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Are Adolescents Less Mature Than Adults? Minors' Access to Abortion, the
Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA "Flip-Flop"

Article  in  American Psychologist · October 2009

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 1

Are Adolescents Less Mature Than Adults?

Minors’ Access to Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA “Flip-Flop”

Laurence Steinberg

Temple University

Elizabeth Cauffman

University of California, Irvine

Jennifer Woolard

Georgetown University

Sandra Graham

UCLA

Marie Banich

University of Colorado

In press, American Psychologist

The research described in this article was supported by the MacArthur Foundation Research
Network on Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice. Direct correspondence to the first
author, at the Department of Psychology, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA 19122 or via
email, at [email protected]
 2

Abstract

The American Psychological Association’s positions in two U.S. Supreme Court cases involving

adolescents have been criticized as contradictory. In Roper v. Simmons, which abolished the

Juvenile death penalty, the APA characterized adolescents as less mature than adults. In

contrast, in Hodgson v. Minnesota, which upheld adolescents’ right to seek abortion services

without involving their parents, the APA argued they were of comparable maturity to adults. In

the present article, we present evidence from a study of the intellectual and psychosocial

functioning of more than 900 individuals between the ages of 10 and 30 demonstrating that the

answer to the question of whether adolescents are as mature as adults depends on the aspect of

maturity under consideration. Adolescents demonstrate adult levels of cognitive capability

earlier than they evince adult levels of impulse control, resistance to peer pressure, and other

aspects of psychosocial maturity. We conclude that APA’s argument that adolescents possess

the necessary skills to make an informed choice about terminating a pregnancy is consistent with

the science of adolescent development, as is its argument that adolescents are less mature than

adults in ways that mitigate their criminal responsibility. We argue that the assumption held by

some jurists, politicians, advocates, and journalists that a single line can be drawn between

adolescence and adulthood for different purposes under the law is at odds with developmental

science. Psychological maturation is asynchronous across different domains of functioning,

especially during periods of dramatic and rapid change, as is the case during adolescence.

Developmental science can and should contribute to debates about the drawing of legal age

boundaries, but the application of research evidence to this sort of policy analysis cannot be done

sensibly without a careful and nuanced consideration of the particular demands placed on the

individual for “adult-like” maturity in different domains of functioning.

 3

Are Adolescents Less Mature Than Adults?

Minors’ Access to Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA “Flip-Flop”

In its landmark 2005 decision abolishing the juvenile death penalty (Roper v. Simmons,

2005), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the inherent immaturity of adolescents relative to adults

mitigated teenagers’ criminal responsibility to the extent that it barred the imposition of capital

punishment for crimes committed under the age of 18, regardless of their heinousness. Prior to

this decision, in the United States, individuals could be executed for capital crimes committed at

the age of 16 or older. By a 5-to-4 vote, the Court ruled that this age boundary should be set at

18, rather than 16.

Developmental science was front and center in the Court’s ruling, which drew

extensively on an amicus curiae brief submitted by the American Psychological Association

(2004), and was informed by a recent summary of relevant research on psychological

development during adolescence published in this journal (Steinberg & Scott, 2003). Writing for

the majority, Justice Anthony Kennedy drew attention to three specific aspects of adolescent

immaturity that diminished their criminal culpability: their underdeveloped sense of

responsibility (and difficulty controlling their impulses), their heightened vulnerability to peer

pressure, and the unformed nature of their character. As Kennedy wrote:

First, as any parent knows and as the scientific and sociological studies

respondent and his amici cite tend to confirm, “[a] lack of maturity and an

underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth more often than in

 4

adults and are more understandable among the young. These qualities often result

in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions….The second area of

difference is that juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative

influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure… The third broad

difference is that the character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an

adult. The personality traits of juveniles are more transitory, less fixed….These

differences render suspect any conclusion that a juvenile falls among the worst

offenders (Roper v. Simmons, 2005).

The position taken by APA in its brief – that adolescents are inherently less blameworthy

than adults as a consequence of their developmental immaturity – was noteworthy not only

because it proved so influential to the Court’s decision, but because it appeared, on its face, to

contradict a stance taken by APA in a previous U.S. Supreme Court case, Hodgson v. Minnesota,

which had been decided in 1990 (Hodgson v. Minnesota, 1990). In that case, which concerned a

minor’s right to obtain an abortion without parental notification, APA had argued that, because

adolescents had comparable decision-making skills to those of adults, there was no reason to

require teenagers to notify their parents before terminating a pregnancy (American Psychological

Association, 1989). Thus, in Roper, APA argued that science showed that adolescents were not

as mature as adults, whereas in Hodgson, it argued that the science showed that they were.

The apparent contradiction in these views did not go unnoticed. Justice Kennedy

explicitly asked at oral argument in Roper if the APA had “flip-flopped” between 1989 (when its

amicus brief was filed in the abortion case) and 2004 (when its brief was filed in the juvenile

death penalty case). It also was raised by those who disagreed with the Court’s decision to
 5

abolish the juvenile death penalty. Indeed, in his dissenting opinion in Roper, Justice Antonin

Scalia drew unambiguous attention to this issue:

[T]he American Psychological Association (APA), which claims in this case that

scientific evidence shows persons under 18 lack the ability to take moral

responsibility for their decisions, has previously taken precisely the opposite

position before this very Court. In its brief in Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U. S.

