that undoubtedly would be a different
matter. To allow one party to reply upon a matter in respect of which the
other party did not lead evidence and has had no opportunity to lead
evidence, would introduce considerations of prejudice, and in doing justice

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 to one party, the Court cannot do injustice to another.
7. Before we examine the pleas raised by the defendants in their written statement it
is necessary to keep in mind that the plaintiff himself stated in paragraph 4 of the
plaint that the property in dispute has been in occupation of the school as licensee
under the permission of Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava erstwhile owner of the property.
Defendant Nos. 11 to 17 in paragraph 10 to 16 of their written statement while
dealing with the question of license expressly stated that the school had made pucca
constructions and had been making various substantial additions and alterations in
the building without any objection. Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava had given away the
premises in dispute permanently to the school and they have been in occupation of
the premises for the last 20 years and during that period they have been making
substantial additions and alterations in the building including replastering, re-flooring
etc. by incurring heavy expenses. In paragraph 18 of their written statement they
pleaded that the license was coupled with a grant and in any case it was a permanent
and irrevocable license in favour of the school and the same could not be revoked by
the plaintiff. The pleadings so raised make it apparently clear that the defendants had
raised a specific plea that the license was coupled with grant, it was a permanent and
irrevocable license and in pursuance of the licence the licensee had carried out work
of permanent character incurring expenses for the advancement of the purpose for
which the license had been granted. In fact, issue numbers 4, 5 and 6 framed by the
trial court relate to the question whether license was irrevocable. The issues so
framed involved the question of irrevocability of the license under both the Clauses
(a) and (b) of the Section 60 of the Act. The plaintiff went to trial knowing fully well
that defendants claim was that the license was irrevocable, on the ground that they
had made permanent constructions and incurred expenses in pursuance of the license
granted for the purpose of school. The plaintiff knew the case he had to meet, and for
that purpose he produced Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava in evidence in support his plea
that the license was a simple license and it was not irrevocable as pleaded by the
defendants. This question has been considered in great detail by T.S. Misra, J. and
we are in agreement with the view taken by him.
8. Mr. Kacker, then contended that mere execution of work of a permanent character
and incurring expenses by the licensee is not sufficient to make the license
irrevocable instead licensee must plead and prove by positive evidence that the
licensee "acting upon the license", executed work of a permanent character and
incurred expenses in its execution. The defendants failed to raise any such plea
before the trial court that they had executed the work of permanent character and
incurred expenses "acting upon the license" and they further failed to produce any
evidence in support thereof. He urged that by making constructions and incurring
expenses a licensee could not make the license irrevocable as the law requires that
constructions, if any, and expenses incurred thereon must be shown to have been
made "acting upon the license". He placed reliance on the Privy Council decision in
Gujarat Ginning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. Ahmedabad v. Moti Lal Hirabhai Spinning
and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. Ahmedabad MANU/PR/0139/1935 and also on a decision
of this Court in Shankar Gopinath Apte v. Gangabai Hariharrao Patwardhan
MANU/SC/0499/1976 : [1977]1SCR411 . In addition to these cases he referred to a
number of High Court decisions in support of his submissions that benefit of Section
60(b) of the Act could not be granted to the respondent school. Similar grievance had
been raised by the appellant before the High Court on the ground on absence of
requisite pleadings with regard to the respondents' claim for the license being
irrevocable under Section 60(b) of the Act. The majority of the Judges of the High
Court repelled the appellants' submission on a detailed scrutiny of the pleadings. We

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 have already referred to the pleadings raised by the defendants which contain
necessary facts to sustain the pleading of the license being irrevocable under Section
60(b) of the Act. It is well settled that the pleadings need not reproduce the exact
words or expressions as contained in the statute, nor the question of law is required
to be pleaded. The substance of the respondents' pleadings clearly informed that their
case was that they had made constructions on the land acting upon the licence which
substantially met the requirement of law. Before we discuss the authorities cited by
the appellants' counsel we consider it necessary to briefly refer to the provisions of
the Act regulating the grant, revocation of license and other allied matters and also
the evidence available on record.
