Nuisance Art. 694: Other Classification
Nuisance Art. 694: Other Classification
Nuisance Art. 694: Other Classification
Art. 694
A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which:
1. Injures or endangers the health or safety of others;
2. Annoys or offends the senses;
3. Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality;
4. Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or
5. Hinders or impairs the use of property
Kinds of Nuisance
1. As to the number of persons affected:
a. Public (or common) – One that affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable number of
persons although the extent of the annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal
(Suarez, 2011); and
b. Private – one which affects an individual or few persons only
2. Other classification:
a. Nuisance per se – That kind of nuisance which is always a nuisance. By its nature, it is always a
nuisance all the time under any circumstances regardless of location or surroundings;
b. Nuisance per accidens – That kind of nuisance by reason of location, surrounding or in a manner it is
conducted or managed;
c. Temporary – That kind which if properly attended does not constitute a nuisance;
d. Permanent – That kind which by nature of structure creates a permanent inconvenience;
e. Continuing – That kind which by its nature will continue to exist indefinitely unless abated;
f. Intermittent – That kind which recurs off and on and may be discontinued anytime;
g. Attractive Nuisance – One who maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances
of a character likely to attract children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent
children from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured
thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser in the premises.
ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE
One who maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract
children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or
resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a
trespasser in the premises
NOTE: The doctrine of attractive nuisance does not generally apply to bodies of water, artificial as well as natural in
the absence of some unusual condition or artificial feature other than the mere water and its location.
NOTE: Any person injured by a private nuisance may abate it by removing, or if necessary, by destroying the
thing which constitutes the nuisance, without committing a breach of the peace or doing unnecessary injury.
However, it is indispensable that the procedure for extra-judicial abatement of a public nuisance by a private
person be followed (NCC, Art. 706).
Every successive owner or possessor of property who fails or refuses to abate a nuisance in that property started
by a former owner or possessor is liable therefor in the same manner as the one who created it (NCC, Art. 696).
NOTE: An extra-judicial abatement can only be applied for if what is abated is a nuisance per se and not
nuisance per accidens.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
FACTS:
In 1975, the spouses Restituto and Pilar Calma purchased a lot, built a house and established
residence in respondent Pleasantville.
Fabian and Nenita Ong also purchased from PLEASANTVILLE a lot fronting that of the Calma
spouses and constructed their own buildings where they resided and conducted their business.
Calma complaint about the utilization of Ongs residence as a lumber yard and that a "loathsome
noise and nervous developing sound" emanating therefrom disturbed him and his family and
caused them and their son to suffer nervous tension and illness.
The Calma spouses filed a complaint for damages against the Ong spouses and
PLEASANTVILLE before the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental.
Petitioner also filed with the National Housing Authority (NHA), a complaint for "Violation of the
Provisions, Rules and Regulations of the Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective
Decree under Presidential Decree No. 957. Petitioner prayed that PLEASANTVILLE be ordered
to abate the alleged nuisance and recover damages for their medical problems purportedly
caused by the nuisance.
The COMMISSION (which had in the meantime taken over the powers of the NHA,)*rendered a
decision dismissing the complaint of the petitioner for lack of merit, but included a portion holding
PLEASANTVILLE responsible for the abatement of the alleged nuisance on the ground that it
was part of its implied warranty that its subdivision lots would be used solely and primarily for
residential purpose.
Aggrieved, PLEASANTVILLE filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction with this
Court assailing the portion of the COMMISSION's decision.
PLEASANTVILLE asserted that since the COMMISSION had found that it did not violate any
provision of P.D. No. 957, the COMMISSION exceeded its jurisdiction when it ordered
PLEASANTVILLE to prevent/abate the alleged nuisance complained of.
The Court of Appeals rendered judgment holding that the COMMISSION "acted capriciously and
in excess of its jurisdiction in imposing an obligation upon the petitioner after absolving it of the
complaint filed against it".
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied his motion. Hence, the
instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Commission gravely abuse its discretion in ruling that Ongs property
constituted a nuisance.
RULING:
Yes. The COMMISSION's conclusion that the activities being conducted and the structures in the
property of the Ongs constituted a nuisance was not supported by any evidence. The Solicitor General
himself, in his comment filed in the Court of Appeals, admits that the decision of the COMMISSION did
not make any finding of a nuisance. Apparently, on the basis of position papers, the COMMISSION
assumed the existence of the nuisance, without receiving evidence on the matter, to support its order for
the prevention or abatement of the alleged nuisance.
Moreover, the spouses Ong, were not even party to the proceedings before the COMMISSION who would
be directly affected by a decision favorable to petitioner. To declare their property or the activities being
conducted therein a nuisance, and to order prevention and abatement, without giving them an opportunity
to be heard would be in violation of their basic right to due process.
Hence, no reversible error was committed by the Court of Appeals when it nullified the assailed portion of
the COMMISSION's decision, the order granting the writ of execution, and any writ of execution issued
pursuant thereto.
But all is not lost for petitioner and his family. There is still a pending civil case instituted by petitioner. In
said proceeding the factual issues can be fully threshed out and the Ong spouses, the parties who shall
be directly affected by any adverse judgment, shall be afforded the opportunity to be heard as they had
been impleaded as defendants therein together with PLEASANTVILLE.
Iloilo Cold Storage v. Municipal Council, 24 Phil 471 (1913)
Facts:
Herein defendants allowed the petitioners to construct their ice plant but upon several
complaints by the nearby residents (smoke from the plant was very injurious to their health and
comfort), the defendant appointed a committee to investigate.
As the complaints were found true, the defendant ordered the petitioner to elevate the
smokestacks and non-compliance will lead to suspension of operation of the establishment.
Petitioner filed a complaint – that the resolution has no intervention of the court and that the
smokestacks be elevated to 100 feet they are compelled to construct is unnecessary and they
are not obliged to do it; hence, they will not do it. ---- a preliminary injunction was issued.
Issue:
- w/n the respondent has the absolute power to declare anything a nuisance. - NO
Held:
NUISANCES. — Nuisances may be divided into two classes: Nuisances per se and nuisances per
accidens. The former are recognized as nuisances under any and all circumstances. The latter are such
only because of the special circumstances and conditions surrounding them.
COST OF ABATING A NUISANCE. — A city cannot burden the property of a citizen with the cost of
abating a nuisance per accidens without a judicial hearing and judgment as to its existence.
INJUNCTION. — Injunction lies to restrain a city from proceeding with the abatement of a nuisance
per accidens before it has been judicially declared to be such.
EXPRESS AND IMPLIED POWER TO ABATE NUISANCES. — If the charter or license does not expressly
subject the business or industry to the exercise of the police power of the State, it is conceded, by the
great preponderance of authority, that such a reservation is implied to the extent that may be
reasonably necessary for the public welfare.
Fallo: order sustaining the plaintiff’s demurrer to the defendant’s answer is reversed. Record to be
returned to the court and commence trial.