417 (1990), the APA found a ‘rich body of research’ showing that juveniles are

mature enough to decide whether to obtain an abortion without parental

involvement. . . .The APA brief, citing psychology treatises and studies too

numerous to list here, asserted: [B]y middle adolescence (age 14-15) young

people develop abilities similar to adults in reasoning about moral dilemmas,

understanding social rules and laws, [and] reasoning about interpersonal

relationships and interpersonal problems.

The petitioner in Roper, the State of Missouri, made a similar point in its brief:

Ultimately, Simmons wants the Court to declare that [drawing the age boundary

for purposes of death penalty eligibility at 16] is now “without penological

justification” not based on research that uniformly reaches that conclusion, but

based on inconsistent research, viewed through the lense [sic] of a stereotype that

the American Psychological Association decried in Hodgson: “[T]he assumption

that adolescents as a group are less able than adults to understand, reason and
 6

make decisions about intellectual and social dilemmas is not supported by

contemporary psychological theory and research.” (Roper, 2004).

Concerns about reconciling the scientific arguments offered in the two cases were also

raised by abortion rights advocates, but in a different context. Indeed, after the first author of this

article met with the Executive Committee of the Society for Research on Adolescence, asking for

the organization’s endorsement of the APA stance in Roper, the committee decided not to sign

on to the APA brief, fearing that the argument that adolescents were not as mature as adults (and

thus ineligible for capital punishment) would come back to haunt those who had worked so hard

to secure the abortion rights of young women. As it turns out, these worries were not unfounded.

Within two years of the Roper decision, the U.S. Supreme Court heard Ayotte v. Planned

Parenthood (2006), which, like Hodgson, concerned minors’ access to abortion without parental

involvement. Opponents of adolescents’ autonomous abortion rights had taken the Court’s

characterization of adolescent immaturity in the juvenile death penalty case and used it to argue

in favor of parental involvement requirements. Citing the Roper decision, they argued:

Parental involvement is critical to ensure not only that the adolescent’s choice is

informed, but that it is freely made and not the result of coercion or

duress….These concerns are heightened for adolescents who, as this Court has

recently observed, are more susceptible than adults to “outside pressure” and

other “negative influences,” and more likely than adults to make decisions that are

“impetuous and ill-considered” Roper v. Simmons, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 1195 (2005).
 7

It is easy to see why many criticized the APA for its apparently contradictory positions. On the

face of it, the APA position in the juvenile death penalty case was in direct opposition to the

stance it took in Hodgson. In its amicus brief arguing for adolescents’ abortion rights, for

example, APA stated:

[B]y age 14 most adolescents have developed adult-like intellectual and social

capabilities including specific abilities outlined in the law as necessary for

understanding treatment alternatives, considering risks and benefits, and giving

legally competent consent (American Psychological Association, 1989, emphasis

added).

However, in its amicus brief arguing against the juvenile death penalty, APA stated:

Given that 16- and 17-year-olds as a group are less mature developmentally than

adults, imposing capital punishment on such adolescents does not serve the

judicially recognized purposes of the sanction (American Psychological

Association, 2004, emphasis added).

APA responded to accusations that developmental psychologists were trying to have their

scientific cake and eat it too – spinning the science for the sake of youth advocacy – by pointing

out that the type of decision under consideration in Roper was not the same as that at issue in

Hodgson:
 8

We [APA] took note of the Hodgson brief in the approval process for APA’s brief

in [Roper] but concluded that the two cases were distinguishable in several

respects. [Roper] and Hodgson, while both dealing with adolescent decision-

making, involved very different legal issues and different types of decisions.

Therefore the research, which was different in each of the two cases, addressed

distinct aspects of adolescent behavior and attributes (Gilfoyle, 2005, p. 1).

There is no question that the legal issues in Hodgson and Roper differed. The abortion

rights case was a 14th Amendment case, involving the amendment’s Due Process clause. The

central question considered in Hodgson was whether the state had a compelling interest in

mandating that an adolescent seeking an abortion be required to first notify both her parents.

Several legal issues were relevant, including whether the notification requirement placed an

undue burden on adolescents (especially those whose parents were divorced or estranged) and

whether providing for a judicial hearing as an alternative to parental notification (known as a

“judicial bypass”) was acceptable, but the most relevant for the present discussion concerned the

competence of adolescents to make informed and sound health care decisions on their own. If it

could be concluded that adolescents were sufficiently competent to make an informed decision

about whether to terminate a pregnancy, the state’s interest in requiring parental notification was

rendered less compelling. Ultimately, the Court ruled that requiring parental notification was

constitutional so long as a bypass provision was part of the law.

The juvenile death penalty case was an 8th Amendment case, involving the amendment’s

Cruel and Unusual Punishments clause. A central issue in Roper was whether adolescents were

mature enough to be held to adult levels of criminal blameworthiness and, in particular, to a level
 9

of blameworthiness that potentially warranted capital punishment; if not, the juvenile death

penalty was excessively cruel. Under a bedrock principle of American criminal law, “penal

proportionality,” the punishment a guilty party receives should be in proportion to his or her

culpability for the criminal act, and certain factors are accepted as mitigating the actor’s

culpability. These mitigating factors include diminished decision-making capability (e.g.,

decision-making that is impulsive or short-sighted), exposure to coercion, and evidence of the

offender’s otherwise good character (Steinberg & Scott, 2003). As noted earlier, the Court ruled

that the inherent immaturity of adolescents, with respect to the impetuousness of their decision-

making, their susceptibility to coercion, and their unformed character, made them categorically

less blameworthy than the average criminal and therefore not eligible for a punishment that was

reserved for only the most culpable offenders.