9 . License as defined by Section 52 of the Act means grant of permission, by a
person to the other, a right to do or continue to do, in or upon, the immovable
property of the grantor, something which would, in the absence of such right, be
unlawful. Such right does not amount to an easement or any interest in the property.
The rights so conferred is license. The grant of license may be express or implied
which can be inferred from the conduct of the grantor. Section 60 provides that a
license may be revoked by the grantor unless; (a) it is coupled with a transfer of
property and such transfer is in force; (b) the licensee, acting upon the license, has
executed a work of permanent character and incurred expenses in the execution.
Revocation of license may be express or implied. Section 62 enumerates
circumstances on the existence of which the license is deemed to be revoked. One of
such conditions contemplate that where license is granted for a specific purpose and
the purpose is attained, or abandoned, or if it becomes impracticable, the license
shall be deemed to be revoked. Section 63 and 64 deal with license's right on
revocation of the license to have a reasonable time to leave the property and remove
the goods which he may have placed on the property and the licensee is further
entitled to compensation if the license was granted for consideration and the license
was terminated without any fault of his own. These provisions indicate that a license
is revocable at the will of the grantor and the revocation may be expressed or
implied. Section 60 enumerates the conditions under which a license is irrevocable.
Firstly, the license is irrevocable if it is coupled with transfer of property and such
right is enforced and secondly, if the licensee acting upon the license executes work
of permanent character and incurs expenses in execution. Section 60 is not
exhaustive. There may be a case where the grantor of the license may enter into
agreement with the licensee making the license irrevocable, even though, none of the
two clauses as specified under Section 60 are fulfilled. Similarly, even if the two
clauses of Section 60 are fulfilled to render the license irrevocable yet it may not be
so if the parties agree to the contrary. In Muhammad Ziaul Hague v. Standard
Vacuum Oil Company, 55 Calcutta Weekly Notes 232 the Calcutta High Court held that
where a license is prima facie irrevocable either because it is coupled with a grant or
interest or because the licensee erected the work of permanent nature there is
nothing to prevent the parties from agreeing expressly or by necessary implication
that licence nevertheless shall be revocable. On the same reasoning there is nothing
to prevent the parties agreeing expressly or impliedly that the license which may not
prima facie fall within either of the two categories of license (as contemplated by
Section 60) should nevertheless be irrevocable. The same view was taken by Das, J.
(as he then was) in Dominion of India v. Sohan Lal AIR 1950 EP 40. Bombay High
Court has also taken the same view in H.F. De Souza v. Children's Education Uplift
Society MANU/MH/0163/1959 : AIR1959Bom533 . The parties may agree expressly or
impliedly that a license which is prima facie revocable not falling within either of the
two categories of license as contemplated by Section 60 of the Act shall be
irrevocable. Such agreement may be in writing or otherwise and its terms or

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 conditions may be express or implied. A license may be oral also in that case, terms,
conditions and the nature of the license, can be gathered from the purpose for which
the license is granted coupled with the conduct of the parties and the circumstances
which may have let to the grant of the license.
10. In their pleadings the defendants had invoked the protection of both the clauses
of Section 60 of the Act, firstly, they pleaded that the license was coupled with the
transfer of property inasmuch as the school had been realising rent from third parties
who were permitted to use a portion of the land. Secondly, they pleaded that the
licensee, namely, the school had executed permanent constructions and incurred
expenses in execution thereof acting on the license. The trial court as well as the
High Court both rejected the respondents' claim of license being irrevocable under
Section 60(a) of the Act. But they upheld the respondents plea of license being
irrevocable under Clause (b) of Section 60 of the Act. It is true that the pleadings
raised in the written statement of defendants did not expressly use the expression
that the school had executed work of permanent character "acting upon the license".
