Corporate Person
Corporate Person
Corporate Person
JACK M. BEERMANN
Professor of Law and Harry Elwood Warren Scholar, Boston University School of Law.
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2018] CORPORATE PERSONHOOD 33
Conkling was no longer on the legal team and his “fake news” originalist
argument was not repeated.
This is not to say that Winkler agrees with one of the standard criticisms of
the Supreme Court’s (in)famous Citizens United decision, that its recognition of
corporate personhood was radical and unprecedented. In fact, Winkler easily
debunks this view, demonstrating that beginning as long ago as 1809,
corporations have racked up an impressive record of legal victories in the
Supreme Court, beating back “broad public sentiment favoring business
regulation.”1 Many of those victories involved constitutional protections for
corporations that make sense only if corporations enjoy at least some of the
constitutional protections textually granted to “persons,” most prominently the
right enjoyed by “persons” to be free from deprivations of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law. Had corporations not been persons, or at
least recognized as a conduit for the economic activities of those persons owning
shares in them, the Lochner era’s substantive due process protections against
economic regulation would not have extended to regulation of corporations.
I agree wholeheartedly with Winkler’s observation, that contrary to the long
record of success for businesses that he documents, “[f]or most of American
history, the Supreme Court failed to protect the dispossessed and the
marginalized.”2 Because I teach and write in the civil rights area, I found
Winkler’s chapter on “Corporations, Race and Civil Rights” very interesting.
Two of the cases discussed in this chapter illustrate that the consequences of
recognizing separate corporate personhood are indeterminate, sometimes
advancing the cause of minority rights and sometimes possibly hindering that
same cause.
The first case I will discuss disregarded the corporate form and ruled in favor
of protecting the NAACP from the State of Alabama’s efforts to prevent it from
acting against racial injustice in that state.3 During the civil rights movement of
the 1950s and 1960s, Southern state governments viewed the NAACP, a non-
profit New York corporation, as a subversive organization. John Patterson,
Attorney General of Alabama in the 1950s, sued the NAACP for failing to
register as a “foreign corporation.” As part of the lawsuit, Patterson demanded
that the NAACP turn over various corporate records, including a list of its
members. The organization did not want to reveal its membership list to the State
of Alabama, fearing that its members would face legal action, harassment, or
worse at the hand of the State of Alabama and other white supremacists resisting
the NAACP’s demands for racial equality. When the Supreme Court ruled in
favor of the NAACP’s right to keep its membership list secret, it did not hold
that the NAACP itself had the freedom of association that protects membership
1 ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS: HOW AMERICAN BUSINESSES WON THEIR CIVIL
RIGHTS, at xviii (2018).
2 Id.
3 NAACP v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); see also WINKLER, supra note 1,
at 262-64.
34 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 98:32
4 People’s Pleasure Park Co., Inc. v. Rohleder, 109 Va. 439, 61 S.E. 794 (1908); see also
United and other cases would do well to read We the Corporations. I expect it
will be recognized, deservedly, as an important work in American legal history.