Whether APA in fact “flip-flopped” or, worse yet, tried to have it both ways, as its critics

have contended, is an exceedingly important question, both with respect to the decisions about

where to draw legal boundaries between adolescents and adults for various purposes and with

respect to APA’s scientific credibility more generally. As some of us have written elsewhere,

“scientists’ authority to enter the policy arena rests largely on the credibility of their research

findings” (Grisso & Steinberg, 2005, p.620). If APA’s statements about the state of scientific

knowledge are seen as advocacy masquerading as research, the integrity of the Association’s

scientific mission is threatened. After all, in both Hodgson and Roper, APA took a position that

could be fairly characterized as, at the very least, friendly to youth advocates. It is crucial,

therefore, to examine the issue empirically. That is the focus of the present article.

For the past several years, as members of the MacArthur Foundation Research Network

on Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice, we have been studying age differences in
 10

many of the cognitive and psychosocial capacities that have been at issue in the Supreme Court

cases discussed above. We have been studying basic intellectual abilities, such as working

memory and verbal fluency, but also aspects of psychosocial development, including impulse

control (Steinberg, Albert, Cauffman, Banich, Graham, & Woolard, in press), future orientation

(Steinberg, Graham, O’Brien, Woolard, Cauffman, & Banich, in press), reward sensitivity

(Cauffman, Shulman, Claus, Banich, Steinberg, Graham, et al., 2008), sensation-seeking

(Steinberg, Albert, et al., in press), and susceptibility to peer influence (Steinberg & Monahan,

2007). To our knowledge, ours is the first study to include both cognitive and psychosocial

measures administered to the same sample, to include an ethnically and socioeconomically

diverse group of individuals, and to span the period from preadolescence through young

adulthood.

Based on the results of this work, some of which we summarize in the pages that follow,

we believe that APA’s seemingly contradictory positions in Hodgson and Roper are in fact quite

compatible with research on age differences in cognitive and psychosocial capacities. More

specifically, our findings, as well as those of other researchers, suggest that whereas adolescents

and adults perform comparably on cognitive tests measuring the sorts of cognitive abilities that

were referred to in the Hodgson brief – abilities that permit logical reasoning about moral, social,

and interpersonal matters – adolescents and adults are not of equal maturity with respect to the

psychosocial capacities listed by Justice Kennedy in his opinion in Roper – capacities such as

impulse control and resistance to peer influence. Not only were the legal issues different in the

two cases, but so are the circumstances surrounding abortion decisions and criminal behavior,

and therefore, the relevant dimensions along which adolescents and adults should be compared,

differ as well. Unlike adolescents’ decisions to commit crimes, which are usually rash and made
 11

in the presence of peers, adolescents’ decisions about terminating a pregnancy can be made in an

unhurried fashion and in consultation with adults.

We recognize that not all abortion decisions are deliberative, rational, and autonomous,

and that not all criminal decisions are impulsive, emotional, and influenced by others. After all,

any decision about whether to abort a pregnancy or carry it to term has an emotional component,

involves both immediate and long-term consequences, and may be influenced by the opinions of

family and friends. By the same token, adolescents’ crimes are occasionally strategic, planned in

advance, and executed alone. In general, though, when contemplating an abortion an adolescent

has time to deliberate before making a final choice and opportunity to consult with an adult

expert, whereas the circumstances leading up to the typical adolescent offense – robbing a

convenience store, for instance – are characterized by heightened emotional arousal, time

pressure, and peer influence.

For example, studies indicate that about half of all pregnant adolescents contemplating an

abortion whose parents are unaware of the situation consult with a non-parental adult other than

medical staff (e.g., a teacher, school counselor, clergy, older relative, adult friend of the family);

this figure is the same among younger (under 16) and older adolescents (Henshaw & Kost,

1992). Moreover, 35 states require all women seeking an abortion to receive some type of

counseling from the abortion provider before the procedure is performed, usually including

information about the specific procedure as well as the health risks of abortion and pregnancy

(Guttmacher Institute, 2008). Twenty-four states mandate a waiting period of at least 24 hours

between the counseling and the medical procedure (Guttmacher Institute, 2008). Thus, it does

not appear as if a high proportion of pregnant teenagers decide to terminate a pregnancy under

circumstances that are rushed or in the absence of adult advice. In contrast, studies indicate that
 12

adolescents’ crimes are more often than not impulsive and unplanned (Farrington, 2003) and

typically committed with peers (Reiss & Farrington, 1991). Thus, while some of the capabilities

relevant to both decision-making contexts no doubt overlap, the circumstances that define

“mature” behavior in each are clearly different. Resisting peer influence, thinking before making

a decision, and considering the future consequences of one’s actions are clearly more important

in criminal decision making than abortion decision making, in part because society structures the

latter context to promote consultation with adults and avoid hasty decision making.