But reading the entire written statement one cannot escape the conclusion that the
defendants had raised the plea that Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava the grantor of the
license had granted license for running the school in the building and for using the
open land for the purpose of school and in pursuance of the license, so granted, the
school had executed work of permanent character and incurred expenses in making
the same. The defendants further pleaded that no objection had been raised by the
grantor of the license or by anyone else against the school in making the
constructions. Repeated assertions have been made in their written statement that
Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava, had granted a permanent license which was irrevocable.
Substance of the pleading was clear that defendants had raised a specific plea that
the school had in pursuance of the license executed work of permanent character and
incurred expenses in execution and that no objection was raised by the licensor
therefore the license was irrevocable. The license had been granted to the school for
the purpose of running school and imparting education to the students, the license
was not merely in respect of building alone but it was also in respect of open land
attached to the building. Additional accommodation was required to provide class
rooms for the students which was an integral part of the purpose for which the
license had been granted and the school carried out works on the open land which
was appurtenant to the main building, with the knowledge of the licensor as has been
found by the trial court and the High Court. In view of the licensor's donation of the
property to the school, and his subsequent conduct, the licensee could reasonably
entertain a belief that the licensor had permitted the construction on the land, and in
pursuance thereof, the licensee made constructions and incurred expenses. The result
is that the respondents "acting upon the license" had executed works by incurring
expenses which rendered the license irrevocable. As regard evidence we have
perused the statement of Ganga Prasad Dhayani, DW 1, Shanker Dutt, DW 2, and
Bhola, DW 3. Their testimony fully established that the school had constructed three
class rooms, latrine and urinals and incurred expenses. Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava in
his testimony claimed that the aforesaid constructions had been made by a trust
constituted by his family members, but no account books were filed in support of the
statement, although it was admitted that the trust maintained accounts on the other
hand vouchers were produced on behalf of the defendants showing that the
management had spent money for making constructions. Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava
who was examined as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff admitted in his testimony
that he continued to be the president of the school since 1938 to 1961 and thereafter
his wife has continued to be the president, it is therefore difficult to believe that he
had no knowledge of the constructions. If the license did not permit the school to

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 execute any permanent constructions, Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava would have
certainly raised objections. His conduct of acquiescence to the raising of
constructions, is eloquent enough to show that the license was irrevocable. No doubt
Raja Ram Kumar made attempts to support the plaintiff's case by saying that he had
not given the property to the school permanently but the trial court and the High
Court both have discarded his testimony and we find no good reason to take a
different view.
11. In Gujrat Ginning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. Ahmedabad v. Moti Lal Hirabhai
Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. Ahmedabad, protection of Section 60(b) of the
Act was invoked by a party who had made constructions on his own land and not on
the land of the licensor and in that factual backdrop the Privy Council held that the
expression "acting upon the license" must mean acting upon a right granted to do
upon the land of the grantor something which would be unlawful in the absence of
such right. A man does not "acting upon a license" executes works and incurs
expense upon his own property as that he can do without any one's license. These
observations do not support the appellant on the other hand they show that if a man
executes work of permanent character and incurs expense on the property of other
person under a license he may have done so "acting upon the license". In Shanker
Gopinath Apte v. Gangabhai Hariharrao Patwardhan the plaintiff had raised plea of
tenancy failing which he claimed to be in possession of the land, in part performance
of an agreement for sale. On the rejection of both the pleas the plaintiff-appellant
therein raised a further plea that he was protected under Section 60(b) of the Indian
Easements Act as he had executed works of permanent character on the land
incurring heavy expenses. This Court rejected the submissions on the ground of
absence of pleadings, issues and evidence. While rejecting the appellant's
submissions the Court observed that even assuming that the appellant had executed
work of a permanent character on the land it could not be said that he had done so
"acting upon the license" as required by Section 60(b) of the Easements Act. The
Court observed that the appellant improved the land by executing work of a
permanent character, he did so, in the belief that being a tenant he would become
statutory purchaser of the land or that the oral agreement of sale will one fine day be
implemented. The execution of the work was done either in the capacity as a tenant
or as a prospective purchaser but not as a licensee. The decision has no application
to the facts of the present case as admittedly the school was a licensee and in that
capacity it executed works of a permanent character, by incurring expenses and this
plea was raised at the initial stage before the trial court.