The importance of maintaining a distinction between cognitive and psychosocial maturity

in discussions of the legal status of adolescents is supported by other research that has examined

age differences in each of these domains. Studies that have examined logical reasoning abilities

in structured situations and basic information processing skills, for instance, find no appreciable

differences between adolescents aged 16 and older and adults; any gains that take place in these

domains during adolescence occur very early in the adolescent decade, and improvements after

this age are very small (Hale, 1990; Kail, 1997; Keating, 2004; Overton, 1990). Our Network’s

earlier study of age differences in competence to stand trial, which depends on individuals’

ability to understand facts about a court proceeding and to reason with those facts in a rational

fashion, also were consistent with these findings. We found significant differences between the

competence-related abilities of adults versus adolescents who were 15 and younger, but no

differences between the abilities of adults versus adolescents who were 16 and older (Grisso et

al., 2003). This general pattern, indicating that adolescents attain adult levels of competence to

stand trial somewhere around age 15, has been reported in similar studies of decision-making

across a wide variety of domains (e.g., Grisso, 1980; Jacobs-Quadrel et al., 1993) and in many

studies of age differences in individuals’ competence to provide informed consent (Belter &
 13

Grisso, 1984; Grisso & Vierling, 1978; Gustafson & McNamara, 1987; Weithorn & Campbell,

1982).

In contrast, the literature on age differences in psychosocial characteristics such as

impulsivity, sensation-seeking, future orientation, and susceptibility to peer pressure shows

continued development well beyond middle adolescence and even into young adulthood (Scott,

Woolard, & Reppucci, 1995; Steinberg & Cauffman, 1996), although few studies have gone

much beyond adolescence (but see Cauffman & Steinberg, 2000, for an exception). Consistent

with this, and in contrast to the pattern of age differences seen in the information-processing,

logical reasoning, and informed consent literatures, studies of age differences in the sorts of risky

behavior likely to be influenced by the psychosocial factors listed above – such as reckless

driving, binge drinking, crime, and spontaneous unprotected sex – indicate that risky behavior is

significantly more common during late adolescence and early adulthood than after (Steinberg,

2007). In other words, although adolescents may demonstrate adult-like levels of maturity in

some respects by the time they reach 15 or 16, in other respects they show continued immaturity

well beyond this point in development.

The MacArthur Juvenile Capacity Study

Participants

Our study was designed to examine age differences in a variety of cognitive and

psychosocial capacities that are relevant to debates about the relative maturity of adolescents and

adults, especially as they affect judgments of criminal blameworthiness. The study employed

five data collection sites: Los Angeles; Irvine, California; Denver; Philadelphia; and Washington

DC. Data for the present study come from 935 individuals ranging in age from 10 to 30 (M =
 14

17.84). Participants were recruited via newspaper advertisements and flyers posted at

community organizations, Boy’s and Girl’s clubs, churches, community colleges, and local

places of business in neighborhoods targeted to have an average household education level of

“some college” according to 2000 U.S. Census data. Because we were interested in

characterizing the capacities of “average” adolescents and adults, we did not target individuals

on the basis of their involvement with the legal system but sought instead to survey an ethnically

and socioeconomically diverse sample of individuals in the age range of interest.

Individuals who were interested in the study were asked to call the research office listed

on the flyer. Members of the research team described the nature of the study to prospective

participants over the telephone and invited those interested to participate. Given this recruitment

strategy, it is not possible to know how many potential participants saw the advertisements, what

proportion responded, and whether those who responded are different from those who did not,

although the education level of the sample is comparable to that of the neighborhoods from

which it was drawn.

Data collection took place either at one of the participating university’s offices or at a

convenient location in the community. Before beginning, participants were provided verbal and

written explanations of the study, their confidentiality was assured, and their written consent or

assent was obtained. For participants who were under the age of 18, informed consent was

obtained from either a parent or guardian.

Procedure

Prior to data collection, all site project directors and research assistants met at one

location for several days of training. The project coordinators and research assistants conducted

on site practice protocol administrations prior to enrolling participants. Participants took part in
 15

a 2- to 2.5-hour interview that included three sets of measures: a) a series of computerized tasks

designed to assess a range of executive functions (not discussed in this report); b) a series of

questionnaires designed to measure a variety of psychosocial capacities relevant to discussions of

how adolescents should be treated by the legal system and c) tests of basic intellectual

functioning. The tasks and questionnaires were administered on a laptop computer in individual

interviews. Research assistants were present to monitor the participant’s progress, reading aloud

the instructions as each new task was presented and providing assistance as needed. To keep

participants engaged in the computer tasks, participants were told that they would receive $35 for

participating in the study and that they could obtain up to a total of $50 (or, for participants who

were under 14, an additional prize) based on their performance. In actuality, we paid all

participants ages 14-30 the full $50, and all participants ages 10-13 received $35 plus a prize

(approximately $15 in value). This strategy was used to increase the motivation to perform well

on the tasks but also to ensure that no participants were penalized for their performance. All

procedures were approved by the IRB of the university associated with the data collection site.

Measures

Of interest in the present report are the demographic measures and IQ, which were used

to ensure that the various age groups were of comparable social and intellectual background, the

measures of psychosocial capacities, and the tests of basic intellectual functioning.

Demographic variables. Participants provided information about their age, gender,

ethnicity, and highest level of education within their household. For youths 17 years of age and

younger, household education was based upon parents' level of education, as research has

indicated that parental education may be the most stable component of a family's social class

(Steinberg, Mounts, Lamborn, & Dornbusch, 1991). For participants 18 years of age and older,
 16

their own educational attainment was used to index this construct. In order to have cells with

sufficiently large and comparably sized subsamples for purposes of data analysis, age groups

were created as follows: 10-11, 12-13, 14-15, 16-17, 18-21, 22-25, and 26-30. The age groups

did not differ with respect to gender or ethnicity, but did differ, albeit modestly, with respect to

household education. Accordingly, all subsequent analyses controlled for this variable.

Demographic characteristics of the sample are presented in Table 1.

Insert Table 1 About Here

IQ. The Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI) Full-Scale IQ Two-Subtest

(FSIQ-2) (Psychological Corporation, 1999) was used to produce an estimate of general

intellectual ability based on two (Vocabulary and Matrix Reasoning) out of the four subtests.

The WASI can be administered in approximately 15 minutes and is correlated with the Wechsler

Intelligence Scale for Children (r = .81) and the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (r=.87). It has

been normed for individuals between the ages of 6 to 89 years. Because there were small but

significant differences between the age groups in mean IQ, this variable was controlled for in all

subsequent analyses.

Psychosocial Maturity. The battery of instruments contained self-report measures of five

capacities frequently mentioned in discussions about age differences in maturity and their

relevance to legal policy. Table 2 lists these measures and provides sample items from each.

Insert Table 2 About Here

 17

Three widely-used and well validated Likert-scale type instruments assessed risk

perception (the extent to which one perceives a potentially dangerous or harmful activity as

risky), sensation-seeking (the extent to which one actively seeks experiences that provide thrills),

and impulsivity (the extent to which one acts without thinking or has difficulty controlling

impulses). Risk perception was assessed using a modified version of a widely-used measure

developed by Benthin et al. (1993). The respondent is presented with 8 potentially dangerous

activities (e.g., riding in a car with a drunk driver, having unprotected sex) and asked to indicate

how risky the activity is (alpha=.82).1 Sensation seeking was assessed using a subset of 6 items

(alpha=.70) from the Sensation Seeking Scale (Zuckerman et al., 1978).2 Impulsivity was

assessed using all 18 items (alpha=.73) from three 6-item subscales of the Barratt Impulsiveness

Scale (Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995): motor impulsivity, inability to delay gratification, lack

of perseverance. All three self-report measures have been shown to be significantly correlated

with behavioral indices of their associated constructs. In our sample, scores on the impulsivity

self-report measure were significantly negatively related to the amount of time participants

waited before making their first move on a Tower of London task, and scores on the sensation-

seeking questionnaire were significantly correlated with sensation-seeking behavior in a video

driving game (Steinberg, Albert, et al., in press). Additionally, individuals who were less likely

to preceive potentially risk behaviors as risky were more likely to report engaging in high risk

behavior.Two additional psychosocial capacities, resistance to peer influence and future

orientation were assessed using new self-report measures developed for this program of work.

1
The original Benthin measure also contains an item concerning alcohol use. Our analyses indicated that including
this item in the scale’s construction adversely differentially the reliability of the scale among the younger and older
participants, most likely because the use of alcohol is risky for minors, but not for adults. As a consequence, we
dropped that item from our scale computation.
2
Many of the items on the full Zuckerman scale appear to measure impulsivity, not sensation seeking (e.g., “I often
do things on impulse.”) Because we have a separate measure of impulsivity in our battery, we used only the
Zuckerman items that clearly indexed thrill- or novelty-seeking (see Table 2).
 18

Each used a response format introduced by Harter (1982), in which respondents are presented

with two opposing statements that are both phrased in a socially acceptable fashion, asked to

indicate which best describes them, and then asked whether the descriptor is “very true” or “sort

of true.” (This format is presumed to reduce social desirability bias.) Resistance to peer

influence (Steinberg & Monahan, 2007) was assessed using a 10-item scale (alpha=.76) designed

to measure the extent to which individuals change their behavior or opinions in order to follow

the crowd. We have no data on the validity of this measure in the current sample, but we do in

analyses of data from a large study of serious juvenile offenders. There we find that the presence

of antisocial peers in one’s network is more highly correlated with one’s own criminal behavior

among individuals who report a low ability to resist peer influence on this measure than among

those who have equally antisocial peers, but score high in self-reported resistance to peer

influence (Monahan, Steinberg, & Cauffman, 2007). Studies of the neural underpinnings of

resistance to peer influence using this measure have found neurobiological differences between

same-aged individuals who vary in their resistance to peer influence in ways consistent with the

notion that higher scores on this instrument reflect better coordination of affect and thinking

(Grosbras, Jansen, Leonard, McIntosh, Osswald, Poulsen, et al., 2007; Paus, Toro, Leonard,

Lerner, Lerner, Perron, et al., 2008), a key component of psychosocial maturity in our

conceptualization of the construct. Future orientation was assessed using a 15-item scale

(alpha=.80) that measures the anticipation of future consequences, planning ahead, and thinking

about the future. The validity of this measure is supported by our finding that individuals who

score high on this scale are more likely to choose a larger delayed reward over an immediate

smaller one in a Delay Discounting task (Steinberg, Graham, et al., in press).

 19

A composite measure of psychosocial maturity was formed by reverse-scoring the

measures of impulsivity and sensation seeking, so that higher scores indicated greater maturity

(i.e., more impulse control and less thrill-seeking), standardizing all five measures, and

averaging the standardized scores. Thus, individuals who score relatively lower on the

composite characterize themselves as less likely to perceive dangerous situations as risky, more

impulsive, more thrill-seeking, more oriented to the immediate, and more susceptible to peer

influence. This is very similar to the portrait of adolescents described by Justice Kennedy in his

majority opinion in the juvenile death penalty case. A confirmatory factor analysis indicated that

the composite model fit the data well (CFI=.95, RMSEA=.075). The five indicators are

modestly, but significantly, intercorrelated (rs range from .14 to .38; average r=.26).