12. Reference was made to a number of decisions of the High Court in support of the
proposition that a license is irrevocable under Section 60(b) of the Act only if three
conditions are fulfilled, namely, (i) the licensee executed work of a permanent
character, (ii) he did so acting upon the license, and (iii) he incurred expenses in
doing so. The onus of proving these facts lie upon the licensee and in the absence of
any evidence on these questions the license could not be irrevocable under Section
60(b) of the Act. Decisions relied are Raghbir Saran v. Param Kirti Saran
MANU/UP/0111/1962 : AIR1962All444 ; Deep Chand v. Kasturi Devi
MANU/BH/0004/1975 : AIR1975Pat17 ; Karan Singh v. Budh Sen
MANU/UP/0162/1938 : AIR1938All342 ; Mohammad Ali v. Ahmad HusainAIR 1932
Oudh. 264; Babulal Choukhani v. Caltex (India) Ltd. MANU/WB/0061/1967 :
AIR1967Cal205 ; Hashmat Jahan v. Sheo Dularey MANU/OU/0068/1941; Brun Daban
Jena v. Ram Chandra Misra [1963] 29 Cut. L.T. 37; Banamali Dalbehura v. Ratnamani
D e i [1954] 20 Cut. LT 319. We do not consider it necessary to discuss these
authorities in detail as in our opinion all the three conditions as required by Section

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 60(b) of the Act have been made out to show that the license was irrevocable. The
respondents placed reliance on the decisions of Lahore High Court had Oudh High
Court in Jagat Singh and others v. District Board Amritsar AIR 1940 Lah 18 and
Thakur Prasad v. J. Thomkinson MANU/OU/0217/1927. In these decisions the Court
held that where a license was granted to a school in respect of a land, and in
pursuance thereof the licensee constructed work of permanent character on the land,
the license was irrevocable under Section 60(b) of the Indian Easements Act. In our
view the Court rightly held that where license is granted for the purpose of running
school without reserving any right to revoke the license and if the licensee erected
works of permanent nature, the grantor of license is not entitled to recover land, as
the execution of work was for the purpose of school and it falls within the expression
"acting upon the license".
13. learned Counsel for the appellant urged that in the absence of any document
containing the terms and conditions of the license, the courts below committed error
in holding that license was irrevocable. Since no written document was executed by
the parties containing the terms and conditions of the license, the terms and
conditions could be inferred from the attending circumstances and the conduct of the
parties. Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava was the President of the Society which was
running the Narhi Middle School, but it was not recognised by the Education
Department of the State of U.P. The correspondence which is on record shows that
the Education Department insisted that there should be some endowment and school
should own building and land before it could be granted recognition. Raja Ram
Kumar Bhargava gave away the disputed property donating the building and the land
in favour of school by his letter dated November 26, 1941 (Ex C-B-6) addressed to
the Inspector of Schools, Lucknow. In that letter Raja Ram Kumar stated "I have
given my building free of rent to the Narhi Middle School. I now write to inform you
that the premises at present in the occupation of the school free of rent which may be
considered my permanent contribution to the cause of the school." On the receipt of
that letter the Education Department granted recognition to the school. The
proceedings of the Managing Committee of the school held on January 6, 1942 (Ext.
B-16) show that a meeting of the Managing Committee was held on that day
president over by Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava and in that meeting the Managing
Committee expressed its deep sense of appreciation and grateful thanks to Raja Ram
Kumar Bhargava for donating the building to the school for procuring the recognition
to the school from the U.P. Government, and it further resolved to name the school
as the Bishun Narain Anglo Vernacular School to perpetuate the memory of Shri
Bishun Narain Bhargava father of Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava. These documents
clearly indicate that Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava had permanently donated the property
in dispute to the school and in lieu thereof the institution was named after his father
to perpetuate his memory. The purpose of the grant was to enable the school to carry
on its activity of imparting education to the students. The school progressed and it
required additional building, Management of the school which was headed by Raja
Ram Kumar himself, constructed additional buildings to provide for class rooms and
other amenities to the students. Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava himself never raised any
objection against the school making additional constructions on the disputed land.