Cognitive Capacity. The test battery included several widely-used tests of basic

cognitive skills, including a test of resistance to interference in working memory (Thompson-

Schill, et al., 2002), a digit-span memory test, and a test of verbal fluency. The resistance to

interference in working memory task test was one in which participants saw four probe letters on

the screen and then a target. They were then asked whether the target was among the four

probes. On test trials, two of the four letters presented had appeared in the previous trial,

providing interference with recall on the present trial. An overall accuracy score was computed

by averaging the number of correct responses across all test trials. The digit-span memory test

was similar to that in the Wechsler Scales. Participants heard a series of 13 sequences of digits

(beginning with 2 digits and increasing to 8) that they were asked to recall forwards and 13

sequences that they were asked to recall backwards. A memory score was computed by

averaging the total number of forward trials and backward trials recalled correctly. Finally, a

measure of verbal fluency asked participants to generate, in one minute, as many words as
 20

possible which either began with a specific letter (3 trials) or were members of a category (e.g.,

fruits) (3 trials). A verbal fluency score was computed by averaging the number of words

generated for each of the six lists.

Because the composite consisted of only three items, it was not possible to derive a

reliable estimate of internal consistency. However, examination of intercorrelations among the

tests showed significant intercorrelations (fluency and working memory, r=.29; working memory

and digit span, r=.39; digit span and verbal fluency, r=.40). Accordingly, scores on each of the

measures were standardized, and the standard scores were averaged to create an index of general

cognitive capacity. Not surprisingly, our composite measure of general cognitive capacity is

significantly correlated with IQ (r=.46, p<.001). Unlike IQ scores, however, which are adjusted

for chronological age, the measure of cognitive capacity is not. More important, because we

control for IQ in all analyses, any observed age differences in general cognitive capacity are not

due to age differences in intelligence.

In its amicus brief in Hodgson, the APA makes reference to the “cognitive capacity” of

adolescents, and cites sources that refer to both information processing abilities (Keating, 1980)

and logical reasoning (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958) in support of its argument that adolescents are as

cognitively competent as adults. We acknowledge that our index, which tilts heavily towards

measuring how many pieces of information an individual can process or produce, does not

measure logical or moral reasoning, and as such is an incomplete measure of cognitive capacity

as conceptualized in the APA Hodgson brief. Our measure assesses cognitive ability in a highly

structured manner, and as such does not tap aspects of executive function that may be important

in novel situations. It is also important to note that our measure of general cognitive capacity

does not include tests of higher-order executive functioning, such as comparing short- versus
 21

long-term consequences, coordinating affect and cognition, or balancing risk and reward. Many

such executive functions have both cognitive and psychosocial aspects to them, however, and

given that our interest was in maintaining a distinction between general cognitive and

psychosocial capacities so as to better examine their distinct developmental timetables, it was

important not to conflate the two. (The measures of psychosocial maturity and cognitive capacity

are very modestly correlated once age is controlled, r (922)=.15, p<.001.) Although our

operationalization of general cognitive capacity is not identical to that used by APA in its

argument, however, it is very clear that the authors of the Hodgson brief were referring to

cognitive abilities and not psychosocial maturity, and that the authors of the Roper brief were

referring to psychosocial maturity and not cognitive capacity.

Results

Two Analyses of Covariance (ANCOVA) were conducted in order to examine age

patterns in psychosocial maturity and general cognitive capacity; as noted earlier, both analyses

controlled for IQ and household education.

The results of the two analyses are shown in Figures 1 and 2. Each figure presents the

age group means for the standardized composites, with a value of 1.0 added to each group’s

mean for ease of presentation (i.e., to make all values positive numbers). The analysis of age

differences in psychosocial maturity indicates a significant age effect, F(6,900)=12.577, p<.001.

As Figure 1 indicates, age differences in psychosocial maturity, as assessed in this study, do not

emerge until mid-adolescence but are present throughout late adolescence and early adulthood.

Indeed, pairwise comparisons, using a Bonferroni correction, reveal no significant differences in

psychosocial maturity among the first four age groups (10-11, 12-13, 14-15, and 16-17 years),

but significant differences between the 16-17-year-olds and those 22 and older, and between the
 22

18-21-year-olds and those 26 and older. In neither case is there a significant interaction between

age and gender, indicating that the patterns are the same among males and females.

The analysis of age differences in cognitive capacity shows a very different pattern. As

with psychosocial maturity, there is a highly significant age effect, F(6, 901)=58.246, p<.001.

However, as Figure 2 indicates, age differences in cognitive capacity are evident during the first

part of adolescence, but not after age 16 – just the opposite from that seen with respect to

psychosocial maturity. Pairwise comparisons using a Bonferroni correction indicate significant

differences in general cognitive capacity between each of the first four age groups, but no age

differences after 16.

Figure 3 presents these data in a somewhat different way. Here we show the proportion

of individuals in each age group who score at or above the mean level of the 26- to 30-year-olds

in our sample on the psychosocial and cognitive composites, graphed in the same figure. As the

figure indicates, general cognitive capacity reaches adult levels long before the process of

psychosocial maturation is complete.

Insert Figures 1, 2, and 3 About Here

Although our measure of cognitive capacity included several of the information-

processing skills noted in the APA Hodgson brief, but did not include indices of the sort of

reasoning to which APA referred, it is important to ask whether the pattern of age differences we

found on this measure resembles that observed using measures of more sophisticated cognitive

abilities of the sort believed to influence abortion decision-making. As we noted earlier, in

addition to the present study, the MacArthur Network also conducted a study of age differences

in capacities related to competence to stand trial (Grisso et al., 2003). The main instrument used

to assess these capacities is the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool – Criminal

 23

Adjudication (MacCAT-CA), a standardized interview that measures respondents’

understanding, reasoning, and appreciation of their legal situation (Poythress et al., 1999).

Although the abilities necessary for competence to stand trial are not identical to those necessary

for competent decision-making about abortion, they are conceptually similar, in that both involve

being able to understand and reason with facts, and appreciate the nature of one’s situation.

Figure 4 presents data from the present study alongside data from the Grisso et al. study

in a way comparable to that used in Figure 3 of this article, that is, in terms of the proportion of

individuals of different ages who performed at the mean level of the adults in the sample. The

Grisso et al. study included participants aged 11 to 24, drawn equally from the community and

the justice system. In order to make the appropriate comparison of these date to the present

study, we excluded the justice system subsample from the analyses (the average IQ of that

subsample was 85, substantially lower than that of the present study), categorized individuals

into chronological age groups that paralleled those used in the present study (11, 12-13, 14-15,

16-17, 18-21, and 22-24), and used the oldest group as the adult reference category. Similarly,

we re-analyzed the cognitive capacity data from the present study after dropping the 10-year-

olds, excluding individuals who were older than 24, and using 22- to 24-year-olds as the adult

reference category.

Insert Figure 4 About Here

As Figure 4 illustrates, the pattern of age differences in abilities relevant to competence

to stand trial is virtually identical to that seen with respect to general cognitive capacity as

assessed in the present study. On both indices, scores increase between age 11 and 16 and then

level off, with no improvement after this age. This gives us greater confidence that the absence

of age differences in cognitive capacity after age 16 observed in our study is not merely a
 24

function of the fact that our index only included measures of basic information-processing

abilities. Rather, our re-analysis of the Grisso et al. data support the argument that adolescents

reach adult levels of cognitive maturity several years before they reach adult levels of

psychosocial maturity.

Discussion

Developmental psychologists with expertise in adolescence are frequently called on to

provide guidance about the appropriate treatment of young people under the law and about the

proper placement of legal age boundaries between those who should be treated as adults and

those who should not. The results of the present study suggest that it is not prudent to make

sweeping statements about the relative maturity of adolescents and adults, because the answer to

the question of whether adolescents are as mature as adults depends on the aspects of maturity

under consideration. By age 16, adolescents’ general cognitive abilities are essentially

indistinguishable from those of adults, but adolescents’ psychosocial functioning, even at the age

of 18, is significantly less mature than that of individuals in their mid-20s. In this regard, it is

neither inconsistent nor disingenuous for scientists to argue that studies of psychological

development indicate that the boundary between adolescence and adulthood should be drawn at a

particular chronological age for one policy purpose and at a different one for another.

Whether and how these findings should inform decisions about adolescents’ treatment

under the law depends on the specific legal issue under consideration. To varying degrees, such

decisions rely on value judgments (e.g., about what aspects of maturity are relevant to a

particular decision, or how mature is “enough” to warrant autonomy and/or culpability), which

science alone cannot dictate. Nevertheless, the legal treatment of adolescents should at the very
 25

least be informed by the most accurate and timely scientific evidence on the nature and course of

psychological development. Based on the results of the present study, as well as previous

research, it seems reasonable to distinguish between two very different decision-making contexts

in this regard: those that allow for unhurried, logical reflection and those that do not. This

distinction is also in keeping with our emerging understanding of adolescent brain maturation,

which suggests that brain systems responsible for logical reasoning and basic information

processing mature earlier than those that undergird more advanced executive functions and the

coordination of affect and cognition necessary for psychosocial maturity (Steinberg, 2008).

When it comes to decisions that permit more deliberative, reasoned decision-making,

where emotional and social influences on judgment are minimized or can be mitigated, and

where there are consultants who can provide objective information about the costs and benefits

of alternative courses of action, adolescents are likely to be just as capable of mature decision-

making as adults, at least by the time they are 16. Three domains of decision-making that would

seem to fit into this category are medical decision-making (where health care practitioners can

provide information and encourage adolescents to think through their decisions before acting),

legal decision-making (where legal practitioners, such as defense attorneys, can play a

comparable role), and decisions about participating in research studies (where research

investigators, guided by Institutional Review Boards, can function similarly). Although adults in

these positions cannot and should not make the decision for the adolescent, they surely can take

steps to create a context in which adolescents’ decision-making competence will be maximized.

The position taken by APA in Hodgson, in favor of granting adolescents’ access to abortion

without the necessity of parental involvement, therefore seems to us to be consistent with the
 26

available scientific evidence, so long as youngsters under the age of 16 have the opportunity to

consult with other, informed adults (e.g., health care practitioners, counselors, etc.).