These facts and circumstances point out the terms and conditions of the license, that
the school was permitted to occupy and enjoy the land permanently for the purpose
of education. In this background, it would be reasonable to infer, an implied
condition that the license was irrevocable and the school was permitted to occupy
and use the premises so long as it continued the purpose of imparting education to
the students.

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 14. The appellant's submission that Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava being Karta of joint
family could not create a permanent license in favour of the school without the
consent of other co-sharers, to the detriment of his minor sons, is devoid of any
merit. No co-sharer or member of the joint family ever raised any objection to the
donation of the property to the school by Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava nor they raised
any objection at any stage of construction of the additional buildings by the school.
There is no evidence on record to show that his three minor sons, on whose behalf
he executed sale deed on 27th June 1961 in appellant's favour were born prior to
1941. Moreover title in the property was not transferred to the school instead a
permanent license was granted, in which every member of the joint family, must have
been interested, as the school perpetuated the memory of the common ancestor Shri
Bishun Narain Bhargava father of Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava. The question of any
legal necessity did not arise and the grant of permanent license in favour of the
school could not be rendered void merely because Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava was
Karta of the joint family. No co-sharer has challenged the validity of the license, on
that ground. On the other hand they have acquiesced to it. There is thus no merit in
the appellant's contention.
1 5 . In view of the above discussion we are of the opinion that the pleadings,
evidence and the circumstances available on record, have fully established that Raja
Ram Kumar Bhargava had granted license to the school in respect of the building and
the land attached to it for the purpose of imparting education and the school in
furtherance of that purpose constructed additional buildings and it further incurred
expenses in carrying out modification and extensive repairs in the existing buildings
during the period, Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava continued to be the President of the
Managing Committee of the school. He never raised any objection to it and there is
nothing on record to show that licensor had retained right to revoke the license. If a
person allows another to build on his land in the furtherance of the purpose for which
he had granted license, subject to any agreement to the contrary cannot turn round,
later on, to revoke the license. This principle is codified is Section 60(b) of the Act.
Moreover, conduct of the parties has been such that equity will presume the existence
of a condition of the license by plain implication to show that license was perpetual
and irrevocable. That being so, Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava could not revoke the
license or evict the school and the appellant being transferee from him could not and
did not acquire any better right. The appellant therefore has no right to revoke the
license or to evict the school, so long the school continues to carry on the purpose
for which the license was granted. The trial court and the High Court have therefore
rightly dismissed the suit.
16. Before concluding, we would like to observe that the appellant purchased the
property in dispute from Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava for valuable consideration and he
continues to be the owner of the property, his desire to get the possession of the
property is quite natural but at the same time we cannot shut our eyes to the hard
reality that Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava erstwhile owner of the property had granted an
irrevocable license in favour of the school. On 27th June 1961 when Raja Ram Kumar
Bhargava executed the sale deed in appellant's favour the property in dispute was in
possession of the school under an irrevocable license. The appellant should have
known that the institution was occupying the property and it was rendering public
service in imparting education to the students and it would be difficult to get
possession, in spite of that, the appellant purchased the property. The school has
been occupying the property since 1939 and it has made permanent constructions
without any demur from any quarter, in this situation it is not possible to grant any
relief to the appellant. To evict the school may result into closure of the institution

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 and that would certainly be against public interest. Having regard to these facts and
circumstances, we gave opportunity to the parties to evolve settlement to adjust
equities without disturbing the cause of education. We regret to say that the parties
could not settle the matter, we have therefore decided the appeal on merits.
17. In view of the above discussion we do not find any merit in the appeal it is
accordingly dismissed. In the circumstances of the case parties shall bear their own
costs.

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