In contrast, in situations that elicit impulsivity, that are typically characterized by high

levels of emotional arousal or social coercion, or that do not encourage or permit consultation

with an expert who is more knowledgeable or experienced, adolescents’ decision-making, at

least until they have turned 18, is likely to be less mature than adults’. This set of circumstances

likely characterizes the commission of most crimes perpetrated by adolescents (which are usually

committed in groups and are seldom premeditated; Farrington, 2003; Zimring, 1998), and may

also be typical of other situations where adolescents are emotionally aroused, in groups, absent

adult supervision, and facing choices with apparent immediate rewards and few obvious or

immediate costs – the very conditions that are likely to undermine adolescents’ decision-making

competence (Steinberg, 2007). These conditions often prevail in situations involving the

purchase of alcohol and tobacco, driving, and other potentially health-compromising behaviors,

such as having unprotected sex. In these cases, adolescents’ relative immaturity should be

acknowledged either by imposing greater restraints on their behavior than are imposed on adults

(e.g., prohibiting the purchase of alcohol, restricting driving to certain hours of the day or certain

conditions) or by providing added protections (e.g., prohibiting capital punishment, making

condoms easily accessible). Thus, APA’s argument that adolescents should not be subject to

capital punishment owing to their impulsivity and susceptibility to peer pressure is consistent

with the results of our own research and with other scientific studies of psychosocial

development that show continued maturation of these capacities well into young adulthood

(Steinberg & Scott, 2003).

 27

In our view, then, the seemingly conflicting positions taken by APA in Roper v. Simmons

and Hodgson v. Minnesota are not contradictory. Rather, they simply emphasize different

aspects of maturity, in accordance with the differing nature of the decision-making scenarios

involved in each case. The skills and abilities necessary to make an informed decision about a

medical procedure are likely in place several years before the capacities necessary to regulate

one’s behavior under conditions of emotional arousal or coercive pressure from peers.

Science alone cannot dictate public policy, although it can, and should, inform it. Our

data can neither “prove” nor “disprove” the appropriateness of requiring parental involvement

before a teenager can obtain an abortion, but they do inform the debate. Nor do our data “prove”

or “disprove” whether it is appropriate to apply the death penalty to individuals who are

inherently more impulsive than adults and whose characters are not yet fully formed – although,

again, they are informative. But our findings do demonstrate how the positions taken by APA in

Hodgson v. Minnesota and in Roper v. Simmons are compatible with each other and consistent

with the rapidly growing body of scientific evidence indicating that intellectual maturity is

reached several years before psychosocial maturity.

Developmental science can and should contribute to debates about the drawing of legal

age boundaries, but research evidence cannot be applied to this sort of policy analysis without a

careful and nuanced consideration of the particular demands placed on the individual for “adult-

like” maturity in different domains of functioning. Jurists, politicians, advocates, and journalists

seeking a uniform answer to questions about where we should draw the line between adolescence

and adulthood for different purposes under the law need to consider the asynchronous nature of

psychological maturation, especially during periods of dramatic and rapid change across multiple

domains of functioning.
 28

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 33

Table 1: Demographic Characteristics of the Sample (N=935)

Age

10-11 12.5%

12-13 14.7%

14-15 13.8%

16-17 15.2%

18-21 15.9%

22-25 14.6%

26-30 13.2%

Gender

Male 49.2%

Female 50.8%

Ethnicity

African-American 29.2%

Asian-American 15.1%

Hispanic 21.2%

White 24.0%

Other/Biracial 9.9%

Household Education

< High School 11.9%

High School Grad 22.8%

Some College 34.1%

College Graduate 21.4%

Post-College 9.7%
 34

Table 2: Indices of Psychosocial Maturity

Construct Measure Sample Item

Risk Perception Benthin et al., 1993 “If you did this activity (e.g.,
had unprotected sex), how
much are you at risk for
something bad happening?”
Sensation Seeking Zuckerman et al., 1978 “I sometimes like to do things
that are a little frightening.”

Impulsivity Patton et al., 1995 “I do things without thinking.”

Resistance to Peer Steinberg & Monahan, 2007 “Some people think it's better
Influence to be an individual even if
people will be angry at you for
going against the crowd.

BUT

Other people think it's better to

go along with the crowd than
to make people angry at you.”
Future Orientation Steinberg, Graham, et al., in press “Some people take life one day
at a time without worrying
about the future.

BUT

Other people are always

thinking about what tomorrow
will bring.”
 35

Psychosocial Maturity
1.5
1.4
1.3
1.2
1.1
1.0
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
10-11 12-13 14-15 16-17 18-21 22-25 26-30

Age

Figure 1. Psychosocial maturity as a function of age.

 36

Cognitive Capacity
2.6
2.4
2.2
2.0
1.8
1.6
1.4
1.2
1.0
10-11 12-13 14-15 16-17 18-21 22-25 26-30

Age

Figure 2: General cognitive capacity as a function of age.

 37

% scoring at mean level of

55
26- to 30-year-old adults

45

35

25
Cognitive
15 Psychosocial

5
10-11 12-13 14-15 16-17 18-21 22-25 26-30
Age

Figure 3: Proportion of individuals in each age group scoring at or above the mean for 26- to 30-
year-olds on indices of cognitive capacity and psychosocial maturity.
 38

Cognitive

Capacity

% scoring at mean level of

60

22- to 24-year-old adults

MacCAT‐CA

50


40


30


20


10


0


11 12-13 14-15 16-17 18-21 22-24

Age

Figure 4. Proportion of individuals in each age group scoring at or above the mean for 22- to 24-
year-olds on index of cognitive capacity and on the understanding and reasoning subscales of the
MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool – Criminal Adjudication (MacCAT-CA), a measure of
abilities relevant to competence to stand trial. MacCAT-CA data from Grisso et al (2003).

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